diff --git a/bibliography/frus1981-88v24.xml b/bibliography/frus1981-88v24.xml index b70f0e5f1..f50bc6f63 100644 --- a/bibliography/frus1981-88v24.xml +++ b/bibliography/frus1981-88v24.xml @@ -7,21 +7,22 @@ North Africa Volume XXIV Chris Tudda + Kathleen B. Rasmussen - in-production + published 2024 - - + 2024 + 2024-12-06 reagan regular 1981 1988 - - + 37 + 925 diff --git a/frus-toc/frus1981-88v24-toc.xml b/frus-toc/frus1981-88v24-toc.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..00c4d9a70 --- /dev/null +++ b/frus-toc/frus1981-88v24-toc.xml @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ + +
+
+

Contents

+
+ +
diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v24.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v24.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..74a499c6d --- /dev/null +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v24.xml @@ -0,0 +1,68592 @@ + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume + XXIV, North Africa + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1981–1988 + Volume XXIV + North Africa + Chris Tudda + Kathleen B. Rasmussen + + + Department of State + Washington + 2024 + frus1981-88v24 + 1981 to 1989 + + + This publication contains 16 associated files. For page images, see the + facsimile element. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Released in 2024 as a digital edition.

+ + + + + display: inline; float: left; + display: inline; float: right; + text-decoration: underline; + vertical-align: bottom; + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1981–1988 + Volume XXIV + North Africa + + Editor: Chris Tudda + General Editor: Kathleen B. + Rasmussen + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington 2024 + Washington + 2024 + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian + Foreign Service Institute + + +
+ About the Series +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the + Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of + the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of + the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General + Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, + researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State + Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new + statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by + President George H.W. Bush on October + 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of + State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

+

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy + decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the + series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation + of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. + The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary + Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the + principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered + or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has + been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major + importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the + purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the + Foreign Relations series be published not more than + 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume + meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and + editing.

+

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published + record in the Foreign Relations series include all + records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major United States + foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. It + further requires that government + agencies, departments, and other entities of the United States Government + engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the + Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records + pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of + selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this + volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National + Archives and Records Administration.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations + between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the + files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for + 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will + eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are + declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department’s + decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems + worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the + National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification + and processing.

+

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken + through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other + agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, + some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan + Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this + volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of + publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library + include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from + White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies + including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the + Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

+

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library + record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This + project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records + Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate + the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential + libraries. Throughout the course of the + project, many, but not all records at each Presidential library were scanned. As + a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of + the Foreign Relations series were not always able to + determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the + paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some + editors of the Foreign Relations series have indicated + this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

+

Editorial Methodology

+

Within each of the five compilations in this volume, the documents are presented + chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation + are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the + date the memorandum was drafted.

+

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign + Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by + guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and + Publishing Team. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, + including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. + Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the + publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. + A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the + volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the + original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. + Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed + insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words + or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. + Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and + a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each + volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as + Secto) is printed at the start of the + text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the + nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number + of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after + declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their + chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not + declassified.

+

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the + footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

+ +

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its + original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also + provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates + whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

+

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, + provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, + describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements + that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from + memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to + supplement or explicate the official record.

+

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page + numbers.

+

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic + Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall + compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of + the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory + Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the + series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and + reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory + obligations.

+

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the + documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with + the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security + Information and applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law + and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the United States Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2017 and was completed in + 2023, resulted in the decision to withhold 11 documents in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 19 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 43 documents.

+ +

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here + provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration’s approach to North + Africa from 1981 until 1988.

+ + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + The Historian + Kathleen B. Rasmussen, + Ph.D. + + General Editor + Foreign Service Institute + +
+ + +
+ Preface +

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign + Relations series that documents the most important issues in the + foreign policy of the administration of Ronald + Reagan. This particular volume is comprised of five chapters—a + chapter documenting the United States’ approach to the region as a whole, three + chapters highlighting U.S. bilateral relations with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, + and a chapter on U.S. policy towards the disputed area of Western Sahara. + Together, these chapters illustrate the Reagan administration’s conception of the region as it related + to broader United States geopolitical goals and the administration’s attempts to + address the wide, often interrelated, range of political, economic, and + strategic challenges to the United States’ interests in the area.

+

The volume covers the administration’s bilateral and multilateral attempts to end + the conflict between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and + Río de Oro (POLISARIO) and Morocco in the + Western Sahara, and attempts by Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to + achieve Maghreb unity and contend with Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s belligerence, including brief + interludes of “union” with Libya. Coverage of the Reagan administration’s policies toward Libya convey the + administration’s concern that Libya’s support for terrorism could destabilize + Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and that these nations might opt for + loose “unions” with Libya in order to placate Qadhafi.

+

Other volumes in the Reagan subseries + document the civil war in Chad, the Arab-Israeli dispute, U.S.-Franco + cooperation in the region, hijacking and hostage-taking incidents involving + United States citizens, the Soviet Union, and the administration’s attempts to + work with the United Nations (UN) and the + Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) to end the + war in Western Sahara. For documents related to the United States’ relations + with Libya and the Reagan + administration’s attempts to reduce Libyan involvement in the Chadian civil war, + readers should consult Foreign + Relations 1981–1988, Vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For + documentation on the Middle East peace process and bilateral United States + relations with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, see Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, and Volume XVIII, Lebanon, + 1981–1984, Part 1, April 1981-August 1982, and Part 2, September 1982–March 1984. For + documentation on overall U.S. relations + with France, readers should consult Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volumes VII, Western + Europe, 1981–1984, and VIII, Western + Europe, 1985–1988. For the United States’ responses to the series of + high-profile hijackings in the Middle East or involving groups from the region, + as well as efforts to secure the release of United States and other kidnapped + foreign nationals taken in Lebanon, readers should consult Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, Volume XLVII, Counterterrorism, Part 1, 1981–May 1985, and + Part 2, June 1985–January 1989.

+

In addition, readers seeking further context for the Reagan administration’s policies in the Middle East and Africa + should consult those Foreign Relations volumes that + address other, geographically contiguous regions. Of particular relevance are + the following: Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian + Peninsula; Volumes XXV, Southern Africa, + 1981–1984, and XXVI, Southern Africa, + 1985–1988; Volume XXVII, Sub-Saharan + Africa; and Volumes XXXIV, Afghanistan, + 1981–October 1985, and XXXV, Afghanistan, + November 1985–February 1989. Readers interested in the Reagan administration’s approach to the global + energy market should see Volume XXXVI, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized + Country Cooperation, 1981–1984, and Volume XXXVII, Trade; Monetary Policy; + Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1985–1988. For the administration’s approach + to “global negotiations” and U.S. efforts to help alleviate the African famine, + readers should consult Foreign + Relations 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic + Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance, and Volume XLI, Global Issues II. For the + administration’s policy toward the United Nations, see Foreign + Relations 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues I. For documentation + about how the global Cold War competition between the United States and Soviet + Union applied to the Reagan + administration’s North African policy, readers should see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March + 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March + 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, Soviet + Union, November 1986-January 1989.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV

+

As with similar volumes in other Foreign Relations + subseries, this volume documents both the United States’ approach to the region + as a whole and its bilateral relations with individual North African countries. + The volume begins by examining the North Africa region, where, in almost all + respects, the Reagan administration + faced the same challenges as, and continued the policies of, the Jimmy Carter administration, as documented in + Foreign Relations, + 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa. In particular, the + Reagan administration weighed many issues: the threats that Qadhafi posed to U.S. security and interests, + the normalization of relations with Algeria, the divide between Mauritania and + Morocco over Western Sahara, and the conclusion of the POLISARIO’s guerilla war.

+

Documentation includes cable traffic between posts and the Department of State; + memoranda between principals, especially those from Secretaries of State + Alexander M. Haig and George P. Shultz to Reagan; and analyses from + members of the intelligence community. Together, this documentation illustrates + how the Reagan administration viewed its + long-time allies Morocco and Tunisia, and a potential new ally, Algeria; + contended with Qadhafi’s radicalism, + support for terrorism, and ever-expanding military power and ambitions; tried to + alleviate the effects of the broader African famine on Mauritania; and explored + various attempts at regional unity. Moreover, this volume documents the + Reagan administration’s perception + of U.S. interests in the region (along with adjacent areas of Africa and the + Middle East), as well as the region’s broader importance as a theater of + East-West competition in the global Cold War.

+

The volume uses chapters to cover the U.S. bilateral relationships with Algeria, + Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. While bilateral relations with these + nations were influenced to a significant extent by events elsewhere—such as the + Middle East peace process, the civil war in Lebanon, and international + terrorism, among others—strategic concerns, especially military supply issues, + dominated the respective dialogues. Memoranda of conversation involving + Secretaries of Defense Caspar + Weinberger and Frank + Carlucci, Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International + Security Affairs Francis “Bing” West + and Richard Armitage, and their Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian counterparts + illuminate the political and defense relationships between the United States and + its allies. The correspondence between, and memoranda of conversation of, + personal meetings between Reagan and + Vice President George H.W. Bush and + Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, King + Hassan II of Morocco, and Tunisian + President Habib Bourguiba reflects the + extent to which the administration valued close relationships with these + leaders. Cable traffic between embassy officials in Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis to + Washington conveyed the balance the administration needed to strike between + maintaining the United States’ traditional alliances with Morocco and Tunisia + while opening up a fruitful new relationship with Algeria—a difficult task given + that each country was important to the United States for different reasons.

+

From 1979 through 1981, Bendjedid and + members of his government had helped to mediate the resolution of the Iran + hostage crisis; Bendjedid also exhibited + a far less suspicious view of the United States than his predecessor, Houari Boumédiène. The Reagan administration wished to capitalize on this new dynamic and worked to + resolve contentious bilateral issues with Algeria, such as the continued U.S. + purchase of liquefied natural gas from Algeria, as the Algerian Government + considered the successful conclusion of these sales emblematic of the new and + improved relationship between the two countries. Tensions, however, existed over + Bendjedid’s support for the UN’s “Global Negotiations” on the international + economy, which the Reagan administration + ultimately opposed. The administration also had to balance Algeria’s support + for, and training of, Palestine Liberation Organization members with its + willingness to become a key player in Washington’s attempts to secure the + release of U.S. hostages taken both in Lebanon and during the numerous airplane + hijacking and other terrorist incidents that occurred during the 1980s.

+

Long-time allies Morocco and Tunisia offered opportunities for, and challenges + to, the Reagan administration. Both + Hassan and Bourguiba, suspicious of the + Soviet Union and concerned about Qadhafi’s adventurism, sought to maintain the strong defense + relationships that their respective countries had enjoyed with the United States + for decades. They also considered themselves leaders of the “moderate” Arab bloc + and practitioners of international diplomacy, and sought to leverage these + defense relationships with the United States to influence the Reagan administration’s policies regarding the + Middle East peace process, the civil war in Angola, and the Namibian conflict. + The relationship between the Reagan + administration and King Hassan had its ups and downs. For example, while the + 1984 “Union” between Morocco and Libya angered Washington, Hassan’s July 1986 + meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon + Peres was warmly received there. The close relationship between + the United States and Israel affected the Reagan administration’s relationship with Tunisia. Israel’s + October 1985 attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization’s headquarters in + Tunis, for example, temporarily threatened to disrupt U.S.-Tunisian relations. + Tunisia was later beset by food riots and external crises, such as Qadhafi’s expulsion of thousands of Tunisian + oil workers from Libya, which exacerbated Tunisia’s internal divisions. These + crises compelled Bourguiba to request + more economic aid from Reagan. In 1987, + Bourguiba was removed from office and + replaced by Zine Ben Ali, who quickly + assured the Reagan administration that + he wished to reinvigorate U.S.-Tunisia relations.

+

The final chapter of the volume documents U.S. policy toward Western Sahara. Like + its predecessor, the Reagan + administration tried to end the war in Western Sahara. While it worked with the + UN and OAU + to mediate an end to the conflict, it acknowledged that Algeria’s and Libya’s + material support for the POLISARIO + guerillas, Morocco’s continued use of U.S. arms in the conflict, and Morocco’s + contentious relationship with Mauritania, including charges that the latter + allowed POLISARIO + guerillas safe haven, all + complicated its efforts and prevented a settlement of the conflict. The conflict + also significantly hampered the efforts to encourage Maghreb unity explored in + the regional compilation. Reporting telegrams and intelligence memoranda show + how the divide between Algeria and Morocco and Mauritania and Morocco hampered + the conclusion of a settlement of the Western Saharan war, particularly when the + Algerian and Mauritanian governments complained that Morocco was using U.S. + military equipment against the POLISARIO.

+

Acknowledgments

+

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald + Reagan Presidential Library, especially Lisa Magana and Cate + Sewell, for facilitating research in the files of the Reagan White House and National Security + Council staff, and Simon Staats at the George H.W. + Bush Presidential Library, who copied relevant documents from the + George H.W. Bush Vice Presidential + Papers that proved crucial to the completion of this volume. Thanks are also due + to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for + arranging access to Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archives + Capture declassification project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study + of Intelligence at the CIA was accommodating in + arranging full access to CIA files, as was + Vincent Kenney, who provided access to records from the Department of Defense. + Special thanks are due to the Department of State’s Information Programs and + Services staff, in particular Ambassador Paul Hare and Kathleen Allegrone of the + Senior Foreign Service, for coordinating the review of this volume within the + Department of State. The editor also wishes to acknowledge the late Ambassador + Harmon E. Kirby, Deputy Chief of + Mission and Chargé d’Affairs in Morocco from 1984 until 1987, who, after his + retirement from the Foreign Service, coordinated the review of dozens of Foreign + Relations volumes during his years of service in the Department of State’s + Office of Information Programs and Services. The editor is also grateful to the + staff at the Records and Declassification Division, Washington Headquarters + Service, Department of Defense, for their help in declassifying some of the + documents included in this volume.

+

The Office of the Historian wishes to thank the interagency declassification + personnel who conducted the review of this volume, including those at the + Department of State, Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS), the FRUS + Coordination Team at the Central Intelligence Agency, the OSD, Records and Declassification Division (RDD) + at the Department of Defense, and the Directorate of Records, Access and + Information Security Management at the National Security Council.

+

Chris Tudda conducted the research for this volume and selected and annotated the + documentation under the supervision of Myra Burton, then Chief of the Africa and the Americas Division, and + Kristin L. Ahlberg, Assistant General Editor of the Foreign + Relations series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review + under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Team Lead of the Declassification + Coordination Team. Stephanie Eckroth and Nicole Orphanides did the copy and + technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Team Lead of the + Editing and Publishing Team. Both declassification review and technical editing + were coordinated by John Powers, Director of the Declassification Coordination, + Publishing, and Digital Initiatives Division.

+ Chris Tudda, Ph.D. + + Historian +
+ +
+ Contents + + About the Series + III + Preface + IX + Sources + XVII + Abbreviations and Terms + XXI + Persons + XXIX + North Africa Region + 1 + Algeria + 211 + Morocco + 412 + Tunisia + 589 + Western Sahara + 755 + +
+ + +
+ Sources +

Sources for Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, Vol. XXIV

+

The files at the Ronald Reagan + Presidential Library, in Simi Valley, California, are the single most important + source of documentation for those interested in North Africa during the + Reagan administration. In + particular, the White House Staff and Office Files Collections were a vital + source for this volume. Of these collections, the most important files were the + Executive Secretariat, National Security Council (NSC) Files, including the Country File for Africa, the Agency File, + which contains memoranda from Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George + Shultz, and the Head of State File; and the files of the Near + East and South Asia Affairs NSC Directorate. + Another important collection is the George + Shultz Papers, a rich repository of key memoranda of conversation + between Shultz and Heads of State, + Foreign Ministers, and other leading political figures, as well as the Evening + Reports and other memoranda Shultz + provided to Reagan.

+

The Vice Presidential Records housed at the George + H.W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas, contain + records crucial to documenting the Reagan administration’s North African policies. As Vice + President, Bush traveled to, and met + with, the leaders of every country in the region except for Mauritania. + Particularly useful for this volume were the files of Donald Gregg, Bush’s Assistant for National Security Affairs.

+

It would be impossible to document the Reagan administration’s North African policies without examining + the records of the Departments of State and Defense, as Haig, Shultz, Secretaries of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Frank + Carlucci, and their subordinates exerted considerable influence + over the development of U.S. policies toward the region. The Department of State + Central Foreign Policy File and institutional lot files are invaluable. The lot + file containing the records of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam’s Official Files contains his + personal notes of meetings for which official minutes were not found elsewhere. + The lot file containing the records of L. Paul + Bremer II, Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, holds key + documentation on the discussion of terrorism. The lot files containing the + records of the Department of State’s Nodis and Exdis Telegrams, 1985–1988, have + invaluable telegrams between the Department and various posts. The Central + Foreign Policy File, consisting of D, P, and N reels, replaced the pre-1973 paper + subject-numeric file. The D and N reels contain + the cable traffic between + Washington and posts and, for the purposes of this particular volume, provide + additional background information concerning key concepts and events. The P (Paper) reels consist of microfilmed versions of + memoranda of conversation, letters, briefing papers, airgrams, and memoranda to + principals. The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College + Park, Maryland, will eventually include the Central Foreign Policy File as part + of Record Group 59 (RG 59).

+

The Department of Defense records contain important memoranda of conversation and + other records that document Weinberger’s, and his subordinates’––in particular Assistant + Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis “Bing” West and his successor, + Richard “Dick” Armitage––discussions with regional leaders, during which they + sought to augment the defense relationship between the United States and Morocco + and Tunisia. The editor also examined records at the Central Intelligence + Agency.

+

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the + preparation of this volume. In addition to the paper files cited below, a + growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the + Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and + encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

+

Unpublished Sources

+

Department of State

+

Lot Files

+ + Lot 12D215: Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State Central + Foreign Policy Files, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams + Lot 85D251: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Files + Lot 85D308: Deputy Secretary Dam’s + Official Files + Lot 87D431: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of + Assistant Secretary of State Richard + Murphy, 1985 + Lot 89D94: Executive Secretariat, Papers of George Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982–1989 + Lot 89D149: Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy + Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files + Lot 89D155: Executive Secretariat, 1987 Official Office Files of the + Secretary handled by Under Secretary Allen + Wallis + Lot 89D283: Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The + Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism + Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, 1 January 1984–21 January 1989 Sensitive + and Super Sensitive Documents + Lot 93D490: Office of Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Under Secretary’s + Official Economic Summit Files, 1975–1981 + + Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption + Documents: Not for the System Documents 1979–1989 + Lot 94D92: Executive Secretariat, 1985 Nodis Memoranda + Lot 94D93: Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Memoranda + Lot 94D432: Executive Secretariat, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda + Lot 94D433: Executive Secretariat, 1988 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda + Lot 94D552: Executive Secretariat, 1988 Nodis Telegrams + Lot 95D23: Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams + Lot 95D25: Executive Secretariat, 1985 Nodis Telegrams + Lot 95D26: Executive Secretariat, 1987 Nodis Telegrams + Lot 2015D608: Executive Secretariat, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The + Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism + + + INR/IL Historical Files + NEA/CIA/INR Meetings + + +

Ronald Reagan + Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

+

White House Staff and Office Files

+ + Crisis Management Center, National Security Council + Elaine L. Morton Files + + Executive Secretariat, National Security Council + Agency File + Subject File + Country File + Head of State File + National Security Decision Directives + + Near East and South Asian Directorate, National Security Council + William J. Burns + Files + Burns/Ross Subject Files + Jock Covey Files + Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files + + Personal Papers + Frank Carlucci + Papers + George Shultz + Papers + + President’s Daily Diary + +

George H. W. Bush + Presidential Library

+

Vice Presidential Records

+ + Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files + Vice Presidential Daily Files + +

Central Intelligence Agency

+ + National Intelligence Council + Job 90T00155R + + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence + Job 83M00035R + Job 83M00914R + Job 89B00224R + + +

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division

+ + Alexander Haig Papers + + +

Washington National Records Center, Suitland Maryland

+ + RG 330, Records of the Office of the + Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–83–0104: 1981 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense + FRC 330–85–0023: 1983 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense + FRC 330–86–0004: 1984 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense + FRC 330–86–0048: 1984 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–87–0007: 1985 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense + FRC 330–87–0008: 1985 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–88–0039: 1986 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense + FRC 330–88–0040: 1986 Official + Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–88–0058: 1985 Official + Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–90–0080: 1988 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense + + +

Published Sources

+

Documentary Collections

+ + Brinkley, Douglas, ed. The Reagan Diaries. New York: Harper Collins, + 2009. + New York Times. + U.S. Department of State. Bulletin, 1981–1988. + Washington: Government Printing Office. + U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981–1988. + Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982–1989. + _______. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United + States: Ronald W. Reagan, + 1981–1988. Washington: Government Printing Office, + 1982–1991. + +

Electronic Sources

+ + Ronald Reagan Presidential + Foundation and Library. http://www.reaganfoundation.org + +
+ +
+ Abbreviations and Terms + + ABC, American + Broadcasting Company + AF, Bureau of African + Affairs, Department of State + AF/AFN, Office of + Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of + State + AF/C, Office of + Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of + State + AF/E, Office of East + African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State + AF/I, Office of + Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State + AF/RA, Office of + Regional Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State + AF/W, Office of West + African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State + AFB, air force + base + AFP, + Agence France-Presse + AID, Agency for + International Development + AID/AA/ANE, + Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Agency for + International Development + AID/NENA, Office + of North Eastern/North African Affairs, Agency for International + Development + AID/PPC, Bureau + for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International + Development + AID/PPC/PPB, + Office of Planning and Budget, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, + Agency for International Development + AFL–CIO, American + Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations + AL, Arab League + AMB, + ambassador + AMH, Alexander M. Haig + ANO, Abu Nidal Organization + APU, Arab + Parliamentary Union + ARA, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + ASAP, as soon as + possible + ASD, Assistant + Secretary of Defense + ASD/ISA, Assistant + Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + ASST, + assistant + ATA, Anti-Terrorism + Assistance + AWACS, Airborne + Warning and Control System aircraft + + + C, Confidential; Office + of the Counselor, Department of State + CAR, Central African + Republic + CBU, Cluster Bomb + Unit + CDA, Camp David + Agreements + CHEROKEE, + communications channel between the Secretary of State and the + Ambassador + CIA, Central + Intelligence Agency + CINCUSAFE, + Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Europe + CINCUSAREUR, + Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe + CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, + Europe + CMSN, + Comité Militaire de Salut National (Committee for + National Salvation), Mauritania + Codel, + Congressional Delegation + Col., Colonel + COM, Chief of + Mission + COMIDEASTFOR, Commander, Middle East Forces, United States + Navy + COMSIXTHFLT, + Commander, Sixth Fleet, United States Navy + + CPD, Capability + Production Document + CPPG, Crisis + Pre-Planning Group + CPR, Chief of + Protocol, Office of the Secretary of State + CT, + counter-terrorism + CVBG, carrier battle + group + CW, chemical + weapons + C–130, turboprop + military transport and tactical airlifter aircraft + + + D, Democrat; Office of + the Deputy Secretary of State + DAO, Defense + Attaché’s Office + DAS, Deputy Assistant + Secretary of State + DATT, defense + attaché + DCI, Director of + Central Intelligence + DCM, Deputy Chief of + Mission, United States Embassy + DDCI, Deputy + Director of Central Intelligence + DEA, Drug Enforcement + Administration + DEB, Defense + Estimative Brief + DefMin, Defense + Minister + Del, delegate; + delegation + DEPSECDEF, + Deputy Secretary of Defense + DIA, Defense + Intelligence Agency + DIAAPPR, Defense + Intelligence Agency Appraisal + DOC, Department of + Commerce + DOD, Department of + Defense + DOD/ISA, Office of + the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + DOE, Department of + Energy + DOJ, Department of + Justice + DOLS, dollars + DSAA, Defense + Security Assistance Agency + + + EB, Bureau of Economic + and Business Affairs, Department of State + EB/IEP, Office of + International Energy Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State + EC, Economic + Commission; European Community + ECONCOUNS, + economic counselor + EID, Eid al-Fitr, + Muslim Feast of Breaking the Fast marking the end of Ramadan + EMBOFF, Embassy + officer + ESF, Economic Support + Fund + EST, Eastern Standard + Time; Emergency Support Team + EUCOM, United + States European Command + EUR, Bureau of + European Affairs (later European and Canadian Affairs), Department of + State + EUR/EE, Office of + Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (later European and + Canadian Affairs), Department of State + EUR/EEY, Office of + Eastern European and Yugoslavia Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (later + European and Canadian Affairs), Department of State + EUR/WE, Office of + Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (later European and + Canadian Affairs), Department of State + Ex gratia, + voluntarily, or without recognizing any liability or legal obligation + EXDIS, exclusive + distribution (indicates extremely limited dissemination) + + + FAR, + Forces Armées Royales (Moroccan Armed Forces) + FBI, Federal Bureau + of Investigation + FBIS, Foreign + Broadcast Information Service + + FLN, + Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria) + FMS, Foreign Military + Sales + FMSCR, Foreign + Military Sales Credit + FOB, Free or Freight + on Board + FonMin, Foreign + Minister + FOSIF, Fleet Ocean + Surveillance Information Facility + FRC, Federal Records + Center + FRG, Federal Republic + of Germany + FROLINAT, + Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (National + Liberation Front of Chad) + FY, fiscal year + FYI, for your + information + F–15, twin-engine + tactical fighter aircraft + + + GA, General Assembly, + United Nations + GB, George Bush + GIRM, Government of + the Islamic Republic of Mauritania + GK, Geoffrey Kemp + GLCM, + ground-launched cruise missile + GMT, Greenwich Mean + Time + GOA, Government of + Algeria + GOI, Government of + Iran; Government of Israel + GOM, Government of + Morocco + GON, Government of + Niger + GOT, Government of + Tunisia + GPS, George P. Shultz + GRH, + Gramm-Rudman-Hollings + GSOMIA, General + Security of Military Information Agreement + GUNT, + Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition or + Transitional Government of National Unity (Chad) + + + H, Bureau of + Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State + HFAC, House Foreign + Affairs Committee + HIM, His Imperial + Majesty + HMG, Her Majesty’s + Government + HQ, + headquarters + HQUSAFE, + Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces + Africa + HRF, Hostage or + Hostile Rescue Force + HT, Howard Teicher + + + ICJ, International + Court of Justice + ICRC, International + Committee of the Red Cross + IEEPA, + International Emergency Economic Powers Act + IG, Interdepartmental + Group + IIM, Interagency + Intelligence Memorandum + IMET, International + Military Education and Training, Department of Defense + IMF, International + Monetary Fund + INR, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/AA, Office of + Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of + State + INR/AR/GIS, + Office of Assessments of Research, Global Issue Staff, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/C, Office of + Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of + State + INR/IL, Office of + Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of + State + + INR/INC/IC, + Office of Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + INR/IRE/CGC, + Collection Guidance Center, Office of Intelligence Resources, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/NESA, Office + of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State + INR/PMA, Office of + Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department + of State + INR/PMA/RF, + Regional Forces Division, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/RCRS, Reports + Coordination and Review Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + IntSum, + intelligence summary + IO, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IO/UNA, Washington + Office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IO/UNP, Office of + UN Political Affairs, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + ISA, Bureau of + International Security Affairs, Department of Defense + ISA/NESA, Office + of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Bureau of International Security + Affairs, Department of Defense + IVP, International + Visitors Program + + + JANA, Libyan News + Agency + JCS, Joint Chiefs of + Staff + JCW, John C. Whitehead + JEC, Joint Economic + Commission + JMC, Joint Military + Commission + JP, John Poindexter + + + KIA, killed in + action + KU, Kuwait + Airways + + + L, Office of the Legal + Adviser, Department of State + L/AF, Office of + African Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State + L/EBC, Office of + Economic, Business, and Communications Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, + Department of State + L/NEA, Office of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, + Department of State + L/PM, Office of + Political-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of + State + LIMDIS, limited + distribution + LITF, Libya + Interagency Task Force + LNG, liquid natural + gas + LPB, L. Paul Bremer; + Libyan People’s Bureau + LTF, Libya Task + Force + + + M–60, main battle + tank of the United States Army + M/CT, Office of + Counter-Terrorism, Department of State + MA, Michael Armacost + MAP, Military + Assistance Program + MAU, Marine + Amphibious Unit + MDS, + Mouvement Démocratique et Social (Democratic and + Social Movement), Morocco + MFA, Ministry of + Foreign Affairs + MILAN, light + anti-tank infantry missile + + MILATT, military + attaché + MMBTU, one million + British thermal units + MNF, Multinational + Force (Lebanon) + MOD, Ministry of + Defense + MPLA, + Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular + Movement for the Liberation of Angola) + MTI, + Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (Movement of + Islamic Tendency), Morocco + MTT, Military + Training Team + MUSLO, + Morocco-United States Liaison Office + + + NAM, Non-Aligned + Movement + NATO, North Atlantic + Treaty Organization + NB, + Nota Bene, note the matter at hand + NDCP, National + Disclosure Policy Committee, Department of Defense + NEA, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/AFN, Office of + North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + NEA/ARN, Office of + Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/ECON, Office + of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + NEA/EGY, Office of + Egyptian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department + of State + NEA/MEN, Office of + Middle East Negotiations, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + NIACT, night action + (indicator of precedence level in a telegraphed message) + NIE, National + Intelligence Estimate + NM, nautical + miles + NOCONTRACT, no + dissemination to contractors + NODIS, no + distribution + NOFORN, no foreign + dissemination + NOTAL, not all + (telegram A, referenced in telegram B, was not sent to all the recipients of + telegram B) + NSC, National + Security Council + NSDD, National + Security Decision Directive + NSSD, National + Security Study Directive + + + OAU, Organization of + African Unity + OFC, office + OIC, Organization of + Islamic Countries + OMB, Office of + Management and Budget + ORCON, Originator + Controlled + ORIG, + original + OSD, Office of the + Secretary of Defense + OV–10, turboprop + light attack, forward air control, and observation aircraft + OVP, Office of the + Vice President + OVP/NSA, Office of + the Vice President, National Security Advisor + + + P, Office of the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State; + President + PanAm, Pan American + World Airways + PCLS, People’s + Committee for Libyan Students + PDRY, People’s + Democratic Republic of Yemen + PERMREP, + Permanent Representative + + PFLP, Popular Front + for the Liberation of Palestine + PKF, OAU Peacekeeping Force + PL/P.L., Public + Law + P.L. 480, Public + Law 480; Food for Peace + PLF, Palestine + Liberation Front + PLO, Palestine + Liberation Organization + PM, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Prime Minister + PM/ISP, Office of + International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + PM/P, Office of + Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of + State + PM/SAS, Office of + Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + PNC, Palestine + National Congress + POLAD, political + advisor + POLISARIO, + Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de + Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de + Oro) + POLOFF, Political + Officer + POLTO, Series + indicator for telegrams sent from the Under Secretary for Political Affairs + while on travel + PRG, Policy Review + Group + PriMin, Prime + Minister + + + QTE, quote + + + R, Republican + RCM, Robert C. McFarlane + RDF, Rapid Deployment + Force + RDJTF, Rapid + Deployment Joint Task Force + REF, reference + REFTEL, reference + telegram + REP, + representative + RESO, + resolution + RG, Record Group, + National Archives and Records Administration + RP, Bureau of Refugee + Programs, Department of State + RPT, repeat + RR, Ronald Reagan + RVA, Richard V. Allen + + + S, Secret; Office of + the Secretary of State + S/CPR, Chief of + Protocol, Office of the Secretary of State + S/CT, Office of the + Ambassador-At Large for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State + S/P, Policy Planning + Staff, (Policy Planning Council during the mid-1980s), Department of + State + S/S, Executive + Secretariat, Department of State + S/S-I, Information + Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State + S/S-O, Operations + Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State + S/S-S, Secretariat + Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State + SADR/SDAR, + Sahrawi (Saharan) Arab Democratic Republic/Sahrawi (Saharan) Democratic Arab + Republic + SAG, Saudi Arabian + Government + SAM–6/8, Soviet + mobile surface-to-air missile systems + SARG, Syrian Arab + Revolutionary Government + SecDef, Secretary + of Defense + + Secto, Series + indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State (used for telegrams + from the Secretary or his party while he is on travel) + SecGen, Secretary + General, United Nations + SEPTEL, separate + telegram + SF, Special + Forces + SIG or S/IG, Senior + Interdepartmental Group + SPECAT, special + category (message requiring special handling) + SSG, Special + Situation Group + STADIS, State + Distribution Only + SYG, Secretary + General + + + T, Bureau of Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology, Department of State + TAP, + Tunis Afrique Presse + TIWG, Terrorist + Incident Working Group + TOPOL, Series + indicator for telegrams sent to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs + while on travel + TOR, terms of + reference + Tosec, Series + indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State or his party while on + travel + TOW, wire-guided + anti-tank missile + TOW night + sights, wire-guided anti-tank missiles with night + vision + TWA, Trans World + Airlines + + + U, unclassified + UAE, United Arab + Emirates + UGTT, + Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (General Union + of Tunisian Workers) + UK, United + Kingdom + UN, United + Nations + UNESCO, United + Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization + UNGA, United Nations + General Assembly + UNHCR, United + Nations High Commission on Refugees + UNITA, União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola + (National Union for the Total Independence for Angola) + UNQTE, + unquote + UNSC, United Nations + Security Council + UNSCR, United + Nations Security Council Resolution + UNSYG, United + Nations Secretary General + UNTT, + Union Nationale de Travailleurs Tunisiens (National + Union of Tunisian Workers) + U.S./US, United + States + USAF, United States + Air Force + USASAC, United + States Army Security Assistance Command + USCENTCOM, + United States Central Command + USCINCEUR, + United States Commander in Chief, European Command + USCINCSOUTH, + United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command + USDAO, United + States Defense Attaché’s Office + USDOC, United + States Department of Commerce + USDOCOSOUTH, + United States Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe + USG, United States + Government + USIA, United States + Information Agency + USIS, United States + Information Service + USN, United States + Navy + USNMR SHAPE, + United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied + Powers in Europe + USSR, Union of + Soviet Socialist Republics + USUN, United States + Mission to the United Nations + + + + VADM, Vice + Admiral + V/R, Very + Respectfully + VIP, very important + person + VIZ., namely or that + is to say + VOA, Voice of + America + VP/V.P., Vice + President + + + WPC, William P. + Clark + + + Z, Zulu time (Greenwich + Mean Time) + +
+ +
+ Persons + + Abbas, Abu (Muhammad + Zaidan), founder of the Palestine Liberation Front, + 1977; mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking, + 1985 + Abdelghani, + Mohamed, Algerian Prime Minister from March 8, 1979, + until January 22, 1984 + Abramowitz, + Morton, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985, until 1986; Assistant + Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, from 1986 until + 1989 + Al-Sabah, Jaber + Al-Ahmad, Emir of Kuwait from 1977 + Allen, Richard V. + “Dick”, President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982 + Anderson, G. + Norman, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, + from 1982 until 1986; U.S. Ambassador to Sudan from August 12, 1986, until + October 24, 1989 + Arafat, + Yassir, Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization + Armacost, Michael + H., UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs from + May 18, 1984 until March 2, 1989 + Armitage, Richard “Rich” or + “Dick,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, from June 5, 1983, + until June 5, 1989 + Assad (Asad), Hafez + al-, President of Syria from March 14, 1971 + + + Babamine, Cheikh Sid Ahmed + Ould, Mauritanian Foreign Minister from December 12, + 1984 + Baccouche, + Hédi, Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs, 1987; + Tunisian Prime Minister from November 7, 1987, until September 27, + 1989 + Baker, Howard, + Senator (R-Tennessee) until 1985; Senator Majority Leader from January 3, + 1981, until January 3, 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 27, + 1987, until July 3, 1988 + Baker, James A., + III, White House Chief of Staff from January 20, 1981, + until February 3, 1985; Secretary of the Treasury from February 4, 1985, + until August 17, 1988 + Baldrige, Malcolm H. + “Mac,” Secretary of Commerce from January 1981 until + July 25, 1987 + Baly, + Slaheddine, Tunisian Minister Defense from 1980 until + 1988 + Bargach, + M’hamed, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from + 1986 until 1989 + Basri, Driss, + Moroccan Minister of the Interior from 1979 + Begin, + Menachem, Israeli Prime Minister from June 21, 1977, + until October 10, 1983 + Belkheir, + Larbi, General and Head of the Algerian High Council for + Security and Senior Adviser to President Bendjedid + Beloucif, + Mostafa, Algerian Defense Secretary General + Ben Ali, Zine El + Abdine, Tunisian Prime Minister from October 2, + 1987, until November 7, 1987; President of Tunisia from November 7, + 1987 + Ben Yahia, + Habib, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States from + 1981 until August 1988; Tunisian Deputy Foreign Minister from August + 1988 + Bendjedid, + Chadli, President of Algeria from February 9, + 1979 + Bengelloun, + Ali, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from 1977 + until 1984 + Benouniche, + Saadeddine, Director of Algeria, Ministry of Foreign + Affairs + Bensouda, + Ahmed, Counselor-Advisor to King Hassan II of Morocco + Berrada, + Mohamed, Moroccan Minister of Finance from 1986 + Bessaih, + Boualem, Algerian Minster of Foreign Affairs from 1988 + until 1989 + Bishop, James + K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African + Affairs from 1981 until 1987 + Biwott, + Nicholas, Kenyan Minister of State from 1979 until + 1982 + Block, John + R., Secretary of Agriculture from January 23, 1981, + until February 14, 1986 + + Bneijara, Sid Ahmed + Ould, Mauritanian Prime Minister from December 12, + 1980, until April 25, 1981 + Bongo Ondimba, El Hadj + Omar, President of Gabon from 1967 + Borg, Parker, + Director of the Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, + Department of State, from 1979 until 1981; U.S. Ambassador to Mali from + September 18, 1981, until July 8, 1984; Deputy Director of the Office of + Combating Terrorism, Department of State, from 1984 until 1986 + Bosworth, + Stephen, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from March 27, 1979, + until June 22, 1981 + Bouabid, + Matti, Moroccan Prime Minister from March 22, 1979, until + November 30, 1983 + Boucetta, + Mohamed, Moroccan Foreign Minister from 1977 until + 1983 + Boumédiène, + Houari, President of Algeria from 1965 until 1978 + Bourguiba, + Habib, President of Tunisia from 1957 until November 7, + 1987 + Boverie, + Richard, Major General, USA; Principal Deputy Assistant + Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from June 1981 until + June 1982 + Bremer, L. Paul “Jerry” + III, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from + February 2, 1981, until March 27, 1983; Ambassador to the Netherlands from + August 31, 1983, until August 25, 1986; Ambassador at Large for + Counterterrorism from October 16, 1986, until May 25, 1989 + Bruce, Robert, + Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, + Department of State + Burkhalter, + E.A., Jr., Rear Admiral, USN; + Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency + Burleigh, A. + Peter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1987 until 1989 + Burns, William + J., Special Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, + National Security Council, from 1986 until 1988 + Bush, George + H.W., Vice President of the United States from January + 20, 1981, until January 20, 1989 + + + Carlucci, Frank Charles, + III, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from + 1978 until February 4, 1981; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, + 1981, until December 31, 1982; Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs from December 2, 1986, until November 23, 1987; Secretary + of Defense from November 23, 1987, until January 20, 1989 + Carter, James Earl + “Jimmy,” President of the United States from January + 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981 + Casey, Mary + Ann, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, from 1981 + until 1984; Deputy Director, Office for Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, + Department of State, from 1984 until 1986; Director of North African + Affairs, Department of State, from 1986 until 1989 + Casey, William J. + “Bill,” Director of Central Intelligence from January + 28, 1981, until May 6, 1987 + Chain, John T. + “Jack,” General, USAF; + Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, United States Air + Force, from 1981 until 1982; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, + United States Air Force, from 1982 until 1984; Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1984 until 1985; + Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, from 1986 + Cherkaoui, + Mohamed, Moroccan Foreign Ministry State + Secretary + Cheysson, + Claude, French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981 + until 1984 + Chirac, + Jacques, French Prime Minister from March 20, 1986, + until May 10, 1988 + Christopher, + Warren, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977 + until January 20, 1981 + Clark, William P. “Bill,” + Jr. or “Judge,” Deputy Secretary of State from + February 25, 1981, until February 9, 1982; Assistant to the President for + National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982, until October 17, + 1983 + + Clarke, + Walter, Director, Office of Coordination, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + Cohen, Herman + J., Principal Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State from 1980 until 1984; Special + Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa, National Security + Council, from 1987 until 1989 + Coon, + Carleton, Director, Office of North Africa, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1981 + Courtemanche, + Jack, Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of + Staff to the First Lady from February 1986 until January 20, 1989 + Covey, James P. + “Jock,” Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, + from 1982 until 1984 + Crocker, + Chester, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African + Affairs, Department of State, from 1981 until 1989 + Curran, Robert + “Tad,” Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, + from 1981 until 1984 + Cutler, + Walter, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from March 2, 1982, until + January 2, 1984 + + + Daddah, Abdallah + Ould, Mauritanian Ambassador to the United States from + 1980 until 1983 + Dam, Kenneth + W., Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, + until June 15, 1985 + Darman, Richard + “Dick,” Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to + the Chief of Staff from January 1981 until August 1981; Assistant to the + President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff from September 1981 until + February 1, 1985; Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 until + 1987 + De Marenches, + Alexandre, Head of French Intelligence from 1970 until + 1981 + Deaver, Michael K. + “Mike,” White House Deputy Chief of Staff from + January 20 1981, until May 1985 + Diallo, Issa, + Senior Deputy to United Nations Secretary General Javier Pérez de + Cuellar + Diouf, Abdou, + President of Senegal from 1981; Chairman of the Organization of African + Unity from July 18, 1985, until July 28, 1986 + Djerejian, + Edward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1986 until 1988 + Dlimi, Ahmed, + Chief of Moroccan Security Services until 1983 + Dobriansky, + Paula, Member, Office of Political Affairs, National + Security Council, from 1981 until 1982; Deputy Director in the European and + Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1983 until + 1987 + Dos Santos, José + Eduardo, President of Angola from 1979 + Draper, + Morris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, until 1983 + Duberstein, Kenneth + “Ken,” Deputy White House Chief of Staff from + February 27, 1987, until July 1, 1988; White House Chief of Staff from July + 1, 1988, until January 20, 1989 + Duke, Angier, + U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from December 20, 1979, until February 28, + 1981 + Dur, Philip + A., member, National Security Council Staff from 1982 + until 1984; Deputy Director of NSC + Political-Military Affairs Directorate from 1983 until 1984; Director of + NSC Political-Military Affairs + Directorate, 1984 + + + Eagleburger, Lawrence S. + “Larry,” Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs from May 14, 1981, until January 26, 1982; Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982, until May 1, 1984 + Eanes, António + Ramalho, President of Portugal until 1986 + Eastham, Alan, + Special Assistant for Near East and South Asia, Office of the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, from 1987 until 1988 + Eckert, William + “Bill,” Military Assistant to the Vice President from + 1981 until 1984 + + Edwards, James + B., Secretary of Energy from January 23, 1981, until + November 5, 1982 + Eisenhower, Dwight + D., President of the United States from January 20, + 1953, until January 20, 1961 + Essebsi, Beji + Caid, Tunisian Foreign Minister from April 15, 1981, + until September 15, 1986 + + + Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al + Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia from 1975 until + 1982; King of Saudi Arabia from 1982 + Feldman, + Harvey, Alternative U.S. Ambassador to the United + Nations from 1981 until 1986 + Filali, + Abdellatif, Moroccan Foreign Minister from 1985 + Flaten, + Robert, Director of the Office of North African Affairs, + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from + 1981 until 1982 + Fortier, + Donald, Deputy Director for Policy, Department of State, + from 1981 until 1982; Director for Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council, from + September 1982 until June 1983; Senior Director for Political-Military + Affairs and Special Assistant to the President from June 1983 until December + 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President from December 1983 until December + 1985; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from + December 10, 1985, until spring 1986 + Fraga Iribarne, + Manuel, President of the People’s Alliance/People’s + Party (Spain) + Fuller, Craig, + Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs from September 14, 1981, + until December 31, 1984; Chief of Staff to the Vice President from 1985 + until 1988 + + + Genscher, + Hans-Dietrich, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of + the Federal Republic of Germany + Gnehm, Edward, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Near East and South Asia + Goldberg, Sherwood + “Woody,” Special Advisor to the Secretary of State + from 1981 until 1982 + González Márquez, + Felipe, Spanish Prime Minister from 1982 + Gorbachev, Mikhail + S., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the + Communist Party, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, from 1985 + Green, Grant, + Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and + Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1986 until + 1987 + Gregg, Donald + “Don,” member, National Security Council Staff until + from 1979 until July 1982; Vice President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs from August 1982 to January 1989 + Gromyko, + Andrei, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, until + 1985 + Guédira, Ahmed + Reda, Royal Counselor-Advisor to King Hassan II of Morocco + + + Habib, Philip, + President’s Special Envoy to the Middle East from 1981 until 1983 + Habré, + Hissène, President of Chad from June 7, 1982 + Haidalla(h), Mohamed Khouna + Ould, President of Mauritania from January 4, 1980, + until December 12, 1984 + Haig, Alexander M., + Jr., Secretary of State from January 22, 1981, until + July 5, 1982 + Hassan II, + King of Morocco from 1961 + Hawes, John, + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from 1985 + until 1987; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, from 1987 until + 1989 + Hedda, Ali, + Tunisian Ambassador to the United States + Helm, Robert, + Director of Defense Programs, National Security Council, from 1982 until + 1984 + Hill, M. + Charles, Executive Secretary of the Department of State + from March 28, 1983, until January 1, 1985; Executive Aide to Secretary of + State Shultz from 1985 until + 1989 + Hodel, Donald + P., Secretary of Energy, November 5, 1982, until + February 7, 1985 + + Holmes, H. + Allen, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs from July 19, 1985, to April 13, 1986; Assistant Secretary of State + for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from April 14, 1985, to + August 8, 1989 + Hussein bin + Tal, King of Jordan from 1953 + + + Ibrahimi, + Ahmed, Algerian Foreign Minister from 1982 until + 1988 + Iklé, Fred + C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2, + 1981, until January 17, 1988 + + + Jallud, + Abdelassalam, Deputy Chairman of the Libyan + Revolutionary Command Council + Jobert, + Michel, Minister of Foreign Trade of France from 1981 until + 1983 + John Paul II (Karol Jozef + Wojtyla), Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church and + Sovereign of Vatican City + Johnson, + Susan, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs + Johnstone, L. + Craig, U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from September 9, + 1985, until July 10, 1988 + Jones, David + C., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June + 1982 + Jorio, Maati, + Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from 1984 until 1985 + + + Kampelman, + Max, Counselor, Department of State, from 1987 until + 1989 + Kaunda, + Kenneth, President of Zambia; Chairman of the + Organization of African Unity from July 27, 1987, until May 25, 1988 + Keel, Alton + G., member, National Security Council Staff; Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Kemp, + Geoffrey, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian + Affairs, National Security Council + Kerroum, + Nuruddin, Algerian Foreign Secretary + Khashoggi, + Adnan, Saudi businessman involved with Iran-Contra + affair + Khediri, + El-Hadi, Algerian Minister of Interior + Khellef, + Abdelaziz, Commerce Minister and Special Emissary of + Algeria + Kimmitt, Robert M. + “Bob,” member, National Security Council Staff, + until 1983; Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from 1983 until + 1985 + Kirby, Harmon + E., Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affairs, U.S. + Embassy in Morocco, from 1984 until 1987 + Kirkpatrick, Jeane + J., U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from February + 4, 1981, until April 1, 1985 + Klibi, Chedli, + Secretary General of the Arab League from 1979 + Kohl, Helmut, + Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 until 1988; Chancellor + of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1982 + Korn, David, Chargé + d’Affaires + ad interim, U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, from July + 1982 until July 1985 + + + Lakehal-Ayat, Medjedoub + (Madjdoub), Algerian Central Director of Military + Security + Lamrani, Mohammed + Karim, Moroccan Prime Minister from November 30, 1983, + until September 30, 1986 + Lantos, Tom, + Congressman (D-California) and member of the House Foreign Relations + Committee + Larijani, + Mohammad-Javad, Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign + Affairs + Ledsky, + Nelson, Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning, + Department of State, from 1985 until 1986 + Levitsky, + Melvyn, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from + 1987 until 1989 + Lilac, Robert, + member, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983 + + + + Mabrouk, Hedi, + Tunisian Foreign Minister from 1986 until 1987 + Mack, David, + Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, from 1979 until 1982; + Director, Office of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near + East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from 1982 until + 1985 + Malek, Redha, + Algerian Ambassador to the United States; one of the main negotiators during + the U.S. hostage crisis in 1980 + Mauroy, + Pierre, French Prime Minister from 1981 until 1984 + McDaniel, + Rodney, Special Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs from March 1985 until January 1986; Executive Secretary of + the National Security Council from January 29, 1986, until 1987 + McElhany, + Samuel, Director, Executive Secretariat, Information + Management Section, Department of State + McFarlane, Robert C. + “Bud,” Counselor to the Department of State from + February 28, 1981, until April 4, 1982; Deputy Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs from 1982 until 1983; Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs from October 17, 1983, until + December 4, 1985 + McKinley, + Brunson, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of + State, from 1983 to 1986 + McMahon, John + N., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence + Agency; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1982 until 1986 + McManaway, Clayton E., + Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of + State, 1981 until September 1983 + McNeil, Francis + J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1983 until February + 1987 + Meese, Edwin “Ed,” + III, Counselor to the President from January 1981 + until January 1985; Attorney General of the United States from February 1985 + until August 1988 + Menarchik, + Douglas, Military Advisor to Vice President Bush + Mengistu, Haile + Miriam, Chairman of the Derg and Head of State of + Ethiopia until 1987 + Mestiri, + Mahmoud, Tunisian Foreign Minister from 1987 until + 1988 + Minnih, Ahmed + Ould, Mauritanian Foreign Minister from 1981 until + December 1986; Chief of Staff, Army of Mauritania, from December 1986 + Mitterrand, + Francois, President of France from 1981 + Moi, Daniel + arap, President of Kenya from 1978 + Montgomery, + Hugh, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State, from October 19, 1981, to January 6, 1985 + Morton, + Elaine, Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, + from 1978 until July 1985; member of Crisis Management Center, National + Security Council, from August 1985 until October 1986 + Mubarak, + Hosni, President of Egypt from 1981 + Murphy, Richard W. + “Dick,” Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from August 19, + 1981, until August 21, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs from October 27, 1983, until May 15, 1989 + Mzali, + Mohamed, Tunisian Prime Minister from April 23, 1980, until + July 8, 1986 + + + Nance, James W. + “Bud,” Admiral, USN; + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January + 1981 until January 1982 + Nassif, + Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs; U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from 1985 until + 1988 + Newlin, + Michael, U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from October 28, + 1981, until July 21, 1985 + Nidal, Abu (Sabri Khalil + al-Banna), Founder of The Fatah Revolutionary + Council (Abu Nidal Organization), + a splinter group of the Palestine Liberation Organization + North, Oliver + “Ollie,” Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs, + National Security Council from 1981 until 1986 + + + + Oakley, + Robert, Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, + Department of State, from September 10, 1984, until October 12, 1986; + Assistant to the President for Middle East and South Asia from January 1, + 1987, until August 1988 + Onu, Peter, + Acting Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity from 1983 + until 1985 + Ouko, Robert, + Kenyan Foreign Minister from 1979 until 1983 and from 1988 + + + Pearson, W. + Robert, member, National Security Council Staff, from + 1985 until 1987 + Peck, Edward, + U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania from February 19, 1983, until July 7, + 1985 + Pelletreau, Robert + “Bob,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near + East and South Asia from 1980 until 1981 and from 1985 until 1987; Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State, from 1983 until 1985; Ambassador to Tunisia from July + 1, 1987 + Peres, Shimon, + Prime Minister of Israel from 1984 until 1986 + Pérez de Cuéllar, + Javier, Secretary-General of the United Nations from + January 1, 1982 + Perito, + Robert, member, National Security Council Staff + Platt, + Nicholas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + International Organization Affairs from 1981 until 1982; Executive + Secretary, Department of State, from 1985 until 1987 + Poindexter, John + M., Rear Admiral, USN; + Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from 1981 until 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs from October 17, 1983, until December 3, 1985; Assistant to + the President for National Security Affairs from December 4, 1985, until + November 25, 1986 + Powell, Colin, + Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1983 until 1986; + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from + December 1, 1986, until November 23, 1987; Assistant to the President for + National Security Affairs from November 23, 1987, until January 20, + 1989 + + + Qadhafi, + Muammar, Leader of the Libyan Arab Republic + Quinn, + Kenneth, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of + State + + + Raphel, Arnold + “Arnie,” Deputy Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from June 1982 until 1984; + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs from 1984 until 1987; Director of the Libya Task Force, 1986; U.S. + Ambassador to Pakistan from May 4, 1987, until August 18, 1988 + Reagan, Ronald + W., President of the United States from January 21, + 1981, until January 20, 1989 + Reed, Joseph + Verner, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from November 7, + 1981, until May 21, 1985 + Rentschler, James + M., member, National Security Council Staff + Ringdahl, Philip + “Phil,” member, African Affairs Directorate, National + Security Council, from 1984 until 1986 + Rixse, J. H. + “Jay,” Special Assistant to the Secretary of + Defense + Roberts, Owen, + Chargé d’Affaires + ad interim, U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa from July + 1980 until May 1982 + Robinson, Davis + R., Legal Adviser of the Department of State, from 1981 + until 1985 + Rodman, Peter + W., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State + from 1984 until 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs from 1986 until 1987; Special Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs and Counselor of the National Security Council + from 1987 + Ross, Christopher + W.S., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Algiers, + from 1979 until 1981; Executive Assistant Secretary to the Under Secretary + of State for Political Affairs from 1985 until 1988; Ambassador to Algeria + from September 20, 1988 + + + + Saadi, Moussa, + Moroccan Minister of Energy and Mines + Sadat, Anwar, + President of Egypt until October 6, 1981 + Sahbani, + Taieb, Tunisian Secretary of State to the Minister of + Foreign Affairs from 1986 until 1988 + Sahnoun, + Mohamed, Algerian Ambassador to the United States from + 1984 until 1989 + Salek, Ould, + Polisario Representative to Algeria + Savimbi, Jonas, + founder of + União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola + (National Union for the Total Independence for Angola) or UNITA + Schmidt, + Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany + until October 1, 1982 + Schneider, + David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1981 until + 1985 + Schneider, William, + Jr., Associate Director, Office of Management and + Budget, from January 1981 to August 1982; Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from September 1982 + Schrager, + Stanley, Chargé d’Affaires ad + interim, U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott from September 1980 until July + 1982 + Schweitzer, Robert + L., Brigadier General, USA; member, National Security + Council Staff, from January until October 1981 + Sebastian, + Peter, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, + from 1980 until 1982; Director of the Office of North Africa Affairs, + Department of State, from 1982 until 1984; U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from + July 3, 1984, until February 19, 1987 + Seitz, Raymond, + G.H., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, + from 1982 until 1984 + Sékou Touré, + Ahmed, President of Guinea until March 26, 1984 + Sfar, Rachid, + Tunisian Prime Minister from July, 1986, until October 2, 1987 + Shamir, + Yitzhak, Israeli Prime Minister from October 10, 1983, + until September 13, 1984, and from October 20, 1986 + Shoemaker, Christopher + “Chris,” member, Defense Policy Directorate, + National Security Council Staff, from 1981 until 1982 + Shultz, George + P., Secretary of State from July 16, 1982, until January + 20, 1989 + Solomon, + Richard, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of + State, from 1986 until 1989 + Speakes, + Larry, White House Press Secretary from March 30, 1981, + until February 1, 1987 + Stark, James, + member, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, + from 1985 until 1986 + Stevens, Paul + Schott, Special Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council from + January 1987 until November 1987; Executive Secretary of the National + Security Council from November 1987 until January 20, 1989 + Stoessel, Walter J., + Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + from February 1981 until January 1982; Deputy Secretary of State from + February 11, 1982, until September 22, 1982 + + + Taft, William Howard + IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 3, + 1984, until April 22, 1989 + Tanter, + Raymond, member, National Security Council Staff, from + 1981 until 1982 + Taya, Maaouya Ould + Sid’Ahmed, President of Mauritania from 1984 + Tazi, + Abdelhaq, Moroccan Minister of Ministry of Foreign + Affairs + Teicher, + Howard, member, National Security Council Staff, from + 1982 until 1983; Director of the Near East and South Asia Directorate, + National Security Council, from 1983 until 1985; Senior Director, Political + and Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1985 until + 1986 + Thatcher, + Margaret, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from + 1979 + + Tower, John, + Senator (R-Texas) and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from + 1981 until 1986 + Turayki (Treki), Ali + Abdelssalem, Libyan Foreign Secretary from 1976 + until 1982 + Tyson, + Charles, Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + + + Ussery, + Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, from 1985 until 1988; Director, Libya + Task Force, 1986; U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Morocco from December 22, + 1988 + + + Veliotes, Nicholas + A., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and + South Asian Affairs from 1981 until 1983; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from + October 7, 1983, until April 1, 1986 + + + Wallis, W. + Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs + from 1982 until 1985; Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and + Agricultural Affairs from 1985 until 1989 + Walters, Vernon A. + “Dick,” U.S. Ambassador-at-Large from 1981 until + 1989; U.S. Ambassador and Representative to the United Nations from 1985 + until 1989 + Wayne, Earl + Anthony, Special Assistant to Secretaries of State + Haig and Shultz + Weinberger, Caspar W. + “Cap”, Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1981, + until November 23, 1987 + West, Francis J., Jr. + “Bing,” Special Assistant to the Secretary of + Defense until April 1981, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Affairs from April 1981 until May 1983 + Wettering, Frederick + “Fred,” member, Political Affairs Directorate, + National Security Council, from 1981 until 1982; Director of African + Affairs, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1984 + Wheeler, Michael + O., Staff Secretary, National Security Council from + 1982 until 1983 + Whitehead, + John, Deputy Secretary of State from July 9, 1985, until + January 20, 1989 + Wick, Charles + Z., Director, United States Information Agency from 1981 + until 1989 + Williams, James + A., Lieutenant General, USA; Director, Defense + Intelligence Agency from September 1981 until September 1985 + Wisner, Frank + G., U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from August 28, 1979, + until April 19, 1982; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African + Affairs from 1982 until 1986; Ambassador to Egypt from August 28, + 1986 + Wolfowitz, + Paul, Director of Policy Planning Staff from January + 1981 until December 1982 + Woods, James + “Jim,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African + Affairs from 1986 until 1994 + + + Yaker, + Layachi, Algerian Ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1982; + Ambassador to the United States from 1982 until 1984 + + + Zweifel, + David, Director, Office of North Africa, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1984 until 1987; + Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Yemen from October 24, + 1981, until June 20, 1984 + +
+ + + + + +
+ North Africa +
+ North Africa Region +
+ 1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (06/06/1981–07/02/1981). Secret. + + + Washington, January 21, 1981 + + +

1. My Meeting With Warren + Christopher: I met with Warren Christopher when he returned + today and congratulated him on the completion of a very difficult + negotiation.Reference is to Christopher’s role in negotiating + the Algiers Accords. See footnote 3, Document + 97. No memorandum of the Haig-Christopher conversation was + found. He praised the Algerians for their role and suggested + that we have a special opportunity to develop further this relationship. + We agreed that we should wait a decent interval after this agreement + before new arms shipments (OV10 aircraft) or sales of new items (M–60 tanks) to Morocco. I have this + question under study. On the agreement, I assured him that, while we + wished to study it and learn more of its implications, we recognized it + generally as a binding obligation.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

+
+ +
+ 2. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810048–0591. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, + Dakar, Khartoum, Lagos, Niamey, Paris, Rabat, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USCINCEUR. + + 737. + + Tunis, January 29, 1981, 1232Z + + + + SUBJECT + (U) Libyan Foreign Secretary’s + Visit. + + + Ref: + Tunis 685.In telegram 685 from Tunis, + January 27, the Embassy reported that, according to the press, + “Turayki’s meetings centered on expansion of bilateral economic + and commercial cooperation, as well as on desire to increase + tourism by opening border. Tunisians describe visit as being + ‘psychological.’ Libyan follow-through will be seen as test of + Qadhafi’s declared + intent to improve relations, especially with respect to Tunisian + proposal for joint exploitation of petroleum resources in + contested continental shelf.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810043–0663) + + + + (C—Entire text) + + A Tunisian cabinet minister directly involved in the visit of + Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki has highlighted for the Ambassador + the main results. Source said that the meeting between Turayki and + Prime Minister Mzali included + several acrimonious exchanges and was dominated by each side’s + interpretations of the reasons for sour relations in the past. An + element which strongly contributed to the tense atmosphere + throughout Turayki’s visit was the refusal of President Bourguiba to receive the Libyan + emissary. According to source, it was Bourguiba who had invited Turayki to Tunis, and the + latter for his part clearly did not believe the medical excuse + proffered as the reason for President’s failure to receive + him. + + In a foretaste of the next step in Libyan diplomacy toward + Tunisia, Turayki pushed hard for a follow-up visit to Tripoli by a + Tunisian Minister. This would probably be Mzali’s close associate Mezri + Chekir. The latter is not enthusiastic, especially since he would + have to discuss the prospect for a visit by the Prime Minister + himself. President Bourguiba, + for his part, is inclined to delay any further diplomatic moves, + primarily to gauge the evolving international situation following + upon the Libyan invasion of Chad. On the other hand, there is a + strong school of thought within the GOT that Tunisia can expect help from no one if Libya + turns against it. Tunisia must, therefore, establish whatever + relationship with Libya is necessary to protect its security. + + Regarding Tunisia’s specific disputes with Libya, Turayki seemed + to have an answer of sorts for each one. With respect to the dispute + over the continental shelf,For more on + the Libyan-Tunisian dispute over the continental shelf, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North + Africa, Documents 4 and 5. he simply noted + that Libya had made in 1972 the same proposal for joint exploration + which Prime Minister Mzali + has now put forward. In 1972 it was the GOT, led by then Prime Minister Nouira, who rejected such an arrangement. He + agreed to take another look at the proposal in the light of current + conditions. Answering Tunisian charges that Libya maintains camps to + train Tunisian dissidents, Turayki denied that the camps have any + evil intentions. They have been established, he claimed, to process + the papers of Tunisians who have crossed the border into Libya + looking for work. + + Turayki’s line on Libyan involvement in Chad was that Libya had + responded both to an appeal for help from the Chadian Government and + to protect Libya’s own security. He said that the help being + extended to FROLINAT by Egypt, + Israel, and others, was posing a clear danger to Libya’s southern + border areas. Far from having an interest in staying in Chad if it + were not wanted, Libya had proposed to Nigeria that the latter + replace Libyan forces in Chad with Nigerian troops. The Lagos + government refused. Libya was still prepared to withdraw its troops + whenever President Goukouni asks it to do so. As for the references + to unity in the recent agreement between Goukouni and Qadhafi, this was nothing more than + a standard rhetorical formula common to many exchanges between + African brothers. + + Subsequent conversations with two separate Foreign Ministry + officials yields line that Libya would have to engage in + confidence-building measures in order to encourage further detente. + Prior to a Mzali visit to + Tripoli, there would have to be visible evidence of Libya’s good + intentions. + + Bosworth +
+
+ 3. Memorandum From Frederick + Wettering of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco + (01/24/1981–04/17/1981). Secret. Sent for information. Sent through + Kemp. An unknown hand + initialed for Kemp. Copies + were sent to Schweitzer and + Shoemaker. A stamped + notation at top of the memorandum reads: “RVA has + seen.” + + + Washington, March 16, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Unsuccessful Coup Attempt in Mauritania (S) + +

The US Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, + advises that an attempted coup against the Mauritanian President + Haidalla by unidentified armed forces, led by a “Colonel Kader” on March + 16 has apparently failed.In telegram 1150 from Nouakchott, March 16, the + Embassy reported that Bneijara had announced on national radio that + “suicide commandos led by Col. + Kader at the orders of Morocco have attempted to seize power and + this morning attacked the Presidency. He called it ‘aggression + perpetrated by Morocco against Mauritania’” and “said the matter + will be taken to the U.N. Security Council and Arab League.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810123–0529) Haidalla is blaming the Moroccans + for the coup. Embassy Rabat reports that the Moroccan Government has + denied any involvement.In telegram 1840 from + Rabat, March 16, the Embassy reported that “a representative of + Moroccan military intelligence” had “‘guaranteed’ there was no + Moroccan involvement” in the attempted coup. The Embassy commented: + “Moroccan officials point out that there are many possible + explanations for the coup attempt, including plots by Libya, Libya + and Algeria conjointly, the Polisario, and Prime Minister Bneijara himself.” The Embassy + said it “prefers check further before offering our views on what + Moroccans may or may not be doing to GIRM.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810124–0230) In telegram 2023 from + Rabat, March 23, the Embassy reported: “Some degree of Moroccan + involvement in March 16 coup attempt in Nouakchott now seems + evident. We now in position here to corroborate GIRM story of Moroccan training of + putschists at Ben Guerir, although scope of Moroccan role in coup + attempt itself (degree of control, planning, timing) remains + cloudy.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810136–0418) (S)

+

President Haidalla, who with his government came to power via the + military coup route himself, has been increasingly pro-POLISARIO Front + and Algeria to Morocco’s dismay. Moroccans have been planning possible + attacks against POLISARIO + concentrations in Mauritania, using Mauritania as a safe haven. (S)

+

Whatever the facts, any allegations by Haidalla of Moroccan complicity + with the coup will be strongly supported by Algeria, Libya, the POLISARIO, and probably the + Marxist-Leninist states in Africa.In telegram + 73398 to Algiers, March 23, the Department stated that, during a + March 18 meeting with Stoessel, “Malek expressed Algeria’s strong concern + about coup attempt in Mauritania which he characterized as attempt + by Morocco to expand its influence to the south.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810137–0083) This affair will unfortunately increase the + paranoia of all parties. It is not unlikely that Haidalla et al. will also blame the US (since he perceives us as Morocco’s + patron).In telegram 67424 to Nouakchott, + March 17, the Department authorized the Embassy to inform the GIRM “The U.S. is deeply distressed + to hear of reports of an attempt today to undermine the Government + of Mauritania.” The Department continued: “USG has applauded recent + efforts of President Haidalla and the GIRM to restore democratic institutions and civilian + government to Mauritania, and cherishes the warm and friendly ties + which exist between our two countries. The U.S. continues firmly to + support Mauritanian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and + neutrality.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810125–0712) (S)

+
+ +
+ 4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, + Mauritania, and AlgeriaSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810044–0751. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Edmund + Hull (NEA/AFN) and Edward Brynn + (AF/W); cleared by Coon, Veliotes, George Harris (INR), Draper, + Morton, Seitz, Borg, and W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O); approved by Stoessel. Sent for information + Immediate to Tunis, Dakar, and Paris. + + 77983. + + Washington, March 27, 1981, 0318Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tension Between Morocco and Mauritania. + + + Refs: + A) Rabat 2113In telegram 2113 from + Rabat, March 25, the Embassy reported that the Moroccan press + had published “the unequivocal official statement” by the GOM “that the Polisario units + launched their attack on Guelta Zenmour from Mauritanian + territory, Morocco’s reservation of the right of self-defense + and attribution in advance of responsibility for any + consequences to the Mauritanian leadership, and the publication + of the instructions to Foreign Minister Boucetta in Tunis to include + this development in the Moroccan complaint against Mauritania to + be presented at the League of Arab States Ministerial meeting.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810141–0420) + B) Rabat 2153In telegram 2153 from + Rabat, March 26, the Embassy reported that according to an AFP + item, Bouabid had warned + Bneijara “that + Morocco ‘has information at its disposition which permits it to + affirm without risk of error that the (March 23 attackers on + Guelta Zemmour) crossed the Mauritanian border from the locality + of Bir Moghrein, situated in Mauritanian territory.’ Such acts + belied Mauritanian claims of neutrality including those made by + Bneijara to King + Hassan at Ta’if.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810143–0384) + C) Nouakchott 1349.In telegram 1349 + from Nouakchott, March 25, the Embassy reported: “It is + saber-rattling time in the continuing war of words (with + considerable risk of escalation) between Morocco and Mauritania. + For past nine days, listeners to Mauritanian radio have been + treated to non-stop condemnation of Moroccan ‘perfidious + aggression’ ordered by the ‘bloodthirsty King Hassan II’ whose ‘immoral + maneuvers bring shame to the Moroccan throne.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810142–0720) + + + + (S) Entire text. + + We appreciate Embassy Rabat’s alert (ref A) highlighting Moroccan + charges that the recent Polisario attack on Guelta Zemmour was + launched from Mauritania and Moroccan reference to possible + retaliation and hints of possible pre-emption of future attacks. We + have also noted Moroccan Prime Minister’s reference to “right of hot + pursuit” (ref B) while continuing charges and counter-charges may + simply be posturing, we agree with Embassy Nouakchott (ref C) that + it is only prudent to encourage restraint before the situation gets + out of hand. + + We have asked INR to assess the + situation on the ground, but we understand that varying local + perceptions may ultimately determine policy. In any case, the U.S. + position should be made clear ASAP. Therefore Charges should make the following points at + the highest possible level in the MFA: + + (For all action posts) The USG + shares the concern of many states and regional organizations + (notably the Arab League and OAU) + about a possible escalation + and widening of the Western Sahara conflict. In the past, the U.S. + has worked evenhandedly to limit the fighting. (For Rabat: We have + urged Algeria, with some success, to discourage attacks by the + Polisario into undisputed areas of Morocco from Algerian soil.) (For + Algiers: We have discouraged any policy of hot pursuit by Morocco + into Algeria.) While we regret any fighting anywhere in the region, + it is particularly important to avoid confrontations between the + states of the region. + + We welcome the Arab League’s Secretary General’s reported + intention to visit Mauritania and Morocco to establish a + dialogue on this subject. + + At this stage, we believe it would be helpful for all + parties to reduce the level of public statements and pursue + their concerns through private channels.Not further identified. + + Your government should be aware that we have made our + concern known to the other two governments bordering the + Western Sahara. + + + For Rabat only. In addition to general points above, you should + inquire about Moroccan intentions re hot pursuit in a way which + expresses our concern. Also stress the following point: + + The U.S. has publicly announced its support for the + independence and territorial integrity of Mauritania. We + note that Morocco has reiterated its respect for Mauritanian + sovereignty and territorial integrity. We strongly + discourage any action which might put into question Moroccan + policy in this regard. + + + For Nouakchott only. While we are expressing our concern to + Morocco about acts that could enlarge the conflict, we are also + concerned about recurrent reports of Polisario movements in + Mauritania. We consider it imperative that GIRM make every effort to ensure that its territory not + be used for Polisario attacks into the Western Sahara or for refuge + and resupply. Share our concern with GIRM and make the following point: + + Mauritania has assured us that it intends to maintain a + policy of neutrality towards the Western Sahara conflict and + opposes use of its territory for attacks on Moroccan forces + by the Polisario. We welcome all measures within GIRM’s power designed to + underscore Mauritania’s neutrality and oppose violation of + Mauritanian sovereignty by any outside forces. + + + For Algiers only. In discussing this issue with the GOA, ask about reports that Algeria + has provided arms to Mauritania and seek clarification of the type + of arms and intent of these shipments. + + Haig +
+ +
+ 5. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, Box 36, April 28, + 1981. Secret; Nodis. + + + Washington, April 28, 1981, 6:20 + p.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Conversation With General Walters on His Recent Trip to North Africa. Tuesday, + April 28, 1981, 6:20 p.m. + +

General Walters said his visits + to Morocco and Tunisia had gone as forecast.In telegram 2744 from Rabat, April 17, Walters reported that during + their meeting, Hassan’s “real interest” was Algeria: “When I told + him that I was going there, he commented that not only did he + approve but was delighted that I was the emissary.” Walters continued: “He said that + if it was not incompatible with my mission he would like me to tell + Chadli that he had been disappointed by the Algerian interruption of + the talks between them and the Moroccans. He would like to resume + them and very much wanted to know what the Algerians real objectives + were in respect to Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810184–0508) On Algeria, + it appeared that President Bendjedid was recuperable.For + Walters’s meeting with + Bourguiba, see footnote 3, Document 287. + Bendjedid had said that he did + not want King Hassan overthrown but he had not given an answer to + Walter’s urging to reopen negotiations with Morocco.For Walters’s meeting with Bendjedid, see Document + 105. + Walters had a long discussion + with Bendjedid about Qadhafi, in which he felt that + Bendjedid showed considerable + disdain and understanding for the problem that Libya poses. Bendjedid expressed his clear + opposition to the proposed Libyan-Sahraoui Union. Walters said that he had been + extremely impressed by the Sudanese—they have no complexes whatsoever. + Walters added that we + needed to get Ambassadors to Algiers and Morocco quickly.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

+

At the end of the meeting, General Walters raised the question of providing C130s to + Algeria.See footnote 3, Document 106. He suggested that he + might be able to offer Bendjedid + the C130s in return for a commitment to reopen negotiations with + Morocco. The Secretary agreed that Walters could pursue this.

+ E. Anthony + WayneWayne initialed “EAW” above + this typed signature. +
+ +
+ 6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria + and TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810044–0751. Confidential. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN); cleared by John Hamilton + (NEA/AFN) and for + information by Lillian Harris (INR); approved by Flaten. Sent for information to Rabat. + + 133439. + + Washington, May 21, 1981, 3347Z + + + + SUBJECT + Analysis of Algerian-Tunisian Relations. + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Recent reporting from the field and contacts in Washington have + drawn attention to dramatic improvement in Algerian Tunisian + relations since Gafsa incident in 1980.See footnote 2, Document + 107. Some have characterized developments as a “sea + change.” Department is aware of some elements of the improving + relationship, e.g. “hot line” between Tunis and Algiers, reciprocal + high-level visits of security officials, and completion of gas + pipeline to Italy via Tunisia. We have tended to interpret + rapprochement as a common response to Libyan threat both because of + timing and substance. We would appreciate your in-house assessment + of this subject to complete our understanding of its extent and + significance. We would invite you to address as well the following + questions: + + What opportunities do these developments offer the US in the context of regional + problems, i.e. Qadhafi and the Western Sahara, and our + bilateral relations? + + What impact does this rapprochement have on the Soviet + position in North Africa?No + response from either Embassy has been + found. + + + Many thanks for your help. + + Haig +
+ +
+ 7. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810306–0344. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority + to Algiers, Jidda, Riyadh, Nairobi, and Rabat. Sent for information + to Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, Khartoum, Paris, Tunis, + USCINCEUR, and + Lagos. + + 3060. + + Nouakchott, June 30, 1981, 1207Z + + + + SUBJECT + President Haidalla Returns to Mauritania After + Moroccan-Mauritanian Reconciliation. + + + Ref: + (A) Nouakchott 3022,In telegram 3022 + from Nouakchott, June 29, the Embassy reported: “June 28 + announcement from Riyadh of reestablishment diplomatic relations + between Morocco and Mauritania is a positive step.” The Embassy + continued: “GIRM appears to have finally demonstrated the basic + moderation of its April 25 government, helped along by Saudi + largesse, uncertainty about Qadhafi and Polisario, and King Hassan’s + basically accommodating speech at the OAU.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810304–0075) Reference is to + Hassan’s call for a referendum on the Western Sahara. (See Document 378.) + (B) Nouakchott 3034.In telegram 3034 + from Nouakchott, June 29, the Embassy reported: “Although it is + common knowledge around Nouakchott, there has been no official + word on GIRM media concerning + reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Morocco,” likely + due to the fact that “President Haidalla and his delegation are + not scheduled to return until 1930 this evening” from Riyadh. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810305–0021) + + + + (C—Entire text) + + Defeat and dismay had been the prefaces to the small diplomatic + victory that President Haidalla brought back with him from Saudi + Arabia late at night on June 29. There was an almost palpable + feeling of accomplishment in the air. It was almost as if + Mauritanian officials were welcoming home a victorious football + team. Haidalla and his delegation, tired from an all-day and + half-the-night plane ride from Saudi Arabia, seemed to feel, for the + first time, that they had acted rather than reacted. As if to cap + off their contribution to this reconciliation, the Mauritanian + delegation arrived in a Saudia Airlines Boeing aircraft. Haidalla’s + antiquated puddle-jumping and gas-guzzling Caravelle is probably + still making its way back to Nouakchott. + + As per ref (B), there had been no official GIRM media announcement of the + normalization of relations between Mauritania and Morocco. Haidalla, + responding to a question from a Mauritanian reporter at the airport, + said that normalization of relations had been agreed to “in + principle” as an outgrowth of King Hassan’s call for a “just” + referendum in the Western Sahara. (Comment: Haidalla made no mention + of the “controlled” referendum proposed by King Hassan.) Prior to + this, in an airport statement, Haidalla praised the “significant and + courageous decision” taken + by King Hassan at the OAU summit + and outlined once again the concrete steps, as seen by Mauritania, + to bring peace to the Western Sahara conflict. He repeated what he + had said in his speech in Nairobi, emphasizing the long-standing + GIRM policy of advocating + direct negotiations between the “conflicting parties—Morocco and the + Polisario” with Algeria and Mauritania cooperating closely. Haidalla + called for a cease fire between Morocco and the Polisario and the + “withdrawal of foreign forces to certain points to be determined” + and their replacement by neutral forces. + + I chatted at the airport with former Prime Minister and now + presidential counselor Sid’Ahmed Ould + Bneijara who characterized the OAU summit as a summit of “reason and + not of extremism.” When I asked him if this reconciliation meant + that the GIRM was going to + “forgive and forget the 16th of March,” Bneijara said that “we are going + to try to forget the 16th of March.” He then added, with a grin, + “there is always the 16th of something.” + + Schrager +
+
+ 8. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (07/03/1981–07/29/1981). Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, July 6, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

+

4. Moroccan Ambassador’s Reassurances about Contacts + with Libya. Ambassador Ali + Bengelloun saw me today with King Hassan’s reassurances + that he had not changed his mind about Qadhafi as a threat to peace and stability.A record of the Haig-Bengelloun discussion is in + telegram 180293 to Rabat, July 10. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810328–0364) + Hassan wants us to view the Moroccan-Libyan exchanges before the OAU Summit as Libyan initiatives intended + to advance Qadhafi’s OAU ambitions. The Libyans did help + Morocco at the Summit by not objecting to the King’s referendum plan for + the Western Sahara but “no deals were made” for the future.See footnote 2, Document + 7. (S)

+
+ +
+ 9. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Allen) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret. Sent for + information. At the top of the memorandum, a stamped notation reads: + “The President has seen.” Underneath this, Reagan wrote: “OK RR.” Carlucci’s trip took place + during the third week of June. + + + Washington, July 13, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci: Trip to North Africa + +

At Tab A is a memorandum from Frank + Carlucci to you,Attached but + not printed is Carlucci’s + memorandum, dated June 25. stating that: + + Egypt wants to expand its relationship + with us into a partnership. + + Sudan has no air defense and fears a + Libyan air strike. (The air defense situation is currently being + improved through U.S. assistance.) + + Tunisia has limited defenses, fears + another Libyan incursion, and wants stepped up training, + equipment deliveries, and joint exercises. + + Morocco professes to heed our advice to + seek a negotiated solution in the war with the Polisario in + Western Sahara. + + Algeria indicates that assurances we + seek on the sale of our C–130 + transport aircraft to them will soon be forthcoming. + + Libya’s Qadhafi is vulnerable to our strategy that: 1) + stresses the rising casualty rate from Libya’s invasion of Chad; + 2) challenges Qadhafi’s + territorial waters claims; 3) builds cohesion among anti-Qadhafi + exiles; 4) convinces our West European friends to decrease their + cooperation with Qadhafi; and 5) increases assistance to Libya’s + threatened neighbors. Our Bay of Sidra exercise will send a + signal to our friends that this strategy is being implemented, + and that we mean business.Documentation on U.S. exercises in the Gulf of Sidra is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. + + Finally, the threat from Libya can only be met by our friends + if we continue to provide them with military assistance and to + display leadership in pressuring Libya to cease its threatening + behavior. +

+
+ +
+ 10. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Library of + Congress, Alexander Haig + Papers, Day File, Box 51, August 13, 1981. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Khartoum, and Tunis. Sent + for information to Damascus, Jidda, Lagos, London, and Paris. Sent + for information Immediate to Rabat. A stamped notation at the top of + the telegram reads: “AMH.” Below the notation, Haig wrote and circled + “8/13/81.” + + 2828. + + Algiers, August 10, 1981, 1600Z + + +

Department/Rabat also for Ambassador Walters. Department pass CINCEUR for + Polad. Subject: Algeria Consults USG on + Tensions Between Libya and Egypt/Sudan.Haig underlined the + subject line.

+ + + (Secret Entire text.) + + Summary: MFA Secretary-General + Dembri called Charge in urgently August 9 at express request of + President Bendjedid and in + context of dialogue established with Ambassador Walters to express GOA concern over escalation of tension + between Egypt/Sudan and Libya and danger of superpower + confrontation. GOA plans to send + very high level delegation to Tripoli shortly to urge moderation on + Qadhafi but wishes to + benefit from USG analysis of and + reaction to situation before delegation departs, especially since + USG is well placed to urge + moderation on Egypt/Sudan. Charge responded that he would report + Dembri’s request to Washington and hoped to be back in touch + shortly. Dembri said prompt response would be extremely useful and + appreciated. We believe GOA prefers + Qadhafi to unknown + successor and is seeking help in protecting and at same time taming + him. We also believe GOA wishes to + forestall both USG action against + Qadhafi (which would + force it and others back into anti-American posture and arrest + momentum toward more genuine non-alignment) and Soviet intervention + on behalf of Qadhafi (which + would bring superpower confrontation to Algeria’s doorstep). We + recommend as rapid and forthcoming a response as present policy will + allow. End summary.Haig underlined the portion + of this paragraph beginning with “We believe GOA” to “on behalf of + Qadhafi.” + + MFA Secretary-General and Acting + Foreign Minister Mohamed Salar Dembri called me in urgently August 9 + to discuss the situation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. MFA Director of West European and + North American Affairs Benouniche and PolCouns Thompson were also + present.Haig underlined the first + sentence of this paragraph. In the right-hand margin next to + numbered paragraphs 2 and 3, Haig wrote: “Gerry. Had urgent meeting Thurs A.M. [August 13] with Walters, NEA & AF—Hope draft has been started [studied?]—A + fascinating msg & an even more fascinating Ambassador who + clearly knows or thinks nothing! AMH.” No record of the meeting has been + found. + + + Dembri emphasized several times at the outset and in the course of + our discussion that he was taking this initiative at the express + request of President BendjedidHaig underlined: “initiative + at the express request of President Bendjedid.” and in + the context of the dialogue that the GOA and the USG had + established thanks to Ambassador Walters on such issues as regional stability and + Libyan over-armament. He went on to say that the proximate cause of + his initiative was the GOA’s + concern over the escalation of tension between Egypt and the Sudan + on one hand and Libya on the other.Haig underlined: + “He went on to say that the proximate cause of his initiative + was the GOA’s concern over the + escalation of tension between Egypt and the Sudan, on one hand + and Libya on the other” in this sentence and drew an arrow + pointing to where he wrote “Woody” in the right-hand + margin. It is particularly disturbing, he said, that the + traditional verbal exchanges are now being engaged in by + military-leaders as well as civilian politicians and are being + accompanied by troop concentrations along the borders. It would be + disastrous, he continued, if an armed confrontation were to + develop,Haig underlined: “would be + disastrous, he continued, if an armed confrontation were to + develop.” particularly since this could trigger + superpower involvement and drag the region into a conflict between + East and West. Algeria itself, he said, could not stand idle in a + crisis involving a neighboring state. + + Dembri then stated that the GOA + plans to send a very high level delegation to Tripoli in a week or + ten days specifically to put pressure on Libya to adopt a more + conciliatory attitude. Before doing so however, he wishes to benefit + from the USG’s analysis of and + reaction to the developing confrontation between Libya and + Egypt/Sudan. The USG, Dembri said, + has good relations with Egypt and the Sudan and can help moderate + their actions. The GOA would like + to contribute to a solution of this matter in a strictly African + context and is seeking the views of others about their possible + contribution to such a solution. + + Dembri observed finally that the problem of the Libyan presence in + Chad seems to be moving toward solution in an OAU context with everyone agreed that + the Libyan troops will be withdrawn when an African peace force (to + which the GOA is prepared to + contribute) is formed. The GOA has + been encouraging Libya to withdraw from Chad, he said, and it would + be very unfortunate if an African resolution of the Chadian crisis + foundered in armed confrontation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. + Libya, Dembri said, was seeking to improve its relations with + countries in the Middle East and in Africa, and its assumption of + the OAU presidency would encourage its + shift to greater responsibility and pragmatism.Haig + underlined the first sentence of this paragraph. + + I told Dembri in response that I had no recent information on the + state of affairs between Libya and Egypt/Sudan and would therefore + not attempt to comment, but would instead report his initiative to + the Department and request any information and analysis that I could + share with him before the GOA + delegation left for Tripoli. Dembri immediately agreed that a prompt + response before the departure of the delegation would be extremely + useful and appreciated. + + I asked Dembri whether it could be said that the situation between + Libya and Egypt/Sudan had been discussed with Major Jallud during his August 6 visit + (Ambassador Walters had + been told August 4 that Jallud was coming to discuss Algerian-Libyan border + problems). Dembri responded that the situation in “the entire + region” had been discussed with Jallud, as it had also with French Minister of + External Relations Cheysson + August 8–9. + + Dembri brought our meeting to a close with the affirmation that + the USG has a clear responsibility + to work (by implication with Egypt and the Sudan) to dampen the + escalation of tension, keep it at a verbal level, and even reduce + it, while the GOA for its part has + a responsibility to put pressure on Libya to moderate its + actions. + + Comment: We are not aware of any basis in fact for Dembri’s + assertion that there has been a dramatic escalation of tension + between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, although we do note that, in an + August 4 memorandum to the President of the Security Council, Libya + accused the USG of seeking to + overthrow the Qadhafi regime, + and liquidate Qadhafi himself + and cited as evidence, inter alia, greater U.S. military assistance + to Egypt and the Sudan and joint Egyptian-American military + maneuvers near the Libyan border. + + Dembri’s initiative follows closely on the visits of Ambassador + Walters to Algeria + (August 4–6) and Major Jallud + to Algiers (August 6) as well as a telephone conversation between + President Bendjedid and + Colonel Qadhafi (August 3), + and two possibly complementary explanations suggest themselves:Haig underlined most of this paragraph. + + + A) President Bendjedid and his advisers, sensitized to + the Libyan arsenal during the Walters visit, asked Jallud to explain its + purpose. Jallud + responded that Libya faces a major threat from Egypt and the + Sudan and must thus arm itself accordingly. Through Dembri’s + initiative, the GOA is + seeking to inform itself, warn the USG of the dangers inherent in a conflict + between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, get the USG to commit itself to work + for a mutual dampening of tensions, and then use this commitment to urge greater + moderation on Qadafi. + + B) Jallud presented + Algeria with its “proof” of U.S./Egyptian/Sudanese + intentions and solicited the assistance of the GOA. Through Dembri’s + initiative, the GOA is + trying to get the USG to + clarify its intentions, warn the USG of the dangers inherent in a conflict + between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, and urge the USG gently not to work for the + overthrow of Qadhafi. + + + Both of the above explanations are plausible, and both may indeed + play their part. Algeria is becoming more and more of a status-quo + power, and the GOA undoubtedly + feels more at ease dealing with an unruly, but tamable, Qadhafi than with an unknown + figure. It wants to continue its efforts to protect and at the same + time domesticate Qadhafi and + is seeking all the assistance it can get. + + Whatever the genesis of the GOA’s + concern may be, it probably sees itself as working as an honest + broker to try and defuse a situation that threatens not only + Qadhafi himself, but + regional peace and stability as well. The Algerian leadership knows + the USG has no particular + admiration for Qadhafi, and + it is almost certainly afraid that the USG intends to do something about him directly or + indirectly (through Egypt and the Sudan). It most likely wants at + all costs to avoid such an American move against Qadhafi, not just to save his skin, + but for two other important reasons as well. Firstly, a move against + Qadhafi whose origin the + GOA perceived to be the USG would force it (and certain other + Arab states as well) to consider providing him with concrete + assistance and retreat into a more or less virulent anti-American + stance that would arrest the momentum towards more genuine + non-alignment that has been developing in Algeria. Secondly, the + Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies would, given the + slightest opportunity (such as that caused by an unexpected delay in + an anti-Qadhafi action), intervene themselves and activate the + Soviet-made arsenal now stockpiled in Libya to support Qadhafi. This would result in a + superpower confrontation on Algeria’s doorstep, a situation that + Algerian foreign policy has consistently sought at all costs to + avoid. + + Action requested: We are not conversant with all the policy + ramifications involved in the GOA + request for information and consultation on ways to dampen the high + tension it adduces between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. We do believe that + it is in our interest, to encourage the GOA to continue to consult with us on issues such as + Libya. Ambassador Walters’ + two visits have created a basis on which the GOA professes to want to build, and we + should take this profession at face value unless it proves + insincere. + + + We believe Algerian-American bilateral relations and our desire to + see the GOA cure Qadhafi’s ambitions would be well + served by a prompt response setting forth our analysis of the + situation between Egypt/Sudan and Libya, and if our present policy + permits, giving the GOA the + assurances it is seeking that we are indeed encouraging Egypt and + the Sudan to avoid an open conflict with Qadhafi. Even if we cannot give the GOA full satisfaction with regard to + our policy, we would like to be able to respond by the end of the + Muslim work week (i. e. Wednesday)August 12. if possible. + + Ross +
+
+ 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810493–0116. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers and + Rabat. + + 6867. + + Tunis, September 17, 1981, + 0933Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Mediation Between Algiers and Rabat. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Foreign Minister Beji Caid + Essebsi told me on Sept 15 that Tunisia has accepted + Algerian request to assist in improving relations between Algiers + and Rabat. When Prime Minister Mzali visited Algiers Sept 3–4, President Bendjedid asked that President + Bourguiba help set up a + meeting with King Hassan. Bourguiba has agreed to play this role. Caid Essebsi visited Rabat on Sept + 8 to feel out Moroccan attitudes. Hassan, who recevied him, was + positive. Tunisians are now working on time and venue. + + Tunisians made effort to broker Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement + some two years ago when Bourguiba sent previous Foreign Minister to Algiers + with what was thought then to be Moroccan offer for a + Hassan-Bendjedid summit.In telegram 7304 + from Tunis, September 17, 1979, the Embassy reported: “Bendjedid + had declined President Bourguiba’s invitation to meet with King Hassan + in Tunis in search of peaceful settlement of Western Sahara + dispute.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D790424–1010) Algerians rebuffed + gesture, and Tunisian + officials said at the time that they would resume mediation only + when it was desired by both sides. + + Caid Essebsi said that + several developments may help explain what he referred to as the + “Algerian initiative”. The Algerian regime is becoming more + internally stable and self confident, while it is increasingly clear + that continuation of Sahara conflict is in the interest of neither + Morocco nor Algeria. Caid + Essebsi agreed with my observation that only area + state which is gaining by current impasse is Libya, and he noted + increasing Algerian irritation with Qadhafi following the Libyan occupation. The Foreign + Minister stressed fact that Algerian willingness to seek Tunisian + mediation reflects a new closeness in Tunisian-Algerian relations + after a year of careful fence mending. High level contacts now occur + every two or three months, and confidence building measures in + economic and technical areas have finally overcome the mutual + suspicions which grew out of the ambiguous Algerian role in the + Libyan-organized Gafsa raid. + + Essebsi asked that the + foregoing information be only for “the eyes of Secretary Haig”. Addressees—please protect + his confidences. + + Comment: Bourguiba has long + aspired to play the role of peacemaker between Algiers and Rabat. + Morocco has been Tunisia’s most reliable friend in the area, but + Tunisia’s strategists know that good relations with Algiers are + essential for Tunisian security. They see the long running + Algerian-Moroccan feud as a source both of regional instability and + of Algerian reluctance to take a firm stand against Libya. Caid Essebsi has had sufficient + experience in the politics of the Maghreb to arm him against false + optimism, and the Tunisians will undertake a more ambitious good + offices role only after they are convinced that both Algeria and + Morocco want this. For the moment, it appears that the Tunisian role + is limited to arrangements for a Hassan-Bendjedid meeting. + + Mack +
+ +
+ 12. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State + and the Embassy in TurkeySource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jun–Dec 1981). Secret; Niact Immediate; + Exdis. At the top of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: “Sec Def + has seen ca 12/6.” Underneath the note, a stamped notation reads: + “13 DEC 1981 SECDEF HAS SEEN.” + + 9008. + + Rabat, December 5, 1981, 1730Z + + +

Ankara for SecDef + Weinberger. Dept pass: + Ambassador Walters; CIA (Admiral + Inman); [name not declassified] and to Ambassador + Reed (in care of Assistant + Secretary Veliotes). Subject: + Secretary Weinberger’s Meeting + With King Hassan: Foreign Relations Items. Ref: Rabat 9004.In telegram 9004 from Rabat, December 4, the Embassy + reported that during a 90-minute meeting in Fez, Weinberger and Hassan “covered a + full agenda of bilateral security issues,” including “access and + transit for contingent U.S. use,” although Hassan “made it clear + that he was sympathetic but concerned that such cooperation could + make Morocco vulnerable to Soviet and Arab actions.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810577–0643)

+ + + (S—Entire text) + + Summary. Hassan told Secretary Weinberger that a Moroccan-Algerian summit is likely + within three weeks, and that Hassan is “75 percent sure” it will + lead to an understanding that will deny further Algerian help to the + Polisario. That summit, plus the anticipation of a favorable + referendum result all countries would respect, made Hassan + optimistic about prospects for resolving the Sahara problem. In + other views expressed during the audience Hassan urged the U.S. to + bring more pressure to bear on Libya by cutting off oil + transactions; disclosed (please protect) that the Fez Summit would + reconvene after April, perhaps with Egypt in attendance; and urged + that the U.S. involve Spain in NATO to the fullest extent as soon as possible, as + insurance against a socialist victory in the Spanish elections of + 1963. Hassan indicated that he looks forward to the visit of + Secretary HaigSee Document + 199. and to a very substantive “working visit” of + his own in the U.S. early next year so that he may meet and confer + with President Reagan. End + summary. + + This message reports various aspects of Morocco’s relations with + third countries discussed during the meeting of Secretary Weinberger with King Hassan at + Fez December 3. Bilateral items are reported septel.See footnote 2 above. + + + Western Sahara. The King described the situation as likely + to acquire some significant new aspects “in the next three weeks.” + He explained that, based on impressions derived from talks with + Algerian Foreign Minister Benyahia at the Fez Summit, Hassan and + Chadli should be meeting at some point on the frontier “in twenty + days”. The Algerians are excited about this meeting and want it well + publicized. He and Chadli will discuss the Saharan situation; + economic cooperation (movement of iron ore from Tindouf to Moroccan + Atlantic ports and of Algerian natural gas to Europe via Morocco and + Gibraltar); resumption of the Fez Summit; and regional security + matters, a “hot issue”. Algeria, Hassan continued, is concerned + about both the Saharan problem and the anticipated reaction of Libya + if Algeria and Morocco reach an understanding on the Sahara. + Relations between Algeria and Libya were very strained at present, + and Qadhafi could become the + sole supplier of the Polisario. Hassan added that it was important + the referendum in the Sahara not be a “reflection” of hostility + between Morocco and Algeria. + + Thus, Hassan continued, after six years of war Morocco seems to + have two breakthroughs for ending it. If things go well at the + Chadli meeting, and Hassan was “75 percent sure” that they would, + there was one way to resolve the Sahara problem; another way, should + the Chadli meeting misfire, would be the referendum, whose results + everyone would have to accept. Hassan hoped that both means would + succeed, for it is better to have a little margin of safety. Hassan + declined to make any precise predictions about the Saharan situation + until after the Chadli meeting had occurred. Meanwhile, Moroccan + forces must remain on the alert in the Western Sahara. + + Secretary Weinberger + expressed the appreciation of the U.S. for the peacemaking + initiatives of the King and indicated we were happy to hear of the + prospective meeting with the Algerian President. Hassan remarked, + somewhat ironically, that it had taken some courage to put forward a + proposal that Saharan Moroccans be asked if they wanted to remain + Moroccans. However, once the problem was solved, regional security + problems would be reduced greatly. Morocco would have friendly + relations with all countries of the area, Mauritania excepted. “For + some decades” there would be difficulties between Morocco and + Mauritania. (He did not elaborate.) + + Libya. Hassan asked the Secretary to urge the President to + continue the “U.S. oil policy” concerning Libya. That policy had had + more impact than realized, according to Hassan, so that in a matter + of months Qaddhafi “will be brought to his knees”. The Secretary + responded that the administration is considering suspension of all + oil transactions with Libya. + As President Mubarak had told + the Secretary,No record of the + Weinberger-Mubarak conversation has been found. Libya + constitutes a great danger to all of us. It appears that Libya is + becoming isolated. The King rejoined that Mr. Hammer,Arnold Hammer, President of Occidental + Oil. of Occidental Petroleum, should join in “turning off + the taps.” + + Fez summit. The King volunteered an analysis of what had + occurred at the recent, brief Fez Summit of the Arab League. He said + that most countries had favored the 8-point plan of Saudi Crown + Prince Fahd;Documentation on Fahd’s + eight-point plan for the Middle East is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute. a small number of + countries opposed it and were closed to persuasion, and a small + number opposed it because they were holding out for more money. Only + one country—Iraq—had opposed it but remained open to persuasion. The + Iraqi Vice President had told Hassan this was the case. Soon Fahd + will visit Baghdad, proof of close Saudi-Iraqi relations, and the + persuasion may occur then. + + Everything at the Fez Summit revolved around the Fahd plan, Hassan + continued. As he saw it, the great danger had been that Saudi + credibility might have come into question because of the summit + proceedings. So, although told it was unprecedented, Hassan had + decided that the wise course was suspension of the summit. The + latter will reconvene “after April”. He said that timing was highly + secret, as was the hope of the Arab moderates that the Camp David + Accords will be observed on schedule, so that perhaps Egypt can be + persuaded to attend the resumption of the summit. He reiterated that + secrecy of this was the key to success, and that Fahd’s Baghdad + visit will be most important for the cause of Arab unity. Hassan, + Fahd, and King Hussein are to remain in close touch during the + adjournment of the summit. + + Spain. As described in greater detail in septel, Hassan + advocated military cooperation between Spain and Morocco, holding + that a military agreement between them would not only serve their + own interests, but provide a context facilitating Moroccan + contingency planning with the U.S. Hassan maintained that he and + Juan Carlos were on the best of terms, telephoning each other + frequently, sometimes only to inquire after the respective families. + The importance of Spanish membership in NATO was such that Hassan would advise the U.S. to push + Spanish participation as fast and as far as possible. Thus by the + Spanish elections of 1983, when the socialists might come into + power, Spain would have passed the “point of no return” on NATO. So, it is essential to “get + Spain involved to the hilt”. Hassan also asked the U.S. to speak with Spain about the + increasing use of the Canary Islands by the Soviets as a base for + surveillance by their “fishing boats”. Secretary Weinberger took note of these + points and said that we would act on them. + + Greece. Mention by the Secretary that Greece was a possible + hold-out against Spanish affiliation with NATO prompted Hassan to mention a message passed to him + by former President Tsatsos. When attending the recent session of + the Royal Academy of Morocco, Tsatsos had sent word that President + Karamanlis retained a great deal of influence in Greece, even after + the elections. Hassan suggested that the U.S. keep this in + mind. + + Comment. It was noteworthy that Hassan did not make a single + reference to Moroccan needs for additional military equipment to be + used in the Western Sahara. Instead, in consonance with remarks to + Admiral Inman two days earlier,A record + of the Inman-Hassan conversation is in telegram 8907 from Rabat, + December 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, N810009–0490) the King seemed to be + placing all his hopes on diplomatic leverage, i.e. a favorable + outcome of his anticipated talks with President Chadli. As reported + above, Hassan exuded optimism about that meeting and the favorable + consequences that would flow from it. In his tour d’ horizon with + the Secretary, Hassan repeatedly vouchsafed confidences that were + surprising before so large an attendance. That he did so is + testimony to the increasingly close, yet discreet, relationship he + seeks to establish with the U.S. The meeting was also a preview of + the topics he will want to take up with Secretary Haig two weeks from now, after + the NATO Ministerials.The NATO + Ministerial meeting took place December 8–12. Hassan’s + current mood is self-assured, both over the Western Sahara and + inter-Arab affairs, so that, as he repeatedly indicated, he is + greatly looking forward to meeting with President Reagan on the occasion of the + King’s “working visit” to the U.S., presumably in January. End + comment. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 13. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820040–1039. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to Cairo. Sent for information to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, + Jerusalem, Jidda, Niamey, Rabat, Tel Aviv, and Tunis. + + 303. + + Algiers, January 24, 1982, 1616Z + + + + SUBJECT + Qadhafi Leaves Algeria + After Largely Failing to Achieve Algerian-Libyan “Unity”. + + + Ref: + Algiers 256.In telegram 256 from + Algiers, January 20, the Embassy reported: “While there are + several theories floating about regarding the object of + Qadhafi’s unexpected + trip to Algiers with an assortment of Lebanese and Palestinian + politicians and Libyan technocrats, one thing clear is that the + Algerians are not overjoyed to see their neighbor.” The Embassy + continued: “Libyans have reportedly floated talk of union + between Algeria and Libya.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820033–0359) + + + + C—Entire text + + Summary: At the end of his January 18–23 visit to Algiers + Qadhafi may have achieved + some symbolic steps toward greater cooperation, but not the “unity” + he apparently sought. So far there has been no public Algerian + comment on the visit, and atmospherics have indicated Algerian + displeasure. End summary. + + While Qadhafi’s arrival was + covered by Algerian press and TV, there has since been very little + media coverage and virtually no Algerian commentary. President + Bendjedid met Qadhafi on arrival and saw him off + as he left for Tunisia, and the two leaders had discussions several + times during the five-day visit. However, the traditional dinner + hosted by the President which would be expected for such a guest did + not take place, and the Algerians gave other indications of treating + the visit with reserve. + + Qadhafi had a meeting the + morning of January 21 with FLN + party leaders led by Abdelhamid Mehri, Chairman of the Party + Information and Culture Committee (substituting for External Affairs + Committee Chairman Sliman Offman, who is ill). That afternoon + Qadhafi met with 800 + Algeria students for a “dialogue”. Neither of these meetings was + reported in the press. + + We assume Qadhafi’s + objectives were largely set out in a Tripoli radio broadcast of + January 21 (LD212126, Tripoli Jana in Arabic 1730 GMT 21 Jan 82)Not found. which reported Qadhafi as stating to the FLN Party leaders that “we are putting + forward a proposal for unity between Algeria, Libya and Syria”. + Qadhafi also reportedly + told this group that a joint + meeting would be held in February between the General People’s + Committee in the Jamahiriyah and members of the GOA, that the two Parliaments would + meet at the end of March, and that “joint theoretical meetings” + would be held between the popular cadres of the two countries. These + moves, Qadhafi said, would be + steps toward a complete merger of the two countries. (We have no + confirmation that the above exchanges were in fact agreed.) + + On a practical level, the Algeris press reported that on January + 19 several members of Qadhafi’s delegations met with their Algerian + counterparts “to strengthen cooperative and economic and commericial + relations between the two countries”. Algerian Finance Minister + Boualem Benhamouda met with Secretary of the People’s Committee for + the Economy Abou Zey Dourda, as did Algerian Minister of Commerce + Abdelaziz Khellef. + Algerian Minister of Primary Education Cherif Kharroubi received + Libyan Secretary of the People’s General Committee for Education + Abdelatif Zlitni, while Algerian Minister of Higher Education and + Scientific Research Abdelhak Bererhi and Libyan Secretary of State + for Culture agreed on inter-university exchanges of scientific + research in the areas of agronomy, oceanography, fishing and housing + in a framework including Tunisia. + + Presidential Press Counsellor (and Central Committee member) + Mohieddine Amimour told an Embassy contact that no joint communiqué + will be issued. He went on to say that various objective political, + economic and social conditions would have to be satisfied before + unity could be achieved. Amimour added that the matter had to be + studied carefully, without emotion, to avoid setbacks such as have + occurred in the past. Amimour explained the lack of publicity given + to the January 21 meetings by saying they were “unofficial”. He said + the leftist Lebanese that came with Qadhafi (reftel) were not officially received by + anyone. On the Algerian attitude toward Qadhafi, he stated “even if the results are + negative, it is important to talk”. + + We can only speculate as to additional topics the two leaders + might have discussed: Middle East developments, U.S. policy toward + Libya, border problems, Chad, and the Western Sahara conflict. One + source in a position to know has told us that agreement was reached + to have a joint border committee meet in the near future. + + Comment: Algeria, like other Arab countries, supports the ultimate + goal of Arab unity. At the same time Algeria has made it clear that + any movement in that direction, especially involving Qadhafi (whose unpredictable, + volatile nature is well understood here) will be considered with + great caution. Nevertheless, while Libyan-Algerian unity is out of + the question, Qadhafi’s visit + comes at a time of high Arab + frustration, following Israeli actions in the Golan and the recent + U.S. Security Council veto. The MFA + issued a strong statement on the latter occasion (Algiers 126).Not found. While Algeria, like + other Arab states is frustrated by what are perceived to be Israeli + unilateral actions to impose de facto conditions favorable to + Israel, we as yet see no signs that Algeria in the face of lobbying + by Qadhafi (and presumably + Assad in the near future) is prepared to alter its basic position on + the Middle East. That is, strong rhetoric but private opposition to + proposals for economic retaliation against the United States. + + Newlin +
+
+ 14. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C–384, Tunisia. Secret. + Prepared on May 4 by [name not + declassified]. + + + Washington, undated + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting [less than 1 line not declassified] + Between the DCI and Tunisian Prime + Minister Mohamed Mzali [less than 1 line not declassified] Ambassador + Cutler and the Tunisian + Ambassador to Washington) + + + + From this meeting it is clear that Mzali is among those Tunisian leaders who oppose + Libya’s Qadhafi and have no + illusions about Qadhafi’s + objectives. Mzali + characterized the Tunisian/Libyan “normalization” as superficial, at + best. He is convinced that Qadhafi’s objective in normalizing relations with + Tunisia is for the purpose of lowering the Tunisian guard. [2½ lines not declassified] + + Mzali believes that the + visit of Qadhafi has actually + helped Tunisia without giving Libya any substantial benefit. + However, he noted that neither the Tunisians nor the Libyans have + realized any gains from the Qadhafi visit. A number of economic and social + projects were agreed to during the visit, but they are meaningless. + [4 lines not declassified] Tunisia will + continue to attend these agreed upon meetings, but they know nothing will come of them. + On the other hand, Qadhafi + views these meetings as some form of union. + + The new open border policy with Libya has helped Tunisia win the + war of minds with Libya. Since the Qadhafi visit some 30,000 Tunisians have visited + Libya in the hope of obtaining economic benefit. Almost all of these + Tunisians have returned from Libya somewhat shocked by the economic + disorder they found in Libya. Tunisians are now more convinced than + ever that their regime is far superior to Qadhafi’s Libya. + + Turning to Libyan terrorist attempts against Tunisia, Mzali believes that Tunisia is in a + much better position today than it was two years ago [13 lines not declassified]. + + Turning to Algeria, Mzali + indicated that President Bendjedid is a serious, constructive leader who is + trying to steer his country along a moderate course. However, + Bendjedid has a variety + of influential Algerians who are trying to take him off the moderate + course; he does have an impossible task. [8 lines + not declassified] + + Finally, Mzali let it be + known that he believes U.S. policy in the area is making it + difficult for moderate Arab countries like Tunisia. For instance, he + noted that groups in Tunisia had pressed him to postpone his U.S. + visit because of the series of U.S. vetoes in the U.N. + +
+
+ 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MauritaniaSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820294–0224. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Melinda + Kimble (AF/W); cleared by Bruce, Bishop, and Bremer; approved by Stoessel. Sent for information to + Rabat, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Paris, Abidjan, Algiers, and + Cairo. + + 155115. + + Washington, June 5, 1982, 1830Z + + + + SUBJECT + GIRM Ambassador Meets With + Acting Secretary Stoessel. + + + + C—Entire text. + + Summary. Ambassador Ould + Daddah’s meeting with Acting Secretary Stoessel covered essentially same + ground as his earlier + conversations with DAS + WisnerIn telegram 137047 to Nouakchott, May 19, the + Department transmitted a record of the Wisner-Ould Daddah conversation. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820263–0191) and AF/W Director Bruce.In telegram 131971 + to Nouakchott, May 14, the Department transmitted a record of + the Bruce-Ould Daddah + conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820255–0546) Session served to + underscore continuing U.S. interest in maintaining good relations + with GIRM, particularly as this is + the first time Ould Daddah + has been received above the level of Under Secretary. End + summary. + + Ould Daddah reiterated + standard litany of Mauritanian concerns about U.S. policies in + Northwest Africa as follows: + + U.S. tilt toward Morocco is destabilizing, particularly + our increased military aid, as it ensures Algeria, Libya and + the Soviets will continue their support of Polisario. + + Mauritania recognizes U.S. African policy is shaped by our + myriad interests in the region and our world role. + Nonetheless, GIRM believes + resolution of Saharan problem would benefit everyone. To + this end, U.S. should encourage Morocco to seek a negotiated + settlement rather than arming itself. + + Mauritania also desires better relations with Morocco, but + the Moroccan stand on the Western Sahara makes it + difficult. + + The GIRM is constantly + criticized about its moderate position in the Sahara and its + efforts to improve relations with the U.S. as there is no + clear sign the U.S. wants better relations. Only naming a + U.S. Ambassador can change this perception and enhance the + level of dialogue between our governments. + + The OAU, according to + Ould Daddah, is + the best hope for a solution.For + the OAU’s role in + attempting to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara + crisis, see Documents 396, 397, and 400. The U.S. + must have patience. An OAU + failure would seriously damage efforts toward inter-African + cooperation and indirectly complicate U.S. relations with + many African nations. Thus, it is essential that we keep + OAU process + alive. + + President Haidalla is anxious to sustain dialogue between + Mauritania and U.S. and suggests sending a special envoy to + the U.S. if we would receive him. + + + Stoessel responded + stressing importance USG places on + good relations with GIRM, noting + we have welcomed its moderate stance on regional issues of mutual + concern. + + U.S. hopes to ask for agrement for a new Ambassador in the + near future as first step in mutual effort to strengthen our + relations. + + + As GIRM will recall, we + earlier proposed visit by General Walters which could still + be useful at some point if President Haidalla would agree to + receive him. After we have completed these two steps, we can + examine the idea of a special Mauritanian envoy to the + U.S. + + On Morocco, Stoessel noted long history of close + U.S.-Moroccan relations, emphasizing that U.S. can only play + an advisory role in Morocco, but not dictate policy. + + Our military agreements with Morocco are designed to + enhance our ability to respond to threats in Southwest + Asia—a strategic essential in U.S. global security + design. + + We agree OAU role has + been helpful generally, but positions taken at Addis + recently have seriously complicated the process. U.S. hopes + next session proves more fruitful, but we remain concerned + about negative role Qadhafi, in particular, may play. + + Nonetheless, U.S. strongly desires to continue dialogue + with Mauritania on these and other issues as we believe + better communication among all parties concerned is key to + negotiated settlement. + + + FYI. Ould Daddah’s extensive contacts since his + consultations in Mauritania have enabled him to outline GIRM’s position at various levels in + Department. Given immediacy of these contacts, plus fact that + Secretary will be in Europe for beginning of SSOD session in New + York,Reference is to the Second + UN Special Session on + Disarmament held June 7–July 10. Department suggests + Foreign Minister Ould Minnih + would profit more from Washington visit at another time.In telegram 2569 from Nouakchott, May 21, + Schrager commented: + “It is equally noteworthy that Ould + Daddah visits come at same time as King Hassan + visit to U.S. and are intended, in some way, to offset enhanced + U.S.-Moroccan relations sure to come about as result of visit.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820267–0478) If he asks to see Department + officials, however, we will seek to arrange usual meetings. End + FYI. + + Stoessel +
+ +
+ 16. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820399–0627. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Algiers, Cairo, Paris, and Rabat. + + 5728. + + Tunis, July 30, 1982, 1358Z + + + + SUBJECT + Deterioration of Tunisian Relations With Libya. + + + Ref: + (A) Tunis 5706,In telegram 5706 from + Tunis, July 30, Cutler + reported: “Mestiri told me that message had been received this + morning, July 30, from Tripoli informing the GOT that SDAR had agreed to refrain + ‘voluntarily and temporarily’ from attending OAU summit and urging Tunisia to + attend. Mestiri said + GOT regards this as ruse to + secure attendance by Tunisia and others who had refused to + attend on basis that SDAR + did not qualify for OAU + membership. In effect, Mestiri said, attendance on basis of SDAR’s voluntary withdrawal + would constitute implicit acknowledgment of SDAR’s right to membership. + GOT therefore has no + intention of attending.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820396–0969) + (B) Tunis 4826.In telegram 4826 from + Tunis, June 25, the Embassy reported that a “Senior Foreign + Ministry official responsible for the continental shelf dispute” + said that Tunisia and Libya “now have until August 25 to reach + an accord on demarcating their offshore boundary. He did not + anticipate, however, that Libyans would be responsive during + this period to Tunisian requests for an accommodation” to their + expected suggestion of joint exploration of the shelf. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820333–0050) + + + + (C—Entire text.) + + Summary: According to SecState for Foreign Affairs Mestiri, implementation of + Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement is now “frozen” and the GOT believes it is re-entering a + “state of confrontation” with Qadhafi primarily as a result of Tunisia’s refusal + to attend the OAU summit in + Tripoli. End summary. + + During my meeting July 30 with Secretary of State for Foreign + Affairs Mahmoud Mestiri, he + assessed current and prospective Tunisian relations with Libya as + poor. He acknowledged that the principal reason was Tunisia’s + refusal to participate in the Tripoli OAU meetings along with the SDAR. Qadhafi had tried hard to get the GOT on board, finally resorting to + warnings that Tunisia’s continued boycott would have negative impact + on Libyan bilateral cooperation. Such threats had only served to + strengthen the GOT’s resolve to + stick to its OAU position. + + Mestiri acknowledged that + Foreign Minister Essebsi and + Economy Minister Lasram had got nowhere when they visited Libya July + 19 primarily for the purpose of exploring Qadhafi’s willingness to strike a + deal on the continental shelf question. While during the visit dates + for future bilateral meetings had been fixed and announced, all + implementation of rapprochement had now been frozen. In fact, the + + GOT considered that it was + re-entering a “state of confrontation” with Qadhafi and that Libyan subversive + activities against Tunisia—which had never really been halted—were + likely to be increased. Mestiri said the GOT wanted the U.S. to know of its assessment. + + Comment: As we have reported, there have all along been divisions + within the GOT on how to deal with + Qadhafi. Mestiri has been particularly + skeptical of rapprochement, and his assessment must therefore be + viewed in that light. Bourguiba was reportedly indignant at Qadhafi’s failure to receive his + foreign and economic ministers earlier this month, and Bourguiba himself has made clear to + us his unaltered distrust of Qadhafi’s intentions. Certainly Qadhafi must be unhappy about + Tunisia’s OAU stance, particularly + if he views Tunisia’s refusal to participate as influencing others + and possibly spelling defeat for the summit. We believe the + Tunisians have some reason for concern re prospects for retaliatory + actions by Qadhafi, although + the actual extent to which rapprochement may give way to + confrontation will depend on further developments including how the + OAU summit finally comes out. + Mestiri’s intent on + sharing with us the GOT’s + assessment seems expressly designed to assure continued U.S. support + for Tunisian security, current policy differences re Lebanon + notwithstanding. + + Cutler +
+
+ 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820447–0499. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information to Algiers, + Paris, and Tunis. The document is misnumbered in the + original. + + 6444. + + Rabat, August 27, 1982, 0900Z + + + + SUBJECT + Some Thoughts on Future US Policy + Directions in the Maghreb. + +

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: The purpose of this cable is to share with the Department and + our colleagues in North Africa some thoughts and questions we have about + U.S. bilateral and multilateral policies in North Africa after the + success at the OAU summit in helping + prevent a + Qadhafi victory.Reference is to the ceasefire in Lebanon brokered by + Reagan’s Special Envoy + to the Middle East Philip + Habib that resulted in the PLO’s withdrawal from Beirut. Documentation on the + Habib Mission is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, + Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August 1982. We believe + the present situation offers us opportunities. End summary.

+

3. Introduction: It seems to us that what has taken place at Beirut and + Tripoli may constitute significant turning points for the Maghreb.Because a two-thirds quorum did not attend, + the OAU meeting scheduled for + August 5 in Tripoli was canceled. News reports indicated that “most + of the absentees were protesting admission to OAU membership of the Polisario + guerrillas in Western Sahara.” Others had “misgivings about Colonel + Qaddafi’s assumption of the OAU + membership for 1982–83;” they considered his policies in Africa “too + radical.” (Geoffrey Godsell, “OAU Summit Fizzles in Qaddafi-land,” + Christian Science Monitor, August 9, + 1982) See Document 403. In taking + stock at this time, we offer some thoughts for next steps in the + evolution of U.S. policy. We send these observations from Rabat for + further discussion, and we will welcome comments from the Department and + advice on next steps.

+

First, we believe that Qadhafi’s + fiasco with the OAU meetings can prove + a highly satisfactory development in terms of U.S. policy objectives. + Whatever the reason African leaders stayed away from Tripoli—opposition + to Polisario membership of the OAU, + rejection of attempts by Libya since at least February to manipulate and + control the OAU, or avoidance of + seemingly chronic inter-Arab quarrels—the result is clear: a rebuke to + Qadhafi’s ambitions and long + record of intervention. The “non-summit” was for the Polisario a major + political setback, for it failed to win confirmation of the “Kodjo coup” + by which it obtained access to the OAU + February. Moreover, as the ostensible reason for the failed summit, the + Polisario has caused discord between its prime backers, Algeria and + Libya, and the particular resentment of the latter.

+

With the Tripoli fiasco and some modest military successes against the + Polisario in July 1982, the Moroccan outlook has now rebounded sharply + from the low point experienced after the Polisario blow at Guelta + Zemmour in October 1981.See Document 387. Thanks to the Tripoli + outcome high officials here regard the Saharan problem as in better + balance. Recent talks with Moroccan leaders lead us to believe, however, + that Morocco is not inclined to move rapidly away from what is + essentially a static position. A standoff, or stalemate, that is, the + status quo is probably acceptable for us over the short run; however, we + believe it is not too early to discuss what might at some point + reinvigorate the process of peaceful settlement of the Saharan + dispute.

+ +

In the meantime, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and even Libya probably + perceive they have a far more important issue before them now—the + greatly altered balance of power in the Middle East by virtue of the + dispersal of the PLO. It is not as + contenders within the OAU but as + members within the Arab League that we believe the Maghreb states will + conduct themselves at least through September.

+

We also believe that more time will be required for the OAU to begin to regroup itself and resume + the Nairobi mandate or some other solution for a Saharan settlement. We + see no catalyst within the OAU at this + juncture. Arap Moi has internal + problems to address, and no other cohesive, broadly acceptable leaders + of the African states has yet emerged. In a few months, perhaps, it may + be opportune to relaunch the implementation committee processes, but it + seems too early to make that judgment now. Perhaps, in fact, we shall + have to wait until Sekou Toure assumes the OAU presidency. Active OAU + attempts to settle the Saharan question may lie in abeyance in the + meantime. End introduction.

+

4. With this as introduction, we suggest the following areas for + consideration in the design of U.S. policy in the coming months: + + The Sahara issue: The U.S. should continue to provide + straightforward support for political settlement of the Saharan + conflict under OAU auspices. + This support, as in the pre-Tripoli summit period, should be + expressed selectively and with relative restraint, particularly + as long as a continuing Qadhafi candidacy is a possibility. + + Stability in Morocco: The U.S. should pursue and expand the + closer association with Morocco begun at the advent of the + Reagan + administration. Morocco remains a threatened state, subject to + destabilization by adverse economic conditions combined with the + military challenge presented by the Polisario. Helping to + strengthen Morocco while encouraging the King to seek a + political settlement of the Sahara conflict should be an + important part of U.S. policy in the region. (We ought to bear + in mind the military and economic imbalance faced by the Kingdom + relative to Algeria and Libya.) In simple terms, we should + continue to help deter some new Guelta Zemmour-like escalation + of sophisticated weaponry supplied to and used by the + Polisario. + + Morocco-Algerian relations: In parallel with the above, the + U.S. should continue to recognize that the best—perhaps sole—way + to obtain a Saharan settlement lies with an eventual improvement + of relations between Morocco and Algeria. We know that the King + was disappointed by inability to bring about a meeting with + President Chadli + Bendjedid last December. Perhaps the Arab League + context, soon to become highly active, may provide additional + opportunities for high level Moroccan-Algerian contacts. The + Saudis might be helpful. + The Egyptians also. If there are appropriate ways to do so, we + should encourage such contacts. Visits by the new U.S. + Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary might advance the better + relations concept. On a less dramatic scale, we offer some other + lower profile suggestions in the following paragraphs. + + Some practical possibilities: In unspectacular but practical + ways, there may be opportunities for lessening Algero-Moroccan + animosities. For example, the establishment of technical, + economic, and other non-confrontational relationships is a + possibility we should consider and urge forward when + appropriate. Given the high sensitivity here of any contacts + with the Algerians, we must, of course, move very carefully + indeed. Nonetheless, the matter seems worth exploring. Perhaps + folding such emergent relationships within a wider + context—triple association of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, for + example, or within the Arab/Muslim framework—would help to + reduce the controversiality of such undertakings. Tunis with its + “neutral” cast in North Africa and its Arab League credentials + might be a good site for meetings. + + Public affairs and AID + initiatives: We hope that the U.S. Information Agency will use + its new lookReference is to the + International Communications Agency returning to the name + United States Information Agency. to see how its + resources can be applied to keeping up the pressure on Libya’s + dictator Qadhafi on the + one hand and to encouraging regional trust in the Maghreb on the + other. Morocco doesn’t hear VOA well. But we understand that Arabic medium wave + broadcasts reach North Africa east of here. If correct, such + broadcasts are an important element in convincing Libyans of + their country’s failing foreign policies and the benefits of + moderation and association with Western countries. At the + same time USIA and AID could do more, we believe, in + promoting regional conferences and meetings to foster contacts + among Americans, Europeans, (e.g. relations with the European + Community, the Iberian connection with the Maghreb), Moroccans, + Algerians, Tunisians and others) thus hopefully reinforcing the + benefits of association with other free world nations. The + Salburg Seminar and Aspen Institutes programs might be an + appropriate model for consideration. English teaching + conferences for ministerial level officials are a prime + opportunity in the Maghreb. So are workshops on television and + radio production and distribution systems.AID is engaged in matters of vital + importance to the region: water resource management; dryland + farming; population; alternate sources of energy. Many Maghreb + officials have a shared background in U.S. colleges and universities. We + believe here that this mix offers significant opportunities for + advancement of regional relationships and thereby USG interests in the areas. + + Mediterranean initiatives: It seems evident to us that the + U.S. should continue to work both sides of the Atlas and + Gibraltar, as it were. Security acceptance for Morocco is + essential if we are to reduce the apprehensiveness of those here + towards the Algerian arsenal. Adding Morocco to the countries + who take part in U.S. assisted military exercises for the + defense of the Mediterranean basin is a constructive step to + undertake. Now that we have a Joint Military Commission with + Morocco, we have a means of enhancing military cooperation as we + have already done with Tunisia and Egypt. At the same time, + continuing a carefully structured military sales program with + Algeria may help to loosen its Soviet connection and encourage + intensification of Algerian ties with the West. We must, of + course, keep Rabat and Algiers judiciously informed about our + respective doings, so as to allay suspicions to the maximum + extent possible.See Document 203. + + A special perspective: France: We also believe it important to + be sure our policies complement those of France, which does and + should retain the extent and depth of its relations with the + states of the Maghreb. (Our purpose may well be to avoid the + kind of cross purposes represented by the contrasting French and + U.S. positions on African attendance at the Tripoli OAU summit.) We understand that + the essence of French policy is often precisely its deliberate + independence, but we feel that sustained consultation and, where + possible, cooperation with France are very much in our North + African interests. France also should be encouraged to avoid + stimulating speculation that the U.S. is preparing to invest + heavily in North Africa—a ploy we think might be designed to + foster inevitable disappointment and thus strengthening of + French influence. +

+

7. Department may repeat as desired to other posts and agencies.

+

8. Ambassador Reed has seen this + message and concurs.

+ Curran +
+ +
+ 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820642–0330. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis + Ababa, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, + Nairobi, Paris, USLO Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and USUN. + + 9160. + + Rabat, December 10, 1982, 1228Z + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan-Algerian Relations: Some Signs of Thaw? + + + + (C)—Entire text. + + Summary: There are a number of indications that Morocco perceives + its relationship with Algeria as on the mend. Official sources have + spoken favorably of Algerian participation in Arab League activities + at FezReference is to the Arab League + summit held in Fez, Morocco, September 6–9. and + subsequently, of the Algerian role at the failed Tripoli II Summit + of the OAU,See footnote 3, Document + 17. and of the Saudi mediation effort. + Meanwhile, in its treatment of Algerian matters, the Moroccan press + has shown considerable restraint during recent weeks. There is, of + course, a strong element of wishful thinking involved; no tangible + evidence of a more conciliatory Algerian position on key bilateral + differences—in particular, over the status of the Western Sahara—has + yet lent substance to the expectant mood at Rabat. End + summary. + + A statement to a Saudi newspaper by Foreign Minister Boucetta to the effect that Morocco + stands ready to respond “forthrightly” to the mediating role of King + Fahd, received prominent coverage in the local press. (Certain + pro-palace dailies headlined it, after the official Maghreb press + agency filed the item.) + + MFA Political Affairs Director + Cherkaoui expressed + gratification over the warming trend in the overall relationship + with Algeria, during a meeting with PolCouns and former Ambassador + Robert Neumann December 4.No record of + the Neumann-Cherkaoui discussion was found. + Cherkaoui said that Fahd had + detected at Algiers a more practical and supple GOA approach towards Morocco than + heretofore. Furthermore, the Saudis reportedly concluded that + Algiers had come to consider its domestic problems and the Libyan + threat as more urgent policy priorities than the Saharan + question. + + Constructive Algerian participation at the Fez Arab League Summit + and the later delegation visit to Washington was appreciated by King + Hassan, Cherkaoui + continued.See footnote 5, Document 116. At Tripoli II the + Algerians had conducted themselves with dignity and statesmanship. + (Cherkaoui + said that the Algerians had + scheduled the Fahd visit adroitly, so as to provide themselves a + reason to limit their stay in Tripoli.) + + Comment: These statements of position, together with a fairly + prolonged absence of anti-Algerian comment in the local press, + suggest to us that the Moroccan official line is to show the maximum + restraint about its long-time adversary. We sense a kind of + expectant optimism, in which Moroccans look to King Hassan and + President Chadli Bendjedid to + reach some sort of normalization with each other. Because they + assume that secrecy and negotiations at the highest level are + indispensable preconditions for any such normalization, otherwise + knowledgeable Moroccans do not seem concerned that they have no + specifics about the process. Combined with the sustained relative + calm of the Western Sahara military situation and the successfully + thwarted Tripoli summits, the possibility of a rapprochement with + Algeria seems to have given Moroccans more confidence in the + country’s diplomatic prospects than at any time since the Polisario + tried to obtain OAU membership last + February. + + This relatively euphoric mood cannot, however, obscure the very + tangible problems to be overcome in moving toward some kind of + accommodation with Algeria. For example, the Moroccans seem to have + discounted, for the moment, the implications of the usual Algerian + resolution on the Sahara at UNGA, + on the grounds that the resolution was ritualistic Algerian + behavior, and, in any event, the resolution enjoyed less support + than in previous years.In telegram 3408 + from USUN, November 13, the + Mission reported that on November 12, the “Fourth Committee + adopted the Algerian Resolution on Western Sahara,” which urged + direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820590–0172) To be sure, the Moroccans have + had their hopes high before. Just a year ago they expected an + imminent Hassan-Chadli summit. None occurred. Instead, there were a + number of reminders, most notably the Algerian attempt to slip the + Polisario into OAU membership, that + differences between Rabat and Algiers are deep and not easily + surmountable. Good feelings notwithstanding, the Western Sahara + remains the proving ground of Algerian intentions as far as this + Kingdom is concerned. End comment. + + Curran +
+ +
+ 19. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Morocco (02/16/1983–04/28/1983). Secret; + Nodis. + + 1274. + + Rabat, February 16, 1983, 1442Z + + +

For Secretary Shultz and Judge + Clark only from Ambassador Reed. + Subject: Moroccan-Algerian Talks.

+ + + (S—Entire text) + + During a meeting with King Hassan February 15, he asked that I + pass to you two, for the most restricted possible number of readers, + the following message: + + Quote: + + I plan a final review with my top advisors of the Algerian + situation February 18/19. + + If the review goes well, and I expect it will, on or about + February 23/24 I will have a secret meeting with President + Bendjedid at a + place on our common border.In + telegram 857 from Algiers, February 27, the Embassy + reported: “Reliable sources in the Presidency and MFA this afternoon + confirmed to us that King Hassan and President Bendjedid met February + 26 in an Algerian village close to the Moroccan border.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830108–0337) + + I have very much in mind your (U.S.) interest in improving + Moroccan-Algerian relations as a part of our shared concern + for improved regional stability. + + I do not expect or indeed think it desirable that the U.S. + have any role or even comment on the upcoming meeting, but I + wanted you to know about my definite plans as soon as I was + able to give them to you. + + Please convey my personal best regards and respects to + President Reagan. + + End quote. + + This message has had extremely limited distribution in + Rabat. + + Reed +
+ +
+ 20. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830158–0037. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Bamako, Niamey, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. + + 1258. + + Algiers, March 22, 1983, 1700Z + + + + SUBJECT + Bendjedid in Tunisia: + Implications for Northwest Africa. + + + Ref: + (A) Algiers 1147,In telegram 1147 from + Algiers, March 15, the Embassy reported: “After meeting with + King Hassan February 26, President Bendjedid will go to Tunisia March 18 for a + long-awaited visit. In so doing, Bendjedid will lay the last stone in the + foundation of Algeria’s reinvigorated good neighbor policy. This + initiative supports two objectives: first, building regional + stability which will allow Algeria to focus tranquilly on its + own internal development, and second, creating a unified front + against Libyan adventurism.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830143–0662) + (B) Algiers 1227,In telegram 1227 from + Algiers, March 21, the Embassy reported that the “Algerian Press + Service (APS) announced noon March 21 that special emissaries + would carry messages from President Bendjedid to neighboring countries. APS says + messages deal with ‘results of President Bendjedid’s trip to Tunis and + regional matters.’” The Embassy commented: “Not surprisingly, + the two heavyweights are sent to Morocco and Mauritania thereby + fueling speculation that the messages deal, at least in part, + with next steps on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830155–0509) + (C) Tunis 2299.In telegram 2299 from + Tunis, March 22, the Embassy reported that “President Bendjedid’s visit appears to + have been a great success from the Tunisian point of view. + Bendjedid’s pragmatic + approach to cooperation suits the Tunisians well, and they + pulled out all the protocol stops for him. Two agreements were + signed, on a final demarcation of the border, and the second a + treaty of brotherhood, in which the two sides agree to respect + each other’s political independence and promise not to allow + their territory to be used against the other. It is too early to + say that a new age has dawned, but the big loser is obviously + Qadhafi.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830157–0993) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Algerian reaction to Tunisia visit of President Bendjedid has been extremely + positive. The treaty of fraternity and loyalty, as well as the + border agreement, are viewed not only as an important bilateral + development, but also as a major step forward in the normalization + of regional relations. This visit—following on the heels of the + Bendjedid-Hassan summit—is seen as a concrete manifestation of + Algeria’s blossoming good neighbor policy (ref A), with implications + for the greater Sahelian region as well as the Maghreb. Special + emissaries have already been dispatched to neighboring countries + (ref B), a clear signal of Algerian intention to engage the totality + of its regional partners (Libya excluded) in the quest for enhanced + stability and cooperation in Northwest Africa. + + + The Tunisian visit has been very well received by the populace at + large who consider improved relations as both natural and desirable. + Unlike many themes in GOA foreign + policy which leave the common man cold, rapprochement with Tunisia + and Morocco generates excitement. There is certainly a factor of + Maghrebian kinship in this reaction, but there is also the + expectation of relaxed travel restrictions and easier access to + neighboring markets where consumer goods are plentiful. + + There is also a strong economic element in GOA determination to push ahead with + its good neighbor initiatives. Regional cooperation is viewed as a + potentially important factor in Algerian economic development. Such + cooperation should flow naturally from normalization of relations; + even if it does not, improved regional stability will have provided + a more favorable environment for Algeria’s own development + programs. + + The Western Sahara remains the principal obstacle in this search + for regional harmony. Algeria and Tunisia have called publicly for + application of the resolutions adopted at the 1981 Nairobi summit. + In fact, the Algerian approach is not so much aimed at + reinvigorating the implementation committee as at “transcending” the + problem. As explained to us by Director for International Political + Affairs Kerroum, the central + idea is to establish first a general atmosphere of growing + cooperation and harmony at the wider, regional level. Concessions on + the Western Sahara should then become easier as contributions to the + advancement of this regional objective, rather than as outright + concessions to the opposing party in the conflict. + + From the Algerian perspective, Bendjedid has taken most of the risks thus far. He + is determined to pursue GOA efforts + to promote regional cooperation, but looks to Morocco to take the + necessary first step toward a peaceful resolution of the Saharan + problem. Algeria is ready to assist in whatever way it can, but + remains insistent that the two parties to the conflict find some + ways of talking to one another. Kerroum said that Algeria was not likely to agree to + the restoration of diplomatic relations—which Morocco would like to + do immediately—until Morocco had made some positive move with regard + to the Sahara. + + We agree with ref C that Qadhafi is odd man out. Although probably not the + principal reason behind Algeria’s good neighbor offensive, Libyan + containment is an important by-product of the process and recognized + as such by the GOA. There are some + who now expect increased Libyan agitation in retaliation for + Qadhafi’s exclusion. + Libya’s expected treaty of friendship and cooperation with the + Soviet Union may also be explained in part by Qadhafi’s increasing regional + isolation. + + Newlin +
+ +
+ 21. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830313–0902. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to + Addis Ababa, Bamako, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and + Tunis. + + 2305. + + Algiers, June 2, 1983, 1010Z + + + + SUBJECT + Libyan and Mauritanian Actions Reportedly Behind Hassan’s Failure + to Attend Maghreb Summit. + + + + S—Entire text. + + Summary. According to Tunisian Ambassador (protect) who took part + in all of Bourguiba’s + meetings in Algiers, King Hassan originally proposed that he join + Bendjedid and Bourguiba in Algiers in a symbolic + show of Maghreb unity. Algerians accepted with alacrity and asked if + Haidalla and Qadhafi could + also be invited. Hassan agreed but just before scheduled meeting + informed Algerian and Tunisians that he had discovered existence of + arms shipments from Libya and Mauritania which made it impossible + for him to meet with these two Chiefs of State.In telegram 2302 from Algiers, May 31, the + Embassy reported: “Algerian attempts to arrange a grand Maghreb + summit collapsed late May 30 when King Hassan and Qadhafi failed to join + Bendjedid, Bourguiba and Haidalla in + Algiers. Algerian officials are taking the line that they did + their duty in extending invitations to other Maghreb Chiefs of + State to join the Presidents of Algeria and Tunisia at their + long-planned summit to promote regional cooperation and that it + is a shame only Mauritania’s Haidalla seized the opportunity. We + assume Moroccan concern over the Western Sahara caused the + non-appearance of King Hassan. The invitation to Qadhafi was probably more of a + gesture than an expectation he might accept.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830308–0213) End summary. + + Tunisian Ambassador states that initial proposal for + Bendjedid-Bourguiba-Hassan summit came from King Hassan. Idea was + for King to join other two Chiefs of State at guest villa where + Bouguiba was staying in order to symbolize Maghreb reconciliation. + Both Algeria and Tunisia warmly welcomed Hassan’s suggestion. + + Algeria next asked if there were any objection to invitations + being extended to Haidalla and Qadhafi. King Hassan reportedly replied that there + was no problem with Haidalla. He was less enthusiastic about + Qadhafi [but?] eventually + agreed he could also be included. + + Shortly before the scheduled Grand Maghreb summit, Hassan informed + the Algerian and the Tunisians that shipments of arms via Libya and + Mauritania had been discovered in Morocco and that, under the + circumstances, he could not meet with Qadhafi and Haidalla. Reportedly, the King stated + that the Libyan shipment was to Casablanca in a British ship. Apparently, the shipment via + Mauritania was a separate operation. + + Tunisian Ambassador considers Qadhafi is behind efforts to sabotage Maghreb + reconciliation. He says Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco all share same + analysis of Qadhafi + problem. + + Tunisian confirmed impression Algerian-Tunisian relations + continued to improve. Bourguiba and Bendjedid had established close personal + relationship and policy of improved relations was very popular in + both countries. + + Polisario seating issue at OAU + summit was not a factor in King’s non-appearance. Tunisians expect + that Algeria and Morocco will maintain their respective positions in + Addis but that Algeria will not mount a major campaign on behalf of + the Polisario. Ambassador Baccouche remarked that the U.S. position on the + OAU Summit was “wise”.In telegram 140422 to the OAU collective, May 20, a repeat + of telegram 18758 from Paris, May 18, the Department stated: + “The US asserts that it: + ‘continues to believe that the admission of the SADR to the OAU would be a grave + mistake.’”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830288–0096) + + Comment: This is a curious development at a curious time. We would + appreciate any confirmation from any source that arms shipments did + in fact take place. While we would not put it past Qadhafi to engage in such antics, + we are surprised that a British ship was supposedly involved. We are + also surprised that Mauritania is allegedly involved in shipping + arms to dissidents in Morocco. + + Newlin +
+
+ 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in ChadSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830399–0442. + Secret; Exdis. Repeat of telegram 5283 from Rabat, July 6, which has + not been found. Drafted by Terrell Otis (NEA/AFN); cleared by Sebastian, Bishop, and William Garland (S/S–O); approved by Schneider. All asterisks are in + the original. + + 195758. + + Washington, July 14, 1983, 0208Z + + +

Following Rabat repeated for your action dtd Jul 6: Action SecSte info + Algiers Cairo Lisbon London Madrid Nouakchott Paris Tel Aviv Tunis.

+ +

Qte: Rabat 5283. Subject: Qadhafi + Visit to Morocco—King Hassan’s Views. Ref: Rabat 5211.Telegram 196717 to Ndjamena, July 14, repeated the + text of telegram 5211 from Rabat, July 5, in which the Embassy + reported: “Qadhafi’s unexpected visit to Rabat ended on Sunday, July + 3. To the end, the visit was played as being at the ‘working level’, + but the lavishness and breadth of the reception given Qadhafi left many with the + impression that it was a full State visit. Efforts were made, our + sources tell us, to keep the frenetic (one high Moroccan called him + ‘schizophrenic’) Libyan from getting out of hand, and most with whom + we have spoken thus far express their skepticism about the sincerity + of Qadhafi’s new-found + moderation and friendliness. It would appear that all expected + issues were in fact covered.” The Embassy continued: “We fear that + the U.S. position in North Africa may have been a Moroccan + bargaining chip.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830402–0613)

+ + + (S—Entire text) + + Summary. King Hassan asked Ambassador Reed to spend the evening with him after the + ceremonial breaking of the Ramadan fast on July 5. The King believes + that while Colonel Qadhafi is + mentally unstable, he is intelligent and, for the time being, + Morocco and the Arab world will have to get along with the Libyan. + Some diplomatic activity is envisaged. + + The King and Qadhafi reached no agreements either on + providing assistance to Morocco (as had been rumored) or on + the Western Saharan and Chad matters. + + The King said his sources in Israel have told him the + Begin government is planning a de facto occupation of + southern Lebanon and is putting the infrastructure in place + to accomplish this. + + The King sent his warm personal greetings to President + Reagan. End + summary. + + + King Hassan asked Ambassador Reed to join him for an evening at home after the + “harirar” or breaking of the fast at the end of the day on July 5. + The Ambassador was accompanied to the meeting by Foreign Minister + Boucetta and Chamberlain + Frej. Neither man stayed for the conversation which took place from + 8:20 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. in the King’s private apartment in the + palace compound in Rabat. + + The King said he wanted to be sure the U.S. and President + Reagan had an early and + authoritative read-out on Qadhafi’s visit. + + It was Qadhafi, according + to Hassan, who insisted on coming to Morocco. He originally came for + a two-day visit and stayed for four. The King found Qadhafi’s behavior erratic and + bizarre, sometimes rude. (The flaunting of female bodyguards who + apparently glowered at guests over their weapons at formal dinners + seemed particularly to have irritated the King.)“Schizophrenic” + was a word used by the King several times to describe Qadhafi. The Libyan “tunes out” at + regular intervals and makes + curious and inappropriate noises and sounds at other times, + according to Hassan. + + However, said Hassan, Qadhafi may be “unstable” but he is not stupid and + he, Hassan, has decided (we understand from other sources the Saudis + share this view) that Qadhafi + will be around for a while and the Arabs will have to learn to live + with him. + + As a start, Hassan has decided to send a special envoy to Libya to + explore the possibility of setting up diplomatic relations with the + Tripoli government. This special envoy may be the brother of + Education Minister Laraki. Hassan said he and Qadhafi also agreed it would be a + good idea to have a meeting of Maghreb leaders. Hassan proposed + Algiers as a site. Qadhafi + was taken aback at this and said he wasn’t “getting along with the + Algerians.” These were the only “concrete” results of the visit. On + Chad and Western Sahara, both sides spent a lot of time sparring and + seem to have ended up hinting to each other that Morocco would stay + out of the Chad situation if the Libyans stopped interfering in the + Western Sahara. + + Qadhafi told Hassan + there are no Libyan troops currently in Chad. + + As an aside to a description of the talks on Western + Sahara/Chad, King Hassan said Qadhafi would giggle and ask him when the + referendum would be held. Hassan said he finally asked when + the Libyans would be holding a referendum in Chad and that + this had caused one of Qadhafi’s tune-outs. + + + The King said he did not ask for Libyan financial assistance and + refused to discuss a Libyan idea to refuse Moroccan military + facilities to imperialists. (“What cheek* do you Americans know what + the Russians have in Libya?”) + + Hassan sent Qadhafi to meet + the father of the current Polisario chief, Mohammed Abdelaziz, who + lives in Rabat. According to the King, the father gave Qadhafi an “earful on the abuses of + the Polisario and their mistaken goals.” + + In sum, the King said, he had spent rather too much time on + Qadhafi but perhaps it + would be useful to have a dialogue. The difficulty of such a + dialogue was illustrated, Hassan said, by the departure scene. + Qadhafi has said he was + going on to Mauritania. However, his aircraft took off due + east** + + On another subject: King Hassan continues to be gloomy about the + Middle East. He claims to have highly placed sources in Israel who + say the Begin government is + preparing the de facto annexation of southern Lebanon and is + installing the infrastructure (roads, schools, etc.) to accomplish + this* + + + The Ambassador discussed weather modification, VOA enhancement and security matters + which will be handled in septels.No + other record of the July 5 Reed-Hassan meeting has been + found. + + The King looked well and seemed relaxed and at ease. There is no + sign of any tension or unusual security on the palace + grounds. + + The redoubtable Moulay Hafid, however, is showing signs of age. He + has developed a slight tremor and in dealing with senior Embassy + officer has been uncharacteristically forgetful and sloppy about + details. + + The King thanked the Ambassador for delaying his departure to meet + at the palace and provided a private aircraft to fly the Ambassador + to London. + +

Curran

+

Unqte

+ Shultz +
+
+ 23. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830409–1130. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to + Algiers, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, and USCINCEUR. + + 5400. + + Tunis, July 19, 1983, 1400Z + + + + SUBJECT + Prime Minister Mzali Visits + Tripoli. + + + Ref: + Tunis 5244.In telegram 5244 from + Tunis, July 11, the Embassy reported an impending visit by + Mzali to Tripoli in + order to attend the Tunisian-Libyan High Commission meeting. The + Embassy’s source said that “Libyan pressure for a Mzali visit has been intense. + In exchange, the Tunisians want tangible progress on several + fronts, including the treatment of Tunisian workers in Libya and + the continental shelf.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830392–0836) + + + + C—Entire text. + + Prime Minister Mzali left + Tunis July 19 for Tripoli to attend a session of the Tunisian-Libyan + High Commission. Although as late as July 15 Foreign Minister + Caid Essebsi told the + Ambassador that no final decision had been made that Mzali would go, it has been + increasingly apparent that the Libyans would take great offense if + he failed to show. The + Tunisian Ministers of Economy and Plans have been in Tripoli since + July 17 to prepare the High Commission meeting. + + The High Commission has existed for some years, but it had been + dormant until it was revived by Qadhafi’s visit to Tunisia in February 1982. + Although the communique issued at the conclusion of that meeting + specified that the High Commission would meet every six months, + presided by Mzali and his + Libyan counterpart, no formal meeting of the High Commission has + taken place until now because there has been no progress on the two + issues of primary concern to the Tunisians: the enrollment of + Tunisian workers into Libyan backed “liberation movements”, and the + continental shelf. + + It is not clear why Mzali + has now agreed to go to Tripoli. We are told that Libyan pressures + have been intense, and it may be that Mzali concluded that his continued refusal to go to + Libya would have provoked an unnecessary crisis with the Libyans. + That one Mzali advisor was + hoping he would not go, and the Foreign Minister’s statement to the + Ambassador July 15 that no final decision had been taken,No record of Mzali’s statement has been found. + indicate that there may have been a debate on the issue within the + government, which Bourguiba + would have had to resolve. + + One thing is certain, Mzali’s visit does not mean that the Tunisian view of + Libya has changed. From Bourguiba on down, the Tunisian Government regards + Qadhafi’s Libya as a + continuing security threat. Mzali can be frank and tough when he wants to be, + and his meeting with Qadhafi + may well be acrimonious. With regard to Chad, the PLO, and relations with Algeria, + Mzali can be counted on + to speak his mind, while concentrating on the problems of Tunisians + in Libyan Camyu and the continental shelf. If Qadhafi is prepared to make + concessions, particularly on the shelf issue, relations could + improve. If not, as seems more likely, Mzali’s visit risks aggravating already strained + relations and threatening the rather threadbare “normalization” + which began in February 1982.In telegram + 5476 from Tunis, July 21, the Embassy reported: “Prime Minister + Mzali appears to have + emerged unscathed, at least publicly, from his recent visit to + Tripoli for the first meeting of the Tunisian-Libyan Joint + Commission. Progress on the difficult political issues which + divide Tunisia and Libya appears to have been minimal. While + agreement was reached on certain economic and commercial + questions, we can expect that Tunisia will watch closely to see + whether or not Libya intends to follow through on its + commitments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830415–0832) + + Cutler +
+ +
+ 24. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830421–1051. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority + to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. + + 3475. + + Nouakchott, July 25, 1983, 1232Z + + + + SUBJECT + Qadhafi’s Mauritania + Visit. + + + Ref: + Nouakchott 3437 (Notal).In telegram + 3437 from Nouakchott, July 21, the Embassy reported: “In meeting + this morning, Foreign Minister Minnih noted that Qadhafi had asked leave to visit Mauritania + following his trip to Rabat; GIRM had replied Mauritania’s friends were always + welcome. GIRM officials were + visibly relieved when Qadhafi’s entourage headed east from Rabat.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830415–0655) + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Summary: In his 45 hour visit to Mauritania, Libya’s Colonel + Qadhafi found officials + wary and a populace relatively indifferent. Qadhafi minded his manners. + Important issues addressed—Chad, Western Sahara, and the Middle + East—apparently prompted no startling revelations. In all + Mauritanian officials made it quite clear that they were not + susceptible to the Libyan leader’s grand schemes for Africa, Islam, + or the Arab world. End summary. + + Mounting a hasty but credible reception to accommodate Col. Mummar el Qadhafi’s auto-invitation to visit + Mauritania, Chief of State Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla welcomed + the Libyan leader to Nouakchott for a forty-five hour visit + beginning July 22. Trailer trucks transported several thousand + inhabitants of Nouakchott’s tent-and-shack suburbs to ringside seats + on the airport road. French and Arab editions of Chaab carried a + photo of Haidalla and Qadhafi + in a fraternal embrace. Qadhafi boarded one of the four aircraft which + transported his entourage at 9 a.m. on July 24. + + Authentically Arab: In apparent contrast to his disastrous public + relations effort in April, 1981,Reference is to Qadhafi’s “unexpected” April 21, 1981, visit to + Mauritania. In telegram 1811 from Nouakchott, April 22, 1981, + the Embassy reported that Qadhafi publicly declared that Mauritania had + accepted “in principle, to join Steadfastness Front” which + opposed the Arab-Israeli peace process as well as “the + possibility of Mauritania-Libya merger.” The GIRM informed the Embassy, + however, that Mauritania had not agreed to any of Qadhafi’s claims. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810189–0944) when he chastised Mauritanians for their + defective claims to membership in the Arab-Islamic world, Qadhafi this time round celebrated + the authenticity of Arab culture and Islamic values in this “most + western bastion of the Pan-Arab nation”. Haidalla, whom he had + earlier asked to step aside in favor of more zealous Pan-Arab + nationalists, was described as “a true guide to the revolution”. During a hastily arranged + meeting with leaders of Mauritania’s structure for the education of + the masses, a year-old political consciousness-raising effort, + Qadhafi drew some + flattering parallels between the SEM and his own successes since + coming to power in September 1969. + + Matters of substance: Apart from two dinners and a breakfast + (offered in a tent 20 miles into the desert), visits to two small + Libyan-supported projects, and meetings with Mauritania’s sizeable + contingent of Libyan secondary school teachers, Qadhafi’s schedule consisted + primarily of two hour long meetings, one with Haidalla and Prime + Minister Taya, and another + with Foreign Ministry officials on both sides. At the latter, + according to one report, Qadhafi stoutly contradicted reports of Libyan + troops’ presence in Chad, and urged Mauritania to play a more active + but unspecified role in the “anti-Zionist” camp. Haidalla and + Qadhafi reportedly + discussed Western Sahara options in their private talk; little more + is known except for a GIRM + official’s comment that Haidalla sought new assurances that a + settlement should not prejudice Mauritania’s sovereignty or the + Sahara’s right to self-determination. + + Comment: In a nice touch, the front page of the July 23 Chaab + managed to juxtapose Haidalla welcoming Qadhafi with a picture of Foreign Minister Ould Minnih receiving Ambassador + Peck. The airport scene + projected another message: Several French military aircraft parked + alongside the runway, prompting rumors they were carrying supplies + to Chad. Mauritanian officials noted with relief and astonishment + that Qadhafi and his party of + 200 brought their own food—even lambs for the traditional meschoui; + Nouakchott’s food markets are notoriously short on basic supplies + this time of year, and news of Qadhafi’s impending arrival had prompted a mini-run + on what delicacies were available. For the rest Nouakchott’s + attention remained steadfastly fixed during Qadhafi’s stay on Mauritania’s + first-ever soccer tournament in their new stadium. From what we can + see at this point, in substance and in form, Qadhafi’s return to Mauritania was + a modest affair; we will assess the significance of the visit in + septel.In telegram 3555 from + Nouakchott, July 28, the Embassy reported: “According to GIRM and foreign observers, + Col. + Qadhafi left Mauritania + not a happy man. His departure, however, may have raised + Haidalla’s spirits. Qadhafi found no audience for federation + schemes, and Chief of State Haidalla took umbrage at his + demeaning assessment of Mauritania and its efforts to mobilize + its own resources.” The Embassy continued: “Qadhafi was heard + urging his aide-de-camp to hasten their departure from ‘this + miserable country.’ It was not a productive visit.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830430–0191) + + Brynn +
+ +
+ 25. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830428–1045. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority + to Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. + + 3148. + + Algiers, July 27, 1983, 1310Z + + + + SUBJECT + Qadhafi in Algeria. + + + Ref: + (A) Algiers 3102.In telegram 3102 from + Algiers, July 25, the Embassy reported that during remarks made + upon his arrival “Qadhafi called Algeria ‘his second country’ + and said the time has come for Arab nations to face up to their + problems, i.e. ‘the march of Zionism backed by American + imperialism.’” The Embassy noted that while no details were + available concerning Qadhafi’s talks with Algerian officials, + nonetheless, “Maghrebi cooperation and Western Sahara are + thought by nearly all observers to figure among major points of + discussion.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830421–0583) + + + + (U) Qadhafi departed Algiers morning July 26, after + two-day stay labelled “working visit” by GOA. President Bendjedid met several times with Libyan leader and + hosted a dinner limited to the Politburo, high FLN officials, and African and Arab + Ambassadors. Qadhafi also + appeared before FLN officials at + party headquarters, where he was reportedly criticized for + encouraging internal PLO + dissension. + + (U) No details concerning the + bilateral talks have filtered out as yet—even the rumor mill remains + dry. Highlights of the joint communique include: + + Reaffirmation of the Saharan peoples’ right to + self-determination and independence and support for the + Addis Ababa OAU Summit + resolution as the best means for “an urgent and peaceful + political solution”; + + Support for the July 16 OAU bureau resolution on Chad, calling for the + withdrawal of all foreign forces and national + reconciliation; + + Agreement on the continuing need for supporting the + struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of + the PLO, its sole and + unique representative; + + Reaffirmation of solidarity with Syria as it faces + “provocations and challenges.” + + + (C) Comment: We doubt that + Qadhafi’s visit broke new + ground. For the Libyan leader, however, it provided a useful + occasion to refurbish his regional credentials and to breathe new + life into a dwindling dialogue with the GOA. Algeria shares in particular the latter objective, + believing it safer to at least remain in communication with the + unpredictable Qadhafi. On + substance, Bendjedid surely + reiterated the Algerian conception of the great Arab Maghreb, i.e., + a community of interest to be patiently developed through increased + regional cooperation over + several generations—the antithesis of Qadhafi’s grandiose visions of immediate fusion into + one great Arab nation. Other topics of discussion probably included + Qadhafi’s impressions—in + the wake of his Rabat visit—of Moroccan intentions in the Western + Sahara, the current state of play in Chad, and recent developments + in the Middle East.See footnote 2, Document + 22. + + Nouakchott minimize considered. + + Newlin +
+
+ 26. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State + and the White HouseSource: + George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice + Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Niact Immediate; Via + Privacy Channel. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was + received in the White House Situation Room. Bush visited North Africa + September 11–16, Yugoslavia September 16–18, Romania September + 18–19, Hungary September 19–20, and Austria September + 20–21. + + 93. + + Algiers, September 14, 1983, + 0135Z + + +

For: NSC/Judge Clark Office of the Vice President. From: Vice President’s + Traveling Party. Subject: September 12 Meeting Between King Hassan II and Vice President Bush.

+ + + The Vice President and King Hassan met on 12 September in the + Royal Palace in Rabat. Ambassador Walters was the only other person present. Since + this was a very private meeting, distribution should be held to + minimum. + + Lebanon. After the amenities, the Vice President said we had + received very alarming news yesterday from Lebanon. The King + interrupted to say he had just heard that Prince Bandar had obtained + a cease-fire from the Syrians, Druzes, and Shiites, and was + currently in Larnaca (Cyprus) talking to President Gemayel of + Lebanon. He did not think that Bandar would have made his proposal + in the first place if he did not have Lebanese agreement. + + The Vice President asked whether such a cease-fire in place would + hold. King Hassan replied that it would “for a while.” + + The Vice President then asked what the King thought we should do + and the latter replied that we should above all not put our tail between our legs and “bug + out.” The Vice President then asked whether the King thought a + government of national unity could be formed in Lebanon. The King + said it could and when it was formed then the countries having + forces in Beirut could withdraw honorably. However, to bug out would + cause tremendous U.S. loss of face. Long term the King was not + optimistic about the durability of the government of national unity + and he added reluctantly, “In the end it may result in a partition + of Lebanon between Syria and Israel.” The King was most concerned + about the activities of the Shiite Moslem Iranian volunteers. The + Syrians were egging them on. Arming and supplying them. + + King Hassan said that he had advised the Saudis to cut off the + Syrians’ money to force the Syrians to cooperate with Bandar. They + had done so and six hours later Assad had indicated willingness to + resume talks with Bandar. The Vice President said that this jibed + with our information. + + Iran-Iraq war. The Vice President then asked the King what he + thought of the Iraq-Iran war. The King replied that the Vice + President would recall that when he was in Washington that had been + the subject about which he had talked the most as it could easily + degenerate into a much more serious conflagration. The Saudis were + most concerned. There were more than 100,000 Iranian pilgrims in + Saudi Arabia. They were demonstrating and causing trouble, but they + could not be kept out because they were Moslems visiting the holy + places. However, when the demonstration began, Prince Abdallah, the + head of the National Guard, had been most concerned and had + curtailed his month-long vacation in Morocco and rushed home. In + addition, said the King, there were a lot more Iranians who had + entered Saudi Arabia through Bahrain and other places and it was + difficult for the Saudis to keep track of all of them. + + Libya. The King then spoke of Qadhafi’s recent visit to Morocco.See footnote 2, Document + 22. The Libyan leader had sent him a message + saying he would like to come to Morocco. King Hassan had asked what + he wanted to talk about and Qadhafi had replied about a number of things. So the + King had agreed that he could come for a day and a half. He had, in + fact, stayed for four days. + + He had promised King Hassan that he would cease all support to the + Polisario. King Hassan said that he had kept that promise up to now + but he was very skeptical for the future. + + “Qadhafi is a schizophrenic” the King added. “All of us are to + some degree. But in most cases our schizophrenia amounts to ripples. + In his case, it is tidal waves.” The King had introduced Qadhafi to the parents of most of + the Polisario leaders. These people are Moroccans living in + Morocco. + + + King Hassan said that Qadhafi was still determined to hold on to large + pieces of Chad and would not give up those territories he had + acquired by force. + + Qadhafi had been so taken + with the uniforms of the Moroccan parachutists that the King had to + have a number made overnight for the Libyan leader’s female party + who were not, contrary to popular belief, bodyguards but students + ranging from 19 to 25 that Qadhafi took with him on his travels on a rotating + basis so that “they could see the world.” + + The King said to Qadhafi at + the outset of the visit that he would talk very bluntly with him + since he would not ask the Libyans for money or cheap gas. He + concluded that Qadhafi was + schizophrenic and a dangerous man, unpredictable and irrational. His + relations with Algeria were deteriorating because of border problems + along the 1,000 kilometers of common frontier. + + Western Sahara. The Vice President then asked about the Sahara. + The King went through the history of the area and the grounds of the + Moroccan claim. He said he had promised a referendum before the end + of the year and he would go through with it. It would be supervised + by the UN and the OAU. The Algerians had indicated to + him that they were not keen for a referendum because they knew that + Morocco would win. + + The King said he had offered the Algerians a free port and fishing + rights on the Atlantic coast. He had told them that they had things + Morocco needed such as energy and petroleum technology and Morocco + had food and other resources Algeria needed. Why should they not + join together to build the great Maghreb. He believed President + Bendjedid would have to + go along with all of this and build a natural gas pipeline to Europe + via Morocco and Spain that would unquestionably be viewed favorably + and perhaps helped by the U.S. which would be delighted to see + Europe less dependent on Siberian gas. The difficulty was that the + Algerians were still searching for their national identity and it + was difficult to get a consensus of those who governed + Algeria. + + The Vice President asked what he could do to help while in + Algiers. The King replied, “emphasize all of the foregoing.” + + The King then gave the Vice President a copy of his letter to + OAU Chairman Mengistu indicating that he would + hold the referendum in the Western Sahara but would not go to Addis + Ababa.Telegram 7313 from Rabat, + September 12, contains the text of Hassan’s letter to Mengistu. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) + + The King said that all parties in Morocco supported his position + on the Sahara and he was quite sure that Morocco would win the + referendum. The July and September 3 and 9 attacks on Morocco were + Algerian-supported.For information concerning the July + incident, see footnote 2, Document + 411. No record of attacks in September has been + identified. Earlier on one occasion the Polisario had + fired 3,000 rounds of Katyusha (122 mm) rockets in one day. That + represented an expenditure of some 20 million dollars and the + Polisario simply did not have that kind of money. It had to come + from Algeria. + + The King said that the form in which the question was posed for + the referendum was important. The Algerians would demand the + withdrawal of the Moroccan administration and armed forces. He would + reply that the referendum which gave independence to Algeria had + been posed simply as “do you want to be part of France or Algeria?” + and in the Sahara it should be phrased: “do you want to be part of + Morocco or of an independent state?” he also pointed out that the + referendum had been held in Algeria with the French administration + and armed forces in place. + + If a majority decided for an independent state in the Sahara. He + would hold free elections and turn the country over. Not to the + Polisario, but to whoever won, just as the U. S. felt that the Palestinians had a right to a + homeland but was not in favor of turning them over to the PLO. + + Invitation to King Hassan. The Vice President said that President + Reagan was looking + forward to a working lunch in the United States with the King. King + Hassan then said that he would probably go to the United States on + September 23. He would speak the day after the President.Reference is to Reagan’s September 26 address to the UN General Assembly. He knew + that the President had 37 leaders who wanted to see him, and he was + delighted that the President had accepted this meeting with + him. + + The Crown Prince. The Vice President and the King then spoke about + the Crown Prince and how the King was more and more putting him into + public life and possibilities in a non-deferred future of his + spending some time in the United States. + + Conclusion. The Vice President and the King agreed to exchange + information on Lebanon later in the day when they met for dinner. At + the end the Vice President handed the King the letter from President + Reagan.No record of Reagan’s letter to Hassan has been + found. + +
+ +
+ 27. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State + and the White HouseSource: + George H. W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice + Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Eyes Only; Via + Privacy Channel. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + 280. + + Belgrade, September 17, 1983, + 1630Z + + +

Fm Admiral Murphy. To Judge + Clark for the President and Secretary Shultz. Subject: The Vice President’s Bilateral With + Prime Minister M’zali of Tunisia.

+

The Vice President met with PriMin + M’zali on September 15 for a discussion of bilateral issues. The meeting + lasted approx. 30 minutes. The atmosphere was cordial. The following + record was compiled from the interpreters notes.

+

The Vice President: I may be useful to make some observations on my + private meetings with President BendjedidSee Document 130 for Bush meeting with the Algerian + Prime Minister. and King Hassan.A + record of the Bush-Hassan meeting is in Document 26. There + are no secrets but we can talk alone and you may have some questions. We + are determined to improve our relations with Algeria and I told + President Bendjedid that that is + what President Reagan wants. I + found the Algerian President to be a very reasonable man. There were no + polemics and little rhetoric. He is a reasonable man who wants us to do + more with King Hassan regarding the Sahara. I told him anything we do + with reference to Morocco should not be viewed as a threat against + Algeria. Bendjedid asked about + U.S. bases in Morocco and I explained the access and transit concept for + the RDF (rapid deployment force). I + made sure Algeria knows that this is not designed to threaten Algeria. + There was another matter which came up. One of our officials had made a + statement to the effect that Algeria is a satellite of the Soviet Union. + I made clear to President Bendjedid that that is not the view of the USG and that it does not reflect the + attitudes of the President, or the Vice President, for that matter. + Concerning King Hassan’s talking to the Polisario, I told Bendjedid that that is a Moroccan + decision.

+

I told the President that we support the referendum and think this is the + right approach. In my talks with King Hassan and President Bendjedid both, whenever the referendum + was mentioned it was cited in a very favorable light. Finally, I told + Bendjedid that we wanted to + cooperate. We are disgusted with Qadhafi and have no use for him but he is not ten feet + tall. We do not trust him and consider him unstable. If there are any + threats, we can exchange information and contribute to the security of Tunisia, we shall be glad + to do it with you as we have offered to do it with other countries. + Bendjedid replied you are + making Qadhafi bigger than he is. + The Vice President responded that if in the future you in Tunisia are + concerned about the movement of Libyan forces or if there is any concern + over a threat to Tunisia we will be glad to pass or share information + with you concerning your security. Now we understand that Qadhafi comes to visit. He is a + neighbor with whom you must deal. This will pose you no difficulties in + the United States. However we do not trust him; we do not want a dialog + with him as long as he subscribes to international terrorism. So if you + want to have this information we will give it to you because we feel + very strongly about Tunisia’s integrity and idependence. We will go the + extra mile for you. But we will not involve you in any of our disputes. + The Prime Minister expressed appreciation and interest in these + proposals. He said that Tunisia has excellent relations with both + Morocco and Algeria at present. Relations have been good with Morocco + for many years. With Algeria they have been based on trust and + brotherhood. There are a number of industrial and commercial projects. + This is good for Tunisia because after Gafsa Tunisia felt caught in a + pincer between Algeria and Libya. Bendjedid is indeed a moderate who wants to raise the + standard of living of his people. He does not have the imperialistic + vision of his predecessor, President Boumédiènne. However, Bendjedid needs time to wipe out the + Boumedienne legacy. There are still militants in the party structure. He + hoped, the Prime Minister said, that the United States might develop a + privileged relationship with the three countries of the Maghreb on a + basis of equality. On the Sahara, the Prime Minister said that he was in + Morocco and talked to King Hassan, who was concerned. Next week he (the + PM) will go to Algiers to talk with + President Bendjedid and the Prime + Minister. He is convinced that if these problems cannot be worked out + there will be no peace, no confidence, no cooperation in the Maghreb. + “We want the U.S. to exert as always its influence in favor of an + honorable compromise”.

+

The Vice President responded that the U.S. would like to see that too, + but that we cannot lean heavily on King Hassan by asking him to do + something that is not in his interest. We asked what kind of a + compromise does Tunisia envisage? Mzali responded that he had asked Hassan how far he + could go, mentioning a formula like that used in the southern Sudan, + i.e. a sort of confederation. King Hassan said that he wanted to + bequeathe his son a Morocco of six or seven laender rpt laender, as in + the FRG. “If I gave in to the Sahara + then the people in the Rif which has been under Spanish domination would + ask for the same thing”. National unity would crumble. However, said + Mzali, the King did not rule + a confederation out. In Tunisia, continued the Prime Minister, we will + continue to try and hope that the solution will ripen. Like you, we cannot take any initiative + which will arouse the two countries. Why don’t we stay in touch, said + the Vice President, to see what kind of initiative develops that we can + both support.

+

The Prime Minister then talked about U.S. assistance to Tunisia, economic + and military, the “close” commission, etc. He referred to problems in + Congress.Not further identified. + He said that for FY83 “we’re ok” but he hoped that the administration + would keep pushing its line with Congress to keep aid at a more + substantial level for Tunisia. Tunisia is a country that has needs for + equipment, at least for its army. With respect to economic aid, Tunisia + apparently is no longer eligible but given the plan it will need to do a + great deal to create jobs and raise the level of young people’s standard + of living. Otherwise the young will listen to Libya and believe that + Libya is some sort of a paradise. On Libya, we’d rather talk but we will + remain vigilent. We’d rather talk than close the borders or create + tension. We recall the Arab saying that you should have the Koran in one + hand and a stone in the other. We do not lack stones. The PM gave a few words about Qadhafi’s visit. He met and talked with + young party members and said “the U.S. is attacking you”. I (M’zali) + said what about the Russians? And Qadhafi has changed on Maghreb unity. He used to say + that it is an imperialist U.S. plot. Now he says that it must be built + by changed policies. So we take note of his change of position and + atttitude. If it persists so much the better. If it does not we shall + not be surprised. The Prime Minister then raised at President Bourguiba’s request the possibility of + setting up an American university in Tunis and replacing the flag ship + of the Tunisian navy. “We were told that a World War Two vintage + destroyer is available.” A 15 or 16 million dollar overhaul will be + required. President Bourguiba + would like to receive it in good working condition. The Vice President + said he would have Admiral Murphy look into that when he gets back to his + office.

+
+ +
+ 28. Telegram From Vice President Bush to President ReaganSource: + George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice + Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Via Privacy Channels. + Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + 281. + + Belgrade, September 17, 1983, + 1635Z + + +

Copies only to: Judge Clark and Sec State. Positively no other + distribution. Subject: Herewith My Capsulized Personal Impressions on + Magreb Countries.

+ + + Morocco. King Hassan showed me unprecedented hospitality. The + foremost symbol of this was very small dinner at which his wife and + four children were in attendance.See + Document 26. + + His main problem is—Morocco, quite simply, is broke. His Majesty + could not bring himself to discuss the gory details. His Finance + Minister had prepared a letter, but the King’s pride and his innate + belief that friends will help friends kept him from passing the + letter to me. + + Morocco has given us access to bases for rapid deployment. Others + would have traded hard and exacted a price—not Hassan. + + It seems imperative to me that we help Morocco now in their hour + of critical need. + + Algeria. I had a very long one-on-one with President Bendjedid followed by a family + lunch at which we were joined by just Barbara and the seldom seen + Mrs. Bendjedid.See Document + 27. + + I was impressed—Bendjedid is much more moderate and reasonable + than I had expected. He is far different than Boumédiènne, a + judgement confirmed by the Moroccans and Tunisians. All subjects + were discussed in a very realistic non-polemical way. + + I left Algeria feeling it is well worth the effort at high levels + to work with them. Someday I would love to see Bendjedid come to meet you. I + guarantee you will like him and find him sensible. + + He has some big problems steering Algeria away from its more + radical past, but I believe he wants to do just that. + + Tunisia. Our friend Bourguiba is out of it. He was pleasant and + emotional but he kind of comes and goes.See Document 27. + + Example: Right in the middle of my somewhat boring toast given at + a lunch for his top people, Bourguiba yelled out “What about Israel? They ought + to do what’s right in the Middle East.” All his top people and his wife tried to calm him + down and shut him up. My heart ached for the poor guy. + + I saw a good deal of his designated successor Mzali, who sends his regards to + you. Mrs. Bourguiba, a very + warm and engaging woman, came unexpectedly to Mzali’s dinner for us. She clearly + overshadows them all—they all defer to her, even Mzali. + + Our relationship with Tunisia is excellent. They have huge + financial problems. + + All three countries worry about the Polisario problem, but Algeria + and Morocco are still pretty far apart. + + They all detest Khadafi, though all have contacts with him. + + Except for their actions in the various multilateral organizations + which often go against us, our relations with Tunisia and Morocco + are excellent and the relationship with Algeria has great + potential. + + One side note—I survived, barely, a challenging press conference + in Tunisia. It was like every questioner was representing Arafat in philosophy and acting + like Sam DonaldsonReference is to the + White House Correspondent for ABC News. in performance. + + They blamed us for the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla.Reference is to the September 16–19, 1982, + massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Shiites in the Sabra and + Shatilla refugee camp by a Lebanese Christian Phalange militia + allied with the Israeli military. Documentation on the incident + is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March + 1984. I just lucked out by being questioned on the + anniversary of the massacre. + + They all stated that Habib + had made an agreement that we would protect the Palestinians when + their fighters pulled out.See footnote 2, Document 17. They + were emotional and unreasonable. Come to think of it though, I’d + rather have done that, than call John Loeb.Reference is to John L. Loeb Sr., a wealthy + financier, philanthropist, and strong supporter of + Israel. + + Oh yes, Yassir Arafat, in + Tunisia, called Mzali, + Tunisia’s Prime Minister, offering to drop by to see me. + + This concludes my report from the Magreb. May all your dates be + free of dromedary dung. May your fruits be devoid of sand. May the + finger of peace be aimed in the right direction. + + George + al-Bush +
+ +
+ 29. Memorandum From Paula + Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Africa, Africa General (07/20/1983–10/01/1983). Secret; Sensitive. + Sent for information. Printed from an initialed copy. A copy was + sent to Bush. + + + Washington, September 29, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + Report on the Vice Presidential Trip to North Africa and Eastern + Europe + +

As you know, I accompanied the Vice President on his recent trip to North + AfricaSee Document + 28. and Eastern Europe, covering seven countries in + ten days. I found the trip to be fascinating, challenging and immensely + rewarding. I was proud to have been able to partake in this important + endeavor.

+

On this visit, the Vice President sought to clarify U.S. policies and + objectives in a regional and global context and to gain new insight into + Magreb and East European thinking. Specifically, in North Africa, the + Vice President discussed such issues as the Western Sahara, the Lebanon + crisis, and prospects for a Middle East settlement, as well as bilateral + trade and economic matters.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to North Africa.]

+

In addition to the private exchange of views, the trip had an important + public diplomacy dimension. The Vice President’s presence in individual + North African and East European countries underscored the importance + which we attach to maintaining an informed and assertive policy in these + regions. The Vice President delivered two major foreign policy speeches. + His speech in Algiers cogently affirmed U.S. support for a policy of + genuine non-alignment and reiterated our position that the fostering of + a free market economy represents the best hope for Third World economic + development.Excerpts of Bush’s September 14 address at + the El Aurassi Hotel are in telegram 3935 from Algiers, September + 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830533–0534) The address is printed in full in + Department of State Bulletin, November 1983, + pp. 11–14. The Vice President’s speech in Vienna provided the + most authoritative exposition to date of the Administration’s policy of + differentiation toward Eastern Europe.A + transcript of Bush’s + September 21 speech in Vienna is in telegram 11579 from Vienna, + September 21. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830545–1038) For text of the speech, see Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign + Policy, Document 168.

+ +

In sum, the trip to North Africa and Eastern Europe was a resounding + success. The Vice President established a personal rapport with the + primary leaders in these countries and thus, contributed to the + furtherance of our bilateral relations. He also succeeded in conveying + both frankly and convincingly Administration views on significant + bilateral and international issues.

+

Morocco

+

Given Morocco’s strong ties with the United StatesWe have enjoyed the longest unbroken treaty + relationship with Morocco dating back to 1787. [Footnote is in the + original.] and King Hassan’s successful meeting with + President Reagan in 1982,Reagan + and Hassan met at the White House on May 19, 1982. it was not + surprising that the Vice President was warmly welcomed in Rabat. In + fact, he was treated as a head of state. He was greeted with a 19-gun + salute and was received immediately by King Hassan without the customary + waiting period. Their meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and + covered a wide range of issues such as Lebanon, Qadhafi, the Middle East settlement and + the Western Sahara. In these discussions, the King purposefully chose + not to request any economic assistance. However, our Ambassador and + other Embassy officials clearly described the critical state of the + Moroccan economy and strongly recommended urgent U.S. assistance. (See + Ambassador Reed’s letter to the + Vice President at Tab A.)Not attached is + Reed’s September 13 + letter.

+

During our stay in Rabat, most of us found Moroccan officials to be + somewhat uneasy. In private conversation, one got the impression that + they were concerned about the Vice President’s stop in Algeria and hoped + that the potential strengthening of U.S.-Algerian relations would not + develop at Morocco’s expense. The Vice President’s trip to Morocco was + capped by a visit to the ancient city of Fez where he was cheered by the + local inhabitants.I was pleased to learn + that we are building a VOA + transmitter in Rabat to broadcast to the USSR/East Europe. [Footnote + is in the original.]

+

Algeria

+

The Vice President’s meetings in Algeria were marked by a cordial + atmosphere and represented a significant milestone in the development of + U.S.-Algerian relations. As this was the first visit to Algeria of an + American official of such rank, the Algerians perceived this event as a + manifestation of our interest in intensified bilateral political + dialogue. The Vice President engaged in very fruitful exchanges with + both President Bendjedid and + Foreign Minister Ibrahimi.A record of Bush’s September 14 conversation with Ibrahimi is in telegram 9899 from + Bucharest, September 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830540–0309) In fact, + Bendjedid + invited the Vice President and + Mrs. Bush to dinner at his home + and introduced them to his family.

+

In the various discussions, the Algerians stressed the importance of the + principles of self-determination and non-alignment in Algerian foreign + policy which stem from their revolutionary experience. Of the issues + discussed, the topics of Western Sahara and Moroccan-Algerian relations + were the most prominent. The Algerians expressed some concern that U.S. + military assistance to King Hassan might diminish his incentive to + negotiate on the Western Sahara settlement and that the existence of + U.S. bases in Morocco might prejudice U.S. reaction to a possible + Moroccan-Algerian conflict. The Vice President vigorously refuted both + claims.

+

The Algerian visit was concluded by the Vice President’s address on U.S. + views of non-alignment and North-South economic issues. His remarks were + well received.

+

Tunisia

+

A model of economic and social development in the Arab world, Tunisia + continues to emphasize domestic progress. Thus, most of the discussion + focused on such issues as education, family planning and the role of + women in social and economic development. In his meeting with the Vice + President, President Bourguiba + proudly pointed out that Tunisia has done more for women’s liberation + than any other Arab country. Specifically, they have ensured equality of + educational opportunities, have promoted women’s political + participation, and have outlawed polygamy.

+

President Bourguiba also chided us + for grain sales and technology transfers to the USSR and stated that we should show + greater interest in transferring technology to our friends such as + Tunisia. Lebanon was briefly discussed. During the luncheon, President + Bourguiba interrupted the + Vice President’s toast and asserted that Begin refused to withdraw from Lebanon. In reply, the + Vice President aptly pointed out that the U.S. is committed to the + withdrawal of all foreign troops and that it is primarily Syrian + intransigence that poses the main obstacle to a Lebanese settlement.

+

Even though it was not originally scheduled, the Vice President consented + to meet with the Secretary General of the Arab League, Klibi, at his request.A record of the Bush-Klibi conversation is in + telegram 9893 from Bucharest, September 18. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830540–0296) This encounter was very useful as the Vice + President strongly communicated U.S. resolve in seeking a peaceful + Lebanese settlement and indicated that if attacks on the U.S. Marine + contingent persist we would do what was necessary to ensure their + security.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to North Africa.]

+
+ +
+ 30. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830733–0734. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority + to Nouakchott and Tunis. Sent for information to Bamako, Niamey, + Paris, and Rabat. + + 5506. + + Algiers, December 13, 1983, 1053Z + + + + SUBJECT + Mauritania to Join Algerian/Tunisian Friendship Treaty. + + + Ref: + Nouakchott 5653 (Notal).In telegram + 5653 from Nouakchott, December 12, the Embassy reported on + Haidalla’s impending visits to Algiers and Tunis. The Embassy + stated: “The primary issues on the agenda, regardless of who + initiated the visits, are probably the current crisis in Lebanon + and the resolution of the Sahara question.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830731–0293) Reference is to the ongoing fighting between the + PLO and the Lebanese + Government and intra-PLO fighting. For additional information, + see Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Parts 1 and + 2, Lebanon, + 1981–1984. + + + + Confidential—Entire text + + During December 13 meeting with DAS + Schneider and Ambassador + Newlin, MFA Deputy Secretary General Kerroum said that Mauritania was + expected to sign on today to Algerian-Tunisian friendship treaty. + Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali + is arriving Algiers 1100 hours, December 13, to join with President + Bendjedid and President + Haidalla for ceremony. It is also reported that Haidalla and + Bendjedid will sign + border agreement formalizing Mauritania-Algerian frontier. + + Comment: Mauritania’s adherence to treaty further crystallizes + division of Greater Maghreb into two camps—Morocco (supported by + cooperation with Libya in certain areas) on one side Algeria, + Tunisia and Mauritania on the other. Although Algerians remain + hopeful that concept of Greater Maghreb cooperation can be + revitalized, they are discouraged by events of last six months + during which no progress has been made. The expansion of the + Algerian-Tunisian treaty also represents a political coup for + Bendjedid, less than one + week before the 5th Party Congress. + + Newlin +
+ +
+ 31. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 1983. + Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not + declassified]. Drafted by Clarke (INR/C). + + + Washington, December 20, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + NEA/CIA/INR Meeting, 16 December 1983 + + + PARTICIPANTS + NEA—Ambassador Murphy + Ambassador Schneider + CIA/DDO—[name not declassified] + INR/C—Walter Clarke + +

The following subjects were discussed in the NEA/CIA/INR weekly + intelligence coordination meeting held in Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy’s office on 16 + December 1983:

+

North Africa. Deputy Assistant Secretary Schneider accompanied the Secretary on + his visit to Morocco the previous week and subsequently left the + Secretary’s party to make a personal visit to Algeria. His travels + provided the focus for some very interesting observations on changing + alliances in North Africa. On the Secretary’s trip,See Document 221. A + complete record of the Shultz-Hassan conversation is in telegram + 9409 from Rabat, December 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830736–0509) it was + considered unfortunate that the Secretary did not raise with King Hassan + [as suggested in his briefing notes]Briefing + notes were not found. Brackets are in the original. the + matter of King Hassan’s apparent rapprochement with Libyan leader + Qadhafi. There is some irony + in the fact that Libya’s diplomatic success in becoming reintegrated to + the Arab world began with initiatives taken by Saudi Arabia.

+

Obviously the quid pro quo for Moroccan assistance + to Libya [recall the ongoing Moroccan efforts to arrange a meeting + between a senior USG representative and + the Libyan Qadaf al-Dam]Brackets are in the + original. is Libyan complaisance on the Western Sahara. This + has led to closer cooperation between Algeria and Tunisia as well as to + strange moves by Morocco.

+

Schneider reported the Algerian + comment that Hassan is so emboldened by his Libyan tie that the + Algerians feel compelled to stand firm on Western Sahara.In telegram 5522 from Algiers, December 14, the + Embassy reported that during a December 13 meeting with Schneider and Newlin, Kerroum said “Qadahafi’s visit to Rabat may have + left the impression that the Polisario would fade away without + Libyan support. Kerroum said + that such an assumption is wrong. Regardless of Algerian logistical + support, the Polisario has large stockpiles of Libyan-supplied + armaments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830738–0115) No record of Schneider’s concern about the + Hassan/Qadhafi relationship was found. The NEA Deputy asserted that the USG is troubled by the evident warmth in the Hassan/Qadhafi + relationship. He is concerned that we have not mentioned this + preoccupation to Hassan.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to North Africa.]

+
+
+ 32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N840005–0248. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared + by Pearson, Schneider, and Hill; approved by + Murphy. Sent for + information to Algiers and Tunis. + + 93445. + + Washington, March 30, 1984, 1425Z + + +

For the Charge. Subject: Libya and our Bilateral Relations With Morocco. + Refs: A) State 77312In telegram 77312 to + Algiers, March 16, the Department transmitted a record of Khellef’s March 12 conversation + with Shultz during which + Khellef “outlined current + GOA views on U.S.-Algerian + bilateral relations and a range of foreign policy issues. The + Western Sahara and Algerian relations with Morocco were the key + topics, with Khellef + stressing Algiers’ conviction that Morocco’s hardening position on + the Sahara, in particular its apparent choice of military rather + than political means to achieve a solution, risked further + deterioration in Morocco’s already difficult domestic situation.” + Khellef speculated that + Hassan’s “reconciliation with Qadhafi and continuing assistance from Morocco’s + ‘friends’ had led to a stiffening of his position.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840173–0806) B) State 78924Telegram 78924 to Algiers, March 17, transmitted a record of + Reagan’s and Bush’s conversation with + Khellef. See Document 135. C) State 91389In telegram 91389 to Rabat, March 29, the + Department instructed the Embassy to “brief GOM at high (political) level on Khellef’s Washington visit” and + included talking points for such a meeting. The Department + continued: “When Moroccans digest line we have taken supporting them + they will, of course, be pleased” and instructed the Embassy to ask + Moroccans “given formal position Morocco and Algerians have taken on + dispute, we are perplexed how Rabat expects to reach objective of + negotiated political solution of Saharan conflict as mandated by + OAU Reso based on King’s + Nairobi offer which we both support and Algerians purport to accept. + We would welcome GOM’s further + thoughts.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840206–0898) D) State 76067.In telegram 76067 to Algiers, March 15, the + Department informed the Embassy about Schneider’s March 13 discussion with Khellef, during which Schneider “repeated expressions by + both the Secretary and the Vice President that in U.S. view the + Moroccans wished a negotiated as opposed to a military solution to + the problem. We did not believe, however, that King Hassan had the + political latitude to engage in direct negotiations with the + Polisario.” The Department continued: “given the formal and fixed + positions Algeria has taken on the dispute, we are perplexed about + just how Algeria might play this role. Consequently, we wondered + what strategy Algeria intended to pursue in the quest of an + objective which it appeared Algeria, Morocco and the U.S. share.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840170–0644)

+ + + (S) Entire text. + + Refs A–C have provided you with the tenor of our recent exchanges + with Algerian emissary Khellef. Ref D instructs you to brief Moroccans thereon and invite + their thoughts on how to inflect current drift towards more + confrontation and dangerous situation in North Africa as a result of + current Libyan activities. + + You will note that Libyan aggressiveness is once again rising + abruptly. London and Omdurman bombings are illustrative.In telegram 5809 from London, March 12, the + Embassy reported that “seven bombing incidents occurred in + London and Manchester over the weekend which authorities believe + were sponsored by the Libyan Government.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840162–0631) Several of these Libyan machinations now in + course could lead to actions targeting Americans (e.g. AWACS in Sudan) or NATO installations,An unidentified plane dropped five bombs on the + Sudanese city of Omdurman on March 16, killing five people and + wounding two. Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiri accused Libya + of ordering the attack. Documentation on this incident is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa. as at COMISO, others + could lead to sharp or sharper confrontations with allies such as + Britain, France or Italy. + + Since we value our relationship with Morocco, we have been at + pains to follow Morocco’s rapprochement with Libya with + understanding for Morocco’s needs. We remain convinced that it is + tactical. But we are also becoming aware of rising costs which + Morocco is incurring as a consequence of its new ties with Qadhafi (e.g. Rabat 2401In telegram 2401 from Rabat, March 14, the + Embassy reported that regarding Morocco’s attempts to prevent + the admission of the SDAR + to the OAU, “privately, the + GOM is working to retain + support of moderate black African states which have + traditionally favored Morocco on this issue, but whose backing + appears to be eroding from frustration over inflexibility of + Morocco’s position and suspicion of the 8-month détente between + Qadhafi and King + Hassan.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840168–0789) and Niamey 1723In telegram 1723 from Niamey, March 20, + the Embassy reported that MFA + Political Director Hama had told the DCM “the GON is + increasingly disenchanted with Morocco and has so informed the + Moroccan Ambassador personally. Hama says the King is speaking + out too much, and that there is a duplicity in the King’s + acquiescence to Libyan aggression in Chad vs. Libyan aggression + elsewhere. According to Hama, there are many black African + states which consider the Moroccan stance racist, and this + undermines their support for Morocco on the Western Sahara.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840183–0177)). + + Given the disruptive potential of Libya’s overt and covert + offensive which may well touch major U.S. interests still more + directly and painfully, we think it is timely to draw palace + attention to our rising sensitivity with respect thereto. (FYI. The Vice President’s comments in + reftel are indicative. End FYI). + You should therefore see Foreign Minister or Royal Counselor drawing + on following talking points: + + Begin talking points for + use with Foreign Minister or Royal Counselor: + + Although we consider that Morocco’s attitude toward Libya + and Rabat’s interest in improved relations with Tripoli are + entirely matters for + the GOM to decide, we are + for our part increasingly disturbed by continuing Libyan + subversion and aggression in and beyond Africa. + + Libyan efforts to absorb northern Chad, Libyan attacks on + Sudan and Jordan, threats towards Egypt, Libyan attempts + upon opponents of the Qadhafi regime residing in third + countries—as in the London bombings—adversely affect + American interests. + + We have long worked to help Morocco create and preserve a + situation in North Africa conducive to a negotiated solution + to the Saharan question, along the lines proposed by His + Majesty King Hassan + II and accepted by the OAU in Nairobi, which we + support. + + Accordingly, we welcomed the diplomatic initiatives which + led to the border meeting between King Hassan and President + Bendjedid in + February 1983. We subsequently urged Algiers to seize the + opportunities offered by the rapprochement and to avoid + rigid positions likely to impede the achievement of + acceptable outcomes. + + We judge by what we are now hearing in African capitals, + including Algiers, of concerns about the Moroccan-Libyan + relationship, that Morocco is paying a rising price in terms + of the support that it enjoys on the Saharan issue and the + potential for a negotiated solution to the conflict. + + In light of these concerns, we would appreciate Morocco’s + views on how a negotiated solution can be achieved under + current circumstances. + + + Shultz +
+
+ 33. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840303–0284. Secret. Sent for information to Algiers, Bamako, + Banjul, Dakar, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. + + 2085. + + Nouakchott, May 9, 1984, 1049Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Situation in the Maghreb: Mauritania’s Views. + + + + (S—Entire text). + + Summary: In an open and wide-ranging discussion, Chief of State + Haidalla told Ambassadors Peck and Reed that his principal external concern is a + peaceful resolution of the Sahara conflict. He fears that Morocco is determined to seek an + unattainable military solution, which places the entire region at + risk, and is particularly concerned about the burgeoning + relationship between King Hassan and Qadhafi. End summary. + + At their initiative, Chief of State Haidalla and FonMin + Ould Minnih met with + Ambassadors Peck and + Reed on May 7, + immediately prior to the latter’s departure. The meeting was + friendly and relaxed, marked by a very evident Mauritanian interest + in ensuring that Ambassador Reed was fully informed on Mauritania’s view of the + regional situation. + + Ambassador Reed opened the + discussion with a description of the effect of his drive up from + Rosso and flight to Tidjikja. He said that reading reports on the + drought was totally insufficient in terms of understanding its + dreadful impact. He was now able to comprehend the magnitude of the + catastrophe, and in his forthcoming session with President Reagan he would strongly support + continued American assistance.Reference + is to the persistent drought that affected much of the African + continent. In telegram 150550 to Addis Ababa, May 22, the + Department reported: “We have followed the course of the serious + and prolonged drought in Africa and have provided a rapid and + generous response. To meet the short term needs of the affected + populations, the administration has approved more than dols. 135 + million in emergency food assistance under PL–480 Title II to Sub-Saharan + African countries this fiscal year (more than in all of fiscal + year 1983) and plans to provide yet more as additional needs are + identified.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840333–0694) Documentation on the U.S. + response to the drought and famine in Africa is published in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues + II. Ambassador Reed added that President Reagan is interested in Mauritania + and admires President Haidalla, which made this meeting particularly + propitious. Haidalla replied with a request that Mauritania’s + profound gratitude be conveyed to President Reagan along with the hope for + success in the forthcoming elections. + + Ambassador Reed then + brought up the subject of the congressional proposal to move the + American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He said that King + Hassan had told him he believed that the letter from President + Reagan on this subject + had been instrumental in securing the moderate position reached at + Fez.On April 28, Reagan wrote Hassan: “As I + have earlier assured you, I am strongly opposed to moving our + Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. We are continuing + discussions with the Congress regarding this issue.” (Telegram + 125030 to Rabat, April 28; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840277–0703) He said + that the U.S. was grateful for Mauritania’s position and volunteered + to answer any questions that might remain on the subject. FonMin + Ould Minnih replied that the + GIRM had been kept well + informed, and was gratified that so many other Muslim nations + evidently shared a complete understanding of the administration’s + firm stand. + + + Ambassador Reed raised the + subject of the OAU and asked how + Mauritania viewed the prospects for the next summit. Haidalla said + that like many other countries, Mauritania was unsure of where or + when the meeting might take place. He believed that the principal + obstacle to a decision was the unresolved question of the SDAR and how the issue of seating + would be handled. He felt that some form of consensus would be + reached with the passage of time, but the whole matter was obscured + by the dangerous developments in the Sahara itself. + + Ambassador Reed replied + that the King had reacted to Mauritanian recognition of the SDAR,The GIRM recognized the + SDAR on February 27. + See footnote 5, Document + 417. as a personal setback and affront. He added he + is positive that the King wants only the best possible relations + with Mauritania and had therefore been distressed by the move, which + he saw as strongly anti-Moroccan. Haidalla replied that one of + Mauritania’s key difficulties was a continuing inability to have its + neutrality properly perceived in Rabat. When the CMSN took the country out of the + Saharan war to save it from total economic and political ruin, it + was seen as an anti-Moroccan move. When, in subsequent years, + Mauritania staunchly, and at some cost, maintained its neutrality in + the conflict, Rabat insisted that this too was anti-Moroccan. + Haidalla ruefully pointed out that Morocco apparently sees all those + who are not strongly aligned with it as strongly opposed to it, an + attitude which is neither reasonable nor productive. + + For five long years, he went on, Mauritania had done whatever it + could in facilitating a peaceful solution. It had steadfastly + refrained from extending recognition to the SDAR because it wished to ensure + that King Hassan knew he had an opening to the South and was + therefore not isolated. Even though Moroccan actions before and + after the signing of the Taif AccordsReference is to the resumption of relations between Mauritania + and Morocco in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Mauritania + in March 1981, which was brokered in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. See + Document 7. clearly indicated + a continued interest in destabilization, the GIRM had refrained from taking any + steps which would limit the opportunities for an eventual peaceful + solution. However, Mauritania and many other countries had finally + become convinced that Rabat was only interested in military means. + This fear was confirmed by the extensions of the berm, with the + greatly increased risk of an expanded conflict, and the sudden + reestablishment of good relations with Libya, a nation which poses + serious threats to every country in the region, including Morocco. + Ambassador Reed interjected + that King Hassan has no illusions whatsoever about the dangers of + dealing with Qadhafi, and is + well aware of them. He wanted to secure the cessation of arms deliveries to the + Polisario, a goal worth the price of improved but cautious + relations. + + Recognition of the SDAR was + intended to accomplish a number of steps, Haidalla went on, none of + which were inimical to Morocco’s interests. He said Mauritania + wished to add momentum to the efforts of those seeking + implementation of the OAU consensus + decision and, at the same time, act to reduce the greatly increased + isolation of Algeria which resulted from the Morocco-Libyan + rapprochement. It was also intended to reduce the likelihood of a + conflict with Morocco by forcing the Polisario into a reciprocal + recognition of and respect for Mauritania’s borders. Haidalla said + that this action, taken to protect Mauritania’s neutrality, is of + short term benefit rather than harm to Morocco. In making the + announcement of the recognition, he went on, he had heavily stressed + that there was absolutely no change in Mauritania’s stance of total + neutrality. + + Haidalla said that no military solution is possible, however, + particularly in the long run. He feels that Morocco is making a + serious mistake and placing the entire Maghreb in danger by + increasing the risks of an expanded war. Ambassador Reed interjected that King Hassan + had personally assured him that under no circumstances would there + be a war with Algeria. Haidalla said that Mauritania has no + self-interests at stake and seeks nothing for itself, insisting only + that the people of the region be allowed to determine their own + future. He said his government still hopes for some form of + political solution in which all of the Maghreb peoples, specifically + including the Polisario and Morocco, could together find some way to + solve the problem. (Comment: He clearly sees this as a means of + avoiding the direct negotiations impasse, which was not specifically + mentioned. End comment). Ambassador Reed stated his belief that the King would be + satisfied with the flag and stamp solution proposed to Bendjedid in February, 1983. He + added that the U.S., for one, would not wish to see a weak, + independent and unstable state established in the area which could + provide a base for hostile interests. Ould Minnih replied that while independence is not + required, it must remain one of the options in a referendum. + + Ambassador Reed said that + he would like to be able to take to King Hassan some idea of the + steps that would need to be taken for the reestablishment of + relations between the two countries, something that he knows the + King is very desirous of having. Haidalla did not answer directly, + but replied with a low-key discussion of Mauritania’s constant, + deep-seated fears of Moroccan intentions. He said that there has + always been a strong desire to include Mauritania in the greater + kingdom. A major effort was made in this direction both before and + after independence, and the Moroccans have never tried to conceal + their objective. The + Istiqlal, in particular, has never ceased urging Morocco’s claims. + Haidalla also quoted a remark attributed to the Crown Prince who has + allegedly said “my grandfather liberated Morocco, my father + liberated the Sahara, and I will liberate Mauritania.” Haidalla said + that this basic attitude, and active destabilization efforts + directed from Rabat, leaves his government to operate under constant + threat from a large and powerful neighbor. Mauritania has therefore + always tried to ensure that it did nothing to provoke the monarchy, + with which it seeks the best possible relationship. (Comment: At + dinner the preceding day with three senior MFA officials, Ambassador Reed asked the same question. The reply in this case + was the full implementation of the Taif Accords, specifically an end + to involvement in the internal affairs of the other party. Morocco + has never stopped harboring and supporting Mauritanian dissidents, + according to the Mauritanians, which violates that agreement. They + added that Morocco’s aggressive intentions toward Mauritania are + well known. End comment). + + Ould Minnih drew attention + to the fact that Mauritania cannot and will not be ignored as the + Sahara conflict moves into a very critical phase. Underlining his + belief that no military solution will be possible, a belief that he + stressed was supported by a vast amount of modern history, Ould Minnih said that Mauritania + is prepared to defend its sovereignty and dignity against all + comers. While the resources for this purpose are limited, the intent + should not be underestimated. The nation’s future is at stake and + would be defended at all costs. + + The session ended with a brief discussion of regional tribalism. + Ambassador Reed said he had + heard that one of Haidalla’s close relatives held a high position in + the Polisario; Haidalla replied that as far as he was aware there + were none. + + Comment: The GIRM was clearly + interested in explaining its views to Ambassador Reed, given his position in the + USG and well-known access to + the King. Ambassador Reed’s + obvious, active and attentive interest in the issues discussed was + very effective in securing from Haidalla a frank expression of his + views. This message was drafted subsequent to Ambassador Reed’s departure. + + Peck +
+ +
+ 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840313–0208. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to Algiers, Cairo, Khartoum, London, Paris, Rabat, Rome, + and USCINCEUR. + + 3712. + + Tunis, May 14, 1984, 1512Z + + + + SUBJECT + Libyan-Tunisian Tensions—Qadhafi Signals That There is Still Room + for Negotiations but His Threats Escalate. + + + Refs: + Tunis 3665In telegram 3665 from Tunis, + May 11, the Embassy reported that the Libyan Foreign Ministry + had released a statement repeating the Libyan charge “that a + group of three terrorists was arrested coming from the direction + of the Tunisian border on May 6.” The statement, according to + the Embassy, indicated that “members of another group, + presumably those involved in the attack on May 8 in Tripoli, + have admitted under interrogation that they infiltrated from + Tunisia on March 1.” The Embassy continued: “On an equally + menacing note, we understand that Libyan radio has broadcast + interviews with Tunisians in Libya in which they call for the + overthrow of the Tunisian Government and the ruling party.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840307–0899) In telegram 966 from Valletta, May 9, + Price reported that the Egyptian Chargé said a “coup attempt” + had occurred in Tripoli on May 8. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301–0124) + Tunis 3685.In telegram 3685 from Tunis, + May 12, the Embassy reported that in an official statement + issued by the Tunisian Press Agency that day, the GOT responded to the Libyan + Foreign Ministry statement, “reiterated previous GOT denial of involvement” in the + incident involving the Libyan exiles, and “stressed GOT desire for good relations with + Libya.”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840310–0940) + + + + (Confidential—Entire text.) + + As of the morning of May 14, Tunisian officials seemed to be + hoping that the crisis with Libya would evaporate. Chargé spoke + briefly at an airport reception for President Abdou Diouf of Senegal with MFA Secretary General Fezzani, a + former Tunisian Ambassador to Libya. Fezzani said that he felt it + was a positive element that the Libyans had admitted holding three + Tunisian personnel in their statement of May 10 (Tunis 3665). He + indicated that negotiations for the return of the three had reached + an impasse, however. + + Fezzani did not seem to be aware of two Libyan statements released + late May 13 and just received here which are the clearest Libyan + public threat of retaliation against Tunisia to date. The first is a + JANA statement which is + moderately worded (LD 132209, notal).Not + further identified. It expresses Libya’s continued desire + for good relations, and says Libya does not doubt that Tunisia + shares this desire. However, “as their passports have shown”, a + handful of terrorists infiltrated Tunisia, and there can be no doubt + that “a Tunisian side or sides” facilitated their entry into Libya. + It is our joint task, the + statement concludes, to “discover those sides which aim to harm + relations between the two sister countries”. The second Libyan + statement purports to represent the views of Libyan “masses” who + demonstrated in Tripoli on May 13 (LD132037 notal).Not further identified. This violently + worded statement accuses “the traitors from Egypt and Sudan’s rulers + and the bad symbols conspiring within the Tunisian regime”, and + calls for battle with the “agent reactionary regime” in Sudan as + well as with “all other Arab regimes which helped in any form + cooperate with the stray dogs”. Libya is, of course, a state of the + masses. Taken together, these statements indicate the line Qadhafi is taking towards Tunisia: + unless the Tunisians admit that infiltration took place from + Tunisia, he may be unable to prevent the angry Libyan masses from + retaliating. The implication in both statements is that while the + Tunisian Government itself may not have facilitated the + infiltration, elements within the Tunisian Government knew what was + going on. + + We continue to believe that a negotiated solution of the crisis is + possible, but that the Tunisians will have to give Qadhafi some satisfaction in the + form of an official expression of regret and private assurances that + they will not allow infiltration from Tunisia. Statements like the + Foreign Ministry’s flat denial of May 9 reiterated by the Tunisian + News Agency May 11 are unlikely to have the desired effect. As time + passes, the two sides are hardening their positions, but Qadhafi is signalling that there is + still time to talk, provided the Tunisians are prepared to talk + seriously.In telegram 3779 from + Tunis, May 16, the Embassy reported: “Senior Tunisian security + officials have told us that there was a clash between Libyan + troops and the Tunisian National Guard May 15 at the border post + of Dehibat in the far south.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840318–0504) Later + that day, the Embassy reported that according a Tunisian Foreign + Ministry statement, “Bourguiba has decided to recall the + Tunisian High Commissioner (Ambassador) from Libya.” The + statement suggested that the Libyan official media “have + persisted in trying to implicate Tunisia in the events which + took place in Tripoli.” (Telegram 3791 from Tunis, May 16; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840318–1034) + + Finally, we hear from the Foreign Ministry that Algerian Foreign + Minister Ibrahimi is expected + here tomorrow. His presence will give the Tunisians moral support in + the face of escalating Libyan threats. + + Anderson +
+ +
+ 35. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840405–0401. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Sent for information + Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Cairo, Casablanca, + London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, USUN, Dakar, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR. + + 5590. + + Rabat, June 23, 1984, 0746Z + + +

Military for Polads. Subject: Algerian-Moroccan Relations: Increased + Tensions. Ref: (A) Rabat 5382 (Notal),In + telegram 5382 from Rabat, June 16, the Embassy reported that the + Moroccan news agency had issued a communiqué. According to the + unofficial Embassy translation, the communiqué stated that on June + 15, a Royal Armed Forces unit “mistakenly took a trail located along + the border in Algeria. The unit was then intercepted by an Algerian + unit thus provoking a minor skirmish.” The Embassy commented: “The + Moroccan communiqué seems to accept Moroccan responsibility for the + border incident while at the same time minimizing its importance.” + The Embassy continued that the reaction by both governments “implies + that neither side wants to give the impression that the incident has + major military or foreign policy implications.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840390–0713) (B) Rabat 4683,In + telegram 4683 from Rabat, May 24, the Embassy reported that on May + 17, Karim-Lamrani, “in a frank exposition of his views,” told + Weinberger “while + Morocco had made great progress in its fight with the Polisario in + the Sahara, it now has to be alert to possible action of some kind + by Algeria in the northern sector. The Prime Minister asked the + Secretary to give consideration to special, urgent military and + economic assistance, with emphasis on grant aid rather than loans. + The Secretary indicated that the USG hopes to be helpful in the longer term and to + improve the mix of grant and FMS + assistance in FY 85.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840339–0122) (C) Rabat 5063.See + also Document 225.

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + Summary: although there has been no apparent increase in the level + of Moroccan military activity following the June 15 incident along + the Moroccan-Algerian border, the incident itself and resulting + publicity underscore increased tensions between Rabat and Algiers. + The June 15 incident, as well as preceding events over the past two + months, has been interpreted by most Moroccans as evidence of a + shift in Algerian policy related to Moroccan military successes in + the Western Sahara. The present atmosphere could further erode + political and economic relations between Rabat and Algiers, + increasing the possibility of more serious incidents. End + summary + + Public reaction to the June 15 skirmish between Moroccan and + Algerian troops at the border near Anaguir (ref A) has been muted. + The GOM has deliberately downplayed + the incident in public statements and has not encouraged editorials or + speculation by the Moroccan press. Press coverage has been largely + limited to reprinting an official communiqué on the incident, and + only one paper, the Istiqlal Arabic-language daily “Al Alam”, + carried information on reported casualties and prisoners taken by + the Algerians. The article, summarizing coverage in the European + press, attributes deterioration in Morocco’s relationship with + Algeria to military exercises conducted by Algeria in mid-May. “Al + Alam” also emphasizes publicity given the incident by the Algerian + media and downplays the importance of the actual clash. + + Privately GOM officials have + described the June 15 incident to us as an “ambush.” A senior + counselor to the Prime Minister, for example, told EmbOff on July 19 + that Moroccan troops, sent to resupply the Moroccan outpost at Hassi + Lebraber, have used the same road twice a month for years. The + official acknowledged that the road passes through Algerian + territory for several kilometers, but said that the Algerians, while + aware of the Moroccan resupply efforts, have never objected to + Moroccan use of this short-cut in the past. The GOA, he charged, deliberately set a + trap for the Moroccan unit using the road on June 15. The same + counselor told us June 21 that the Moroccan military is taking a + particularly hard line on the incident. He said that he had attended + a meeting late into the evening June 20 with Colonel-Major Achabar, + Secretary General of the National Defense Administration, to discuss + the incident. Achabar, he said, was taking the incident very + seriously. Asked whether the GOM is + considering exchanging Algerian prisoners captured in 1976 for the + 31 Moroccans captured by the Algerians June 15, our interlocutor + said that he and the Moroccan military would oppose “handing + concessions to the Algerians after such an incident,” but that any + decision on such an issue would have to be made at the level of the + King and Royal Counselor Guedira. + + Senior Moroccans tend to view the June 15 incident and recent + military activity by the Algerians as a consequence of Morocco’s + expansion of the berm and military defeats Morocco has inflicted on + the Polisario. Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani told Secretary Weinberger on May 17 that Algeria + will no longer be able to put pressure on Morocco through the + Polisario and may, therefore, shift the focus of its efforts to the + northern sector. In the past, Karim-Lamrani explained, Morocco’s + task has been defense of the Sahara; now the GOM may be faced with the need to + shift assets to the more vulnerable north. Senior military officers + tend to share the Prime Minister’s views on the increased likelihood + of incidents along the border, and there is a possibility that + several units have already been shifted from the south to + Oujda. + + The June 15 incident did not take place in isolation but climaxed + several months of activity and tension along the entire border. In + late April, Algeria conducted a series of overflights in Moroccan + airspace and over the Western Sahara, coinciding with a large-scale + Moroccan effort to + further extend the berm. King Hassan told Secretary Weinberger shortly thereafter + that Bendjedid had let him + know that he had personally ordered the MIG–25 flights. In mid-May, + following joint U.S.-Moroccan exercises, the GOA conducted well-publicized + exercises which, according to official GOA statements, constituted a “warning to potential + enemies.” + + Comment: Moroccan-Algerian relations, which appeared to offer + promise following the resumption of high-level contacts between + Rabat and Algiers in early April, have clearly deteriorated. The + GOM will probably continue to + downplay the June 15 clash and subsequent publicity in large part + because Moroccan leaders realize that, in a direct military + confrontation with Algeria, the odds would be considerably against + them. Nevertheless, while reaction to recent incidents in both + Algiers and Rabat suggests that the risk of direct military + confrontation remains low, current tensions could well provoke + further, more serious incidents. A face-saving exchange of prisoners + could defuse tensions, but at present the Moroccan military appears + in no mood to pursue this option. + + Kirby +
+
+ 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N840008–0401. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + 5882. + + Rabat, July 5, 1984, 1120Z + + + + SUBJECT + King Hassan on State of Relations With Libya and Algeria. + + + + (Secret—Entire text.) + + Summary: Following July 3 meeting with Air Force Chief of Staff, + General Charles Gabriel,A record of the + Gabriel-Hassan conversation is in telegram 6009 from Rabat, July + 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840441–1090) King Hassan took + Ambassador aside for one-hour private audience. The exchange, which + covered multiple topics (septels)No + other record of the Reed-Hassan meeting has been found. + included review of present Moroccan relations with both Libya and + Algeria. While aware of limited Libyan resupply of Polisario, Hassan + remains most concerned by Algerian intentions. Dialogue with + President Bendjedid, he said, + has reached highly sensitive + phase even including exploratory discussion of Maghreb + “confederation”. End summary. + + At the conclusion of audience on military issues with General + Charles Gabriel, King Hassan continued discussion for one hour with + Ambassador Reed. While + conversation covered many subjects, Hassan clearly wished to provide + highly sensitive, close-hold up date on state of play with Libya and + Algeria. The King began by indicating his awareness of resumed, but + still limited, Libyan resupply of Polisario guerrillas. Hassan + stated that, following the recent attempted coup in Libya, Colonel + Qadhafi was convinced of + Moroccan complicity and recalled his Ambassador in Rabat. Hassan + subsequently sent an emissary to Qadhafi to make clear that, effective July 16, 1983, + he had ceased all training for Libyan opposition elements. He + further requested and received Qadhafi’s agreement for reassignment of the Libyan + Ambassador who is well regarded locally. The King continued that he + is aware that Libya has since dispatched several plane loads of + supplies to the Polisario, but the assistance, he said, is limited + and he is not yet concerned. War in the Sahara, he summarized, had + ended in a military sense with expulsion of the Polisario from the + territory. + + Turning to Algeria, Hassan said that Libyan resupply could not + take place without Algerian approval. Recalling his meeting with + President Bendjedid in + February 1983, he reiterated that Morocco’s interest in the Sahara + remains only the symbolism of the Moroccan flag and postage stamps. + He said that Morocco is already a large country and difficult to + manage, implying that a successor to the throne would be best served + by an autonomous Sahara within a confederated Morocco. Speaking in + strict repeat strict confidence, he reported that the dialogue begun + over a year ago with Bendjedid is now entering a delicate stage. The + Algerian President had sent Foreign Minister Ibrahimi to Morocco with tentative + proposals for a confederation of Algeria and Morocco as part of a + larger Maghreb. Hassan had received the proposal and immediately + ordered separate studies on the viability of (1) an + Algerian-Moroccan confederation, and (2) a confederation of the two + countries with Tunisia and possibly other Maghreb states. Before + replying to Bendjedid, he + also requested Algeria’s more detailed thinking on the two + prospects. The next step, Hassan noted, asking that the Ambassador + not take notes, will be a further exploratory meeting in Paris July + 6 between Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Foreign Minister + Ibrahimi. + + Asked by Ambassador Reed + what confederation with Algeria would mean in practical terms, + Hassan replied that Bendjedid + is conscious of growing human restraints in the present + authoritarian political system adapted from the Soviet model. + Confederation could thus imply a shifting away from such a system + with political adjustments and flexibility expected from Morocco as + well. Algeria, the King said, appears to favor a confederation with + Morocco as the first step toward Maghreb unity, since the two + countries are the major regional powers. + + + As a parenthesis to the above, the King brushed aside the June 15 + border incident with Algeria as inadvertent and entirely Morocco’s + fault. He implied that it resulted strictly from poor judgment by an + individual, local commander. + + Comment: We suspect Rabat and Algiers remain a long way from + confederation, but are encouraged that secret dialogue is continuing + at the Guedira-Ibrahimi level. Hassan, who prides himself on being a + geopolitical and abstract thinker, frequently takes the long-term + view and in this conversation was clearly thinking ahead to a future + in which an untried successor will be faced by domestic and regional + pressures working against continuation of the traditional and + autocratic Moroccan system of government. Confederation, as a + symbolic rather than practical concept, probably thus appeals to him + in the abstract as a will-o’-the-wisp to achieve sovereignty in the + Sahara while making peace with Algeria. + + Reed +
+
+ 37. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State + and the Embassies in Tunisia and AlgeriaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D840518–0422. Secret; Immediate. Sent + Niact Immediate to Tunis and Algiers. Sent for information Immediate + to Jidda and USLO Riyadh. Sent for information Priority to Addis + Ababa, Cairo, Casablanca, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Madrid, + Nouakchott, Paris, Tel Aviv, Tangier, USUN, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USDOCOSOUTH, USCINCEUR, USCENTCOM, Dakar, Conakry, Abidjan, Lagos, Kinshasa, + and Libreville. + + 7071. + + Rabat, August 14, 1984, 1749Z + + +

Military for Polads. Subject: August 13 Hassan-Qadhafi Meeting: + Conclusion of a Treaty Forming a Union Between Morocco and Libya. Ref: + (A) Rabat 7035,In telegram 7035 from Rabat, + August 13, the Embassy reported: “King Hassan arrived early August + 13 in Oujda, near the Algerian border, where he was joined by + Colonel Qadhafi. AFP reports here indicate that + Algerian President Bendjedid, + and perhaps King Fahd, are expected to join the summit today.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840514–0702) (B) Rabat 7069.Telegram 7069 from Rabat, August 14, contains the + text of a joint Libyan-Moroccan communiqué announcing the union of + the two nations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840517–0979)

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + Further to ref (A), reports that Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, and perhaps King + Fahd, would join the August 13 meeting in the Moroccan border town of Oujda between King + Hassan and Colonel Qadhafi + proved incorrect when neither appeared during the course of the day. + The Hassan-Qadhafi meeting broke up late in the afternoon with + Hassan departing for Fez, and Qadhafi going to Algiers and, on August 14, to Tunis + for consultations with Algerians and Tunisians over the principal + result of the Hassan-Qadhafi meeting: the conclusion of a treaty + instituting a union of states between Morocco and Libya (ref + B). + + The conclusion of the treaty, which was announced almost 24 hours + after Qadhafi’s departure + from Oujda, is the single most important step Hassan has taken in + his 13-month-old rapprochement with Libya. As we have reported, + there have been increasing high-level contacts between Morocco and + Libya in recent weeks, although there has been no indication that + the subject of the discussions was a treaty of union. Indeed, this + matter was handled in the greatest secrecy, with senior GOM Ministers, in response to our + inquiries, regularly denying that there was anything special going + on (French and Spanish Embassies tell us they were wholly unaware + that union was in the works). Even in the aftermath of the + announcement of the treaty’s conclusion, no details have been + released specifying the practical effect of the treaty, which will + not be implemented until ratified separately by Morocco and Libya + according to the procedures of each country. Nevertheless even as a + purely symbolic gesture, Hassan clearly intends through this + decision to signal to his opponents in the region that Morocco + continues to enjoy strong support; he also probably hopes that + through agreement on this treaty, he will reinforce Qadhafi’s interest in continued + rapprochement with Morocco, and continued political and diplomatic + support for Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara dispute. From + Qadhafi’s point of view + the treaty will presumably serve his own need to decrease Libya’s + isolation. + + Foreign Minister Belkeziz, who is now in Fez with the King, + telephoned Chargé afternoon of August 14 to say that he hopes to + meet to discuss these developments as soon as possible after his + return to Rabat late August 14 or early August 15. Apart from + Belkeziz, as senior GOM and palace + officials—all of whom accompanied the King to Oujda—filter back to + Rabat in the days to come, we will attempt to learn additional + details regarding the consequences of the treaty of union and the + substance of the Hassan-Qadhafi talks. Based on recent form, we can + predict with some confidence that the GOM will be at pains to try to reassure us that while + the agreement with Qadhafi + offers Morocco certain temporary material and political advantages, + there is, in a profound sense, less to it than meets the eye. + + Comment: Given the paucity of available facts and the recentness + of this development, we shall not attempt major instant analysis in + this telegram. On the other hand, some quick reflections are in + order: (1) one of Hassan’s + major motivations in entering this union, we think, is to bolster + Morocco’s position in its jockeying with Algeria, broadly for + predominance in the Maghreb, but particularly with respect to the + Western Sahara; (2) Morocco sees some practical near-term economic + value in specific cooperation agreements that either have already + been concluded or are rumored to be upcoming under the union + umbrella (e.g., civil air and other transport agreements); and (3) + purely speculatively, and admittedly without any proof, we wonder + whether the main bait for Hassan may have been a promised Libyan + quick fix for Morocco’s difficult cash flow problems. Hassan, by all + accounts, remains supremely confident of his ability to outmaneuver + Qadhafi and even to + moderate his maverick behavior. In our view, it would thus not be + out of character for the King to attempt to solve economic problems + by commitment to loose association with Qadhafi which recent Arab history suggests would be + non-binding and short-lived. + + After all foregoing has been said, we enter caveats: (1) from late + ticker reports we note that Moroccan Royal Counselor Guedira has + accompanied Qadhafi in his + August 13–14 conversations in Algiers and Tunis; and (2) we recall + Hassan’s comment to Ambassador Reed some weeks agoSee + footnote 3, Document 36. + that Rabat and Algiers were quietly exploring the possibility of a + Greater Maghreb grouping under which a Western Sahara solution might + be arranged. Thus, it seems to us that Qadhafi and Guedira could arguably have gone to + Algiers and Tunis either (a) to explain the Morocco-Libya Union and + argue that it is not directed against anyone; or (b) to try to put + the finishing touches on some broader arrangement. If their purpose + is the latter, the analysis suggested in para. 5 in this cable would + not necessarily hold in its entirety. In the absence of any real + evidence one way or the other, and purely on the basis of instinct, + we think their travels can best be explained by (a) rather than (b), + however. + + Kirby +
+ +
+ 38. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A + stamped and handwritten notation indicates that Weinberger and Taft saw the + telegram. + + 7380. + + Rabat, August 24, 1984, 1352Z + + +

For Secretary: NEA for Assistant + Secretary Murphy. Also for + S/AL. Department please pass to DCI and + SecDef. From Ambassador-at-Large + Vernon Walters. Subject: + Ambassador Walters’ August 23 + Meeting With King Hassan.

+ + + Secret/Nodis entire text. + + Upon arrival in Casablanca at 1430 on 23 August 1984 I was met by + Chargé Kirby and taken directly to the Casablanca palace where I saw + King Hassan for one and one half hours. + + King Hassan said that he knew the U.S. Government was concerned + and he wished to review with me the genesis leading to his signature + of the agreement with Qadhafi + on August 13. He said that his primary responsibility was to the + people of Morocco. They had become isolated as a result of the + Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian pact (which he had not been invited to + join and which seemed to him to encircle Morocco). + + The last time he had talked with Algerian Foreign Minister + Ibrahimi, the latter had + proposed a Maghreb confederation between at least initially, Algeria + and Morocco. King Hassan said he had been enthusiastic. Whereupon + Ibrahimi had asked him to + put down on paper his ideas on how such a confederation could be + organized. He had agreed to do so and had sent the papers to the + Algerians more than two months ago. There had been no comments or + reply from the Algerians since then. + + King Hassan then strongly felt the need to take some balancing + action of a similarly spectacular nature. Qadhafi had addressed to him, + Mubarak, Bourguiba, Bendjedid and Haidalla similar + letters saying that he wanted to do something for Arab and + Maghrebian unity. Qadhafi + said his conscience was bothering him for he seemed to be bothering + other Arab leaders and he wondered what he could do. The King had + then on 12 July sent Guedira to propose to Qadhafi a plan for union not repeat + not merger in which the sovereignty of member nations was intact and + which other Arab and African nations could join. To his surprise, + Qadhafi had accepted and + asked Hassan to come to Syrte to sign the agreement. Hassan had refused to go to + Syrte because of past U.S.-Libyan clashes and Qadhafi had proposed that he come + to Oujda—right on the Algerian/Moroccan border—to see the + King. + + King Hassan said that all of this had transpired in the greatest + secrecy and none of his Ministers with the exception of Royal + Counselor Reda Guedira and Minister of Interior Driss Basri was informed until they + were on the train and approaching Oujda. He then said that it was + important to read the agreement carefully point by point and he + proceeded to read it to me commenting on certain points. He pointed + out that the presidency of the union would be exercised jointly by + the leader of Libya and King of Morocco and in consequence Qadhafi could not take rash actions + without his consent. He then said “I have no illusions about + Qadhafi. Either I tame + him or the union breaks up. And because of his past behavior. He + will be blamed for the break-up.” There was perhaps only a ten + percent chance that he would succeed in taming Qadhafi, but that was still ten + percent more chance than had existed previously. The Libyan leader + said he was sure his signature of this agreement would infuriate the + Soviets and cause Hassan difficulty with the U.S. Hassan had replied + that he was sure the U.S. was not just a fair-weather friend but a + real friend. + + Hassan said he and Qadhafi + had agreed that the question of the union (not merger) of the two + states should be subject to a referendum as soon as possible. In + Morocco that referendum would take place on August 31. + + The union would also have a joint court and if agreement on + disputes could not be reached, both parties would accept the + jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. + King Hassan pointed to Article 11, which reads, “In the unbounded + reservation of their respective sovereignties each of the two states + undertakes not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other + state.” + + When I asked about the mutual defense aspects of the treaty and + what would happen if there were to be a Libyan attack on U.S. forces + in the Gulf of Sytre and the U.S. struck back, Hassan said that in + such a case he might write a letter of concern to President + Reagan and that would be + all. + + King Hassan said that Qadhafi had insisted on including in the text an + article on economic cooperation. Hassan had replied “My people think + you are rich. I know you are broke.” Qadhafi had not demurred. Hassan also pointed out + that he had invited Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia to + join—something they had not done with him in their tri-partite + treaty. + + King Hassan said that secrecy had been indispensable and this was + why he had not notified us, the French, or Egyptians until after the + signature of the agreement. He repeated that the treaty was not a + merger. Could be + denounced at any time, and gave Qadhafi no hold over him. There had been no mention + in the treaty of “imperialism or colonialism”. And that the preamble + of the treaty indicated that it was a point of departure for other + states to join. King Fahd had been informed and was enthusiastic at + the idea of taming Qadhafi. + + He then asked me how the U.S. felt about this agreement. I replied + that I had conveyed to President Reagan and Secretary ShultzNot found. + his message that he would not change his relationship with us + whatever happened, but I would be remiss in our personal friendship + if I did not tell him how concerned we were about this matter. + Qadhafi was viewed in the + U.S. as an unscrupulous killer very much in line with the opinion + the King had expressed to me the last time we met when Hassan said + to me, “If you go to see him, do not take anything to drink or eat. + He will give you something that will kill you a year later.” The + King nodded wryly as I reminded him of this. Then he said “You have + not been able to get rid of him or to silence him. Why not give my + plans a chance?” + + I said Qadhafi was a thug + who killed, subverted and was actively plotting against King + Hussein, King Fahd and President Nimeiri. We had been taken by + surprise by this announcement of which we had no advance knowledge. + Qadhafi was still in + northern Chad and there was serious evidence that he was connected + with the mining of the Red Sea and his terrorists were operating all + over Western Europe. + + King Hassan then said, “You have not been able to stop this kind + of behavior. Why not give me a chance to see if I can tame him. If I + can’t, the union will break down.” + + I said that we were concerned that this move would play into hands + of the Algerian hardliners to the detriment of Bendjedid. + + King Hassan said he could reassure me on that score. The Algerians + had been astounded at the Moroccan riposte to their tri-partite + alliance.In telegram 3766 from + Algiers, August 18, the Embassy reported: “Algerians are staying + cool and taking the high road in the wake of the Hassan-Qadhafi + agreement on union. Rather than denouncing the agreement (which + Qadhafi and Guedira + did not announce during their stop here), Algeria is pointing to + the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian Treaty of Friendship which is + open to other adherents as the true model for building the Grand + Arab Maghreb.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D840528–0402) He had called + President Bendjedid after the + signature and the Algerian President had accepted Hassan’s proposal + for a meeting between the two Chiefs of State and would send an + envoy to Morocco to work out the details on August 29. + + King Hassan also indicated that he had been in touch with + President Mitterrand who + would be coming to Morocco for a week’s vacation on the 29th of August. Mitterrand did not want to be in + Morocco on the day of the referendum on the treaty. So he would fly + to the Canary Islands for that day and then return to Morocco on the + following day. + + I then pointed to the difficulty of coordinating the policies of + Morocco and Libya. Hassan replied, “I will do the + coordinating.” + + I mentioned the questions that this union would raise for us in + the matter of aircraft. Hassan said Qadhafi had intended to buy 25 Airbuses but they had + American engines and perhaps the Moroccans could lease them, get + them maintained and return them to the Libyans. Hassan had told + Qadhafi that the + Americans were not children, would see through this scheme at once + and it was out of the question. He understands the problem of + maintenance for Libyan aircraft. + + Article 12, according to the King, would not in any way affect his + relationship with us. Qadhafi + had said, “You have your friends and I have mine”. + + Joint maneuvers:I then told the King why we had postponed the + joint maneuvers.After it learned of the + Moroccan-Libyan union, the Reagan administration postponed the joint + maneuvers. He listened carefully and wished us well. He + did not seem at all upset nor did he protest in any way the + postponement. + + Western Sahara:I expressed our concerns to Hassan about his + statements on “hot pursuit”. He replied that he knew any serious + attack on Mauritania could well draw Algeria into the war. Algeria + had overwhelming superiority over Morocco in all areas of military + hardware and only in the quality of its men did Morocco have + superiority. He certainly would not provoke a conflict with Algeria. + In reply to my question as to whether President Bendjedid was really in charge, + Hassan replied “More so now than at any time since he succeeded + Boumédiènne”. He was looking forward to this next meeting with the + Algerian President and hoped they could move forward together. + Certainly he did not have the hardware to match vast quantities of + Soviet equipment in the hands of the Algerians and more was + arriving. + + I asked whether he did not believe that the signature of this + agreement with Libya would antagonize the moderate black Africans + and hasten the Polisario’s admission to the OAU. We had been watching the strength of Morocco’s + position on the ground and its deterioration politically among the + OAU members. King Hassan said + Mubarak had urged him to + take some political action on the Sahara and he would soon hold a + referendum on the future of the territory. I could not elicit the forms in which the + question would be asked nor a date for such a referendum. Nor would + he discuss what he would say if the SDAR was seated. He did note that it was almost + impossible for anyone to attack Dakhla without crossing Mauritanian + territory. I asked him whether he had a direct threat of a military + nature from the Algerians and he said “No”. There had been no + threat. Saharaouis will vote in the parliamentary elections and in + the referendum on union with Libya. + + The King said “My agreement with Libya is wide open to the + Algerians, Tunisians and Mauritanians and even the Egyptians”. As an + aside he said, “After I see you, I am receiving the Major General + who is the head of the Egyptian Intelligence Service. He has told me + that the Egyptians view this union as a real possibility to get + Qadhafi back in the + corral”. Hassan then said, In all such deals there is a locomotive + and freight cars and I am a locomotive. If the union is unworkable, + I will break it”. + + It was clear that he did not want to be drawn out on what he would + do politically about the Sahara. But seemed fully aware of what + would happen at the next OAU + meeting. + + Then King Hassan said, “You Americans often do things I don’t like + or do not fully understand without consulting me in advance and I + don’t expect you to. We now have a 10 percent chance of being able + to tame Qadhafi. That is not + much, but it is 10 percent more than we used to have. Fahd and + Mubarak understand what I + am doing. The Tunisians have been odious.In telegram 6326 from Tunis, August 16, the Embassy reported: + “Taken aback and obviously irritated by the Moroccan-Libyan + decisions to form a union, the Tunisians are being pushed toward + Algeria. Qadhafi is + maintaining that the union was King Hassan’s idea, and has urged + the Tunisians to consider joining. Tunisia is not about to do + anything of the sort, but it is caught in the middle and will + continue to attempt to keep all of its neighbors—especially + Libya—off its back.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840523–0506) I will + work on the black Africans and we will see what we shall see. Every + nation has its problems. You have your Russians and your Chinese. + Algeria is my Russia and Qadhafi is my China. You must show understanding and + give me a chance to tame this madman. You must show that you are not + just fair-weather friends but friends in difficult times + also.” + + Finally. The King said he was sending his Counselor Reda Guedira + to Washington on September 4 to explain to those in the U.S. + Government who might be concerned about his agreement with Qadhafi,See Document 228. A record of the + Shultz-Guedira meeting is in telegram 267326 to Paris, September + 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, N840010–0334) and why Morocco had + taken this step, and would be grateful if the appropriate + appointments could be scheduled. + + + After my meeting with the King I met separately with GuediraNo record of the Walters-Guedira meeting + has been found. and flagged the various points of our + concern so he could be ready to answer them in Washington. + + Comment: King Hassan looked serene and relaxed. The only tone of + sharpness crept in when he said, “You must show that you are not + just fair-weather friends.” He seemed pleased to be able to tell me + that following this agreement he would be meeting with French + President Mitterrand (who + will spend a week in Morocco), Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid and that the Chief + of Egyptian Intelligence was waiting to see him as I left. He said + he looked forward to further discussions with me at the time of his + daughter’s wedding on September 15. That will give him some time to + reflect on our concerns and at that time I will press further on + what he intends to do about the Sahara. He may have seen Bendjedid by that time and will + certainly have seen Mitterrand. My plate was quite heavy this + time. + + Kirby +
+
+ 39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840600–0276. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eisenbraun; cleared + by Zweifel; approved by Nassif. Sent for Information Priority to Algiers, + Rabat, and Paris. + + 279876. + + Washington, September 20, 1984, + 2253Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Ambassador’s Call September 19 on DAS + Nassif. + + + + C—Entire text. + + Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Habib + Ben Yahia called at his request September 19 on + NEA + DAS + Thomas Nassif. Ben Yahia reviewed intra-Maghreb + relations in light of the Moroccan-Libyan accord, counseling the + U.S. not to react too harshly against Morocco. Ben Yahia’s major concern was that + the U.S. do what it could to avoid further Maghrebi polarization, + the main short-term result of the Moroccan-Libyan accord. Ben Yahia also observed that the + announced Libyan-French + troop withdrawal from Chad was welcome news but did nothing to + settle internal strife in Chad. End summary. + + Ben Yahia began the + meeting by requesting the U.S. reaction to the recent Washington + visit of Moroccan Royal Advisor Redi Guedira.See footnote 6, Document + 38. + Nassif summarized the visit, + stressing that Guedira had been told plainly of U.S. displeasure + with the accord. Nassif noted + some congressional dissatisfaction on both sides of the Hill and in both authorizing and + appropriating committees. Nassif stressed that the Department would be + watching developments closely but that we wanted the traditionally + close relationship with Morocco to continue, if possible. We do not + like the resulting polarization of the Maghreb and do not believe + the accord bodes well for a resolution of the Western Sahara + conflict. Morocco is using Libya to give political legitimacy to the + strategic gains Morocco had achieved by constructing the berm. + Nassif also said new + questions are raised on whether the Western Saharan conflict would + become more an Arab than an OAU + problem. Nassif concluded by + noting the new French-Libyan agreement on troop withdrawals from + Chad and wondered what relationship, if any, that event had to the + Moroccan-Libyan agreement. + + Ben Yahia responded that + while the troop withdrawal agreement was a positive development, it + did not necessarily suggest that Qadhafi was being more moderate, as Hassan said + might happen as a result of the Moroccan-Libyan accord. Ben Yahia cautioned that Qadhafi’s traditional pattern is to + withdraw in one area and to be aggressive elsewhere. At any rate, + noted Ben Yahia, the + internal situation in Chad had not been resolved; Habre’s position + was still weak and further civil conflict was inevitable. Nassif concurred that this would + probably be the case. + + Responding to Nassif’s + question, Ben Yahia turned + his attention to relations among the Maghreb states. He said that + Tunisia does not want strained relations with Morocco and that the + 1983 Tunisian-Algerian Treaty of Friendship, later joined by + Mauritania, should not be seen as directed against any country. + Ben Yahia thought + Algerian President Bendjidid had been weakened vis-à-vis his hard + line domestic critics by the accord. + + The meeting was concluded by Ben + Yahia’s advice that the U.S. avoid the instinct to + punish Morocco for its accord. Instead, Ben Yahia suggested an extended period of + observation to see whether in fact the accord would survive and + whether Qadhafi would in fact + moderate his views. Punitive U.S. action might only exacerbate Moroccan-Algerian relations + and polarize further the Maghreb.In + telegram 7361 from Tunis, September 21, Sebastian replied: “I see King + Hassan’s union as primarily a tactical move. He has gambled on + shuffling the deck in order to break the deadlock—in his favor, + of course.” Sebastian + continued: “Algeria and the Sahara remain his main focus, and he + has taken his precautions with Chadli with whom he hopes to meet + even now. He is not likely to hesitate in dropping the union + when it has served his purposes. We should not allow our ties to + Morocco to be unduly distended by Hassan’s misstep, for we are + central to his calculation and strategic orientation. We must + therefore try to preserve our balancing Maghrebi + relationships—all of them.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011–0026. + He suggested that the French could perhaps play a role in improving + Moroccan-Algerian relations. + + Shultz +
+
+ 40. Letter From the Ambassador to Morocco (Reed) to Secretary of Defense + WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. No classification marking. A + stamped notation at the top of the letter reads: “1984 SEP 28 PM 1:47 Office of the Secretary of + Defense.” + + + Rabat, September 21, 1984 + + Dear Mr. Secretary, + +

This is a hard letter for me to write but, given your past interest in + Morocco, I feel that I owe you my best assessment of where we stand in + light of the Oujda Accord and of the long-term implications of King + Hassan’s “Union” with Libya for the relationship with the United States. + Frankly, my first reaction, as the President’s Envoy in Morocco, was + that the Libyan Treaty, with one stroke, put at risk three years of + steady progress in U.S.-Moroccan relations on which I have so often + counted on you for support and counsel.

+

Now that I have had the opportunity, however, to discuss the Libyan + Treaty during two lengthy audiences with King Hassan and to exchange + views with virtually every Moroccan decision-maker during the recent + five-day wedding festivities for the King’s eldest daughter,In + telegram 8038 from Rabat, September 15, Reed summarized his meetings with Hassan, + Karim-Lamrani, and “a number of Moroccans within the King’s inner + circle. I conclude that, while the treaty is signed and was approved + in a referendum by 99.9 percent of the population, there are serious + private doubts and divisions within the palace and government over + the relationship with Libya.” (Reagan Library, Near East and South + Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 + (09/07/1984–09/20/1984)) I have a better sense of Moroccan + thinking and objectives in this unlikely union. The road will not be + easy for us, and Morocco’s alliance with Libya has clearly harmed + Hassan’s improving image in the United States. We should recognize, + however, as the King has repeatedly stressed to me, that the Treaty does + not represent a formal union or federation, much less a merger of the + two states.In a September 11 letter to + Reagan, Hassan wrote in + part: “We are anxious to assure you that the new Treaty affects and + modifies in no way the nature of our relations.” He continued: “We + made a point of it to inform Colonel Kaddafi beforehand of all there + is between the U.S. and Morocco and to express to him clearly our + firm determination not to modify any of it.” (Reagan Library, Near + East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 + (09/31/1984–11/19/1984)) Despite regular dialogue with us on + Libya, Hassan and Moroccans generally, also clearly underestimated the + depth of U.S. reactions.

+

In my conversations here, I have left Moroccan officials in no doubt + concerning U.S. opposition toward any steps giving legitimacy to the + Libyan regime. They now understand our position clearly, and I believe + that we should watch developments closely in the coming months. While it + will not be a time for dramatic new U.S. projects, equally we must work + to preserve what we have built up and put in place in Morocco.

+

The Kingdom remains a strategically located, moderate Arab state in a + volatile region. Its command of the Straits of Gibraltar and location on + flight paths to the Persian Gulf will continue to make it a valuable + partner, although not one we can take for granted. In political terms, + Morocco remains chairman of the major Arab and Islamic organizations and + will inevitably be important to the United States. It was King Hassan + who worked behind-the-scenes to set up Anwar + Sadat’s historic journey to JerusalemReference is to Sadat’s November 1977 visit to Jerusalem, during + which he addressed the Israeli Knesset. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + January 1977–August 1978, Documents 147, 149, 150, 152, and 153. and who, last + January at Casablanca, worked to end Egypt’s isolation from the Islamic + Conference.Reference is to the Arab + leaders summit held in January during which the Arab League voted to + allow Egypt to rejoin the organization. Egypt was suspended in 1979 + after it signed a peace treaty with Israel brokered by President + Carter. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August + 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, footnote 3, + Document 248. With the largest Jewish population in the Arab + World, King Hassan has also set an example of harmony for his divided + region, hosting a conference of Moroccan Jewish communities in Rabat + last May, attended by members of + the Israeli Knesset and world Jewish leaders. In the economic field, + Morocco’s current liberalization policy and increasing reliance on the + free market process hold promise of long-term stability and reflect + precisely the policies which we are urging the developing world to + follow.

+

Given these long-term interests, I believe that both in personal contacts + with key Moroccans and in our overall policy toward the Kingdom we + should strike a careful balance between recrimination and acceptance of + a fait accompli. After signature of the Treaty + with Libya and its approval by 99.9 percent of the population in a + national referendum, it would be hard to disavow without loss of face in + the short term. There are also tactical reasons which impelled Morocco + toward Libya. Among them I would cite: + + Pressure on Algeria to offset the recent + Algerian/Tunisian/Mauritanian Agreement. + + Libyan support on the Western Sahara and agreement to cut off + its flow of Soviet arms to the Polisario. + + Possible improvement of Morocco’s diplomatic situation in the + OAU by neutralizing + Qadhafi’s proteges + (Ethiopia, Bourkina Fasso, Madagascar, etc.) and offering weary + Africans an alternative Arab or Maghreb forum for the Western + Sahara. + + Libyan financial support at a moment of acute + austerity. + + Access to Libya’s one-half million foreign workforce for + Moroccans and potentially troublesome Moroccan returnees from + Europe. + + Increased Moroccan bargaining power to strike a subsequent + deal with Algeria, Saudi Arabia and others. +

+

As Hassan measures these possible advantages against adverse reaction + from the United States and others, I suspect that there will be a period + of trial and error in the union with Libya. In the longer run, I believe + that political “unions”—and even for that matter Qadhafis—come and go in + the Arab World, but that the ties forged over two centuries between the + United States and Morocco are likely to prove more lasting.

+

I wanted particularly to share these preliminary thoughts with you and + know that I can count on your support for basic United States interests + in Morocco and your continuing interest during the difficult period + ahead.In an October 22 letter to + Reed, Weinberger wrote: “Thank you for + your assessment of the Oujda Accord.” He continued: “An interagency + group is studying our future policy in the area to see what + limitations or constraints the Oujda Union has placed on current or + future plans and programs. Personally I hope the ‘Union’ ends very + shortly.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 1, Morocco)

+

With every best wish,

+ Joseph +
+ +
+ 41. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency + (Williams) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent for + information. Drafted by [name not + declassified]. Stamped notations at the top of the + memorandum read: “1984 26 OCT 09:19 Office of the Secretary of + Defense” and “SEC DEF HAS SEEN OCT 29 1984.” Copies were sent to + Taft and Iklé. + + S–0611/DIO + + Washington, October 25, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Moroccan officials—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U) + +

(C) On 22 October I met with the Moroccan + Ambassador, Mr. Maati Jorio, and + his Defense Attaché, Colonel Mohammed al-Kostali.No other record of the meeting has been + found. Ambassador Jorio had requested the meeting, primarily to discuss + Morocco’s rationale for the recent agreement with Libya. Throughout the + meeting Ambassador Jorio + emphasized his fervent belief that the Morocco-Libyan treaty should not + change the close historic relationship between our two countries. In + particular, he made a strong plea that our bilateral military programs + continue as before.

+

(C) Jorio said he understood US concerns about Morocco’s alliance with Qadhafi. He added that, of all north + African countries, “Morocco has been the most damaged by Libya.” After + more than ten years of trouble with Qadhafi, King Hassan concluded that “dialog is better + than confrontation” and thought the time had come to introduce Qadhafi into the circle of Arab + moderates. Jorio acknowledged + that Morocco may not succeed in influencing Qadhafi but thought it worth trying.

+

(C) Jorio did not advance economic considerations in support + of the treaty with Libya, but the implication was clearly there. Both + Jorio and Kostali were + pessimistic about Morocco’s economy: high rate of population growth, + five years of drought, and no real export potential besides phosphates + (which are facing a shrinking world demand). Even a further reduction in + oil prices will be of little help, according to Jorio, because any small savings in + purchase price will be eroded by climbing dollar exchange rates.

+

(C/[distribution not declassified]) When asked + about the impact of the Morocco-Libyan treaty on Algeria, Ambassador + Jorio replied that President + Bendjedid is “very upset.” He + quoted Bendjedid as saying “No + one can imagine a union of North African states without Algeria.” Recalling that I was the first + US general officer to visit Algeria + since independence, I suggested that the improvement in US-Algerian + relations might enable the United States to play a helpful role in North + Africa; however, the Moroccans were not very receptive to the idea. + Kostali said [less than 1 line not declassified] + Jorio and Kostali went on to + express concern over the sale of C–130s to Algeria and their potential effectiveness in + supporting the Polisario insurgency.See footnote 3, Document 106.

+

(C) With regard to Western Sahara, the + Moroccans seemed fairly optimistic over the military situation. Kostali + thought the planned final extension of the berm will do much to cripple + future Polisario raiding activity. He denied that Polisario units had + succeeded in crossing the berm in their raid on 13 August; “all the + wreckage was on the outside.” Jorio and Kostali thought the rubber ZODIAC boats used + in three recent attacks on Moroccan fishing craft either came from + Algeria or were launched from nearby ships, perhaps Soviet ships.

+

(C) On the diplomatic side, Jorio noted that Morocco’s position was + unfavorable in that most African states were lining up in support of + admitting the Polisario to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).See Document 422. + Jorio did not directly relate the + question of Polisario recognition to the Morocco-Libyan treaty. He + implied, however, that Morocco was hoping Libya would help out on this + issue in one of two ways: (a) by urging some of the more radical OAU members to accept Moroccan claims in + Western Sahara; or (b) by supporting Morocco in an effort to shift the + question of Western Sahara from the OAU + to the Arab League, which is likely to prove a more sympathetic forum + from Morocco’s standpoint.

+

(C/[distribution not declassified]) Of particular + interest were Jorio’s comments on + Libya, where he had previously served as ambassador. He described the + difficulty of doing business in a country like Libya which in theory has + no governmental structure, only committees, and does not recognize the + governmental institutions of other countries. Nonetheless, Jorio opined that Qadhafi is neither crazy nor fanatical; + rather, he is a very clever man who is “good at giving shows” when he + wants to dramatize a point. Furthermore, Qadhafi, who lives simply and sleeps in a barracks or a + tent, is not avaricious; he uses money solely to further his own brand + of revolutionary Islam. Jorio + downplayed the importance of any other Libyan figures such as former + Prime Minister Jallud: “There is no number two man in Libya.”

+

(S/[distribution not declassified]) Comment: An + experienced diplomat with previous government service at cabinet level, + Ambassador Jorio carefully + articulated the official Moroccan position on the alliance with Libya. Both in his generally + unfavorable treatment of Algeria’s role and his more positive attitude + toward Libya, he was clearly trying to put the best possible face on the + Morocco-Libyan treaty. His portrayal of Qadhafi as role-player rather than madman is intriguing + and probably valid up to a point; Qadhafi has shown the necessary flexibility and survival + capacity to outlast all but four Arab heads of state. Nonetheless, + Jorio has ignored (or chosen + not to mention) other aspects of Qadhafi’s track record which do not suggest a lasting or + productive relationship between the two countries: Qadhafi’s abrupt and sometimes erratic + shifts in alliance; his propensity for suddenly turning against former + allies (Sadat, Nimeiri, Bourguiba, and perhaps Assad); and his disregard for + accepted rules of international behavior as demonstrated this year in + LondonDuring an April 17 demonstration + by Libyan dissidents in front of the Libyan People’s Bureau in + London, shots were fired from a window of the building, wounding 11, + including a British police officer who later died. British + anti-terrorist forces later landed on the building, leading to a + stand-off between British authorities and the Bureau. (Telegram + 113541 to Instum Collective, April 18; Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840255–0296) In telegram + 9232 from London, April 23, the Embassy reported that the United + Kingdom had broken relations with Libya. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840264–0240) + Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. and—most likely—the Red Sea. King Hassan may be + able to exert some temporary restraining influence on his new partner, + but a long-term reformation is unlikely.

+

(U) Coordination within OSD is not required.

+ James + Williams + + Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Director + +
+ +
+ 42. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (McFarlane) to + President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Near East and + South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 + (09/31/1984–11/19/1984). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by + Teicher. A copy was sent + to Bush. + + + Washington, November 17, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Response to a Letter from King Hassan + II of Morocco + +

Issue

+

Whether to sign a letter (Tab A) to King Hassan of Morocco.

+

Facts

+

Following the visit, of Royal Counselor Reda Guedira, King Hassan II wrote you a letter (Tab + B)Attached but not printed. See footnote 3, Document 40. + reaffirming his desire for close friendship with the U.S. and assurances + that Morocco will maintain its independence from Libya.

+

Discussion

+

Your response (Tab A) candidly explains our political, legal and security + concerns related to the Moroccan Union with Libya. You express + disappointment and apprehension regarding Qadhafi’s intentions. As you know, an interagency review + of our policy toward North Africa is underway, and we plan to make + policy recommendations regarding U.S.-Moroccan relations in mid-November + for your consideration. Your letter does not address our future + relationship.

+

Recommendation

+

OK + No

+

That you sign the letter to King Hassan + II.Reagan checked and initialed the + “OK” recommendation.

+ + + Tab A + Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan + IISecret. + + + Washington, November 17, 1984 + + Your Majesty: + +

I was pleased to receive your letter of September 11; I read it with + care. I have discussed with Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, Director Casey, and National Security + Advisor McFarlane the + conversations they held with your trusted adviser, Royal + Counselor—Reda Guedira. I am sure that he has conveyed to you the + essential points and issues covered during his discussions here in + Washington. My views and concerns have also been communicated to you + directly by Ambassadors Reed + and Walters.

+

The friendship which historically has bound our two governments and + peoples is both important and enduring just as is my great and + continuing personal regard for Your Majesty. With this foremost in + mind, I am compelled to express my disappointment and apprehension + concerning the step which you have taken with the Libyan regime.

+

I appreciate your assurances that Libya will not derive benefits from + existing or future agreements between our two countries. In + particular, I am encouraged by your solemn pledge that sensitive + items will not be shared with Libya. The possibility that material + may be obtained by the Libyans is still worrisome, and we must + strive to prevent this.

+

U.S. foreign policy is conditioned and influenced by Congressional + action and open to public scrutiny and criticism. I know you are + well aware of this basic characteristic of the American system.

+

We are dealing presently with both of these aspects, but we are faced + with mounting pressures in both fora to consider the impact of your + new union, and future actions which ensue from it, on our bilateral + relations.

+

Equally important to these considerations are my continued + apprehensions about what this agreement may portend. My concern is + deep because I feel so strongly about the strength and importance of + the relationship which we have forged together over the past four + years. This relationship must be preserved and safeguarded insofar + as possible from interference and harm.

+

Your Majesty, you understand better than most the true nature of the + Qadhafi regime. The + record establishes that he is not a man to be trusted. In his 15 + years of turbulent and erratic rule, there have been times when + Qadhafi has tried to + appear both reasonable and + responsible. Whether in the Arab, African or global context, these + periods, regrettably, have been all too brief. The record confirms + that episodes of “good behavior” are short-lived and, if the past is + repeated, Qadhafi’s real + nature as an inveterate troublemaker and enemy of the West and of moderate governments + such as yours will soon re-emerge with the dangerous and + unacceptable behavior which is a trademark of his rule. This is why + I am so deeply troubled by the prospect that he will betray Your + Majesty as he has other governments with whom he has made such + arrangements in the past.

+

I know that you have set yourself the noble goal of reforming the + Libyan leader. You are a wise, honorable and skillful leader as has + been so often and amply demonstrated. Yet, in this instance I must + express to you my conviction that nothing of real or lasting value + can come from your association with Qadhafi. Failure to achieve your stated goal could + entail significant costs, and I fear that your great and richly + deserved reputation may be tarnished by the efforts on which you + have embarked.

+

Your Majesty, I speak with a heavy heart and out of deep friendship. + In the interest of preserving and enhancing the friendship and + cooperation between our countries, it is my earnest hope that a way + can be found to dispel quickly the pall cast on our relationship by + your treaty with Qadhafi.

+

I remain your sincere friend,

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan + +
+
+ 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria + and MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840789–0766. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wukitsch; cleared + by Schermerhorn (NEA/AFN), + Zweifel, Sheldon Krebs + (S/S–O), Johnson (P), and Covey; approved by Nassif. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis and + Nouakchott. + + 363217. + + Washington, December 11, 1984, 0053Z + + +

For Ambassadors. Subject: Démarche to Governments of Algeria and + Morocco.

+ + + Secret—Entire text + + Algerian-Moroccan relations have degenerated to a point where the + possibility of conflict cannot be ruled out. Algerian FonMin + Secretary General Kerroum told you November 23 that + the GOA would not be the first to + engage, and seeks to calm the situation.No record of Kerroum’s + November 23 comment has been found. In telegram 5699 from + Algiers, December 8, the Embassy reported: “Kerroum told + Ambassador Dec 8 Algeria seeks to reestablish dialogue with King + Hassan on a political solution for the Western Sahara.” The + Embassy continued: “Speaking officially on behalf of President + Bendjedid, Kerroum said Algeria does not + seek confrontation with Morocco, and it will not take the + initiative to raise tensions.”(Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840786–0643) + The GOM likewise disclaims + aggressive intent. Nonetheless, there is little prospect for + meaningful dialogue, even though King Hassan recently told + Ambassador Reed that he is + in almost daily telephone contact with Bendjedid. + + Among negative indicators are: + + A significant buildup of Algerian and Moroccan military + forces along the shared border. + + Moroccan Ambassador Jorio’s statement that war fever is building + in Morocco.In telegram 356507 to + Algiers, December 5, the Department noted that in a + December 3 meeting with Nassif, “Jorio stated his personal + belief that there is a growing popular sentiment in + Morocco for going to war with Algeria” even as Moroccans + admitted “Algerian military superiority.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840779–0474) + + The Moroccans reportedly are on the verge of expanding the + berm to within 35 km of the border—a move bound to appear + provocative to the GOA. + + In mid-September, the GOA + reportedly ordered a reduction in the number of non-official + Algerians in Morocco; some apparently have left. + + Moroccans claim Polisario has obtained SAM–6 missiles and + other sophisticated weaponry, operable only by Algerians or + outsiders. + + GOM sources claim that + the GOA has flown CAP for + recent Polisario attacks against the berm. (We do not have + independent confirmation.) + + Bendjedid is under + domestic pressure to take more direct action to assist the + Polisario. + + There has been one recent reported incident of + cross-border firing, initiated by the Algerians. + + + For Rabat: You should seek the earliest opportunity to make the + following points to the highest level of authority available: + + Various sources available to us indicate that there has + been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian + relations. + + We are particularly concerned over the increase in + military forces in the border area. + + + Although your government has assured us that Morocco has + no aggressive intentions, misinterpretation or mischance may + lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger. + + We urge your government to exercise caution, and to take + steps to dispel current tensions. + + Our Ambassador in Algiers is making a similar demarche to + the Government of Algeria. + + + For Algiers: You should seek the earliest opportunity to make + highest level demarche to your host government making the following + points: + + Various sources available to us indicate that there has + been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian + relations. + + We are particularly concerned over the increase in + military forces in the border area. + + Although FonMin + Secretary General Kerroum and others in your government have + assured us that Algeria has no aggressive intentions, + misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; + escalation is a clear danger. + + We urge your government to exercise caution, and to take + steps to dispel current tensions. + + Our Ambassador in Rabat is making a similar demarche to + the Government of Morocco. + + + We are calling in Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors for similar + presentation by Under Secretary Armacost.In telegram + 366367 to Algiers and Rabat, Dam reported: “Armacost made démarches to + Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors separately on December 11. + Neither expressed surprise at our expressions of concern over + increasing tensions between the two countries over the Western + Sahara and both accepted as reasonable our fear that by + mischance and unfortunate incident could develop.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840796–0666) + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 44. Memorandum From Phil + Ringdahl of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco (09/21/1984–01/11/1985). Secret. Sent for + information. + + + Washington, December 12, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Coup in Mauritania + +

Information

+

There is still no information on the new government in Mauritania, which + overthrew the previous leader, Lt Colonel Haidalla, in an apparent + bloodless, palace coupIn telegram 5905 from + Nouakchott, December 12, the Embassy informed the Department about + the coup: “According to the information being given out, the CMSN voted Haidalla out unanimously.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840794–0878) (Haidalla was attending the + Franco-African summit in Burundi, thus violating one of the cardinal + rules of staying in power in Africa which is to stay at home—always). + There is a curfew, the airport is closed. Our Embassy has no + problems.

+

We will be looking to see whether Libya was involved—recall yesterday’s + comments by President KountcheNo record of + Kountche’s comments has been found. that neither Libya nor + Morocco liked the recent regime; Morocco because of non-support on + Western Sahara, and Libya because of opposition to its Chad + occupation.

+
+ +
+ 45. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State + Richard Murphy, 1985: + Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985. Secret. Drafted by Sheila Lopez + (S/S–S); cleared by Nassif, Zweifel, and Johnson. Sent under a December 12 covering + memorandum from Hill to + Senior Interagency Group No. 48. Platt forwarded the draft NSSD, which he noted was “fully cleared interagency and + can be drawn on when preparing the NSDD on this subject,” to McFarlane under a January 25, + 1985, covering memorandum. + + + Washington, December 12, 1984 + + +

NSSD + 6/84: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MAGHREB

+

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

+

The treaty of union between Morocco and Libya has readjusted the + political situation in North Africa in a troubling manner. Hassan and + Qadhafi apparently each felt + politically isolated, and perceived the union to be a way out of their + respective dilemmas. Through union, Hassan may have won time during + which to consolidate his position on the Western Sahara. Qadhafi gained an unmerited measure of + respectability. Despite his subsequent diplomatic maneuvering, we + anticipate continuation of habitual Libyan adventurism and use of + terrorism focussed on Libyan dissidents.

+

The GOA perceives Algeria to be the + primary target of the union. In response, it has increased support for + the Polisario attacks against Moroccan positions, and deployed regular + military forces in greater strength along the entire length of the + common border with Morocco. In Morocco there is a growing presentiment + that military confrontation is possible. Meanwhile, the GOM apparently intends to proceed with + further extension of the berm; this further will provoke the GOA. Both governments disavow aggressive + intentions, but missteps could lead to escalating clashes. Meanwhile; + the Tunisians have adopted essentially a wait-and-see posture in + reaction to the treaty while privately voicing their unhappiness.

+

We are concerned by the damaging political respectability conferred on + Qadhafi by the Union with + Morocco. Beyond this consideration, our primary specific concerns relate + to the potential transfer of US + intelligence, military equipment and technology, or other controlled + items from Morocco to Libya. King Hassan repeatedly has assured us that + no such transfers will take place. This bears close monitoring. We are + also concerned that enhanced Libyan access will pose long-term security + problems for Morocco and that additional Libyan dissidents or + intelligence concerning them might be turned over by the Moroccans to + the Qadhafi regime.

+ +

Despite these concerns, we have concluded that the treaty poses no + immediate legal impediments to continuation of present US programs with Morocco. Likewise we + conclude that Hassan wants the union (which stemmed from his initiative) to work and, hence, will not soon + abrogate it.

+

We strongly desire that the union collapse at the earliest possible date; + in the meantime, our objective is that Hassan so circumscribe his + relationship with Libya that the treaty remains relatively meaningless. + To achieve this, we should carefully avoid too much overt pressure on + the King; politically, he cannot be seen to be backing down in the face + of US pressure. Instead, we should + underscore Qadhafi’s actions + which may be contrary to the spirit of the treaty and focus Moroccan + attention on our concerns about implementation of the union.

+

In addressing the changing regional situation, other key conclusions are: + + The Bendjedid Government in Algeria continues to move in + cautious fashion along a path of pragmatism and away from + pedantic socialism. There is some dissatisfaction with the + Soviet arsenal and support which we might be able to exploit. + However, this dissatisfaction does not + reflect a deep-seated GOA + desire to abandon either good relations with the Soviet Union or + its carefully burnished non-aligned credentials. + + Political malaise in Tunisia continues to grow. Bourguiba’s tenacious hold on + power complicates the transition already in train. Tunisia’s + near to mid-term future may be turbulent. A successor government + may move to associate Tunisia more closely with the Arab + mainstream. Continued US support + and assistance, especially in the military field, is a positive + stabilizing factor against radicalism. + + Qadhafi may change + tactics, but not his basic objectives. Knowing this, area + governments presumably will act accordingly to protect their + national interests, but may concomitantly engage in closer + relations with Qadhafi + than we believe are prudent. This will continue to complicate + our own policy toward Libya. + + Following seating of the SDAR by the OAU + summit in Addis November 12, Morocco walked out as + anticipated.See Document 423. When the + Western Sahara issue subsequently was debated in the Fourth + Committee at UNGA, the + Algerian resolution was passed, inter + alia calling for direct Moroccan-Polisario + negotiations. Although no move was made to extend UN membership to the SDAR, this could come in the + future. Meanwhile on the ground, Moroccan military control + continues to be strengthened. + + Across the area, longer term, endemic challenges to stability + stem largely from problems of population growth, poor + agricultural outputs, + sluggish markets for petroleum and phosphate exports, and + maldistribution of resources. Unrest growing out of + deteriorating social and economic conditions, especially in + Morocco and Tunisia, is likely and easily exploitable by Islamic + fundamentalists and other groups inimical to US interests. We recognize these + factors, but cannot unilaterally offer sufficient resources to + resolve the basic, interrelated problems. Nevertheless we should + work to increase our resource flows in the area. (OMB Comment: “This judgment lacks + analytical justification. There is no necessary correlation + between increased economic aid to the Maghreb and reduced + political instability. While it may be necessary periodically to + increase aid in response to a country’s specific economic needs, + there is no justification for a policy assumption that higher + economic aid levels will substantially correct the complex + social-political-economic problems that are endemic in the + region.”) +

+

Despite troubled prospects, we retain strong, healthy relations with + Morocco and Tunisia and improving ones with Algeria. Important US interests are served by relevant + programs.

+

U.S. OBJECTIVES

+ + + To foster political stability and economic and social development + through preservation and strengthening of moderate regimes. + + To limit regional subversion, particularly to neutralize relevant + Libyan-sponsored activities, and restore Qadhafi’s isolation. + + To assure passage through the area for commercial and strategic + military purposes. + + To deny the area to further Soviet penetration; to diminish + existing Soviet influence. + + To guarantee Western access to the area’s material resources; to + expand the market for American goods and services. + + To limit regional polarization. + + To reduce Algerian-Moroccan tensions and prospects for + conflict. + + To help bring about abrogation of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of + union. + +

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

Morocco:

+ + + [2 lines not declassified] + + Do not press Hassan publicly to abrogate the treaty, but + periodically remind him of our concerns and of his statement that if + attempts to “tame” Qadhafi + fail, he will sever the union. + + [3 lines not declassified] + + Conclude a General Security Of Military Intelligence Agreement + (GSOMIA) with + Morocco. + + + Continue visible cooperation under the Joint Economic (JEC) and Joint Military (JMC) Commissions at current levels + (DOD would delete “visible + cooperation” and substitute “all on-going economic and military + cooperative programs”.) + + Unless or until we determine that treaty implementation + unacceptably harms US interests, + economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should be + determined on criteria other than the GOM’s relations with Libya. (OMB Comment: “The proposed separation between + assistance levels and Moroccan-Libyan relations is artificial and + unrealistic. US efforts to convey + our deep dissatisfaction with the Oujda Agreement will be severely + undercut if we propose increasing security assistance to Morocco in + 1986. Furthermore, Congress will probably oppose the proposed + increases. Such a request could set off a politically + counterproductive public debate on the merits of aid to Morocco at a + time when the King is pursuing policies contrary to US interests.” DOD would reword second clause to read “. . .economic + and security assistance levels for Morocco should not be contingent + on the GOM’s current relationship + with Libya.”) + + Proceed on schedule with joint US/Moroccan military exercises, + keeping in mind Algerian and Spanish sensitivities as to time and + place and notifying those governments in advance as appropriate. + (DOD would reword first clause + to read: “Proceed on schedule with planning and execution of the + joint US/Moroccan military exercises program, . . .”) + + In the short-term (through March 1985), continue working level + visits pertaining to JEC and JMC activities but discourage Cabinet + level and other US high visibility + visits. (DOD proposes rewording “In + the short term . . .continue working level visits to Morocco but + discourage Cabinet level, high visibility visits.”) + + Do not invite, but respond positively should King Hassan propose + to come to Washington for private meetings with the President; use + such meetings to reiterate our concern about the Moroccan-Libyan + union. + + Prepare for the 4th Annual Joint Economic Commission meeting to + take place on schedule in May 1985. (DOD would propose same treatment for Joint Military + Commission meetings.) + + Proceed to negotiate texts for the Bilateral Investment Treaty + (BIT) and Bilateral Tourism Agreement (BTA) to be signed no earlier + than March 1985. (USTR position is that BIT should be signed as soon + as it is ready.) + +

Algeria:

+ + + Seek further to improve relations through the visit by President + Bendjedid in 1985, by + increasing Sixth Fleet port calls, and by other gestures as + appropriate. + + + Expand military cooperation by issuing a Presidential + determination permitting access to defense articles and services via + FMS, increasing IMET funding for career professional + training, and modifying policy to permit GOA acquisition of “lethal items”. + + Stimulate US private sector + participation and transfer of technology by establishing a Joint + Economic Commission. + + Intensify efforts to persuade the GOA to shift its gas export policy to a market-oriented + basis so as to increase likelihood for future sales in Europe and + the US. + +

Tunisia:

+ + + Demonstrate continuing, visible support by Sixth Fleet port calls, + occasional joint military exercises and other gestures as + appropriate; reaffirm publicly that these actions are in support of + Tunisian security and independence. (NSC supports an increase in military exercises and + other gestures.) + + In planning security assistance levels, take into account + Tunisia’s need to limit debt service on military procurements and + obtain additional military training. (NSC supports an increase in economic and security + assistance levels.) + + Continue to identify and expand contact with potential leaders, + whether in power or in the opposition; make clear in such contacts + that we continue to support the established GOT. + + Offer appropriate military/logistical support in the event of a + Libyan move against Tunisian territorial integrity, preferably in + support of the lead of France or other interested countries but + unilaterally if necessary. + + Enter into discussions with the GOT and other concerned governments to establish + realistic USG responses should + Libya attack Tunisia. + +

Libya:

+ + + While maintaining current levels of political pressure and + economic sanctions on Qadhafi, continue to review possibilities for increasing + such pressure. + + Continue a policy of containment based on strengthening ties with + Qadhafi’s neighbors and + utilizing our rhetoric to advance our goals while avoiding elevating + his status in the international arena. + + Publicly now reiterate our existing NSDD 16 policy encouraging US nationals to depart from Libya.Scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. Should future Libyan actions be + sufficiently egregious, consider the use of mandatory measures to + require Americans to + depart Libya. (USDOC urges that + this be done as routinely and discreetly as possible.) + + Continue our intelligence sharing and cooperation with friendly + governments in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism. (DOD proposes alternate wording + “Continue our intelligence sharing and expand political-economic + cooperation with friendly governments in our efforts to combat + Libyan terrorism and other unacceptable behavior.”) + +

Regional:

+ + + Continue to endorse publicly a political settlement of the Western + Sahara issue by an expression of self-determination. + + If necessary, veto SDAR + membership in the UN Security + Council. + + Proceed with implementing the VOA + modernization agreement with Morocco. + + Within approved budget levels, pursue expansion of public + diplomacy and educational/cultural programs with Algeria, Morocco, + and Tunisia. + + Morocco and Tunisia should have access to the blended credit + programs rather than increased PL + 480. (State opposes) (Treasury proposes alternate + wording as follows: “Morocco and Tunisia should have access to + blended credit programs to an extent dependent upon both need to + counter subsidized competition and periodic assessments of their + creditworthiness.”) + +

New Recommendations:

+

During the policy-level clearance process, the following new + recommendations were put forward. Some of these may not have been + addressed in the NSSD study/analysis. + None of them has been formally agreed to by the IG. The proposing department or agency should be prepared + to explain and defend the respective recommendation in the context of + the SIG.

+ + + Make every effort to assist Tunisia’s external security and + economic vitality. (DOD + proposes) + + Continue to search for opportunities to exploit Qadhafi’s weaknesses, internal + instability and paranoia. (DOD + proposes) + + The task force on Libya established by NSDD-16 should be + reconvened to explore the entire spectrum of feasible political, + economic and military options available for dealing with Libya.In a January 3, 1985, briefing memorandum + to Armacost, Murphy wrote: “In + negotiations leading up to the January 8 S/IG on North Africa, Arnie Raphel achieved Rich + Armitage’s agreement to drop two DOD-proposed new recommendations.” (Department of + State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records + of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, + 1985) No record of the S/IG has + been found. (DOD + proposes) + + + A policy of “correctness” toward Qadhafi is recommended which places the onus on him + to conform to acceptable standards of international behavior. + (DOD proposes) + + Encourage Hassan to cooperate visibly with the US in a manner that will “irritate” + Qadhafi. (NSC proposes) + + Prepare internal paper on diplomatic + options for US to try to reduce + Moroccan/Algerian tension and conflict potential.No record of the paper has been found. + (NSC proposes) + + The NSC wishes to discuss a + possible recommendation relative to the “Stairstep” program in the + Gulf of Sidra.Reference is to the + operational name for naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. + Documentation on the exercises is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. + + The Office of the Vice President wishes to discuss the merits of + pressing for a UN initiative to + resolve the Western Sahara dispute. + +

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

+
+
+ 46. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840795–0430. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to Algiers, Dakar, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and USCINCEUR. + + 5910. + + Nouakchott, December 12, 1984, 1733Z + + + + SUBJECT + Effects of the Coup. Ref: Nouakchott 5905.See footnote 2, Document + 44. + + + + C—Entire text. + + Based upon our knowledge of the members of the reconstituted + CMSN, and on the assumption + that there will be no wholesale changes in the membership—at least + in the near term—we offer the following preliminary and tentative + assessments of what the ouster of Haidalla may mean. + + For the U.S. continued good and improving relations. The key + players are still well disposed towards us. Our economic assistance, + especially the emergency food aid, is very much appreciated, and the + other phases of the + relationship (IMET, internal + security, the USIS program, Peace + Corps, etc.) are equally solid and on the upswing.Haidalla was + an enthusiastic backer of the orientation in our direction; we + believe that the vast majority of the committee was and is in full + and complete agreement. Taya, as the new President, is clearly in that + grouping. + + For the West. More of the + same. If the anticipated purges focus on those who have always been + rumored to be the most nearly out of step, i.e. Boukreis, the + pro-Libyan, the solidly pro-Western stance that Mauritania has + followed will be maintained. + + For the Maghreb. A more difficult call, but probably a + continuation of the present course. There is a slightly improved + chance of a gesture of some minor kind toward Hassan, which the + timing could make more meaningful, as long as Morocco does not make + any unfriendly noises in the interim. + + Internally. To the extent Haidalla’s removal reflected discontent + with specifics of his stewardship, there are two candidates for + consideration as possible results.The rumored move, toward + democratization/legitimization of the government. The CMSN announced a return to democratic + rule as one of its three goals when it overthrew the Ould Dada + regime five years ago (end the war with the Polisario and economic + recovery were the other two), and made an unexpected, almost fatal + effort in 1980 that involved a projected constitution, civilian + government and a discussion of political parties. It was being + rumored that Haidalla wanted to try again, using the Structure for + the Education of the Masses (SEM) as the vehicle, in the belief that + it was ready to serve that function. We understand that not very + many people on the CMSN agreed + (for good reason, in our opinion) and therefore suspect that the + experiment will be postponed.Islamization. The cautious but + steady implementation of the Sharia may be accelerated by the + removal of Haidalla as one of the cautious but steady proponents. + Mauritania is not at all a hot bed of fundamentalism, but Maurs have + been strongly advocating a more rapid and more strict application of + Islamic laws. The black community has been somewhat apprehensive + about the potential impact on their marginally more liberal habits, + and too much of a too rapid change could precipitate problems, + especially if the Maur dominated CMSN does not maintain its cohesion. + + Unless the CMSN does itself in + as the result of the departure of Haidalla, matters will go on much + as before. We speculate that there may well have been an + accumulation of minor disatisfactions that finally led his + colleagues to vote him out. Perhaps he was beginning to enjoy his + role a bit too much, and offending his colleagues by tending to forget he was only + primus inter pares, as tends to happen to people in similar + positions. (The recent proliferation of large-sized portraits of + Haidalla prompted quiet expressions of disapproval in some + quarters.) To the extent this is the real reason he was dethroned, + and the rather thin list of domestic and external issues mentioned + above lends some credence to the thesis, the eventual results of the + change may not be numerous. + + Peck +
+
+ 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840824–0766. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority + to Nouakchott, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR. + + 6014. + + Algiers, December 27, 1984, 0707Z + + + + SUBJECT + Maghreb Diplomacy: Algerian Moves. + + + Ref: + A) Nouakchott 6160,In telegram 6160 + from Nouakchott, December 24, Peck reported that in their first meeting since + the coup, “Babamine said he was empowered by his government to + state that Mauritania wanted to deepen and strengthen every + facet of the relationship that now existed” with the United + States “and would actively seek new areas for fruitful + cooperation in the best interests of the two countries. He + stressed these latter points twice.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840821–0750) + B) Algiers 5952.In telegram 5952 from + Algiers, December 23, the Embassy reported: “To the extent that + we are able to read the views and preoccupations of + decision-making Algerians, we are struck by the extent to which + they too are scratching their heads and trying to make sense of + the recent ineptitude of Moroccan diplomacy.”(Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840820–0438) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Although Algerian FonMin + Ibrahimi’s visit to Morocco + has been reported from here by Agence France Presse (AFP) and apparently “leaked” in + Morocco, the Algerian media have been silent. However, they have + reported the visit of Mauritanian FonMin Cheikh Ould Babamine, his meeting with President Bendjedid, his onward travel to + Tunis, and the departure today (Dec 26) of FonMin + Ibrahimi for + Nouakchott. + + The visit of Ibrahimi to + Morocco has been rumored here for about a week. The lack of official + Algerian acknowledgement that Ibrahimi actually went, reflects a desire to open a + private dialogue with King + Hassan that might lead to concrete steps on the Western Sahara. The + GOA is cognizant of Morocco’s + bellicose atmosphere (ref B) and probably believes that little + effective diplomacy can be achieved by adding further public + pressure to Hassan’s situation. The local foreign press has also + noted Algeria’s restraint thus far during the latest phase of the + berm construction. The reported Moroccan “leak” of Ibrahimi’s visit may be seen by the + GOA as unhelpful to initiating + a fruitful dialogue. + + On the other hand, Mauritanian special envoy FonMin Babmine’s visit has been + publicly welcomed. While Babamine reportedly carried a message from new Head + of State Col. + Ould Taya, the + participation in the Presidential meeting of the Mauritanian Chargé + d’Affaires may have precluded much frank discussion. FonMin + Ibrahimi’s trip to Nouakchott + will provide an opportunity for an authoritative response to + Taya’s message and + also discussion of Ibrahimi’s + visit to Morocco. Thus year our Algerian contacts appear relatively + relaxed about the Mauritanian change of government but, + nevertheless, are exerting characteristically energetic diplomatic + efforts to maintain the good relations it has with the Mauritanian + ruling council (CMSN). + + Newlin +
+
+ 48. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + January–June 1985. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, January 31, 1985 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to North Africa.]

+

4. Tunisian Ambassador on Maghreb Summit. This + morning Ambassador Ben Yahia + outlined for Mike Armacost + Tunisia’s hopes to host a Northern African Summit.A record of the Armacost-Ben Yahia meeting is in + telegram 32886 to Tunis, February 2. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850074–0970) He + stressed that while agreement to hold a summit had been reached in + principle with each of the other Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria, + Mauritania and Libya), no timeframe or specific agenda has yet been set. + Discussions probably would center heavily on face-saving ways to settle + the Western Sahara dispute and thus improve bilateral relations between + Morocco and Algeria. Armacost + pointed out our reservations over according Qadhafi any + opportunity to enhance his “respectability” and reiterated our policy of + not dealing with Qadhafi until he + demonstrates a change of methods. Ben + Yahia responded that Tunisia shares such reservations and + will do all it can to keep Qadhafi from exploiting a summit. (C)

+
+
+ 49. Defense Intelligence EstimateSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Defense Intelligence Estimate: North Africa: + Prospects for Stability, February 1985. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in + the Middle East/South Asia Division, Directorate for Estimates, + Defense Intelligence Agency, and coordinated with the Service + Intelligence Chiefs, based on information received as of mid-January + 1985. + + DDE–2200–290–85 + + Washington, February 1985 + + +

[Omitted here are a title page and preface.]

+

Unclassified

+
+ +
+

NORTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY (U)

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

(C) North African stability will continue + on a downward trend over the next three years. Pandemic problems, + including high population + growth rates, agricultural inadequacy, economic constraints and regime + legitimacy questions, will plague the North African regimes. Strained + relations and the prospects for interstate conflict will contribute to + the instability equation.

+

(S) Each regime faces problems + sufficiently serious to topple the leadership given the right catalyst; + however, barring such unpredictable events as assassinations, we judge + that most incumbent rulers will remain in office over the next three + years. The lifespan of Tunisia’s aging President Bourguiba is a major uncertainty.

+

(S) Tunisia’s future is likely to be + increasingly turbulent. The likelihood for an abrupt change of regime + will increase greatly once the Tunisian President dies. On the other + hand, his continued rule will also increase the longer term prospects + for a revolutionary, not evolutionary, transformation of Tunisia.

+

(C) Over the very long term, Algeria + appears to have the prerequisites to support a substantially improved + standard of living for its populace. Its success will depend on the + implementation of pragmatic economic and social policies over the near + term.

+

(S) Interstate hostilities are a distinct + possibility. Although none of the governments seek such conflict, only + the catalytic event is missing in the cases of Algeria-Morocco and + Egypt-Libya. A substantial military defeat could cause the losing + government to fall. Morocco’s King Hassan would not survive the loss of + the Western Sahara in a war with Algeria.

+

(S) The United States will face + challenges; the possibilities range from a friendly state distancing + itself from the United States, through interstate conflict, to the + emergence of an anti-Western regime. The internal threats to Morocco, + Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt appear to loom larger than those + to Algeria or Libya. The loss of US + access to Egypt or Morocco, for example, would seriously affect US contingency deployment planning. Should + an Algerian-Moroccan war erupt, improving US-Algerian ties would likely + suffer. Any such developments would provide opportunities for the USSR to exploit.

+

(C) A change in Libyan leadership would + not necessarily portend a reversal of Libya’s international behavior or + a warming of relations with the United States, especially if the new + leadership perceived itself in need of Soviet goodwill.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

+
+ +
+ 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850118–0640. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, and Rabat. + + 1561. + + Tunis, February 21, 1985, 1043Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algerians Tell Tunisians That Maghreb Summit Must Wait + Indefinitely. + + + Ref: + Tunis 1507.In telegram 1507 from + Tunis, February 19, the Embassy reported that Algerian officials + insisted that “Tunisia should not issue invitations to Maghreb + summit yet” as the Algerians “said they needed more time in + their bilateral exchanges with the Moroccans.” The Embassy + commented: “The GOT has had to + accept the fact that the Algerian-Moroccan dispute cannot be + papered over by elegant rhetoric, however well-intentioned.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850113–0318) + + + + (Secret—Entire text.) + + FonMin’s Special Assistant + Hassen el Ghouayel (protect) told Political Counselor late February + 20 that Algerian Ambassador Messaoud Ait Chaalal had asked to see + GOT Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi earlier in the day + with an “urgent” message. Ait Chaalal, who had just been in Algiers + on consultations, informed the GOT + that the GOA could not accept the + two-month time limitation proposed by the Tunisians to give the + Moroccans and Algerians time to work out their differences prior to + the holding of a Maghreb Summit of Five. El Ghouayel offered no + further details on the contents of the message, but in response to + questioning he said that the exchange was friendly. He gave the + impression that Algeria’s decision was based on its judgement that + their bilateral contacts with Morocco were not advancing. + + Comment. Although we cannot predict for certain how President + Bourguiba—who had strong + hopes for a summit—will react, we believe that the Tunisians will + almost certainly put their efforts on hold for the time being, while + not abandoning hope for the concept over the longer term. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 51. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense + WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0007, 1985 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 42, Morocco 1985. Secret. Sent through + Iklé. Drafted by [name not declassified] (ISA/NESA). A stamped notation at + the top of the letter reads: “21 MAR 85 10:08 Office of the + Secretary of Defense.” Underneath that notation, a second stamped + notation reads: “SECDEF HAS SEEN MAR 21 1985.” + + I–21945/85 + + Washington, March 20, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT: + Meeting with Moroccan Ambassador Jorio (U)—INFORMATION + MEMORANDUM + +

(S) On Tuesday, 19 March, I met with + Moroccan Ambassador JorioNo other record of the Armitage-Jorio + conversation has been found. to clarify what Ambassador + Jorio had said to DAS + NassifNo record of the Nassif-Jorio conversation has been found. + about changed attitudes in Morocco concerning the Moroccan-Libyan + union.

+

(S) Ambassador Jorio explained Morocco now believes there is a change + in the US attitude about Morocco’s treaty with + Libya as a result of Foreign Minister Filali’s discussions with USG officials, particularly in the State Department.Reference is presumably to the February 21 + meeting between Filali and + Shultz, during which + Filali “conveyed to the + Secretary King Hassan’s earnest desire to give a quote new dynamic + unquote to the bilateral relationship, which he said, had quote + settled unquote since last August’s Libya-Morocco treaty. Filali said the treaty had achieved + its two objectives: neutralizing Libyan support for the Polisario + and forcing Algeria to talk directly to Morocco.” Shultz “agreed that it is + important to renew and reenergize periodically all elements of a + relationship. He said it is time to put problems behind us and to + move and build the relationship.” (Telegram 56991 to multiple + recipients, February 26; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850129–0199) Apparently, these + officials gave Foreign Minister Filali the impression that, even if they do not support + it, they better understand Morocco’s position with Libya, and that this + arrangement was dictated by national and regional circumstances. + Ambassador Jorio explained + further that Morocco wanted first, to counter Algeria’s efforts to + isolate Morocco, and second, to stop Libyan supply of the Polisario. He + characterized the treaty as a “treaty of neutralization not + friendship”.

+

(S) I told Ambassador Jorio that, despite announcement of the + treaty, we have continued to recognize the strategic importance of + Morocco and maintain good relations, while giving Morocco time to + justify this act. I pointed out that the consistency of our relations + with Morocco was demonstrated with the expedited delivery of the M48A5 + tanks Morocco requested. + However, we still are displeased with the Moroccan/Libyan treaty, and + our policy toward Qadhafi has not + changed.Weinberger drew a line in the right-hand margin next + to this sentence, underlined the sentence, and wrote: “yes” underneath it.

+ Richard L. + ArmitageArmitage + signed “Rich” above this stamped signature. + + Assistant Secretary of Defense + + (International Security Affairs) + +
+
+ 52. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850256–0626. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Algiers, Dakar, Rabat, and USCINCEUR. + + 02093. + + Nouakchott, April 14, 1985, 1502Z + + + + SUBJECT + Mauritanian-Moroccan Ambassadorial Exchange. + + + Ref: + A) FBIS London UK (131226Z Apr 85)Not found. + B) Nouakchott 00414.In telegram 414 + from Nouakchott, January 23, the Embassy reported that in the + wake of the December coup which removed Haidalla (see Documents 44–46) “the most important new initiatives have related + themselves to international relations. The new government has + pledged a return to impartial neutrality; the effect will be to + weaken ties to the Polisario, examine ways to resume a dialogue + with Rabat and if possible insulate Mauritania more effectively + from the ramifications of any Algerian-Moroccan conflict.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850050–0142) + + + + C—Entire text. + + April 13 announcement of an exchange of Ambassadors between + Mauritania and Morocco (ref A) represents the culmination of an + important phase in the reorientation of GIRM foreign policy launched in the wake of palace coup + four months ago. At Mauritania’s instigation Morocco and Mauritania + recalled their Ambassadors in April, 1981, after the Haidalla regime + saw Moroccan complicity in the aborted attempt to seize power + (during which Taya + narrowly escaped plotters’ attempt to assassinate him). The + announcement indicates that the alleged disappearance of extensive + Moroccan assets consigned to escrow has either been resolved, or was + not a problem in the first place. The resumption of ties will be + popular in many quarters here. The capacious Moroccan mosque, vacant these past + four years, will now open. Many Mauritanians with close family ties + to Morocco will welcome the decision. An extensive commerce diverted + since 1981 to the Canaries will likely resume. + + The news also constitutes tangible evidence—and there is little + enough of it—that the Taya + regime is determined to implement, albeit carefully, its objective + of a truly neutral relationship to the Western Sahara conflict (ref + B). The high-profile Algerian presence which prevailed during much + of the four year hiatus in Moroccan-Mauritanian ambassadorial level + relations has already diminished, and may diminish a bit more. + Nonetheless, as the concurrent visit of Minister of Interior Djibril + O. Abdallahi (the former Cimper)Djibril + Ould Abdallahi, also known as Gabriel Cimper. to Algiers + suggests, Taya will make + every effort to insure that the pendulum does not swing too far the + other way. + + Peck +
+
+ 53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (McFarlane) to + President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC National Security + Decision Directives, NSDD 168 + [U.S. Policy Towards North Africa]. Secret. Sent for action. + Prepared by Teicher. A + stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President + has seen.” + + + Washington, April 29, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + NSDD on U.S. Policy Towards + North Africa + +

Issue

+

Whether to sign the NSDD on U.S. Policy + Towards North Africa (Tab A).

+

Facts

+

Following the conclusion of the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union (Oujda + Accords), an interagency review of U.S. policy toward North Africa was + conducted.See Document 45. The review examined the changing + regional situation, U.S. goals and interests on a bilateral and regional + basis, and policy recommendations for U.S. relations with each Maghreb + state.

+ +

Discussion

+

The interagency review concluded that the situation in North Africa poses + opportunities and risks for American interests. The fundamental + challenges to regional stability stem from an array of + political-military and socio-economic factors, which reflect internal + and external developments.

+

The NSDD provides policy directives on + a country-by-country and regional basis. Some of the directives are + already accomplished, primarily as a result of the visits of Algerian + President Bendjedid and Moroccan + Foreign Minister Filali. Of + special note is a directive to undertake a review of U.S. strategy + toward Libya. The NSSD concluded that + further work is required to focus on overcoming Qadhafi’s continuing subversive and + adventuristic behavior. We hope to have policy options ready for review + by early summer.

+

Recommendation

+

OK + No That you sign the NSDD on U.S. Policy Towards North Africa at Tab A.Reagan + checked and initialed the “OK” option.

+ + Tab A + National Security Decision Directive 168Secret. + + + Washington, April 30, 1985 + + +

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NORTH AFRICA + (S)

+

Assessment

+

The evolving situation in North Africa poses opportunities and risks + for American interests. The fundamental challenges to regional + stability stem from an array of political-military and + socio-economic factors, which reflect internal and external + developments. In light of the region’s geo-strategic position + opposite NATO’s southern flank, + the potential for increased Soviet regional influence and the + dangers of Libyan adventurism, the United States must pay special + attention to recent developments in the Maghreb and devise + appropriate policies to protect and promote American interests. + (S)

+

As a result of the August 1984 Oujda Accords, the regional balance of + power was upset and Colonel Qadhafi succeeded in easing his international + isolation. We shall continue to make clear to the Government of + Morocco our disapproval of its union with Libya. However, based on + our interests in Morocco and continuing close cooperation with Rabat + in many important fields, as well as King Hassan’s personal + assurances that sensitive + activities will not be placed at risk, we shall maintain correct and + friendly working relations. (S)

+

Over the past several years, the Government of Algeria has + demonstrated a growing eagerness to strengthen our bilateral + relationship. In part as a result of the changed regional balance, + as well as a degree of Algerian dissatisfaction with the Soviet + Union, we shall seek to improve our position in Algiers. + Nonetheless, we do not anticipate that the Algerian government will + abandon its relations with Moscow, at least for the foreseeable + future, nor will it act in a manner that diminishes its non-aligned + international standing. (S)

+

The war in the Western Sahara represents the most important factor + contributing to the changing balance of power and Moroccan-Algerian + tensions. A political solution remains elusive. Moroccan military + dominance continues, but, in part responding to the Oujda Accords, + Algiers has increased its direct support for the Polisario as well + as its military readiness along the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. The + danger of immediate hostilities seems to have temporarily abated, + though miscalculation could lead to rapid escalation. The U.S. shall + continue to work with Morocco, Algeria and other interested parties + to encourage a negotiated settlement of the Sahara war. (S)

+

Qadhafi has exploited the + Oujda Accords to ease his international isolation at the same time + that his adventuristic policies intensify. His support and use of + terrorism, both in and beyond the Middle East, continues, along with + a preoccupation with regional subversion. Libyan relations with the + Soviet Union are also being enhanced (although intermittent tensions + are evident) through the development of naval support infrastructure + and BACKFIRE-capable airbases. New measures must be considered to + overcome the challenges posed by Qadhafi. (S)

+

The situation in Tunisia bears special attention. Islamic + fundamentalism, Libyan intrigues and socio-economic unrest combine + to create dangerous challenges to the Tunisian government and its + pro-West orientation. Against this backdrop, political malaise is + growing, even as the presuccession political struggle intensifies. + President Bourguiba’s + successor may feel compelled to move away from a close political + relationship with the U.S. towards the more independent Arab + mainstream. (S)

+

U.S. Objectives (S)

+ + + To foster political stability and economic and social + development through preservation and strengthening of moderate + regimes. + + To help bring about abrogation of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty + of union. + + To limit regional subversion, particularly to neutralize + relevant Libyan-sponsored activities, and restore Qadhafi’s isolation. + + To reduce Algerian-Moroccan tensions and prospects for + conflict. + + + To limit regional polarization. + + To deny the area to further Soviet penetration and diminish + existing Soviet influence. + + To assure passage through the area for commercial and + strategic military purposes. + + To guarantee Western access to the area’s material resources, + and expand the market for American goods and services. + +

Policy Directives (S)

+

Consonant with existing circumstances and U.S. interests in the + Maghreb, the U.S. Government will pursue the following policies:

+

Morocco: (S)

+ + + Without pressing Hassan publicly to abrogate the treaty, + persistently impress upon him our concerns, develop with Hassan + criteria to judge Qadhafi’s behavior—remind him of his statement that + if attempts to “tame” Qadhafi fail, he will sever the union. U.S. + cooperation with the Government of Morocco should be such as to + make the union less palatable to Qadhafi. + + [2 lines not declassified] + + [2½ lines not declassified] + + Conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement + (GSOMIA) with + Morocco. + + Continue cooperation under the Joint Economic (JEC) and Joint Military (JMC) Commissions at current + levels. + + Economic and security assistance levels for Morocco should be + determined on global criteria, but will reflect any Oujda treaty + implementation which unacceptably harms U.S. interests. + + Revert to pre-treaty procedures in planning and execution of + the joint U.S./Moroccan military exercise program, keeping in + mind Algerian and Spanish sensitivities as to time and place and + notifying those governments in advance as appropriate. + + In the short-term (through mid-June, 1985), continue working + level visits pertaining to JEC + and JMC activities but + discourage Cabinet level and other U.S. high visibility + visits. + + Reschedule Joint Economic Commission and Joint Military + Commission meetings. + + Proceed to negotiate and conclude texts for the Bilateral + Investment Treaty (BIT) and Bilateral Tourism Agreement + (BTA). + +

Algeria: (S)

+ + + Seek further to improve relations enhanced by the State visit + of President Bendjedid in + April, 1985, by increasing Sixth Fleet port calls, and by other + gestures as appropriate. + + + Expand military cooperation based on the Presidential + Determination permitting access to defense articles and services + via FMS, increase IMET funding for career + professional training, and modify policy to permit GOA acqusition of “lethal items”. + FMS sales will be reviewed + on a case-by-case basis, taking into account our objective to + reduce Soviet influence in Algeria, U.S. relationships with + other area states, and our interest in fostering a negotiated + solution to the Western Sahara dispute. + + Emphasize private sector pursuit of Algerian markets while + responding affirmatively to GOA + interest in establishing a Joint Economic Commission. + + Intensify efforts to persuade the GOA to shift its gas export policy to a + market-oriented basis so as to increase likelihood for future + sales in Europe and the U.S. + +

Libya: (S)

+ + + An NSC chaired interagency + group shall be established to review U.S. strategy toward Libya, + and to prepare policy options to contain Qadhafi’s subversive + activities. + + Pending the strategy review, continue to strengthen ties with + Qadhafi’s neighbors + while calibrating our rhetoric to advance our goals without + elevating Qadhafi’s + status in the international arena. + + While maintaining current economic sanctions on Qadhafi, State Department + chaired interagency committee will review possibilities for + increasing such pressure, e.g. reducing U.S. economic + participation in the Libyan economy, more stringent restrictions + to prevent Americans from working in Libya, and possible + multilateral sanctions. + + [less than 1 line not declassified] + expand political-economic cooperation with friendly governments + in our efforts to combat Libyan terrorism and other unacceptable + behavior. + + The Department of Defense will review the Stairstep Exercise + Program and forward options and recommendations to the NSC for interagency review and + coordination. + + Ensure that the onus to conform to acceptable international + standards rests with Qadhafi. Our posture should be conveyed through + diplomatic channels and public statements by U.S. + officials. + + Hold systematic, high-level discussions with the French + government in order to achieve Libyan withdrawal from + Chad. + + +

Tunisia: (S)

+ + + Demonstrate continuing, visible support by Sixth Fleet port + calls, occasional joint military exercises and other gestures as + appropriate; reaffirm publicly that these actions are in support + of Tunisian security and independence. + + In planning security assistance levels, take into account the + GOT’s need to limit debt + service, the desire to obtain additional military training, and + the external security to Tunisia. + + Continue to identify and expand contact with potential + leaders, whether in power or in the opposition; make clear in + such contacts that we continue to support the GOT. + + Offer appropriate military/logistical support in the event of + a Libyan move against Tunisian territorial integrity, preferably + in support of the lead of France or other interested countries + but unilaterally if necessary. + + Enter into discussions with the GOT and other concerned governments to establish + realistic U.S. Government responses should Libya subvert and/or + attack Tunisia. + +

Regional: (S)

+ + + Continue to endorse publicly a political settlement of the + Western Sahara issue by an expression of + self-determination. + + If necessary, veto SDAR + membership in the UN Security + Council. + + Prepare an internal paper on possible U.S. diplomatic moves + designed to reduce Moroccan/Algerian tension and conflict + potential. Specifically focus on options for resolving the + Western Sahara dispute. + + Proceed with implementing the VOA modernization agreement with Morocco. + + Within approved budget levels, pursue expansion of public + diplomacy and educational/cultural programs with Algeria, + Morocco, and Tunisia. + + Morocco and Tunisia should have access to blended credit + programs to an extent dependent upon both need to counter + subsidized competition and periodic assessments of their + creditworthiness. + + Ronald + Reagan + +
+ +
+ 54. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for African + Affairs (Crocker) to Secretary of + State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive + Secretariat Sensitive (05/18/1985–05/31/1985). Secret; Sensitive. + Drafted by Teicher on May 18; + cleared by Bishop, Johnson (P), and Zweifel. + Bishop initialed for + Crocker. McKinley initialed the memorandum + and wrote: “20 May.” + + + Washington, May 20, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + King Hassan’s Comments on Libya; Possible Adherence by Chad to + Moroccan-Libyan Union + +

Summary: At the end of a wide-ranging May 16 discussion with Assistant + Secretary Murphy and NSC staffer Teicher,A record of the + portion of the Murphy-Hassan conversation devoted to bilateral + relations is in telegram 4624 from Rabat, May 7. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850348–0373) A record of the Murphy-Hassan conversation devoted to + Algerian-Moroccan relations and the Western Sahara is in telegram + 4623 from Rabat, May 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850348–0348) King Hassan + confided that during Ramadan, he, Qadhafi, and Habre will sign an “international + agreement” bringing Chad into the Moroccan-Libyan “Arab-African + Union.”Hassan’s statement to Murphy about Chad’s possible + adherence to the Libyan-Moroccan treaty is in telegram 159491 to + Rabat, May 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) Hassan stressed that this secret should be shared + only with President Reagan, Vice + President Bush and you. The + King said this proposal originated with him—his vision of an opportunity + to solve the long-festering Chad problem. He claimed at least tacit + acquiescence of Mitterrand. End + summary.

+

During lengthy audience with King Hassan May 16, Assistant Secretary + Murphy raised Qadhafi’s growing boldness in + challenging U.S. interests. There are contradictory tendencies—on the + one hand Qadhafi has made + overtures to the USG for improved + relations, and on the other he continues to work actively against Libyan + citizens in the United States and elsewhere and against American + worldwide interests. Teicher + elaborated, providing examples of Qadhafi’s actions and rhetoric in various areas of the + world. He noted that President Reagan has become increasingly concerned about the + mounting evidence of Qadhafi’s + continued subversive behavior and insults directed against the President + himself and against the American people.

+

Murphy then invited Hassan’s + views on how to deal with Qadhafi + in order to try to change his behavior.

+

In reply, Hassan said that Qadhafi + is an “unbalanced child”; he has his own peculiar mind-set based on + ‘‘Bedouin law.” He mused that + the USG ought to ask some “trusted + friend” to pose to Qadhafi the + following question: Leaving U.S. support for Israel aside (which is a + question concerning all Arabs and not just Qadhafi), what is Libya’s specific grievance against the + United States? Hassan would be willing to undertake this mission if the + President so desired. He then expressed his strong belief that if + Qadhafi were ever to make an + explicit promise to the United States with regard to his behavior, he + would live up to it.

+

Murphy commented that one of the + most disturbing things is that Qadhafi has never foresworn terrorist activity. Hassan + responded that Qadhafi is not, in + any case, responsible for all such activity in the world.

+

Hassan then continued that President Reagan is a great friend and almost a brother. Qadhafi, on the other hand, is a + temporary associate because of temporary circumstances. Last year Hassan + had seen himself threatened by two strong enemies, Algeria and Libya. He + had sensed an opportunity to neutralize perhaps the more dangerous of + the two—i.e., Qadhafi. Given his + responsibility to the Moroccan people, he had seized the opportunity to + do so via the Oujda accord.

+

Hassan wanted the President to know that he, Hassan, is willing to give + his head and heart to any effort that the President might request. He + hopes that the President will have NSC + Adviser McFarlane prepared, + when he visits Morocco in June, to tell Hassan what we wish him to do + with respect to Qadhafi, the + Gulf, or any other area. He wants to help the President and believes + that a searching “unofficial” conversation with McFarlane could usefully explore how + he might be of assistance.

+

After a pause, Hassan said that he wished to inform the President, Vice + President and you of a matter in strictest confidence. (He stressed this + need for secrecy several times.) Sometime in the weeks just ahead he, + Qadhafi and Habre will sign + an agreement bringing Chad into Morocco and Libya’s “African-Arab + Union”. Hassan said he had proposed this to Habre as a way of ending the + thankless, unavailing conflict in Chad. Habre had agreed, provided + Hassan himself would strongly back the undertaking. Hassan had then + proposed Chad’s incorporation to Qadhafi, stressing that (A) this would be an + “international agreement” which would commit Qadhafi, and that (B) Morocco would march out of the + union if undertakings arrived at were not adhered to. After six days’ + reflection, Qadhafi had agreed. + It now appears that the deal will be signed during Ramadan. Hassan said + that French President Mitterrand + has been informed and in effect accepted; with French parliamentary + elections coming up, Mitterrand + is not interested in getting further bogged down in Chad. (Comment: + Implicit in Hassan’s account is that Habre will continue as President of + Chad.)

+

In response to a question by Ambassador Reed, the King said that he thought he probably will + have to visit Tripoli “some day, but not right away.”

+ +

In subsequent conversation over lunch with Foreign Minister Filali, Murphy explored further the Libyan question. Filali said Qadhafi still operates from a sense of isolation and + continues to seek international acceptance and legitimacy. He contended + that Libya is interested in improving relations with the U.S. for + precisely that reason. Qadhafi + will not necessarily moderate his fiery rhetoric while seeking + acceptance; he sees no contradiction between the two.

+

Murphy pointed out that the + GOM should be under no illusion + that the USG will moderate its views on + Qadhafi. Teicher cited the extremely dangerous + nature of the “Voice of Vengeance” broadcasts, Libyan subversion in + Tunisia (apparently in anticipation of the post-Bourguiba era), and the + Libyan provision of Scud rockets to Iran. He also reviewed the + heavy-handedness of Libya in post-Nimeiri Sudan.

+

Comment: Since the issue of Chad’s possible adherence to the + “Arab–African Union” previously has come to our attention, we will be + able to probe Habre about the matter without betraying Hassan’s + confidence. We will pose to him (and separately to Hassan) questions as + to what Chad may stand to gain from this move. Our earlier information + was that Habre had decided against the union, and + there may still be some maneuvering taking place. End comment.

+
+
+ 55. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850417–0048. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to + Algiers, Casablanca, Dakar, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent + for information to USCINCEUR. + + 3167. + + Nouakchott, June 13, 1985, 1546Z + + + + SUBJECT + Regional Tensions: Taya + is Worried. + + + Ref: + A) Nouakchott 3043,In telegram 3043 + from Nouakchott, June 6, the Embassy reported: “There is a faint + sense of unease in the unfolding of the new relationship with + Morocco. The exchange of Ambassadors and the opening of the + Moroccan mosque have not generated the appropriate levels of + enthusiasm, and it is possible that the Western Sahara question + is adversely affecting the GIRM’s view of things.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850400–0393) + B) DIA Wash 130028Z Jun 85.Not found. + + + + S—Entire text. + + Summary. Chief of State Taya is extremely ill at ease over what he perceives + to be the increased regional dangers resulting from Morocco’s 5th berm. The Polisario is + insisting on transit rights, Algeria is as yet unwilling to state + its position on the subject, Morocco is seen as increasingly + menacing, and the possibility of Moroccan-Algerian collusion is + considered serious. Taya + sought assurances of U.S. support in the event of trouble and an + increased information flow in the interim. End summary. + + Chief of State Taya + called me in June 13 and started the discussion with an inquiry as + to what is going on in the area. He said he would appreciate being + informed on what the US knew, with + particular respect to Morocco-Algerian relations and the current + status of wall-building in the Sahara. + + I provided a brief update on American perspectives, and reminded + Taya that our position + with respect to resolving the Saharan conflict had not changed since + being clearly re-enunciated (and briefed to Taya) at the time of the + Bendjedid visit.Bendjedid visited Washington in April and met + with Reagan, Bush, and Shultz. See Documents 147 and 148. I added that there was something in the + air which suggested that developments were taking place (ref A), and + asked what the Mauritanians knew about the situation. Taya waffled around with + generalities until I asked point-blank if the Polisario had recently + demanded transit rights: The conversation became more + focused. + + Taya brought from his + desk a map showing the Western Sahara and the locations of all the + berms. He pointed to the work that has already been accomplished + with the 5th berm (south to and around Guelta Zemour) and to the + future plans for its completion (west to Dakhla). What Morocco has + done, he said, is to take all the Sahara that is even marginally + habitable, leaving the Polisario only sand. That organization, + however, is totally unwilling to abandon the struggle and has + therefore told the GIRM that it + must have access to Mauritanian territory in order to be able to + launch attacks against the new southern wall. Mauritania has refused + and has informed Algeria of its position. (The Polisario demand was + delivered by Mohamed Ould + Salek—Nouakchott 2928;Reference is to the defensive perimeter—an earthen wall—built + by Morocco in the Western Sahara against the Polisario + guerrillas. See footnote 2, Document + 431. the Mauritanian demarche was made by + FonMin Ould Minnih.) + + Responding to questions, Taya said that the Algerians professed ignorance of + this new development, and have since refused to make their position + clear. (Taya saw Amb + Djadri on June 11.) This has left the GIRM feeling particularly uneasy because they are no + match for the Polisario unless Algeria cuts the supply lines. + Taya added that + Mauritania has many friends that it can count upon for support and + asked what the United States would do in the event of a conflict. + I replied that the + U.S. was committed to Mauritania’s territorial integrity and would + be opposed to any armed aggression, but that our efforts would be + restricted to diplomatic and political channels, leaving any other + measures to other countries more directly involved. Taya seemed quite satisfied with + assurances of our political support. + + Taya said he was + particularly concerned by Morocco’s intentions. He remarked that he + had been present when King Hassan had made a remark which had left + him ill at ease ever since: “La mechoui du probleme Saharaoui sera + cuit sur le does de la Mauritanie.” He said that in building the 5th + berm, unnecessary since Morocco already controls the only parts of + the Sahara that have any meaning, the King was intentionally forcing + the Polisario to confront Mauritania in order to be able to continue + the struggle. Morocco, in his view, would be the only one that would + stand to benefit from such a development. I pointed out that to the + extent this last point was correct, Algeria would be unlikely to let + a conflict break out. Taya + said he would feel a lot better if Algiers would make its position + clear. (I asked if he had any plans to see Chadli, and he said there + were none.) + + Everyone had been hopeful that the reestablishment of relations + with Morocco would remove all tensions with the northern neighbor, + Taya said, which has + not proven to be the case at all. King Hassan sees matters from a + different perspective than do others, which makes his actions + difficult to predict, but Mauritanians do not doubt that his + interests in the country, while minimal, are inimical. + + Taya was also deeply + concerned over the possibility that Morocco and Algeria were working + together to resolve the overall problem at Mauritania’s + (unspecified) expense. I remarked that I doubted relations between + the two countries were good enough right now to permit such a + development, adding that Algeria, in particular, would be unlikely + to benefit from any difficulties developing within Mauritania + proper. + + Comment. Taya was + somewhat distraught, and stressed that he was the only one in the + government that was concerned over these matters. He said he hoped + that the U.S. would keep him informed of any developments of which + it becomes aware bearing on the Sahara question. He was visibly + pleased when he was reminded of the commitment to Mauritania’s + territorial integrity and sovereignty which the U.S. made at the + time of the March 16, 1981, coup attempt.In telegram 2928 from Nouakchott, May 30, the Embassy + “utilized” the Polisario’s demand “to direct attention to a + point that appears to be relatively little-known: there is no + official Polisario/SDAR + representation in Nouakchott, nor has there been.” The Embassy + continued that despite pressure from the SDAR and Algeria, the GIRM had refused in order to + “avoid provoking Rabat.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850382–0042) He also + understood why we would give to France, Algeria and others the lead + role in efforts to + resolve—by whatever means—any armed struggle involving Mauritania. + Taya seems to believe + that the possiblity of such a development is fairly strong. + + He is also beset with a serious case of the jitters. If the + Polisario is actually going to be let loose to undertake armed + efforts to cross large segments of Mauritanian territory, then + Taya is jittery for + very good reasons. That would mean that Algeria’s policy (as seen + from here) of keeping Mauritania out of the war may have changed, + altering a major regional equation to a significant degree. It is + for this reason that I think a real clash with the Polisario is + unlikely: I do not see how it could benefit Algeria.See footnote 3, Document + 3. + + Peck +
+
+ 56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Zweifel and Robert Barrett (NEA/AFN); cleared by Van Heuven, + Sokolsky, Otto, Nassif, + Johnson, and McKinley; + approved by Raphel. + + 212472. + + Washington, July 12, 1985, 0316Z + + + + SUBJECT + Discussion With GOM on State of + Libyan-Moroccan Relations. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + We wish to discuss with GOM + officials recent developments which may present risks and + opportunities for U.S. efforts to dissolve the Moroccan-Libyan + relationship.Reports that the recent Libyan-Iranian accords + have resulted in strains in the Morocco-Libya relationship are + intriguing;In telegram 6009 from + Rabat, July 1, the Embassy reported: “A working level security + official of the Sûreté Nationale told EmbOff on July 1 that ‘we + are being careful because things between Morocco and Libya are + heating up and are very tense.’ He said King Hassan had sent + Royal Counsellor Ahmed Reda Guedira and Interior Minister + Driss Basri to Libya + on June 26 to convey displeasure over a Libyan-Iranian + ‘strategic alliance’ announced by Libyan Press Agency (Jana) on + June 24.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850464–0055) + + + + Signs that Qadhafi + is upset with Moroccan reluctance to pursue military + cooperation are also encouraging. Whether or not reports of + renewed Libyan support to the Polisario are credible is of + interest; + + On the other hand, the report that a trip to Libya by + Hassan might occur in the near future is worrisome; + + Was the reason behind Basri’s trip to Tripoli to take issue with + Qadhafi on his + Iranian ties, or was it to arrange for visit by the + King? + + What are we to make of the just-concluded joint + Moroccan-Libyan parliamentary sessions, in particular the + establishment of a “defense affairs committee”? + + + Should Hassan carry through with his on-again, off-again plans to + visit Qadhafi, this would + cast a new pall over the U.S./GOM relationship—regardless of when + such a visit took place. It would be particularly unfortunate if it + occured immediately before or after JEC and JMC meetings + or if a Hassan/Qadhafi meeting resulted in discussion or agreements + on military cooperation. It is our hope that Hassan never make the + trip to Tripoli. In theory, stiff-arming on this issue might so + displease Qadhafi that it + might lead to an explicit or implicit demise of the union. + + To review the bidding and to alert the GOM to our concerns about and potential consequences of + a possible Hassan trip to Libya, you should seek an early + appointment with FonMin + Filali to make the following + points. + + The Iraqis and several other Arab governments have reacted + sharply to Qadhafi’s + policy of increased support for Iran. We understand the + GOM might also have + problems with this. We would be interested in the GOM assessment of + Libyan-Iranian policies, especially in the area of weapons + supplies. What, if anything, is the GOM doing vis a vis Qadhafi on this one? + + We likewise are concerned by the reported military + agreement between Libya and Sudan. What are GOM views? + + The news that the joint Libyan-Moroccan parliamentary + meetings established a “defense affairs committee” is + troubling. Any discussion or agreements on Moroccan/Libyan + military cooperation would present us with particular + difficulties, given the nature of our bilateral + relationship, we request information about the proposed + powers and importance of that committee. + + There have been unconfirmed reports that Qadhafi may have recently + renewed at least financial support to the Polisario. Is + there any validity to these reports? + + As GOM is aware, we have + serious reservations about any expansion of Qadhafi’s influence. This + was the basis for our concern about the King’s intention to + bring Chad into the Arab-African union. Has that issue been laid to + rest? (FYI: We have one + report that Hassan may still be pressing for a Habre-Qadhafi + meeting. End FYI.) + + Renewed activity to implement the Oujda accords and + official visits between the two capitals have led to + speculation that King Hassan may soon visit Tripoli. + + It strikes us also that such a visit, coming in the wake + of Libya’s accords with Iran and Sudan, could strain + Morocco’s relations with its Arab friends. + + Such a visit would be most unfortunate, especially at a + time in which we both are working for successful and + productive meetings of the JEC and JMC.Kirby met with + Filali on + July 15 and relayed the Department’s instructions. In + telegram 6576 from Rabat, July 16, Kirby commented: + “Twice during the Libyan portion of our conversation I + pointedly reminded Filali that Washington continues to be + very concerned about Qadhafi’s terrorist efforts world-wide + and that the Moroccans must understand that we are, + therefore, concerned about any new or continuing + initiatives with Qadhafi that friends of ours like + Morocco might undertake.” (Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot + 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis) + + + Whitehead +
+
+ 57. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff (Rodman) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, S/P + Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy + Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, August 1–31, 1985. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Sokolsky; cleared by Ledsky. Copies were sent to + Murphy and Holmes. + + + Washington, August 1, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Managing U.S. Policy Toward Morocco and Algeria + +

You requested my thoughts on the U.S.-Moroccan-Algerian + relationship.No record of Armacost’s request has been + found.

+

In the nature of things, our relationships with Morocco and Algeria are + not symmetrical. While both are important countries, our relations with + the two cannot really be equated. We derive strategic, military, and political benefits from + Morocco that Algeria presently is either unwilling or unable to provide. + Thus, Algeria could not substitute for a loss of our assets in + Morocco.

+

In my view, it would be a mistake to risk the tangible benefits of our + links with Morocco in the quest for intangible benefits from an improved + tie with Algeria. Indeed, on two central cross-cutting issues on which + Moroccan and Algerian interests conflict—the Western Sahara and arms + sales—it is difficult to discern any other choice for us than to tilt + toward Morocco.

+

General Considerations

+

King Hassan has his own agenda and will play the balance of power game in + North Africa according to his perception of Morocco’s interests. The + Union with Libya and Hassan’s less than enthusiastic support for the + Hussein-Arafat initiative underscore his willingness to act in ways + inimical to U.S. interests.See Document 37.

+

Nonetheless, Morocco makes a significant contribution to our overall + defense strategy and there is no other country in the region that can + replace it. It offers the United States important support for our + security strategy in Southwest Asia, the Mediterranean, and NATO; we have paid a relatively moderate + price for our access agreement, use of Moroccan facilities, exercise + program, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and VOA facilities.

+

Moreover, Morocco still attaches considerable importance to its + relationship with the United States. It relies on us for military, + economic, and diplomatic support and believes that the bilateral + relationship is central to Morocco’s overall security position in the + region. Morocco’s dependence on the United States continues to provide + us with a measure of influence over Hassan’s policies—for example, + implementing the Oujda Accord in a way that does less harm to our + interests in Morocco than might have been feared.

+

Algeria, on the other hand, offers us modest benefits—a partial + counterweight to Libya, denial of extensive Soviet access to its + facilities, modest support for the peace process—but does not desire + open or close strategic cooperation with us. While it will continue to + provide limited access to its port facilities for U.S. forces, domestic + constraints, the ideology of the leadership, its position within the + nonaligned movement, and its relationship with Moscow will sharply limit + its military cooperation with the United States.

+

Algeria is interested in expanding its relationship with us, especially + in the areas of military procurement and economic and trade relations. + But its limited need for our assistance will not give us significant leverage over Algerian + policies. Indeed, there are a number of issues on which U.S. and + Algerian interests will continue to diverge despite improved bilateral + relations: + + continued terrorist training of Palestinian, radical Lebanese + Shia, and other guerrilla groups; + + encouragement of Polisario demands on Mauritania to allow use + of its territory for operations in the Western Sahara; + + support for the Sandinistas; + + support for Third World positions in the UN and other international + forums. +

+

We do not possess sufficient carrots or sticks to effect a change in + Algerian positions on these issues. It is also unlikely that Algeria is + prepared to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union significantly in + return for greater military and economic assistance from us. Finally, we + cannot give Algeria what it really desires: an end to U.S. support for + Morocco.

+

The Western Sahara Problem

+

We should avoid a shift in U.S. policy on the Western Sahara in favor of + the Polisario or Algeria; indeed, the creation of an independent + Polisario state in the Western Sahara would be a potentially strategic + blow to our interests. It would contribute to continuing instability in + the region, provide a potential staging ground for Polisario attacks + into Moroccan territory, and possible Soviet strategic access to + facilities on the eastern coast of the Atlantic.

+

The risk of an escalation of the Western Sahara conflict has increased in + the wake of Morocco’s extension of the berm; nonetheless, the war is + unlikely to spread in ways that would threaten important U.S. interests + in the region.

+

I suspect that a more active U.S. role in trying to resolve the Western + Sahara conflict would inevitably be seen as partisan and thus antagonize + one or another of the major parties. Each would probably misperceive the + U.S. as siding with its adversary; we would bear the burden if failure + occurs. Algeria would urge us to use our leverage over Hassan to get him + to the negotiating table and to make substantive concessions. It is not + in our interest to lean on a friend like Morocco to make compromises + with a potential enemy like the Polisario. Hassan would expect us to + support his position, which would only strain our relationship with + Algeria. The conditions simply do not exist for successful U.S. + mediation.

+

We should continue to emphasize our bilateral relationships with Morocco + and Algeria and subordinate settlement of what is essentially a regional + dispute to our larger strategic objectives in the region. The U.S. + should not play a more active role in the negotiating process until the + Moroccans and Algerians are closer to finding their own solution—and + then only if both parties request direct U.S. participation. At present, + neither Algeria nor Morocco is interested in a settlement except on + terms unacceptable to the other. We should therefore maintain our + present policy of encouraging Morocco and Algeria to resume their + high-level dialogue in search of a negotiated settlement.

+

Arms Sales

+

Our first priority in our military programs in North Africa should be to + help meet Morocco’s security needs. Algeria’s advantages in the quantity + and quality of military equipment give it clear military superiority + over Morocco. Moroccan forces are inadequate to defend the country from + a large-scale Algerian offensive due to severe logistic shortfalls in + maintenance, spare parts, fuel, and munitions. Morocco depends on U.S. + assistance to maintain the operational effectiveness of its armed + forces. And, unlike Algeria, Rabat does not have its own resources to + finance its force requirements.

+

In contrast, Algeria is in the middle of a major force expansion and + modernization program based upon the acquisition of large quantities of + front-line Soviet equipment. Its requirement for U.S. military + assistance is limited to the upgrading of Soviet-origin weapons and the + acquisition of advanced technology to modernize existing equipment. + Algeria’s interest in developing an extensive military supply + relationship with us is limited at best. Algeria will not, however, take + any steps in the shortrun to jeopardize its military supply relationship + with the Soviets—a dependency which provides Moscow with a large degree + of leverage over Algerian policies.

+

Our fundamental strategic interests in North Africa are to keep the + Strait of Gibraltar under pro-Western control, to preserve a regional + balance of power between Morocco and Algeria, and to ensure the + continuation of a moderate, pro-Western regime in Morocco. These + interests require, in my view, favored treatment for Morocco on issues + where Moroccan and Algerian interests conflict, rather than a balanced + or even-handed approach. This does not mean that we should forgo the + threat of a U.S. “tilt” toward Algeria as a means of exerting leverage + over Hassan. But this threat is more effective if it is not carried + out.

+

Clearly, we must avoid placing ourselves in situations where both Morocco + and Algeria expect us to solve their problems with the other. At this + early stage in our evolving relationship with Algeria, the best way to + proceed is to expand cooperation with Algeria in areas that do not pose + a threat to Morocco and where we have a competitive advantage over the + Soviet Union. The most promising areas for such U.S. assistance are + technology transfer to modernize Algerian industry and agriculture, + greater contacts in the scientific, cultural, and educational fields, + the upgrade of Algeria’s Soviet-made equipment, and training programs + for Algerian military personnel.

+
+ +
+ 58. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia 1985. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. + Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of + Near Eastern Analysis, based on information received as of August + 27. + + + Washington, August 27, 1985 + + +

Libya-Tunisia: What are Qadhafi’s Intentions

+

Summary

+

The Libyan expulsion of Tunisian workers—26,000 so far this + month—threatens Tunis with its most serious domestic crisis since the + January 1984 bread riots.See footnotes 2 and + 4, Document 329. + Qadhafi probably is using the + expulsion in part to cover the infiltration of Libyan trained Tunisian + dissidents.See footnote 2, Document 312. We believe he will use + the dissidents to help destabilize Tunisia and influence the + Presidential succession when Bourguiba dies. The return of large numbers of workers + will ripen the climate for destabilization by adding to an already + record pool of urban unemployed. Even while Bourguiba is alive, Qadhafi probably will try to intimidate Tunis into a + more pro-Libyan posture, perhaps using terrorist attacks or a + small-scale military demonstration near the border. Tunisian fears of a + Libyan invasion, however, are unwarranted for the present. [portion marking not declassified]

+

We believe that Tunisia has exaggerated the threat of an imminent Libyan + invasion, but its fears of Libyan-sponsored destabilization are well + founded. A key unknown involves the extent to which Libya’s accelerated + two-year effort to build a subversive network has succeeded in + developing assets in the Tunisian armed forces. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 59. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (McNeil) to Acting Secretary of State WhiteheadSource: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State + Richard Murphy, 1985: + Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, August 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by + Otto on August 23; approved by Richard Clarke (INR). Quinn initialed the memorandum and wrote: + “8/30.” + + + Washington, August 30, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Morocco and Algeria: Sources of Tension—Chances of Change + +

You discussed with Mort the fact that Morocco was in part motivated in + its Libyan union by a desire to check Algeria and Algerian aid to the + Polisario.No record of the + Abramowitz-Whitehead discussion has been found. We have + looked at the Moroccan-Algerian relationship to examine the prospects of + a cooling of tensions in the Sahara dispute and an improvement in + overall relations between Morocco and Algeria. A thorough analysis is + attached,The undated paper, entitled + “Longstanding Differences Between Morocco and Algeria,” is attached + but not printed. summarized by this memorandum.

+ + + The Border. Before the French relinquished + their protectorate over Morocco in the mid-1950’s, they readjusted + the border in Algeria’s favor. In 1962, the Moroccans wanted redress + from newly independent Algeria. In its absence, a border war ensued + in 1963. The Moroccan parliament has never ratified a subsequent + treaty fixing the common boundary. + + The Saharan War. Algeria provides most of + the weapons and funding for the Polisario guerrillas seeking to + wrest control of the Sahara from Morocco. The Moroccans view the + conflict as a military engagement with Algeria by proxy. The + Algerians may well regard their support for the Polisario as an + element in containing the “expansionist” Moroccans. + + Economic and Social Disparities. Morocco + has a traditional social structure, a mixed economy with a broad + private sector, and a varied press. Algeria stands in marked + contrast. After independence, Algeria became a leftist-oriented + state in which the government controlled both the economy and the + press. Despite some preliminary moves toward reform, Algeria remains + a one-party socialist state, uncomfortable with Western + pluralism. + + Prospects for Reducing the Tensions. + Morocco and Algeria have kept their rivalry within bounds for 20 + years, but the fundamental + differences between the two could be difficult to resolve. Some + benefits to the US in North Africa + may derive from the enduring Moroccan-Algerian friction, so long as + it does not get out of hand. We might sharpen our assessments of the + potential for a major confrontation through exchanges with the + Spanish and French, whose long association with the region gives + them considerable insight. + +
+
+ 60. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850648–0637. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat Exclusive. Sent for + information to Algiers, Cairo, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, + Rome, and USCINCEUR. + + 8285. + + Tunis, September 12, 1985, + 1515Z + + +

Military addresses handle as Specat Exclusive. Department please pass to + HQ + EUCOM Vaihingen GE for Polad. USCINCEUR for Polad. DIA for the Director. Subject: Tunisia’s + Confrontation With Libya After Oujda. Ref: Algiers 4737.In telegram 4737 from Algiers, September 11, the + Embassy reported that Hached said Tunisia and Algeria “were now + coordinating their military strategy toward Libya, that they would + like to ‘make an end of the Qadhafi problem now’ and urged the U.S. to support + this effort. Hached characterized Algerian assurances of military + support as a blank check of which the Tunisian Government feels + fully confident.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850644–0872)

+ + + S/Exdis—Entire text. + + Summary. In light of comments of Tunisian Ambassador in Algiers on + Tunisian-Algerian planning vis-a-vis Qadhafi (reftel), Embassy will be alert to and + report on any indications here. Tunisia finds itself increasingly + isolated with Algeria in the Maghreb, while remaining weak + militarily and vulnerable to Libyan actions. At the same time, many + Tunisians remain suspicious of Algerian motives, while recognizing + need for Algerian support and goodwill. GOA/GOT coordination + has seen an upsurge, and we do not exclude planning for clandestine + options against Qadhafi, + should this ever be deemed opportune in light of Libya’s own + capabilities against Tunisia. Introduction of Egypt into the + equation, an eventuality unclear at this writing, could change the + situation significantly. End summary. + + Reftel reports conversation in Algiers between USA/DCM and well + plugged-in but clearly uninstructed Tunisian Ambassador Hached. + Latter left inference of active Algero-Tunisian planning for + conflict with Libya and + removal of Qadhafi. We will, + of course, be alert for indications here that bear on this inference + and will report our findings. + + Meanwhile, it will not have escaped Department’s notice that the + Tuniso-Libyan rupture, following the Oujda Accord and the apparent + failure of Moroccan mediation (the Guedira/Filali mission) has left + Tunisia more than ever isolated with Algeria in the Maghreb—a + marriage of unequals. However that may work itself out,In telegram 8006 from Rabat, August 27, the + Embassy reported: “King Hassan has offered his good offices in a + bid to relax current tensions between Tunisia and Libya” which + included visits by Filali + and Guedira to Tunis and Tripoli. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850608–0255) + Tunisia’s traditional political recourse in an “open” Maghreb, viz., + the uses of the Moroccan and Libyan relationships to counterpoise + Algeria, is badly constrained for now—and the ramifications of this + bear watching. Seen from here, the situation thus created could open + the GOT to a reexamination of its + distant relationship with Cairo as well as further efforts in the + direction of Rabat. + + Within this framework lie realities which must in any case be + taken into account in evaluating Hached’s assertions. First, on the + military side, Tunisia remains immensely vulnerable and quite + incapable of major offensive military operations (as opposed to + raids or clandestine paramilitary actions). Second, politically, + suspicion of Algeria’s ultimate motives remains widespread here, + cohabiting uneasily with the recognition—equally pervasive—that + Algerian support and goodwill are more than ever important to + Tunisia’s ability to resist Libyan threats. Finally, and we, of + course, defer to Algiers on substance at this point, we assume + Tunisians calculate that bulk of Algiers military capabilities + likely to remain deployed against Morocco, whatever happens + here. + + This said, there has been an upsurge in GOA/GOT coordination: + political, military and economic and we can safely assume that + contingency plans for meeting various forms of possible aggression + are being discussed. We would speculate, moreover, that thought is + also being given to clandestine options against Qadhafi. While there are many, + here, who would welcome a successful American preemptive initiative, + vis-a-vis Qadhafi, it seems + reasonable to assume, in the light of our often expressed posture of + restraint, that the governments in Tunis and Algiers do not really + expect us to take such an initiative, although they might well hope + for some form of U.S. support should they choose to do so. + + In summary, then, Tunisia is more exposed to Algerian pressure + than heretofore and is trying to adapt while harboring traditional + concerns lest the relationship become too burdensome. + Notwithstanding greater coordination between Tunis and Algiers, we + do not see Tunisia + prepared for offensive military action of scope. This said, we think + Tunis would seek to respond to localized Libyan military + initiatives, should they materialize—preferably in some form of + coordination with its friends, Algeria prominently included. + Finally, we do not exclude planning here for clandestine action + against Qadhafi should this + ever be deemed opportune in the light of Libya’s own capabilities + against Tunisia. It has come to our attention that Tunisian military + planning includes retaliation for commando-type operation. Algerian + support would be essential in case of escalation. These thoughts + have focussed mainly on Tunisian-Algerian cooperation. If, as some + indications suggest, an Egyptian role is to be considered, the + equation could change significantly.In + telegram 287750 to Tunis, September 19, the Department noted + that on September 13, Ben + Yahia had told Whitehead “this crisis has brought about a + fundamental change in Tunis’ policy towards Libya—from ‘crisis + management to crisis prevention.’ GOT’s former ‘open door’ policies have given way to + a much firmer position. The GOT + has concluded that even the economic benefits from Tunisians + working in Libya are more than offset by the long term risks + from ‘brainwashing’ to which they are subjected in Libya. + Accordingly, the GOT has + decided to call on Tunisians to depart Libya.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850664–0919) This factor remains unclear at this + writing. + + Sebastian +
+
+ 61. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State + and Multiple RecipientsSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850689–0183. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Priority to + the Arab League Collective, London, Paris, Rome, USUN, and USCINCEUR. + + 8860. + + Tunis, September 27, 1985, + 1216Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisia Breaks Relations With Libya. + + + Ref: + Tunis 8845 (Notal).In telegram 8845 + from Tunis, September 26, the Embassy reported that both AFP “and local Embassy sources + confirm report of letter bomb explosion in down-town Tunis this + morning,” the second such report in 2 days. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850686–0249) + + + + (Confidential—Entire text.) + + Summary. GOT for the first time + ever has broken relations with Libya, following nearly two months of + steadily deteriorating relations. Blatant terrorist acts traced to + the Libyan Embassy proved to be the catalyst. Expected mediation efforts may succeed + in reducing tensions, but relations between the two will not return + to normal for the forseeable future. The GOT, breaking with its posture of recent weeks, has + chosen to accentuate the support it enjoys from the U.S. in the + latest stage. End summary. + + The GOT announced evening of + September 26 its decision to break relations with Libya. An item in + the official news agency TAP cited + “Libya’s policy of aggression and permanent hostility towards + Tunisia which aims at threatening its accomplishments, its security + and the stability of its institutions.” It [went] on to cite the + crisis launched by Libya in August with the expulsion of Tunisian + workers and the subsequent deterioration in relations due to Libyan + acts including subversion, hostile press campaigns, explicit threats + to employ force, and repeated violations of Tunisian airspace.See Document + 58. It said the GOT had “irrefutable” proof of Libyan use of its + diplomatic presence to foster terrorism, espionage and + subversion.In a September 26 + information memorandum to Shultz, Abramowitz wrote: “There are currently no new + signs Libya intends to launch a conventional ground attack on + Tunisia, and we continue to believe an outright invasion is + unlikely. However, Libya could easily bomb targets throughout + the country, or launch a variety of terrorist or unconventional + operations, with little warning. Should Libya nonetheless stage + a major ground attack, it would bog down after initial + gains—because of Libyan deficiencies. Before Libya could do much + Algeria, not Egypt, would likely act.” (Department of State, + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of + Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, + September 1985) It noted the most recent incident + involving the dispatch of letter bombs to Tunisian press figures by + Libyan diplomats. + + This is the first time relations between the two states, + sporadically troubled since Qadhafi’s accession to power in 1969, have been + formally cut. At this writing, Tripoli has yet to react, although it + issued unconvincing denials of complicity in the letter bombs. The + latest chapter in the deterioration of relations in fact began early + this year and may well, as many Tunisians believe, have reflected a + decision by Qadhafi to turn + the pressure on after Bourguiba’s late 1984 illness. Whatever, pressures + against the workers by way of limiting their remittances were + instituted. In March a clandestine radio station began broadcasting + encouragement to Tunisians (and to a lesser extent other Maghreb + peoples) to kill people of the Jewish faith among their population. + This promoted a scene in which a furious President Bourguiba dismissed Libyan Foreign + Minister Turayki from his office, prompting further threats from + Qadhafi. Meanwhile, + Qadhafi’s media had been + railing against Arab Chiefs of State (e.g. Mubarak, Hussein, Bendjedid) who were “humiliating” + the Arab world by rendering homage in Washington. Subsequently, the + Bourguiba visit was + announced. The final phase in this downward trend in relations was, + as the GOT statement noted, the + expulsion of workers in early Aug the blatant actions of Qadhafi this week actually left the + GOT little choice but to break + relations. + + Throughout the summer, but particularly since the expulsions + began, Qadhafi has shown + unusual sensitivity to perceived insults against him in the Tunisian + press. Indeed, the Tunisian press has become more strident since + early September, when major gestures of support by the Algerians and + Iraqis seemed to mark a watershed in Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali’s traditional + tendency to temporize with the Libyans. Mzali and the GOT + rather effectively used the tensions to rally the country. In doing + so they were not above pushing recalcitrant trade unions into + submission. Meanwhile, there is no question that the Tunisian press + became more personally insulting to Qadhafi, on one occasion in recent days terming him + a “bloodstained madman.” + + It is unclear where things go from here. We would expect any + number of mediation efforts to be launched in coming days. The + regional propensity to be able to kiss and make up is legend. But + even if some sort of reconciliation is achieved steps have been + taken which will not permit things to go back where they were + anytime soon. There are probably only 15,000 or so Tunisians still + in Libya. They are, to be sure, potential hostages, but most + probably have deeper roots than those that have left, just as the + 10,000 or so Libyan passport holders in Tunisia have deep roots + here. Short of an unlikely all-out military move, Qadhafi has the Omdurman option or, + more likely, the possibility of carrying out more terrorist + incidents. Some gimmickry such as a repeat of his previous “green + marches” on the Egyptian frontier area are also possible. Whatever + hostile actions he takes will continue to have negative effect on + the overwhelming majority of the Tunisian people already + disenchanted with his acts to date. Even those who have criticized + Mzali’s exploitation of + the crisis are now silent. Thus, his hopes of creating internal + problems for the regime have, at least for the short term, + backfired. + + The U.S. has for the moment been thrust into the prominent role as + Tunisia’s supporter. Pictures of the Ambassador calling on President + Bourguiba September 26, + coupled with his reiteration of U.S. support to the local press and + replays of the State Department spokesman’s September 26 remarks, + were prominently featured on TV and the local Arabic and French + press. This contrasts with desire to downplay U.S. in public + demonstrated up to now, and GOT + preference to be seen as relying in the first instance on Arab + brothers. The Prime Minister’s trip to Algiers this weekend will + take us out of the limelight somewhat, but the GOT appears to have decided that, at + its lowest point to date in its relations with Libya, it wants its + big friend seen up front. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 62. Interagency Intelligence AssessmentSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1985 (10/01/1985). Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. + Prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for + Near East and South Asia, and coordinated within the Central + Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of + Defense. Information available as of October 9 was used in its + preparation. + + IIA 85–10006 + + Washington, October 10, 1985 + + +

MOROCCAN-LIBYAN UNION: ONE YEAR + LATER

+

SUMMARY

+

The year-old Moroccan-Libyan union was a product of pragmatic + considerations on the part of two Arab leaders who continue to have + divergent long-term interests in North Africa. Both partners have + achieved what they perceive as useful benefits from the union, although + the costs so far have been far greater for Moroccan King Hassan. We see + nothing on the horizon to suggest an early end to the union.

+

Hassan claims the union is a means to eliminate Tripoli’s support to the + Polisario Front. More importantly, it should be seen as a strategic + challenge to Algeria, and as an attempt to ease Morocco’s pressing + economic and social problems that had sparked riots in January + 1984.See Document + 222. Libyan leader Qadhafi views the partnership as a major coup in his + efforts to enhance his international standing, isolate Algeria, and in + turn to counter US attempts to isolate + him. He also hopes to use Morocco as a conduit to obtain restricted + US equipment and spare parts, + particularly for Libyan aircraft.

+

Hassan’s benefits so far have been primarily economic. Since the union, + he has received around $150 million in aid from Qadhafi as well as a growing, but still + small, market for Moroccan agricultural exports and jobs for Moroccan + workers. These gestures, however, have fallen far short of making the + union the great economic panacea touted by Hassan at the time the + agreement was signed.

+

The benefits to Qadhafi have been + several, and have entailed little cost. Morocco is no longer a center of + Libyan dissident activity and Hassan has toned down considerably his + comments on Libyan subversion in Sudan and Chad. Algeria has been + strategically challenged. Morocco is less supportive of moderate Arab + efforts related to the peace process. Moreover, Moroccan goods have + helped ease a crippling shortage in Libya of essential consumer goods + that has prompted + unprecedented criticism of Qadhafi’s policies. Nonetheless, increased Algerian + animosity may ultimately prove to be the biggest drawback to Qadhafi.

+

The union’s drawbacks have been almost exclusively borne by Hassan. He + has suffered a public and nettlesome setback in his relations with + Washington and has exacerbated an already deteriorating situation with + neighboring Algeria. [2 lines not declassified] + Moreover the union has strengthened Algerian determination to challenge + Morocco, and Algiers has successfully widened diplomatic recognition for + the Polisario during the past year.

+

On balance, we believe that Morocco would be the more likely of the two + to end the pact. Hassan might allow the treaty to atrophy if Qadhafi does not continue to provide + sizable amounts of economic aid, particularly if the opposition tries to + develop Libyan assistance into a major political issue. The King might + even break openly with Libya if Qadhafi insisted on closer military cooperation or on + Rabat’s adopting a more anti-US and anti-Israeli stand. Hassan almost + certainly would denounce the union if Moroccan security uncovered clear + evidence of Libyan-sponsored threats to his regime or if Qadhafi resumed supplying the + Polisario. If Rabat did abrogate the pact, Qadhafi would turn sharply on Hassan, and seek to + overthrow him.

+

Hassan wants to maintain close relations with the United States, but + fears Washington will take more significant punitive action against him. + Of particular concern would be a large cut in US economic and military assistance; he is already + sensitive to slights in protocol to himself and senior Moroccan + officials. If Moroccan-US relations were to severely deteriorate, Hassan + could terminate the joint military access agreement and US use of [less than 1 + line not declassified] facilities in Morocco, despite the + strategic and financial costs such a step would entail.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

+
+ +
+ 63. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850907–0347. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Accra, + Algiers, Cairo, Moscow, Ouagadougou, Paris, Rabat, Warsaw, and + USCINCEUR. + + 11620. + + Tunis, December 18, 1985, 1622Z + + + + SUBJECT + FonMin on Libyan-Algerian + Contacts, Tunisian-Libyan Relations. + + + Ref: + A) Tunis 11215,In telegram 11215 from + Tunis, December 6, the Embassy reported: “It is too early to be + certain, but Tunisia’s friends—especially Algeria—may be nudging + Tunisia towards a slightly less confrontational posture + vis-à-vis Libya.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850877–0368) + B) Tunis 11500,In telegram 11500 from + Tunis, December 16, the Embassy reported that the Tunisia Press + Agency had announced that “Essebsi was received by President + Bourguiba on the + morning of December 16” and that he “will travel to Algeria + December 17 as Special Envoy of President Bourguiba to President + Bendjedid.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850902–0269) + C) Tunis 11578In telegram 11578 from + Tunis, December 18, the Embassy reported that Mzali, whom the Department, + before the Libyan crisis, had “seen as one of the more + conciliatory elements in the GOT vis-à-vis Libya,” had “seized on the crisis” in + September and “set the GOT tone + of never letting relations ‘go back’ to where they were before.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850906–0712) (all Notal). + + + + S—Entire text. + + Summary. Ambassador took occasion of session with GOT + FonMin + Caid Essebsi December 18 to + discuss state of Tunisian relations with Libya and Algeria, in light + of FonMin’s one-day visit to + Algiers December 17 where he met with Algerian President and FonMin. Discussions with Algerians + focussed on Algerian-Libyan rapprochement and possible Qadhafi visit to Algeria. GOT raised standard concerns over + Libyan intentions. While Caid + Essebsi indicated understanding of “pressures” on + Algeria to improve its relations with Libya (including possibly + inviting Qadhafi to visit) he + stressed Tunisia’s intent not to resume diplomatic relations with + Tripoli, unless Libya proved willing to compensate Tunisia for + losses caused by expulsions. Caid + Essebsi thought Algeria’s new interest in Libyan + relations stemmed primarily from “Moroccan decision to opt for a + military solution in the Sahara.” All in all, GOT seems increasingly worried about + pace and tenor of recent Libyan-Algerian contacts. One response to + Qadhafi’s much publicized + African tour has been to dispatch Deputy FonMin + Mahmoud Mestiri to several + African countries in effort to keep Tunisian-African relations on + track. End summary. + + + FonMin + Beji Caid Essebsi received + Ambassador Dec 18, the morning after FonMin’s return from quick visit to Algiers. PolCouns + accompanied Ambassador. + + Ambassador said he would appreciate having the Minister’s + impressions of his visit to Algiers of the previous day. He said we + had also had some exchanges with the Algerians and were aware of + Bendjedid’s decision to + receive Qadhafi eventually. + We had exchanged points of view on the region. The Algerians said + they posed conditions for the meeting but had no confidence in + Qadhafi’s assurances. We + had stressed our concerns over Qadhafi’s intentions in the region, especially as + concerned Tunisia and we had urged Algeria to continue its support. + We had also voiced our concerns over possible Libyan mischief + vis-a-vis Egypt, Sudan and Chad. + + Caid Essebsi noted he had + just spoken to Bendjedid the + previous day. The Algerians were under a lot of pressure—from + Qadhafi and “others”—to + receive the Libyan leaders. It appeared the Soviets had talked to + Qadhafi in Moscow about + Tunisia and Algeria, reminding them of their concerns for stability + (sic) and disapproving of Libyan pressure on Tunisia. One of the + purposes of MFA SecState Mahmoud Mestiri’s current trip to + Moscow (Tunis 11395),In telegram 11395 + from Tunis, December 12, the Embassy reported that on December + 11, the Tunisian Official News Agency (TAP), “carried an item citing ‘official source’ + which announced that MFA + SecState Mahmoud Mestiri + would be ‘transmitting an oral message to Soviet leaders.’ The + message, TAP continued, would + express gratitude for Soviet assistance following the Israeli + raid, as well as touch on other questions of mutual interest.” + The Embassy commented: “The unusually suggestive GOT/TAP announcement of the Mestiri visit leads one to conclude that the + Tunisians are doing a little siren act on the Soviets, at least + in part for our benefit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850893–0610) For more on the + Israeli October 1 raid on the PLO’s headquarters in Tunis, see Documents + 331–334. + Caid Essebsi said, was to + get readout on what Soviets had said to Qadhafi. + + GOT understood, Caid Essebsi said, that Libyans + had sent a high-level delegation to Bendjedid and had urged him to see Qadhafi. Bendjedid had at first refused. But + when Algerian FonMin + Ibrahimi came he said + Algerians had reversed themselves. Caid + Essebsi had told Bendjedid yesterday that Algeria is of course + sovereign. He noted that Algiers, unlike Tunis, still had relations + with Libya. But Tunisia wanted things to be clear. There was no hope + of resumption of relations by Tunis with Tripoli. Tunisia would not + exclude a possible eventual resumption of normal ties if there were + compensation by Libya for costs Tunisia had to assume due to Libya’s + expulsions of Tunisian workers. But in future Libya must stay out of + Tunisia’s affairs and renounce such actions and allow Tunisia to + live side-by-side (read: passively) with Libya. + + Caid Essebsi said he told + Bendjedid Algeria’s + receiving Qadhafi would help + get latter out of his isolation. Algeria, after all, was not Burkina Faso. Others would + now see receiving him as less of a stigma. Who knows, he might even + visit Egypt next since Mubarak had inexplicably offered to receive him. In + any case, Tunisia was different and would not accommodate Qadhafi. + + Bendjedid had told FonMin he had no confidence in + Qadhafi either. He noted + Qadhafi would not be + received in Algiers but at an unspecified location elsewhere. But, + Caid Essebsi sighed, + Algeria was concerned about the Sahara war and worried that Morocco + had opted for a military solution, so it had to try to manage + Qadhafi a little. + + Caid Essebsi mentioned + that Mestiri would be making + stops in Burkina Faso and Ghana on his way back from Moscow as a + follow-up to the earlier mediation meeting those countries had + undertaken to lessen tensions between Libya and Tunisia. The GOT does not seem to have taken these + efforts very seriously, but based on Caid Essebsi’s comments and other impressions we + have gotten from the MFA the GOT is anxious to maintain its own + relations in Africa, especially after Qadhafi’s recent trip there. + + Comment: The Tunisian concern reflected ofer Algerian-Libyan + contacts has not been relieved since on Dec. 4 meeting with + Caid Essebsi. If + anything, it has been heightened. + + Sebastian +
+
+ 64. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Reagan + Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, North Africa. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of + Near Eastern and South Analysis, based on information received as of + January 10. + + NESA M 86–20005 + + Washington, January 10, 1986 + + +

North Africa: The Power Equation

+

Summary

+

The two major alliances of North Africa are undergoing internal strains + which could lead to a shift in the balance of power in the Maghreb. + Morocco’s King Hassan and Libyan leader Qadhafi are increasingly dissatisfied with the + implementation of their union; longstanding differences among Algeria, + Tunisia, and Mauritania have prevented their loose pact from taking + root. We do not anticipate a dissolution of the current groupings in the near term, but friction, + if unchecked, could lead the countries to realign their foreign + policies. Tentative signs are that change in the alliances would involve + rapprochement between Algeria and Libya and possibly expanded ties + between MoroccoIn the left margin an unknown + hand drew a line bracketing “realign their foreign policies. + Tentative signs are that change in the alliances would involve + rapprochement between Algeria and Libya and possibly expanded ties + between Morocco and Tunisia.” and Tunisia. We believe Algeria + and Libya are the most likely countries to benefit from any major + changes, while Morocco and Tunisia would be more isolated and + vulnerable. Overall, the balance of power in the Maghreb would not + change appreciably, unless in the unlikely event that Algeria and Libya + form some sort of an alliance. Such shifts in the region would provide + opportunities for Moscow to expand its influence and produce mixed + results for Washington. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+
+ 65. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense + WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1986. Secret; Noforn. Sent + through Iklé. Drafted by + Charles (ISA/NESA). A stamped + notation at the top of the letter reads: “SECDEF HAS SEEN JAN 24 + 1985.” Taft also initialed + the memorandum. + + + Washington, January 18, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Breaking the Moroccan/Libyan Accord (S)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

(S/NF) Recent events, including indication of Libyan involvement in the + Rome/Vienna airport bombings,Reference is to + the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna + airports. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, + June 1985–January 1989. The United States believed that + Qadhafi supported the + suspected mastermind of the attack, Abu Nidal. See also footnote 2, Document 156. + appear to have further strained the delicate Moroccan-Libyan Union. + Several Moroccan government + officials (GOM) have vigorously + criticized Qadhafi for his + support for terrorist groups, as well as for his position on + rapprochement with Algeria. King Hassan has commented privately that he + believes Qahdafi’s support for terrorism will lead to his undoing.No record of Hassan’s comment has been + found. These incidents may have given us an opening for + weaning Morocco away from its Libyan union.

+

(S/NF) US/Moroccan relations are valued + highly for both strategic and political reasons. It is a country with + which we have shared a “special relationship” for 199 years, even if + strained recently by the Oujda Accord. The United States benefits + directly from Morocco’s agreement [less than 1 line + not declassified] and host to a major VOA relay station. In the longer term, it will serve US interests for Morocco to be strong + enough to balance revolutionary Algeria in the Maghreb. A radical or + pro-Soviet state at the western approaches to the Mediterranean would + weaken our geo-strategic posture. These considerations argue strongly + for some tolerance on our part toward the Union for now, but also for + our taking appropriate action whenever possible to sever the Libyan + tie.

+

(S/NF) Despite recent embarrassments by Qadhafi, King Hassan still sees value in the Union as a + means to both preclude Libyan support to the Polisario and to divert + Algerian forces to the Libyan border. There also are some modest + economic benefits accruing to Morocco as a result of the Union, but + these are not substantial. There are good indications that King Hassan + would dissolve the Union openly if renewed Libyan support for the + Polisario or other Libyan actions against Moroccan interests could be + proven publicly.

+

(S/NF) King Hassan continues to have the highest regard for his US connection, and for what he believes is + his close rapport with President Reagan. He also realizes that the distance between Rabat + and Washington since the Oudja Accords has grown significantly, as + evidenced by his inability to be guaranteed a meeting with the President + when he planned to visit the US last + year, and by our declining economic and security assistance program.

+

(S/NF) POSSIBLE INCENTIVES TO WEAN MOROCCO FROM LIBYA: We need to send a + positive, unequivocal signal of US + support for Morocco,Armitage wrote five + vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to the phrase “We need + to send a positive, unequivocal signal of US support for Morocco.” one that assures the + King it is possible to restore our “special’s relationship” to its + former vigor, and that shows him he has a better alternative than the + Accord. Such a message must be political primarily, but must include + economic inducements as well.

+ +

(S/NF) Some specific steps we should consider: + + Given the King’s feelings of political isolation, send a + Presidential invitation for King Hassan to visit early this + year, a visit replete with the pomp and ceremony the King + enjoys.Armitage made two + vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this + paragraph and wrote: “This is important point.” Weinberger wrote: “agree” + underneath Armitage’s comment. + + + NSC proposed such a + visit, but scheduling has been held up until dates for + the next Reagan/Gorbachev meeting are resolved. + + If we delay until later in the year, we could miss the + opportunity offered by the lastest Libyan + debacle; + + + Send a US emissary to Morocco. + Given his close relationship with the King, we recommend UN Ambassador Dick Walters;Weinberger wrote: “OK” in the right-hand + margin next to this point. + + Selectively expand or redirect our intelligence exchanges to + provide explicit proof to the GOM of Libyan support for terrorism and any other + evidence of Libyan actions that adversely affect Moroccan + interests; + + Readdress the idea of a referendum to resolve the western + Sahara problem, offering US + assistance in negotiations between Morocco and Algeria, and in + the UN; + + While Gramm-RudmanReference is to + the Budget Deficit Reduction Act, December 12, 1985, + authored by Senators Phil Gramm (R-Texas), Warren Rudman + (R-New Hampshire), and Ernest Hollings (D-South Carolina), + which provided for automatic spending cuts in the federal + budget if discretionary funding exceeded budget spending + thresholds in a given fiscal year. poses obvious + obstacles, consider providing additional concessionary or grant + FMS for much desired and + much needed equipment, e.g., an advanced US fighter aircraft, armored vehicles and + ammunition (US assistance + summary at TAB A);Attached but not + printed is an undated information paper entitled + “Morocco—Security Assistance Program.” + + + As an “access” (but not “base rights”) country, + Morocco should receive a higher level of priority in the + security assistance allocation process than it currently + does. This may be because the access agreement has + received relatively little publicity, which the + Moroccans prefer. + + + Explore the possibility of doing more for Morocco as part of + our transit access and joint exercise agreement by offering to + “lease” Moroccan facilities based on existing levels of US usage for transits and + exercises, an arrangement similar to the Oman “Operations and + Maintenance Agreement”.Not further + identified. + + + Morocco did not request such payments when we + concluded the Access Agreement,See Document + 207. primarily because they believed + by giving + us such privileges, they in turn would receive higher + levels of concessionary FMS and grant aid. + + In view of impending Gramm-Rudman cuts to their + overall O & M budgets, we expect the military + services will oppose this idea strongly as, you may + recall, they did the Oman O & M payments. If you + support this idea, and if Morocco shows interest in + receiving such remittances, you most likely will have to + direct the Services to make these payments. + +

+

(S/NF) If you believe these ideas should be pursued further, we could + include the subject as a topic for your next breakfast meeting with + George Shultz and John Poindexter, or prepare a + memorandum for you to send to them.

+ Richard L. ArmitageArmitage signed “VR/Rich” above this + typed signature. Below it he wrote: “Mr. Secretary, A visit + to the White House would do more than all the other items + combined—Rich.” + + Assistant Secretary of Defense + + (International Security Affairs) + + +

Breakfast topic: ____________Weinberger wrote: “OK” next + to “Breakfast topic.”

+

Prepare a memo: ____________Weinberger drew a line from + “Prepare a memo” and wrote: “Brief talking points.”

+

Other: ____________

+ +
+
+ 66. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Niact Immediate, Nodis. + + 510. + + Algiers, January 30, 1986, 1508Z + + + + SUBJECT + Qadhafi Message to + U.S. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary: I met for an hour with President Bendjedid Jan. 30 at his request to + discuss a variety of regional issues, most significant of which was his Jan. 28 + meeting with Qadhafi.In telegram 497 from Algiers, January 29, + the Embassy noted that “Algerian media gave GOA version of January 28 + Bendjedid-Qadhafi meeting, indicating Algerians gained some + ground in putting distance between Morocco and Libya on the + Western Sahara. While Algeria reaffirmed its support for + Libyans’ territorial integrity, the U.S. was not condemned.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860073–0223) After expressing condolences on + Challenger explosion,Reference is to the + January 28 explosion of the U.S. space shuttle Challenger. Documentation on the incident is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XL, Global Issues I. + Bendjedid described + commitments made by Qadhafi + on regional issues. He also passed on message from Qadhafi dealing with latter’s + reputed desire for decreased tensions and willingness to deal with + Soviet presence in Libya and terrorism. End summary. + + Bendjedid traced history of + difficult relations Algeria has had with Qadhafi but noted that Algeria had as a geopolitical + imperative to maintain friendly relations with the Libyan people. As + a result, he said, Algeria took a nuanced position on Libya—standing + up to Libyan transgressions such as in Tunisia while maintaining + friendly “official” relations to prevent the mobilization of Libyan + public opinion against Algeria. In this context, Bendjedid said, he had met with + Qadhafi after having + stalled the meeting for over three months and having rebuffed dozens + of pointed requests. + + Bendjedid found Qadhafi agitated and troubled by + current events—he expressed a strong desire to rebuild the bilateral + relationship with Algeria. Bendjedid said he had told Qadhafi that there were a number of + preconditions to an improved relationship, all of which Qadhafi said he would agree to. + Qadhafi had even offered + to sign a protocol listing the preconditions in detail, an offer + which Bendjedid had rejected, + saying that Libyan promises were meaningless—only actions counted. I + asked Bendjedid about those + preconditions. He said they related to Tunisian security and Libyan + conduct. I asked if Qadhafi’s + support for Ben Bella had not been discussed. Bendjedid said he had raised it and + that Qadhafi has promised + that this support was a thing of the past and would not be + continued. + + On Tunisia, Bendjedid said + Qadhafi had expressed + shock that Algeria had sided with Tunisia against Libya. Bendjedid had said that the merits + of the case left no choice. Libya was the aggressor party, Tunisia + the victim. He warned Qadhafi + that Algeria would stand by Tunisia in every possible way should it + be confronted by Libya. Qadhafi expressed hope for normalized relations with + Tunisia. (In response to my query, Bendjedid said contacts between Tunisia and Libya + had already begun through the two countries’ Ambassadors in Paris + and would likely increase soon.) Algeria was undertaking to provide + a list to Qadhafi of the assets of Tunisians + which had been left behind by expelled workers. Qadhafi had promised to review such + a list to arrange satisfactory settlement. + + I asked if Bendjedid had + pressed Qadhafi on terrorism. + He said he had and was told by Qadhafi that although he strongly supported the + Palestinian cause he had not been involved in any way in the recent + events in Rome and Vienna.See footnote 2, Document 65. + Bendjedid said he had gone + over with Qadhafi the + terrible damage done to the Palestinian cause by such + incidents. + + Discussion of terrorism provided Bendjedid with opportunity to get to the point of + our meeting. Bendjedid said + Qadhafi was preoccupied + by the deterioration of his relations with the U.S. Despite his + opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East, Qadhafi did not want his + relationship with the U.S. to deteriorate to the point that he would + have to subordinate himself to the Soviets in order to buy a measure + of protection. Qadhafi had + said that Soviets had been after him for a long time to grant basing + rights and that he had always resisted this “infringement” on Libyan + sovereignty. Qadhafi said + that U.S. fleet actions and menacing acts could leave him no choice + but to capitulate to Soviet demands.Documentation on U.S. naval actions is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. + Qadhafi had expressed great + dismay over such a prospect. (Bendjedid noted in passing that such a development + would also be viewed by Algeria as a direct challenge to its + interests given fact that Qadhafi would sooner or later leave the scene but + Soviets, once based in Libya, would be difficult to extract.) + + Qadhafi had said that he + wanted to see if the U.S. would be prepared to lower the tensions + and work to establish better relations. He asked specifically if + Bendjedid would pass on + his concerns and offer to the U.S. Ambassador. Bendjedid said he had agreed to act + as a message-carrier only. He said he told Qadhafi he was sure the U.S. would + want to know what they would get in return. Qadhafi had said that, aside from + Soviet role and potential pressure, he knew that U.S. had certain + other concerns (a clear reference to terrorism, Bendjedid noted) and that he was + prepared to deal with these as well. Bendjedid said there were no more specifics. + + Dropping his role as message-carrier, Bendjedid observed that Algeria wanted reduced + regional tension—it did not want a Soviet base in Libya or the U.S. + fleet engaged permanently off the North African coast and was + therefore prepared to play any role the U.S. might find useful in + relaying messages. He said he was always skeptical of what Qadhafi said—he had known him a + long time—and would never + guarantee the sincerity of Qadhafi’s commitments. But, Libya’s problems were + acute enough to cause even Qadhafi to seek a better way to do business and + therefore, Bendjedid said, + there might be something useful which could be accomplished—based on + deeds, not words. He thought the U.S. should give it a serious look, + particularly given the lack of serious alternatives for dealing with + Libya. On this issue, Bendjedid noted that although Qadhafi faced internal dissent and + economic problems that might someday bring him down, the fact was + that no external opposition leader appeared to have the necessary + internal connections or abilities to get the job done. Bendjedid thought that when + Qadhafi disappeared it + would be from internal opposition, not from anything stimulated by + exile groups. In the meantime, Bendjedid implied somewhat circuitously, the U.S. + might best show some flexibility and not allow Qadhafi to exploit U.S. rhetoric + and menacing acts to rally Libyan opinion. Bendjedid thought that Qadhafi commitments obtained Jan. + 28 with regard to Tunisia and Ben Bella and, by implication, + regional stability, would give Algeria some leverage to contain + Libyan activities. I expressed great skepticism, which he accepted. + I promised to be back in touch with him with our views. + + Comment: From Algerian perspective, Qadhafi meeting looks like a substantial success. By + stalling meeting date, Algerians were able to prevent element of + surprise which Qadhafi has + used to his advantage elsewhere. Remote desert location of meeting + allowed Algerians to control media coverage and prevent any + possibility of pro-Qadhafi demonstrations. On substance, Algerians + obtained concessions (however hypothetical) on Tunisia, support for + Ben Bella, and on the Western Sahara, in the latter case, thereby + throwing something of a monkey wrench into the Morocco-Libya + relationship. In return, they allowed Qadhafi his much-solicited meeting and agreed to + transmit his message to the U.S. I doubt they expect us to snap up + the Qadhafi offer and do not + believe it makes much difference to U.S.-Algerian relations whether + or not we respond negatively. The remaining question, as yet + unanswered, is whether Qadhafi-Bendjedid meeting will lead to + cooling of Algeria’s relationship with various Libyan exile leaders. + For the time being, Algerians are likely to take wait-and-see + attitude and, given Algerian skepticism over anything Qadhafi says, not discard any + options for dealing with the Libya problem. I will have the further + opportunity to explore this issue with the President’s Secretary + General (Belkheir) on + Saturday.February 1. + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Ussery, Teicher, Pearson, Tracy, and McKinley; approved by Armacost. + + 110910. + + Washington, April 10, 1986, 0314Z + + +

For Ambassador From Under Secretary Armacost. Subject: Reply to King Hassan. Ref: Rabat + 2912.In telegram 2912 from Rabat, March + 25, Nassif reported: “Acting + through Interior Minister Basri, King Hassan has given us advance notice and + explanation of what he considers an ‘absolute minimum’ message of + support he plans to send to Qadhafi in the context of ongoing Gulf of Sidra + incidents. The message, which contains no reference to the U.S., has + passages on ‘solidarity’ and Libyan ‘patriots’ and ‘victims.’ It + appears to be the minimum which Hassan, as Chairman of the Arab + League, Islamic Conference, and Jerusalem Committee considers + necessary to avoid outright rupture with Qadhafi and attendant risk of Libyan reinvolvement + in the Western Sahara. I pointed out to Basri probable adverse Washington reaction to such a + message.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860230–0333) Documentation on the Gulf of + Sidra incidents is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad.

+ + + (S—Entire text) + + Basic message relayed to Ambassador Nassif by MinInt Basri (reftel) also sent via Director Casey.Reference is to a March 26 memorandum from Rixse to Shultz and Poindexter. (Reagan Library, + Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross Subject + Files, Morocco 1986) In latter case Hassan asked that + President and Secretary Shultz be assured that “The message of solidarity + sent today was the minimum that should be done. It was at the same + time the maximum. King Hassan II.” + + You should respond orally to both messages (your choice as to + interlocutor but no need to do so directly with the King) using + following points: + + I have been directed to convey USG views of King’s message to Qadhafi, as explained to me + by MinInt Basri and + also relayed to President and Secretary Shultz “by the hand of Mr. + Casey.” + + USG cannot accept that + Moroccan message of strong support for Qadhafi was “the minimum + that should be done.” + + On the contrary, USG + notes that some Arab governments did not take public + positions; others took courageous course of entering + reservations to Arab League resolution on this topic.In telegram 3594 from Rabat, April + 11, Nassif + reported that he had met with Filali on April 10 and + that Filali + stated that “Morocco is ‘caught in the middle’ in the + present confrontation between the U.S. and Libya. + Morocco still has a union with Libya. Although there is + little substance to the arrangement. The Libyans, for + their part, were not pleased with the King’s message to + Qadhafi and + wanted more.” Nassif commented: “Despite these + protestations, Filali clearly understood, and appeared + to expect negative USG + reaction to the message, which I believe he will convey + to King Hassan.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 + Nodis) + + + USG cannot understand nor + accept Moroccan “total solidarity” with Libya which attacked + U.S. military units operating in international waters. Such + a Moroccan posture can only encourage Qadhafi to continue to + pursue his various illegal activities. It is USG’s hope that GOM will reconsider its + position. + + + Shultz +
+
+ 68. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Reagan + Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, North Africa. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of + Near Eastern and South Analysis, based on information received as of + April 15. + + NESA M 86–20054 + + Washington, April 15, 1986 + + +

Outlook for a Maghreb Summit [portion + marking not declassified]

+

Summary

+

A possible meeting in May between Algerian President Bendjedid and Moroccan King Hassan + could be the forerunner of a greater Maghreb summit in the coming + months. Since the beginning of the year, the five states of North + Africa—Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya—have talked + increasingly about a “Greater Arab Maghreb” and the necessity for a + regional summit to discuss the concept. Leaders in these countries + always have paid lip service to Maghreb unity, but meetings between them + of late suggest that the prospects for such a forum are better than + usual. The impetus appears to be coming primarily from President + Bendjedid of Algeria who met + with Qadhafi in late JanuarySee Document + 66. and reportedly plans to meet soon with King Hassan. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

Uncertainties about the stability of alliances in the region are the + driving force behind these contacts, rather than pan-Arab or altruistic + desires for cooperation. Private agendas would dominate any summit. The + Western Sahara problem would be the principal focus of any meeting + attended by both Algeria and Morocco. The animosities between the states + preclude any comprehensive and lasting political settlement. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 69. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of + State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Raphel) to Secretary of State + ShultzSource: Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Records, 1 January + 1984–21 January 1989 Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents: Lot + 92D52, ES Sensitive April 1–30, 1986. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. + Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Ussery and Rand Beers (LTF). A copy was sent to INR. Raphel + sent the memorandum in his capacity as Chairman of the Libya Task + Force. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” + Later that day, Platt, under + a covering memorandum, forwarded a summary of the memorandum to + Poindexter. (Reagan + Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross + Subject Files, Morocco 1986) + + + Washington, April 17, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Delegation Meets With Qadhafi + +

Ambassador Nassif met today with + Moroccan Minister of Health Tayeb Ben Sheikh. Ben Sheikh, Deputy Prime + Minister Laraki and President of the Moroccan Parliament Othman + travelled to Tripoli April 16. During their seven hour stay, they had a + 15–20 minute meeting with Qadhafi. + + Meeting took place at Qadhafi’s “office” in the Azizziya compound. + Qadhafi was + completely uninjured and calm, although obviously shocked by the + attack.Reference is to the April + 15 U.S. air raid on Libya. Documentation on the incident is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For the + Moroccan reaction to the raid, see footnote 3, Document 256. + + Qadhafi alleged that + his 15 month old adopted daughter killed and two sons moderately injured in the attack. GOM delegation did not ascertain + where Qadhafi had been at + time of attack. + + Qadhafi’s home severly + damaged but not completely destroyed. Windows in “office” blown + out, but not much other damage in Azizziya compound apparent to + Moroccans. + + Meeting with Qadhafi + took place before his TV appearance (which apparently done from + Tripoli). Meeting with Moroccans shown on Tripoli TV. + + Several other Libyans present at meeting, but Ben Sheikh + claims not to have been able to identify them (presumably he + could have identified figures such as Jalloud). + + Atomosphere was of “state of war”, expecting further U.S. + attacks. Moroccans judge that Libyan public rallying to + “underdog” Qadhafi. + + During stay, GOM given restricted, guided tour. Saw damage to + French embassy, said nearby “private residences” completely + destroyed. Discounted that there was any damage to Libyan + intelligence headquarters. + + + No estimate, feel for numbers of personal casualties (although + Nassif speculates + that Ben Sheikh may have been included in delegation to extend + offer of medical assistance if appropriate.) + + Ben Sheikh did not credit reports of fighting in Tripoli + yesterday, felt that firing was manifestation of general + nervousness, state of alert. He stressed that his observations + based on very limited exposure. + + Ben Sheikh refused to comment on substance of discussions with + Qadhafi, but + delegation presumably relayed message from Hassan to Qadhafi and may have brought + back a reply. +

+
+
+ 70. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross + Subject Files, Morocco 1986. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from + a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House + Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: + “Save—Have Elaine Morton come + & read this—thanks.” Below this note, Morton initialed the + telegram. + + 5833. + + Rabat, June 12, 1986, 1624Z + + + + SUBJECT + June 11 Audience With King Hassan: Dealing With Libya. + + + Ref: + State 183331.In telegram 183331 to + Rabat, June 11, the Department transmitted talking points to + Nassif in preparation + for his impending meeting with Hassan, which read in part: + “termination of the Moroccan/Libyan union is one of the primary + objectives of my mission.” The Department instructed Nassif to emphasize that “real + progress on the Libyan issue during your Washington visit will + be critical to the success of your visit and will color the + discussions on all other issues.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N860006–0285) + + + + (Secret—Entire text) + + Summary. During a June 11 audience with King Hassan at the Royal + Palace in Skhirat, which focused almost entirely on the King’s + upcoming trip to the United States, I emphasized to Hassan that + Washington saw U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya as the + centerpiece of discussions. I observed that talks on that subject + would set the tone for all other discussions during the visit. + Hassan said he understood the importance the U.S. placed on the + issue, commenting that he too had many grievances against the Libyan + leader who, he emphasized, could turn on Morocco at almost any time. + He noted, however, that such cooperation was so sensitive as to + require very restricted discussion, since mere mention of the + subject heightened the external security threat against Morocco. I + told Hassan the U.S. understood the security concerns and would be ready to + discuss ways in which to cooperate to meet the threat during the + visit. Other subjects reported septels.In telegram 5837 from Rabat, June 12, Nassif reported that he raised + the issue of Hassan meeting with Peres. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0329) In telegram + 5845 from Rabat, June 12, Nassif reported that Hassan “offered a lengthy + aside on animosity between Algeria and Morocco.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N860006–0701) End summary. + + I met for an hour with King Hassan at the Royal Palace in Skhirat + on June 12. The meeting was at my request, and focused on Hassan’s + upcoming trip to Washington. Hassan was accompanied by Royal + Counselor Reda Guedira and FonMin + Abdellatif Filali. + + I opened discussion by making points in reftel and noting to + Hassan the importance Washington placed on the Libyan issue in the + discussions to be held in the course of his visit. Advising Hassan + that I would speak with the candor that has characterised our + previous discussions, I said that Washington intended for + U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya to be the centerpiece of the + talks, and that the progress in these exchanges would in large part + determine the success of the rest of the visit. I told Hassan that + Washington wanted to see an end to the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, + and sought to cooperate with Morocco in opposing Libyan support of + terrorism around the world and of subversion against its African + neighbors. + + Hassan at first appeared somewhat taken aback by this direct + presentation. He observed that, between chiefs of state, any subject + was open to discussion. He understood the importance the U.S. places + on the Libyan issue. Warming to the subject, he acknowledged that it + was in Morocco’s interest as well to discuss the Libyan issue during + the visit. He agreed that Libya is a major supporter of + international terrorism and seeks to destabilize African neighbors. + He added with vigor that Libya had been at the origin of the Sahara + problem, as a result of its support for creation of the Polisario + guerrilla movement. Noting that the Oujda Accord with Libya had been + designed to “neutralize Qadhafi, not just to isolate him,” Hassan observed + that Qadhafi is so volatile + that he could turn on Morocco at any time. He repeated that he was + ready to fully discuss the Libyan issue. + + Hassan then noted that he had one concern about any discussion of + bilateral cooperation against Libya: that the discussions be handled + with an absolute maximum of discretion. He said it would be + necessary that any meeting which discussed the subject might be + restricted to a very small group of advisers on either side. “You + have your methods of dealing with Qadhafi,” he remarked, “and I have + mine.” He continued that “there are certain subjects of conversation + between Chiefs of State that should be discussed ‘off the record’.” + He said that, for example, + he would have no problem if the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and myself were to + participate in this discussion, but emphasized that the group of + advisers should be kept small.Morton drew a vertical line in + the left-hand margin bracketing the last sentence in this + paragraph. + + Hassan explained that Libya, along with Algeria, represented the + greatest threat to Morocco. He said that, while he feared no + internal threat and was confident that his great-great-grandchildren + would continue to occupy the throne in Morocco, he was not confident + about external threats, over which he had so little control. It was + for that reason that he felt it so important that attendance at any + meeting to discuss cooperation against Libya be tightly + controlled. + + I assured Hassan that we would be prepared to consult in advance + with him on who would attend the meetings from each side. + Reiterating what I have told him in the past, I said that I had made + termination of the Moroccan-Libyan relationship a priority goal, but + added that Washington understood his concerns over a security threat + from Libya should that goal be achieved. I told him that we would be + prepared to explore with him in Washington ways to meet an increased + Libyan threat resulting from U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against + Libya. + + Comment: Hassan’s response to my presentation on Libya did not + appear to have been thought out in advance. It was more of a + visceral reaction to an unexpected statement of intent.In telegram 6312 from Rabat, June 26, the + Embassy reported “King Hassan’s meeting with the President is a + major opportunity to advance our objectives of ending Morocco’s + union with Libya. In reality the agreement is moribund. Hassan + prefers a languishing relationship to a public breach. He fears + renewed military assistance to the Polisario, concerted action + with Algeria, and potential subversion within Morocco by + Qadhafi.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 + Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis) Hassan ultimately + canceled his visit to the United States, scheduled for July, in + favor of a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres. See Document 259. He was, however, quick to point + out that he would face a real threat of Libyan subversion the day he + terminated the tenuous union he now has with Qadhafi. Senior Moroccan security + officials have often told us of the active Libyan efforts currently + underway to put a network of Libyan activists in place for the day + the Oujda Accord collapses, and described the enormity of their task + in taking effective countermeasures. Hassan did not discuss during + our June 11 meeting what exactly he would expect from the U.S. in + exchange for terminating the relationship with Libya, nevertheless I + suspect he will move cautiously before he takes any such step, + carefully weighing the costs and benefits to Morocco. I am confident + also that the June 11 audience has left him with no illusions about + the importance we will give the Libyan question during the visit to + Washington, and what we expect from him. We will need to give + careful consideration to increased security threats to Moroccan and Polisario presence in + the Western Sahara, if Libya reverted to past practice following a + rupture in the union. Should Hassan raise these issues, we should be + ready to respond to his concerns, if we expect forward movement from + him. Embassy analysis of the current Moroccan-Libyan relationship + follows by septel. + + Nassif +
+
+ 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Algiers 1986 Nodis. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher; cleared by Zweifel, Andrew Steinfeld (P), Pascoe, Maura Harty (S/S–O), and Ussery; approved by + Armacost. Sent for + information Priority to Rabat and Tunis. + + 215666. + + Washington, July 10, 1986, 0238Z + + +

Algiers for Ambassador Johnstone. + Subject: Algeria-Libya. Ref: Algiers 3468.In + telegram 3468 from Algiers, July 7, the Embassy reported: “There is + a troubling drift in Algeria’s policy toward Libya. What started out + as a tactical ploy by Algeria to ‘neutralize’ Qadhafi and sow distrust between + Libya and Morocco is threatening to turn into a policy with a + momentum and a constituency of its own.” (Ibid.)

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Gloomy analysis in reftel underscores our growing concern about + Algerian-Libyan rapprochement. We endorse your proposal to raise + this again with ranking GOA + officials; we leave the choice and number of interlocutors, as well + as the content of each approach, to you. + + While making our position on Qadhafi clear, you should—at least at this stage in + the internal Algerian debate on this subject—avoid conveying the + impression that we now judge an Algerian-Libyan union to be an + inevitability that would destroy the progress we have in our + bilateral relations.In telegram 6999 + from Tunis, July 16, the Embassy stated: “At this vantage point, + Algero-Libyan union looks like something of a periodically + resurfacing trial balloon born of latent conflict between + Algiers FLN militants and their + allies on one hand and military loyalists and their friends on + the other. Key pre-condition to such union, i.e. radicalism + ascendant in Algeria remains unmet.” The Embassy continued: + “this said, any Algero-Libyan ‘union’ would seem bound to break + Oudja alliance, unquestionably an important Algerian goal.” + (Ibid.) From the Washington perspective, it would seem + likely that an Algerian decision would be conditioned largely by + regional considerations and that our ability to dissuade the GOA from such a course may thus be limited. Our + objective should be to ensure that Algerian leaders understand and + take into account our opposition to a union, while at the same time + doing nothing to strengthen the hand of those elements who might + seek to exploit for their own purposes the sensitivity of Algerians + to perceived “threats”. + + Similarly, we should be cautious about overstating a strong + negative reaction to a possible Algerian-Libyan union in banking + circles. Decisions in the banking community will continue to be + based more on judgments about Algerian creditworthiness (reportedly + still high) than on any chill in US-Algerian relations that would ensue. + + Finally, on the Algerian reaction to Hassan’s visit (para 9 + reftel), you should reiterate to your interlocutors that our Libya + policy has been made clear repeatedly to virtually all governments + with which we have relations. This includes close friends, as well + as the Soviets and the Eastern bloc. We have made no secret of our + disapproval of the Moroccan-Libyan union and will use the occasion + of Hassan’s visit to underscore that concern. + + Shultz +
+
+ 72. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, INR/IL Historical Records, + [text not declassified], Algiers, + 1986–88. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction + not declassified]. + + 3942. + + Algiers, July 30, 1986, 1438Z + + +

Eyes Only for NEA + Armacost and Murphy only. Subj: Algeria-Libya.

+ + + Secret entire text. + + In the past six weeks, the Algeria-Libya relationship has been the + subject of intense internal maneuvering within the GOA, leading, it would appear, to a + major policy decision by President Bendjedid to largely [1½ lines not + declassified]. + + As previously reported (Algiers 3468 Nodis),See footnote 2, Document + 71. internal debate pitted General Belkheir and Foreign Minister + Ibrahimi, who opposed + political rapprochement with Libya, against FLN Party Secretary Messaadia, National Assembly + President Rabah Bitat and certain military officers who favored political + rapprochement up to and including union with Libya. + + Debate appears to have been resolved in favor of the anti-Qadhafi + group by the President shortly after his return from Brussels. Our + first indication of this came in my meeting with Ibrahimi on July 17 (Algiers + 3722).In telegram 3722 from Algiers, + July 18, Johnstone + reported: “I had a long, ‘relaxed, general policy review of the + regional situation’ with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi July 17 at his + request. Ibrahimi used + meeting to express concern over Tunisia, provide categorical + assurances on Algerian policy toward Libya, and to urge a + discreet U.S. role on the Western Sahara.” Johnstone indicated that + Ibrahimi “said that, + despite what the Libyans might be saying, Algeria would under no + circumstances accept political union with just Libya. The only + union Algeria would accept was a union that included Tunisia, + Mauritania, and Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860552–0711) [3½ lines not declassified] + + It now appears that: + + Messaadia’s planned trip to Libya in July–August has been + indefinitely postponed. + + [2 lines not declassified] + + [5 lines not declassified] + + + We are, of course, pleased by this favorable turn of events. I + think our intensive campaign, both here and in Washington, to + convince the Algerians of the damage to U.S.-Algeria relations posed + by continued Libya-Algeria rapprochement has been one factor, among + others, contributing to the GOA + decision. Another possibly more important factor has been the + growing sense [3 lines not declassified] a + successor regime that is even more distasteful. + + [1 paragraph (19 lines) not + declassified] + + We will continue to monitor Algeria’s peripatetic relationship + with Libya for signs of any further changes of mind. However, for + the time being, we are on a roll and should capitalize on it by + pressing ahead with our efforts to rid the region of the Qadhafi problem. + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 73. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860661–0613. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to DOD, the White House, + Algiers, Tunis, Paris, Madrid, Damascus, Riyadh, Amman, and + Cairo. + + 8659. + + Rabat, August 29, 1986, 2305Z + + +

White House for NSC. Subject: King + Hassan’s Decision to Break Union With Libya. Refs: (A) Kirby-Zweifel + August 29 TeleconNot found. (B) Rabat + 8658.In telegram 8658 from Rabat, August + 29, the Embassy reported that Hassan would be giving a national + television address that evening. “Several informed Moroccans,” the + Embassy noted, “think that the speech will somehow touch on Libya,” + including an announcement that Morocco would withdraw from the Oudja + Accords. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860660–0905)

+ + + (Confidential—Entire text) + + As reported ref A, Hassan announced in a televised address + tonight, August 29, that he has broken Oujda Accord because + Qadhafi, in his August 27 + communique with Syria’s Assad, had accused Hassan of “treason” in + meeting Shimon Peres last + month. + + While Morocco-Libya relations had deteriorated badly since the + Hassan-Peres meeting, as recently as Tuesday nightAugust 26. Hassan and Peres met on July 21. See Document 259. Hassan had been + determined to do nothing to provoke Qadhafi so as to leave the onus on the latter for + any rupture that might occur (ref B). The Qadhafi-Assad communiqué + thus seems clearly to have pushed Hassan over the edge,In telegram 5179 from Damascus, August 29, the + Embassy reported: “Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s unexpected + visit to Libya August 24 and 25 has been played here as an + unqualified success. Asad was able to demonstrate solidarity + with Qadhafi at a moment + of apparent ‘threat,’ thus making up for what the Libyans had + considered lukewarm support at the time of the April bombing and + keeping a promise reportedly made to Qadhafi at that time. Asad was able to elicit + from the Libyans a forceful condemnation of the Hassan-Peres + meeting.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860659–0741) and he doubtless + wanted to get in his licks before the always unpredictable Qadhafi had a further opportunity + to snipe at Hassan in his expected September 1 address. + + While it is speculation on the Embassy’s part at this stage, we + think another factor weighing in Hassan’s decision to break was + probably his desire to further improve relations with Washington in + advance of a U.S. visit which he still presumably hopes to make at + some early stage to discuss, inter alia, Morocco’s need for economic + and military assistance. Regardless of what Washington’s current + intentions may be, many senior palace and GOM officials believe there is a better than even chance that the U.S. + will take another hard crack at Qadhafi in the days or weeks just ahead. Hassan may + well have calculated that if Oujda was about to be scrapped by one + side or the other anyway, and if Washington and Libya were about to + clash, Morocco could gain more points with Washington by breaking + Oujda before rather than after the clash.Reagan wrote Hassan + on September 3 to thank him for breaking the Oudja Accords. See + Document 260. Hassan may + also have reasoned that even in terms of his relations with the Arab + world, it would be easier for him to abandon Qadhafi before rather than after + such an American strike. + + Kirby +
+
+ 74. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1986. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Information available as of September 11 was used in the + memorandum’s preparation. + + NESA 86–10037 + + Washington, September 1986 + + +

THE MAGHREB: POPULATION PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL + STABILITY

+

Key Judgments

+

The serious and deepening social and economic problems in North + African—high unemployment, overcrowded cities, and a growing food + deficit—are undermining the foundations of political stability in the + region. Rapid population growth is a major factor in these problems, and + the situation will worsen as the population in Morocco, Algeria, and + Tunisia jumps from 53 million today to a projected 84 million in the + year 2000. [portion marking not declassified]

+

The rapid population growth is destabilizing because it is eroding the + old land-based, family-oriented, traditional Islamic society of the + Maghreb faster than governments in the area have been able to promote + development of economically advanced, urban-based societies. The + traditional rural economy cannot absorb the population increase, and, as + a result, the cities are drowning in an excess of youthful jobseekers. + Rapidly expanding public + education systems try to inculcate the skills and habits of thought + needed to adapt to modern society, but all too often they only broaden + horizons and whet ambitions faster than the job market can grow to + satisfy them. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

As these developments have gathered momentum, increasingly large numbers + of people—especially the younger generation—have become alienated from + their societies. Some of these socially and intellectually uprooted + individuals have started to turn their backs on modernization and reject + along with it the United States and other Western countries that they + see as principal agents of change. This impulse has been the driving + force behind the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist revival in the + Maghreb. Other individuals are discontented that their governments are + not doing more to promote change, and this group—substantially smaller + than the fundamentalists—is the recruiting ground for radical leftists. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

Political protest is not yet a major force, but it almost certainly will + become so as social and economic conditions deteriorate in the region. + Political leaders who fail to accommodate either leftist or + fundamentalist aspirations almost certainly will be forced to use more + repressive measures to shore up their authority. Leaders who lean too + far toward either fundamentalism or leftist radicalism, however, will + probably stir up opposition from the other quarter. Moreover, + fundamentalism and leftist radicalism imply different political + blueprints, and the underlying conflict between them suggests that + politics in the Maghreb will become increasingly turbulent. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Maghreb leaders are aware of the dangers that rapid population growth + poses to long-term political stability, and they have begun to deal + constructively with some of the principal causes and consequences of the + problem. In Morocco, family planning is slowly gaining acceptance, + especially in the cities and among the better educated. Algeria + recognizes the need for family planning, though a national program is + still in the initial stages of implementation. Tunisia already has made + limited gains in controlling population growth through + goverment-sponsored family planning programs. In spite of these efforts, + progress in population control is likely to remain limited in North + Africa for some years to come. Inadequate education is a fundamental + obstacle, and governments will proceed cautiously in order to avoid + offending traditional values. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

The strong possibility that rapid population growth will continue and + could contribute to increased political instability and anti-US + sentiment is of particular concern because of the region’s strategic + location. Political leaders in the region are well aware of the + Maghreb’s strategic importance. We anticipate that Morocco, Tunisia, and + possibly Algeria will try to exploit that fact by pressing Washington + for financial assistance as they struggle with the economic and + political consequences of + rapid urban growth. Maghreb governments almost certainly will view + Washington’s response to their requests for assistance as a measure of + US commitment to their needs and—in + the case of Morocco and Tunisia—as an indication of US reliability as an ally. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is a map and the body of the memorandum.]

+
+
+ 75. Memorandum From James Stark + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Poindexter)Source: Reagan Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, Algeria. Secret. + Sent for information. Copies were sent to Teicher, Ross, Morton, Saunders, and Bohn. + + + Washington, September 12, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Discussions in Tunisia and Algeria + +

From September 1–7, I accompanied Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard + Armitage to Tunisia and Algeria for bilateral political-military + discussions. Also participating were LtGen Phil Gast (DSAA), Deputy Assistant Secretary + Bob Pelletreau (OSD/ISA), + Deputy Assistant Secretary Dave + Zweifel (State/NEA) and + RADM Tony Less (JCS/J–5) together with + representatives from each Service and EUCOM. This memorandum reviews the highlights of those + meetings.

+

Tunisia

+

The meetings were hosted by Defense Minister Baly and included short private meetings for Armitage + with President BourguibaFor the Armitage-Bourguiba discussion, see + footnote 3, Document 345. + and Prime Minister Sfar.Telegram 8684 from Tunis, September 5, + contains a record of the Armitage-Sfar meeting. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860677–0376) Armitage reported that conversations with + Sfar were more substantive + than previous meetings with Mzali, and that Sfar + was an impressive interlocutor, dynamic, and articulate.

+

The meetings went very well. It was obvious that Bourguiba had given directions that + U.S.-Tunisian security relations were to be expanded. As a result, + agreements were reached on many minor issues and discussions of security + assistance for Tunisia centered around a realistic request list.

+ +

The most important event of the meetings was close-hold Tunisian + agreement to commence joint contingency planning. I suspect this + decision was due to the success of the April raid on Tripoli, the + continuing threat from Libya, and Tunisia’s hope that closer cooperation + with the U.S. will free up additional economic and security assistance. + As a first step, Admiral Less and the Tunisian Army Chief of Staff + (General Baraket) met to discuss a draft TOR.No record of this meeting + has been found. Subsequent meetings will be held and will + include EUCOM representatives.

+

Financially, Tunisia is very worried about the pressures of declining + revenues and cuts in U.S. security assistance. In this area, Tunisia has + three goals: + + It assumes FY87 security assistance will remain at FY86 + levels. The U.S. delegation noted that this would be unlikely. + Expect Ambassador Ben + Yahia to lobby Congress for an earmark. + + Tunisia raised a possible rescheduling of its FY87 FMS loan principle. We promised to + look into this, but noted that this could cause legal and + downstream financial problems. They should not expect a positive + answer. + + Tunisia wants to reduce the “exorbitant” interest rates on + prior FMS loans, which + currently run 11–14 percent. This issue is currently being + actively worked by NSC, State, + DoD, and Treasury. We hope to have some positive answers by the + end of September. +

+

While the very ambitious “Bourguiba list” of desired U.S. arms remains + Tunisia’s goal, the GOT tabled a new, + more realistic, list headed by Stinger, anti-mortar radar, and + surveillance aircraft. Its total cost would be $325 million.

+

Finally, Tunisia expressed interest in receiving counterterrorism + training for its army. Armitage noted that such training was not + conducted solely by the U.S. Army, and that we would have to have + further discussions at the policy level.

+

Algeria

+

The meetings with Algeria were hosted by Ministry of Defense Secretary + General Cheloufi.In telegram 4521 from + Algiers, September 8, the Embassy reported on Armitage’s discussions + about military issues with the Algerians. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860680–0680) The discussions covered military sales and + cooperation, as well as regional political issues.In telegram 4529 from Algiers, September 9, the + Embassy reported on Armitage’s discussions about political issues + with the Algerians. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D860683–0479) Embassy officers + commented that the high turnout of top Algerian officers was unique and + illustrated Algeria’s commitment at the highest level to expanding its + relations with the U.S.

+ +

Armitage stressed that the U.S. wished to improve and deepen its security + cooperation with Algeria, but only at a pace with which both countries + would be comfortable. The U.S. is not interested in short-term gains, + but rather in a satisfactory long-term relationship. As we expand + training, sales, and other contacts with Algeria, we should expect + relations to improve.

+

Cheloufi, while stressing Algeria’s independence and non-alignment, also + emphasized its desire to diversify weapons sources. Privately, he also + acknowledged that the earlier emphasis on a socialist model together + with its single product (hydrocarbon) economy was causing problems. + Algeria’s leaders want to relax the strict socialism, making Algeria + attractive to Western investment in order to diversify their economic + base.

+

The Algerians were totally ignorant of FMS regulations. General Gast explained U.S. procedures in + some detail. The Algerians proposed, and we agreed, to set up a joint + military working group to handle questions about military sales, + training, and equipment. After much last minute maneuvering, we signed + agreements on a GSOMIA and IMET which had been under negotiation for + almost a year. The Algerians also informed us that, in accordance with + their sales agreement, the Soviets had said nyet to any Bear SparesReference is to the U.S. program that provided + spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weapons to + countries wishing to reduce dependency on Soviet military + aid. program for the Algerian MIG–21s.

+

Political discussions centered on Libya and Morocco. Both sides openly + discussed areas of disagreement. + + Algeria concurred on the nature of the Libyan threat, but + disagreed with the U.S. decision to bomb Tripoli. Their approach + is to open contacts with political and military circles in Libya + and try to moderate Qadhafi’s behavior. Privately, they recommended + action which would “eliminate the individual” without + endangering the Libyan populace. For our part, we explained the + rationale behind the April strike and the fact that + assassination is not an option for the United States. + + Algeria’s only major problem with Morocco is the Western + Sahara dispute. They agree that it cannot be resolved militarily + and are anxious for substantive political discussions. They will + not, however, agree to a meeting if it is solely to buy more + time for Hassan. For its part, the U.S. stressed its interest in + bringing Algeria and Morocco to a negotiating table, but refused + to agree to pressure Hassan into concessions. As a result of the + renunciation of the Oujda Accords, the Algerians expect Libya to + offer military equipment and financial support to the Polisario, + but feel they can control Libya’s access and activities. The + Algerians stressed that they do not begrudge us our good + relations with Morocco and do not expect the Western Sahara + question to affect U.S.-Algerian relations. +

+
+ +
+ 76. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880143–0505. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, + Cairo, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Rome, USUN, and USCINCEUR. + + 1856. + + Tunis, February 19, 1987, 1459Z + + + + SUBJECT + Prime Minister Baccouche + Discusses Maghreb Issues. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary: Prime Minister Baccouche said Qadhafi had been on his best behavior during + February 5–7 visit to Tunis and appeared willing to allow Tunisia + economic benefits from normalization. He did not push for exchange + of Ambassadors. While professing readiness to enter Tripartite + AccordSee Document 30. if others wished, he readily + agreed to Tunisian position that resolution of Western Sahara issue + should have priority so that Morocco also could join in a five-state + Maghreb. Thus, in Baccouche’s + judgment the March 19 fifth anniversary of the Tripartite Accord + would not witness startling events. Tunisia was exploring how it + might helpfully play an intermediary role in the Saharan issue and + would welcome U.S. suggestions. End summary. + + In one hour meeting February 18 PriMin + Baccouche briefed Ambassador + on Tunisia’s relations with Libya and his view of Maghreb + developments following recent visits. After reviewing on again, off + again background to Qadhafi’s + February 5–7 visit, Baccouche + said Tunisian leadership had not known what to expect from Qadhafi, such as whether he would + go on the offensive over reasons which had led to earlier + postponements, i.e., Tunisia receiving President Bendjedid first and welcome + accorded to visiting French and U.S. Mediterranean fleet commanders. + In fact, Qadhafi was on his + best behavior while in Tunis, intent on demonstrating his friendship + and goodwill. He insisted on treating Ben Ali and Baccouche as “revolutionaries” who had overthrown + the hated Bourguiba regime + and persistently refused to see continuity of Tunisian policies even + when Tunisian leaders had pressed this point. On bilateral economic + matters, Qadhafi had been + accommodating but very general, leaving the details to be worked out + during re-established joint commission sessions which Baccouche thought would take place + in late March. Joint commission would include a number of + sub-committees on specific issues such as workers, tourism, trade, + etc. Tunisia intended to prepare well for this session and seek + maximum economic benefits, both in order to provide relief for the + hard-pressed south and also, Baccouche implied, in order to recover ground which + was being lost to Algeria in exploiting Libyan economic + opportunities. + + + In answer to specific questions, Baccouche said that Algeria had supported having the + previously agreed Algerian-Libyan gas pipeline pass through Tunisia. + This would provide potential energy for Tunisian light industries, + as well as western Libyan cities and towns. Minister of Interior + Ammar had visited Tripoli Feb. 16 to discuss entry modalities. + Ben Ali and Qadhafi had agreed to eliminate + visa requirements for each other’s citizens as of February 15 but in + practice Libya was requiring each Tunisian to have TD200 in hard + currency. In the other direction, only twelve Libyans had entered + Tunisia thus far, owing to the requirement for a Libyan exit visa, + which only proven regime loyalists could obtain. Baccouche did not yet have Ammar’s + report of his meetings but assured Ambassador that Tunisia had the + means and the will to monitor closely all Libyan visitors. The + question of naming Ambassadors did not come up during Qadhafi’s visit, and Tunisia was in + no rush to name an Ambassador to Tripoli. Nevertheless, GOT had identified its current + Ambassador to Jordan, said Ben Mustapha el Gharbi, as its likely + candidate. + + Ambassador told Baccouche + that Qadhafi’s impromptu + remarks on Feb. 8Not further + identified. at Sakiat Sidi Youssef were insulting and + unacceptable to the U.S. We knew GOT agreed and did not intend to make an issue of it. + Baccouche noted that + Qadhafi had gone out of + his way to attack all Tunisia’s friends and confirmed President + Ben Ali’s extreme + displeasure with Qadhafi’s + remarks. They had been blacked out in Tunisia. When Ben Ali had taken Qadhafi to task afterward, the + Libyan had responded that he was by mentality a revolutionary, not a + head of state, and thus could only talk in this way. As for more + general impressions of the Libyan leader, Baccouche said, he and Ben Ali thought that Qadhafi was less energetic and + aggressive than in the past. Whether the causes were physical or + mental, they did not know, but they felt it was harder for Qadhafi to act. In addition, + Baccouche said, he + estimated that 80–90 percent of the Libyan population was ready for + a change of leadership. + + The Maghreb. Qadhafi had + explained to Ben Ali that + he was not keen to join the Tripartite Accord and saw no particular + value in it, but he would do so if others wished. Tunisia had + countered with the necessity of including Morocco in any larger + Maghrebian agreement. Qadhafi, said Baccouche, agreed completely that a five-state + Maghreb should be the objective rather than a four-state accord. He + also agreed that the first step had to be to accelerate a solution + to the problem of the Western Sahara. Thus in Baccouche’s judgment no startling + event would happen on March 19, the fifth anniversary of the + Tripartite Accord, as Algeria had hoped. Baccouche added that Qadhafi had told Polisario leader Abdul Azziz during + their meeting at Annaba that the Polisario must also work to resolve + rather than perpetuate the Western Sahara issue. + + Baccouche said that Tunisia + was examining how it could play a more active intermediary role in + the Sahara question. Foreign Minister + Mestiri had recently visited + Gabon to consult with a senior U.N. official on this issue. + Baccouche himself would + shortly visit Rabat and Algiers, and President Ben Ali would make an official + visit to Algeria on March 2 and 3. The essence of the problem, he + said, was to convince King Hassan that he had to help Algeria + disengage from the Polisario. A face-saving formula needed to be + found. Algeria could not just put 500 or 5,000 Polisario supporters + in jail. Baccouche said he + would welcome ideas or suggestions from the U.S. regarding how + Tunisia might help in this process. He closed by saying Tunisian + officials would look forward to discussing this and other subjects + with General Walters during + his upcoming visit. + + Pelletreau +
+
+ 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted byO’Neill; cleared by Zweifel, Denis Kiely (PM), Robert Ayling (AF/C), Elen Laipson (S/P), Steinfeld, Robert Downey (S/S–O), Ussery, and Quinn; cleared for information by Jay + Bruns (D); approved by Murphy. Sent for information to + USCINCEUR. + + 78524. + + Washington, March 17, 1987, 1728Z + + + + SUBJECT + Possible Tunisian-Libyan Reconciliation. + + + References + A) Tunis 2615,In telegram 2615 from + Tunis, March 13, the Embassy reported: “Reception by Bourguiba of senior Libyan + envoy suggests that Libyans have made significant offer to + remove outstanding financial differences” incurred after Libya + expelled Tunisian workers in 1986. The Embassy continued: + “Restoration of diplomatic relations seems a distinct, if + necessarily not a near-term possibility. We should not + overreact.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870195–0752) + B) Tunis 2560,Not found. + C) Tunis 2515.In telegram 2515 from + Tunis, March 11, the Embassy reported: “GOT has advised us in + confidence of new high-level contacts with Libya, at Libyan + initiative. Bourguiba may + receive Libyan envoy tomorrow. Senior GOT officials insist that Tunisia will stick to its + demands for restitution on various outstanding claims, but that + restoration of diplomatic relations, while not in the cards + anytime soon, cannot be excluded eventually.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870191–0770) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Embassy should make following reply in response to Prime Minister + Sfar’s 3/11 briefing on + possible Tunisian-Libyan resumption of ties: + + We respect GOT’s + sovereign right to decide on rapprochement. However, fact + that PM broached this + subject with us indicates an interest in our + reaction. + + + USG is concerned that + GOT action will + diminish pressure on Qadhafi, particularly unwelcome at a time + when Libya is engaged in aggression against Chad. + + We share PM + Sfar’s analysis that + threat to Tunisia from Qadhafi continues and is of serious + concern. + + Nonetheless, we are pleased that GOT still intends to proceed with military + contingency planning; this is our intention as well. + + We will be especially sensitive to implications of this + new GOT-Libyan relationship relevent to this planning, which + is premised in large part on threat from Qadhafi. + + We noted well PM + Sfar’s assertion that + normalizaion of relations will be contingent on a resolution + of all rpt all outstanding issues—including that of training + camps inside Libya. + + We strongly urge the GOT + to maintain this position. + + + Shultz +
+
+ 78. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: George H.W. + Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security + Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19874, Folder + 19874–017, Western Sahara [Morocco, Algeria] 1987. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. In the right-hand margin, Gregg wrote: “This is very + helpful.” Underneath this notation, Bush wrote: “agree GB 6–2.” + + 5213. + + Rabat, May 28, 1987, 1205Z + + +

For Secretary, Armacost and + NEA Asst Secy Murphy. Department + please pass to White House for Vice President and NSC- Carlucci, DOD for Secretary and Armitage. Subject: May 27 Meeting + With Foreign Minister: Algeria-Morocco Relations and King Hassan’s U.S. + Visit.Bush circled “Morocco” in the subject + line.

+ + + (S—Entire text). + + Summary: + + King Hassan sent Foreign Minister to Algeria May 25 for a + secret meeting with President Bendjedid. He carried a message urging + reconciliation and putting forth a proposal to begin direct + discussions on all outstanding issues. + + + Filali, on King’s + instructions, also asked that Hassan’s U.S. visit take place + during last quarter of 1987 since his stay in Great Britain + will preclude a July meeting. End summary. + + + I was invited to the home of the Foreign Minister Wednesday + evening, May 27. He explained to me that no one else, including + members of the government, were aware that he had been sent by King + Hassan to Algeria Monday, May 25, carrying a personal message to + President Bendjedid that it + was time for Morocco and Algeria to resolve their differences + directly. The Foreign Minister equated it to the U.S./Soviet + relationship: “Regardless of your differences, you meet regularly to + resolve them.” King Hassan made a proposal to establish two + commissions. A foreign affairs commission headed by the respective + Foreign Ministers would concern itself with diplomatic relations and + the war in the Sahara. A second commission headed by the Interior + Ministers would discuss trade, commerce, and open borders. The + Foreign Minister found the Algerian President very receptive to this + overture. Bendjedid’s + counterproposal was to establish one commission headed by the + respective Foreign Ministers but with the authority to discuss all + issues. Filali agreed. + + Filali then met separately + with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, whom he described as “apparently” + supportive of the initiative. Ibrahimi spent quite a bit of time discussing + Algeria’s concerns about Tunisian stability and rising + fundamentalism. It was Filali’s view that Ibrahimi was more concerned with fundamentalism in + Algeria, a popular theme in Morocco.Bush drew a + vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the + previous sentence. + Filali believed that it was + Algeria’s genuine concern in this regard that was changing their + thinking with regard to relations with Morocco. + + Ibrahimi had then discussed + the danger that Iran posed. He suggested that Iran was aiming at + Syria and Lebanon after Iraq, followed by Egypt and others. + Filali explained that in + the Iranian definition of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” the + “nation” was not confined to the territory of Iran. + + The two Foreign Ministers agreed that the future of the Maghreb + depended upon improved Moroccan/Algerian relations. (Filali commented to me that the + 1983 treaty of fraternity and concord between Algeria, Tunisia and + Mauritania was a meaningless document.) They agreed to meet again + next Monday, June 1, at the nonaligned Mediterranean Foreign + Ministers’ conference in Brioni, Yugoslavia to discuss their + respective ideas and agenda items. In the meantime, each side would + work to come up with proposals of its own. Ibrahimi had also explained to + Filali that Algeria’s + prior proposal to settle the Saharan dispute was merely a framework for opening discussion. In + principle, Algeria was prepared to open the border with Morocco but + the two sides needed to discuss the question of visas. + + I congratulated the King and Foreign Minister on their initiative + and effort to continue the momentum begun at the May 4 summit + meeting near Oujda.In telegram 4354 from + Rabat, May 5, the Embassy reported on the Hassan-Bendjedid + Summit, which resulted from Saudi King Fahd’s mediation efforts. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D870345–0097) I asked how the U.S. could + assist and Filali expressed + King Hassan’s desire for us to encourage those elements in Algeria + who support reconciliation. He specifically mentioned the Algerian + Secretary General of Defense who would be visiting the Pentagon in + July, implying that he would be a good person to talk with. He also + asked us to push this line through our Embassy in Algeria. I assured + him we always had and would continue to do so. + + I inquired whether the King’s initiative had anything to do with + the recent prisoner exchange.In telegram + 5124 from Rabat, May 26, the Embassy reported that Red Crescent + officials had brokered the exchange of Algerian prisoners + captured in 1976 by Moroccan authorities in the Western Sahara + and Moroccans likely captured by Polisario forces in 1984 and + held by Algeria. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D870404–0730) + Filali denied any connection + between the two and offered that the first the GOM had heard about Algeria’s + willingness to make the exchange was last week. It had come up in + discussions between the Saudis and the Algerian Prime Minister who + was in Saudi Arabia for other reasons. The Saudis then contacted the + Moroccans, who agreed. + + I told the Foreign Minister that I would report this news and that + of course we fully supported the spirit of cooperation that was + emerging from the summit meeting. + + The Minister then asked if the King could visit the U.S. during + the second half of October, November or December. The visit to Great + Britain was going to be extended and he would not be able to come in + July. I mentioned that those dates were not now being filled by + additional visits, given the possibility of a Reagan/Gorbachev + summit this fall.Reference is to the + Washington Summit December 7–10, during which Reagan and Gorbachev signed the + Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. See Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + October 1986–January 1989, Documents 105–115. He said he + understood but hoped some time during the last quarter of 1987 could + be found. He added that after Ramadan and his daughter’s wedding in + Marrakech June 5–8, King Hassan would like to meet with me. + Filali’s meeting with + Ibrahimi in Yugoslavia + would have occurred and hopefully there would be other things to + discuss. He expressed a + desire and need to keep in close touch with us on the progress of + the talks. + + Comment:While I have never been sanguine about the + possibility of significant progress in the Algerian/Moroccan + dispute, including the Western Sahara, I must say I saw a new + attitude developing. There appeared to be a desire and hope that the + time is right for improved relations. Both sides have made + significant gestures—Algeria, by its agreement to meet at the summit + level with Morocco without preconditions and their apparent + initiative to move the prisoner exchange question forward; Morocco, + by the Foreign Minister’s mission to Algeria to put forward a + suggested framework for continuing the dialogue. Each side will be + looking to us to urge the other party along toward compromise. While + we should certainly continue to do so, the problem is still best + resolved in a bilateral and Arab context with the U.S. pushing it + from behind rather than from the middle. + + Department please pass to Embassy Algiers and Tunis. + + Nassif +
+
+ 79. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff (Solomon) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, S/P + Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy + Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, July 1987. Secret. Drafted + on July 21 by Laipson. Solomon signed “Dick” next to his name in the “from” + line. + + + Washington, July 24, 1987 + + + + SUBJECT + North Africa: Shifting Sands + +

SUMMARY: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity + among the North African states presents both opportunities and risks for + our current policies in the region. We are encouraged by Moroccan and + Algerian efforts at rapprochement and settlement of the western Sahara + problem: we should look for ways to support and strengthen this trend. + At the same time, Libyan moves to better its relations with Algeria and + Tunisia—to date received + favorably in Algiers, warily in Tunis—pose a possible challenge to our + Libya policy. This memo examines the recent developments in the region + and considers their implications for U.S. policy. END + SUMMARY.

+

The Maghreb: Between Rivalry and + Rapprochement

+

Underlying most regional activity in North Africa are two fundamental + drives: one is the historic geostrategic rivalry between Morocco and + Algeria, which keeps them locked in a pas de deux aimed at preventing + the other from establishing regional hegemony; the second is the + continued quest of all the regional states for greater cooperation and + integration. The entire post-independence period has been characterized + by both the competition between Morocco and Algeria (the Sahara war can + be seen as a by-product of this competition) and the search for + integration, for Maghreb unity.

+

In the past, most integration efforts have been at the expense of either + Morocco or Algeria. The 1983 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, + brokered by Algeria, brought it into alliance with Tunisia and + Mauritania, leaving Morocco out. Morocco’s surprising (and short-lived) + union with Libya of 1984, although driven by complex motivations, can be + seen in part as a riposte to the 1983 accord.

+

At first glance, the current situation seems to fall into this pattern. + Algeria’s qualified support for Libyan inclusion in the 1983 tripartite + arrangement has been interpreted as aimed at isolating Morocco. But + there is an alternative view: the willingness of Algeria and Morocco to + work towards a new bilateral relationship is more significant than the + probably passing reintegration of Libya into the regional system. The + fact that the Algerians are working on both fronts at once is promising: + their overtures to Libya should not be read as leaving Morocco out of + any serious measures to promote regional economic and political + cooperation.

+

Morocco and Algeria: Beginning of a New Era?

+

Since the Saudi-brokered May 4 summit between King Hassan and President + Bendjedid,See footnote 4, Document + 78. follow-up has included: + + May 25 prisoner exchange involving over 200 prisoners,See footnote 5, + Document 78. the first exchange in over a + decade; + + June visit by a U.N. delegation during which Morocco and + Polisario agreed in principle to receive a U.N. technical team + to prepare for holding + a referendum, and subsequent meetings under U.N. auspices in + Geneva;In telegram 5993 from + Rabat, June 22, the Embassy reported that during a June 20 + conversation, Filali + informed the DCM that “the + talks had gone well and that Morocco had given the green + light for a UN technical + team visit to the Sahara. Filali said in fact the discussions had gone + so smoothly that ‘you could have written the script.’” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870494–0109) See also footnote 2, + Document 451. + + July 11 public visit by the Algerian foreign minister to + Morocco.In telegram 4177 from + Algiers, July 15, Johnstone reported that he had met with + Sahnoun, who + reported on Ibrahimi’s meeting with Hassan. According to + Johnstone, + Sahnoun said that + “Ibrahimi had not been able to figure out what to make of + Hassan’s new positions. Sahnoun pointed with satisfaction to + Hussein’s ‘Times’ interview in which Hassan said he would + accept a Saharan state if that was the will of the Saharan + people, noting that Algeria viewed this as a significant + statement. Sahnoun + was encouraged by this progress but warned that Hassan is a + devious poker player.” Sahnoun nevertheless “implied steady + movement toward normalization with Morocco.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870558–0595) +

+

Progress in settling the Saharan war is the keystone to improved + Moroccan-Algerian relations, and both sides are showing some flexibility + in moving the process forward. Most significant is Morocco’s reversal of + its previous position, now arguing that Algeria is not a direct party to + the conflict—allowing eventual direct public contacts with the Polisario + and offering the Algerians a face-saving out. In addition, Morocco now + embraces more actively the long-standing plan for a U.N. supervised + referendum in the territory. Algeria, at the May 4 summit and subsequent + secret meetings, has hinted at deals that would provide nominal + satisfaction to Polisario and non-aligned aspirations while recognizing + Moroccan strategic control of the territory.

+

While a quick breakthrough on the war may be unlikely—due primarily to + pressures within the Algerian and Polisario camps and to recent + Polisario successes in breaching the Moroccan berm—Morocco and Algeria + are also thinking about other bilateral issues, and this could sustain + the momentum in this fragile rapprochement process. There are powerful + incentives on both sides to improve trade and economic relations. A + natural complementarity exists: trade of Moroccan agricultural products + for Algerian oil and gas would be welcomed. Other border problems need + to be worked out.

+

Where Does Qadhafi Fit In?

+

Libya has only a tenuous claim to membership in the Maghreb club. Its + location and different colonial experience, coupled with the + peculiarities of its current government, have historically made it a + marginal player in Greater Maghreb schemes. Yet Libya has found a role + as spoiler, and the regional players have been willing to expand the + Greater Maghreb concept.

+ +

The Algerians have mixed feelings about Qadhafi. They are sensitive to the potential damage to + their own image in being too closely associated with him, claim to + recognize his unreliability, and are likely to stand firm on the + importance of settling their bilateral border differences. At the + moment, Algerian leadership is viewing the cup as half full, not half + empty, arguing that closer ties to Libya will have a salutary effect. + They are also trying to position themselves for a post-Qadhafi period, + and prevent Soviet gains. They have argued to the Tunisians that + bringing Qadhafi into the club + serves Tunisia’s interests:In telegram 4184 + from Algiers, July 16, Johnstone reported that he had met with Chaker, who + said that “Tunisians now have come to a meeting of minds with + Algerians on how to handle Qadhafi, and the two countries are moving together + in close cooperation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D870564–0068) the price for + membership will be settling all outstanding Tunisian financial claims. + For their part, the Tunisians remain more openly skeptical of Qadhafi’s capacity to change, see his + so-called moderation as short-term tactics, but will remain engaged in + the process in the interests of recuperating financial assets and + jobs.

+

Considerations for U.S. Policy

+

The current state of intra-Maghrebi relations, albeit in flux, presents + both opportunities and risks. Movement for greater regional economic + cooperation and for settling bilateral differences is desirable for U.S. + interests.

+

Morocco/Algeria

+ + + We should look for ways to express publicly our encouragement of + Morocco and Algeria in their efforts to improve bilateral relations + and to settle the Saharan war. We might consider a major speech on + the Maghreb by one of the Department’s principal officers, or + include the two capitals in a senior official’s travel plans over + the coming months. + + To complement our own public support, we should urge our European + allies, France and Spain in particular, to do likewise. We should + track closely the Saudi role. The Saudis, motivated by Arab League + concerns, are playing the key broker role. We should consult with + them and indicate our support. + + We should continue to indicate our support for the U.N. mandate in + working for a settlement. Closer consultations with U.N. officials + on the Sahara settlement process would send useful signals to the + regional players and bolster the U.N.’s commitment to what is likely + to be a long process. + +

Qadhafi’s New North Africa Policy

+

Qadhafi’s efforts to reintegrate himself into the Arab world’s western + flank pose some problems for us. Our policy of isolating him while maintaining good + relations with his neighbors is under challenge. We need to consider + ways of influencing this current phase of intra-Maghrebi maneuvering, + although not with a heavy or visible engagement.

+

We should consider: + + raising with the Algerians the terrorism implications of + admitting Libya to the 1983 pact. This is difficult, since our + bilateral dialogue over terrorism is complex and under stress + because of recent Abu + Nidal developments. But despite our sharp + differences with Algeria over Palestinian activities, for the + most part, the Algerians share our concerns about Libyan + meddling in the region and against western targets. + + encouraging the Tunisians to stay the course: they are playing + a useful role in keeping the Algerians mindful of both Qadhafi’s fickleness and the + importance of keeping Morocco included in regional cooperation + efforts. +

+
+
+ 80. Telegram From the Department of State to IntSum Collective and the Embassy in + LebanonSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870621–0110. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Nocontract. Sent for + information Priority to the Treasury Department. Drafted by Charles + Dunne (INR/NESA); cleared by + Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA); + approved by Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA). Sent for information to DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC, the Mission in Vienna, CINCUSNAVEUR, USCENTCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, COMSXTHFLT, + USCINCEUR, USIA, the Delegation to the MBFR in + Vienna, London, Paris, Rome, DOD/ISA, CINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR for INTAF. + + 238961. + + Washington, August 3, 1987, 2238Z + + +

The Maghreb: Handling the Islamic Challenge.

+ + + (S/NF/NC) Islamic fundamentalism draws from common sources but + lacks political unity. Government heavy handedness has made Islam a + serious problem in Tunisia; more skilled management has blunted the + challenge in Algeria and Morocco. Nonetheless, success in Tunisia as + Bourguiba leaves the + scene could encourage Islamic radicals throughout the + Maghreb. + +

Iron Fist in Tunisia

+ + + (S/NF/NC) Long opposed to President Bourguiba’s political secularism, Tunisian Islamists + are exploiting national drift and fear of repression to expand their + following. Tunis has responded with extensive, often heavy handed measures to + contain Islamists,Reference is to the + government’s crackdown on Tunisian Islamic fundamentalists + following the August 2 bombings of tourist hotels in Tunis. See + Document 352. closely + watching the military for Islamic sympathies and naming efficient + hard-liners to head the key Education and Interior Ministries. + Rather than deterring fundamentalism, however, these actions have + generated sympathy for the Islamic tendency movement among groups + with differing philosophies. + +

Pragmatism Sidetracks Critics

+ + + (S/NF/NC) Algeria, a self-declared secular republic since + independence, jailed Islamists in the 1960s but has since tried + generally more moderate tactics to cope with fundamentalism. Algiers + has taken steps to give the impression that Islam plays a major role + in national life, recasting its national charter to acknowledge + Islam’s role in Algerian culture, promoting moderate Islam to + counter Iranian or Libyan doctrines, and spending large sums on + mosque construction. Algiers has also ordered security services to + infiltrate home-grown and foreign-inspired groups, including one + linked to ousted former President Ben Bella. It has generally + limited strong-arm tactics to rooting out one especially violent + sect, leaving the mainstream alone. Some on the Algerian left fear + the government is not sufficiently sensitive to the threat, + however. + +

Flying Mohammed’s Flag

+ + + (S/NF/NC) Like Bourguiba, + King Hassan originally used Islamists in the 1970s as a foil to the + Moroccan left. Now, however, like Algiers, he recognizes the threat + and has chosen a more considered approach. Hassan wields his role as + ‘‘commander of the faithful” (and direct descendant of Mohammed) to + defuse Islamic critics. He built a powerful Religious Affairs + Ministry to oversee religious grants and train imams, uses his + Interior Ministry to monitor religion, and tries to exert central + political control over religious education and religious + scholars. + + (S/NF/NC) After a major crackdown in 1985, the Islamic movement + either ebbed or went underground. More recently, there are signs of + reemergence. This spring 90 Islamists were arrested in northern + Morocco (frequently the scene of dissident activities) and two + incidents of Islamist activity in the Navy troubled the military, + thought free of Islamic influence. Rabat does not think Islamists + will soon be strong enough to take on the government. It worries, + however, that they could exploit social discontent to make new + gains. + + +

The Soft Sell Works–for Now

+ + + (S/NF/NC) Islamic fundamentalists in North Africa are not linked + to one another, but the socio-economic strains and unemployment + prevalent in the Maghreb provide potentially fertile soil for + growth. And success by fundamentalists in Tunisia could provide a + stimulus now lacking among Moroccan and Algerian Islamists. + + Shultz +
+
+ 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870753–0464, D870680–0214. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for + information to Algiers, Cairo, Ndjamena, Nouakchott, DOD, and USCINCEUR. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by Casey, Eastham, Laipson, Long, Sharon + Wiener (NEA/AFN), Michael Minton + (S/S–O), and Mueller; approved + by Ussery. + + 260613. + + Washington, August 21, 1987, 0615Z + + +

Milads handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Tunisian Policy re + Rapprochement With Libya and Maghreb Unity. Reference: Tunis 8957.In telegram 8957 from Tunis, August 13, the + Embassy reported: “Tunisia and Libya are still far apart in their + negotiations to settle economic claims and security arrangements, + according to Social Affairs Minister Baccouche. Meanwhile, Tunisia is nervous about + Algerian-Libyan rapprochement which is perceived to have significant + support inside Algeria and possibly Soviet backing. For strategic + reasons, Tunisia wants Morocco included in any Maghreb unity scheme, + but surprisingly Tunisia’s recent envoy to Morocco found King Hassan + relaxed about the Libyan-Algerian initiatives. Baccouche was mindful of U.S. + reaction to improved ties between Tunisia and Libya. Action + requested: further guidance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870739–0302, + D870655–0481)

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Ambassador took right line on Libyan-Tunisian rapprochement and + Maghreb unity in August 12 conversation with Tunisian Minister of + Social Affairs Hedi Baccouche + (reftel). There follows some additional material which you may want + to draw on in future conversations with Baccouche on this subject: + + Libyan Rapprochement: + + We continue to believe that a normalizaton of relations + with Libya will diminish pressure on Qadhafi at a time when he + is faced with + isolation in GOT, the Arab + and African worlds and in a military confrontation with + Chad, which is supported by France and the U.S. + + Qadhafi’s policies + of terrorism and aggression have not ended as is evidenced + by Libyan attacks against dissidents, by continued + aggression in Chad, and by firm support for Iranian + terrorist tactics at a time when Tunisia has broken + relations with that state. + + Qadhafi is + unreliable and cannot be trusted to keep his + promises. + + Past experience teaches that once Qadhafi is confronted, he + backs off, reappears docile, only to return to his + aggressive ways. + + The problems that exist between Tunisia and Libya were + created by Libyan aggressiveness. The USG has responded to the + Libyan threat with increased assistance to the GOT including even closer + military cooperation + + We trust that GOT will + firmly maintain its position that normalization is + contingent on adequate compensation for expelled workers, a + reduction of Libyan military presence along the border, the + closing of dissident integrity and sovereignty. + + + Maghreb Unity: + + We remain opposed to Libyan membership in an expanded + tripartite friendship agreement. Such a development would + lend a false aura of legitimacy to Libya. We do not + anticipate that including Qadhafi in arrangements for a greater + Maghreb will diminish his aggressive tendencies. + + We are equally suspicious about schemes that would isolate + Morocco. We support Tunisia’s efforts to keep King Hassan + apprised of proposals for Maghreb unity and urge the GOT to continue its efforts to + thwart proposals that would result in Morocco’s exclusion + from a Maghrebi union. + + + Whitehead +
+ +
+ 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870830–0685. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Algiers, Cairo, Nouakchott, Paris, Rome, USCINCEUR, and USUN. + + 9759. + + Rabat, October 8, 1987, 1743Z + + + + SUBJECT + Morocco, Libya and Maghreb Integration. + + + Refs: + (A) Tunis 11365,In telegram 11365 from + Tunis, October 7, the Embassy reported that Baccouche “stressed that GOT continued to feel pressure” + from both Libya and Algeria “and also its own public opinion to + restore diplomatic relations.” The Embassy continued: “U.S. + appears to be alone in urging Tunisia to resist regional + pressures to normalize its relations with Libya and bring Libya + into closer association with the Maghreb.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870826–0587) + (B) Rabat 9655,In telegram 9655 from + Rabat, October 6, the Embassy reported that in a meeting with + Cherkaoui, Casey “underscored U.S. + opposition to steps which would reduce Qadhafi’s isolation and assured + Cherkaoui that the + U.S. understood unity in the Maghreb could not be achieved + without Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D870830–0863) + (C) Rabat 9694,In telegram 9694 from + Rabat, October 7, the Embassy reported that in a “widely + reproduced interview given to a Paris-based Arabic weekly,” the + Libyan People’s Bureau representative in Rabat stated: “(A) it + was never intended that the Sahara would constitute a state; (B) + early Polisario leaders had foreseen reintegration of the + territory with Morocco; and the Polisario must revise its + position, which constitutes an obstacle in the path of Arab + unity.” The Embassy continued that this statement “coincides + with recent indications in the Moroccan media of stepped-up + Moroccan-Libyan contacts between Qadhafi and the Palace. At the same time the + ex-Moroccan representative to the now-defunct African-Arab + Union, tells us that he expected no major new developments in + Moroccan-Libyan relations.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870827–0087) + (D) Rabat 9680.In telegram 9680 from + Rabat, October 7, the Embassy reported that on October 6, + Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Europe/Americas Director + Zine El Abadine Sebti told Casey: “Moroccan del at UNGA was talking up possibility + of a consensus resolution in the Fourth Committee” on a Western + Saharan referendum. The Embassy continued: “Sebti said GOM was exploring a possible + African-drafted text which simply would state membership’s + support of SYG’s referendum + initiative and steer clear of polemics.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870827–0225) + + + + (Secret/Noforn—Entire text) + + Begin summary:Embassy Tunis reftel on current U.S. loneliness + in arguing for isolation of Qadhafi is consistent with what we hear in Rabat. + Part of Qadhafi’s attraction + derives from the structure of intra-Maghreb competition. This being + the case, we are unlikely to have much success in dissuading our + friends unless and until progress is achieved in lessening active + Algeria-Moroccan conflict. That means ensuring that the + UNSYG’s effort on the SaharaReference is to Pérez de Cuéllar’s attempts to + reach a diplomatic solution to the war in the Western Sahara. + See Document 451. in fact moves + forward productively. End summary. + + Morocco appears to be taking in stride recent Libyan-Tunisian and + Libyan-Algerian talks about closer relations and the possibility of + Libya joining the Maghreb treaty of friendship. As reported ref B, + the Moroccans say they are not objecting to Tunisian-Libyan + rapprochement, nor, according to the GOM’s Intelligence Chief in a conversation of October + 8, does Morocco fear recent Algerian-Libyan moves toward union or + whatever. While some of this could be bravado, the Moroccans, as + shown by the Libyan Peoples Bureau Rep statement of support on the + Western Sahara (ref C), are capable of playing off the Libyans + against Algeria. In addition, the Tunisians appear to be keeping + King Hassan informed of their moves with the Libyans (ref A). A Medi + I (Tangier) radio report of 10/8 says Hedi Baccouche already is in Rabat. + + The point in these moves is that none of the Maghreb powers + appears to be willing to take a stand against Libya, each for its + own special reasons: Algeria because of its Maghreb/Western Sahara + and broader Arab agenda interests, Tunisia because of its special + economic/security needs, and Morocco to secure its Western Sahara + goals and keep Algeria off balance. In fact, Qadhafi seems to have rediscovered + in his need to break out of diplomatic isolation that each of his + neighbors have some use for him, quite apart from the fact of his + unreliability and unsavory reputation. Internal and regional + considerations, thus, appear to outweigh U.S. concerns about + Qadhafi’s breaking out of + diplomatic isolation and gaining diplomatic respectability. + + What is sorely needed is a better set of U.S. arguments, if we are + to have any impact on the question of relations with Qadhafi. Given the individual and + regional concerns noted above, our arguments need to have some + appeal to the interests of the players involved. In the case of + Morocco, so long as there is active conflict with Algeria, there + will be interest here in playing off Libya. The now defunct Arab + African union with Libya was inspired in large part by the desire to + secure marginal gain (i.e., neutralizing Libyan support for the + Polisario) in the long contest of wills with Algeria. We expect that + similar motives are in the minds of GOA leaders as they contemplate closer relations with + Qadhafi. + + If we are to keep Qadhafi + in the isolation he richly deserves, we must change the regional + perception that he is a necessary, if erratic, make-weight, to a + realization that he is a threat to specific and immediate regional interests. We cannot + get an audience for our case on Libyan terrorism and subversion so + long as our friends believe they have far more important and direct + security concerns, with which Qadhafi may be helpful, or at least not harmful. One + of these is obviously the agony of the Bourguiba regime. Another is the Saharan war. As a + continuing conflict, it has provided both a vehicle for + Moroccan-Algerian competition and a durable incentive to their + respective diplomatic efforts with Qadhafi, despite their caustic views on his + behavior. Removing the conflict would of course not totally remove + Qadhafi’s freedom of + action—there are many other reasons why countries in the region deal + with him, including broader Arab and Islamic agendas. But it would + significantly reduce the perception in Rabat and Algiers that he + could offer something positive in their bilateral competition. And + that would, at a minimum, give us more air time for our case. + + Fortunately, the UNSYG has + already taken the initiatve on this issue. He will, however need + support. + + Hawes +
+
+ 83. Editorial Note +

On November 7, 1987, the Government of Tunisia announced that longtime + President Habib Bourguiba had + been removed from power and replaced by a new government headed by + Zine El Abdine Ben Ali. + (See footnote 3, Document 354.) On November + 8, the U.S. Embassy in Algeria commented in telegram 6887 that “the + Algerian reaction to the change in Tunis thus far has been both measured + and positive” and noted that “given their anxiety over the political + drift in Tunis of the past several years, they can only be satisfied + with the change.” Moreover, “Ben Ali’s accession to the Presidency has + so far avoided the Algerians’ nightmare scenario of an uncertain + transition in Tunis which would tempt Qadhafi to intervene.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870921–0471)

+

The Government of Morocco, the Embassy reported in telegram 10738 from + Rabat, November 9, reacted to Bourguiba’s fall “with considerable understanding, if + not sympathy,” which included both a “message of congratulations” from + King Hassan II to Ben Ali and a comment that “Tunisia + was indebted to ‘brother Bourguiba’ and that he was confident Ben Ali would work to safeguard + Bourguiba’s contributions by introducing changes and + reforms as circumstances directed.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870922–0705) The Government + of Mauritania, as reported in telegram 4771 from Nouakchott, November 9, + “issued a public statement wishing the new Tunisian Government success + in its endeavors.” The Embassy further reported: “The Taya government is relieved that the + problem of Bourguiba’s succession + has been resolved in an orderly and peaceful fashion.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870923–0039)

+
+
+ 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870971–0161. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, + Tunis, Nouakchott, London, Paris, Casablanca, USCINCEUR, and USUN. + + 11419. + + Rabat, November 25, 1987, 1751Z + + + + SUBJECT + Filali Sees Upturn in + Algerian-Moroccan Relations. + + + + (Secret—Entire text) + + Summary: Filali told + Ambassador Nov. 25 that Algeria and Morocco are moving toward + reestablishing diplomatic relations early next year, and that three + joint subcommittees would meet in Morocco in mid-December to work on + various political/economic/technical issues. He said the GOA was willing to discuss the Sahara + as a bilateral issue. The UN Mission + currently visiting the area is a favorable factor for Morocco. + Filali thinks that after + the mission submits its report to the SYG next monthIn telegram + 4503 from USUN, December 24, + the Mission reported: “Secretariat official Diallo expects that the report + to the SYG of the UN technical team (TT) to Western + Sahara, now under preparation, will be factual description of + demographic and infrastructural data needed to implement an + eventual self-determination referendum in the territory, and + will make no specific proposals for achieving a ceasefire or + agreement on holding a referendum.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D871051–0126) the SYG + will visit Rabat and Algiers in January to help resolve the issue. + End summary. + + I saw Filali November 25 at + my request and asked him first about his weekend visit to Algiers + (other subjects septel).See footnote 5, Document 272. + Filali was very positive about his meetings + there, saying that this was his first real official visit to + Algeria, i.e., there were all the trappings of meetings, press + coverage, an official dinner in his honor and a return lunch the + following day by the Moroccan side. + + More to the point, Filali + said he felt the Algerians (he met with both President Bendjedid and FonMin + Ibrahimi) were for the first + time willing to discuss realistically the Saharan dispute and to + treat it as a bilateral issue (rather than pretending that Morocco + had to deal only with the Polisario). The Algerians, he said, had + suggested that both sides think about ways to resolve the dispute. + The Algerians had indicated they were tired of the issue and + Filali acknowledged + Morocco was also. The Algerians would like to see the Western Sahara + issue resolved in a Maghreb context. Additionally, both sides have + agreed to a cessation of negative press reporting. + + Filali said prospects are + good that Morocco and Algeria can reestablish diplomatic relations + after the first of the year. The two sides have agreed to meet again + in Morocco in mid-December. Three subcommittees—political, + economic/finance and cultural/consular affairs—as envisioned + following the Hassan/Bendjedid summit of May, will hold detailed + discussions. The talks will be supervised at the + Secretary-General/Secretary of State level of the respective MFAs + and will include reps from other ministries (Interior, + Transportation, etc.) as needed. + + Filali noted that MFA SecState Moulay Ahmed Cherkaoui + had already gone to Mauritania and Royal Counselor Ahmed Reda + Guedira would be going to Tunis tomorrow to brief the immediate + neighbors on the talks in Algiers. + + On the current UN Mission to the + Western Sahara, Filali said + he felt the visit was so far very positive for the Moroccans. + Filali envisions that the + UN team will be presenting its + report around mid-December and that some time in January Perez de + Cuellar would very likely plan to visit the region to offer his + ideas on a settlement. He said he saw the UN Mission role as not only technical and exclusively + focused on referendum modalities but also on the broader political + aspects of resolving the conflict. + + Comment: This is a sharp change from Filali’s negative comments to me prior to his trip + to Algiers. He has never been so buoyant about prospects for + improvement of relations. His readout contrasts considerably with + the output of the propaganda machines on both sides during the first + days of the UN Mission visit. We + have, of course, been disappointed before—notably on the lack of + follow-up to the Hassan-Bendjedid summit last spring. It is + certainly too early to conclude that Algiers has decided to drop the + Polisario—particularly given the recent combat. Filali seemed genuinely optimistic + that the two sides were no longer talking past each other and were + beginning to engage on real problems. If Algeria and Morocco in fact + move to formal relations next year, it will inevitably mean some + redimensioning of the status of the Polisario, at a minimum. + + Comment continued: We note Hamdani’s downbeat assessment of the + meeting (Algiers 7248).In telegram 7248 + from Algiers, November 25, Johnstone reported that Hamdani “called the + visit ‘unfortunate’ since Filali brought nothing new on the Western + Sahara. He expressed readiness to improve Algerian-Moroccan + bilateral relations and said GOM wants to participate in wider Maghreb + consultations that Algeria is now promoting. Hamdani insisted + that resolution of the Western Sahara problem and those other + issues are inescapably linked.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870969–0934) + This contrast could mean we will be treated to a rerun of the + post-Hassan-Bendjedid meeting, when contrasting assessments also + reflected competing agendas, not just between Algeria and Morocco + but internally as well. Clearly Filali’s comments suggest the GOM believes (or wants to believe) + that that period is over. + + Nassif +
+
+ 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in EgyptSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880041–0790. + Secret; Priority. Drafted by Whitaker; cleared by Janean Mann + (INR/NESA), Judy Bird + (INR/NESA), Donald Mulligan + (INR/AA), Charles Jefferson + (INR/PMA), Gary Dietrich + (INR/NESA), and George + Harris (INR/NESA); approved by + Harris. + + 14143. + + Washington, January 16, 1988, 0630Z + + +

For Ambassador Wisner from INR/NESA-GSHarris. Subject: Maghreb: + Belling the Libyan Cat . . . They Hope.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott will sell Qadhafi admission to their regional + pact, but only as long as he meets their price. Rabat, not a pact + member, does not see the benefit in objecting. US reservations will not make the + Maghreb states seriously reconsider, but the disparate natures of the parties will doom the + Maghreb pact sooner or later. + +

Networking

+ + + Last month, Algerian Prime Minister Ibrahimi went to Libya;In telegram 116 from Algiers, January 9, the Embassy reported + Ibrahimi’s + “characterized aim” of his December 18–20 talks in Tripoli “as + improving economic cooperation, while Ibrahimi referred to political + dimension strictly within a Maghreb context: ‘we consider (that) + the work we have been doing with the Jamahirya over the past + year and a half is a positive step toward the building of the + Arab Maghreb.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D880021–0149) Algerian, + Tunisian, and Mauritanian Foreign Ministers considered admitting + Libya to the Tripartite Pact;In telegram + 5529 from Nouakchott, December 28, 1987, the Embassy reported: + “According to the Tunisian DCM + in Nouakchott, the December 20 summit in Algiers of the Foreign + Ministers of Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia focused chiefly on + the Western Sahara war, Maghreban economic integration, and + Libya’s request to join the Tripartite Treaty of Fraternity and + Concord. The Tunisian diplomat stated that Algeria’s pressure on + Tunisia to let Libya join the Treaty had abated.” The Embassy + continued: “No final decision had yet been made to allow Libya + into the treaty. But given the improvement in Tunisian-Libyan + relations, Libya’s accession to the treaty was likely: Libya + might join as early as March or April 1988, when the treaty + members will hold a summit in Nouakchott to mark the fourth + anniversary of the compact.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871056–0857) + and Tunis renewed ties to Qadhafi.In telegram + 14462 from Tunis, December 29, the Embassy reported: “The + Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released December 28 a + joint Tunisian-Libyan communiqué announcing the decision to + re-establish diplomatic relations because of the ‘positive signs + that have occurred in their relations.’” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871060–0081) + In telegram 245 from Tunis, January 8, the Embassy reported that + the two nations had “re-established diplomatic relations albeit + at less than Ambassadorial level.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880596–0830, + D880019–0046) Algerian President Bendjedid then visited Tunis and + Tripoli to quash remaining obstacles to his conception of a greater + Maghreb. Qadhafi was set to + visit Tunis this week, but cancelled when Tunis received the Sixth + Fleet Commander January 11–13. + +

Algeria: Dealing

+ + + Algeria has made numerous economic deals with Libya, but its chief + goals are diplomatic and political. It thinks it can manipulate + Qadhafi, and wants to + play a role in Libya after he goes. It thinks Libyan membership in + the Tripartite Pact would give Rabat a stark choice—join an + Algeria-designed regional network or face isolation—which would + press Hassan to settle on the Western Sahara. And in Algerian + politics, economic gains would mollify technocrats who seek regional + trade/cooperation (though most think Morocco—not Libya—offers a more + complementary economy). + + +

Tunisia

+ + + An arm well-twisted: Aware of potential rewards and Algiers’ + Maghreb designs, Tunis is haggling with Libya over an admission + price to the Tripartite Pact. For renewal of diplomatic ties, Libya + agreed to pay ousted Tunisian workers and stop giving refuge to + Tunisian dissidents. Algeria has given Tunisia a de facto security + guarantee, but President Ben + Ali is bolstering his southern military command, and + is using the Sixth Fleet Commander’s visit as a signal of his + preference for close US ties. + +

Morocco

+ + + Collecting alimony: King Hassan ended “union” with Qadhafi in 1986 in response to + US pressure and Libyan criticism + of Moroccan-Israeli ties. But trade, financial, and political links + remain strong, and may be improving. Despite rumors of new Libyan + aid to Polisario, Qadhafi + publicly backs Hassan’s view of the Western Sahara. And Rabat and + Tripoli retain intelligence links. + +

Indecisive—or Cunning

+ + + If coaxed Rabat says it fears regional isolation, but has not + lobbied its case in Maghreb capitals.In + telegram 1246 from Tunis, February 3, however, the Embassy + reported that in a February 2 interview “Baccouche declared that + ‘talk of Morocco’s isolation presents a pseudo-problem, there + will be no Maghreb without Morocco.’ Citing the Western Sahara + as a major obstacle, Baccouche asked ‘How can one envision the + creation of a greater Maghreb without a solution to this + problem?’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880093–0179) Seeing the Tripartite + Pact as Algeria-inspired, it will not seek to join. Its only + leverage on Algeria is the Western Sahara, but Hassan is reluctant + to use this sensitive issue as a bargaining chip. Rabat thinks + Qadhafi suspects Algerian + motives, and sees Maghreb politics as a calculated political game. + Its current strategy is to hunker down, perhaps suffer a bad year or + so, but keep playing its own Libya card, and wait for the newly + unified Maghreb to self-destruct. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 86. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880120–0439. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to + Algiers, Casablanca, Nouakchott, Paris, and Tunis. + + 1448. + + Rabat, February 11, 1988, 1556Z + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Reaction to Quadhafi Meetings With Ben Ali, Bendjedid and Abdelaziz. + + + Ref: + (A) Rabat 1300,In telegram 1300 from + Rabat, February 8, the Embassy reported on Filali’s February 5 + conversation with the DCM: + “Lamenting lack of Algerian movement on bilateral relationship + and continuing efforts with other regional states, Filali asserted that it would + not be in Algeria’s interest to construct a Maghreb without + Morocco, even if it were able to do so. The further Algeria was + able to go in that direction, the more Morocco would have to + turn its economic, political and security options with Europe + and the U.S.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880109–0102) + (B) Tunis 1370,In telegram 1370 from + Tunis, February 5, the Embassy reported: “Libyan leader + Qadhafi arrived in + Tunis Feb. 4 proclaiming his intent to discuss unification of + the Arab nation.” The Embassy continued: “Libya is lukewarm + about joining the Tri-partite agreement, and Tunisia will not + encourage it. Given Qadhafi’s style, Embassy believes Qadhafi’s visit is at least as + likely to exacerbate Tunisian-Libyan relations as it is to + improve them.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D880101–0475) + (C) Algiers 798.In telegram 798 from + Algiers, February 10, the Embassy reported: “At first glance, + Qadhafi’s visit + yielded little of substance.” The Embassy commented: “Latest + round of visits apparently advanced the cause of Maghreb unity + in only a symbolic sense.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880116–0792) + + + + (Confidential—Entire text) + + Summary: The Moroccans are annoyed but officially remain silent + regarding Qadhafi’s recent + fishing expedition with his Maghreb neighbors. Most galling to the + GOM was the GOA-arranged meeting between Qadhafi and Polisario Chief + Abdelaziz. The press is highlighting a post-Annaba statement by + Qadhafi that he wanted + union with all the Maghreb states and had no intention of resuming + military aid to the Polisario. End summary. + + We have been treated to the usual press fulminations attributing + the usual motives to the usual suspects (i.e., the Algerians and + their purported effort to gang up on Morocco) following the meetings + with Qadhafi in Sakiet and + Annaba. The GOM, nevertheless, is + maintaining public silence while trying to assess the damage, if + any. Looking at matters from a Rabat tilt, the local press of + February 10–11 has been quick to note that Qadhafi appears to be playing + Rabat’s game, not Algeria’s, in two respects. First, according to + Qadhafi’s February 9 + AFP interview, the Libyan + leader referred to the existence of a union agreement with Algeria, + presumably indicating he remained uninterested in joining the + Tripartite Treaty. The AFP quoted + Qadhafi as saying “there + will soon be further + contacts and the proposals (for union) will be submitted to + Morocco.” Qadhafi then + reportedly added “If Morocco does not want to participate in this + union, we are in no hurry to settle the (Sahara) conflict and we + will not insist.” + + On another point important to the GOM, Qadhafi + reportedly stated that Libya had not resumed military aid to the + Polisario: “We decided a number of years ago not to take part + militarily in that conflict. We are only furnishing humanitarian + assistance.” Thus, it appears initially to the Moroccans that no + great damage to its interests has emerged from any of Qadhafi’s meetings in Algeria or + Tunisia over the past week. + + Officially but not in public, the Moroccan position remains that + expressed by Foreign Minister Filali to DCM + February 5, i.e., that Algeria is making a mistake in trying to + isolate or pressure Morocco and that even if the GOA succeeds in bringing the other + Maghreb states into a treaty framework without Morocco, it will not + achieve the desired result (ref A). MFA Counselor for Arab/Islamic Affairs Adib Taieb + indicated to PolOff February 5 that the GOM continued to be reasonably relaxed about the faint + prospects of Libyan adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Taieb told us + that the GOM thought Tunisia would + continue to oppose such a move, while an Iraqi diplomat said his + government had learned from the Tunisians that the GOT had virtually promised as much to + visiting Moroccan PM Laraki during + his visit to Tunis a week ago. + + Nassif +
+
+ 87. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880243–0287. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, + Nouakchott, Tunis, and USUN. + + 2888. + + Rabat, March 21, 1988, 1734Z + + +

NEA for Murphy. Subject: Rabat Mini-COM, March 17–18, 1988.

+ + + Confidential entire text. + + Begin summary: Ambassadors Johnstone, Nassif, Pelletreau and Pugh, and Deputy Assistant Secretary + Ussery, met in Rabat + March 17–18 for an informal review of Mahgreb issues, including + prospects in the Western + Sahara, the developments between Mahgreb states, Libya, the role of + the Soviets, U.S. commercial interests and other topics. This + message reports highlights of the discussion and conclusions. End + summary. + + Western SaharaWhile U.S. interests would be served by a + resolution of the conflict, it seems clear that outside efforts to + promote settlement (UNSYG, + Tunisia, Saudi Arabia) have little prospect of success until Algeria + and Morocco decide they want to move to a solution, which is not yet + apparent. There may, in fact, be some risk that the United Nations + will allow an interest in the technical aspects of peacekeeping and + a referendum to get ahead of political preparations. We concluded + that it would be useful to consult more fully with the Tunisians + (the Mestiri visit), the + Saudis, and the UNSYG, so as to + have a better base of information on how others assess the situation + and what they are doing. In talking with the Tunisians and Saudis, + we would want to find out what they believe to be agreed elements + between the parties. Is there, for example, agreement on Moroccan + sovereignty, with some form of local autonomy? Is there agreement + that there would be no independent Sahara foreign or defense policy + or membership in international organizations? What is the attitude + of the parties towards a “Quebec” formula? While much discussion + centered on means of resolving dispute, including specific formulas + such as “Quebec”,Reference is to the + special protections of the French language and French-Canadian + culture in the province of Quebec within Canada’s federal + parliamentary democracy. and possible U.S. roles, we do + not believe that U.S. interests would be served by identifying the + U.S. with any particular formula for resolution of the conflict or + by a more visible U.S. role. At the same time, we agreed that the + range of solutions potentially acceptable to the parties is quite + narrow, probably focusing on detailed arrangements for some form of + local autonomy, under recognized Moroccan sovereignty and + control. + +

The Greater Mahgreb

+

Overall, we believe that an improvement of relations between the + countries of the Mahgreb, particularly between Algeria and Morocco, + would be in U.S. interests, by enhancing long term regional stability + and lessening the opportunity for Soviet involvement. We must recognize + that the continuing attraction of the greater Mahgreb idea, and the + competitive dynamics of the Mahgreb states, may well lead to the + inclusion of Libya in broader groupings despite our arguments in favor + of isolating Qadhafi, however + limited the effect of such arrangements and groupings may be.

+ +

We may, thus, be confronted with the necessity of reevaluating the + effectiveness of our Libya political policy in the region, and searching + for additional and/or other means of constraining Qadhafi in the Mahgreb. On the economic + side, we are concerned that U.S. policies targeted at Qadhafi are having some + counterproductive effects, resulting in additional profits to Qadhafi and an expansion of third + country oil and other economic activity in Libya. This, too, requires + continued evaluation.

+

Trade and Commerce

+ + + It is clearly in our interests to expand Maghreb-U.S.-commercial + relations; fundamental differences between the commercial situations + of the regional countries mean that we must approach each situation + differently: + + For relatively cash-rich Algeria, we are preparing to intensify + our sales promotion efforts, and look particularly at major + projects. + + Our approach in cash-poor Morocco and Tunisia should be oriented + more toward U.S. direct investment, with the goal of penetration of + the EC Market for low-labor-cost + manufactured goods. + + In this context, we believe USDOC could profitably prepare a study for U.S. + businessmen on the advantages of European penetration through + Maghreb investment; we note for instance that each Embassy recently + submitted a new investment climate statement, which statements would + be useful in such a regional document. + + Current experiences in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia with aircraft + sales efforts indicate to us that we must make an effort to be more + closely identified with the marketing efforts of U.S. + companies. + + Host governments must understand that the USG is firmly behind American companies, even if there + are several U.S. competitors for a contract, in order to + counterbalance very effective representation by European Embassies + on behalf of their national companies. + + We should also begin sharing more information on such regional + sales efforts and consider how we can better coordinate our support + to these efforts. + +

Military and Strategic + Cooperation

+ + + Our military cooperation programs in each of the countries are an + important and useful element of the bilateral relationship. + + This is not a zero sum game; we can and should improve our + military cooperation with rivals Morocco and Algeria at the same + time, without unduly threatening either. Exercises in Morocco and + Tunisia, the “spare parts” + program in Algeria, and the African coastal security program in + Mauritania are all examples of successful military programs. + + The Moroccan base line program, if enacted, will be a thorn in the + Moroccan-Algerian relationship, but not cataclysmic. + +

The Soviets

+ + + The Soviet Union’s strategic agenda in the region has been largely + frustrated to date; the East-West balance in the Mahgreb remains + strongly in our favor. + + The Soviets are marginalized in Morocco and Tunisia, although they + may make minor inroads with activities such as the Mjara Dam project + in Morocco. Their record on fishing has not endeared them to the + Mauritanians. And Algeria has moved to a more neutral political + position and an increasingly Western orientation in trade and + commerce. + + However remote, the risk of future Soviet bases in Libya remains + the number one US concern vis-a-vis + the Soviets in the area given Qadhafi’s unpredictability and uncertainty about the + post Qadhafi era. + +

Regimes and Bilateral + Relations

+ + + Each Ambassador reviewed the state of our bilateral relations and + the condition of the host regimes. Both are in good shape in each + host country, despite specific problems facing each government, but + declining assistance levels are a problem in Tunisia. + +

Locust Invasion

+ + + More coordination between host countries, as well as our + respective aid missions economic sections is needed to meet the + immediate emergency. Because of political sensitivities, we may have + to lean more heavily on international organizations than we would + otherwise prefer. At a minimum, we must do everything possible to + foster an effective time-sensitive sharing of information throughout + the region. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State + and Multiple Diplomatic and Consular PostsSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0613. Confidential; Immediate. + Sent Immediate to Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott. Also sent to + Cairo, Riyadh, Paris, London, Casablanca, USUN, and USCINCEUR. + + 4850. + + Rabat, May 17, 1988, 1121Z + + + + SUBJECT + Restoration of Algerian-Moroccan Relations. + + + Ref: + Rabat 4848.Telegram 4848 from Rabat, + May 17, transmitted the text of the Moroccan-Algerian communiqué + announcing the reestablishment of relations. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880424–0255) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Summary: The decision of King Hassan and President Bendjedid to restore diplomatic + relations is a major step forward, for which the Saudis and we can + take some credit. While Interior Minister Basri told Ambassador not to read + more into the communiqué language than is evident, King Hassan + clearly implied to SecDef + Carlucci a month agoA record of the Carlucci-Hassan meeting is + in Document 275. he expects some movement on the Sahara. + Basri said he estimated + it would take a year to resolve the 13-year-old conflict, and that + the de facto ceasefire in the territory is still holding. Meanwhile, + the door is now open for Hassan to attend the Algiers summit. The + U.S. should make every effort to stimulate concrete measures by the + two sides to improve bilateral trade and economic cooperation, as we + have been doing. End summary. + + The decision to restore diplomatic relations on the terms stated + in the communique did not come easily. While Algeria appears to have + come the greatest distance in agreeing to normalize without explicit + progress on the Sahara conflict, Morocco has committed itself to a + solution based on a “free referendum of self-determination . . + .without any constraint.” + + During May 16 dinner at Basri’s home, the Interior Minister told Ambassador + that the agreement was no more and no less than what the language + stated and cautioned against reading more than that into the + communique wording. He stated, for example, that Morocco had not + committed itself to recognize the 1972 border agreement, which he + said first had to be ratified by Parliament. He did say, however, + that the two sides have reaffirmed the validity of other agreements. + (Comment: These would appear to include the 1969 Ifrane Treaty of + Solidarity and + Cooperation,Reference is to the + Treaty of Ifrane, signed by Hassan and Boumédiène on June 15, 1969, + which settled a long-standing border dispute between Morocco and + Algeria. which was to be valid for an initial 20 years, + plus some ten bilateral accords concluded at Tlemcen in 1969 in the + fields of economic, commerical and judicial cooperation.) + + With regard to the Sahara dispute, the Moroccans so far remain + tight-lipped about the substance of any discussions with the + Algerians on resolving this central issue of contention between + them. It is likely that discussions are moving forward on some + referendum modalities. In response to Ambassador’s question as to + whether the Sahara dispute would be resolved soon, Basri responded that it should take + about one year to resolve. He added that there is a de facto + ceasefire in the desert which appears to be holding. It should also + be noted that King Hassan made an optimistic statement about + improved relations with Algeria a month ago to SecDefSee footnote 3, above. looking ahead to a return of + Moroccan troops from the Sahara—a clear implication that he expects + some movement on the issue. + + The communiqué language indicates that Arab solidarity—in advance + of the Algiers Summit—was a major consideration and perhaps + determined the timing of the announcement. This suggests a good will + gesture by Hassan to Bendjedid, as well as a possible Saudi role in + brokering the reconciliation. Whether this means Hassan will change + his mind and attend the June 7 summit in Algiers is not known; + Basri told Ambassador + that Hassan’s attendance was not a sure thing, but agreed that the + door was open. When the Ambassador offered that it would be contrary + to the spirit of the reestablishment of relations for Hassan not to + attend, Basri agreed. + + Whether or not progress is imminent on the Sahara or whether + Hassan goes to Algiers, we can take some credit for promoting the + reconciliation. Since the Ramadan summit of last year when King Fahd + brought Hassan and Bendjedid + together on the border, we have been urging the Moroccans and + Algerian representative in Rabat to take a different tack. We had + suggested that rather than attempt to resolve the Western Sahara + problem as a first step, they should begin by reestablishing + diplomatic and economic relations. Moving to resolve the Western + Sahara problem would then be easier since the climate would have + warmed and economic incentives would prevail over purely political + goals.See footnotes 4 and 5, + Document 456. The U.S. should continue to encourage and + support this process. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 89. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880441–0225. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Sent for information + Priority to Algiers, Cairo, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and + Rome. + + 5445. + + Tunis, May 23, 1988, 1422Z + + + + SUBJECT + Qadhafi Meets Ben Ali at Jerba: Joint + Communiqué Lists Seven Accords. + + + Ref: + Tunis 4868.In telegram 4868 from + Tunis, May 5, the Embassy reported: “In the first two weeks of + April, following Col. + Qadhafi’s theatrical + demolition of the main Libyan border post and before the + beginning of Ramadan, tens of thousands of Libyans swarmed into + Tunisia. Armed with wads of dollar traveler’s checks, these + ‘tourists’ charged up to dols 2 million per day at the border + before proceeding northward on a huge shopping spree. Their + numbers dwarfed those of the previously reported flows in the + opposite direction—Tunisians headed to Libya looking for work.” + It continued “Restoration of diplomatic relations between + Tunisia and Libya last December has permitted the resumption and + expansion of an economic relationship which is of significant + value to Tunisia and crucial to the two countries’ bilateral + relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880389–0768) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + At the invitation of President Zine + el Abidine Ben Ali, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi came to the + Tunisian island of Jerba for a two hour tete-a-tete on May 22. + Qadhafi arrived in the + afternoon and left that evening. According to media reports, King + Hassan II of Morocco + telephoned Ben Ali to + express his congratulations on the meeting and his optimism about + the future of North African relations. The King reportedly made a + separate call to Qadhafi. + + Qadhafi was accompanied by + Chief of Military Intelligence Colonel Khwildi Humidi, Secretary of + the People’s General Commission for Services Fawzi al-Shakshouki, + and Director of Cooperation of the People’s Commission for + International Contact Mohamed Sayala. Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche, Foreign Minister + Mahmoud Mestiri, Interior + Minister Habib Ammar, + Transportation and Tourism Minister Abderrazak Kefi, Social Affairs + Minister Taoufik Cheikhrouhou, Minister of Information Abdelwahab + Abdullah, and the ruling party’s Director for External Affairs + Mohamed Karboul accompanied Ben + Ali to Jerba. + + The talks were capped by a press communiqué in which the two + parties reaffirmed the will to work for North African unity. The + communiqué also announced seven agreements which reportedly: + + Guarantee freedom of movement for persons between the two + countries by means of a common personal identity card which + will be prepared by a joint commission; + + + Guarantee free movement of goods between the two + countries; + + Guarantee freedom of residence, work, and property for the + citizens of the two countries within both countries + respectively; + + Work to implement the following complementary projects + between the two countries: + + connection of the electric network. + + extension of the telephone network. + + the Ras Jedir/Sfax highway. + + the pipeline between the Zaouia refinery and + Zarzis. + + + Cooperate in the implementation and management of economic + and pilot development projects such as: + + the Tripoli hospital. + + the Jbel Lakhdhar agricultural project (in + Libya). + + the Iron and Steel Consortium at Misrata (in + Libya). + + + Restate the agreement previously concluded on the + continental shelf. The final accord on this subject is to be + signed during the visit that President Ben Ali will make to + Libya in the coming days. (FYI: Ben + Ali is now expected in Libya in early June + after the OAU meeting in + Addis Ababa. End FYI.) + + Reaffirm cooperation in the field of information + concerning common production and diffusion. + + + In previously-scheduled meeting May 23 with Secretary of State + Sahbani (septel),No record of the Pelletreau-Sahbani + meeting has been found. Ambassador raised Jerba meeting. + Sahbani had not had a + chance to get a read out, but noted U.S. interest. On the specific + issue of the common identity card, Sahbani opined that it would probably function as a + laissez passer for individuals whose professional or business + interests required frequent travel between the two countries. It + would not replace national identity cards. + + Also on May 23, Central Bank Governor Khelil told Ambassador he + wholeheartedly supported the current opening with Libya. Tunisia was + benefiting, he said, in terms both of its sales to visiting Libyans + and of employment opportunities for Tunisians in Libya. The Central + Bank was making foreign exchange available to Tunisians seeking to + replace or increase their stocks for the Libyan trade. Private + sector would import goods to meet the Libyan demand, pay GOT customs, and sell at a profit to + Libyans who had exchanged hard currency for Tunisian dinars. The + economic advantages to Tunisia of rapprochement with Libya were + greater than they would be, as a practical matter, with Algeria. + Politically, too, the cooperation with Libya would give Tunisia a + stronger and co-equal voice in dealing with Algeria and Morocco in + the Maghreb context. + + + (NF) Comment. Coming shortly before Ben Ali’s expected visit to Tripoli, the Jerba + meeting is a surprise. The telephone conversations with King Hassan + tend to confirm a previous report [less than 1 + line not declassified] that Ben Ali took the initiative to play a role in + promoting Libyan-Moroccan relations. With the dramatic announcement + of renewed Algerian-Moroccan relations, President Ben Ali probably saw an + opportunity to increase the momentum toward Maghreb unity and win + some credit for Tunisia in the process. As Foreign Minister + Mestiri noted to us + previously, bringing Libya around is considered a special vocation + on the part of the current GOT. + + The long list of bilateral accords reflects a Libyan desire to + rebuild its relations with Tunisia from the ground up and + simultaneously derive the maximum economic benefit from the process. + They will be popular here—as Khelil’s comments to Ambassador + testify. + + The accords appear to renew momentum toward freer movement of + goods and people between the two countries. Taken as a whole the + agreements seem to go further than those existing between Tunisia + and Algeria which provide for free movement of goods and people, as + well as rights of residence, work, and property only within a 15-km + wide strip on either side of the border. Tunisia can be expected to + benefit disproportionately from free trade, at least as measured by + relative export levels (reftel). However, as with all free trade + arrangements, the consumers of both countries will benefit the most. + This may be the motivation behind Qadhafi’s making what otherwise would appear to be a + one sided concession. Strapped by import restrictions and stagnant + production at home, he has opened a safety valve which allows the + Libyan consumer to vent his pent up demand abroad, rather than + growing increasingly dissatisfied with the limited range of goods + and services available in Libya. + + Pelletreau +
+ +
+ 90. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880503–0454. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to the Arab League Collective. Sent for information to + Paris and USCINCEUR. + + 3253. + + Algiers, June 11, 1988, 1305Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Day After: A Maghreb Mini-Summit. + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Summary. The day after the close of the emergency Arab + summit,Reference is to the Fifteenth + Arab League Summit held in Algiers June 7–9, which expressed + support for the Palestinian intifada. Documentation on this + issue is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. Chiefs of State of Algeria, Tunisia, + Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania held their “Maghreb mini-summit” on + Friday June 10. Bendjedid and + Hassan met before the full gathering, and King Fahd joined the + Maghrebians for lunch. Leaders decided to form a committee to study + the building of Grand Maghreb. Committee will hold its first meeting + in Algiers July 13. Hassan and Bendjedid were stars of the event. Polisario was + notably absent, and Western Sahara barely earned a mention in + Algerian press commentary. End summary. + +

Fahd, Hassan, and Bendjedid the Stars

+ + + The leaders of five Maghreb states—Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, + Libya, and Mauritania—met in Algiers June 10, day after the closing + of the Arab League emergency summit. Session began with a meeting + between Hassan and Bendjedid + accompanied by their entourages. Algerians attending were the entire + top echelon of government: FLN + Permanent Secretariat Chief Messaadia; Foreign Minister Ibrahimi; + Presidential Cabinet Director Belkheir; and Interior Minister + Khediri. + + Following the full session, the two Chiefs of State moved to + Bendjedid’s beach house + in nearby Zeralda, where Saudi King Fahd joined them for a three-way + private meeting. Then the other three Maghreb leaders arrived for a + lunch with Fahd, Hassan and Bendjedid. Fahd left Zeralda after lunch, and the + five Maghrebian leaders held their meeting that afternoon. According + to the communique issued afterward, the leaders decided to form a + committee to prepare the means of building a Grand Maghreb. This + committee will meet July 13 in Algiers. + + From media point of view, Hassan and Bendjedid were the stars, with King Fahd in a major + supporting role. Bendjedid’s + early morning visit to Hassan on his boat; the latter’s gracious + thanks to his host at the conference closing ceremony; and the media + and official attention + lavished on the Moroccans their last day here indicate both sides + are determined to maintain the euphoria created by the restoration + of relations (now almost a month old). Fahd’s presence represented + both his blessing the meetings and an acknowledgement of his role as + mediator and reconciler. + + Comment. At first glance, the five-way summit itself produced + little of substance beyond forming the committee and the + photo-session. Nevertheless, the meeting itself demonstrated that + frictions surrounding the summit, especially between Qadhafi and Hassan (see Algiers + 3249)See footnote 2, Document 180. would not prevent + the leaders from meeting under Algerian auspices. End + comment. + +

Wither the SDAR?

+ + + Mini-summit was most notable for who was not there: the Polisario. + It is clear that the Algerians now consider the Grand Maghreb an + arrangement of five states and that Polisario’s interests will have + to be advanced in some other way. The Algerians’ message from both + the Bendjedid-Hassan and the multi-lateral contacts was clear: the + Polisario and the Western Sahara question are not going to interfere + with Algerian-Moroccan reconciliation and with Algeria’s Arab-based + regional diplomacy. + + Algerian Press Service (APS) commentary in June 11 daily El + Moudjahid drove home the above message. Its editorial, entitled “On + the Way to Unity”, made no mention of the Western Sahara and made + only oblique references to “painful problems still + unresolved.” + + Same editorial also distorted history when it claimed that the + FLN Central Committee meeting + of June 1987 had issued a call for Maghreb unity. Central Committee + had done no such thing, but had instead urged bi-lateral + Libyan-Algerian unity as a “natural and historical necessity”. + Central committee message was suppressed until after FLN Politburo met two weeks later and + set the record straight by issuing call for building a greater + Maghreb on solid economic and cultural foundations. + + Comment: We suspect the above example of doublethink from + Algeria’s Ministry of Truth is an acknowledgement that even those + who once urged union with Libya have now joined the bandwagon of a + Grand Maghreb of five with Morocco in and the Polisario out. + + Brayshaw +
+ +
+ 91. Defense Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Defense + Intelligence AgencySource: + Reagan Library, Frank + Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: North Africa. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. + + DIAAPPR + 23–88 + + Washington, June 23, 1988 + + +

NORTH AFRICA: MAGHREB DIPLOMACY (U)

+

Summary

+

(C) North African + leaders from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania held + their first summit ever on 10 June and pledged to form a committee + charged with building a greater Arab Maghreb.See Document 90. The committee will convene on 13 July in Algiers. The + announcement caps a yearlong effort by Algeria to bring Libya into + the regional mainstream first by improving its own relations with + Libyan leader Qadhafi and + then by effecting a Libyan-Tunisian rapprochement. The + reestablishment of relations between Morocco and Algeria on 16 May + and the continued warming trend in Libyan-Tunisian relations were + instrumental in reviving previously frustrated efforts toward a + Maghreb alliance.See Document 88. For + the first time in more than 12 years, a climate has been created + that is conducive to regional economic and political stability. All + states will try to promote the concept of a greater Arab Maghreb to + encourage economic integration and to bolster regional security. + Reconciliation, however, will most likely be inhibited by + traditional rivalries and animosities. Regional states are motivated + by independent and sometimes conflicting agendas, and they harbor as + many differences as they do similarities.

+

Discussion

+

Saudi Intervention

+

(C) On 16 May Morocco and Algeria + announced the restoration of bilateral relations, thereby removing a + major obstacle to the creation of a greater Arab Maghreb. The decision + to restore diplomatic ties following a 12-year hiatus caps efforts + initiated a year ago when Saudi Arabia engineered a tripartite summit + between the Moroccan, Algerian, and Saudi heads of state. Riyadh has + over the years used its good offices to try to mediate a settlement to + the Western Sahara conflict. With no resolution of this contentious + issue apparent, Riyadh + reportedly sought a normalization of relations as the best avenue for + pursuing a political deal and for increasing stability in the Arab west. + Saudi efforts would not have been possible, however, had Morocco and + Algeria not been motivated by self interest and priorities at home to + end the impasse.

+

Self-Motivating Factors

+

(S) Several converging factors most likely + encouraged Algerian President Chadli + Bendjedid to drop his longstanding demand that the + Western Sahara dispute be resolved before he restored relations with + Rabat. Under Bendjedid, Algeria + has placed great emphasis on maintaining a bridge between Arab nations + so that it can negotiate conflicts—for example, between Iran-Iraq and + Libya-Tunisia—mediate differences among Palestinian factions, and use + its contacts with all parties to negotiate an end to terrorist actions + peacefully. Algiers responded emotionally to the uprising in the + Occupied Territories, placing much of its prestige on hosting an Arab + summit to address the issue. A successful summit, however, requires + high-level attendance and, by restoring relations with Rabat, Algiers + was able to obtain support from Morocco’s King Hassan and his wealthy + Arab allies.

+
+ +
+

(S) The willingness of Algeria to + compromise probably also demonstrated its interest in securing closer + economic and political ties in North Africa. Although Algiers’ relations + with both Tunis and Tripoli were much improved, some leaders in the + region were reluctant to engage in a relationship that isolated Morocco. + Also, Algiers probably concluded that the Western Sahara conflict was + yet one more dispute that did not serve Arab interests and that efforts to resolve + it could aid in burnishing Algeria’s Arab credentials. Moreover, + Algeria’s priorities have changed. The country is now committed to + social and economic reform, and regional disputes only divert resources + from these objectives.

+
+ +
+
+ +
+

(C) Morocco, for its part, had little to + lose from the move. It has not yet compromised its position on the + Western Sahara but has gained potential leverage over its regional rival + by demonstrating that the benefits of economic and political cooperation + outweigh those of a protracted guerrilla campaign. The resumption of + Algerian-Moroccan relations puts Rabat back into the mainstream of North + African affairs and reduces the threat of hostilities with its + militarily superior neighbor. Moreover, Morocco has gained an economic + partner with whom it can pursue potentially lucrative trade and + development projects. Contacts between Moroccan and Algerian firms are + already under way. Rabat hopes to market car parts, tires, fruits, and vegetables in Algeria, + and Algeria has already begun exporting tractors, bicycles, and + televisions to Morocco.

+

The Desert War

+

(C) The Western Sahara dispute remains a + potentially divisive issue, although Saudi mediators are optimistic that + a breakthrough is near. Rabat and Algiers reportedly reject the idea of + sovereignty for the territory but have not yet agreed on a form of + autonomy for the Saharan people. Also, King Hassan will apparently not + accept diplomatic representation for the Polisario at international + organizations or Polisario demands that he withdraw his military and + administrative apparatus before a referendum. Both Saudi and Moroccan + officials concede a settlement could take a year. An end to the conflict + is not, however, inevitable. Morocco and Algeria must overcome years of + suspicion and mistrust and competing claims for regional dominance in + order to secure a lasting peace. Lack of progress on this issue could + well lead to a setback in bilateral relations.

+

Tunisian-Libyan Relations

+

(C) The Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement + has given impetus to improved Tunisian-Libyan relations. Libyan leader + Qadhafi and Tunisian + President Ben Ali have now met + on four occasions, including their 22 May meeting on the Tunisian island + of Djerba.See Document + 89. While on Djerba, the two sides reportedly + agreed in principle to allow each country’s national goods free passage + across the borders; to cooperate in the field of energy; to extend and + interlink telephone networks; and to construct a highway between Sfax, + Tunisia, and the Libyan border. A common national identity card will + also be created and will carry the same information and design but in + different colors for each country. In addition, Tunis and Tripoli + reportedly agreed in principle to joint exploitation of the Continental + Shelf, according to the International Court of Justice ruling, although + differences persist over the division of resources.

+
+ +
+ +

(S) Economic considerations and security + concerns were undoubtedly instrumental in Ben Ali’s decision to pursue closer ties to Libya. + Negotiations on Libyan monies owed to Tunisia, since the 1985 break in + relations should net Tunis some $45 million, although this amount is + only half of Tunisia’s initial demand. Roughly 20,000 Tunisians have + traveled to Libya in search of work since diplomatic ties were resumed + in December, but the number who remain in Libya is probably far fewer. + More than 200,000 Libyan tourists have visited Tunisia, providing hard + currency for the economically depressed southern region. Tunis will also + benefit from joint ventures currently under discussion and from Libya’s + complementary economy, which will provide a market for Tunisian labor, + goods, and services.

+
+ +
+

(C) Ben + Ali also apparently calculated that more was to be gained + by trying to cooperate with, rather than confront, his volatile + neighbor. Relations between Tunis and Tripoli have been strained since + their abortive 1974 unity agreement,See footnote 4, Document 288. forcing + Tunisia to remain alert to a Libyan conventional military attack or + Libyan-sponsored subversion. Tunis most likely believes that by bringing + Qadhafi into the North + African fold, it can alleviate its security concerns and reduce the + threat from the east.

+

[portion marking not declassified] Qadhafi, for his part, is seeking + respectability and a means of ensuring a Libyan role in regional + affairs. Economic cooperation with the promise of greater availability + of goods, as well as agreements already reached easing travel + restrictions, should also bolster his domestic position. He is apt to + use relations with his neighbors to try to drive a wedge between them + and the US, but North African foreign + policy will not be based on the colonel’s whims.

+ +

Outlook

+

[portion marking not declassified] The current + level of cooperation in North Africa bodes well for near-term regional + stability. A stable North Africa also benefits the US by creating a more economically and + politically stable environment in which to conduct foreign relations. In + addition, it reduces the potential for Soviet intervention and a + superpower tug-of-war. The current calm and accommodation will, however, + be difficult to preserve. Born of independent tactical considerations, + this unlikely alliance joins Hassan, the conservative Monarch; Bendjedid, the pragmatic centrist; + Ben Ali, the moderate + activist; and Qadhafi, the + radical revolutionary. Differing ideological predilections, varying + agendas, and ingrained suspicion and mistrust will most likely inhibit + any permanent reconciliation.

+

[portion marking not declassified] Qadhafi’s entry into the alliance will + increase the Libyan leader’s respectability but probably not at the + expense of US relations with alliance + members, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. Hassan, Bendjedid, and Ben Ali perceive the necessity of + trying to rein in Qadhafi as a + means of enhancing regional security and perhaps reaping economic + rewards, but they remain distrustful of the colonel’s intentions. + Moreover, they are unlikely to sacrifice US support for Qadhafi.

+

(C) The Western Sahara dispute continues + to be a potentially divisive issue, but all sides appear to be tiring of + this protracted conflict. In addition, renewed ties between Morocco and + Algeria provide a more conducive framework for reaching a political + settlement. Both sides will have to compromise, with Hassan offering + enough autonomy to the Saharan people to satisfy Algeria’s need for a + face-saving way out. Realizing that the King’s political fortunes are + closely tied to the Western Sahara and to ensure that the peace process + continues, Algiers will most likely have to relent on its demand that + Morocco withdraw its military and administrative apparatus from the + territory before a referendum. Failure to reach an agreement would most + likely lead to the breakdown of regional reconciliation. For now, all + sides can benefit from the current respite to focus on troublesome + domestic issues, including their flagging economies, and to bask in the + lull in regional tensions.

+
+ +
+ 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880638–0820. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, + Nouakchott, Paris, Riyadh, and Casablanca. + + 7144. + + Rabat, July 22, 1988, 1636Z + + + + SUBJECT + Maghreb Joint Commission: Libyan Role, “Security,” and + Moroccan-Algieran Normalization. + + + Refs: + (A) Algiers 3867,In telegram 3867 from + Algiers, July 18, the Embassy reported: “Maghreb Political + Commission ended work July 14 by setting up five committees, + each to be chaired by a different state, to explore different + aspects of regional cooperation.” The Embassy continued: “While + the Libyan delegation pressed theme of union, views of the other + four countries on the need to give priority to economic + integration prevailed. Meeting further consecrated idea that the + Maghreb is a five-nation affair, reinforcing impression that + regional cooperation will not be held hostage to the Western + Sahara and indeed that progress on the Maghreb may render a + solution to the war more palatable to Algeria and Morocco.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880615–0692) + (B) DIA WASHDC 210010Z Jul + 88.Not found. + + + + (Confidential—Entire text). + + Summary: (a) On the Libyan role at the July 14 political + commission meeting in Algiers, MFA + rep said that Qadhafi’s + extreme union proposals had irritated the commission and resulted in + Libya’s receipt of the least important committee assignment; (b) on + “security,” a subject reported in the Moroccan press as part of + Tunisia’s committee portfolio, there has been some speculation that + the Grand Maghreb will turn its attention to “the presence of + foreign military bases in the region;” (c) Foreign Minister + Filali reported agreement + on the margins at Algiers to set up two new Moroccan-Algerian mixed + committees, to meet this September. End summary. + + Ref wrap-ups of July 14 Maghreb Political Commission results tally + well with what we hear in Rabat that, creation of the five + committees aside, the Commission took no substantive decisions and + focused almost entirely on economic and other non-political issues. + At the same time, some additional aspects have emerged at this + end: + + Libyan Role at AlgiersMFA + Islamic and Arab Affairs Counselor Benbrahim told us that the + commission had been irritated by extreme Libyan integration + proposals and, as a result, Libya had been given the least important + of the committee assignments, i.e, structure and organization. (The + hottest committee assignments, according to Benbrahim, were those + dealing with economics, education and culture.) Concerning specific + Libyan proposals, the Counselor confirmed that brief Moroccan press + reports were essentially + correct—e.g. A “union of Maghrebian states” in which supreme + authority rested with a Council of Heads of State (with authority + for war and peace). There would be an Executive Council, a General + Secretariat (with large budgetary powers) and Legislative and + Judiciary Councils. The “union” would have a common currency, + foreign policy and armed forces. Qadhafi had also proposed the unification of + economic, cultural, commercial and social sectors. + + When asked if he thought Morocco would follow Algerian and + Tunisian leads in abolishing visa requirements for Libyans, + Benbrahim said he could not make a prediction. On the one hand, + Morocco was losing Libyan tourism because of its visa requirement; + on the other, free circulation of Libyans would present a threat to + Moroccan security. + + “Security”According to earliest Moroccan press accounts of + commission results, Tunisian committee assignment of social affairs + and human resources also included “security.” A subsequent + unattributed press analysis had it that, according to diplomatic + circles, the Tunisian committee assignment would be one of the most + difficult, involving as it did “the presence of foreign military + bases in the region . . .” All three MFA officials whom we asked about “security and foreign + bases” cautiously said they thought the subject had not been + discussed at Algiers and, in any event, was a matter which involved + the sovereignty of each member state. On the other hand, Algerian + Embassy Counselor here said that discussion of this subject was only + logical. The term “security,” he continued was vague and was meant + to encompass the various insecurities of each member—i.e. for + Tunisia it was fundamentalism and the frontier with Libya, for + Libya, the Gulf of Sidra, for Mauritania, the threat to its + neutrality, and for Morocco the Polisario, etc. An informed + Istiqlali journalist told us that discussion of “security” was a + natural development within the Maghrebian context, adding that new + Maghrebian directions would be toward greater non-alignment, away + from the U.S. and the USSR, and + toward Europe, if not France. + + Comment: Although we are not sure whether the subjects of security + and foreign military bases were actually brought up in Algiers, it + would appear that they may be blowing in the Maghreb breeze, and + that some would not be adverse to an airing of them within the + confines of the emerging Grand Maghreb. End comment. + + Moroccan-Algerian NormalizationOn his return from Algiers, + Foreign Minister Filali told + reporters that he had held bilateral discussions with Ibrahimi. The two had reviewed with + satisfaction bilateral progress since the resumption of relations, + and agreed that the successful work of the mixed committee on the + free circulation of persons and goods, should be followed up with + further mixed committee meetings on economic relations and on + culture and education, to be held in September in Algiers and Rabat + respectively. Filali + expressed the hope that + the Grand Moroccan-Algerian Mixed Commission would meet this year, + whether before or after the meeting of the Maghrebian Commission in + Rabat on October 24. + + Hawes +
+
+ 93. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880951–0415. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority + to Paris, Madrid, USUN, + Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott. + + 10356. + + Rabat, October 26, 1988, 1311Z + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting of Maghreb Political Commission Announced for October 27 + in Rabat. + + + Ref: + Rabat 10124.In telegram 10124 from + Rabat, October 17, the Embassy reported: “In his October 14 + address to Parliament, King Hassan reaffirmed his policy of + support for normalization with Algeria, for Algeria’s President + Chadli Bendjedid and + for the building of a grand Maghreb. In a visionary portion on + international reconciliation, he praised the Soviet Union and + foresaw the integration of a united Arab Maghreb with a Europe + composed of both East and West.”(Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880921–0560) + +

1. Confidential—Entire text.

+

2. Following an October 22 meeting of the four accredited Maghreb reps + with King Hassan in Ifrane, the GOM + announced that the meeting of the Maghreb Political Commission will be + held in Rabat October 27. According to King Hassan’s October 14 address + to Parliament, the Political Commission will prepare for submission to a + Maghreb summit the results of the recent meetings of the five Maghreb + Sub-commissions (reftel).

+

Comment: Hassan’s assertion in his parliamentary address that the + Commission meeting would not take place until “after October 24” had + renewed private and opposition press speculation that the event had been + postponed indefinitely, either because of Algeria’s internal + difficultiesReference is to the riots + that occurred in Algeria, October 5–11. For additional information, + see Document 183. or Morocco’s + displeasure over Algerian tactics in the UNGA Fourth Committee.Reference + is to Algeria’s continued efforts to pass a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for direct + negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. See footnote 2, Document 458. + Hassan’s willingness to proceed is a further indication of his + determination to prevent Algerian-Moroccan Fourth Committee + confrontation from prejudicing Maghreb-building efforts. Initial press + reaction to the October 25 + Fourth Committee vote also shows that the GOM is not displeased with the results (further reaction + septel).In telegram 10451 from Rabat, + October 27, the Embassy reported that MFA Arab/Islamic Affairs Counselor Adib Taieb informed + the Chargé on October 26 that “despite obvious irritation with + Algerian tactics in New York,” (see Document + 458) Morocco “was still four-square behind the referendum + plan and would cooperate fully with the UNSYG’s newly-appointed special representative. Taieb + cited the convening of the Maghreb Political Commission in Rabat + October 27 as proof that events in New York had not sidetracked the + Maghreb integration process.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880956–0079)

+ Hawes +
+
+ 94. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880973–0439. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Paris, and Casablanca. + + 10690. + + Rabat, November 2, 1988, 1728Z + + + + SUBJECT + Maghreb Political Commission—A Political Bust? + + + Ref: + A) Rabat 10572,In telegram 10572 from + Rabat, October 31, the Embassy reported: “As for the outcome of + Maghreb Political Commission, complete agreement was not reached + on a political structure document and Morocco has been charged + with working out a final draft for presentation to Heads of + State.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880965–0390) + B) Rabat 10532,In telegram 10532 from + Rabat, October 28, the Embassy reported: “During its evening + session of October 27, the Maghreb Political Commission approved + for subsequent consideration a draft treaty establishing a + ‘community of the countries of the Arab Maghreb.’ The draft + document indicates that the leaders in Rabat have opted for a + gradual integration of economic/social policies, retaining + considerable political autonomy. The Commission action largely + overrode evident Libyan support for a draft whose terms would + have provided immediate establishment of a political + federation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880960–0189) + C) Rabat 9654.In telegram 9654 from + Rabat, October 3, the Embassy reported: “On his return from the + Tripoli meeting of the Maghreb Sub-Commission on institutional + development, Parliamentary President Ahmed Osma said that the + participants had been divided between the Libyans, who favored + immediate creation of a strong ‘supra federal state’ and the + rest who favored a gradualist approach.” The Embassy continued: + “A Sub-Commission pilot study for a ‘Maghreb Union’ would be + presented to the Grand Maghreb Commission, set for October 24 in + Rabat. An MFA source said that + Qadhafi was ‘relaxed’ + and would not lose patience with the slow pace of Grand Maghreb + institutional development.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880880–0678) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Summary: Despite glowing communiqué claims that the results of all + five Maghreb Sub-commissions had been approved, the Maghreb Political Commission, meeting + in Rabat/Fez October 27–28, failed to muster sufficient political + will to approve a plan on Maghreb structure and organization. The + problem of finding a “definitive formula” was kicked upstairs to the + Maghreb Heads of State. According to our sources, delegation + disagreements over the draft community treaty exposed fundamental + differences in approach to Maghreb integration, which foreclosed the + kind of political union (but not economic, social and cultural + cooperation) proposed by Libya and, evidently, by Tunisia. The + unresolved problems of the Western Sahara, Algerian internal + difficulties and Libyan institutional and behavioral irregularities + contributed to the failure to achieve consensus. End summary. + +

[Omitted here is the Embassy’s detailed analysis of the communiqué and + the prospects for Maghreb integration.]

+ + + Comment. Given that neither Morocco nor its three non-Libyan + Maghreb partners are ready to address the tough issues of political + integration (much less union), but cannot afford to disparage it + either, the Political Commission meeting was a popular political + necessity, but one not to be overplayed. Accordingly, by October + 31/November 1, the Moroccan media was already beginning to drop + mentions (glowing or otherwise) of this issue. Conceptual and other + differences between Libya (and possibly Tunisia) and its neighbors, + the unresolved Western Sahara problem and current Algerian internal + preoccupations apparently inhibited a serious effort toward + institutionalized political cooperation, whether under the rubric of + union, community or even assembly. Morocco has been charged with + bridging the differences and submitting its findings to a summit + (rumored to be put off until early 1989). Given its modest + step-by-step approach, one can expect the GOM proposals to be somewhat general, high on + integrationist rhetoric and pragmatic. + + Hawes +
+ +
+ 95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881086–0609. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Kunstadter + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Casey (NEA/AFN) and Wiener; approved by + Burleigh. Sent for + information to Algiers, Ankara, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and + Brussels. + + 401233. + + Washington, December 13, 1988, 0025Z + + + + SUBJECT + Qadhafi Speech to Tunisian + Chamber of Deputies: Demarche Instructions. + + + Ref: + Tunis 12622.In telegram 12622 from + Tunis, December 9, the Embassy reported: “GOT’s worst fears came to pass + when Qadhafi delivered a + virulent anti-Western diatribe before the Chamber of Deputies + December 9. Qadhafi + blamed America, ‘the master of lies,’ for blocking + Algerian/Libyan unity and seeking to destroy the Arabs.” The + Embassy continued: “The Deputies were often ill at ease with the + Colonel’s rhetoric, and GOT + censored TV and radio coverage. Recommend USG lodge official protest.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D881079–0084) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Using talking points in para 3 below, Embassy is requested to + lodge a protest with GOT over + Qadhafi’s December 9 + anti-U.S. speech in Tunisian Chamber of Deputies (reftel). + Department will make parallel demarche Dec. 13 to the Tunisian + Ambassador.In telegram 402431 to + Tunis, December 14, the Department indicated that Burleigh had delivered a + démarche to Hamzaoui during which Burleigh noted that “we had carefully studied + Qadhafi’s remarks, + which had drawn considerable attention in Washington. The speech + would have been unremarkable had Qadhafi not abused Tunisian hospitality by + attacking the U.S. and U.S. relations with the Maghreb.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D881090–0110) + + Begin talking points: + + The United States Government has noted the anti-U.S. + speech Qadhafi made + to the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies December 9, as well as + the fact that it was broadcast live to the Tunisian + people. + + When Qadhafi made a + similar attack on the U.S. at Sakiet Sidi Youssef last year, + we were inclined to view it as an isolated incident which + had arisen in circumstances over which GOT had little or no + control. + + Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of this occasion. + Moreover, the fact that Qadhafi has been publicly able to attack the + U.S. twice on Tunisia soil suggests an unfavorable pattern + which does not serve to strengthen our bilateral + relations. + + His speech violated the third country rule; we trust the + GOT has lodged a + vigorous protest with the Libyan Government. + + Qadhafi’s abuse of + Tunisia’s hospitality in such a fashion reaffirms our view + that he has not reformed. His insistence on making such a presentation + directly to the Tunisian people confirms our view that he + has not in the least abandoned his intention of influencing + and intervening in Tunisia’s internal affairs.In telegram 12935 from Tunis, December + 20, the Embassy reported that Pelletreau “vigorously + protested Qadhafi’s anti-American speech” in Tunisia’s + Chamber of Deputies. Ben + Yahia “responded defensively that + Tunisian society is now immune to Qadhafi’s rhetoric. + Ambassador also advised Tunisians to inform themselves + carefully on Libya’s CW + capability. Ben + Yahia pleaded for U.S. patience and + hinted that Tunisia would be conveying specific + proposals from Libya in the interest of detente with the + new U.S. administration.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881108–0586) + + + Shultz +
+
+ 96. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881112–0655. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, + Bamako, Cairo, Dakar, Khartoum, Ndjamena, Niamey, Rabat, and + Tunis. + + 5532. + + Nouakchott, December 21, 1988, 1450Z + + + + SUBJECT + Libyan Chemical Weapons Program. + + + Ref: + State 399207.In telegram 399207 to + multiple recipients, December 10, the Department provided a + French translation of the talking points to all African + diplomatic posts, November 28, concerning Libya’s chemical + weapons program. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D881080–0836) + + + + On December 19, DCM, accompanied + by PolOff, raised the issue of Libyan chemical weapons production + with Ambassador Abderrahmin Ould Hadrami, Director of African + Affairs at the MFA, and provided + him a copy of the talking points contained in reftel. + + In response to our démarche, Hadrami replied that Libya had + formally denied that its Rabta chemcial plant produced chemical + weapons and offered to let foreign observers visit the plant. He + asked whether the USG is aware of + the Libyan denial. DCM replied that + the USG has evidence that, despite + Qadhafi’s disclaimers, + the plant is indeed intended for CW + production. It would be fairly easy, he continued, to hide the + evidence of weapons production at the time of a site visit. Hadrami + listened to this explanation but said nothing. He did, however, agree that the + possibility that such a CW plant + exists in Libya is quite important for Libya’s neighbors in the + Sahel and Maghreb, and the GIRM + welcomes whatever information the USG can provide. + + DCM also left a copy of the + talking points on the Rabta chemical plant when making a démarche on + December 19 on the upcoming CW + conference in Paris with Ambassador Melainine Ould Moctar Neche, + MFA Director for International + Organizations. + + Comment: Our impression is that Hadrami is not convinced that the + Libyan plant is truly meant to produce CW weapons but is open to persuasion. We do not know at + this stage whether this skepticism is shared by his superiors in the + MFA. Embassy will attempt to + sound out more senior MFA officials + on this topic in the weeks to come. In the meantime, we would + welcome whatever additional evidence of Libyan use of Rabta for + CW production the Department can + provide.In telegram 5603 from + Nouakchott, December 27, the Embassy reported: “Foreign Minister + Col. Mohamed Sidina Ould + Sidya convoked the Chargé on December 27 to advise the USG that the GIRM privately asked Libya about + its new chemical production plant and received the same denial + about weapons production and offer soon to invite international + observers that Libya is putting out publicly. The Minister said + he was relieved to learn that USG policy is to pursue diplomatic means to + dissuade Libya from CW + production because military action would not be fitting for a + super power and it just isn’t worth it. Ould Sidya said he + agreed with the USG that + Libya’s neighbors should be concerned about the possible + introduction of CW into the + region and seek a consensus against it.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881124–0776) End comment. + + Twaddell +
+
+ +
+ Algeria +
+ 97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret; + Flash; Cherokee; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + 17215. + + Washington, January 22, 1981, 2013Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian Government Request for Clarification of Remarks Made at + January 21 Dept Press Briefing. + + + Ref: + Algiers 354.In telegram 354 from + Algiers, January 22, the Embassy reported that Benouniche said “the GOA is deeply concerned over the + Department Press Spokesman’s statement that the new + administration will have to carefully study the hostage + agreements before committing itself to respecting them. As a + result of its concern, the GOA + is requesting an explanation of these remarks by the USG as soon as possible.” (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria + (01/22/1981–01/22/1982)) + + + + (S) Entire text. + + In response to GOA + MFA Director Benouniche, you should give him + text of press guidance prepared for use by Department spokesman on + January 22: + “Three points need be emphasized in handling the heavy + load of questions concerning the new administration’s + willingness to implement the agreements entered into in + order to effect the release of the hostages.Reference is to the Algiers Accords, the + series of agreements between the United States and Iran + brokered by Algeria that ended the Iran hostage crisis. + Documentation on the Accords is in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran + Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980. + See also Roberts + Owen, “Final Negotiations and Release in Algiers,” American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct + of a Crisis (New York: Council on Foreign + Relations, 1985), pp. 297–324. + “(1) The agreements negotiated between the United States + and Iran, as well as the relevant executive orders, are very + detailed and complex documents. This administration has + already begun an in-depth review of what they entail and + require on the part of all parties involved. This review + will be conducted as expeditiously as is feasible. + “(2) This administration, consistent with domestic and + international law alike, fully intends to carry out the + obligations of the United States.In telegram 17547 to Algiers, January 23, the + Department transmitted the text of a letter from + Reagan + thanking Bendjedid for helping resolve the + hostage crisis. Reagan wrote: “Algeria will long + represent to the American people and to the world that + rare combination of compassion and competence of which + you have every right to be proud.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810033–0928) + + “(3) We must all recognize, however, that the + implementation of the agreements will be a complex and + time-consuming process, and one which will require the + cooperation of all parties.” + + + You should also note that some of implementing steps are underway. + The administration sent the executive orders to the Federal Register + for publication January 22. In the first court case challenging the + agreement, the judge ruled that the President had full authority to + reach agreement for the release of the hostages. We expect other + similar suits and will continue to defend the agreement. + + Haig +
+
+ 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810038–0924. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + + 399. + + Algiers, January 26, 1981, 1840Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Implications of the Hostage Agreement for U.S.-Algerian + Relations. + + + + (Secret—entire text.) + + Summary. The GOA probably + accepted the role of intermediary in the hostage crisis primarily to + protect “the Iranian revolution”, to enhance Algeria’s role as a + peacemaker, to strengthen the international position of Algerian + diplomacy and the domestic position of Bendjedid and Benyahia, and to change Algeria’s + image in the U.S. and in the West, bilateral issues were probably of secondary + concern, although the GOA + undoubtedly hopes that its new image will yield it benefits over + time. In discharging what is essentially a moral obligation, the + USG may wish to consider a + number of steps: renewal of Bendjedid’s invitation to visit the U.S., a rapid + resumption of LNG negotiations, + action on military training proposals, and a number of other + initiatives, some easy, some not. End summary. + + In discussing their efforts in the hostage crisis with us, + Algerian officials have stressed humanitarian aspects, and we + understand MFA officials have been + told not to respond to questions about Algeria’s mediation except + with general statements about its humanitarian concerns. However, + the GOA probably undertook the role + of intermediary in the hostage crisis for a number of reasons, among + which we see: + + + A strong commitment to protect and support “the Iranian + revolution” which Algerians see as similar in many ways to + their own struggle for independence. In this context, the + GOA probably saw the + continuing hostage crisis as dangerous because it (1) + invited renewed U.S. military action in Iran, (2) could have + led the U.S. toward support for Iraq, (3) hampered the + emergence of strong domestic political institutions in Iran, + and (4) tempted the Soviet Union to continue exploiting + Iranian weakness and the possibility of U.S. military + action. + + A commitment of principle to the resolution of regional + disputes of a strongly destabilizing nature. Since the + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the GOA has been sensitive to the destabilization + of the Gulf/Indian Ocean region, and it probably saw the + hostage mediation as contributing to stability and opening + the way to the resolution of other conflicts, particularly + the Iran-Iraq conflict. + + A strong desire to re-establish the importance of Algerian + diplomacy, in the world at large and in the Third World in + particular. Since the death of BoumédièneHouari + Boumédiène, the second President of + Algeria, a proponent of Western Saharan + self-determination and of non-alignment in foreign + policy, died in 1978. and the appointment of + Benyahia as Foreign Minister, Algerian diplomacy has + achieved some modest success on the Western Sahara issue and + on relations with France, but there has been no initiative + or success spectacular enough to give the Bendjedid regime and its + Foreign Minister their own place in the sun. Now, Bendjedid and Benyahia are + clearly established on the world scene, and the + Boumédiène/BouteflikaAbdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Minister of Foreign + Affairs from 1965 to 1978. legacy has been + clearly relegated to the past. Bendjedid has been strengthened as + President, and Benyahia has been strengthened as Foreign + Minister. With the exception of the pro-Moscow Marxists, all + elements of the Algerian body politic have probably seen + something in Algeria’s role to praise. “Progressive” + leftists such as Yahiaoui probably saw this role as + supportive of Iran. “Liberals” such as Algeria’s technocrats + probably saw it as a natural opening to the West. The middle-of-the + road nationalist majority, including most of the military, + probably saw it as a healthy reaffirmation of Algeria’s + place in the world and of Bendjedid’s place in Algeria. + + A desire to change Algeria’s image in the West in general and the + U.S. in particular. The GOA + has been working hard to make its policy of non-alignment a + truly genuine one, and is convinced that the only way to do + this is to enjoy good relations with both superpowers. In + this context, it has been hampered by its outdated image as + a “radical” state that always supported the Eastern bloc and + lost no opportunity to attack the West, even to the extent + of supporting certain forms of international terrorism. + Without changing its rhetoric, the GOA has gradually taken specific policy actions + to alter its course and its image. Its mediation effort is the latest of + these actions, and perhaps the most eloquent. + + A growing commitment of the rules of international + diplomacy and genuine shock and embarrassment at the actions + of the “Iranian revolution” in this domain. + + + The GOA probably does not expect + anything directly from the U.S. as a result of its mediatory role, + and it is not likely to make any specific request linked to the + hostage agreement. It knows that, now that the hostages have been + released, it has little leverage on us beyond that conferred by our + intangible moral debt. It is not going to come to us and say “stop + selling weapons to Morocco” or “pay more for LNG” instead, it will hope that its + improved image in the U.S. will make it possible for U.S. + policymakers to respond positively as it tries to strengthen its + non-alignment and to respond with understanding as it pursues its + national interests in the region and in the world. + + The obvious terrain on which the GOA will hope to elicit more cooperation from U.S. + policymakers is military. The GOA + has standing requests for training and equipment which it has + justified explicitly in terms of lessening its dependence on the + Soviet Union. It undoubtedly hopes that its new image will make it + possible for U.S. policymakers to respond positively in spite of + continuing disagreement on some areas of bilateral and regional + affairs. + + The GOA will also hope to elicit + a more truly neutral U.S. policy on the Western Sahara. In recent + months, it has increasingly come to fear that the USG would support King Hassan in + anything he did because of the idealized reputation he enjoys as + America’s friend. Now, the GOA will + hope that it too will be seen as ready to collaborate with the U.S. + on certain (but by no means all) issues and will thus also have a + claim on America’s friendship. Such friendship would, in the GOA’s view, argue for the U.S. to find + ways to support King Hassan short of espousing his claims to the + Western Sahara in theory or in practice. + + Other issues such as the Middle East crisis and the North-South + dialogue, while important to Algeria, are not current issues of + burning concern in Algerian-American bilateral relations, and in any + case the GOA certainly understands + that American policy on such fundamental questions cannot be guided + by considerations related to U.S. relations with Algeria. + + Against the background, we believe it would be in the U.S. + interest to demonstrate our gratitude and our desire to improve + relations by taking several of the following actions, some of which + should not be difficult provided we do not renounce the accords + through which the hostages were freed: + + + Renew the invitation issued to President Bendjedid by President + Carter to visit + the United States.Carter extended the + invitation to Bendjedid in a February 9, 1979, letter. + For text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, + Part 3, North Africa, Document 71. Such + a gesture would not only demonstrate our gratitude over + Algeria’s role in the hostage crisis, but would also show + that the new administration is interested in the Third World + and would encourage the trend toward more moderation by a + key non-aligned leader. This would be particularly important + given reported plans for Bendjedid to visit the Soviet Union as early + as this March. + + Promptly put forward a new proposal in the LNG price negotiations,See Document + 99. one which would be as forthcoming + as possible but consistent with our fundamental criteria + based on market factors. The most recent round of talks in + Washington appeared to show such a new U.S. proposal is + possible. + + Authorize cash sale of some military training, thus + improving our ties to the dominant element in the Algerian + political system. This proposal has already been considered + with some care within the Department of State, but no + decision has been taken. + + Consider the sale of C–130 aircraft to Algeria, as the GOA has previously requested + and we had previously shelved.In + telegram 327 from Algiers, January 29, 1980, the Embassy + informed the Department about Algeria’s request to + purchase C–130 + aircraft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D800051–0664) In telegram + 56446 to Algiers, March 1, 1980, the Department informed + the Embassy that “time is not rpt not propitious for + C–130 sale.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D800108–0312) This would + admittedly be a difficult policy decision. + + Promptly act to facilitate GOA rental of purchase of a much-needed larger + Chancery in Washington. We have held up such action pending + resolution of a property dispute in Algiers, but could now + go ahead in Washington and trust the GOA to arrive at a fair + settlement of our claim in Algiers. This gesture would be + especially pleasing to Ambassador Malek, one of the three + Algerian negotiators. + + Expand educational and cultural exchanges particularly by + offering additional Fulbright scholars and facilitating an + exhibition of Algerian arts and crafts in the U.S. + + Review our decision not to participate in the 1981 Algiers + International Fair (i.e., institute the biennial cycle of + attendance agreed informally with the Department of Commerce + in 1981 instead of 1982). + + Invite Minister of Planning Brahimi and his senior + subordinates to Washington for a symposium organized by the + Department of Commerce on business opportunities in Algeria + following approval of the new five-year plan (Brahimi and + his colleagues participated in such a symposium in London + following Queen Elizabeth’s visit to Algeria). + + Consider participation in the reconstruction of the El + Asnam region through grant aid to private voluntary agencies + such as Catholic Relief Services for assistance to the + handicapped and the orphaned. + + + The above are preliminary ideas. We will be happy to elaborate on + any of them at the Department’s request. + + Haynes +
+
+ 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810045–0601. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN), David Burns (EB/IEP), and Kritzer (DOE/IA); approved by Edward Morse + (EB/IEP). + + 24475. + + Washington, January 31, 1981, 0027Z + + + + SUBJECT + US-Algerian LNG Talks. + + + Ref: + (A) Algiers 408,In telegram 408 from + Algiers, January 27, the Embassy reported that El Paso Chairman + Petty gave Algerian Energy Minister and Chairman of Sonatrach + (the Algerian National Energy Company), Belkachem Nabi, a letter + which said “as result of the suspension of deliveries of LNG to our company, which is now + going into its 10th month, the situation of El Paso is now + entering into a critical phrase. I must frankly tell you that we + have reached the crossroads. One road leads us to resumption of + deliveries of LNG to our + customers in the United States and the other leads us to a + cessation of this project.” Petty said that if an agreement to + resume deliveries were not reached by February 15, “we will have + no other choice but to write off the considerable investment + that our company has made in the LNG project for the reason that we do not have any + assurance that the LNG + deliveries will be resumed in the near future.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810039–1079) + (B) Algiers 453.In telegram 453 from + Algiers, January 28, the Embassy cautioned that “the El + Paso/Sonatrach LNG price + problem must be solved within the next few weeks or El Paso will + walk away from the deal. This would cost U.S. companies and the + U.S. Treasury many hundreds of millions and would create serious + new problems in U.S. relations with Algeria at a time when + Algeria is being widely praised for its role in the hostage + affair. The Embassy recommends a course of action and suggests a + draft USG/GOA agreement on LNG pricing under the El Paso + contract.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810041–0776) + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Reftel A reports El Paso’s January 25 communication to Energy + Minister Nabi of its imminent decision to write off its LNG project unless an accord is + reached between the USG and the + GOA on prices prior to the third week of February. + Once El Paso has taken this step, we believe it would be extremely + difficult, if not impossible, to resurrect this contract. Unless the + basic Algerian position changes subsequently, it would also be very + difficult to implement the trunkline LNG project. We, therefore, face a major turning point + in our economic/energy relationship with Algeria. + + Given the very short fuse and magnitude of this decision, we are + concerned: (a) that the GOA take + seriously El Paso’s decision, (2) that a wider GOA circle than just the Energy + Minister be aware of the El Paso decision, and (3) that we do + everything possible to limit damage to the US-Algerian relationship should an agreement be + impossible. + + For these reasons we believe that it would be useful for the + Embassy to acquaint the MFA and + other appropriate GOA Ministers of + our views at an appropriate level at an early date. Department + suggests Charge see Western Europe and North American Affairs + Director Benouniche by + January 31 or February 1.In telegram 476 + from Algiers, February 1, the Embassy reported that during a + January 31 meeting “Benouniche paid careful attention and + restated our points completely and clearly to confirm that he + understood the essentials. There is not the least doubt that he + did understand the problem, including the fact that El Paso’s + deadline is neither arbitrary nor tactical.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810048–0553) We will be pursuing the same objective + through Ambassador Malek in + Washington. Obviously, care will have to be taken so that the GOA does not perceive this step as an + ultimatum. Nor do we want to politicize what we view as basically an + economic issue. For good economic reasons on both sides, an accord + may not be possible, but we would not want this failure to result + from a miscalculation on the Algerian side or come as a particular + surprise to government circles beyond the Energy Ministry. + + Based on arduous negotiations, six rounds over the past ten + months, we have to conclude that given the outstanding differences, + Round VII may not be decisive. Nevertheless, given the El Paso + decision to withdraw from the project absent a U.S./Algerian + governmental accord by the middle of February, a USG team is prepared to come to + Algiers if the GOA so desires. + Given El Paso’s intended decision, these talks would have to take + place the week of February 16 with an outer time limit of February + 18 because of El Paso’s corporate procedures to close the books on + fiscal year 1980. We will leave it to Boussena to determine + advisability and precise timing of seventh round in consultation + with DOE’s Borre. + + In discussing this matter with the MFA, you should make the following points: + + Since April, 1980, American and Algerian negotiators have + been making persistent and strenuous efforts to reach an + agreement on a + framework to permit resumption of LNG supplies to El Paso.In telegram 87426 to Paris, April 3, + 1980, the Department reported that “El Paso’s efforts to + extend the March 31, 1980, expiration date of their May + 11, 1979, LNG price + amendment with Sonantrach have failed to produce + agreement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D80168–1066) Progress + has been made, but significant gaps remain. + + El Paso has now notified the USG that it has decided that it cannot + indefinitely sustain the financial drain of maintaining its + assets and paying the LNG + tanker debt in the absence of assured LNG supplies. It is preparing + to write off the project by the third week of February + unless an accord is reached. + + We are thoroughly aware of the Algerian pricing goals, + although we must question whether they are realistic in + relation to the U.S. market and regulatory + requirements. + + An interim solution must be consistent with the price + provisions of Canadian and Mexican gas trade; regulatory + authorities, the Congress and the public simply would refuse + to accept an outcome whereby Algeria, after nearly one year + of interrupted deliveries, appeared to be accorded better + terms than hemispheric trading partners whose reliability is + well established. + + Moreover, regulatory precedent constrains the U.S. from + approving a price for Algerian LNG that exceeds the ERA’s competitive + alternate fuels price test. + + We think it would be unfortunate for the project to fail + at this point, especially in view of the substantial + investment on all sides. We are prepared to work within our + stated policy and framework which Algerian officials + understand well, to seek to make one last effort to reach an + agreement over next few weeks. + + However, we recognize that the U.S. and GOA views on price and on the + economic factors involved may differ so widely that in fact + no agreement is reached. In that case, the USG would consider this result + a decision reflecting the economic policies and interests of + the two parties and not directly related to the favorable + evolution in the political relationship between our two + countries. + + + (FYI Embassy: Department and + DOE are reviewing the + interesting approach outlined in ref B. We recommend Embassy not + pass draft proposal in ref B to the GOA.) We will be cabling specific instructions in a few + days.No further instructions were + found. + + Haig +
+ +
+ 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret; + Immediate. Sent for information to Madrid, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and + USCINCEUR. Printed from a + copy that indicates the original was received in the White House + Situation Room. + + 481. + + Algiers, February 1, 1981, 1525Z + + +

CINCEUR for POLAD. Subject: GOA Protests + Sale of M–60 Tanks to Morocco. Refs: A) + State 18634 Notal;In telegram 18634 to + Algiers, January 23, the Department reported that the United States + would inform the Algerian Chargé “of our decision to sell Morocco + 108 M–60 tanks. At the same time, + we will inform him that the title to the first two OV–10 aircraft approved for sale to + Morocco by President Carter + in 1979 is being conveyed to the GOM as previously scheduled.” The Department suggested + that the Embassy inform the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + “at your discretion,” of the decision, “noting that, in keeping with + the close relationship between our two countries, we wanted to bring + the Algerians up to date on the status of our military relationship + with Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810035–0632) For Carter’s decision to provide + OV–10s and arms to Morocco, + see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, + Document 49. B) Algiers 424 Notal;In telegram 424 from Algiers, January 27, the + Embassy reported that Benouniche called in Ross “to request clarification of the Department’s + January 23 notification of recent USG decisions on arms to Morocco.” The Embassy + explained that based on telegram 18634 (see footnote 2, above) it + had chosen not to inform the MFA + about the decisions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810040–0211) C) Algiers 435 + Notal.In telegram 435 from Algiers, + January 28, the Embassy warned that the impending deliveries of arms + to Morocco “is, unless we can give the GOA convincing background elements rapidly or take some + of the edge off with a rapid gesture towards Algeria, going to have + a chilling effect on bilateral relations as they have emerged from + the GOA’s role in the hostage + negotiations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810041–0428)

+ + + (S) Summary: The GOA has made a low-key oral protest + over our decision to begin consultations with Congress on the sale + of 108 M–60 tanks to Morocco. + Public and private criticism of the substance and timing of this + decision has begun to mount. End summary. + + (C) At the end of a meeting held at + my request January 31 to discuss the Algerian-American LNG negotiations (septel),Not found. + MFA Director of Western European + and North American Affairs Saadeddine + Benouniche asked me to stay behind after EconCouns + Smith’s departure. He then made the following presentation. + + (S) The GOA has taken note of our explanation of our decision + on the M–60 tanks as being grounded + in our traditional relations of friendship with Morocco. It is + disturbed that our explanation mentions neither the clauses of the 1960 + Moroccan-American Arms AccordReference + is to the 1960 agreement by which the United States agreed to + sell arms to Morocco with the stipulation that the arms only be + used for Moroccan self-defense. that restrict the use of + arms sold to Morocco for the defense of Morocco’s internationally + recognized territory nor the language used to justify President + Carter’s November 1979 + decision to sell OV–10 aircraft + and other equipment to Morocco—i.e., that this sale was meant to + promote negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara + dispute.See footnote 2 + above. Indeed, our reference to the non-suitability of + these tanks for use in the Western Sahara implies that we have + placed no formal restriction on their use there. In the absence of a + clear reference in our explanation to either the restrictions of the + 1960 Arms Accord or the justification of the 1979 arms sale + decision, the GOA believes the sale + of M–60 tanks is contrary to the + spirit of the resolutions and recommendations of the various + international organizations that have pronounced themselves on the + Western Sahara issue. Such a sale would, in the absence of evidence + to the contrary, work against the exercise of self determination in + the Western Sahara and contravene the OAU’s call on external parties not to prejudice the + negotiating process it has defined. + + (S) On the basis of the above + analysis, Benouniche said, he + had been asked officially to present a protest over our decision. I + told him I had taken note of the analysis and of the protest he had + presented and would transmit them to the Department. + + (S) Comment: Following the return + of President Bendjedid and + Foreign Minister Benyahia from the Islamic Summit January 29Reference is to the third summit of + Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation + held in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, January 26–29. and + publication of wire services reports of our decision in the leading + government-owned Algiers daily “El Moudjahid” January 31, both + official and unofficial criticism has begun to mount. Benouniche was acting under + instructions, and, although both the level and the form of the + protest were low-key, civilian and military leaders in the GOA are clearly disturbed. Captain + Mahfoud, the Deputy Director of External Relations at the Ministry + of National Defense, began a previously scheduled meeting with the + DATT February 1 with strong + criticism of our decision (septel in DAO channels).Not + found. The Director of Higher Air School at Tafaraoui, + Major Hamid Abdelli, voiced similar criticism of the substance and + timing of our decision to our Vice-Consul in Oran January 31.Not found. + + (U) The first press editorial on + our decision has also appeared, and it is predictably critical but + surprisingly laconic. The government-owned Algiers daily “Ash-Sha’b” wrote in a February + 1 front-page editorial: “The decision . . . could have passed as a + simple, ordinary news item . . . had it not been for the speed with + which it was taken and the inopportune circumstances in which it + occurred. It had been expected that the requests of the Rabat regime + would receive a sympathetic hearing within the new administration, + especially after its candid announcement of its hostility to + national liberation movements. . . . But the speed with which the + Secretary of State rushed to take this decision . . . raises a + number of questions about the hidden motives behind this race with + time and about whether the new administration may not have had grave + reports about the situation in Morocco requiring it to deliver arms + on an urgent basis. . . .” End comment. + + (S) We will continue to report + Algerian reaction on this issue and would welcome further guidance + from the Department as it becomes available. + + Ross +
+
+ 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Rabat. Printed + from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White + House Situation Room. + + 32945. + + Washington, February 7, 1981, 1807Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting With Algerian Ambassador, February 6, + 1981. + + + + Algerian Ambassador Malek + met with Secretary Haig + February 6 for 50 minutes, primarily for a discussion of Iranian + hostage agreements. Also present were DAS + Morris Draper, Country + Director Carleton Coon + (NEA), and Stephanie van + Reigersberg, interpreter. After the meeting with the Secretary, + discussion of bilateral issues continued in NEA, with desk officer Edmund Hull joining the group + (septel).In telegram 32071 to + Algiers, February 7, the Department reported that after their + meeting with Haig, + Malek and Draper discussed the sale of + M–60 tanks to Morocco and + the LNG issue. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810058–0084) + + + Secretary opened meeting by outlining in warm terms gratitude of + U.S. Government and President Reagan to GOA for + its assistance in securing hostage release, as well as for Malek’s personal role. Malek was modest about Algerian + role, noting that it was “normal” since Algerian services had been + requested by both USG and the + Iranians. Algeria had tried to be honest and scrupulous. However, it + had been a difficult task, what with changes in the political power + struggle in Iran. The Algerians like the Americans had been in a + state of suspense until the last moment when the hostages had + actually boarded the plane.From then on things had moved very + rapidly, so rapidly that he had not had the opportunity to brief + American officials on what had transpired in Tehran during the last + crucial three weeks that preceded the release. He said he would be + glad to give the Dept a full briefing on that period. + + Malek noted that the + Iranians had in the end made many concessions and that the GOA regarded the final agreement as + good from the U.S. point of view. At any rate, the present problem + was less one of analyzing the past than one of examining how to + implement the agreements from here on out. He cited deadlines and + procedures built into the agreements. + + In response Secretary stressed U.S. awareness of difficulty of job + Algerians had taken on, gratitude at outcome, and admiration for + Algerian skill, patience, and dedication. He said that history will + never record what the consequences of failure of those negotiations + would have been, but he said that they would have been “very + dramatic” and this provided all the more reason for U.S. gratitude + at having the crisis resolved. Secretary noted that inevitably there + had been speculation in the U.S. press regarding implementation of + the agreements. He assured Ambassador Malek that the Reagan administration intended to meet its + obligations, consistent with international law and domestic legal + requirements. In the process, he said, the U.S. will be guided by + the long term objective of conducting itself in a way that would not + force Iran into the arms of the Soviets. He cited reassurances of + President Reagan that the + U.S. would not proceed in a spirit of revenge. It was normal, + however, that a new administration not party to the events leading + up to the agreements would wish to study them thoroughly. For that + reason, he said, the Department would greatly welcome Algeria’s + advice and counsel, including any observations Malek had on the difficult period + immediately preceding the conclusion of the agreements. He suggested + a review with Malek of the + implementation of the agreements, and that three-week period, take + place with U.S. officials involved with the issue, including some of + our new team, at the Assistant Secretary level. + + + The Secretary then referred to strong public feelings in the + United States toward Iran and said that the future conduct of the + Iranians would necessarily influence the administration’s ability to + implement the agreements in the spirit in which they were + reached. + + Malek noted that agreements + for release of hostages should be seen as a valuable basis not only + for settling the immediate dispute at hand but also for gradual + normalization of relations between U.S. and Iran. In both contexts + it was important that terms of agreement be adhered to. Iranians had + been very distrustful during negotiations of whether U.S. would live + up to commitments. Malek + carefully stressed that the Algerians had placed their own + credibility on the line in assuring the Iranians that they could + trust the U.S. + + Malek then analyzed + specific portions of the hostage agreements. The U.S. commitment not + to interfere in Iranian internal affairs was nothing more than what + every country agreed to under the UN + Charter. The matter of unfreezing Iran’s assets had also been + simplified by Algeria’s suggestion that Iran leave certain of its + funds frozen here in the U.S. under agreed conditions but that it + immediately repay its loans to U.S. banks abroad. If this particular + formula had not been agreed, months of additional negotiations + between Iran and the U.S. banks would have resulted. Malek said he understood the + problem for the U.S. involved in the agreement’s provision to lift + attachments and suits against the assets in U.S. banks here, but + added that the arrangement governing the appropriate awards out of a + renewable dols one billion escrow account was a very reasonable + procedure, in his view. He said he understood fully the other issues + considered sensitive for Americans: (a) the proviso that no legal + claims be introduced by the hostages or their families after the + hostages were released; and (b) the question of USG cooperation with Iran’s efforts + within the U.S. legal system to identify and locate assets of the + Shah. + + Malek asserted that what it + all came down to was that it was time for Iran and America to “turn + the page” in their relations. He drew the analogy of Algeria’s + protracted conflict with France. Malek assured the Secretary of his willingness, and + the willingness of his government, to cooperate in any way toward + implementation of the agreements. He also noted that, as the + protecting power for Iran, the Algerian Embassy has many problems + arising from the large number of Iranian nationals still in the + U.S., and expressed the hope that cooperation with the Department + would continue on this front too. + + Referring to “turning the page”, the Secretary said that whether + we were able to do that gracefully and effectively will be + influenced by the outcome of the situation of the U.S. citizens who + are still in difficulty in Iran. He noted also in this connection + that there had been earlier telephone threats (perhaps by Iranians) against hostage families; + this could complicate matters considerably if continued. + + Changing the subject, Secretary then referred to a matter that had + surfaced virtually at the moment that Algeria’s efforts with the + Iranians had been crowned with success. This involved the new + administration’s need to resolve at once a longstanding military + sales issue with Morocco. The Secretary said he wanted to assure + Malek and the Algerian + Government that the decisions taken on delivery to Morocco of + aircraft and the sale of tanks had occurred when they did because of + such factors as production line deadlines. These decisions also + reflected U.S. determination to pursue policies which will + consistently and reliably support historic friends of the U.S. + However, he stressed, neither the decision itself nor the timing + were in any way intended as an act or signal of unfriendliness to + the Algerian Government. In practical terms the delivery date of the + tanks (two and a half to three years) would occur long after we + anticipated a settlement of the Sahara question. + + The Secretary said that the USG + “strongly favors a prompt, negotiated settlement” of the Saharan + dispute. Conflict will not settle the issue. + + He then reiterated that it was the policy of the Reagan administration to seek to + build on and consolidate promising recent developments in the + relationship between the U.S. and Algeria. + + Malek said that press + accounts and the tank decision timing had created a rather curious + impression and had raised questions in Algiers. His government, + nevertheless, continued as always to hew to a position of not + seeking to destabilize Morocco while favoring self-determination for + the Western Sahara. He said he saw a useful place for a USG role in the search for a + settlement of this dispute, since the U.S. agrees that it cannot be + settled by force of arms. Malek expressed the hope that the U.S. can convince + Morocco of the need for a peaceful solution. On the broader issue of + U.S.-Algerian relations, Malek said Algeria is ready to work for further + strengthening. The U.S. is already Algeria’s first trading partner, + and Malek hoped that the + situation would continue to evolve favorably. + + Haig +
+ +
+ 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810071–0191. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Ritzer + (DOE); cleared by Poore (DOE), Pierce Bullen (EB/IEP), Dennis Sandberg (S/S–O), and Joseph Twinam (NEA); approved by Deane Hinton (EB/IEP). + + 38672. + + Washington, February 14, 1981, 0612Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian LNG: Letter to + Boussena. + +

1. Confidential—Full text.

+

2. Following is text of letter from DOE + Acting Assistant Secretary Peter Borre to Sadek Boussena. Talking points + are being transmitted septel. French text follows septel.

+

3. Begin text of letter:

+

Dear Sadek:

+

Pursuant to Round VI of the LNG + bilaterals in Washington and our recent phone conversations, I have been + authorized by my authorities to present the U.S. position concerning the + suspended El Paso Algeria LNG + project.See Document + 99. At the outset, I must emphasize that this + matter has received a careful, rigorous review by senior officials of + the administration. We have carefully developed a position which could + permit a constructive negotiation on an issue in which U.S. law and + regulatory policy and the realities of the market impose very rigid + constraints on us.

+

— Base Price

+

I am instructed to convey formally that an FOB price of dols. 3.70/MMBTU, effective on April 1, 1981, + for the duration of the entire second quarter, is the limit with respect + to pricing, based upon fundamental US + gas policy considerations; my instructions on this point are + unequivocal.

+

In the context of understanding on this point, we would be prepared to + discuss with you the remaining issues, and advance the following + position with respect to them:

+

— Crude Oil Equivalency for Escalation

+

We have given very careful consideration to the Algerian objectives with + respect to the eventual attainment of crude oil equivalency; we + recognize that this is a point of fundamental concern to you. After + extensive analysis and review, we are willing to accept an escalation + mechanism which is based upon a relationship to the absolute change, + rather than to the proportional change, in a basket of crudes defined + as: Saudi Arab Light, + Algerian Saharan blend, U.K. forties, Mexican Isthmus and Venezuelan Tia + Juana medium (26 degree). The operation of this mechanism would be + subject to a percentage limitation factor, with only a certain + percentage of the absolute increase, translated to gas equivalency, to + be applied to the FOB price. Escalation + would be phased up to this percentage over the course of the + agreement.

+

— Escalation Mechanism

+

The FOB price will be adjusted on the + basis of the relationship of average quarterly changes in the crude oil + basket prices. To illustrate, the July 1, 1981 price adjustment for the + third quarter would be calculated by taking the absolute difference + between the average second quarter and average first quarter 1981 crude + oil basket prices, expressed in U.S. dollars per million BTU, with the + result multiplied by the applicable percentage limitation factor. The + computed figure would be added to previous quarter’s FOB price (dols. 3.70 per MMBTU in this case) to derive the new + quarter’s price.

+

— Price Ceiling

+

The escalation provisions would be limited by an alternate fuels price + ceiling. Whenever the escalation mechanism for the adjustment of the + FOB price yielded a result in + excess of the price level yielded by increasing the base FOB price by the change in U.S. alternate + fuels prices between first quarter of 1981 and the quarter immediately + preceding the date of escalation, the latter would become the ceiling + FOB price. The U.S. cities + comprising the alternate fuels ceiling are derived from our regulatory + review of existing gas imports: New York, Detroit, Chicago, + Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Minneapolis/St. Paul, St. Louis, Los + Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle/Takoma. The fuels would be a mix + comprised of 20 percent no. 2 fuel oil and 80 percent no. 6 residual + fuel oil.

+

— Sharing of Escalation

+

The recovery of the U.S. companies proposed 50 cent/MMBTU contribution as + well as future increases in operating charges is a commercial issue + which Sonatrach, El Paso and the customer companies will have to + resolve, provided that all parties remain within the parameters on + FOB escalation.

+

— Duration

+

Based on a current determination of market need, and on alternative + arrangements made by the customer companies since the interruption of + loadings, it would be virtually impossible to obtain regulatory approval + for an agreement of very limited duration, such as one year. Therefore + we propose an agreement for a term of 18 months from the date of first + loading, with an automatic renewal for a further comparable period + unless both parties agree to replace this agreement with a long-term + arrangement for the remaining life of the contract.

+ +

During the course of six rounds of negotiations over the past ten months + our governments have expended considerable efforts to secure an interim + arrangement. The remaining differences between our positions are + relatively small as compared to last April. It would be unfortunate if + not tragic to continue to incur the sizeable losses which the affected + parties have sustained when mutual economic interests call for the + resumption of this project and the preservation of the contract which + dates from 1969. I look forward to hearing from you via our Embassy + confirming the advisability of holding Round VII in Algiers as scheduled + early next week.

+

Sincerely,

+

Peter Borre

+

Acting Assistant Secretary

+

for International Affairs

+ Haig +
+
+ 103. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Bremer) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Confidential. + + + Washington, February 17, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian Liquified Natural Gas + +

The seventh round of Algerian-US discussions on a + government-to-government framework for the resumption of the import of + Algerian liquified natural gas (LNG) + into the U.S. under the El Paso Algeria LNG project will take place in Algiers February 17–18.In telegram 38673 to Algiers, February 14, + the Department transmitted talking points for the Embassy to use + when presenting the letter to the Algerians. The United States + wanted the GOA to understand that + it was “taking this step of conveying a revised U.S. position in the + interest of expediting the upcoming round of talks. Time is short, + and we want to do everything possible to give these negotiations a + maximum chance to succeed,” and hoped that “the GOA appreciates the high priority + which the administration has accorded this problem.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810071–0172) Attached are copies of the letter cabled to the + Algerians outlining our + position,In telegram 712 from Algiers, + February 18, the Embassy reported that the LNG discussions “showed that fundamental differences + continue to exist” between the United States and Algeria over the + price of LNG. Given the + disagreement, the two sides “agreed to end the seventh round of + government-to-government discussions without any plans to meet + again” unless “either side came up with something new.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810076–1107) and the draft of a possible joint + announcementNot attached. See Document 102. which would embody the + US-Algerian understanding on these + LNG imports if agreement is + reached.

+

This will probably be the last round of US-Algerian talks on this project, in view of the El Paso + Company’s financial deadlines. Since the two sides are at this point + still far apart, it is quite possible that the talks may not be + successful. We do not have a great deal of give in our position because + of the possible impact on Canadian and Mexican border prices, and + because of regulatory considerations.

+

On the political side, we have tried to insulate the possible demise of + the El Paso project from having any effect on political relations with + Algeria, through discussions with the Algerian Ambassador and with the + Foreign Ministry in Algiers.Not + found.

+ L. Paul + Bremer, III + + Executive Secretary +
+
+ 104. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (02/04/1981–03/13/1981). Confidential. + + + Washington, February 18, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+

5. Liquefied Natural Gas Talks with Algeria: Talks + over the price of Algerian LNG + shipments to the US concluded today + without agreement. We have no immediate need for the gas; the price the + Algerians were asking, linked to crude oil, was higher than we pay for + Canadian and Mexican imports.

+

We emphasized to the Algerians that the LNG issue was strictly commercial, and the failure of the + talks should not prevent an improvement in US-Algerian relations. So far the Algerians seem to agree. + (LOU)

+
+ +
+ 105. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810186–0883. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + + 1578. + + Algiers, April 20, 1981, 1705Z + + +

For the Secretary from General Walters. Subject: Meeting With Algerian President + Chadli Bendjedid.

+ + + (S) Entire text. + + At 11 this morning (April 20) I saw President Chadli Bendjedid for one hour at + his palace. Charge Ross and + Lee Martiny were with me. Foreign Minister Benyahia was the only + other person present. The President decided to speak in French and + dismissed the interpreter. + + I opened by thanking him for receiving me, stating that Secretary + Haig had asked me to + come to brief him on the Middle East tripIn telegram 96383 to Rabat and Algiers, April + 15, the Department transmitted Haig’s talking points for Walters’s meeting with + Bendjedid. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810179–0764) and to thank him for Algeria’s + successful efforts to obtain the release of the American hostages in + Iran. I assured him that we intended to live up fully to the terms + of the Algiers agreement, supported the territorial integrity of + Iran, had no desire to push the Iranians into the Soviet camp, and + harbored no spirit of vengefulness toward Iran. + + I then said that we fully recognized the important role of Algeria + in international affairs and that President Reagan very much believed in + consultations with others, not just to inform them of our point of + view but to listen to theirs and perhaps to change ours in the light + of what we learned. A better understanding of one another will help + us develop and consolidate those areas where we can + cooperate. + + The purpose of my trip was to brief him on the Secretary’s trip + and to discuss bilateral and regional matters.Haig + visited Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, and Riyadh April 4–8 to discuss + the Middle East peace process. Documentation is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute. It was important that he + have a clear idea of our strategic views. I then reviewed the Cairo, + Jerusalem, Amman, and Riyadh stops.Earlier in April, Walters met with Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian, + and Saudi leaders to explain the U.S. position on the Middle + East peace talks. Documentation is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. I told him about the F–15 and AWACS sales to the Saudis despite considerable Israeli + opposition, the Secretary’s cooling the Israelis off an intervention + in the Zahle fighting, and our understanding of the importance of + solving the Palestinian and Jerusalem problems, which were central + to peace in that area. + When I described the Camp David agreements as not an end in + themselves but a first step of a long journey, he smiled + understandingly and did not challenge those agreements. I described + the concern of many Middle Eastern countries over Qadhafi’s irrational and reckless + behavior. + + Then I said that we fear that the Middle East conflict greatly + aided Soviets in mischief making in the area, but that even without + the Palestinian problem there was the global problem of Soviet + expansionism. There were no Palestinians in Central Asia, Southeast + Asia, or Central America, but we still had aggressive Soviet + pressure in all these areas. Afghanistan, an Islamic and developing + country, had been brutally invaded. We sought no confrontation with + the Third World, but we were aware of the realities of Soviet + aggression. We intended to redress the military balance, strengthen + our friends, consult with others, put our financial house in order, + get a handle on inflation, and resume the upward move of American + productivity. + + We were concerned about the conflict in the Western Sahara. + Morocco is strategically important to us. We do not desire to see + the Straits of Gibraltar in unfriendly hands. We know from the + Moroccans that there have been talks between them and the Algerians + and that these talks were broken off.Reference is to the ongoing discussions between Algeria and + Morocco over the former’s support for the Polisario guerillas in + Western Sahara. We regret this as we very much favored a + peaceful solution of this difficult problem between brother nations. + We had constantly made this clear to the Moroccans, who seemed + disposed and anxious to talk to the Algerians. + + When I mentioned Qadhafi’s + proposal for a federation between the Sahraoui and Mauritania,In telegram 1811 from Nouakchott, April + 22, the Embassy reported on Qadhafi’s “unexpected” visit to Mauritania, + during which he publicly made the federation proposal. The + Government of Mauritania assured the Embassy that it “did not + agree with Qadhafi’s + public statement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810189–0944) I got the first + really sharp reaction of the whole talk from Bendjedid: “No, + absolutely not. Out of the question.” I reiterated that we favored a + negotiated solution for the Sahara conflict, had offered our support + for the integrity and independence of Mauritania, and encouraged + direct contacts between the parties to the conflict. + + We were concerned about Libya now more so than previously. I then + again thanked him for receiving me personally and recalled that I + had earlier discussed a number of these matters with his Foreign + Minister. + + President Bendjedid then + thanked me for coming to see him and said that in the matter of the + hostages Algeria had only done its duty and that he was pleased to hear that we + supported the territorial integrity of Iran. He hoped that the + conflict between Iran and Iraq could be peacefully solved within the + next few weeks by the good offices mission of the Islamic + Conference. He remarked that he felt my visit and the presentation I + had made to him were “positive and encouraging”. + + On the Middle East he too believed that solution of the problem of + the occupied territories and Jerusalem was essential, without such a + solution there could be no peace in the area, and a solution would + result in lessening of tensions throughout that region. What I told + him of our attitude encouraged him. He was sure that Saudi Arabia + would never attack Israel. + + On Namibia Algeria maintained here as elsewhere the right of + self-determination and independence for all peoples. It was conflict + in certain areas of Africa and the feeling of some countries in the + area that they were threatened that made possible the pressure of + “people from other countries”. I said that the United States did not + threaten any of the newly independent countries. They had brought in + many thousands of Cubans, Soviets, East Germans and others: he + remarked that they were threatened by South Africa. I said that + neither Ethiopia nor Yemen was threatened but they still had tens of + thousands of non-Africans or non-Arabs. He smiled ruefully and said, + “oh well, Ethiopia is something else”. He had, however, gotten my + point. + + On Libya he said he had seen Qadhafi the day before. One should not take + seriously all of his rhetoric and impulsive statements. I repeated + that I was more concerned by the immense quantities of arms he has + brought into Libya and stored in huge depots. Most countries tried + to have several pilots or drivers per plane or tank. Libya was the + only country which had several planes per pilot and several tanks + per driver. As a soldier, I know that he would understand that we + were concerned as to the ultimate users of all of this equipment. + Qadhafi had already moved + on Chad and his neighbors. President Bendjedid said that he was working with Nigeria and + other members of the OAU to solve + this problem and was confident that they could do it. He indicated + the Lagos mini-summit on Chad had been rescheduled to the near + future with the agreement of all the parties and asked that + “outsiders” give Africa a chance to solve this problem for + itself.In telegram 4340 from Lagos, + April 10, the Embassy reported that the planned Lagos + mini-summit on Chad had been postponed, apparently because + Nigerians were unable to persuade Qadhafi and Adhijo to attend. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810171–0519) Documentation on the OAU’s mediation efforts is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. + + I remarked that Qadhafi had + tried to federate or unite with almost all of his neighbors + including Algeria. The President laughed and said that with Algeria it would never + work. Union was like a marriage, you had to have agreement from both + sides. I added that both sides have to be “consenting adults”. He + laughed and repeated “consenting adults” with emphasis on the last + word. + + On Morocco and the Western Saharan conflict he said that Algeria + sought no quarrel with Morocco. It did not want to see the overthrow + of the monarchy, which it considered a factor for stability in the + area, since no one could tell what sort of regime would follow. + Algeria was not directly concerned in the conflict between the + Sahraoui people and Morocco. He would not hide the fact that Algeria + had helped the Polisario as it had helped all movements of national + liberation. Algeria had often shown its desire for a peaceful + solution and was disposed to help, but he made no direct offer to + resume negotiations. I decided not to press this point as I was sure + he had my message. I said that, if he really wanted to help, he must + find some way to get the negotiations started again in a way that + would not cause the Moroccans to lose face. After all, every man + killed in this conflict is a brother and a fellow Moslem. He agreed, + saying that they were all Arabs whether descended from those here + before the Arab conquest or not. The Algerians regarded them all as + brothers. + + I took the initiative of closing the conversation by saying I had + detained him long enough. He then thanked the President and + Secretary for sending me. He felt my visit would encourage + cooperation in a number of areas of common interest. He expressed + great interest in the President’s recoveryReference is to the abortive March 30 + assassination attempt on President Reagan. and said that he looked forward + to seeing him at the Mexico meetingReference is to the North-South Summit, or the International + Meeting on Cooperation and Development, scheduled to be held in + Cancun, Mexico, in October. Documentation on the summit is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International + Debt; Foreign Assistance. or perhaps later in + the U.S. + + Comment. The conversation was much warmer and more cordial than + that with Foreign Minister Benyahia the previous day.A record of the April 19 discussion with + Benyahia, which Walters + described as “polite” and “actually less confrontational than I + had expected,” is in telegram 1559 from Algiers, April 19; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810185–0989. President Bendjedid was smooth, relaxed, and + assured without being cocky. His manner was extremely friendly + throughout. Several times he nodded understandingly as I made a + point. I was struck by his lack of criticism of the Camp David + Agreements. At no time did he consult the Foreign Minister, who took + no part in the conversation. He clearly regarded Qadhafi as a troublesome child who + will some day grow up, but he implicitly recognized that the Libyan + leader’s antics were + disturbing. When I spoke of our concern about whence the crews might + eventually come for Qadhafi’s + vast numbers of tanks and planes, it was clear that he understood + what I was telling him. + + He seems a man sure of himself, an Algerian nationalist not + entirely caught in an ideological straightjacket. He has some + flexibility. It will be interesting to see if he does anything to + resume talks with the Moroccans to support his affirmation of his + desire for a settlement with them. + + I am considerably encouraged by the talk’s atmosphere even though + I cannot point to any concrete positive development. + + Department repeat as desired. + + Ross +
+
+ 106. Memorandum From James + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret. Sent for information. An + unknown hand initialed for Rentschler. + + + Washington, May 7, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + C–130 Aircraft to Algeria + (U) + +

Ray Tanter tells me you asked for + a status report on the sale of C–130 + aircraft to Algeria, an issue which is of very long standing. The basic + facts, coordinated with Ray, are these:Tanter wrote his + initials in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. + + + State has agreed in principle to the sale, as a means of a) + diversifying Algerian arms dependence (up to now they have dealt + almost exclusively with the Soviet bloc); b) easing some of the + disgruntlement the Algerians feel for what they perceive as a + less than forthcoming attitude following their help on the + hostage crisis; and c) demonstrating even-handedness in our + regional North African policy. (S) + + However, State also feels that the sale + can be used to promote some movement toward a political solution + in the Western Sahara and want to test the Algerians on that + score; (S) + + + With the above in mind, Dick + Walters met yesterday with Algerian Ambassador + Malek, pressed him + gently on two points: + + We would need assurances that the aircraft would not + be used in support of Polisario operations in the + Sahara;On May 4, + Walters + told Malek + that the “U.S. would like to go forward” with the + sale of C–130s to + Algeria, “but wanted the planes to be for ‘Algerian + purposes only.’ Malek said he assumed this meant ‘not + in support of the Polisario’ and Walters confirmed + this meaning.” (Telegram 115525 to Algiers, May 5; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, N810004–0316) (C) + + We would like to see the Algerians take an initiative + to resume bilateral talks with Morocco on a political + settlement of the Saharan conflict (Dick handled this + part with great tact, suggesting that since Morocco has + greater need of a settlement, Algeria would be in a + better position to provide a beau + geste).Walters told + Malek that + “the fact of the matter was that Morocco’s fate was + at stake, and Algeria’s was not. A resumption of + high-level contacts between Algeria and Morocco was + desirable. The U.S. was looking for help from the + Algerians” to settle the Western Sahara issue. + (Ibid.) (C) + +

+

Malek is relaying all of this to + Algiers for instructions; pending any response, the ball remains in the + Algerian court.In the margin underneath + this sentence, an unknown hand wrote: “Thank + you 5/11.” (U)

+
+
+ 107. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810284–0872. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Cairo, Moscow, Lagos, Nouakchott, Rabat, and Paris. Sent for + information Immediate to Tunis. + + 2309. + + Algiers, June 17, 1981, 1830Z + + +

Department please pass SecDef and + USCINCEUR. Tunis also for + DepSecDef Carlucci. Subject: + Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci Visits Algeria.

+ + + (C—Entire text.) + + Summary. DepSecDef Carlucci visited Algiers June 16–17 for discussions + with the Algerian Government. At both the MOD and MFA, Carlucci briefed senior + officials on U.S. defense policy and its regional implications and + described U.S. concern over Libyan activities. His MOD interlocutor avoided a substantive + response on these issues, + but raised instead his hopes for further sales of AMC trucks and his + expectation that the end-use assurances the U.S. is awaiting + regarding C–130 aircraft will soon + be transmitted. Carlucci’s MFA + interlocutor indicated Algerian understanding of the need for + strategic balance, stressed Algeria’s desire for good relations with + the U.S., criticized U.S. sales of arms to Morocco without + restrictions, and called for an end to the Western Sahara conflict + through negotiations and self-determination. On Libya, he described + the threat it poses to the region as overestimated, dismissing such + operations as the Gafsa affairReference + is to the January 26–27, 1980, commando raid by Libyans and + Tunisian rebels on Tunisian Government installations in Gafsa. + See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, + North Africa, footnote 2, Document 204. as + worthy of a cheap detective novel. Libyan assistance to the + Polisario, he said, was fully under Algeria’s control. However, + Libya’s arsenal was indeed a matter for concern, as was the + possibility of union between Chad and Libya. For this reason, + Algeria was collaborating with Nigeria to find a formula for the + departure of Libyan troops. We found Carlucci’s visit valuable as a demonstration of U.S. + interests in high-level dialogue, as an opportunity for the U.S. to + set forth its defense policies, and as an occasion for the GOA to reiterate its desire for a + cautious expansion of ties and acknowledge certain aspects of the + Libyan danger. End summary. + + Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci visited Algiers June 16–17 to continue the + administration’s political and military dialogue with Algeria. In + the absence of Foreign Minister Benyahia and MFA Secretary-General Dembri in France + and of MOD Secretary-General + Belloucif in the U.S., the visit and program were approved at the + very last minute, and Carlucci was received by middle-level officials of + the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in their capacities as + Acting Secretaries-General. Although President Bendjedid was purported to be out + of town and did not receive Carlucci, and although the GOA was unable to provide any formal hospitality, both + of the meetings held were extremely cordial, and Carlucci’s interlocutors + apologized repeatedly for the absence of their principals. + + In a 40-minute meeting with Acting MOD Secretary-General and Director of Logistics Col. Abdelmalek Guenaizia and in a + 90-minute meeting with Acting MFA + Secretary-General and Director of Western European and North + American Affairs Saadeddine + Benouniche, Carlucci reviewed U.S. defense policy, emphasizing + the commitment of the Reagan + administration to strengthening national defense in the face of an + erosion of the strategic balance and a change in Soviet military + policies and the resulting need for the U.S. to build up its + capacity for flexible response through, among other things, + cooperation with like-minded governments. Carlucci stressed that the forces and capabilities + developed in the process were not meant for intervention in the + internal affairs of other states or in purely regional disputes. + Specifically, the development of further collaboration with Morocco + was taking place in the context of U.S. global strategy, not in + response to any regional or local dispute. Carlucci took the occasion of + both meetings to describe heightened U.S. concern for Libyan + adverturism. Although he indicated he had no formula to propose for + dealing with this disturbing phenomenon, he invited Algerian views + on the subject. + + At the MOD, Guenaizia (who was + clearly not authorized to address broad issues of foreign or + military policy and kept glancing at a major introduced as the new + Director of External Relations for reassurance) limited himself to a + review of the two pending issues in military sales—AMC trucks and + C–130 aircraft. On the truck + sale, Guenaizia said the MOD was + extremely satisfied with the negotiations and U.S. approval and + indicated the first purchase of 1,300 units was likely to be merely + a beginning. On C–130 aircraft, + Guenaizia said the end-use restrictions being discussed in + Washington posed no problems to the GOA, and the assurances the U.S. desired would be + forthcoming “very soon”. On broader political and military issues, + Guenaizia made no substantive response, although he kept nodding + understandingly throughout Carlucci’s presentation. He limited his response on + Libya to several nods and a broad smile. (Comment: This is the first + time a GOA official has initiated a + discussion of the C–130 sale in + Algiers. That this should occur so soon after President Bendjedid’s visit to Moscow + demonstrates the seriousness with which the GOA is approaching this sale.) + + At the MFA, Benouniche responded to Carlucci’s remarks with a well + organized and well reasoned presentation of Algeria’s view of world + and regional issues. Although he broke no new ground except on + Libya, the following points of his presentation were noteworthy: + + Algeria is fully aware that the continued independence to + which it and other small states aspire requires detente and + the absence of superpower confrontation. This in turn + requires a strategic balance between the two superpowers + which it is not appropriate for Algeria to pass judgement + on. (Comment: Nowhere did Benouniche take issue with U.S. efforts to + restore military equilibrium vis a vis the Soviet Union; + indeed, in an airport discussion with the Charge after + Carlucci’s + departure, he went so far as to say Algeria understands the + reasons for U.S. actions in this field.) + + The genuine non-alignment to which Algeria aspires + requires good relations with the U.S., and Algeria is + heartened whenever new areas of collaboration are + found. + + + Algeria understands fully the traditional good relations + that exist between the U.S. and Morocco. What it cannot + understand is the change in U.S arms sales policy that took + place in November 1979 and by which Morocco was furnished + weapons specifically for use against the Polisario outside + its internationally recognized boundaries. + + Algeria seeks proper decolonization of the Western Sahara + through negotiations between the warring parties and through + the internationally-sanctioned method of self-determination. + To do otherwise sets a bad precedent for Africa by bringing + inherited borders into question. Algeria fears the + continuation of the conflict for two reasons: (a) under + certain circumstances, it could escalate into a wider + conflict; (b) it threatens the stability of Morocco, and + Algeria is keenly aware of the need for stability + there. + + + On Libya, Benouniche went + somewhat further than GOA + interlocutors have gone in the past. He began by excluding Libya’s + intervention in ChadReference is to + Libya’s December 1980 invasion and current occupation of + northern Chad. as a special case and went on to minimize + the gravity of the Libyan threat in its other manifestations, + expressing the view that the destabilizing threat Libya poses to the + region has been overestimated. As an example of the absence of + danger or serious purpose to be found in Libyan adventures, he cited + the Gafsa raid, whose scenario (an armed attack by 40 men on a city + of 200,000 some 600 kilometers from the capital in the expectation + that this would lead to a wide-scale revolution) he described as + worthy of a cheap detective novel. + + Libya’s role in the Western Sahara conflict, Benouniche affirmed, is not an + independent one. While it supports the Polisario, it can go no + further. To do so would be to challenge Algeria, and this it cannot + do. Morocco may try to exploit Libya’s present unsavory image to + obscure these facts, but this is simply a maneuver to relegate + Morocco’s own intervention in Mauritania into the background. + Algeria does not believe Libya has the capacity to get the upper + hand in the Western Sahara issue to change the substance of the + problem. + + Chad, he said, is a different problem. The absence of any state + structure had helped give the impression that the Libyan + intervention had been a massive, effective operation, but this was + not as true as it seemed. In any case, no one in Africa had really + found the Libyan intervention at the request of the Lagos Accord, + which Algeria continues to support, a really dramatic + development.Reference is to the + August 21, 1979, peace agreement between the warring factions in + the Chadian Civil War, which created the Gouvernement d’Union + Nationale de Transition (GUNT), or Transitional Government of National + Unity. The announcement of Chadian-Libyan union was an + entirely different matter, one on which Algeria had taken a clear position. Unions + cannot be achieved in this manner; they must be authentic + expressions of the wishes of each country. When they take place in + the presence of military forces, this is annexation. Algeria has + been working and continues to work with Nigeria to find a solution + based on a formula leading to the departure of Libyan troops from + Chad. Since, in Algeria’s view, Libya intervened for its own + motives, not on behalf of “other parties”, a solution can be found + in a regional setting. + + In give-and-take following Benouniche’s remarks, Carlucci indicated that the + Reagan administration + indeed has revised U.S. arms transfer policy to make it responsive + to overall U.S. interests in the national security field,In telegram 84780 to all diplomatic posts, + April 3, the Department informed the posts that “the + administration is in the process of revising U.S. conventional + arms transfer policy to make it more responsive to the new + security challenges we face and more supportive of our military, + political and economic interests.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810157–1195) + but stressed that in Morocco’s case this did not mean a change in + policy on the issue of the Western Sahara. The U.S. continues to + urge a peaceful solution on its Moroccan friends. While the Moroccan + military now appears to have greater confidence in itself and in its + role, the Moroccan Government also appears to be more willing to + negotiate on the Western Sahara issue. However, it is not + appropriate for outside powers like the U.S. to make value + judgements on the basis of such impressions. It is to be hoped that + the Nairobi summit conference of the OAU will start the parties on the road to a peaceful + solution.Reference to the + Organization of African Unity meeting held in Nairobi in + June. + + Carlucci also + reiterated U.S. concern over the size and continuing growth of + Libya’s arsenal, again indicating he had no formula to propose to + deal with this troubling trend. Benouniche responded that indeed Libya’s sizeable + arsenal could pose a problem. Algeria had noted U.S. concern over + this arsenal as expressed during the visit of General Walters in April, and, when it + shared with the U.S. its view that Libya was not a worrisome factor, + it limited this evaluation to Libya’s activities, not its + arsenal.See Document 105. + + When a member of Carlucci’s delegation raised the existence of some + difficult-to-verify reports that Libya’s support for the Polisario + was growing rapidly and might prove an obstacle to a peaceful + solution, Benouniche + responded that Libya did not have the logistical capability to move + in this direction. Only two routes were possible—the existing + trans-Algerian route and a theoretical Niger-Mali-Mauritania route. + Algeria was firmly in control of the first, while the second was + impractical. + + + Comment: The GOA appears to have + taken a calculated risk in approving this visit in the full + knowledge that top leadership would be absent. It had to balance its + desire to avoid giving a negative signal against the danger of + leaving its visitors with the impression they were not getting their + due. In spite of the absence of GOA + principals, however, the visit was valuable as a demonstration of + U.S. interest in continued high-level dialogue, as an opportunity + for the U.S. to set forth its defense policies and their regional + implications, and as an occasion for the GOA to reiterate its desire for a cautious expansion of + ties, notably in the military field, and acknowledge for the first + time (albeit guardedly) the dangers that Libya presents. It is an + interesting coincidence that Algeria nominated its first defense + attaché in Washington on the very day of Carlucci’s visit. + + We are not certain why President Bendjedid did not receive Carlucci. It may be that he did + not wish to see him because he is a principal of the Department of + Defense and such a meeting would have made too much too soon of + Algerian-American military relations. It may, however, simply be + that the MFA failed to coordinate + preparations for the visit adequately. We had several indications + large and small that it had failed to do anything until the very + last minute, and a Presidential call may have proven impossible to + arrange on that basis. + + In the absence of ministerial or presidential calls, the Algerian + press was extremely restrained in announcing the visit June 16. A + small front-page item in “El Moudjahid” simply noted that “in the + framework of an orientation trip (tournee d’information) in the + Mediterranean region, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci is visiting + Algeria from June 16 to 17. During his visit, Mr. Carlucci will have discussions + with Algerian officials.” This short item has already caused foreign + journalists in Algiers to call us for more details, but we have + limited ourselves to saying that Mr. Carlucci is visiting a number of countries in the + Mediterranean region for discussions on issues of mutual interest on + the bilateral, regional, and world scene. We suspect the Soviet + Embassy would gladly give us several cases of vodka for a fuller + report. + + Ross +
+ +
+ 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D81364–0411. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + + 2752. + + Algiers, August 5, 1981, 0950Z + + +

Pass NEA, S/AL, AF, ARA. Subject: + Ambassador Walters Meets With + President Bendjedid.

+ + + (Secret Entire text.) + + Scarcely had I returned from meeting with Defense Secretary + General Belloucif on the morning of my arrival in AlgiersA record of the Walters-Belloucif conversation + is in telegram 2757 from Algiers, August 5. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810364–0618) than word came that President Bendjedid would see me at once (in + great contrast to the cliff hanger on my last visit in April). I + went to Presidential palace with Charge Ross and my executive assistant + Nancy Lewis. There was a guard of honor in the courtyard. + + President Bendjedid greeted + me warmly. I told him that the concern I had expressed regarding + Libya on my first visit was still present and, in order to let him + know that it was well founded, I wanted to show him some photography + I felt he would find interesting. As I showed him the pictures, he + looked very interested but handled them as though they were + pornographic in nature. He thanked me for the confidence that we had + indicated by showing him this photography. + + President Bendjedid said he + had talked sternly to Qaddafi at NairobiSee footnote 6, Document + 107. and the Colonel had promised to be good, as he + was very anxious to have the 1982 OAU meeting in Tripoli. Bendjedid said he had told Qaddafi that Algeria + would not tolerate any Libyan destabilization of Tunisia, Mali, + Niger, and Upper Volta. He did not mention Mauritania. Bendjedid took credit for a good + part of Qaddafi’s improved behavior since Nairobi. + + He then spoke of Morocco, saying that King Hassan’s offer of a + plebiscite in the Western Sahara had been well received but that his + last press conference was discouraging. He hoped that Hassan was + talking for home consumption only. He denied any desire to weaken + Hassan, saying Algeria wanted peace and good relations with Morocco + but that the Western Sahara was the only fly in the ointment. + Algeria wanted to work with the Moroccans on economic projects, such + as a natural gas pipeline to Morocco and beyond to Spain and Europe. + He expressed belief that opposition parties were trying to paint + King Hassan into a corner + and denying him freedom of maneuver. He recognized that the Istiglal + and other opposition groups were more intransigent on the Western + Sahara than the King was. + + I told the President that we were concerned with the situation in + Central America and did not want to see clouds on our developing + relations with Algeria. He said, “Belloucif has told you the story.” + Here again, I got the impression that the sale of ten tanks to + Nicaragua was a one-time shot. I detailed our post-Somoza aid to + Nicaragua and said that the Sandinistas seemed to want to close the + door on their relations with us. + + I then told Bendjedid that + we hoped to have a decision on the C–130’s soon and were considering the Algerians’ other + requests to buy military equipment in order to diversify their + sources of supply. We would notify them as soon as we reached a + decision.In telegram 217122 to + Algiers, August 15, the Department informed the Embassy that it + “has approved, subject to our legal requirement for + congressional consultations, a commercial sale of C–130 aircraft to Algeria.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810381–1215) + + He spoke of his visit to China some years ago and, in answer to my + question, said he had always seen Mao and Chou En Lai either alone + or with only one or two people present. + + President Bendjedid said it + was his feeling that the Ethiopians were ready to talk to the + Somalis but the latter did not know what they wanted. After asking + for Algerian help in arranging talks, they had added so many new + conditions that talks had broken off. He was personally convinced, + and the Ethiopians had told him so, that they were looking for a + secure way out of dependence on Soviets and Cubans. + + I told Bendjedid of my + visit to Foreign Minister Benyahia in the hospital near Paris, where + he was recovering from injuries sustained in a plane crash. He was + most appreciative that I had gone. He praised Defense Secretary + General Belloucif, saying he was a man who understood the + world—“both sides, like you”—a sly reference to the fact that + Belloucif and I both speak Russian. + + Bendjedid said that during + his visit to the Soviet Union, Brezhnev had not brought up + Afghanistan, but Bendjedid, + as a Moslem leader, had. He felt Brezhnev was looking for a way out + of the Afghan morass that would not cause him to lose face before + the world. + + I told him I was delighted that the Algerian Government had given + agrément for the new U.S. Ambassador. As I left, he spoke of his + desire for better relations with us and asked me to convey to + President Reagan his warm + regards and his hope that they could talk in Cancun.See footnote 9, Document + 105. + + + Comment: My reception on this visit to Algiers has been + incomparably warmer and the Algerians much more forthcoming than + during my previous visit in April. I saw the President and the + Defense Secretary General within five hours of my arrival. President + Bendjedid was much more + relaxed and cordial than on my previous call. The Defense Secretary + General was downright friendly. Since I was last here, Bendjedid has removed Yahiaoui and + others who opposed his moderate policies, and I believe that an + Algerian Government decision has been made to take a certain + distance from the Soviet Union and to move toward a more truly + non-aligned position. Both Bendjedid and Belloucif were almost sheepish about + the tanks and hopeful we would see their action in perspective. The + fact that I visited Foreign Minister Benyahia in France did no + harm. + + Ross +
+
+ 109. Letter From President Reagan to Algerian President BendjedidSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Algeria: + President Bendjedid + (8105773–8407957). No classification marking. + + + Washington, October 3, 1981 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I am pleased to take the opportunity presented by the commencement of + Ambassador Newlin’s mission to + Algeria to convey to you my greetings and those of the American + people.

+

North Africa has been an area of considerable interest to my + Administration, and I look forward to a strengthening of our + relationship. General Walters + has told you of our continuing concern about the destabilizing effect + that Libyan actions are having in your region and elsewhere in + Africa.See Document + 108. In addition, we are most concerned about + Libyan support of international terrorism and other forms of lawless + behavior. We are, as you know, determined to respond directly and + effectively to threats against international order and regional + stability and welcome a continuing dialogue with you on this and other + subjects of mutual interest.

+

We also have been watching developments toward a solution of the Western + Saharan conflict with great interest. Progress in this regard has been encouraging, and I + wish to commend Algeria for its very constructive role. Now that a + framework for a peaceful solution exists, I hope that a ceasefire can be + implemented rapidly to put an end to the human suffering and damage + caused by the war and to create the necessary conditions for the conduct + of the proposed referendum.

+

I look forward to joining you and other national leaders at the + forthcoming Summit at Cancun.See footnote 9, Document 105. In telegram + 3554 from Algiers, October 6, the Embassy advised the Department + that “Algeria’s main objective at Cancun is an agreement to launch + global negotiations. If the U.S. is seen as the principal country + blocking such agreement, we can expect sharp criticism from Algeria. + Although we would not anticipate our bilateral relations to be + seriously impaired, we cannot exclude a setback to our improving + bilateral relations if the U.S. is seen to thwart a major Algerian + objective in which President Bendjedid is personally involved.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810471–1002)

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+
+ 110. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810388–0828. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Geneva, Rabat, Tunis, and USUN. + + 4046. + + Algiers, November 15, 1981, 1620Z + + + + SUBJECT + After Cancun: Algerian Views. + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Summary and comment.In discussion of post-Cancun steps, + Algerian MFA official said GOA continues to envision UN as central forum to coordinate + disparate technical discussions on global growth and + development.See footnote 9, Document 105. During the + Cancun Summit, attendees from 22 nations explored ways to + alleviate world hunger, strengthen investment in the developing + world, and increase trade between the developed and developing + nations. He stressed that GOA has no interest in histrionics in global + negotiations and that its intention is to engage in business-like + negotiations on specific economic issues. He said next step is up to + USG—to accept or reject concept + of global negotiations and to propose an agenda. + + + In Embassy’s opinion, there is no question that Algeria attaches + great importance to a coordinated international approach to critical + economic issues, particularly money and finance, raw materials, + energy, and food and agriculture. An unwillingness by the U.S. to + consult on separate issues under a UN umbrella would certainly be regarded as an effort to + avoid or undermine discussions on those issues. Although current + Algerian objective of an omnibus agreement encompassing the results + of a series of sectoral negotiations is grandiose in the extreme, it + provides insight into what GOA + believes GN’s should accomplish. End summary and comment. + + In 75-minute discussion on Nov. 11, Econ Off reviewed points in + reftel with Mohamed Benhocine,No record + of this conversation was found. Director Economic and + Financial Affairs, MFA. Benhocine + served in GOA’s Mission in New York + for six years, and participated in Cancun preparatory meeting in + Mexico City.The preparatory meeting + took place August 1–2. No record of the meeting has been + found. EconOff was meeting with Benhocine for first time, + and assessed him as able, careful, and thoughtful with a good sense + of humor. + + Benhocine said GOA considers + Cancun to have been a success in that it clearly was a step down the + road toward global negotiations. He noted that “everyone now seems + to spell global negotiations with capital letters.” + + EconOff said USG, too, considers + Cancun to have been a successful meeting, but that it is still too + early to talk of launching GN’s. He reviewed four “understandings” + in President’s Cancun addressThe text + of Reagan’s October 22 + address is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, Book + II, pp. 980–982. Excerpts from the address are also printed + in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of + Foreign Policy, Document 68. and said USG is in process of conducting series + of informal discussions at end of which we will determine whether it + will be possible for us to engage in a new preparatory + process. + + Benhocine said GOA has not yet + arrived at a satisfactory French rendering of USG use of “understandings”, and asked + what word USG is using in its + French translations. EconOff said ICA text of speech uses “point + d’accord”. + + Benhocine said that, in general, GOA, could proceed on basis of four “understandings.” + He added, however, that GOA and + most G–77 governments wish to discuss in an open forum the future + roles and objectives of the specialized agencies, “of which we are + all members” and to discuss those roles and objectives in relation + to broad detailed negotiations in the fields of energy, money and + finance, agriculture, + trade, etc., i.e., global negotiations. Benhocine stressed that for + GOA and G–77 “global + negotiations” has two meanings: + + “Universal” in the sense of covering all the main fields + of economic growth and development, and; + + All-inclusive in terms of participation by all interested + governments. He said GOA + continues to believe GN’s should be held in UN context but stressed that + voting procedures would have to be set aside in favor of a + negotiating process. He said it would be pointless to try to + use UN voting machinery in + which the majority could adopt a formula which the minority + would ignore, and added that GN’s could be successful only + if all governments could arrive at negotiated agreements on + new roles and strategies which they found it in their + interest to support. + + + EconOff said it would be very difficult for the USG to participate in GN’s in the + UN context on basis existing + resolutions and that our emphasis now is on new and as yet unnamed + preparatory process as the next step after the informal discussions + now underway. Benhocine said he understood clearly USG reluctance regarding GN’s in + UN, but said it would also be + difficult, and probably counter-productive psychologically, to + “throw away two year’s work” by UN + members. He said GOA and G–77 have + stressed UN as forum for GN’s + because they see the need for a central body to coordinate what must + of necessity be a series of disparate detailed talks on major + issues. He said that in absence of central coordinating body, series + of sectoral negotiations on trade, energy, etc. would not take into + account the relationships between sectors and between the IMF, IBRD, etc., and would inevitably + fail to find the answers the world badly needs. He said GOA continues to envision GN process + in UN context as follows: with + parliamentary voting machinery set aside, participants would + negotiate agenda for talks and broad objectives to be sought; 2) + technical negotiations would then be held, including negotiations on + specialized agencies; 3) results of technical talks would be + referred back to central forum for tailoring if needed and eventual + inclusion in coordinated package agreement on all issues. He said + GOA has no desire to create new + organizations or machinery. On the contrary, GOA hope is that, with parliamentary + machinery set aside, existing UN + machinery can be used as a forum for negotiation. + + With regard to follow-up steps, Benhocine said GOA considers next move is up to + USG; that is, U.S. should make + known its views regarding the concept of GN’s, and should propose an + agenda. He said that for practical purposes the “new preparatory + process” cited in the President’s message is already underway and + that the sense of urgency shown by all leaders at Cancun had raised + “great expectations” that GN’s would be launched soon. EconOff said + that our usage of “preparatory process” is different: that it would follow, if at all + the informal talks now being conducted and would involve discussions + of agenda and procedures for eventual negotiations. + + In summing up, Benhocine stressed that GOA, both as a government and as chairman of G–77, has + no interest in engaging in divisive debate or in trying to conclude + a shallow, contentious “global” agreement that would be without + meaning. He said GOA wishes to + engage in serious negotiations on concrete growth and development + issues and subjects, including the specialized agencies, with the + prior understanding that changes will be made and new strategies + adopted only if and when the participants—particularly the major + Western powers—agree that such changes should be made. + + Newlin +
+
+ 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810388–0828. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Priority to Damascus, Lagos, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Rabat, Tunis, Tel + Aviv, and USUN. Sent for + information Immediate to Paris. The document is misnumbered in the + original. + + 4495. + + Algiers, December 16, 1981, 1630Z + + +

Paris please pass General Walters. Dept pass S/AL. Subject: General Walters’ Discussion With Algerian + Officials.

+ + + (S) Entire text. + + Summary. General Walters + had wide-ranging, worthwhile exchange with Acting Foreign Minister + Dembri Dec. 15 which covered C–130’s, Western Sahara, Libya, Chad, Golan Heights and Abu + Ain. Dembri revealed bilateral talks with Morocco were going on + which could result in Hassan-Bendjedid summit. On Chad, Algeria + would send observer detachment. Exchanges were frank but friendly. + General Walters later + covered much of same ground with the Director of the National + Security Council. President Bendjedid, who was tied up,In telegram 556 from Algiers, February 7, 1982, + the Embassy attributed Bendjedid’s absence to “GOA unhappiness over the + large number of high-level U.S. officials and delegations + visiting Morocco and the apparent neglect of Algeria.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820068–0014) sent word he hoped to meet with + General Walters on his next + visit. End summary. + + + Acting FonMin Dembri opened + the conversation by warmly welcoming General Walters on his third visit to + Algeria. Dembri said that visits like his, along with recent + fruitful discussions that were held with DAS Constable,A record of + Constable’s October 16–20 visit to Algeria is in telegram 3752 + from Algiers, October 20. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810494–0656) are + indispensable for genuine mutual understanding between Algeria and + the U.S. Dembri remarked that he hoped the dialogue would continue + and become more intense. + + Dembri raised the question of Israel’s reported decision annexing + the Golan Heights.On December 14, 1981, + Israeli Prime Minister Menachem + Begin successfully pushed a measure through the + Israeli Parliament annexing the Golan Heights, which Israel had + occupied since the June 1967 War. (David Shipler, “The Golan + Heights Annexed by Israel in An Abrupt Move,” New York Times, December 15, 1981, pp. A1, A12) + Documentation on the U.S. reaction to this decision is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute. General Walters asked if he had read the + State Department’s statement declaring any such move a violation of + international law, and Dembri said he had. Algeria, he added, was + very satisfied with the position the U.S. had taken, and believed + this position would be helpful at the imminent Security Council + consideration of the issue. General Walters remarked that the Israeli action was of deep + concern to the U.S. since our view remains that any unilateral + change in the status of the Golan Heights would be contrary to + Security Council Resolutions 242,No + record of such a statement by the Department of State has been + found. Walters was + likely referring to the White House’s contention that the + annexation seemed to “violate the United Nations Security + Council document,” UN Resolution + 242, “that has provided the framework for an overall peace + settlement in the Middle East for more than 14 years.” (Bernard + Gwertzman, “Israel’s Decision to Annex Golan Upsets U.S. Aides,” + New York Times, December 16, 1981, + pp. A1, A13) UN Resolution 242 + was a November 22, 1967, UN + Security Council Resolution that called for the withdrawal of + Israeli forces from the territories captured during the June + 1967 War, the right of all nations in the region to be + sovereign, independent, and to live in peace free from the + threat of war, freedom of navigation, “a just settlement of the + refugee problem,” and the guaranteed “territorial inviolability + and political independence of every state in the area.” + and 338,UN Security Council Resolution 338, October 22, + 1973, called for a ceasefire in the October 1973 War, the + implementation of all parts of UNSC Resolution 242, and negotiations among all + parties to achieve “a just and durable peace in the Middle + East.” on which the Middle East peace negotiations since + 1967 have been based. He observed that GOA allegations of US + complicity were false. + + Dembri said that one reason for Algeria’s great concern over + Israel’s move was that it came at a particularly bad time in Arab + eyes—following hard on U.S. extradition of Abu Eain to Israel.The Government of Israel accused Ziyad + Abu Eain of setting off a bomb in Tiberias that exploded on May + 14, 1979, killing 2 children and injuring more than 30 others. + Eain later became a resident of Illinois. On February 20, 1981, + the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed his extradition to + Israel. General Walters responded that Abu Eain’s extradition came + after the case had been + considered at every level of the U.S. judicial system, including the + Supreme Court which was completely independent, and that legal + rather than political considerations governed the extradition + decision. + + Dembri replied that his government was not taking issue with U.S. + internal legal procedures, but was worried about the political + consequences, in particular the inevitable deterioration of + America’s image and influence in the Arab world. He noted Algeria + and other Arab ambassadors had made démarches on the case but their + views were apparently not given much weight.The Algerian démarche is in telegram 3815 from + Algiers, October 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810504–0802) + + On the Western Sahara, Dembri noted that Algeria and the U.S. have + used much the same language in their support of OAU decisions supporting a + referendum.See footnote 8, Document 386. The + principal Algerian objective is stability in the Maghreb. In this + context, “we consider U.S. arms assistance to Morocco to be + destabilizing and to contain a real threat of escalation.” + + Dembri said that he wanted to reiterate what Foreign Minister + Benyahia had said to DAS Constable + after Guelta ZemmourIn telegram 3743 + from Algiers, October 19, the Embassy reported that “in response + to King Hassan’s allegation of foreign involvement at Guelta + Zemmour, Benyahia stated categorically that Algeria did not + allow use of its territory by foreign elements in support of the + Polisario and Beloucif + asserted formally that no foreign elements were involved in that + battle.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820513–0671)—that Algerian + territory had not been and would not be used by foreign troops for + the purpose of supplying arms to the Polisario. The present + situation was unstable and dangerous; it was important for the + OAU to move as soon as possible + to resume the negotiating process and fill the present vacuum. + Dembri stressed Algeria’s desire for improved relations with + Morocco, for economic and commercial as well as political reasons. + He added that his government was disturbed about the deteriorating + economic situation in Morocco and its implications for internal + political stability. “We are the greatest defenders of the Moroccan + monarchy”, Dembri said. He revealed bilateral talks with Morocco + were taking place. If they were successful, a Hassan-Bendjedid + summit would take place. + + Concerning a settlement, Dembri remarked that the problem of + direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario remained a + difficult problem. He understood the U.S. view that the OAU decision did not call for direct + negotiations between the two parties. On the other hand, there was + no question but that the UN General + Assembly had called for direct negotiations. General Walters interjected that it + seemed to him there was no possible way that a body comprising 150 + nations could make a + well-considered decision regarding the negotiating modalities in a + complicated regional dispute. As for the U.S., the General + continued, America would certainly take no action toward escalating + the Sahara dispute. Our arms assistance to Morocco was directly + proportionate to the provocation—the introduction of SAM–6 missiles + and their use by the Polisario.For + more on the arming of the Polisario with SAM–6 missiles, see + footnote 3, Document 384, and + Document 385. General Walters added that the U.S. hoped for improved + relations between Algeria and Morocco, and was pleased that + high-level bilateral contacts had been taking place. + + Dembri commented that the Algerians were disturbed as much by the + symbolic effect of all the American visits to Morocco as by the arms + assistance itself. He added that his government simply did not + understand the need of all the U.S. military advisors in Morocco. To + this General Walters + responded that the U.S. for its part did not understand why + sophisticated materiel, which represented a qualitative change in + the military balance, had been introduced into the Western Sahara. + General Walters said he + well understood the problem of foreign military advisors. For + example, the U.S. had some 150 advisors in all Latin America while + the Soviets had over 300 in Peru alone. (Dembri got [garble] + indirect reference to Soviet military advisors here.) + + Dembri noted that there would soon be a meeting of the OAU Implementation Committee in + Nigeria to consider next steps in the negotiating process. Both the + Polisario and Morocco had reservations regarding the original + Nairobi decisions, and it would be important at this next meeting to + prevent any backsliding. He stated that if the military escalation + continues and there is no progress in the negotiations, it will be + catastrophic for the region. + + Dembri reiterated Algeria’s wish to intensify consultations with + the U.S. The purchase of C–130s + was a clear indication of Algeria’s desire for improved relations. + He stressed that when the planes were formally turned over to the + Algerians, it would be useful to make clear that the C–130 sale was in no way related to + the Algerian role in the release of the American hostages. We do not + want to become professional mediators, he said. General Walters said he understood + Algeria’s sensitivities on this point, and would make certain no + such linkage was made. + + Dembri turned to the current friction between Libya and the U.S., + noting that this deteriorating relationship was very disquieting to + Algeria. American rhetoric seemed to be mounting, the press + dramatized the situation and the result was a spiral of + recriminations. General Walters stressed that the U.S. withdrawal of oil + company employees from Libya was not frivolous, but was based on + hard information. He noted + that the U.S. has evidence that Qadhafi has dispatched two terrorist squads to the + U.S. with the aim of assassinating President Reagan or other high American + officials.Documentation is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVIII, Libya; Chad. What concerns us most, the + General remarked, is that Qadhafi is totally unpredictable; while there is no + logic or Libyan interest in assassinating U.S. officials, Qadhafi’s pattern of irrationality + makes it essential that we take the evidence seriously. The General + continued that it was also necessary to keep in mind that Americans + had been traumatized by the assassination of six Ambassadors in + recent years. No American President could therefore afford to + dismiss a terrorist threat from Libya. Still another consideration + was that the Reagan + administration is determined to cease projecting an appearance of + U.S. weakness and to establish America’s international credibility. + Dembri responded that Algeria was opposed to any kind of terrorism, + but from an outsider’s point of view the whole U.S.-Libyan dispute + appeared to be a mirage. When Dembri noted that there had been press + reports of a possible U.S. assassination attempt against Qadhafi, General Walters said he wished to deny + categorically that assassination was an option. President Reagan had not only ruled out any + consideration of such action, but even discussion of it, as had his + predecessors. + + Turning to Chad, Dembri confirmed that Algeria had agreed to send + a detachment of observers to assist the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. He noted also that + Algeria had provided considerable aid to the GUNT, principally in the form of + medical equipment. Algerian aid, he stressed, was designated for use + only by the government itself. He added that Algeria recently had + made a demarche to the Sudan,Not + found. asking that military assistance to Habre be + terminated. General Walters + responded that U.S. policy is very similar. We have made + representations to both Sudan and Egypt asking them to stop + supporting Habre.In telegram 320522 + to Khartoum, December 3, the Department informed the Embassy + that during their November 18 meeting, Nimeiri agreed with + Haig “that Habre + must be induced to cease military activities until the situation + in Chad and Libya’s intentions become clearer.” Egyptian + Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal told Crocker that “Egypt shares this view.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810575–0623) Documentation on the Haig-Nimeiri + conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVII, Sub-Saharan + Africa. + + The discussion with Col. Belkeir + took place at the Presidency immediately after the meeting with + Dembri. General Walters + covered many of the same points, essentially reviewing the preceding + discussion. Belkheir’s main + points were related to the Western Sahara. Like Dembri, he + emphasized the need for stability in the Maghreb. At the same time + he stressed that Algeria strongly believed that a national liberation movement like + the Polisario must be supported. The FLN could not betray its own experience and + ideals—especially that a liberation movement has the right to secure + its independence by whatever means it can. Again repeating a point + made by Dembri, Belkheir + underlined Algerian concern that increased U.S. arms assistance to + Morocco could lead to an escalation of the conflict. General + Walters reiterated that + our response has been proportionate to the escalation brought about + by the introduction of SAM–6’s, and its purpose is to restore the + military balance and prevent further escalation of the Western + Sahara conflict while diplomatic efforts for a solution + continue. + + Belkheir emphasized the + importance of reinvigorating the OAU negotiating process as the only way of avoiding + further military escalation. He said that Algeria, as a developing + country, needs to use its resources for social and economic + development, and its interest lies in a normal and stable + relationship with Morocco. Finally Belkheir noted Algeria’s satisfaction that the + C–130 sale had been completed. + He remarked that this transaction was an earnest of Algeria’s desire + for closer relations with the U.S. + + Newlin +
+
+ 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original + was received in the White House Situation Room. + + 288. + + Algiers, March 16, 1982, 1620Z + + +

For Deputy Secretary Stoessel + from Newlin. Subject: The Future + of US-Algerian Relations—The Lockheed + Project.

+ + + (S) Entire text. + + Negotiations between Lockheed and Algeria on a far-reaching + package of aircraft, technical studies, constructions and + training/maintenance have reached the point where Lockheed chairman + Roy A. Anderson paid a 3-day visit to Algiers for in-depth + discussions with senior Algerian officials and Embassy. + + On March 13 Algerian Air Force Chief Abdelli sketched Algeria’s + needs, the most urgent of which are approval of eight additional + C–130 + aircraft and FMS training. Abdelli officially + requested me to obtain an early reply to Algeria’s requests in this + area, particularly training. + + Abdelli reiterated that Algeria had given firm end-use assurances + concerning the C–130’s. Moreover, + Algeria was a huge country whose development needs were as urgent as + they were enormous. Algeria, he stressed, had no expansionist aims + whatsoever. + + He then went on to state Algeria’s intention to buy a wide-bodies + aircraft for presidential use and additional similar aircraft for + Air Algerie, as well as technical training and maintenance + facilities for its aircraft fleet. As a developing country, Abdelli + said Algeria could not afford separate civilian and military + maintenance infrastructures. + + The Algerian Air Force chief mentioned that financing would be an + important consideration. He also stated that the USSR, France, the UK and the FRG were all interested in obtaining the contract for + this large program, details of which are reported septel.Not found. + + Comments and recommendations: + + Having been given end-use assurances, which Algeria is + scrupulously respecting, I believe we should promptly + approve the request for the pending C–130’s. + + Logically, we should also approve the USG training which requires a + presidential determination to make Algeria eligible for + FMS. Algeria considers + it has purchased U.S. military equipment which it is + currently unable to use for the purpose for which it was + bought because of the lack of desired USG-supplied training. + (Abdelli rather bitterly referred to the fact that C–130’s were currently being + used to import eggs.) + + If, despite logic, we are currently unable to provide the + kind of training Algeria so strongly desires, I believe I + should be authorized to tell Abdelli frankly the reasons + therefore. I hope that pouring cold water on a request that + the Algerian military looks on as a test of American good + faith will not materially damage Lockheed’s chances for the + overall package being discussed, but I cannot be + certain. + + + I do not need to underline the potentially fundamental political + implications of this project. The largest, richest and most stable + North African country is considering entering into a long-term + relationship with a major American company which will ultimately end + its military dependence on the Soviet Union in a key area. In + addition, the economic benefits are considerable. Lockheed has been + cautious in this department, but chairman Anderson told me the additional + modules for wide-bodied aircraft, spares, training and maintenance + facilities would amount to + dols. 600 million and the entire package could eventually cost + upwards of dols. 2 billion. + + Anderson may raise some of + these issues at the dinner hosted by Ambassador Malek March 19 which Anderson understands you are also + attending. You should be aware that the Algerians have asked us + specifically not to mention the planned purchase of a presidential + aircraft to Ambassador Malek, + even though Malek is aware at + least in general terms of the other aspects of the proposed + cooperation. As best we know, the only decisions of a military + nature that need to be taken now relate to the additional C–130’s and the FMS training. Lockheed will soon begin + an exhaustive in-country study of the other components of the + package. A decision to assist with maintenance of non-U.S. built + military aircraft may not be required until several years from + now. + + Newlin +
+
+ 113. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; + Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + 2888. + + Algiers, July 15, 1982, 1545Z + + + + SUBJECT + Relocating the PLO. + + + Ref: + State 195773.In telegram 195773 to + Algiers, July 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to + approach the GOA about helping + the United States “seek an honorable way for the PLO in Beirut to depart Lebanon in + safety,” given that “no Arab country has come forward + demonstrating an inclination to receive the 5–8,000 PLO combatants from West Beirut.” + The United States believed that “the survival of the PLO as a potentially constructive + political force in the region is at stake,” contended that “to + prevent further bloodshed, someone must take these fighters,” + and sought Algeria’s “views on how this question of a haven or + havens for the PLO fighters + might be achieved. We are profoundly concerned that, should + there be further delay, events may take an uncontrollable + course.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary, Acting FM Dembri took a hard line in reply to my + presentation of points reftel. He said no Arab country could receive + the PLO when their wish was to + return home. The PLO leadership and + fighters in West Beirut were prepared to die and if they perished + others would rise to replace them. More time for negotiations was + needed. Dembri again urged the U.S. to recognize the PLO and to support the achievement of Palestinian rights. + Dembri’s reply may have been largely tactical. End summary. + + I saw Acting Foreign Minister Dembri at 1500 local and used points + reftel verbatim while stressing our view several times that time was + growing short if a catastrophe was to be avoided. Dembri began by + saying it was clear the State Department had not taken any account + of Algeria’s views as expressed earlier. (I denied this and said I + thought we both wished to avoid carnage in Beirut and preserve the + possibility for a constructive political role for the + Palestinians.) + + Dembri said no Arab country could permit the Palestinians to go + further from Palestine when their desire was to return home. The + United States should, he urged, recognize the PLO and the right of the Palestinians + to their homeland. Secretary-designate Shulz’ remarks before the + SFRC were encouraging,Reference is to + Shultz’s July 13 + statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during + his confirmation hearings, in which he declared in reference to + the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations: “For these talks to + succeed, representatives of the Palestinians themselves must + participate in the negotiating process.” (Department of State + Bulletin, August 1982, pp. + 49–53) but the U.S. must go further. + + The U.S., Dembri said, should exercise pressure on Israel. More + time was needed for negotiations. The world would not accept an + Israeli diktat. It was not Israel, he said, who was threatened by + the Arab states, but the Arab states who were threatened by + Israel. + + I noted it was unrealistic to think of the Palestinians returning + under present circumstances and again urged Algeria to help find a + haven of refuge for the PLO now in + West Beirut. Dembri asserted the leadership and fighters were ready + to die and that, if they perished, new leaders and new fighters + would rise in their stead. + + Dembri confirmed FM Ibrahimi had departed for the Non-Aligned meeting in + Cyprus. There would be fifty ministers taking part and a total of + eighty delegations. The PLO, he + thought, would be in the chair. All other prospective meetings would + await the outcome of the non-aligned session. + + Comment: I believe Dembri’s prompt reply was largely tactical. He + was, I believe, taking a hard line on the eve of the Non-Aligned + meeting which Algeria sees as a major event. He may also have been + influenced by the categoric Syrian refusal to accept armed elements + expressed to Ambassador Paganelli. We continue to think that Algeria + wishes to get the best possible deal for the PLO if it has to leave Beirut. + Ideally, this would be recognition by the United States but short of + that it could mean enhanced political recognition by the Europeans + and others. Finally, Algeria has reacted favorably to + Secretary-designate Shulz’ + remarks on the Palestinian question and will be anxious to foster + what it considers to be a positive new element in U.S. policy toward + the Middle East. + + Dept may wish repeat to addressees reftel. + + Newlin +
+
+ 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Italy + and AlgeriaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Head of State File, Algeria: President Bendjedid (8105773–8407957). Secret; Niact + Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original + was sent from the White House Situation Room. + + 248777. + + Washington, September 3, 1982, 1231Z + + + + SUBJECT + Message for President Bendjedid. + +

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. Please pass to Ambassador Walters the following text of a letter from the + President to President Bendjedid + for delivery during his meeting.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Mr. President:

+

I have asked Ambassador Vernon + Walters, who has my full confidence, to set out for you + and your government the details of the major initiative in the context + of the Middle East peace process which I announced September 1.Reference is to Reagan’s September 1, 1982, Fresh Start initiative + for peace in the Middle East, in which he called for a plan to + “reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns with the legitimate + rights of the Palestinians.” This, he argued, required a “new + realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East.” The + initiative specifically called for “full autonomy” for the + Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza during a 5-year + transition period from Israeli to Palestinian rule. Meanwhile, + Israel should immediately adopt “a settlement freeze” in these + areas, which “more than any other action, could create the + confidence needed for wider participation in these talks.” The + United States, however, would not support the creation of an + independent Palestinian state. The text of the address is printed in + Public Papers: Reagan 1982, Book II, pp. 1093–1097, and in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign + Policy, Document 116. Documentation on the initiative is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute.

+

As Ambassador Walters will make + clear, it is my firm determination to seize the historic opportunity + that exists today to move toward a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. While we + believe that the United States has a significant responsibility to seek + a resolution of this critical issue, I am aware that in order to achieve + progress, the views of all must be seriously considered. For that + reason, Ambassador Walters’ + discussions with you and our similar discussions with other leaders are + an important first step.

+

Our differences in the past have been on means, but not on the goal of + securing peace and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. I know + that you will listen carefully to the details of my proposals and + consider them in the light of your own long dedication to peace and + justice. The time is ripe and our actions today can contribute + significantly to the achievement of our common goal.In telegram 3610 from Algiers, September 5, + Walters indicated that + during a September 5 meeting in Algiers, Bendjedid said “this action by the United States was + a definitely positive step. He could not be ‘more royalist than the + King’ and whatever was acceptable to the Palestinians would be the + Algerian position. The Arabs believe that the PLO is the sole legitimate + representative of the Palestinian position.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820461–0403)

+

Sincerely,

+

Ronald Reagan

+ Shultz +
+
+ 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United Nations and the Embassy in AlgeriaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D820522–0982. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. + Drafted by Peter Sebastian + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + David Schneider (NEA), Richard Sherman (S/S–O), McManaway (S/S), and + E. Anthony Wayne; approved by Shultz. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, + Rabat, Damascus, and Paris. + + 285232. + + Washington, October 9, 1982, 0142Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Secretary’s bilateral with the Algerian Foreign + Minister + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Summary: Algerian FonMin + called on Secretary October 6 in New York. At Secretary’s + invitation, Ibrahimi reviewed + Algerian views on Mid East. In so doing he stressed Algiers + agreement with Fez Arab + League’s summit eight pointsReference + is to the Arab League summit held in Fez, Morocco, September + 6–9. The eight-point plan in part called for Israeli withdrawal + from all lands it had captured in the 1967 war, the + establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its + capital, and a UN Security + Council guarantee that would “guarantee peace between all states + of the region, including the independent Palestinian state.” A + translation from the original French is in telegram 6811 from + Rabat, September 10, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820469–0512) Documentation + on the eight-point plan is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. and its participation in summit + committee formed to contact permanent members of UNSC. Ibrahimi qualified American September 1 principles + on MESee footnote 2, Document 114. as step forward but + urged establishment Palestinian state which U.S. could “impose”. + Secretary disagreed but stressed we also believe in centrality of + Palestinian question. On Gulf war, Ibrahimi described Algerian mediation efforts which + continue. Progress being made slowly. Regarding Northwest Africa, + Ibrahimi reaffirmed + GOA’s support for OAU’s cease fire/referendum formula + for ending Saharan war and its desire have good relations with + Morocco. Ibrahimi charged + U.S. had abandoned neutrality in that conflict when it decided + install bases in Morocco. He said GOA is satisfied with its economic tie to U.S. but + thought political relations needed to be developed. Secretary + affirmed desired friendly relations with both Algeria and Morocco. + Ibrahimi asked for help + with Algeria’s Chancery problem and volunteered to settle question + of villa belonging to Embassy Algiers. End summary + + The Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi accompanied by + New Algerian UN Perm Rep Mohamed Sahnoun, Algerian + Ambassador to the U.S. Yaker + and political director, Algerian MFA called on the Secretary in New York on October 6, + 1982. Under Secretary Eagleburger, NEA + DAS + Schneider and NEA/AFN director also sat + in. + + Secretary opened with an expression of condolences for the passing + of Ibrahimi’s predecessor. + This evoked an expression of personal and official appreciation from + the Algerian Minister. + + Ibrahimi, expressing + pleasure at this opportunity to continue a high level dialogue with + the USG begun four months ago with + the Vice President,No record of the + Bush-Ibrahimi meeting, which took place June 10, was + found. began by characterizing our bilateral relations. + These relations, he said, suffer from a contradiction in Algerian + eyes in that the GOA is pleased + with the state and development of our economic relations but + considers that our political relations “remain to be developed.” + Ibrahimi, continuing, + said that Algeria as we knew is attached to its independence and + non-alignment. As its war of national liberation from France has + clearly shown, it is and remains unprepared to accept domination + from any quarter. At present, he said, there is no conflict between + Algeria and the U.S. and there will be none so long as these + principles are shared. + Ibrahimi considered that + current circumstances permit political relations to become more + complementary with our bilateral economic cooperation “with which we + are satisfied.” So much for principles. + + The Minister then offered to discuss the Middle East and Northwest + Africa. On the Middle East, he said that he had already stressed + four [garble] ago “when we were on the threshold of Israel’s + invasion of Lebanon” that all efforts to solve the Middle East + problem had failed because they had not addressed the heart of the + issue—the Palestinian question. He had put it to the Vice President, + Ibrahimi continued, that + events in Lebanon might lend themselves to the correction of this + shortcoming. Since then, the PLO + had evacuated Beirut; the Fez summit had convened and the world had + witnessed the massacre in Beirut.See + footnote 6, Document + 28. + + FonMin + Ibrahimi then adverted to the + Fez summit. He insisted, in his words, on Algeria’s “responsible and + moderate participation in that summit.” He noted that the summit had + adopted “a joint resolution reflecting joint Arab positions.” He + underlined that this result was achieved despite the fact that “the + events in Beirut did not operate to strengthen either Palestinian or + Arab moderation.” + + Ibrahimi then characterized + the U.S. role: the U.S. ceased being a simple mediator in the last + four months in this context, he asserted. It has now committed its + prestige fully which is why a positive outcome is needed. The + Minister gave it as Algeria’s view that the international situation + now favors the “imposition” of a durable solution in the Middle East + by the creation of Palestinian state. The U.S. can exploit several + salient features of the situation “to impose a just solution:” there + is a strong moderate trend running in the Arab world favorable to + such an approach. Domestic Israeli opinion “is hostile to Begin’s policies.” The Algerian + people find it hard to understand that the U.S., which has always + defended the right of self determination, does not appear willing to + vouchsafe this right to the Palestinian people. + + The Secretary then said that it appears to us, now that various + groups have taken positions on the issues, that the [time?] is near + for the principals to come together to discuss their differences and + propose compromises “particularly in so far as the Palestinian + problem is concerned which, I agree, is central to a solution.” The + President’s September 1 proposals address the issues. Now is the + time for dialogue. We think, the Secretary said, that King Hussein + should be centrally involved. This is because the population of + Jordan is roughly 2/3 Palestinian; because, historically, Jordan has + had jurisdiction on the West Bank and because economic exchanges of + scope exist between Jordan and the West Bank. Affiliation thus seems + sensible. This said, the Secretary continued, we do not believe + anyone is in a position to impose a solution on Jordan or on Israel. + One can, however, argue with Israel as we do that there will be no peace in the region + without a solution to the Palestinian problem. Israel has a + tremendous stake in peace, the Secretary said. Israel’s claim of + sovereignty over the West Bank/Gaza will not bring peace. We have + said as much to the Israelis. There is now a great debate in Israel + and within world Jewry on this point. To illustrate, the Australians + and New Zealanders told us today that Jewish quarters in their + respective countries are deeply engaged in this debate, the echoes + of which certainly reach Israel. The Secretary summarized: “We + cannot impose a solution but you are correct in saying that the + Palestinian issue must be confronted and dealt with. I am interested + to hear you say in this connection that moderate views dominated in + Fez.” + + Ibrahimi then said he + wished to explain that his use of the term “impose” was intended to + convey that in Algeria’s view the U.S. has the means to give a + durable impetus to a solution. Algeria believes that the President’s + September 1 principles represent an important step forward. + Concerned, however, that a further delay in the creation of a + Palestinian state, for example by emphasis on some sort of link + between Palestine and Jordan, will lose us time. Algeria considers + that a Palestinian state must be created on the West + Bank/Gaza. + + At Fez, Ibrahimi said, + there was unanimity on the eight points in the Fez summit + declaration as well as on the committee which is to be sent to make + contact with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and especially with + the U.S. + + The Secretary responded that we looked forward to a visit by the + committee. All details have not repeat not yet been settled but we + currently anticipate receiving the delegation October 21–23 or there + abouts. Ibrahimi seemed a bit + surprised by the dates pointing out that the committee would meet + beforehand. The Secretary reiterated that we had responded + affirmatively to the request for a meeting to the committee but that + timing had to fit with the President’s schedule because the + President wishes to receive the committee himself. Ibrahimi said that, whatever the + date, we hope the dialogue would help to move things forward. + + The Secretary then asked about the Gulf war and the status of the + efforts the Algerian Government was making “to play a constructive + role in its settlement. How do you see the prospects and the + situation in both of the belligerent countries?” + + Ibrahimi replied that as + soon as the war had broken out Algeria had attempted to offer its + mediation. Unfortunately, he said, Iraq began by refusing Algeria’s + offer “because Arab countries could, in its view, only side with + Iraq.” Later on, the Minister continued, both belligerents agreed to + this mediation and Algeria began this difficult process. The cost to + Algeria of this effort is already high because it lost its best sons + (in the crash of his predecessor’s aircraft). + Despite this the GOA issued a statement at the level of + the FLN Politburo of its + willingness to persevere. Accordingly, mediation efforts resumed + last June. Positions were still soft. There were problems. Iran + demanded the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq wished to maintain + Baghdad as the venue of the Non-Aligned Summit. In July, during the + Iranian Prime Minister’s visit in Algiers, the Iranians dropped + their major pre-condition to negotiation above cited. Three points + remained: (a) the return to pre-war borders; (b) the return to Iraq + of Iraq’s refugees in Iran; (c) reparations. Algeria continued its + efforts “and I can tell you that the atmosphere now is propitious to + the initiation of negotiations”. The most difficult remaining + problem is that of reparations. Algeria, Ibrahimi continued, suggested an international fund + from which payments might be made to Iran but Iran rejected this + suggestion. The Secretary inquired how such an international fund + might be financed? Ibrahimi + replied that the idea was launched by India and accepted by the Gulf + states. Algeria believes that the Gulf states would pay. Ibrahimi explained that Iran wants + the money directly from Iraq. Iran does not care, however, where + Iraq gets the funds. The Secretary observed wryly that third parties + were being asked to pay for the belligerent and the Algerians + responded wryly that as the Arabs were paying for the war, they + might just as well pay for peace. Ibrahimi pointed out how sad it was to see the + return of the status quo ante bellum presented by both sides as a + victory after the expenditure of much blood and treasure. + + Turning to Northwest Africa Ibrahimi reminded that he had expressed Algeria’s + concern to the Vice President last June over the turn of U.S. policy + vis-a-vis Algeria. Ria felt that the U.S. had “abandoned neutrality + by building bases in Morocco.” We believe the U.S. can play a role + to achieve a solution of the Saharan problem on the basis of self + determination, Ibrahimi said. + Algeria was pleased in 1981 that King Hassan had finally agreed to + accept that basis. The GOA had + saluted King Hassan’s acceptance of the OAU formula in a speech by President Chadli expressing + satisfaction and asking that the details and guarantees of a cease + fire and referendum in the Sahara be worked out promptly. President + Bendjedid had also + discussed the prospect of economic cooperation with Morocco + following the end of the Saharan war. Ibrahimi explained that such cooperation could + involve phosphates, the iron ore in N’gara-Djebilet and a pipeline + feeding gas to Europe across the Mediterranean via Spain. Algeria’s + political leadership had delayed this latter project “in the hope + that the end of the Saharan war would allow Moroccan industry to + benefit from this Algerian gas.” + + Ibrahimi then said that he + wished solemnly to reaffirm that Algeria had never had a problem + with the Moroccan monarchy. At the time of the attempted Skhirat + coup “we could easily have helped to topple it but did not do so + because we think each people must be free to choose their own + regime.” King Hassan had told him, Ibrahimi + said, that he would never + forget that Boumediene was the only Arab leader to send a delegation + to Rabat to wish the King well after Skhirat. Ibrahimi hoped that the Saharan + problem would be solved on the basis of the OAU decision and the principle of self determination. + Ibrahimi then noted that + Algeria has an interest in the survival of the OAU and hopes that efforts now in + course would lead to an OAU summit + “soon.” + + The Secretary then said that he shares Algeria’s views on the + importance of the OAU. “We want to + see its continuation as a vehicle for solving problems.” The + Secretary welcomed Ibrahimi’s + expressions of friendship for Morocco. He said that the U.S. has + friendly ties to Morocco and sees no reason why we should not also + have friendly ties with Algeria particularly since a reciprocal view + seems to emerge from Foreign Minister Ibrahimi’s presentation. In so far as the OAU formula and self determination in + the Sahara are concerned King Hassan, to our knowledge, still + accepts them both. We have the impression that establishing the + conditions necessary to carry out these steps is proving difficult + “but hope it happens.” We would try to help, the Secretary said, + although this is an issue at some remove from us. The Secretary then + stressed our agreement with Algeria’s views of the importance of the + OAU and again welcomed Minister + Ibrahimi’s remarks on + Algerian desire for friendly relations with Morocco. It seems to us + to follow, the Secretary said, that friendship between Algeria and + the U.S. should also be possible. Ibrahimi responded by saying that, although Algeria + was disappointed when Hassan after Nairobi II began talking of a + “confirmatory referendum”, Algeria still favors the rapid + organization of a referendum which is also the desire of many + African governments. + + Turning to bilateral relations, FonMin + Ibrahimi opined that matters + were progressing well. Secretary Baldrige expects to come to Algeria in December and + this will further reinforce our ties. + + As FonMin + Ibrahimi prepared to take his + leave, he told the Secretary that there was a small problem on which + he requested the Secretary’s help. There is a villa (Mustapha Rais) + belonging to the American Embassy in Algiers. Its status has been a + problem “which we will now solve.” This [garble] the purchase by + Algeria of a new chancery in Washington, D.C. The question of the + villa in Algiers will be settled as Ambassador Newlin requests, Ibrahimi said, and reiterated his + hope that the Secretary would help Algeria with the acquisition of + its badly needed chancery in Washington. The Secretary responded + that we would do our best. + + Ibrahimi told the Secretary + he hoped to see him in Algiers in his current capacity. He noted in + passing that former Deputy Secretary Christopher would see Sonatrac official Youssefi in + a few days and said “things are progressing.” + + Dam +
+ +
+ 116. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, + Tunis, USCINCEUR, and USUN. Sent for information Priority + to Nairobi. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat and the + Secretary of Defense. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + 4230. + + Algiers, October 17, 1982, 1800Z + + + + SUBJECT + U. S. Efforts to Moderate Algerian + Behavior and Joint Exercises With Morocco. + + + Ref: + A. Algiers 4195In telegram 4195 from + Algiers, October 14, Newlin reported that when he informed Acting + Foreign Minister Hadj Azzout about the joint U.S.-Moroccan + military exercises scheduled for November 9–12, “Azzout replied + that such exercises would be viewed with ‘great apprehension’ by + the GOA and that he would + report the information to President Bendjedid. He anticipated that I might be called + back to the MFA for a GOA protest.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820529–0981) + B. State 286172In telegram 286172 to + Algiers, October 12, the Department instructed the Embassy to + inform the Algerians about the upcoming joint exercises with + Morocco and state that “the exercises are not intended to + threaten any third country.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820526–0988) + C. Rabat 7593In telegram 7593 from + Rabat, October 6, the Embassy reported on the joint exercise + conference held between the Moroccan armed forces and U.S. Naval + Forces Europe, September 30–October 1. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820518–0483) + D. State 287167In telegram 287167 to + Algiers, October 13, the Department summarized an October 12 + meeting with Ibrahimi, in + which Bush said the + “international situation now offered new opportunities for + progress in Mid East. It thus unfortunate that effort under way + to ‘kick Israel out of UNGA.’ + This would be important error in context Arab as well as + American peace plans. Expulsion/suspension of Israel would set + back opportunities which now exist for progress on peaceful + solution of Palestinian problem. UN would be rendered more irrelevant. Moreover, + should expulsion or suspension eventuate, U.S. would not remain + behind.” Ibrahimi + replied: “As matters stood now where even the Fez Arab League + Summit speaks in its point seven to the status of Israel, ‘we + agree it is an error of strategy (to attempt + expulsion/suspension) and this question should not rpt not be + posed now.’ Ibrahimi + added that he was speaking only for Algeria in so stating.” + Bush later + suggested that “perhaps Algeria could use its undoubted + influence to play a moderating role.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820527–0008) + E. State 290328.In telegram 290328 to + Algiers, October 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to + remind Ibrahimi that the + “USG is deeply concerned over effort now in course in + international organizations, which it considers unfortunate in + both substance and timing, to suspend credentials of + representatives of the state of Israel.” The Department also + instructed the Embassy to “ask that Algeria take action which + will avoid a successful challenge” to Israeli credentials at the + UN. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820533–0561) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + I believe it important for Washington to understand that the U.S. + is at present engaged in two endeavors which in my judgment run at + cross purposes. On the one hand are our efforts to persuade Algeria + to support a + negotiated settlement with Israel and to abandon efforts to expel + Israel from the UN and its organs. + On the other hand is our increasingly high-profile military + relationship with Morocco, and in particular the U.S.-Moroccan joint + naval exercises scheduled for early November. + + As reported in ref (A) two high-ranking Algerian officials (one of + whom—Col. Belkheir—ranks + among the three most powerful men in Algeria) reacted with + unaccustomed anger to the information that U.S.-Moroccan naval + exercises are to be held Nov 9–12 at Al-Hoceima on the southern + Mediterranean littoral. I was asked how the maneuvers met the + strategic objectives related to the Gulf which General Walters and other U.S. officials + assured Algeria were the purpose of increased U.S. military + cooperation with Morocco. + + As Washington knows, Algeria not only considers U.S. military + assistance to Morocco the main impediment to a Western Sahara + settlement, but tends to regard the U.S.-Moroccan military + relationship (however wrongly) as a strategic threat to Algeria + itself. There is still another dimension: the Bendjedid government wants to + lessen Algeria’s military dependence on the USSR, but considers that difficult to + do while its rival for Maghreb preeminance intensifies its defense + relationship with the U.S. Algeria may also find it harder to reject + Soviet overtures for joint exercises given U.S.-Moroccan + maneuvers. + + In all of this the facts may not be as important as the + perceptions. Indeed, Algerian reaction to the U.S.-Moroccan military + relationship seems to me both emotional and obsessive. It is, + nevertheless, obvious that our influence with the Algerians on + matters of importance to us is constrained when we are doing what + angers them most. + + I have some hope that Algeria will help us on the issue of Israeli + credentials in UN bodies, largely as + a result of the Vice President’s intervention with Foreign Minister + Ibrahimi. Nevertheless, I + cannot be certain that more influential people than Ibrahimi (like Belkheir) will not advise Bendjedid to go slow at a time when + the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship appears to have been raised + a notch by the invitation of joint amphibious exercises. In present + circumstances, clearly the most effective way to assure our + multilateral goals would be cancellation of the Al-Hoceima + exercises—or at least postponement. I must leave it to others to + balance the interests involved—both bilateral and multilateral. I + recognize that joint naval exercises must be planned months in + advance, but I hope that there is flexibility in such planning to + take into account the political climate at the time of the actual + maneuvers. + + Turning to the more general problem of maintaining influence in + Algeria while continuing our special relationship with Morocco. It + is crucial to keep in mind the distinction between private joint + planning between U.S. and Moroccan military staffs and joint + exercises which cannot but + come to Algeria’s attention. These two kinds of cooperation have + very different consequences for our dialogue with Algeria. As we + move into a period of Middle East diplomacy when Algerian support + (like that of Morocco) will become increasingly important to us, our + bilateral relationship with Algeria rests on an uncertain base. + Important figures (like the President and Foreign Minister) wish to + see that relationship rapidly improve, while other powerful forces + perceive U.S. interests as unalterably opposed to those of Algeria. + A decision not to proceed with the Al-Hoceima exercises at a time + when we are working hard to build an Arab consensus on the + Arab-Israeli conflict would obviously enhance our influence with an + important Arab participant in the Middle East diplomatic + scene. + + Assertions that U.S.-Moroccan joint maneuvers are not directed + against third parties (i.e. Algeria) are simply not believed + here. + + Newlin +
+
+ 117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820534–0603. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeat of telegram 290955 to + Algiers, October 16. Drafted by Marc Grossman (NEA/ARN); cleared by Gary Usrey + (S/S–O), David Mack (NEA/ARN), and Alan Corky (NEA/ARN); approved by Veliotes. + + 290955. + + Washington, October 22, 1982, 0022Z + + +

Following sent action Algiers info, USUN, Tunis, Rabat, Damascus, Jidda, Cairo, Nairobi, Tel + Aviv 16 Oct.

+

Quote. Subject: Algerian Foreign Minister’s Call on the Vice President. + Refs: A. State 287167;See footnote 5, Document 116. B. + State 285232.See Document 115.

+ + + (S) Entire text. + + Summary: + + Algeria’s FonMin Mohamed Taleb + Ibrahimi accompanied by Ambassador to the U.S. Layachi Yaker and MFA’s Political Affairs Director + Kerroum called on Vice + President Bush October 12 + at their request. The Vice President was seconded by senior staff, + Messrs Gregg and Hughes; + State NEA + DAS + Schneider and FN Director + Sebastian also sat in. Exchange of views + lasted approximately 3/4 of an hour and was cordial + throughout. + + Invited by the Vice President to do so, Ibrahimi opened by summarizing + salient events which had occurred in the four months since he last + spoke with the Vice President.See footnote 4, Document 115. He + initially introduced these three subject headings (bilateral, gas + and military) prefacing Algeria’s political leadership wished to + have good relations with the U.S. and to pursue a dialogue between + the two governments. Bilateral relations, he said, were as he had + described them to Secretary Shultz a few days ago (cf ref B para 5). + + On gas, Ibrahimi said that + after signing gas agreements with France, the UK, Italy and Belgium, Algiers wishes + to give a new impetus to the conclusions of agreements with American + consumers. + + Regarding military matters, Ibrahimi said that Algeria had decided three years + ago on a policy of diversification of military procurement. + Purchases of equipment have been made in the U.S. and, the Minister + said, he hoped that Algeria’s upcoming requests in this area would + also be agreed by the USG. + + Having gone through these bilateral points Ibrahimi then turned to + multilateral issues. He again summarized, saying that since his last + conversation with the Vice President there had been (unspecified) + Moroccan visits to Algiers and his participation in the Fez Arab + League Summit.See footnote 2, Document 115. On + the latter, he had, Ibrahimi + said, met with King Hassan + II “in margins of the conference”. They had discussed + their countrys’ bilateral relations in terms of the Saharan issue. + Ibrahimi said he had told + King Hassan once again that Morocco should support the organization + of a referendum in the Western Sahara. Although he preferred not to + go over old ground, the Vice President should know of the GOA’s wish to renew the dialogue with + Morocco and to practice a policy of cooperation with it, Ibrahimi said. The minister + explained that Algeria is being logical with itself in giving + Maghreb issues priority over broader inter-Arab differences. + Ibrahimi said that + Algeria thus favors efforts at regional coordination in North Africa + along the lines of the Gulf coordination committee, the activities + of which Algeria approves. This led Ibrahimi into a discussion of the situation within + the Arab world. + + Since the last conversation, Ibrahimi told the Vice President, the Fez summit and + “the events in Beirut” have dominated the Middle East scene. Last + June, he said, Algeria had deplored the absence of a joint Arab + reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Better late than never, + there now is, as a + result of the Fez summit, such a joint Arab reaction and this + constitutes a positive. + + Ibrahimi said he had told + the Secretary that the international situation favored U.S. efforts + to bring about a durable as well as an equitable solution to the + Arab-Israeli problem. These favorable circumstances could prove + evanescent, however. The opportunity, therefore, needs to be seized. + In any event, the solution to the problems of the Middle East + requires a solution to the Palestinian problem. The situation, + currently, is favorable—Ibrahimi continued—because “the moderates + dominate the PLO; they are + ascendant within the Arab world and have the wind in their sails. + Israeli public opinion has been powerfully affected by the Beirut + events and U.S. public opinion is aware as never before of the + issues which agitate the region. The Soviet Union, finally, is + focused on its own internal and external problems (Poland and + Afghanistan).[”] + + The Vice President, responding, then said that on the Middle East + President Reagan had put + forward his own principles since he (Bush) had last met with Ibrahimi. This shows U.S. interest in the region as + well as determination to address the Palestinian question. We agree, + the Vice President continued, that the climate is more conducive now + to positive action than it has been. Paradoxically, the horrors in + the refugee camps in Beirut have helped bring a better understanding + of the issues. The Vice President agreed with FonMin + Ibrahimi’s characterization + of Israel’s public opinion and also accepted that the U.S. is + favorably placed to be a catalyst for peace in the Middle + East. + + There then followed the discussion of the Israeli credentials + issue reported fully in ref A. + + The Vice President then returned to a discussion of Middle East + developments. He said that we do not know how the conversations + between King Hussein and Yasser + Arafat are going. However, the mere fact that they + are having their discussions is already a plus. + + Ibrahimi responded that the + Algerian Government believes the pursuit of a Jordanian-Palestinian + federation would lose us precious time. Sooner or later we will need + to face up to the necessity of a Palestinian state, Ibrahimi said. He said that he + expected Arafat to make the + King understand the validity of this point. + + The Vice President said that if the federation concept were to be + seen as a step towards peace, it would facilitate progress. The Vice + President opined that one would expect it to be difficult for + Arafat to drop his demand + for a state. He noted that negotiations were needed to explore if it + were not better to go the federation route. Going that route + promised to become a gigantic step forward towards peace. + + + Mr. Gregg then invited + Ibrahimi’s comments on + the state of Algerian efforts to mediate the Gulf war between Iran + and Iraq. + + Ibrahimi opened by + stressing that the prerequisite to a successful mediation was + secrecy. Too many cooks had too many oars in this issue. For + example, the OIC, NAM, the UN and its SYG were + all attempting to play a role. Algeria was attempting to make a + quiet contribution. The Iranians had posited three conditions which + needed to obtain before mediation became possible: A return of the + armies behind the pre-war international borders of the two + countries; the problem of reparations and the problem of Iraqi + refugees in Iran. Since last June’s contact between the Vice + President and himself, Ibrahimi said, the Iranians had abandoned another + prerequisite—the overthrow of the Iraqi regime—and Iraq no longer + insisted on becoming the venue for the next meeting of the + non-aligned. “We solved that issue by asking India to host the + seventh NAM conference.” On the + first and last point, return of the armies to their home territories + and problems of Iraqi refugees, negotiations now seem possible, + Ibrahimi continued. The + major remaining problem is that of reparations but Algeria hopes to + get the parties to the negotiating table nevertheless. The Vice + President then said that, once again, Algeria was in a special + position to be useful. He recalled the constructive role Algeria had + played in connection with the release of the American hostages in + Iran and told Minister Ibrahimi that the American people continue to be + grateful to Algeria for what it had achieved in that context. “You + may not think that we have shown our gratitude appropriately, the + Vice President said but the American people remember and are + grateful.” + + Ibrahimi thanked the Vice + President for these words. He said that it was important to Algeria + to know the sentiments of the American people “because the feelings + of a people are usually more meaningful than those of their + princes.” + + In closing, Ibrahimi noted + that Algeria had also attempted quietly to settle current + “U.S.-Iranian financial difficulties.” (read the Iranian claims + payments problem). He was confident that Algeria would succeed in + this effort as well. Shultz + +

Unquote

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 118. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official + Memoranda (10/26/1982). Secret. Sent through William Schneider and Eagleburger. Drafted by Sebastian and David Schneider (NEA); cleared by Walters, Raphel, Arthur Keys (S/P), and Stanley Escudero (H). Sebastian initialed for the clearing officials. A + stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: + “GPS.” + + + Washington, October 26, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + C–130’s for Algeria + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

We must decide whether to approve Algerian purchase of eight Lockheed + C–130s. This issue has raised the + more basic question of how we best conduct our relations with Algeria to + generate greater Algerian consideration of US interests.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+ + + We approved the sale of six C–130s to Algeria on August 13, 1981. These planes have + been delivered. Algeria then contracted with Lockheed to buy eight + more. We have no commitment to Lockheed to license them for export, + although Lockheed had apparently assumed we would. The C–130 contract is worth $146 million. + The GOA has expressed interest in + further Lockheed purchases worth as much as $1 billion and up to 12 + Boeing 737, 747, 757 and 767 aircraft. A favorable decision on the + C–130 aircraft could therefore + convey a positive signal to the Algerians. A negative decision at + this stage of the sale would contribute to an even stronger negative + message. + + The Department is agreed that current conditions in Algeria + justify an effort on our part to encourage greater consideration of + US interests by the Government + of Algeria. Opinion is divided, however, on our overall strategy + toward Algeria and this sale. Ambassador Walters and S/P believe that though the record is + mixed, the overall trend of Algerian behavior continues to oppose + US interests. They cite: + + Algeria’s continued collaboration with Libya in support of + the Polisario, + + its shipment of arms to Nicaragua, + + + its anti-US record at the UN, + + its continued harsh criticism of the US in its government controlled + press. + + +

The first sale of C–130s did not alter + this fundamental pattern of hostility, and another is unlikely to do so. + Though we should not expect one or two deals to work miracles, how can + we hope to profit from the overall relationship if we passively accept + losses on each transaction? To avoid this, we should use each + transaction to impress upon the Algerians that further transactions will + require Algeria to demonstrate sensitivity to overall US interests in specific ways.

+

Ambassador Walters and S/P believe that before we approve the + further sale of C–130s, the Algerians + should show by an unambiguous gesture that their desire for improved + relations reflects a genuine potential for change of policies adverse to + US interests. (An appropriate and + feasible gesture might be Algerian recognition of the Habre government + in Chad or some similar adjustment in Algerian policy. There have been + recent disturbing though unsubstantiated reports of Algerian material + support for anti-Habre forces; the long range of the C–130s could contribute significantly to + such an effort.) Once such a gesture is made, we would approve the sale, + making clear at the same time that continued improvements in our + bilateral relations will, on our side, reflect Algerian willingness to + demonstrate sensitivity to US interests + in specific areas of concern. Examples would be: a) moderate their + military support for the Polisario to prevent escalations of the Western + Sahara war; b) seriously pursue a political settlement of the Western + Sahara conflict through direct discussions with Morocco; c) build a + record of greater US-Algerian + cooperation at the UN; d) encourage a + more objective tone in official press coverage of the US.

+ + + NEA and PM believe that the sale should be approved, as a + contribution to our efforts to influence aspects of Algerian foreign + policy. They believe that: + + denial of this sale would not provide leverage adequate to + induce the GOA to abandon + major objectionable elements of its foreign policy; + + substitution of Western for Soviet equipment supports + non-alignment and the nationalism which motivates Algerian + policy; + + the sale would not be incrementally destabilizing insofar + as the Polisario and Morocco are concerned (Algeria uses + other means to support the Polisario and CIA believes it wishes to + substitute C–130s for its + aging Antonov 12s); + + + it would serve US + commercial interests; + + a soft energy market and Algeria’s increased reliance on + gas earnings work in our favor; + + we already have a stake in extant positive facets of + Algeria’s foreign policy (Gulf War Mediation; Iranian claims + settlements; adherence to “moderate” Fez Arab League Summit + approach to Middle East issues, including PLO withdrawal from Beirut; + responsiveness to US request + for assistance in defusing the Israeli credentials issue in + Nairobi and New York); + + it is an error to relate such decisions too directly to + GOA performance while + Algeria’s leadership is in transition and President + Bendjedid is + still working to achieve a more consistent, pragmatic GOA policy. + + +

NEA and PM propose that, after a positive decision on C–130s, we seek a sustained political + dialogue with the Algerians to explore areas of difference and agreement + and create a general understanding that what we can do for Algeria in + the future will be affected by the nature of its policies on issues of + importance to us. We would reciprocate the stated Algerian desire for + improved political relations and proceed in ways which recognize that + what we can do to help Algeria is limited in scope and therefore limited + in the influence it can bring us. We would note in this connection that + one useful step would be a reduction in Algerian public criticism of + U.S. policies. We would also recognize that at the outset we will be + more interested in the trend we can generate in Algerian policy than its + overall balance. Ambassador Walters and S/P note + that despite over a year of high-level contacts, including visits by + Ambassador Walters as a + Presidential emissary, the trend on balance continues to be negative. + They believe the dialogue must be more explicitly related to US interests. NEA and PM believe that the + balance should only be expected to shift gradually with the evolution of + Algeria’s leadership and other relationships.

+ + + Two additional issues are relevant. First is the effect of the + sale on Moroccan security and our relations with Morocco. General + Walters and S/P question our selling military + equipment which would increase Algeria’s military capability against + Morocco. (Embassy Rabat shares this concern.) NEA and PM argue that this limited sale of aircraft which + probably will replace obsolete transports will not significantly + alter the military situation in the region (an intelligence study + reaches this same conclusion). All agree the Government of Morocco + will take exception to this sale and perhaps use it to argue for + more US military assistance. NEA and PM consider that this is manageable and believe at + least some Moroccans will continue to understand our argument (as + they did prior to the first sale) that it is in both US and Moroccan interest that US influence with Algeria increase. We + should inform Morocco and Tunisia of our decision to sell the + aircraft in advance. While we should not give these governments a veto over our + decision, we should take their views into account prior to informing + Lockheed and the Algerians of the sale. PM believes it is essential to obtain King Hassan’s + reaction before moving ahead with the sale. + + The second issue is Congressional reaction to the sale. General + Walters and S/P believe that Congressional leaders + will question such a sale to Algeria and see it as inconsistent with + our support to Morocco and likely to generate greater Moroccan + demands for US assistance. NEA, H + and PM believe that there would also + be Congressional support and that, given the modest level of the + sale, Congressional concern will be manageable. Should we decide to + proceed with the sale we would wish to consult in advance with + Congressional leadership. + +

RECOMMENDATIONS

+ + + That, before we approve the C–130 sale, we insist that the Algerians make an + unambiguous gesture (such as, for example, recognition of the Habre + government in Chad). When we convey approval we make clear that + future improvements will require Algeria to demonstrate sensitivity + to overall US interests in specific + ways. These might include steps such as those in the examples + mentioned in para. 2 above. (S/P and + S/AL favor. NEA and PM oppose.)Shultz did not + approve or disapprove the recommendation. + + Alternately, that we agree to the sale of C–130s and initiate a sustained + political dialogue designed to make clear that the future of our + relations and the things we can do for Algeria will be affected by + Algeria’s general readiness to take into consideration US interests. (NEA and PM favor. + S/P and S/AL oppose.)Shultz + initialed the “Approve” option. A stamp next to his initials + reads: “NOV 1 1982.” + + That, if you approve the sale, we inform the Governments of + Tunisia and Morocco of our decision and, without giving them a veto, + take their views into account prior to informing Lockheed and the + Algerians.Shultz initialed the “Approve” + option. A stamp next to his initials reads: “NOV 1 1982.” + That we also consult in advance with Congressional leaders.See footnote 4, + Document 108. + +
+ +
+ 119. Memorandum From Geoffrey + Kemp of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret. Sent for + information. Drafted by Attardo. A stamp at the top of the + memorandum reads: “WPC has seen.” A note from Poindexter attached to the + memorandum reads: “Jeff Kemp, 11/5, Judge has agreed to sale of + C–130’s. State has been + notified. JP.” + + + Washington, October 27, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Proposed Sale of C–130s to + Algeria + +

State is proposing that the export license permitting the Lockheed + Corporation to sell an additional 8 C–130 aircraft to Algeria be approved. Commerce agrees but + DoD has expressed some concerns.

+

Algeria bought 6 C–130s last year and + they intend to purchase the 8 additional transport planes to replace + obsolete Soviet transport aircraft now on hand. Discussion of the sale + has been going on for six months now and by the end of this week a paper + will go up to Secretary Shultz + for his decision.See Document 118.

+

The arguments can be broken down as follows:

+

FOR: + + We would be enabling Algeria to diversify its military + equipment sources (moving away from Soviet purchases) and + helping them to achieve a true non-aligned status. + + They have expressed to us their desire to develop improved + relations with us and this would provide an opportunity to do + so. The Algerians were very supportive of King Hassan during the + visit of the Arab League to Washington.A memorandum of Reagan’s October 22, 1982 + conversation with Hassan and other members of the Arab + League is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. + + The sale would indicate to the Algerians that we, too, are + interested in a closer bilateral relationship. + + The Algerians did eventually modify their position on the + Israeli credentials issue at the UN and a sale such as this may give us further + leverage with them on such other issues as the Polisario and + Sandinista movements. + + Despite some Moroccan unhappiness which the U.S.-Moroccan + relationship can weather, the sale would enhance our interests + and visibility in the North African region. + + + The sale of these 8 C–130s + would not shift the military balance in the area at all. +

+

AGAINST: + + We should make explicit certain conditions Algeria must meet + prior to the sale. For example, they must: + + take a more moderate position in the Middle + East + + cease support for the Polisario + + not oppose U.S. on so many issues at the UN + + be more reasonable with the price of natural + gas + + cut off their support for the Sandinista in + Nicaragua + + be less tolerant of Libya + + + They may use the C–130s in + support of the Polisario. + + Algeria has continued to take a confrontational posture + against Israel. Will we be fostering this attitude by approving + the sale? + + We would be encouraging their oil-price hawkishness. + + We would be encouraging their failures to meet gas supply + commitments to U.S. suppliers. + + We would be ignoring their attempts to harbor + terrorists. +

+

All arguments aside, the Lockheed C–130 + sale to Algeria is much larger than it appears. It has now developed + into the issue of how to go ahead with plans for improved relations with + Algeria. On balance I support the sale. There is a downside but this is + a golden opportunity to strengthen our relations with an important Arab + country that has been closely associated with the Soviet Union.

+
+
+ 120. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + September–December 1982. Secret. + + + Washington, November 5, 1982 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+

4. C–130s for + Algeria. Larry + Eagleburger called in the Algerian Ambassador today to + convey the Administration’s decision to license the commercial sale of + eight additional C–130s to + Algeria.A record of the + Eagleburger-Yaker conversation is in telegram 315185 to Algiers, + November 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820581–0857) + Eagleburger + expressed our strong hope that + the US and Algeria can work together + toward building an improved bilateral relationship. Ambassador Yaker received the news of our decision + with pleasure. He accepted Eagleburger’s proposal that we proceed with a serious + discussion of the outstanding issues between us. (S)

+
+
+ 121. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + September–December 1982. Secret. + + + Washington, December 20, 1982 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+

3. Mac Baldrige’s Visit to Algeria. Mac Baldrige’s recent visit to + Algeria was a success. Mac, leading a Trade and Investment Mission, saw + most of the key Algerian economic decision makers and had a 90-minute + meeting with President Bendjedid,A record of the + Baldrige-Bendjedid conversation is in telegram 42404 from Paris, + December 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820637–0093) who said that Algeria + desires better political and economic relations with us. The Baldrige mission revealed significant + commercial prospects in the fields of agribusiness, water resources, + telecommunications, aviation and avionics, operations and maintenance + services, and manpower training. In the wake of Mac’s visit, the + Algerian Government signaled its wish to begin negotiations soon on a + civil air agreement providing for direct flights from Algeria to the + US and is negotiating two large + contracts, each in excess of $200 million, with Lockheed and Boeing. + President Bendjedid also + indicated his desire for other high level US visits. (C)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+
+ +
+ 122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830006–0972. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted in NEA with text received from the White + House; cleared by Hill and + Sebastian; approved by David + Schneider. + + 2333. + + Washington, January 5, 1983, 2013Z + + + + SUBJECT + Letter From President Reagan to President Bendjedid. + +

1. (C) Entire text.

+

2. Following is text of letter from President Reagan to President Bendjedid that should be delivered at + earliest convenience: signed original being pouched. Letter is dated + December, 31.

+

Begin text: Dear Mr. President: Secretary Baldrige has reported to me fullyNo record of Baldrige’s report to Reagan was found. the views + you asked him to transmit. I greatly appreciate your taking the time to + meet with him at length,See Document 121. and I am grateful to + Minister Khellef and the many + other Algerian Ministers who met with members of the Trade and + Investment Mission. The American business leaders were also very pleased + with the intensive series of meetings they had with the heads of + Algerian enterprises during their stay.

+

As Secretary Baldrige informed + you, the United States reciprocates your desire for good bilateral + relations. Indeed, the U.S. hopes to have good relations with all + countries in your area. I also fully share your aspirations for regional + stability and cooperation. The United States thus supports a resolution + of the Western Sahara problem in conformity with OAU decisions, and we hope that a + ceasefire and referendum can be organized soon. I understand that these + and other topics will be discussed in the context of the enhanced + political dialogue our two governments have begun.

+

Please be assured that the United States is prepared to assist in all + possible ways in the realization of the plans which you have for + accelerating the development of your country and for further improving + the life of your people.

+

May I send you, Mr. President, at this holy season of the prophet’s + birthday and the new year, my best wishes and those of the American + people for health and prosperity.

+

With warm good wishes to you and your country for 1983.

+

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan.

+

End text.

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 123. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official + Memoranda (01/18/1983). Confidential. Sent through Eagleburger. Schneider initialed for Veliotes. Drafted by Ann Korky + (NEA/AFN) on January 7; + cleared by Sebastian and + David Schneider. Korky + initialed for Sebastian. A + stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” In the + right hand margin next to the subject line, an unknown hand wrote: + “P staff informed 1/24 9:00 am.” Tab 2 is not + attached. + + + Washington, January 18, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + President Bendjedid’s + Invitation to Visit Algeria + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

How to respond to Algerian President Bendjedid’s invitation for you to visit Algeria.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

During his December visit to Belgium, President Bendjedid drew aside our Ambassador to + discuss with approval Commerce Secretary Baldrige’s recent Trade and Investment Mission to + Algeria and to extend an invitation for you to visit Algeria “soon,” in + the context of our mutual effort to improve relations. In your absence, + Under Secretary Eagleburger + sent an interim response through the Algerian Ambassador here, noting + his own positive, personal reaction and the practical difficulties + involved in scheduling your foreign travel.In telegram 354567 to Algiers, December 22, 1982, the Department + transmitted the text of a letter from Eagleburger to Yaker. Eagleburger said in part “I am delighted with this + initiative and understand full well the political gesture reflected + in it. I am sure the Secretary will be equally pleased. You are + aware, of course, how crowded his schedule is and the difficulty he + faces in planning foreign travel commitments. Nonetheless, I am + confident the Secretary would look forward to visiting Algeria at + some mutually agreeable time, if it proves possible.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820664–0055)

+

Bendjedid’s invitation does represent a political gesture of some + significance. The Algerians had protested to us a series of US actions in November (our joint + amphibious exercises with Morocco, a USN sail-through of Algerian-claimed territorial waters in + routine demonstration of our right of innocent passage without prior + notification, and our vote against the Algerian-sponsored UNGA resolution on the Western Sahara) that they consider + inimical to GOA interests.In telegram 4815 from Algiers, December 1, 1982, + the Embassy reported that Newlin had been called in on November 30 “for + general discussion of bilateral relationship with Director of North + American and European Affairs Chitour. Expressing surprise and + regret at recent U.S. actions—joint U.S.-Moroccan exercises, Sixth + Fleet penetration of territorial waters, and U.S. vote in U.N. + against Algerian resolution on the Western Sahara—Chitour laid down + a clear marker that such initiatives do not square with the Algerian + conception of improving the political dialogue.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820621–0869) We understand that the GOA had seriously considered cancelling the Baldrige visit, but that its success + led Bendjedid to extend his + invitation to you. Ambassador Newlin strongly recommends that you accept.In telegram 200 from Algiers, January 17, Newlin suggested that given “the + unusually warm reception accorded by President Bendjedid to Secretary Baldrige and members of his Trade + and Investment Mission,” which “offer U.S. opportunities for a + gradual and steady improvement in our political and commercial + relations,” Shultz “should + respond affirmatively to Bendjedid’s invitation.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830027–0096)

+

While I believe that you should do so in principle, a visit in the + immediate future would be premature. At your direction, we have begun an + expanded political dialogue with the Algerians. Both Under Secretary + Eagleburger and I have met + with their Ambassador, and we have agreed with him on an agenda of + issues for future discussion. We have not yet, however, had a sufficient + number of exchanges to gauge the direction of the dialogue. A visit to + Algiers at the Secretarial level might usefully come at a somewhat later + time.

+

As an interim step, I recommend you send Under Secretary Eagleburger for a round of + discussions with the Algerian leadership.Eagleburger and + Yaker met on January 24. + A summary of their conversation is in telegram 24488 to Algiers, + January 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830047–0778) This should be followed + or preceded by a brief stop in Tunisia to defuse the concerns a visit to + Algiers alone might cause in Rabat. (It could be done in three + days.)

+

As hosts, the Algerians will have a degree of influence with PLO leaders, and it would be useful to + have Eagleburger reinforce + Algeria’s newly constructive approach to the peace process by following + up Foreign Minister Ibrahimi’s + participation in the Fez delegation.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you initial the cable at Tab 1,Not + attached. conveying verbally your acceptance in principle of + Bendjedid’s invitation, + subject to future agreement on a mutually convenient date, and proposing + that meanwhile Under Secretary Eagleburger visit Algiers on your behalf for high-level + exchanges on issues of mutual concern.Eagleburger initialed + below this recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830162–0971. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared + by David Schneider, Eagleburger, Hill, and Robinson (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, + Jerusalem, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Nouakchott, and USUN. + + 80332. + + Washington, March 24, 1983, 0512Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Shultz Receives + Algerian Ambassador Yaker. + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Summary: The Secretary met March 18 with Algerian Ambassador + Yaker for a 30-minute + review of issues between us. Yaker discussed Algerian efforts to improve + relations with its neighbors, reiterating GOA’s traditional call for direct Moroccan-Polisario + negotiations. He urged U.S. to adopt a more balanced position on the + Western Sahara, to reconsider its policy on contacts with the + Polisario and PLO. The Secretary + noted that the U.S. position on the PLO was clear and unchanged. On Libya, Yaker said that Algiers does not + approve of all Qadhafi’s + actions, but wants good relations with all its neighbors. + U.S.-Libyan strains are a problem for the GOA. The Secretary responded that Libya could easily + improve relations with the U.S. by ceasing its destabilizing + activities. Yaker termed the + results of the Delhi NAM summit + “positive,”Reference is to the + seventh conference of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned + Movement (NAM), New Delhi, + March 7–12. and said the GOA continues to look to global negotiations for + solutions to pressing world economic problems. He also raised U.S. + regulatory action on Algerian gas imports, noting the GOA’s strong interest in protecting + the integrity of its gas contracts, including pricing provisions. + End summary. + + The Secretary received Algerian Ambassador for twice postponed + bilateral March 18. Under Secretary Eagleburger, DAS + Schneider and AFN Director + Sebastian sat in. + + Yaker opened by reiterating + President Bendjedid’s + invitation to the Secretary to visit Algeria “when you can.”See Document + 123. The Secretary responded that he would like + to come, could not now say when that would prove possible, but + appreciated the fact and spirit of the invitation which reflected a + desire, reciprocated, for the improvement of our relations. + Yaker responded that + Algeria is also working in this sense. The Baldrige visit had been a great + success opening new + perspectives.See footnote 2, Document 121. + However, Yaker continued, + there are also problems in our bilateral relations. A question has + been raised about the cost of imported Algerian gas; the El Paso + negotiations have left some scars.See + footnote 2, Document 99. + Algeria has a strong interest in protecting the integrity of its + (gas) contracts, including the (price) incentives they contain. + Algeria has tried to develop this resource and its import programs + are based on its sales. As a result, Algeria’s financial situation + is good in that its debts are manageable. + + Moving to Algeria’s current regional posture, Yaker said that Algeria has decided + to take the initiative to improve its regional relations. It is + demarcating borders with its neighbors. Algeria believes that the + prospects for rapprochement with Morocco are promising, “providing + we find a solution to the problem of the Western Sahara.” The + Secretary welcomed these remarks. Yaker then said that Algiers is confident the + Saharan problem will be resolved if there are “negotiations between + the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario,” to implement the OAU’s cease fire/referendum formula. + Yaker then pointed out + that President Bendjedid had + just arrived in Tunisia where he had been given a good reception. He + expected the visit to have a favorable impact on Algerian-Tunisian + relations. + + Yaker then moved on to + conclude that the USG should take + all of these developments into account. The U.S. should take a more + balanced position towards the Western Sahara and a settlement based + on self-determination, he said. We should prefer such a settlement + to a military solution which is beyond reach. The Secretary + commented that we agree on a negotiated solution and share Algeria’s + interest in peace, stability and regional cooperation in North + Africa. + + Yaker then turned to Libya. + U.S.-Libyan relations are a problem for the GOA, he said. “We do not know what to do but are + concerned.” Algiers does not approve of everything the Libyan regime + does but is striving to have good relations with all its neighbors. + The Secretary responded by interjecting that it would be easy for + Libya to have better relations with us. All Qadhafi needs to do is to stop + destabilizing his neighbors, e.g. Chad. “It’s his behavior that + bothers us.” + + Yaker then inquired about + developments in the Middle East. He reiterated the commitment of the + GOA to the solutions developed + in Fez as a basis for negotiations.See + footnote 2, Document + 115. He said that Israeli unresponsiveness to Arab + proposals was having an adverse impact. He wondered whether U.S. + policy was taking adequate account of Lebanon’s need for unity, integrity and sovereignty. + The Secretary said that the U.S. had been responsive to the Arab Fez + initiative. We had received King Hassan and his delegation;See footnote 3, + Document 119. had studied the questions sent us + and responded; had met repeatedly in capitals. Key to a solution, + the Secretary said, lies in direct talks between the Arab countries + and Israel. King Hussein is central to this, as are the + Palestinians. We do not yet know what Hussein will do or when but + believe he will find his way to the table. As for the recent visits + of Lebanese and Israeli delegations, they had gone reasonably well, + but problems remain. Withdrawal remains our goal. To achieve it, + adequate answers will have to be found on the issue of Israel’s + security from attack from southern Lebanon. To assure this, a mix of + agreed measures will be needed. Some of the job will have to be done + by the Lebanese themselves. The MNF + and UNIFIL may also play a role. + + Yaker asked whether we had + contact with the PLO. The Secretary + said we do not speak to the PLO. + Yaker said his government + considered we should, that it would be useful and “highly + advisable.” The Secretary responded that the position of the USG was clear. It had been set forth + time and time again. Our conditions had not changed. Yaker said that the PLO wanted contact with us and wanted + to talk. Algeria thought it would be helpful. This had been the + spirit of the PNC which had given + Arafat a flexibility he + had lacked. Arafat’s position + had emerged strengthened. + + Yaker then turned to the + Gulf war. He said Algiers’ mediation efforts continued but the + conditions posed by Iran remained unacceptable to Iraq. Yaker noted that we had received + the Iraqi Foreign Minister and wondered what had come of that. He + said that Algeria was in close touch with King Fahd and working in + consultation with him for stability in the region. The Secretary + replied that we have no relations with Iran and that our tie with + Iraq is “thin.” The Secretary said he had seen the Iraqi Foreign + Minister to discuss bilateral relations and hoped that the GOA’s efforts at mediation would prove + successful. + + Yaker turned to the Delhi + NAM summit. He qualified the + results as “on balance, positive.” He thought it possible that + global negotiations (GN) would be achieved in stages. The GOA attaches importance to the + American position. It thinks that getting GN started would be in our + mutual interest even if no new resource flows are immediately + triggered. The Secretary said that it was too soon for him to + comment on the NAM summit. He said + that meanwhile it is good news for the world that the U.S. economy + is again expanding. The + impact would be felt worldwide in trade and economic development. GN + clearly needs further definition, however, the Secretary continued. + Can these talks be structured so as to respect the IMF and other international + institutions? We have lately seen again the importance of the IMF. Yaker said his government thinks we should be + discussing an emergency program for the IMF to increase its lending by 40 percent. There had + indeed been positive developments but more needs to be done, given + the growing indebtedness of many countries and their unmet + development needs. The Secretary said that no single measure will + solve the problem. Austerity is needed. Countries must come to grips + with themselves. + + As the conversation was drawing to a close, Yaker raised two further questions: + (a) the consequences of U.S. military cooperation with Morocco and + (b) whether the U.S. would favor direct contact with the Polisario. + The New York Times, Yaker said, called the Polisario + Marxists. This is untrue. “We know them as nationalists,” he said. + Yaker added that Algeria + intended to replicate with Bourguiba what President Bendjedid had just done with King Hassan. + + The Secretary responded stating gratification for these Algerian + views. He expressed his appreciation of the importance of the + efforts at regional stabilization Algeria was making. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830202–0910. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Ann Korky + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Pelletreau, Teicher, Katherine Shirley (S/S), Thomas Randall (S/S–O), and Kemp; approved by + Veliotes. + + 99445. + + Washington, April 12, 1983, 1736Z + + +

For Under Secretary Eagleburger/Topol 20027. Subject: Oral Message for + President Bendjedid from + President Reagan.

+ + + (C) Entire text. + + You should deliver the following oral message from President + Reagan to President + Bendjedid during your + April 13 meeting.See Document 126. + + Begin text: Mr. President: the past several days have witnessed + important developments in the Middle East peace process, including + efforts by some to impede or destroy it. At this critical time, I + want to assure you personally that the events of this weekendOn April 10, the PLO’s Palestine National Council rejected Arafat’s agreement with + Jordanian King Hussein to allow Jordan to negotiate with Israel + on the status of the West Bank. Documentation on this issue is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute. have not swayed my + determination to pursue the just and lasting peace that is so long + overdue. The proposals I outlined September 1See footnote 2, Document + 114. continue to hold the promise of peace, of + a settlement that meets the essential needs of all the parties. + There is no substitute for direct negotiations in bringing this + long-standing conflict to a close. It is clear that we cannot allow + a minority to exercise a veto over the peace process and it is of + the utmost importance that Jordan have the full and unambiguous + support of all who truly seek an equitable and durable peace. If our + current efforts are defeated, the primary losers will be the + Palestinian people and their desire to realize their legitimate + rights. If we remain firm in our resolve, I am confident that we can + achieve a just and comprehensive settlement. In the critical days + ahead, the assistance of Arab statesmen will be important to assure + that the opportunity for peace now before us is not lost. I + appreciated your positive comments when I undertook my initiative + last September and Algeria’s constructive role in the months since. + I hope that I can continue to count on your help at this critical + juncture. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 126. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830226–0322, D830224–0138, D830224–0719. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. + + 1629. + + Algiers, April 13, 1983, 1025Z + + +

From Under Secretary Eagleburger/Polto 2007. Dept rpt as desired. + Subject: U/S Eagleburger’s + Meetings in Algiers: Session With Foreign Minister. Ref: Algiers + 1630.In telegram 1630 from Algiers, + April 13, the Embassy transmitted a summary of Eagleburger’s discussions in + Algiers on the Middle East, the NAM + meeting in New Delhi, and global negotiations. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830204–0977)

+

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. Reftel reported on U/S first session in Algiers. This message reports + on second, more restricted meeting.

+

3. FonMin + Ibrahimi, accompanied by MFA + SYG Azzout and Political Affairs + Director Kerroum received U/S + Eagleburger, accompanied by + Ambassador Newlin and AFN + Director Sebastian for about 45 + minutes late morning April 11. Meeting was cordial throughout. FonMin discussed Algerian-Moroccan + relations, OAU and Saharan settlement + perspectives as well as US-Algerian + bilateral ties. Following developed.

+

A. Algerian-Moroccan relations, OAU, and + Saharan settlement perspectives. In response to Under Secretary + Eagleburger’s question, + FonMin described President + Chadli Bendjedid’s + conversation with King Hassan in late February during their border + meeting.See Document + 19. + Ibrahimi said that Chadli had + opened by telling Hassan that he was not authorized to speak for the + Polisario but, as President of Algeria, was prepared to transmit to + Polisario any proposal King might wish to make. He invited King’s + comments. Hassan responded, “Nairobi does not please me much.” Hassan + said that if a referendum eventuates there will be a winner and a loser. + This would leave scars on the Algero-Moroccan relationship. Hashen asked + why the Saharans who had chosen the Polisario and those who had chosen + Morocco should not talk to each other. Ibrahimi said Chadli responded that in his view, only + way to bridge so polarized a position is through the emergence of a + Saharan state. King responded that Moroccan man in the street would find + Saharan state difficult to accept. Chadli replied that Moroccan public + opinion was what King had made it. King could change it. He (Chadli) + wished to say to King in front of FonMin + Boucetta as representative of Istiqlal that Algeria + considered King Hassan, not Moroccan political parties, its only valid + interlocutor in Morocco.

+

According to Ibrahimi, Chadli then + said that as President of Algeria he wished to be helpful to Morocco. + Algeria considered Moroccan monarchy factor of stability in Morocco and + its region and thought what Moroccan people needed now was not more war + but more bread. King’s eventual agreement to a Saharan state could be + made more palatable to Moroccan public opinion, if Moroccans saw direct + benefit to themselves in such an outcome. Algeria would be prepared to + assist in making this possible by helping to provide a suitable + political and economic cover. The King said he was interested only in + the flag and the postage stamps. However, he would consider Algeria’s + proposals. Chadli then said that, politically, a Saharan state together + with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, could be fitted into a + greater Maghrebi ensemble. Initially, a Maghreb summit might be convened + in which the leaders of these countries might participate. This should + please the Moroccan people. Economically, Algeria would contribute the + iron ore of Ngara Djebilet. This ore needed to be exported via the + Atlantic. This would require a port which Moroccan labor could build on + Morocco’s Atlantic coast with direct benefit to the Moroccan economy. + Also, “when Algerian gas crosses Moroccan territory” Moroccan households + and industry could burn Algerian fuel. The Moroccan and Algerian people + could thus have something in common. In the same line of thought, + Saharan phosphates might be exploited jointly between Saharans and + Moroccans. The King, Ibrahimi + said, asked for time to think it over.

+

Ibrahimi then told Eagleburger that Chadli had also gone + to Tunisia to explore this idea.See Document 20. Algeria and Tunisia had + signed a border agreement and a treaty of friendship. The latter should + prove reassuring to the Tunisians after Gafsa. Tunisia’s investigation + of that incident had shown that there had been no Algerian involvement + whatsoever. Algeria had also negotiated border demarcation agreements + with all of her other African neighbors, Libya excepted. The GOA hoped to be able to complete the + process by signing with Mali and Mauritania before the end of the month. + Algiers considered that the border with Morocco had been demarcated and + agreed since the King of Morocco had signed the relevant accord in ’72. + That left only Libya and the Libyan [garble] was expected in Algiers + today (Apr 11) to begin negotiations of a frontier accord. Algeria had + thus set up a “Maghrebi dynamic”. It had been pleasantly surprised to + see the scope of the favorable reactions its initiative had elicited + throughout the region. Libya was confronted by a choice of either + integration (into the Maghreb) or isolation. Algeria hoped Tripoli would + chose integration. In Algeria’s view the construction of a greater + Maghreb and a more solid region should be seen in Washington as a favorable development. The + U.S. could help to bring it about. Its assistance (unspecified) would be + welcome.

+

U/S Eagleburger wondered how + FonMin + Ibrahimi saw the Saharan issue + play itself out in OAU context? + Ibrahimi replied that for + first time in its history, 1982 had seen two failures to convene an + OAU summit. A third attempt is now + being readied. Algeria hoped it would succeed. Algeria wanted the OAU to survive, believing that regional + organizations had value and that the OAU is best placed to deal with African problems. He hoped + the U.S. agreed. The U/S assured him that we do agree. The Under + Secretary then asked about Qadhafi’s reaction to these developments. Ibrahimi smiling said that the first + adjective that came to mind was “unpredictable”. No one knew what + Qadhafi would do. Algiers was + counting on the strength of the pro-Maghrebi current now running in area + to convince Qadhafi to go along. + In reply to further questions, Ibrahimi said he could not say how various problems + which had plagued the OAU would play + themselves out. This was up to contact Group of 12, “mandated” to + organize Addis summit. As Ibrahimi understood it, Chad would be represented by + Habre and there would be no rpt no preparatory ministerial. The summit + would be convened directly. All chiefs of state would attend and they + would discuss everything. (Comment: He did not go beyond this + formulation. End comment)

+

Under Secretary Eagleburger + expressed appreciation. He said that to extent U.S. could be helpful it + would be. U.S. wished to contribute to efforts now in course to + strengthen the Maghreb and explore ways in which to end the Saharan + conflict. Moroccans know this. Tunisians are currently somewhat + concerned with respect to Qadhafi’s intentions towards them. We are trying to assist + there as well. Ibrahimi + interjected that it is important to contain the Saharan conflict “so + close to our frontiers, those of Morocco and Mauritania.” We must try to + do so without humiliating the Moroccan monarchy, he said. Algeria had + had ample opportunities to intervene in Morocco after the Skhirat + attempt on King Hassan,Reference is to the + attempted assassination of King Hassan on July 10, 1971, at his + palace in Skhirat in southern Morocco. but had not done so. + Algeria now hopes to return to the posture prevalent during the decade + of cooperation which marked relations between Algeria and Morocco from + 1965 to 1975. “The U.S. can help us” settle the Saharan problem, + Ibrahimi said. Eagleburger noted that Ibrahimi had included Mauritania in + proposed greater Maghreb. Ibrahimi said that Mauritania was widely seen as + Achilles heel of Maghreb “the place it can be sundered”. It had to be + included. Algeria was doing what it could to help the Mauritanian Govt + which it saw as nationalist regime. Libyans, Iraqi Baath, Moroccans had + all tried destabilize Mauritania at some point. Algeria had told Libyans + that it believes in the non-exportability of national “facts” and does + not approve of Libyan + interference in the affairs of its neighbors. This remains the Algerian + view. This is not merely a matter of principle but a position on which + Algiers has acted. In fact, Ibrahimi said in closing this part of the conversation, + Algeria, which is not blessed with unlimited resources, has expended + $200 million last year in aid to other African states “without a quid + pro quo”.

+

B. Eagleburger invited Ibrahimi to discuss his view of our + bilateral relations. Ibrahimi + responded that GOA saw them as on the + whole satisfactory. Algeria would like to see them expand further. + “There is a lot more we could do.” Two areas come to mind: agro-business + and cultural/educational exchanges. Algeria coe [could + be?] a long-term customer. It will have to import important + quantities of grain for the foreseeable future. Such imports might + usefully be put on a solid organized basis. The cultural area is also + often neglected. The GOA wants to train + Algerians of tomorrow to be at home in Arabic, French and English. The + U.S. could send English teachers to Algeria. We should be working on + this. Algeria, of course, needed to sell its gas. This too is an + undertaking over time.

+

C. At FonMin + Ibrahimi’s request U/S also + summarized U.S. views on Middle East developments and the Williamsburg + Summit as presented at first meeting (reftel). Ibrahimi expressed appreciation.

+ Newlin +
+
+ 127. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830251–0912. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Amman, + Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Rabat, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, + and Tunis. + + 1952. + + Algiers, May 4, 1983, 1515Z + + + + SUBJECT + Growing Algerian Activism in Middle East Peace Process. + + + Ref: + Algiers 1937 (notal).In telegram 1937 + from Algiers, May 3, the Embassy reported that Presidential + Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi believed that “while recognizing + positive elements of President Reagan’s plan, U.S. needed to endorse + Palestinian self-determination in order for Arafat make the leap.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830249–0345) + + + + Confidential Entire text. + + + Summary: Algerian involvement in the Middle East peace process has + entered a more activist phase. Although now willing to engage its + good offices—as demonstrated in recent trip of Presidential Emissary + Lakhdar Brahimi and message of President Bendjedid to President ReaganTelegram Tosec 40208/121121, May 3, + summarized Bendjedid’s + message to Reagan: “Yaker came in to express Algerian President + Bendjedid’s belief + that it is time for the U.S. to take a ‘bold initiative’ and + make a statement acknowledging the fundamental importance of the + Palestinian problem and the rights of the Palestinian people to + self-determination. He did not refer to the Moroccan + initiative.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830247–0959)—rather than sit + passively on the sidelines, the GOA + remains wary of treading on PLO + prerogatives. Algerian influence at present derives in large part + from a strict policy of noninterference in internal Palestinian + affairs and its concomitant success in keeping lines of + communication open with more radical Middle East players—within the + PLO as well as among Arab + states—while increasing its cooperation with moderates, notably + Arafat and Saudi Arabia. + The GOA remains convinced that the + Reagan initiative + contains flaws, but—always keeping within the general parameters + prescribed by Arafat and the + PLO mainstream—is ready to + assist more actively in the search for a compromise solution. End + summary. + + The evolution of Algerian Middle East policy has been long and + tortuous, but has picked up speed in recent months. Although the + GOA had gradually distanced + itself from the Steadfastness Front over a number of years, the + final break was consummated only in the fall of 1982. Algeria not + only resisted Libyan and Syrian pressures for further front + activities, but also signed on publicly with the Arab mainstream at + the Fez Summit. GOA representatives + then played a positive and active role in the follow-up visits of + the Fez Contact Group to UNSC + capitals.See footnote 3, Document 119. Previously President + Bendjedid had + characterized the Reagan + initiative as insufficient, but nonetheless a step forward + containing positive elements. Most recently, Bendjedid engaged Algerian + diplomacy in an effort to find an alternative formulation for + self-determination which might help in breaking the Jordan-PLO + impasse. To that end he dispatched adviser Lakhdar Brahimi on a + special mission to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan and then wrote + personally to President Reagan. + + Among other signs of a more activist Algerian Middle East policy, + one of the most striking is the regular series of consultations + between Arafat and Bendjedid. This personal + relationship appears to have grown steadily in the wake of the + PLO evacuation of Beirut—where + the GOA placed the totality of its + resources at PLO disposal—and to + have intensified during the PNC + meeting when Algeria provided a no-strings-attached refuge for + Arafat in his time of + need. Much publicity has + also been given to the GOA’s + 10-million-dollar contribution to the PLO during the battle of Beirut and to the military + training provided in Algeria for Palestinian fighters. + + At the same time, however, Algeria has done its best to keep open + lines of communication with other PLO factions, especially those of Hawatmeh and Habbash. + They are routinely received at the highest levels and were given no + reason to complain of GOA meddling + or favoritism during the PNC. + Algeria also maintains good contacts with the radical Arab states of + its former Steadfastness Front alliance. For example, both Arafat and King Hassan asked + Bendjedid to intervene + with Assad on the subject of an Arab summit. Finally, building on + Bendjedid’s November 1982 + meeting with King Fahd and his more recent meetings with his + Moroccan and Tunisian neighbors, the GOA has increased its cooperation and coordination with + moderate Arabs. Lakhdar Brahimi’s April 23 meeting with King Hussein + seems to have added Jordan to that list. + + The net result is a substantial Algerian capacity to play the role + of honest broker in the Middle East. The GOA is proud of its peacemaking initiatives elsewhere, + as in the release of U.S. hostages in Iran and ongoing efforts to + resolve the Iran-Iraq war. It would be tempted by the possibility of + playing a meaningful role in the Middle East in what it sees as the + most important of all conflicts. In that context, the GOA feeler on a self-determination + formulation represents a cautious toe in the water; Brahimi’s + positive remarks to King Hussein and Bendjedid’s letter to Reagan offer the prospect of significantly greater + activism. + + It is difficult to predict how far Algeria will be prepared to + pursue its new role. Its most comfortable position is that of + go-between or broker on behalf of the PLO. The GOA firmly + believes in the PLO as the sole and + legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and has said + consistently that it could accept any solution in the Middle East + which would be acceptable to the PLO. Thus, support for PLO-sponsored initiatives entails only limited + political exposure for the GOA. + Beyond that, however, Algeria remains chary of any maneuvering which + might hint at usurpation of Palestinian prerogatives. + + Nonetheless, the GOA is now more + receptive to active participation in consultations among its Arab + partners and could prove to be a useful link between moderate and + radical elements. Lakhdar Brahimi told the Ambassador that Algeria + would work discreetly to improve Syria-PLO, Jordan-PLO, and + Syria-Jordan relations—all in coordination with the Saudis. Brahimi + also welcomed regular consultations with U.S. on the peace + process. + + Overall, the evolution in Algerian Middle East policy is positive + from our perspective. The GOA has + shown itself already to be a valuable ally for Arafat, helping to free him to some + extent from Syrian pressures. Growing coordination with Saudi Arabia, + Morocco and Jordan should improve prospects for the moderate Arab + camp. Algeria’s ability to talk with all parties—including the + U.S.—provides a useful channel and potential influence heretofore + unavailable. Although the GOA is + likely to be very cautious in its approach, its emerging activism + should be carefully evaluated as a new factor in the Middle East + equation. + + Newlin +
+
+ 128. Letter From President Reagan to Algerian President BendjedidSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Algeria: + President Bendjedid + (8105773–8407957). No classification marking. + + + Washington, May 19, 1983 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

Once again, we face a period of risk and opportunity in the Middle East, + one that prompts me to share my thinking with you and other Arab + statesmen and to seek your support.

+

As you are aware, Mr. President, we have succeeded in concluding an + agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. + This agreement marks an important and necessary first step towards the + withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory, a requisite + condition for the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty and authority + over all Lebanese territory. It seeks to ensure also that the + circumstances that led to Israel’s military action last summer will not + recur.

+

From your message of May 2,See footnote 3, Document 127. which + your Ambassador delivered here in Washington, I know of your concern for + Lebanon’s future. Ambassador Newlin has reported to us also Algeria’s consistent + support for the restoration of full Lebanese independence and + sovereignty. I can assure you, Mr. President, that the United States is + firmly committed to that same goal and that implementation of the + agreement we have reached is essential to its achievement.

+

Those who seek peace and stability in the Middle East and who support the + Lebanese Government’s commitment to reestablishing with honor full + authority over its national territory and destiny share our interest in the successful withdrawal + of Israeli and other foreign forces from Lebanon. This goal is important + in itself and a step towards resolution of the Palestinian problem + which, like you, we consider the heart of the Middle East dispute.

+

We are aware of the recent contacts your government has had with that of + Syria and other Arab states. I hope, Mr. President, that your government + will use these contacts with Syria to support the withdrawal agreement. + The alternative is continued conflict and bloodshed in Lebanon, with + risk to the region as a whole and further delay in seeking a + comprehensive settlement to the larger problems of the Middle East.

+

I know from your message of your concern for these issues, and I do + appreciate your willingness to receive Ambassador Walters as you did last + September.See footnote 3, Document 114.

+

With best regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+
+ 129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830452–0491. Confidential. Drafted by James Vincent (AF/I); cleared by Sebastian and Kenneth Scott (AF/W); approved by Vincent. Sent for + information to Bamako, Dakar, Conakry, and Nouakchott. + + 222550. + + Washington, August 12, 1983, 1005Z + + +

Following State 222550 dtd Aug 8, sent action Algiers being repeated to + you for your info:

+

Quote: Subject: Ambassador Yaker’s + August 1 Call on the Vice President.

+ + + (C) Entire text. + + Summary: In cordial August 1 conversation, Vice President + Bush and Algerian + Ambassador Yaker reviewed + current African and Middle Eastern questions with Yaker taking predictable Algerian + line on Chad, Western Sahara and Algerian-Libyan relations. On the + Middle East, Yaker recalled + President Bendjedid’s message + to President Reagan + urging U.S. statement on + Palestinian self-determination as key to progress on Lebanon and the + Arab-Israeli dispute.See footnote 3, Document 127. + Yaker raised issue of + Algerian gas exports to U.S. as potentially serious problem in our + bilateral relations. Vice President said he would study the issue in + anticipation of his September visit to Algiers. + + Vice President Bush + received Ambassador Yaker at + latter’s request August 1 for lively but cordial conversation. + Following is summary of salient points: + + Vice President’s trip—Yaker reported that Algeria’s + President Bendjedid + is greatly looking forward to the opportunity of an exchange + of views with the Vice President on issues of bilateral and + international interest. The Vice President replied that he + too looked forward to these talks. + + The Vice President invited Yaker to comment on his government’s views + in events in Chad. Yaker said that the Algerian Government was + concerned by the events and mentioned that during Col. + Qadhafi’s visit in + Algiers on July 25–26 it had been agreed “that there should + be no intervention by outside powers in Chad.” The Vice + President asked Ambassador Yaker how this squared with Qadhafi’s intervention? The + Ambassador replied that Qadhafi was responding defensively to the + “presence of foreigners” in Chad. Yaker said his government + believes that the only solution to the Chadian problem + resided in the reconciliation of Chad’s political + factions. + + Western Sahara—Yaker summarized the results of the 19th + Addis OAU summit. He, + naturally, laid stress on the fact that the Western Sahara + resolution of the 19th summit identified the parties.See Document + 407. He pointed to King Hassan’s speech + of July 9 saying that King Hassan says that he is ready to + proceed with the implementation of the resolution while + making no move to do so. + + Algeria/Libya—In response to the Vice President’s + question, Yaker + characterized Algerian-Libyan relations as “normal”. He + pointed to the complementarities in the two countries + economies and noted the GOA’s interest in the building of a “Greater + Maghreb”. He said that Algeria was ready to pool her + resources with those of her neighbors in order to solve + problems. + + Middle East—Yaker recapitulated his government’s current + views on the Middle East, without breaking new ground. He + pointed out that Algeria had sent a message to President + Reagan urging + the U.S. to speak out on the issue of self-determination for + the Palestinians in a Jordano-Palestinian framework. He + stressed his government’s view that the basic (Palestinian) problem + had to be dealt with if all the other related problems were + to be resolved. + + Lebanon/PLO/West Bank—In response to the Vice President’s + account of the evolution of Syria’s position on the + withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, which + included specific reference to Assad’s previous assertion + that Syria would pull out of Lebanon once the Israelis had + agreed to do so, Yaker noted the dilemma of the Palestinians: + where would they go? He linked the current split in the + PLO to Israel’s + invasion of Lebanon. He urged the U.S. to declare that it is + Washington’s view that self-determination for the people of + the West Bank is needed; that their future lay in + association with Jordan. If the U.S. Government were to make + such a statement “then we can get together and solve all the + issues now before us in the region.” Yaker thought that + President Gemayel’s writ runs only in Beirut; that the + Syrians have security concerns; that Israel should be asked + to withdraw its troops unconditionally and that Israeli + settlement activities should be stopped. + + Yaker raised + Algeria’s gas exports to the U.S. as an important bilateral + issue. He informed the Vice President of the presence of an + Algerian delegation which had come to study the problem. The + Ambassador gave the Algerian Government’s view that its + LNG contracts with + American firms should be fulfilled. Algeria is being asked + to review the terms of its agreements with Trunkline. In an + effort to be accommodating, Algeria has agreed to set aside + a take or pay provision of the contract with Trunkline for + two years. It has agreed to reduce the volume of its sales + of gas to Trunkline by 40 percent. In so doing, it would + earn roughly dols 500 million less than it had planned, sums + which it would have to borrow on the financial markets as a + consequence. Notwithstanding these Algerian concessions it + now appears that Congress and the FERC may take positions + adverse to Algeria in this context. “This would create + difficult problems in our bilateral relations.” After + hearing Yaker out, + the Vice President responded that he would get himself + briefed up on details of the gas problem so as to be + prepared to discuss it in Algiers. Shultz + + +

Unquote

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 130. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the White House and the + Department of StateSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830573–0711. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information to Rabat and Tunis. + + 3937. + + Algiers, September 15, 1983, + 1145Z + + +

Tunis for Vice President’s Party. Subject: Vice President’s visit to + Algeria: Meeting With Prime Minister Abdelghani.

+ + + S/Exdis—Entire text. + + Vice President, accompanied by his working party, met September 14 + with Prime Minister Abdelghani at the Palais du Gouvernement. Algerian + participation included Minister of Planning Brahimi, Ambassador + Yaker, and MFA Director for Europe and North + America Chitour. + + Abdelghani warmly welcomed + the Vice President, calling his visit a major event in the history + of our bilateral relations, one which would contribute substantially + to the beginning of a new era. The GOA is ready to actively examine all possibilities for + enlarging bilateral cooperation and giving it new elan and new + dimensions. The Prime Minister recalled Algeria’s non-aligned + position, a cardinal principal enshrined in the national charter. In + that context, Algeria is working to consolidate its independence as + well as for peace, progress and the liberty of peoples still under + domination. The GOA is ready for + fruitful, balanced, mutually beneficial relations with all those who + accept cooperation on a reasonable and equitable basis. Abdelghani underlined the + importance which Algeria attached to the diversification of its + contacts as well as to efforts to better our bilateral exchanges and + reinforce our mutual cooperation. + + The Vice President emphasized our total respect for the principles + of non-alignment and national independence, stressing that the U.S. + seeks the best possible relations with all the nations of the + Maghreb. Finally, the Vice President thanked Abdelghani for the very warm + welcome extended by the GOA. + + Turning to the Middle East, the Vice President said the U.S. + understands Algeria’s position that there can never be true peace + until a solution is found to the Palestinian problem. In our view, + the President’s Sept 1 initiative is not dead—many countries agree + with its general thesis and with a number of its specific points. + The situation in Lebanon in particular has prevented progress toward + a general Middle East + settlement. The U.S. seeks a Lebanon free of all foreign forces. + Syria, however, is now obstructing progress in refusing to honor the + Lebanese request for the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Israel + certainly poses some difficult problems, but at this moment it is + Syria that needs to cooperate. The U.S. does not want to see its + marines in combat, but its forces are there in the MNF context and will defend themselves + as necessary, protected by U.S. forces in the region. + + Abdelghani replied that + until the Palestinian problem is resolved, peace in the Middle East + will not be possible. This problem has been at the root of Middle + East upheavel since 1948. + + The Vice President agreed, saying the President’s initiative was + unique for the U.S. in recognizing the need to get to the heart of + the Palestinian question through negotiations. Speaking frankly, he + said that it is impossible for the U.S. to deal with an + organization—the PLO—whose very + charter still calls for the destruction of the Zionist entity. The + U.S. cannot in good conscience negotiate with an organization that + would destroy a good friend. + + The Prime Minister said that intermediaries can never be as + effective as the principal parties themselves. In any case, Israel’s + existence cannot be realistically threatened militarily. He + concluded with the thought that the U.S. could greatly influence + Israel. + + The Vice President replied that Israel’s existence is a fact. It + cannot be destroyed militarily and therefore the PLO loses nothing by abandoning its + call for Israel’s destruction—only then would negotiations with the + U.S. be possible. The Vice President concluded that we very much + need this dialogue which could come from a changed PLO position. + + Abdelghani thanked the Vice + President again for his visit and expressed the hope for continued + progress in the bilateral relationship. He mentioned the proposed + joint economic commission as a useful tool for expanding the + U.S.-Algerian dialogue. + + Murphy and Gregg have seen this msg. + + Newlin +
+ +
+ 131. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Attorney General + (Clegg) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council + (Kimmitt) and the Deputy + Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Covey)Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Algeria 1983 (2). Confidential. + + + Washington, November 14, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting Between Algerian Ambassador Yaker and Attorney General William French + Smith + +

You had requestedNot found. that I + give you an account of the meeting—held in the Attorney General’s office + on November 9 from 11:00 a.m. to approximately 11:30 a.m.—between + Algerian Ambassador Layachi Yaker + and Attorney General William French Smith. (Also present at the meeting + were Second Secretary Ahmed Boutache and myself, but we said + nothing.)

+

The meeting began with a lengthy exchange of pleasantries, focusing + especially on the Attorney General’s past trips to northern Africa. This + culminated in the Ambassador inviting the Attorney General to visit + Algeria, an invitation which was repeated twice more in the course of + the meeting. The invitation was made with special reference to meeting + with the Algerian Minister of Justice. The Attorney General expressed + interest in visiting Algeria.

+

The Ambassador then stated that only the United States can bring a just + and comprehensive peace to the Middle East, and that if our forces there + were replaced by U.N. forces or the forces of a neutral country (he + suggested a Scandinavian country) then we would be free to deal with the + various actors involved in the conflict. But, he said, this was not what + he came to talk about.

+

Rather, he said what he came to talk about was, first, the Iranian claims + situation and, second, natural gas. On the Iranian claims matter, the + Ambassador said he hoped Algeria would be able to work things out in its + dealings at The Hague soon, and that he was always available to discuss + any problems arising from the claims with the Attorney General. He + expressed the hope that relations between Iran and the United States + would improve, though he recognized this might not be immediately + possible. The Attorney General said that the United States greatly + appreciated the “essential and valuable” role that Algeria played in + getting the hostages released. The Ambassador added that this was done not for any hope of gain, + political or economic, but for humanitarian reasons.

+

Most of the meeting was spent discussing natural gas issues. First, the + Ambassador stated by way of introduction that the Vice President’s trip + to Algeria was viewed positively. He then began discussing the contract + between Sonatrach and Trunkline/Panhandle. The Ambassador said that the + situation in Congress was complicated by the fact that so many of its + members were already running for reelection. The legislation proposed by + Senator Percy and Congressman Young was discussed.Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois), Chairman of the + Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Bill Young + (R-Florida), introduced a bill requiring the Department of Energy to + suspend Trunkline’s authorization to import high-priced Algerian + LNG within ten days after + enactment of the bill. Later, references were also made to + the efforts of Congressmen Dingle and Sharp, and Senator McClure.Representatives John Dingle (D-Michigan), + Philip Sharp (D-Indiana), and Senator James McClure (R-Idaho) + supported efforts to force U.S. companies to import lower-priced + Algerian LNG based upon fair market + conditions. The Ambassador said that a $1.5 billion + investment was made by Algeria pursuant to this contract, which was + negotiated in good faith, and that Algeria had borrowed a great deal + from the Export-Import Bank and commercial banks (including Chase + Manhattan). In order to service this debt, Algeria must continue its + exports, which the proposed legislation threatens. The Ambassador said + that there was no problem with the contracts in the Boston area, because + there is no other potential supplier there, but the Midwest contracts + pose problems. Singling out the Algerian companies, he said, was like a + bill of attainder, violates the sanctity of contracts, and would force + Algeria to submit the matter to arbitration, which Algeria has no desire + to do. Algeria has already agreed, for the first time ever, to waive the + take-or-pay clause in the contract, costing them $250 million a year and + reducing the volume they supply by half.

+

The Ambassador said that this legislation, then, is a very serious + matter, which could affect our relations a great deal; it implicates + international law and international relations, and will damage American + credibility. Algeria has refrained from making an issue of this in the + press, but, considering the legal issues involved, his government + thought that the Ambassador should raise the matter with the Attorney + General.

+

The Attorney General, who let the Ambassador do most of the talking + throughout the meeting, thanked the Ambassador for his views. He + observed that this Congress has not passed much of anything, especially + in the House. The Attorney General said that he understood Algeria’s + concerns and what the problems were. He added that the legislation is not yet so far along that + the Department of Justice has been asked to render a legal opinion on + its constitutionality.

+

The Ambassador said that their lawyers were looking at the constitutional + issues raised by the bill. He said that Algeria does not have lobbyists, + that it doesn’t want to use them, but that American officials should be + aware of what the risks in the bill are. That, he said, was why he had + asked to meet with the Attorney General. This is a long-term, 20-year + contract, he said, and though it may seem you are oversubscribed now, + with a recovering economy you may soon want more gas again, as indeed + was the case a few years ago. The companies involved here are getting + along fine, the Ambassador said; it is only the interference of Congress + and the regulatory agencies which has created problems.

+

These are the problems I wanted to raise, said the Ambassador, and they + must be worked out in our countries’ common interest.

+

The Attorney General again thanked the Ambassador for his thoughts. The + legislative process is hard to predict, he said, and he did not know yet + what involvement the Department of Justice would have. In any event, he + was pleased to have the Ambassador’s views.

+

The Ambassador then said that the Secretary of State was also aware of + Algeria’s views, and was sympathetic. He alluded to the Secretary’s + recent trip,Reference is presumably to + Shultz’s October 26–27 + visit to Paris to discuss Lebanon with the French, Italian, and + British Foreign Ministers. and the upcoming trip of Secretary + Hodel as well. Secretaries + Baldrige and Brock are also + sympathetic, he said; we have been keeping in touch with the + Administration.

+

The Ambassador said a formal invitation for a visit by the Attorney + General to Algeria would be forthcoming. He mentioned explicitly the + possibility of working out a U.S.-Algerian mutual assistance law + enforcement treaty, similar to the one recently signed with Morocco. The + Ambassador was profuse in his thanks to the Attorney General for meeting + with him.

+

NOTE: IF EITHER OF YOU BELIEVE THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED, + PLEASE LET ME KNOW. Thank you very much for the information, written and + oral, you supplied us in such timely fashion before the meeting.

+
+ +
+ 132. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State + (Dam)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S–I + Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of + Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983—Sept. 1984. No + classification marking. Dictated by Dam on January 6. + + + Washington, January 6, 1984 + + +

FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1984

+

I had a longish meeting with the Ambassador of Algeria today,In telegram 5072 to Algiers, January 7, the + Department informed the Embassy that during this January 6 meeting, + Yaker told Dam “the GOA could not accept Trunkline’s suspension of LNG liftings, that Algeria expected + the USG to help develop ‘solutions’ + to the suspension, and that the Trunkline situation held ‘serious + political implications’ for U.S.-Algerian relations. Citing recent + improvements in bilateral relations, Yaker stated the GOA did not want a ‘crisis’ in relations but would + consider ‘other courses of action’ if the Trunkline contract were + maintained.” Dam replied + that “the U.S. legal system did not allow the administration to + dictate actions to American companies involved in international + transactions, suggested the GOA + consider legal remedies to achieve its objectives in the Trunkline + situation, and said the Department remained open to further + discussions on the matter if the GOA desired.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840041–0049, + D840012–0764) who came in to protest the cancellation by + Trunkline, a natural gas corporation, of a natural gas contract with + Sonatrach, an Algerian public corporation. This is a contract which + involved very large sums of foreign exchange for Algeria, and the + cancellation came as a major blow to Algeria. The U.S. Government had + not been informed prior to the cancellation by Trunkline,In telegram 363524 to Algiers, December 23, 1983, + the Department transmitted the text of a memorandum of conversation + of Hodel’s December 15 + meeting with Yaker. During + the meeting, Hodel “said + that as soon as he learned about the Panhandle decision to suspend + Algerian gas imports he called Minister Nabi” to explain that “this + action by the company was totally unexpected. We wanted to make + clear that the USG had not been + involved in nor directed this action and that it was a private + company action.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830760–0434) which apparently is in + very serious financial straits because of the high price of the Algerian + contract compared to other sources of natural gas in the U.S. Midwest. I + explained to Yaker how the United + States was not in a position to force a U.S. corporation to live up to + its obligations, nor was it able to guarantee, with money or otherwise, + the obligations of this foreign corporation. I also mentioned the fact, + without being explicit about it, that when the shoe had been on the + other foot and Algeria had been unilaterally increasing the price of + natural gas in its contracts with the United States, Algeria had been + delighted to obtain the additional money and had not been concerned + about compensation to the United States.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+
+ +
+ 133. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official + Memoranda (02/23/1984). Secret. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by Ann Korky + (MEA/AFN) on February 22; cleared by Sebastian, David + Schneider, and in substance by Loustonou (USDOC). A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum dated February 27 reads: “GPS.” Hill initialed the top right hand + corner of the memorandum and wrote: “2/27.” Tab 2, telegram 887 from + Algiers, February 20, is not attached. In the telegram, Newlin reported that Kerroum had informed him that + “Bendjedid wished to send Minister of Commerce Khellef to the United States + between March 12–17 carrying a message to the President.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840111–0568) + + + Washington, February 23, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Proposed Visit of Algerian Presidential Emissary + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

How to respond to President Bendjedid’s request to send Commerce Minister Khellef to Washington in the period + March 12–17 to deliver a message to the President and meet with you for + substantive discussions.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

Algeria’s Acting Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Newlin February 20 that President + Bendjedid would like to send + Commerce Minister Khellef to + Washington in mid-March to deliver a message to the President and hold + discussions with you on the situation in the region. Though Khellef’s mandate would clearly be + broader, the announced purpose of the trip would be to discuss US-Algerian economic/commercial relations. + Commerce Secretary Baldrige has + set aside time on his schedule March 13 to see Khellef. We will also seek appointments + for Khellef with Energy Secretary + HodelA summary of Hodel’s November 1983 visit to Algiers, which + included a 55-minute meeting with Bendjedid and discussions with Nabi about the + Trunkline contract, is in telegram 5147 from Algiers, November 22, + 1983. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830687–0281) and Agriculture Secretary Block,A + record of Block’s January + 31–February 2 visit to Algeria is in telegram 586 from Algiers, + February 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840071–0133) both recent visitors to + Algiers.

+

Bendjedid’s proposal is an important step forward in the political + dialogue that we have been pursuing with the GOA since late 1982. For the first time, the Algerians have taken the + initiative to seek consultations with us in Washington through a special + Presidential emissary. They have been responsive to previous such + requests from us and have received at either the Presidential or Foreign + Minister level a variety of senior US + officials, including the Vice President, Secretaries Baldrige, Block and Hodel, Under Secretary Eagleburger and Ambassadors Rumsfeld and Walters.See documents 114, 120, 121, 126, 130, and 132. No record of + Rumsfeld’s meeting with Algerian officials has been found. We + should be as forthcoming as possible to Bendjedid’s request, seeking a brief meeting with the + President and a longer appointment with the Vice President, as well as + meetings with you and others in the Department.

+

The cable attached at Tab 1Tab 1, telegram + 57544 to Algiers, February 28, is not attached. It is in Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840127–0636. authorizes Ambassador Newlin to inform the GOA of your general agreement to the + proposed visit, indicates specifically that you will receive Khellef and notes that we will work + with the White House and others to develop a formal schedule for the + March 12–17 timeframe.On March 3, Hill advised McFarlane that the Department + recommended that Reagan + agree to a “brief meeting” with Khellef on March 13 in order to personally receive + Bendjedid’s message. + (Memorandum from Hill to + McFarlane, March 3; + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria + (01/24/1982–09/26/1983))

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the cable attached at Tab 1.

+

That you agree to an appointment with Minister Khellef in the period March 12–17.Shultz initialed the “Approve” recommendation. A + stamp next to his initials reads: “FEB 27 1984.” Shultz asked his assistant to + “work out” a meeting time.

+
+ +
+ 134. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + January–March 1984. Secret. + + + Washington, March 12, 1984 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+

2. The Algerian Emissary. I met with the Algerian + Commerce Minister Khellef,The Shultz-Khellef conversation is in + telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806) who + is to deliver an oral message to you tomorrow from President Bendjedid. Khellef alleged a Moroccan turn towards a military + solution in the Western Sahara and argued that the US should press King Hassan to move towards + direct negotiations with the Polisario. I told him we agree on the need + for a negotiated settlement, but believe the Moroccans recognize that a + military solution is unrealistic and want to proceed with the OAU-mandated referendum. Khellef mentioned the situation in + Lebanon but argued that the Palestinian problem and the lack of + acceptance of their right of self-determination was at the heart of the + dilemma. The US could help, Khellef said, by bringing Israel to + recognize this. I told him we continue to believe that Palestinian + problems can be best confronted in negotiations between Jordan (with + Palestinian participation) and Israel.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+
+
+ 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840177–0244. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by David Schneider; + cleared by Teicher, Covey, and Gregg; approved by + Schneider. Sent for + information to Rabat, Tunis, Nouakchott, and Paris. + + 78924. + + Washington, March 17, 1984, 0139Z + + + + SUBJECT + Meetings Between Algerian Emissary Abdelaziz Khellef and the President and the Vice + President. + + + + S—Entire text. + + Summary: Algerian Special Emmissary, Commerce Minister Adbelaziz Khellef presented on + March 13 a brief and general oral message from Algerian President Bendjedid to the President at a + short meeting in the Oval Office followed by a longer meeting with + the Vice President. Bendjedid’s message spoke of his desire for friendship, + cooperation and dialogue and of his sending Khellef in a quest for further + development of a bilateral cooperative relationship in which both + bilateral and regional affairs could be discussed. Khellef elaborated on this in his + meeting with the Vice President, discussing the Western Sahara at + length. He explained that Algeria seeks peace and stability in the + Maghreb and the continuation of Hassan’s reign. The Algerians see + Hassan’s extension of the berm, his new understanding with Libya, + and his failure to avail himself of opportunities following the 1983 + Bendjedid-Hassan summitSee Document 19. as indications that + Hassan may be seeking a military solution to the dispute. Algeria + wanted to share its views to see if the U.S. might be able to + moderate Hassan’s position. The Vice President replied that he did + not believe Hassan seeks a military solution to the Western Sahara + dispute. There is difficulty about direct talks, however. The U.S. + supports a referendum and believes that there is much Algeria can do + the bring about a negotiated solution. We believe that Hassan has + his eyes open about Libya; the U.S. would be troubled if Hassan’s + understanding with Qadhafi + harmed Algerian intrests or the U.S.-Algerian relationship. As time + ran out, Khellef called for + self-determination for Palestinians as the ultimate solution for the + Lebanon problem and expressed concern about Iranian intransigence + and movement away from negotiations to end the Iran-Iraq war. End + summary. + + The President very briefly met in the Oval Office with Algerian + Commerce Minister Abdelaziz + Khellef at 3:00 p.m. on March 13.According to the President’s Daily Diary, + Reagan, Bush, Khellef, and Yaker met on March 13 from + 3–3:06 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President’s + Daily Diary) Thereafter Khellef met for a longer discussion with the Vice + President in his West Wing + offices. Also present at the meetings with the President and the + Vice President were, on the Algerian side, Algerian Ambassador + Yaker and Ambassador + Abdelkrim Chitour, Director for Western Europe and North America, + MFA; and, on the U.S. side, the Vice President, + Donald Gregg Assistant + to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, Charles Tyson, Deputy Assistant to + the President for National Security Affairs, Howard Teicher of the NSC Staff, and David Schneider State/NEA. + + The President opened the conversation warmly welcoming Minister + Khellef, a greeting which + Khellef reciprocated with + great thanks for the President’s making available time for the + meeting. Khellef conveyed the + greetings of the Algerian President, saying that Bendjedid wished to convey a + message of friendship, cooperation, and desire for dialogue. He recalled his + coming to know the President at Cancun with pleasure. Khellef also noted his satisfaction + with his discussions with the Vice President during the latter’s + visit to Algeria. Khellef + said that he had been asked to visit Washington in order further to + develop a cooperative bilateral relationship in which both bilateral + and regional issues could be discussed. This, said Khellef, briefly, was his message + from Bendjedid. The President + again expressed his appreciation for the Algerian visit and the + message Khellef had conveyed. + The group thereupon left the President and the Oval Office; the Vice + President escorted the Minister to his office where a more detailed + discussion ensued. + + The Vice President opened the discussion asking Khellef to tell President Bendjedid how much the extra + courtesy which Bendjedid had + shown the Vice President had meant to him and Mrs. Bush. Equally important was what + Bendjedid had said about + the relationship he desired with the U.S. The Vice President had + returned to Washington and immediately informed President Reagan about this. Khellef replied that Bendjedid had also asked him to + speak of his pleasant recollections of the Vice President’s visit. + He had instructed the Minister to continue the dialogue which the + Vice President had initiated. Khellef reported on various visits which had been + exchanged between the two countries and the achievements which were + being made: setting up a joint economic commission, developing a + commercial relationship, signing an agricultural agreement, etc. In + his only reference to the natural gas issue, Khellef noted that the only + drawback in our commercial relationship was the conflict between + Trunk-line and Sonatrach, to which he wished to find a solution so + that our commercial cooperation could improve. + + Khellef then turned to the + Western Sahara issue, which clearly was the most important matter he + wished to discuss. He explained that the Algerian approach was to + find out how Algeria could help King Hassan find a solution. The + Bendjedid-Hassan meeting in 1983 was a beginning. Then the Addis + OAU resolution “made a solution + possible.”Reference is to a June + 11, 1983, OAU Resolution which + called for “direct negotiations” between Morocco and the + Polisario. See footnote 3, Document + 408. This was confirmed in the UNGA, which made an appeal for direct + Moroccan discussions with the Polisario. Unfortunately, Khellef said, the direct talks did + not take place. Hassan had stepped back. The Algerians fear that he + may think that a military solution to the Western Sahara dispute is + possible. They disagree. Algeria wishes to see the Mahgreb a region + of peace and stability where all resources could be devoted to + development. They want Hassan to remain on the Moroccan throne. His policy of + “non-negotiation” did not help movement toward these + objectives. + + The Vice President interrupted to explain that he had talked + personally to Hassan.Not found. + We do not feel that he wants a military solution. There is a + difficulty regarding direct talks, however. As for the U.S., we wish + there would be a negotiated solution. We believe Algeria can do much + to bring about this result. We support a referendum. We are quite + close to Morocco and don’t believe that it has shifted to military + means. + + In response to a question from the Vice President regarding the + basis for Algerian concerns, Khellef replied that Hassan did not seize the + opportunities offered in the aftermath of the Bendjedid-Hassan + meeting in 1983. Further, Morocco has now extended the berm in the + Western Sahara in a way which involves Mauritania. Then, Khellef said, there is the + arrangement Morocco has reached with Libya, under which Hassan + supports Qadhafi on Chad and + Qadhafi supports Hassan + on Western Sahara. Khellef + added that Qadhafi has many + reasons to be unhappy with Algeria. The Vice President intervened to + say that he seriously doubted that King Hassan was putting any great + trust in anything Qadhafi + said. We think Hassan has his eyes open about Libya. Khellef concluded that these were + the reasons why Algeria believed there had been a shift in Moroccan + policy. Algeria wanted to share these views to see if the U.S. might + moderate Hassan’s position regarding a negotiated settlement. + + The Vice President asked how Algerian interests were affected by + Hassan’s understanding with Qadhafi. Khellef replied that Algeria had no objection in + principle to any rapprochement in the Mahgreb but it wanted to see a + clear foundation for such rapprochement. There should be no alliance + which threatens the region. Algeria has improved its ties with + Tunisia and wishes to do the same with Morocco and, ultimately, + Libya. + + The Vice President then expressed U.S. pleasure with the direction + in which our bilateral relationship with Algeria was proceeding. + Ambassador Yaker was helping. + We want relations further to improve. We are tremendously impressed + by Chadli Bendjedid. + Mentioning the natural gas problem, the Vice President said that + nothing should interfere. In regard to regional affairs, he said + that we would be very troubled if we thought any understanding + between Hassan and Qadhafi + would harm the interests of Algeria. We would be willing to take + this matter up. We see nothing redeeming about Qadhafi; he is behind + much of the terror in the world. We understand Libya’s neighbors’ + concerns. If the President concluded that Qadhafi was undermining Algerian + interests or our bilateral relations, we would want something done + about the matter. + Qadhafi is stirring up + trouble in Chad and even in this country. Algeria has an + extraordinarily important role to play in the Mahgreb, including in + the quest for a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara + dispute. + + As time began to run out, Khellef briefly mentioned Lebanon, expressing the + hope that factional dialogue, taking into account the interests of + Syria, would improve the situation there. He maintained that the + Palestinian issue was the basic cause of Lebanon’s difficulties and + urged recognition of the right of Palestinian self-determination as + important to the solution. The Vice President countered by + explaining that the President’s September 1 proposals were still an + effective approach to a solution of the Palestinian problem. As the + meeting broke up, the Vice President said he wished there had been + time to discuss the Iran-Iraq situation. There had been great loss + of life and threats to our interests. We were very worried about the + situation there. Khellef said + the Algerians had been surprised by Iranian intransigence. Most + recently the Iranians had again “slipped back” from any receptivity + to negotiations. + + Shultz +
+
+ 136. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC National Security Decision + Directives, NSDD 72 [United States + Program for the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at + Sea]. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate + to the Department of State. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the White House Situation Room. Shultz was in Seoul May 1–2 for + meetings with South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan. + + Secto + 4063/4554. + + Seoul, May 2, 1984, 0013Z + + +

White House please pass ASAP to + Bud McFarlane in + Fairbanks, Alaska. Subject: May 2 Algeria Naval Challenge.

+

To: National Security Advisor Robert + McFarlane

+

From: Secretary of State George P. + Shultz

+

(Begin text)

+

Quote

+

I understand that you have agreed to a DOD proposal to carry out an assertion of our navigational + rights off the Algeria coast + on May 2.In telegram Tosec 40380/126762 to Seoul, May 1, + Murphy noted that “the + Navy periodically schedules transits within 3 and 12 miles inter + alia of the Algerian coast to demonstrate that we do not accept the + GOA’s requirement for prior + notification of innocent passage by foreign warships. We + successfully challenged the Algerian requirement in November 1982. + Since that time, DOD has proposed + transits on two other occasions. Both times, the Pentagon was + overruled in deference to objections raised by the Department. The + NSC decided last week over the + Department’s opposition to schedule another transit May 2.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840281–0242) Since this proposal was discussed at + the meeting John Poindexter + chaired at the White House April 24,No + record of the meeting was found. tensions along the + Algerian-Moroccan border have continued to rise and we have also + repeated expressions of Algerian concern that certain aspects of our + military relations with Morocco, including the joint exercises now + underway, may in fact support current Moroccan operations in the + Sahara.

+

These developments have convinced me we should postpone the May 2 + challenge operation until later in the year. At a time when we have + asked our Ambassadors in Algiers and Rabat to counsel calm and restraint + to their respective hosts, we should take no action that would undercut + their efforts. Nor would the purposes of NSDD 72National Security + Decision Directive 72, “United States Program for the Exercise of + Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea,” December 13, 1982, stated + that “the United States will continue to protect U.S. navigation, + overflight, and related security interests in the seas through the + vigorous exercise of its rights against excessive maritime claims.” + (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 72 [United States Program for + the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea]) For text + of the directive, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, + Global Issues II, Document 192. be served if the + Algerian Government views our challenge in the context of the Saharan + conflict or U.S.-Moroccan bilateral relations rather than as a neutral, + non-political assertion of our navigational rights. A challenge so + perceived would exacerbate the regional tensions that we have sought to + quiet and put at risk our strategy of seeking improved relations with + all the Maghreb states in support of a peaceful settlement of the Sahara + dispute. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that the May 2 operation be + immediately ordered postponed.Poindexter underlined the words “I + strongly recommend that the May 2 operation be immediately ordered + postponed.”

+

I also would ask you to take another look at the proposed Greek and + Turkish challenges and whether now is the best timePoindexter + underlined the words “now is the best time” and underneath it wrote: + “There is never a ‘best’ time. JP.” to assert our admittedly legitimate freedom of + navigational rights.

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 137. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice + President BushSource: George H.W. Bush Library, + Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, + Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, + Algeria—1984. Confidential. Sent through Murphy. Printed from an + uninitialed copy. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, on + a copy printed for Kemp, + Gregg wrote: “Sorry you + weren’t there. DG.” + + + Washington, June 26, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Nourredine + Kerroum, Secretary General of the Algerian Foreign + Ministry + +

I had a fascinating meeting with Mr. Kerroum which demonstrated once more how valuable our + relations with Algeria can be.

+

I discussed our concerns about Afghanistan. Kerroum agreed with our analysis.Gregg + placed an asterisk after this sentence and in the left-hand margin + wrote: “said pressure should be kept on Soviets.” He said he + believed that the Soviets now regretted their decision to invade and + doubted that it had been inspired by fears of Muslim fundamentalism and + said it would be very hard to get them out. Kerroum said that Algeria had worked jointly with India + to press an NAM resolution against the + Soviet move, but that it was hard for Algeria to pursue the Aghan issue + whenever it was placed in an East-West context.Gregg + underlined the words “it was hard for Algeria to pursue the Afghan + issue whenever it was placed in an East-West context” and in the + left-hand margin wrote: “this was stressed.” I said we had no + desire to put Afghanistan into that category, adding that our major + concerns were to end the agony of the Afghan people and to get the + Soviets out so that a neutral and non-aligned country could reemerge. I + indicated that you had talked to Mrs. Gandhi about that topicNot found. and urged that Algeria do all in + its power to press for a political solution.

+

We next talked about Libya, and while Kerroum agreed that there was widespread unhappiness + within that country, it was not at all certain that Qadhafi would be overthrown. Algeria’s + distaste for Qadhafi was clear in + what Kerroum said, but it was + also obvious that at this point they do not intend to take any forcible + action.

+

On Iran-Iraq, Kerroum confirmed + that there is a debate within the Iranian power structure, largely + between President Khamenei and Speaker Rafsanjani. While Khamenei takes + a more reasonable line, he cannot advocate a settlement of the war with + Iraq that does not show to the + Iranian people some concrete result of all of the fighting. A recent + Algerian delegation was told in Teheran that the Iranians would give up + all of their claims in Iraq except for their demand of Husayn Saddam’s + resignation. Kerroum said he + found no reason for optimism in looking at the war.

+

Kerroum dwelt largely on Algeria’s + problems with Morocco and urged that the U.S. take a more balanced + stance. He said it now appears that King Hassan believes that we will + support him no matter what his posture relative to problems in the + Western Sahara. Kerroum felt that + a more balanced U.S. stand would push Hassan toward a more sensible + West Sahara policy.After this sentence, Gregg wrote: “He was vehement on + this.”

+

Kerroum sent his best regards to + you and stated that your talks with President Bendjedid and Foreign Minister + Ibrahimi were the “clearest + milestones” which mark a new U.S.-Algerian relationship. (Just before he + left, Kerroum indicated that they + are considering seriously the release of the American prisoner, Jay + Salby, on humanitarian grounds. I thanked him for this indication of + concern.)

+

Tom Nassif and Alec Toumayan both + indicated that the meeting had been interesting and that several new + points had emerged.

+
+
+ 138. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Africa, Algeria (06/15/1984–12/22/1984). Secret. Sent via + Privacy Channels. Also sent Immediate for the Vice President. + Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + 59. + + Algiers, September 24, 1984, + 1522Z + + +

For the Vice President Immediate.

+

Your September 28 meeting with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi will be a critical one for the + future of our relations in North Africa. The meeting will provide the + first opportunity for an in-depth high-level exchange with Algeria after + the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union. This message outlines Algerian + concerns and views as perceived here.

+

The Algerians see the Oujda TreatyReference + is to the August 13 agreement between King Hassan of Morocco and + Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, + which established a “union of states” between the two nations. For + additional information about the treaty, see Document 37. as directed against them. It confirms + their belief that the King has abandoned the search for a compromise solution of the + Western Sahara conflict and intends to pursue, with Libyan financial + help, a military solution.

+

Thus far, Algeria has reacted with relative restraint. It considers the + Oujda Treaty an unnatural union which is unlikely to last, but wonders + how the King plans to use it in the Western Sahara context.

+

Algerians, like others, find it hard to believe that with our extremely + close relations with the King he would have taken such a radical step + without our foreknowledge and at least tactic consent. I have tried at + the highest levels to reassure them that we had no advance notice from + Hassan and that our policy toward North Africa and Qadhafi in particular has not + changed.

+

Our public statements and Guedira’s reception have gained us credibility + in Algiers. However, the situation is complicated because Algeria + believes France and perhaps King Fahd were aware that Oudja was in the + works. This has reawakened Algerian suspicions of French double-dealing. + (The French handling of their deal with Qadhafi on Chad has also had an unsettling effect.) The + Algerians say they have no plans to resume high-level secret contacts + with the King. Given his search for a military solution, typified by a + further extension of the berm near the Algerian border, the Algerians + say they have nothing to discuss.

+

Algeria is aware of the fact that we wish to maintain our traditional + close relations with Morocco. They themselves probably are in favor. + What they will be concerned about is a deliberate polarization of the + region by the King with the object of associating the United States with + a Moroccan-Libyan anti-Algerian alliance. Your personal relationship + with Bendjedid and Ibrahimi provides an opportunity to + clear the air. They would like to believe we were not somehow involved + in the Oujda Treaty but they find it hard to do so.

+

Ibrahimi will be prepared to brief + you on Algerian efforts on behalf of Buckley and the other two Americans + held hostage in Lebanon. Hopefully he will have seen Kuwaitis in New + York before he comes to Washington.

+

With all of your other responsibilities at the present time, your + willingness to see Ibrahimi is + deeply appreciated.

+

Warm regards and all best wishes.

+ Newlin +
+ +
+ 139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad, and FranceSource: George H.W. Bush Library, + Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, + Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners Files, OA/ID 19777, + Folder 19777–129, Meetings with Foreigners—September 1984: Breakfast + with Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi, September 28, 1984. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + 292635. + + Washington, October 2, 1984, 1506Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Breakfast for FonMin + Ibrahimi. + + + + (S—Entire text). + + Vice President hosted breakfast Sep 28, 1984 for FonMin + Ibrahimi of Algeria. The + following were participants: + U.S. + -Vice President + -Donald Gregg, Vice President’s Office + -Geoffrey Kemp, NSC Staff + -Thomas A. Nassif, DAS + NEA + + Algeria + -Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Foreign Minister + -Mohamed Sahnoun, Algerian Ambassador-Designate to + U.S. + -Ahmed Attas, Interim Director, International + Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry + + + + The breakfast was preceded by a brief private meeting between the + Vice President and the Foreign Minister. At breakfast the Vice + President offered to discuss whatever subjects were of interest to + the Foreign Minister. + + The Vice President expressed U.S. surprise and disappointment at + the Libya-Morocco union. He stressed the point that we had had no + advance notice and had given Guedira a harsh message. The United + States did not trust Qadhafi + and we are looking at the agreement with great skepticism. The Vice + President also reiterated the importance the U.S. attaches to its + relationship and dialogue with the Algerians. + + The Foreign Minister said he would like to talk about the + Libyan-Moroccan Treaty and to give us both the facts and his + analysis. He began by stating that Royal Counselor Guedira of + Morocco during talks with Ibrahimi in May of 84 on the Western Sahara had + offered a treaty of union similar to the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty. + Ibrahimi had told Guedira + that it was unrealistic. Unions in the Arab world are done too + hastily. It was unacceptable in that it sidestepped the main issue + in dispute which was the Western Sahara. Additionally, it made no + reference to + Mauritania and Tunisia. Guedira insisted that President Bendjedid see the document. + Ibrahimi reported that + Bendjedid agreed with + Ibrahimi’s + position. + + In July of ’84 Ibrahimi + made a counter-proposal to the Moroccans suggesting that the + discussion continue in an enlarged meeting which would include + Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. The purpose of the + meeting would be to find a solution to the Western Sahara. Ibrahimi also suggested to the + Moroccans a treaty between Morocco, Algeria and the Western Sahara. + Guedira said that was unacceptable because it put the Western Sahara + on the same level with Morocco. This conversation occurred about a + week before the negotiations began on July 13 between the Moroccans + and Libyans. + + After the Moroccan-Libyan agreement was signed, Qadhafi came to Algeria and told + Pres. Bendjedid that King + Hassan was proposing a union with Libya and that Qadhafi had it under study. When + Qadhafi began reading the + text, Pres. Bendjedid + interrupted him and began quoting to him the text, explaining that + the Moroccans had proposed the same treaty of union to Algeria. + Ibrahimi said to the Vice + President that the Algerian Government considers to have been lied + to twice by Qadhafi. First, + by not saying that the agreement between Morocco and Libya had + already been signed at the time of Qadhafi’s visit, and second, by not revealing the + two defense articles, Article 4 and Article 12. The Foreign Minister + stressed to the Vice President that the defense provisions had not + appeared in the draft offered to Algeria by Morocco and had probably + been added by Qadhafi to the + Moroccan-Libyan treaty. + + Ibrahimi told the Vice + President that Guedira had called him after the union was announced. + He told Guedira that there was nothing more to talk about. Morocco + and Libya should conduct their experiment and they would talk + later. + + The Vice President asked the Foreign Minister whether the treaty + would require Morocco to assist Libya, if the Libyans went into + Tunisia. The Foreign Minister said they were looking at the effect + of the mutual defense provisions on many scenarios, the possibility + of Libyans and Moroccans going into either the Western Sahara or + Mauritania. Ibrahimi reminded + us that President Bendjedid + had previously notified King Hassan that if Morocco moved against + Mauritania, Algeria could not stand idly by and that he had also + warned Qadhafi against moving + on Tunisia. + + The Foreign Minister told the Vice President that on two occasions + the Moroccans had turned over Libyan dissidents. In one instance + they invited to Morocco a dissident who was in Egypt and then on the + pretense of going to Saudi Arabia, flew him instead to Libya where + he was greeted by Col. + Qadhafi. The Moroccans had + also been responsible for + fingering Libyan dissidents in Libya. The Vice President expressed + his shock and concern at this betrayal by Hassan of Libyan + opposition leaders. + + The Foreign Minister made his assessment that the Moroccan-Libyan + Treaty was tactical, based on present circumstances and would be a + short-term agreement. He noted that the Libyans had until 1983 been + the primary military supporter of the Polisario. + + There was a brief discussion of the Iran-Iraq war. The Foreign + Minister asserted that no progress has been made and even though + some Iranian leaders now feel that the war has not been useful + nobody can make a move while Khomeini is alive. + + The possibility of progress with the Syrians was also discussed + briefly. The unresolved question being how much flexibility the + Israelis will exhibit and how much the new rotating premiership will + hinder progress. + + The Vice President asked the Foreign Minister about President + Bourguiba’s health. He + replied that he was as well as any 80-year old man and that he was + very lucid, despite appearances. + + The Vice President thanked the Foreign Minister for the meeting + and offered to meet with him again anytime he was in Washington. The + Vice President felt that these were useful exchanges and still + remembered fondly his visit to Algeria and the hospitality shown to + him by President Chadli + Bendjedid. + + Dam +
+
+ 140. Letter From President Reagan to Algerian President BendjedidSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Algeria 1984 (1). No classification + marking. + + + Washington, October 29, 1984 + + Your Excellency: + +

I congratulate you and the people of the Democratic and Popular Republic + of Algeria on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of your struggle + for independence.Algeria’s War of + Independence began on November 1, 1954.

+ +

The peoples of the United States of America and Algeria both fought long + wars and sacrificed much for their independence and I am proud to note + that, after you achieved independence, the United States continued to + participate in the planned and orderly development of Algeria, + particularly by opening our institutions of higher and technical + education to Algerian students and by participation of American + businesses in the expansion of Algeria’s industrial and technical + infrastructures.

+

America values the friendship of Algeria. We seek to further improve our + relations, and I am aware of the efforts Algeria has made in this + direction. America will long remember Algeria’s helpful role in + achieving the release of American Embassy personnel who were held + hostage in Tehran. We also appreciate your efforts to help solve the + dispute between Iran and Iraq, and Algeria’s contributions on other + issues of concern to my government and the international community.

+

Mr. President, as you know, the United States is one of Algeria’s major + commercial partners. My country is the second largest customer for + Algeria’s crude and finished hydrocarbon products, and we are a major + supplier of technical, agricultural and consumer products for the + Algerian market. We value this relationship and wish it to expand even + further.

+

Allow me to take this opportunity to thank you for the hospitality your + country has offered to officials of my administration, particularly the + personal hospitality you gave to Vice President George Bush. In keeping with this + growing friendship and our shared desire further to develop mutually + beneficial relationships between our two peoples and governments, I + would like to extend to you an invitation to visit the United States at + a mutually convenient date during 1985.In a + November 6 letter Hodel, who + led the U.S. Delegation to Algiers for the 30th anniversary of the + revolution, informed Reagan + that, after presenting him with Reagan’s letter and invitation, Bendjedid “Without hesitation and + with obvious pleasure” had “accepted immediately.” (Reagan Library, + Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Algeria + 1984(1))

+

Allow me, Your Excellency, again to express my warm personal greetings to + yourself and to the people of Algeria, and my best wishes for your + continued well-being, progress, and prosperity.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 141. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice + President BushSource: George H.W. Bush Library, + Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, + Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, + Algeria—1984. Confidential. Sent through Murphy. Bush initialed the top right-hand + corner of the memorandum and wrote: “12–1.” + + + Washington, November 29, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary General, Algerian Foreign Ministry + +

This afternoon I received Mr. Nuridin + Kerroum, Secretary General (#2 man) of the Algerian + Foreign Ministry. At the specific request of Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, who wants to keep you + personally informed, he updated me on major issues of interest to + Algeria. His main points:

+

— Western Sahara. The OAU seated the SDAR/POLISARIO and then Morocco left the OAU.During + the November 12–15 OAU meeting in + Addis Ababa, Morocco quit the OAU + after the SADR’s seating. In + telegram 2735 from Maputo, November 27, the Embassy reported: “The + OAU members were essentially + ‘tired’ of the Western Sahara issue, and wanted to resolve it once + and for all at the Addis meeting. The Morocco-Libya pact had also + caused consternation among African leaders and alienated the GOM from previous supporters. + Moreover, the Africans were unhappy that Morocco had not fulfilled + the commitment for a referendum put forth at the last summit.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840757–0843) Yesterday, Nov 28, the UN Fourth Committee (a UNGA committee of the whole) passed an + Algerian resolution calling for Morocco to negotiate directly with the + POLISARIO (Hassan will not) + (Note: US abstained on that vote).United Nations General Assembly Resolution + 39/40, which the General Assembly ultimately approved on December 5, + called for direct negotiations between Morocco and the + Polisario. Morocco needs to move. Algeria wants to help + Morocco make progress—not embarrass the King. Union with Libya didn’t + help. We talk to the Moroccans on the phone when we wish. I saw the + Moroccan Foreign Minister daily at the UN. Don’t be surprised if Ibrahimi appears in Rabat by the end of the year. We are + talking.

+ + + Morocco-Libya Union. The Union is + unnatural, and has objectives Africans oppose. It contributed to + Morocco’s defeat on OAU seating of + the SDAR (which Libya voted + for). “We don’t say it in public, but I think we were the first to + decide that Qadhafi is crazy. + The same day he signed the Union with Hassan, he came to Algiers and + swore to President Bendjedid + that he had signed nothing. I was there.” + + Drought. Algeria got the OAU to agree to forming a Special Fund + to focus Africans on solving their drought problems. Algeria contributed $10 million + seed money, and hopes the US will + add a symbolic contribution—in addition to its large bilateral aid + efforts. Fund HQ will be in Dakar. + Next OAU summit will focus only on + economic issues—hopefully avoiding divisive political ones. + + UN. Algeria + would like to have its UN mission + coordinate more closely with ours on issues of mutual interest. This + would be helpful to both missions. + + Iran-Iraq War. The war can end only on the + basis of no victors-no vanquished. But with Khomeini and Saddam in + power, that is impossible. Things seem hopeless as long as they are + in power. + +

Mr. Kerroum was very forthcoming + and glad to see that we were. Talking with these folks continues to be a + pleasure, a learning experience, and a clear indicator that we can work + together on more and more.

+
+
+ 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860011–0371. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to + USDOC and USDA. + + 46. + + Algiers, January 6, 1985, 1622Z + + +

Commerce for Dennin. USDA for Sims. Subject: President Bendjedid Orders a Strengthening of + U.S.-Algerian Relations.

+ + + Confidential—Entire text + + Summary: President Bendjedid’s strengthened mandate after the FLN Party CongressThe FNL’s 5th Party Congress took place in + December 1984. will apparently be used in part to push + forward more rapidly improving relations with the United States. + Senior MFA officials are now + looking closely at specific actions that can be taken in this area. + Mid-February joint commission meeting will be used to signal + publicly that U.S. and Algeria are cooperating in more significant + ways. End summary. + + In both a luncheon with Ambassador Sahnoun on January 4 and in my January 6 meeting + with MFA + SecGen Hamdani; I was told that + President Bendjedid had + personally ordered that strengthening of Algeria’s relationship with + the United States be moved forward more quickly now. Hamdani and + Sahnoun indicated that + the President came out of the FLN + Party Congress with a stronger mandate to carry forward the policies he wants, and + further improvement of ties with the U.S. is a very high priority. + Hamdani, in particular, left no doubt that he is under instructions + to get the job done. + + Hamdani asked me for my appraisal of where we stand and which + areas are most amenable to early improvement. I told him that we + have had good policy direction within both governments favoring + improved ties but that we suffer from the weight of sluggish + bureaucracy. I noted that we have put several offers on the table + for the sale of U.S. military equipment but have not yet registered + any notable success. I also noted that we have encountered problems + in the way our two countries do business in agricultural trade. + GOA is state-oriented while we + leave sales and technical transfer issues mostly in the hands of the + private sector. These two have had trouble connecting, I said, and + we have to work harder to find ways of getting them together. + + I also brought up the Pullman Kellogg Boufarik Airbase case as an + example of the frustrations American companies encounter in trying + to get business in Algeria. I noted that Pullman Kellogg feels badly + treated since it made such a large investment in designing the + Boufarik project, only to see the contract go to what can only be + called an unqualified bidder.In + telegram 536 from Algiers, February 7, 1983, the Embassy + described the GOA’s + cancellation of the contract, under which a U.S. company was + scheduled to upgrade Boufarik airbase, as “unprecedented. We are + frank to say we do not know for certain what led to this + surprising development but suspect that Presidency itself had + second thoughts about political advisability of high cost, high + visibility aircraft dedicated exclusively to presidential + travel.” Nevertheless, the Embassy stated it was “inclined to + accept Algerian assurances that cancellation had nothing to do + with bilateral relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860069–0511) These + cases are complicated, I went on, by the common practice in Algeria + of only starting the “serious” negotiations for a contract once the + contract letting and bidding phase is completed. American companies + are not accustomed for the most part to doing business this way, and + they feel there is an element of bad faith in GOA practice of shaving deals after + bids have been accepted or contracts signed. If we want to see more + American companies active in the Algerian market, I noted, we have + to examine issues like these. + + Hamdani, and the MFA’s Director + for Europe-North America (Mohamed Ghoualmi), seemed anxious to focus + directly on specific cases—apparently so that they can tell + President Bendjedid that they + are taking concrete steps to carry out his order. Ghoualmi asked for + an informal paper on the Boufarik Airbase issue. We will provide + this soonest on the basis of our knowledge and information provided + by USDOC.The informal Commerce paper was not + found. + + In a broader sense, Hamdani said GOA is looking forward to Joint Commission meetings in + mid-February as an opportunity to make progress and remove blocks. + Ghoualmi added that there are some areas where the GOA + would like to put particular focus. He was concerned that Algerian + use of the U.S. higher education system had been too haphazard, with + a large number of students failing to take optimum advantage of + their study in the U.S. He proposed that we seek ways to organize + and direct this activity. Ghoualmi also brought up the close + relationship between Boeing and Air Algerie. He said Algeria was + very happy with Boeing as a partner, especially Boeing’s excellent + record in the area of technology transfer. He thought the Joint + Commission might be a venue for stimulating similar relationships + and he intimated (albeit vaguely) that there might be some important + development for Boeing at that time. + + Comment: Bendjedid seems + firmly committed to path of improving ties with the U.S. and is + likely to try to make and portray JEC meeting as a highly successful event. We are + pursuing advance preparations at this end via working level meetings + among Embassy econoff, commercial officer and ATO with MFA, MinAg and Ministry of External + Commerce. + + Johnstone +
+
+ 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Lebanon + and AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N850001–0457. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Stanton (NEA/ARN); cleared by Murphy, Raphel, Mack, Oakley, McNeil, Twetten (CIA), Samuel Krys (M), Poindexter, Platt, Cassius Johnson (S/S–O), and Pelletreau; approved by Armacost. Sent for information + Immediate to Kuwait City, Bern, Damascus, and Riyadh. + + 16233. + + Washington, January 17, 1985, 1701Z + + +

For Ambassadors from U.S. Armacost. Subject: Démarche Regarding Reported Islamic + Jihad Plans to put U.S. Citizens on Trial.

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + This is an action message. + + Addressees will have seen by now media reports of January 14 + Islamic Jihad statement regarding the U.S. kidnap victims.In telegram 268 from Beirut January 15, + the Embassy transmitted the text of the statement. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850031–0107) An anonymous caller to Beirut news agencies + claimed Islamic Jihad’s responsibility for the death of two French + ceasefire observers the same day and indicated that the five + Americans who had been kidnapped in Lebanon would be tried as CIA spies. According to the January 14 Reuter version + of the report, the caller is quoted as having said the following: + Quote We wish to notify (State Department Spokesman) Alan Romberg + that William Buckley, Jeremy Levin, Benjamin Weir, Peter Kilburn and + Lawrence JencoCIA Station Chief William Buckley and Jeremy + (Jerry) Levin, the Beirut Bureau Chief of Cable News Network, + were kidnapped in March 1984; the Reverend Benjamin Weir, a + Presbyterian missionary, was kidnapped in May 1984; American + University in Beirut Librarian Peter Kilburn, disappeared and + was assumed kidnapped in December 1984; and Father Lawrence + Jenco, the Director of Catholic Relief Services, was kidnapped + on January 5. are now in our custody preliminary to + trying them as spies . . . these people are using journalism, + education and religion as a cover and are in fact agents in the + CIA. They have exploited the + hospitality accorded to them by Islamic areas to persist in their + subversive activities and will get the punishment they deserve . . . + the two French spies were liquidated this morning after they were + caught red-handed spying on our youths and positions in the Islamic + suburb as part of their mission to monitor the movements of our + youths and report to Atlantic, Israeli and Falangist intelligence. + Unquote. + + Addressees should approach host governments at appropriately high + levels as soon as possible and deliver démarches based on the + talking points provided below.In + telegram 345 from Algiers, January 20, the Embassy reported that + Ayat had “listened closely” to the démarche “and said kidnappers + had assured Algerians some time ago that no rpt no physical harm + would come to the hostages (Buckley, Weir, Levin). GOA would send someone to Lebanon + January 22 and would make maximum effort to secure release of + those held. He hoped to have a report the first part of + February.” The Embassy commented: “Despite frustrations, GOA gives every evidence that it + is going to keep trying.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 + Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Jan 5 thru + Sept. 22) On February 11, the Embassy in Algeria reported: + “Algeria is in direct contact with Hizballah group holding the + hostages and that latter maintain their demand for the release + of the three Lebanese prisoners held by Kuwait” who had been + convicted of the December 12, 1983, truck bombing of the U.S. + Embassy in Kuwait. Although the Algerians worried that + “something may have happened to Weir” since he was being held by + another group, they agreed “to maintain dialogue with Hizbollah + to continue to seek release of Americans without conditions.” + (Telegram 770 from Algiers; ibid.) Talking points for use + with the Syrians will follow by septel. + + The United States Government views with the utmost gravity + and concern the January 14 statement by Islamic Jihad in + Beirut that the five Americans kidnapped in Lebanon will be + tried as spies. + + It goes without saying that there is absolutely no truth + to the charge that these citizens have used journalism, + education and religion as a cover for spying. Nevertheless, + some of the kidnap victims have been in the hands of the + terrorists now for almost a year. Their suffering and that + of their families is beyond words. + + We do not, however, wish to engage in a debate with + terrorists about the lives of our citizens. This latest + threat contravenes all civilized norms of human behavior and + common decency, as well as Islamic injunctions regarding + hospitality and the treatment of guests. + + Clearly the lives of these five innocent Americans are now + in jeopardy. There is no time left for patience. We call + upon your government to do everything it can to effect the + safe release of the Americans. We have asked for your help + in the past, but we may now be running out of time. It is + essential that we redouble all efforts to secure the release + of these innocent people to their families. We urge you in + the strongest terms to take every possible measure you can + to free our people. + + Should harm come to these five Americans, the United + States would have to take actions which it deems + appropriate. + + + FYI only. We are making a + separate approach to Iran through the Swiss to let the Iranians know + that we will hold them directly responsible should any harm come to + our people. + + Beirut minimize considered. + + Shultz +
+
+ 144. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (01/22/1985) (2). + Confidential. Sent to Shultz + under cover of a January 22 memorandum from Chain, in which Chain recommended Shultz sign the + memorandum. + + + Washington, January 25, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + FMS Eligibility for + Algeria + +

The Department requests you sign the attached determination that Algeria + is eligible to purchase defense articles under the Foreign Military + Sales Program. Section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control ActReference is to P.L. 94–329, the Arms Control + Export Act, June 30, 1976. requires that the President find + that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to a + foreign government would “strengthen the security of the United States + and promote world peace” and sign a determination to that effect. On + April 8, 1983, you signed the determination making Algeria eligible for + defense services (training).Not + found.

+ +

Our military relationship with Algeria has been expanding slowly since + President Chadli Bendjedid came + to power in 1979. The exchange of defense attaches, USN ship visits, approval of selected + commercial sales such as 17 C–130 + aircraft, initiation of an IMET + Program this year and the earlier determination of FMS eligibility for defense services have + constituted our measured response in the military sphere to the + Government of Algeria’s greater moderation in foreign and domestic + policy and its avowed desire to improve bilateral relations. These acts + have been intended also to advance our own long-term goals of expanding + relations with the military as the most important institution in Algeria + and of helping Algeria to diversify its sources of military supply at + the expense of the Soviet Union.

+

Algeria is the most stable state in the region and the Algerian military + is the guarantor of its stability. It no longer identifies primarily + with the Arab radicals on Middle East issues in general and has played a + mediating role in the Iraq-Iran conflict, as it did between Iran and the + U.S. during the hostage crisis. Neighboring states as diverse as Niger, + Mali, Tunisia and Mauritania now look to Algeria in some degree for + protection against Libya.

+

Algeria’s more moderate posture clearly coincides far more with US interests than with those of the Soviets + and their radical allies such as Libya. Over the past four years there + have been a 50-percent reduction in the Soviet military presence in + Algeria and no new orders for Soviet equipment. However, this process of + reducing the Soviet military presence can go only so far until + alternative sources of equipment, parts and expertise are available to + the GOA on a reliable basis.

+

Several Algerian officials, including the de facto Minister of Defense, + have recently requested that Algeria’s FMS eligibility be expanded to include defense articles. I + believe this forthright request is indicative of a new inclination on + the part of the Algerian military establishment to deal directly with + ours and that a positive response would further both of our long term + goals of helping Algeria decrease its military supply dependency on the + Soviet Union and expanding relations with the Algerian armed forces.

+

FMS sales will be reviewed on a + case-by-case basis, taking into account not only our objective to reduce + Soviet influence in Algeria, but also US + relationships with other states in the area and our interest in + fostering a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

+

Signature of the attached Determination would also constitute approval of + the Justification that follows it. The Justification and the + Determination would be provided to the Congress; only the latter would + be published in the Federal Register.

+ + + Attachment + Presidential DeterminationConfidential. + + + Washington, undated + + +

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF THE + ELIGIBILITY OF ALGERIA TO MAKE PURCHASES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES UNDER + THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

+

Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) requires, as a + condition of eligibility for the purchase or lease of defense + articles and defense services from the United States under the Act, + that the President find that the furnishing of such articles and + services to the country concerned “will strengthen the security of + the United States and promote world peace”.

+

Presidential Determination No. 73–10, dated January 10, 1973, + established a consolidated list of countries eligible to make + purchases of defense articles and services on a Foreign Military + Sales (FMS) basis from the United + States Government. Because of changing international circumstances, + new countries are added to this list from time to time. Algeria, + which had served as intermediary between the U.S. and Iran during + the hostage crisis, was made eligible to purchase defense services + by Presidential Determination No. 83–6, dated April 8, 1983. It is + my judgment that circumstances now warrant that Algeria also be made + eligible to purchase defense articles.

+

Our military relationship with Algeria has been expanding slowly + since President Bendjedid + came to power in 1979. The exchange of defense attaches, USN ship visits, approval of selected + commercial sales such as C–130 + aircraft, initiation this year of an IMET Program, as well as the earlier Presidential + Determination, have constituted our measured response in the + military sphere to the Government of Algeria’s greater moderation in + foreign and domestic policy and its avowed desire to improve + bilateral relations.

+

Algeria’s more moderate posture clearly coincides far more with + US interests than with those of + the Soviet Union and its radical allies such as Libya. Neighboring + states as diverse as Niger, Mali, Tunisia and Mauritania now look to + Algeria in some degree for protection against Libya. There has been + a major reduction in the Soviet military presence in Algeria. + However, this process of reducing the Soviet military presence can + go only so far until alternate sources of equipment, parts and + expertise are available to the GOA + on a reliable basis.

+ +

I have therefore concluded that eligibility for Algeria to purchase + defense articles as well as defense services under the Act will + further both of our long-term goals of helping Algeria decrease its + military supply dependency on the Soviet Union and of expanding + relations with the Algerian military, and thereby will strengthen + the security of the United States and promote world peace.

+ +
+
+ 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, + Jan. 5 thru Sept. 22. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Mack; + cleared by Johnson (P), David Long (M/CTP), McKinley, Ruth Van Heuven (S/S–O), and Miles Pendleton (P); approved by Raphel. Sent for information + Priority to Beirut and Damascus. + + 50738. + + Washington, February 20, 1985, 0355Z + + + + SUBJECT + Kidnappings—Line To Take With Algerians. + + + Ref: + Algiers 849.In telegram 849 from + Algiers, February 14, the Embassy reported that “Hizbollah told + the Algerian representatives in Beirut that Syria had made a + démarche to the Iranian authorities urging them to intervene to + have the American kidnapees released to Syria.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + At next opportunity you should tell regular Algerian contacts of + our great appreciation for their continuing efforts to gain release + of American hostages. The line taken by Algerians with Hizballah + (reftel) was useful. We hope that advice like their own will + eventually persuade Hizballah to release captives either to Syrians, + to Algerians themselves or to responsible Lebanese parties. + + You should inform Algerians that as best we can tell Levin escaped + captivity.In telegram 857 from + Algiers, February 14, the Embassy reported: “Lallali had + telephoned us shortly before 1500Z February 14 to say Algerians + have information that Levin ‘escaped’ (s’est échappeé) from his + captors this morning and is now with (chez) the Syrians. He + could not or would not be more specific as to whether he is + reportedly in Damascus or with Syrian forces in Lebanon. Lallali + asked that we try to confirm accuracy of this report.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, N850002–0463) A day later, the Embassy in Algeria + confirmed to Lallali that “Levin had in fact escaped and would + be turned over to the Embassy at 1000 Damascus time.” The + Embassy also reported that “in response to Ambassador’s hope + Algerians would continue to press Hizbollah to release the + remaining hostages, Lallali said GOA would certainly do so. He promised to call if + he receives further word.” (Telegram 860 to from Algiers, + February 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) He was not released by or allowed to escape Hizballah. While we remain + hopeful that Hizballah will eventually realize the futility of + holding Americans, the Levin escape is not evidence of any change in + the attitude of the captors. Indeed, the harsh treatment Levin + received during his long captivity increases our concern for the + well being of the other hostages. We must assume that the health of + all of them, especially those who are elderly or require medication, + has deteriorated during their captivity. The Hizballah should + realize that to continue holding the Americans represents an + inhumane decision that puts the lives of the captives at risk and + can only create problems for their captors. + + You should assure the Algerians of our continued appreciation for + their discreet role as well informed and professional + intermediaries. We will continue to work closely with other + governments, especially those of Lebanon and Syria, but will not + discuss Algerian efforts with them. In general, we will continue + trying to avoid needless publicity surrounding the issue of the + hostages. With respect to the visit to Beirut of Mohammed Ali, you + should tell the Algerians that the former heavyweight champion’s + visit was a private one and that he did not carry any kind of + message from the USG. Indeed, + administration sought to dissuade him from the visit on grounds of + the personal security of Mohammed Ali and his entourage. + Nonetheless, we recognized his humanitarian motivations and provided + a briefing on the hostage situation and conditions in Lebanon. We, + of course, did not inform Mohammed Ali of the role being played by + Algeria. + + With respect to purported Islamic Jihad statement that one of + remaining captives has been sentenced to death, you should say that + we are unable to confirm a link between this anonymous caller and + the men holding our hostages. While any action taken to harm the + Americans would meet an appropriate USG response, we do not intend to get into a public + debate with anonymous phone callers. + + You should also tell Algerians that in the wake of Levin’s escape + we are more convinced than ever that Government of Iran has close + links to the captors of our four Americans and could, if Iran chose, + exercise influence to have them released.On March 7, the Embassy in Algiers commented + that “it is clear Algerians believe hostages are being held by + original Hizballah abductors. They recognize an Iranian + connection but do not seem to consider it overriding when it + comes to the Dawa prisoners” still being held by Kuwait. The + “Algerians are well aware of our suspicions that the GOI could bring to bear decisive + influence in this matter if it chose to do so.” (Telegram 1274 + from Algiers; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: + Lot 95D025, Box 1, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Jan 5 thru Sept. + 22) Iranian denials to other governments are to be + expected, but they should not fool anybody. + + Minimize considered. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 146. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 3, Algeria (Jan–Dec). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of + Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. + Information as of April 1 was used in its preparation. + + + NESA M# 85–10051Washington, April 1, 1985 + + +

[Omitted here is a table on Algerian-U.S. Trade.]

+

ALGERIA-US RELATIONS: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

+

President Bendjedid will be the + first Algerian head of state to make an official visit to the United + States since Algeria’s independence in 1962. Bendjedid almost certainly sees his visit as the + capstone of his attempts to gain international recognition as an Arab + and a Third World leader. He also will be looking for Washington’s + approval of his cautious but consistent efforts during the past several + years to move Algeria away from its earlier radical image. In addition, + he will use his meetings with US + officials to reaffirm Algeria’s commitment to expanding ties with the + United States. The Bendjedid + regime is particularly sensitive to what it believes is a lingering + perception in Washington that Algerians are radicals, support terrorism, + and are too closely aligned with the Soviet Union. He will want to focus + discussions on economic development and regional stability. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Political Interests

+

Bendjedid is likely to stress + Algeria’s role as negotiator on various Middle East issues. He will + point to Algeria’s efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, to bring + together Syria, Jordan and pro- and anti-Arafat groups, and to effect + the release of US hostages in the Middle + East. The Algerians believe that the Hussein-Arafat agreement merits + serious consideration, but Bendjedid is likely to remind US officials that Syrian participation is essential for the + success of any peace proposal. Bendjedid almost certainly believes that Arab + recognition of Israel’s right to exist is inevitable. He will encourage + Washington to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

Bendjedid may ask for US assistance in prodding Morocco to look + for a peaceful settlement of the Western Saharan dispute. Bendjedid believes that his willingness + to meet with Moroccan King Hassan in 1983 and his proposal earlier this + year—that Western Sahara would control its internal affairs while Hassan + would be its titular ruler and + represent the Saharans in international organizations—are clear signs + that Algeria wants a negotiated solution. The Algerians view Morocco’s + construction of the berm in Western Sahara and its intransigence in + recent talks as evidence that Hassan is interested only in a military + solution. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Bendjedid will support + Washington’s concerns about Qadhafi’s destabilizing activities in North Africa and + the need to counter Libyan influence in the region. Algiers is + particularly iritated by the Moroccan-Libyan union, which it sees as + being directed against it and would like to see the agreement’s demise. + At the same time Bendjedid is + unlikely to support Washington’s efforts to isolate Libya, so as not to + provide Qadhafi with any excuse + for meddling inside Algeria. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

Security Issues

+

Algeria’s commitment to diversify its sources of military equipment and + upgrade its military technology is an important element in the + rapprochement with Washington. Algiers also sees diversification as a + way to shake off the close identification it has had with the Soviet + Union and to enhance its nonaligned credentials. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Algerians are generally cautious in their military planning and are not + likely to ask for equipment that they do not need or cannot assimilate + into their inventory. For the moment, the Algerians are interested in + US military training and equipment + to maintain and enhance Soviet materiel already in place. The Algerians + hope the visit will strengthen the prospects of Congressional approval + for Algerian purchases of defense items under the Foreign Military Sales + program, to which Algeria has just been added. In the long term, + depending on Algerian perceptions of Washington’s response to this + request, Algiers could ask for US + fighter aircraft, tanks, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

Economic Assistance

+

Unlike most Third World leaders visiting Washington, Bendjedid will not + ask for financial aid. Despite a soft oil market, the Bendjedid government has handled the + sharp drop in oil and gas sales with a sensible austerity program and + has maintained an excellent international credit rating. Algeria is + still committed to socialism, but Bendjedid and his advisers have placed greater emphasis + on decentralization and opening up the economy to the private sector. + Algeria will seek US help in developing + sectors of the economy that were neglected by previous regimes, such as + agriculture and water resource management. The issue of US purchases of Algerian liquefied natural + gas may be raised, according to the US + Embassy, but the Algerians realize that their insistence on maximum + prices precludes any significant increase in sales. [portion marking not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 147. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, President Bendjedid of Algeria Visit 4/17/15. Secret. Drafted + by Teicher. The meeting took + place in the Oval Office. + + + Washington, April 17, 1985, 10:40–11 a.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with President Chadli + Bendjedid of Algeria (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Secretary of State George P. + Shultz + Donald T. Regan + Robert C. + McFarlane + Ambassador Michael + Newlin + Arnold Raphel, Acting + Assistant Secretary + Howard R. Teicher, NSC + Staff + Zaki Aslan, Interpreter + President Bendjedid + Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Foreign Minister + Ambassador Mohamed + Sahnoun + +

The President welcomed President Bendjedid to the White House and + America, noting that he had looked forward to the visit with great + anticipation and hope for future U.S.-Algerian relations. Before turning + to the principal issues, the President expressed + the gratitude of the American people for Algeria’s role in obtaining the + release of U.S. hostages in Iran. He added that America also appreciates + Algeria’s continuing effort to secure the release of Americans and + others held captive in Lebanon. (S)

+

The President turned his attention to Middle East + issues. “America’s top priority in the Middle East is to help move the + peace process into direct negotiations based on UNSCR 242,”See footnote 5, Document 111. + he said. King Hussein’s effort to bring moderate Palestinians into the + process should be encouraged. The President + applauded Algerian support for the King, stressing his hope that it + would continue. Palestinian participation is a prerequisite to + meaningful negotiations. However, direct PLO representation creates problems for Israel. Prime + Minister Peres has been flexible + in exploring ways to overcome this hurdle and bring about peace. (S)

+

The President referred to earlier meetings with + President Mubarak and King Fahd, + noting that both had stressed the important role Algeria plays in + shaping Arab attitudes toward the peace process. In this context, the President commented on the U.S. “appreciation of Algeria’s + close ties with Syria. The U.S. hopes that President Assad has no doubts + about our belief that the Golan Heights is also subject to UNSCR 242 and should therefore be the + subject of direct negotiations between Israel and Syria.” (S)

+

The President described current U.S. efforts to + move the process forward in terms of Ambassador Murphy’s current mission.Documentation on Murphy’s visit to the Middle East to discuss the + Arab-Israeli peace talks is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. He urged President Bendjedid to use his influence within Palestinian + circles to develop the most positive, flexible position regarding + participation in and the substantive issues of direct negotiations. The + President stressed that American leverage can + only be effective in the context of negotiations. He concluded his + remarks by asking President Bendjedid for his assessment of the prospects for the + peace process? (S)

+

President Bendjedid opened his remarks by thanking the + President, on behalf of his delegation and the Algerian people, for the + invitation to Washington in order to strengthen relations between the + two countries.See Document 140. There is a willingness for better + relations on both sides, but the question is how to achieve this goal. + (S)

+

With regard to the hostages in Iran, President + Bendjedid said + Algeria performed its national duty for humanitarian reasons. No U.S. + thanks are necessary. Iran’s confidence in Algeria helped a great deal. + He added that Algeria will continue to exert every effort with the + concerned parties to bring about the release of those held today. + (S)

+

Concerning the basic Middle East issue, President + Bendjedid stated + that he welcomed any initiative, no matter how big or small. He + described the current situation as likely to “lead to dangerous tension + in the Arab world and beyond.” He did not believe the Government of + Israel was helping to push a solution on the basis of the legitimate + rights of the Palestinians. Referring to the unprecedented Fez + proposals, President Bendjedid commented that “maybe we can meet + halfway.” He continued that Arab requests are simple. “All have a right + to live in peace and security. Why not the Palestinians?” He further + opined that it is improper to call the Palestinians terrorists. They + believe in their just cause, and are not just spreading international + terror. “Algerians used to be called murderers and outlaws, but we were + only seeking our rights. Algeria distinguishes between national action + and unruly behavior.” (S)

+

With respect to political action, President Bendjedid stressed “Algeria’s + belief in the Palestinian right to self-determination. This is not for + the PLO, but for the Palestinians and + everyone else in the area. The + U.S. should take a step in this direction. It would convince people to + act.” He continued that the Jordanian-Palestinian effort “is between + them”. Syria also lost land in 1967. Damascus needs something to + encourage dialogue. It is just not realistic to think Israel will be + wiped out. (S)

+

President Bendjedid opined that given how the United + States gained independence, America should understand the human + dimension of the Palestinian issue. The failure to understand has bred + extremism. Arabs and Muslims realize they have been insulted. This is + why Islamic extremism is growing. The U.S. has a responsible role to + play. Algeria has tried to help. But concessions, to be just and fair, + must come from both sides. “If there is a will for peace, peace will + triumph. Any positive step toward Palestinian self-determination will + result in progress.” (S)

+

Apologizing for his lengthy remarks, President + Bendjedid turned to + the situation in Lebanon. President Gemayel had been in contact with + him. Algeria is very worried about continuing outside interference, the + religious dimension, and the deteriorating situation. Gemayel is + suffering, especially due to those Christian factions who are working + with Israel to establish Christian enclaves in the South and East. He + hoped that all the interference in Lebanon could be stopped, noting that + not only Israel interferes in Lebanon. Bendjedid closed his remarks + by stressing that “it is Algeria’s duty to do all that can be done to + help Lebanon.” (S)

+

In response, the President noted that the U.S. and + Algeria seem to be in agreement. “My September 1 initiative is based on + direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. The Palestinian problem + has to be solved based on land in exchange for peaceful, secure + borders.” The PLO’s refusal to + recognize Israel’s right to exist leads to their exclusion from + negotiations. “This is why King Hussein is working with Palestinians, + unless the PLO acknowledges Israel’s + right to exist.” (S)

+

President Bendjedid replied that when the Palestinians + are asked to recognize Israel, they say “it’s their last card. What + would the Palestinians get in return?” (S)

+

The President said that President Sadat showed that negotiations are + necessary, and that they work. (U)

+

The meeting adjourned, and the participants joined the Plenary in the + Cabinet Room at 11:07. (U)Later that day, Reagan wrote in his diary “Algeria under this Pres. + is a different Algeria than it was a half dozen years ago. We have + found major areas of agreement—on Quadafi, Middle East Peace etc.” + (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, p. 446)

+
+ +
+ 148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading April–June + 1985. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, April 18, 1985 + + +

1. Algeria. During our meeting this + afternoon,The Shultz-Benjedid + conversation is in telegram 120960 to Algiers, Cairo, and Baghdad, + April 20. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850276–0344) President Bendjedid noted that Algeria has very + good relations with all Arab countries and wishes to be helpful on + Middle East issues. He asked what we expect of his government and + whether there might be any change in our own approach to the issue. I + sought to reassure Bendjedid that + the Israelis genuinely are interested in entering into negotiations with + an acceptable Arab delegation. I also told him it would be helpful if he + would encourage King Hussein and support him once a joint + Jordanian/non-PLO Palestinian delegation is formed. Benejedid nodded his + understanding. On the Western Sahara situation, he noted that we are now + fully informed on Algerian objectives and proposals and expressed the + hope that we will encourage King Hassan to seek a negotiated settlement. + I told him we understand that Algeria has no territorial ambitions in + the Western Sahara and that we are pleased that his government will keep + working with the Moroccans on this problem. I assured him that, to the + extent we have influence with King Hassan, we will encourage resolution + of the problem. I thanked Benjedid for his government’s efforts in + seeking the release of the kidnapees in Lebanon. I proposed that this + subject be taken up in greater detail at the working level. He readily + agreed and directed that Col. + Bencherchali meet with Acting Assistant Secretary Raphel to pursue the topic. This + meeting should take place this evening.In + an April 19 information memorandum, Raphel informed Shultz that he had met with Bencherchali on April 18 + and told him that “Those holding our hostages have one central + demand—the releases of the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait in exchange for + our people. The Kuwaiti government has been quite firm, even during + the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran, in refusing any + prisoner trade. The policy of the United States is equally firm and + precludes any trade involving our citizens.” Bencherchali replied + that while Algeria wanted “to continue to help” he was “not as + upbeat as Bendjedid who, + earlier in the visit, had said that we might see some positive + movement in the next several weeks. Bencherchali believes we still + have a long road ahead of us.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis + and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D92, Box 1, Nodis Memoranda April 1–30, + 1985) (SENSITIVE)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+
+ +
+ 149. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State + Central Foreign Policy Files: Lot 12D215, Top Secret Hardcopy + Telegrams. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes only for the + Secretary. + + 2935. + + Algiers, June 4, 1985, 1625Z + + +

Eyes Only the Secretary from Newlin. Subject: Hostages in Lebanon. Ref: Algiers + 2933.Telegram 2933 from Algiers, June + 4, reported that Lakehal Ayat “sketched a gloomy picture of the + deteriorating situation in Beirut. He promised continued efforts to + elicit a reply from Buckley but confided that Algerians were + encountering resistance on the part of Hizbollah.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number])

+ + + T.S.—Entire text. + + For over a year we have worked intensively with the Algerians, + Syrians and others in an effort to secure the liberation of those + taken hostage in Beirut by Hizbollah. + + Throughout the past 15 months, we quite rightly have held firm to + our position of no concessions to the kidnappers. Kuwait has been + just as firm in treating the Dawa prisonersSee Document + 143. as an internal GOK affair with the convicted + terrorists subject to Kuwait law. + + Intensive efforts by Algeria to obtain the prisoners’ release on + humanitarian and other grounds have been invariably met with the + Hizbollah response, “is Kuwait prepared to release the Dawa + prisoners?” + + In the eyes of the Algerians, this standoff shows signs of + deteriorating: + + Algeria believes there is a risk of conflict between Amal + and Hizbollah once Amal gains control of the Palestinian + camps. (This is similar to analysis in RCI 15101.)Not found. + + Algeria also believes Hizbillah will step up terrorist + activities in Kuwait and elsewhere. + + The Algerians believe the Saudi ConsulIn telegram 4740 from Riyadh, May 21, + the Embassy reported that after 16 months in captivity, + Saudi Consul Hussein Farrash had been released and flown + to Saudi Arabia by a private Syrian aircraft. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850354–0880) was released + on orders from Tehran as the result of Prince Saud’s recent + visit. We obviously have very little leverage with Iran. + Moreover, the Syrians have repeatedly promised help but without + results beyond delivering escaped or freed hostages. + + + Added to the above, are reports the Emir may be considering + signing death warrants for the condemned Dawa terrorists. + + I don’t know what other options we have or may be able to develop. + The Algerians have not thrown up their hands and are clearly + prepared to continue their efforts. At the same time, they have + confided that they are finding their contacts increasingly rigid and + inclined to further violence. As seen from Embassy Algiers, there is + no hope of compromise on either Hizbollah’s or Kuwait’s side and + increasing danger to the hostages. In fact, in our dialogue with the + Algerians, we find ourselves no longer discussing possibilities of + release but transmittal of letters, etc. + + In making this judgment, I want to be clear that I am not + suggesting any change in our long-standing policy concerning + terrorism. But I do want you to know my perception that there are no + hopeful signs that the situation of the hostages is going to improve + and new indications that events in Lebanon and perhaps elsewhere + will make their position even more precarious. + + Newlin +
+
+ 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850276–0344. Secret; Exdis; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Casey; + cleared by Poindexter, + Oakley, Pelletreau, and Sheldon Krebs + (S/S–O); approved by Quinn (S/S). + + 182587. + + Washington, June 14, 1985, 1724Z + + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Message. + + + + Secret. Entire text. + + There follows for confirmation purposes text of message from the + President to President Benjedid. + + Begin text. — The hijacking of the TWA aircraft is a matter of the most personal grave + concern for me.TWA flight 847 was hijacked on June 14 shortly + after take off from Athens. After a brief stopover in Beirut, + where hijackers released 19 passengers, the hijackers forced the + pilot to fly to Algiers. Five hours later the hijackers forced + the pilot to take off and fly back to Beirut. Further + documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, + Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989. + + + + The hijackers are armed and dangerous. According to the + information we have received, they have already shot and + wounded three passengers, one of them seriously. They need + urgent medical treatment. + + We are uncertain about the quantity of fuel the plane is + carrying. As the fuel stock decreases, the hijackers are + likely to become increasingly desperate. + + We have been working closely with you on the Americans who + are being held hostage in Lebanon and are grateful for your + continued efforts on their behalf. + + We have been especially appreciative of your involvement, + given the esteem and respect which Algeria enjoys both in + the US and in the Middle + East. + + I know also the principled nature of Algerian policy. I + share a conviction of the importance of dealing with + terrorist incidents such as this aircraft hijacking in a + firm manner. + + In recent years, Algeria has played an important role as + an intermediary between the U.S. and those who regard us as + their foe. In light of this special aspect of our very good + relations and the special circumstances prevailing in this + case, I am requesting you to allow the hijacked aircraft to + land, and to not allow the plane to take off again. End + text. + + + Shultz +
+
+ 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by the TWA Task Force; cleared by Kenneth Quinn, Ruth Van Heuven + (S/S–O), and Raphel; approved + as text received from the White House. + + 184123. + + Washington, June 15, 1985, 2155Z + + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Message to Bendjedid. + +

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. Ambassador Newlin should seek + an immediate, personal meeting with President Bendjedid to deliver the following + letter from President + Reagan. Ambassador should + make clear that the President expects a reply from Bendjedid.

+

3. Begin text.

+

Dear Mr. President:

+

I regret disturbing you during the month of Ramadan, but events have been + forced upon us which require serious consideration and action.

+

When we met in April,See Document 147. I stressed the gratitude the + American people feel toward the Algeria for its efforts to bring about + the release of our hostages in Iran, as well as your assistance with + other terrorist incidents. Tragically, we are again faced with the need + to cooperate to resolve a terrorist act of war against the United States + in particular, but, in reality, a deed directed against all of + humanity.

+

Recognizing our respect for Algeria’s role in resolving this crisis, I + appreciate your government’s willingness to take all possible measures + to end this hijacking in Algiers. We realize that keeping the plane in + Algiers entails a certain level of risk for the passengers and crew. + However, should the plane depart Algiers and return to Beirut, the + passengers and crew would be thrust into a hostile, lawless environment + where the prospects for violence and loss of life would be much greater. + Therefore, I want to ask that you take the necessary steps to keep the + aircraft in Algiers.

+

Your government has worked skillfully to keep the negotiations going, and + I am aware that efforts are underway to involve the ICRC to improve communications with the + terrorists. We do not object to the participation of the ICRC, as long as such a process is + productive. However, if such a process fails to produce positive + results, I am obligated to fulfill my constitutional responsibility to + protect the lives of American citizens. Circumstances may arise under + which you would find it useful to draw on specialized competence from + outside. The United States stands ready to offer whatever assistance + your government may find useful, including that of a technical nature + which would facilitate negotiations and help prepare for other + eventualities. It is my sincere hope that together, we will succeed in + finding a successful solution.

+

It seems clear that a failure to resolve this crisis decisively and + immediately can only result in greater danger to the passengers and crew + of this aircraft while encouraging more air piracy in the coming summer + months. We must directly confront this threat to civilized humanity.

+ +

I have no doubt that you will continue to play the courageous + humanitarian role which has earned you and the people of Algeria + worldwide respect and gratitude.In telegram + 3145 from Algiers, June 16, Newlin reported: “After listening to oral + translation of President’s message, he [Bendjedid] said Algeria was + willing to continue its efforts. In order to prevent further deaths, + it was essential Israel begin to release the Shiite prisoners as it + had announced it would do. GOA did + not know why hijackers reneged on earlier agreement. One theory was + that hijackers had heard radio reports of U.S. Delta-type team in + Mediterranean area and had decided Algeria was no longer safe. I + made a strong pitch GOA accept U.S. + technical assistant on a highly secret basis. Despite initial + misgivings over possible leaks, Bendjedid said he would look into possibility with + his senior advisers.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) The telegram is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, + June 1985–January 1989.

+

With highest regards.

+

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan End + text.

+ Shultz +
+
+ 152. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice + President BushSource: George H.W. Bush Library, + Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, + Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19796, Folder 19796–005, + Algeria—1985. Confidential. Copies were sent to Fuller and Fortier. At the top of the + memorandum, Bush wrote: + “Good report. GB.” + + + Washington, June 18, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Conversation with Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun + +

I telephoned Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun and said I would like to talk about the current + hostage situation. He responded immediately and came to my office, where + we had a good thirty-minute discussion. Highlights are as follows: + + Sahnoun feels that a + solution to the immediate problem can be worked out. He believes + that the ICRC, working with + the Israelis, can be very helpful. + + + Sahnoun is aware that + the American public is deeply frustrated and angered. He + suggested that three things be done: + + Remind the American people that it is not just the + U.S. that suffers from terrorism. Recently, Kuwait,Reference is presumably to + the December 3, 1984, hijacking of Kuwait Airways + flight en route from Kuwait City to Karachi. + Hijackers shot and killed two USAID workers. + Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, + Part 1, Terrorism, January 1977–May + 1985. JordanOn June 11, terrorists hijacked a + plane owned by Alia, a Jordanian airline, shortly + before its planned flight to Amman. After two days, + the hijackers released all 71 hostages, blew up the + plane on the tarmac at Beirut Airport, and escaped + into the city. (Ihsan Hijazi, “Beirut Hijackers Free + Travelers, Blow Up Jet,” New York + Times, June 13, 1985, p. A1) and Saudi + ArabiaNot further + identified. have all suffered at the hands of + terrorists. + + An international effort must be undertaken to ensure + that security at international airports be enhanced. + Sahnoun spoke + admiringly of El Al’s protective measures and urged that + other western airlines take similar measures. + + Sahnoun said + that VOA and USIA do too little in + explaining U.S. policy to the Middle East. He stated + that we report the news, but do not make clear to Arab + people why we do what we do. + + + Turning to Lebanon, Sahnoun said, “Israel has awakened a monster by + invading Lebanon.”On June 6, 1982, + Israel invaded southern Lebanon. Documentation is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + vol. XVIII, Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August + 1982. By this he was referring to the + Lebanese Shiites, long the numerically dominant segment of the + people who are now just beginning to realize actual power + through the chaos created by the Israeli invasion. As they have + successfully resisted the Israelis, the Shiites have become, in + a way, intoxicated by their power and will not be denied. + Sahnoun said that the + Syrians have been very wise to stay out of Shiite territory or + they would also be attacked as are Palestinians and other ethnic + groups. + + Sahnoun said that U.S. + retaliation in a Lebanese context would be deeply + counterproductive. He said that a “profound enmity” would be + created among the Shiites toward the U.S. He said that the + Shiites are like the Corsicans in that they are prone to + carrying on endless vendettas. In talking to the original two + hijackers in Algeria, it became clear that their primary + motivation was release of prisoners held by Israelis who + included many former relatives.Israel used the Ansar detention camp in southern Lebanon to + house thousands of captured prisoners after it invaded + Lebanon in 1982. Shiites killed by a U.S. retaliation + would have relatives who would dedicate themselves to continuing + vendettas against the U.S. Retaliation might also unite Shiites + in other countries against the U.S. Sahnoun added that he does not rule out + retaliation in all cases, but that if we retaliate, we must be + very clear about the consequences with which we will have to + deal. + + + Finally, Sahnoun urged + that we not pull out of Lebanon. He suggested that we keep a low + profile, but urged that we maintain a presence so that our + influence can be used constructively as the tumultuous results + of the Israeli invasion gradually subside. +

+

I thanked Sahnoun for coming and + for all that Algeria has done to be helpful in this case.

+
+
+ 153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, + Jan 5 thru Sept. 22. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by + Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); + cleared by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN), Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA), Quinn + (S/S), Ryan Crocker (NEA/IAI), + Robert Pace (S/S–O), and Johnson; + approved by Raphel. The + document is misnumbered in the original. + + 275963. + + Washington, September 9, 1985, 1453Z + + +

For Ambassador Johnstone from + Raphel. Subject: GOA Involvement With PLO Operation. Ref: (A) Algiers 4520In telegram 4520 from Algiers, September 1, + Johnstone reported that + he had informed Belkheir that + recent media reports “would provoke serious concern in Washington + about Algerian role in training terrorists.” Belkheir replied that “He wanted to + speak frankly on the issue. He would not deny that Algeria had + trained many in the PLO since the + Revolution. (He did not say the training was continuing but he also + didn’t say it had stopped.) He said Algeria could deny categorically + that any training was given to anyone with the purpose of carrying + out a terrorist act or that the Government of Algeria was involved + in any way in planning or promoting any such act. The GOA could not accept accountability + for every action engaged in by the PLO because some had trained in Algeria.” Johnstone in turn stated + “incidents such as this could not help but work against our + bilateral relationship which both countries wanted to improve.” + (Ibid.) (B) [less than 1 line not + declassified] (C) USDAO Tel Aviv IS 12891Not found. (D) Algiers 2228.In telegram 2228 + from Algiers, April 25, the Embassy reported that in response to the + United States’ démarche concerning Algerian involvement in an + abortive April 20 PLO attack off + the coast of Israel, “Kerroum told Chargé that GOA does not hide the fact that it has + provided training to the PLO in the + past at Tebessa. However, it is GOA + policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of liberation + movements.” The Embassy commented: “At no point did Kerroum deny that this PLO operation may, in fact, have been + launched from Algeria, nor did he answer previous Embassy query + about Abu Jihad’s presence here in the first half of April.” + Furthermore, the Embassy stated “What is clear, is the GOA is very concerned about the U.S. + reaction to possible Algerian involvement as evidenced by its rapid + and authoritative response at this high level. Kerroum also reflected his + government’s desire to distance itself from any responsibility with + this specific operation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850288–0190)

+ + + (S) Entire text. + + + Department appreciates your initiative (ref A) in approaching + Presidency Secretary General Belkheir regarding the Algerian role in training + terrorists. We note that Belkheir’s rejoinder is similar to MFA Secretary General Nouredine Kerroum’s response to + Embassy’s April 24 démarche,No record + of the U.S. démarche was found. shortly after the + “Atavirus” incident (ref D). Kerroum stated that the GOA did not provide training or equipment for the + Atavirus operation, had no knowledge of the “Palestinian commando + operation” and, if the GOA had + known about it, it would have done everything possible to prevent + it. At the same time, and with a less distant historical context + than Belkheir’s, Kerroum reiterated GOA policy to provide training for the + PLO and not to interfere in + PLO internal affairs. + + Action requested: We believe, however, that we must not allow this + incident to be passed over so quickly by the GOA. Embassy should make demarche at + the highest possible level concerning these events. Discussion of + the incident should be specific and pointed, drawing on reftels and + indicating to the GOA our awareness + of the following information: + + The PLO group received + approximately a year of training in Algeria at a base in + Tebessa, including instruction in the use of explosives and + artillery; + + In mid-July 1985, the group was organized as a unit at + Tebessa and left Algeria for Tunis in early August; + + On August 12, they traveled to Athens where they boarded a + passenger ship and sailed to Limassol, Cyprus, arriving on + August 14; + + Also on August 14, they boarded a chartered yacht, the + “Casselardit”, in Limassol and left for Sidon, Lebanon, + arriving on the same day; + + The group was refused entry to the Port of Sidon and + returned to Cyprus on August 14, remaining there until + August 24; they sailed again on August 24 and were + apprehended that day by Israeli naval forces; and + + Interrogations also revealed that training of terrorists + in Algeria is continuing actively. + + + Embassy should remind GOA that + GOA told us that it would not + approve of such operations and would act to prevent them. If reports + of continuing training of terrorist units for specific hostile + actions against Israel are true, at a time of improving relations + (including military cooperation) between the U.S. and Algeria, such + activity risks harm to both countries’ interests and to overall + efforts in the Middle East peace process. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850717–0517. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Raphel; cleared + by Gregg, McKinley, Pearson, and Ruth Van Heuven + (S/S–O); approved by Raphel. Sent for information + Immediate to Rabat. Sent for information to Tunis, USUN, and Paris. + + 309868. + + Washington, October 8, 1985, 1923Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Ibrahim. + + + + All secret + + Summary—During a meeting with the Vice President, Algerian Foreign + Minister Ibrahimi explained + Algerian views on key issues in the Maghreb—the Western Sahara and + the threat from Libya—and also discussed the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis.On October 1, Israel bombed the Palestine + Liberation Organization (PLO) + headquarters in Tunisia. See Documents 331–334. End + summary + + Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi met with the Vice President on October + second at 2:00 p.m. Also attending were Ambassador Sahnoun, D. Gregg of OVP, A. + Raphel of NEA and + H. Teicher of NSC. + + The Foreign Minister opened by expressing President Bendjedid’s warm greetings. In + response, the Vice President said that the Bendjedid visit to the statesSee Document + 147. moved bilateral relations forward in a way + seldom seen in such visits. The Minister noted that bilateral + relations between the two countries were quite good. + + The Minister then turned to the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis noting that + it had engendered intense emotions in Algiers since this is the + first Israeli strike against the Maghreb. He said that he had + consulted closely the other Arab Foreign Ministers in New York in + preparation for the UNSC + debate. + + The Minister noted that efforts in the Maghreb had been directed + against Qadhafi who, in + Algerian eyes, will never listen to voices of reason. Therefore, + Algeria has been attempting to strengthen Tunisia. The GOA had agreed to buy Tunisian + products and to fund industrial projects in southern Tunisia. + Algiers also wanted to strengthen Tunisia militarily—the Israeli + attack had caused major problems for this effort to contain + Qadhafi. + + In response to a question from the Vice President, Foreign + Minister Ibrahimi outlined + the history of the Algerian-Moroccan dialogue on the Western Sahara. + He added that Algeria discovered evidence in July that Libya was continuing to + supply Soviet arms to the Polisario, thereby showing that Libya + remained active in the conflict. + + The Minister noted that in addition to concerns about Libya and + the Western Sahara, Algerian efforts in the Maghreb were focussed on + a third issue as well—the role of France. Paris is interested in + working with the Maghreb countries individually and has no + appreciation for the importance of a United Maghreb. Also, the + French-Libyan accordReference is to the + September 17, 1984, agreement between France and Libya under + which both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Chad. + Documentation on the accord is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. on Chad and the socialist government’s + policies on the Western Sahara are troubling to Algiers. + + In response to the Vice President’s question on the possibilites + for a referendum in the Western Sahara, Ibrahimi described the history of the effort noting + that three elements were key to a solution of the Sahara issue—a + referendum, negotiations, and the withdrawal of all forces before + the referendum. The Minister added that the UN Secretary General’s new report calls for a + referendum without conditions.See footnote 3, Document 433. The + GOA has asked the Secretary to + play a role in supervising the referendum. + + The conversation then returned to the Israeli raid on Tunis with + the Vice President saying that it caused a real dilemma for the + United States which is a target of terrorism everywhere. We want and + need maximum international cooperation to combat terrorism.In telegram 316383 to Algiers, October + 15, the Department reported that Bush had also told Ibrahimi that “he is in charge of the + President’s Special Task Force on Terrorism. He added that we + would be glad to exchange ideas, either in Washington or + Algiers, on how to counter terrorism. Ibrahimi responded that he + would pass this message to his government. In any case, + cooperation in this field has already begun, and Ibrahimi agreed, should be + deepened. It is essential, however, that the dialogue be carried + out very discreetly.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 + Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Nodis Sept + 30 thru Dec 17) At the same time, the mood in the United + States would fully support appropriate retaliation in response to + the terrorist killings of American citizens. Although we have + excellent relations with Tunisia, we also understood the Israeli + response to terrorist acts against its citizens. + + The Vice President went on to say that we do not condone attacks + into Tunisia and asked the Foreign Minister to tell President + Bourguiba that we are + troubled by what has happened. Our friendship for Tunisia is deep + and historical. Yet, we must work with like-minded states to find + ways to fight the scourge of terrorism. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 155. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President BendjedidSource: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office + of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, + OA/ID 19796, Folder 19796–005, Algeria—1985. No classification + marking. + + + Washington, December 17, 1985 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I was pleased to have received your distinguished Ambassador, Mohamed Sahnoun, on December 12 and to + hear from him the oral message which you sent outlining your concerns + about the situation in North Africa.Telegram 382284 to Algiers, December 16, contains a record of the + Bush-Sahnoun meeting as well as Benjedid’s oral message. Bendjedid had instructed Sahnoun to “deliver a message + directly to the Vice President.” The message read in part: + “Bendjedid ‘very concerned’ about situation in area, particularly + Qadhafi’s moves and + possibly ‘hidden’ motives. These might be related to his intention + to do something in Chad.” Bendjedid also “turned to the situation in + Mauritania where Qadhafi + trying to buy adherence to his Arab-African union with Morocco” + given that “Mauritania is desperately poor and pressure is on” and + that “Bendjedid wants to draw USG + attention to developments, call for vigilance. GOA is concerned about perceived + temptation for Moroccans to exploit situation by encouraging + Mauritanian entry into union—which would complicate situation for + Algeria.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot + 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Nodis Sept 30 thru Dec + 17)

+

During my discussion with Ambassador Sahnoun, it was immediately clear that we share a common + perception about the malevolent designs of Colonel Qadhafi. My government’s unyielding + view is that Qadhafi is not to be + trusted in any context. Over the course of time, he deliberately has + pursued a path at variance with the accepted norms of international + behavior. Like you, we believe that his regime poses an unremitting + danger to Libya’s neighbors and, through the use of terrorism as an + instrument of policy, to the international community at large.

+

Like you, we perceive a Libyan role in the recent Egypt Air + hijacking,On November 23, three members + of the Adu Nidal + Organization hijacked Egypt Air flight 648 shortly after the plane + left Athens. The plane was diverted to Malta. The hijackers shot and + killed two female passengers—one American and one Israeli—and + wounded three others. Two days later, Egyptian commandos stormed the + plane, killing 54 passengers, two crew members, and one hijacker. + (Judith Miller, “From Takeoff to Raid: The 24 Hours of Flight 648,” + New York Times, November 26, 1985, p. + A1) as well as in numerous other instances of terrorism. For + example, we have well-documented evidence of Libyan plots to carry out + terrorist acts against American government installations in Khartoum. As + I suggested when I last met with Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi,See Document + 154. + there is both purpose and + scope for close cooperation on these issues. I hope we can pursue this + mutual concern.

+

On other issues of immediate concern which you raised about Qadhafi, our information and assessment + are generally very close to yours. There is mounting evidence that + Qadhafi contemplates further + military moves in Chad. While we are uncertain as to his immediate + intentions, we credit reports of a significant buildup of Libyan forces + in the northern part of that country. Even if he does not engage in + further adventurism to the south, continuing Libyan occupation in the + north, to include the Aozou strip, is unacceptable. My government + strongly supports the legitimate government of President Habre, and I + applaud your decision to meet with him in Algiers.

+

Even more dangerous to area stability are Qadhafi’s attempts to establish hegemony in Sudan. + Success would pose a grave threat throughout the region. Qadhafi’s plotting and publicized, + cynical offer to “buy” Sudanese obeisance fits a pattern of attempts to + exploit the economic and financial difficulties which beset many of his + neighbors.

+

Military tensions between Egypt and Libya have abated momentarily, but + the threat of conflict remains so long as Qadhafi persists in his relentless determination to + destabilize the Government of President Mubarak. I am particularly heartened to know that you + continue to consult with the Egyptian government on matters of such + concern. We are also in close and continuing contact on this matter. Of + particular concern are reports that the Soviets have agreed to major new + arms deliveries to Libya, possibly to include SA–5 missiles. + Introduction of these would seriously threaten Mediterranean and North + African security.

+

Tunisian leaders are clear in their assessment that Qadhafi represents a continuing and + very serious threat to the stability of their country. Your strong, + clear and undiminished support for President Bourguiba’s government is a vital contribution to our + mutual objective of helping assure the security of Tunisia.

+

Regarding your assessment of the situation in Mauritania, we do not have + independent information of plotting against the Taya government. Quite frankly, we + believe it unlikely that King Hassan would seek to undermine President + Taya who has shown himself + to be quite favorably disposed toward Morocco. To me, it is more + plausible that Qadhafi might seek + to take advantage of Mauritania’s economic weakness to pressure that + government towards joining the Arab-African Union. Again, we have no + information to confirm this. We would not welcome expansion of that + union. I invite your continued thoughts on this most important + matter.

+

Mr. President, I deeply appreciate your having informed my government of + your decision to meet with Colonel Qadhafi. I well understand that this is a difficult + decision for you and that you have sought to establish conditions aimed at eliciting better + behavior from Qadhafi. I share + your skepticism about Qadhafi’s + sincerity, even should he make such commitments. In the same spirit of + friendship and candor with which you sent your message, I express my + hope that you will use this meeting both publicly and in private to + convey the strongest possible message of disapproval to Qadhafi concerning his international + behavior. You know even better than we that Qadhafi will try to exploit this meeting to gain + international respectability and to advance his regional goals. That + would indeed be unhelpful in dealing with this dangerous and erratic + dictator.

+

If it would be of value to you, my government is prepared to send an + official to Algeria to provide you personally with a more detailed + review of our information about Qadhafi’s activities. This could be arranged prior to + your meeting with Qadhafi, which + I understand will not take place until at least very late this + month.

+

Please accept my highest regards and warmest wishes. I wish you and the + people of your great country a prosperous and happy 1986.

+

Sincerely,

+ George + BushBush wrote: “Warmest Personal + Greetings to you and your family” under his + signature. +
+
+ 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860038–0924. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + + 130. + + Algiers, January 8, 1986, 1654Z + + +

Dept pass as desired. Subject: Condemnation of Terrorism: Algerian + View.

+ + + Secret—Entire text + + Summary: MFA + SecGen Hamdani heard our + demarche on Abu Nidal + January 6,In the wake of the December + 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports + (documentation scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, + Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989), the United States + sent a démarche to Damascus, which was sent for information to + multiple posts, stating that “there is compelling evidence that + Abu Nidal’s + organization was involved. He is a dangerous and ruthless + terrorist, committed to violence and destruction.” The démarche + continued: “Abu Nidal + cannot operate in a vacuum, however; he is dependent on others + to provide sanctuary, facilities, and financial support. Recent + evidence indicates that Abu + Nidal has obtained increased support from Libya. + The only certain way to curtail the bloody activities that + Abu Nidal has made + his vocation in life is to cut off the support system that keeps + his organization alive. Those who provide Abu Nidal assistance must + share in the responsibility for his actions, and must likewise + be subject to universal opprobrium.” (Telegram 265 to Damascus, + January 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860003–0712) including request to + intercede with Syria on + cutting its ties with that group. I urged that GOA make its opposition to terrorism + well known publicly. Hamdani, after much circuitous and unhelpful + argumentation, indicated that GOA + does not want to undermine its ability to serve as an interlocutor + with wide-ranging groups in the Middle East and, for this reason, + will continue to take a reserved public position on terrorism. + GOA, at same time, is likely to + continue behind-the-scenes support for USG efforts to combat terrorism. End summary. + + I had a long and, on the surface, not very satisfactory discussion + on January 6 with MFA + SecGen Hamdani of the issue of + terrorism and the need for all states to condemn it forthrightly. + Drawing on Dept guidance, I urged that Algeria make its opposition + to terrorism well known by condemning publicly such acts as those at + the Rome and Vienna airports that were most certainly carried out by + the Abu Nidal group with + Libyan support. I also gave him our background paper on Abu NidalNot found. and urged that GOA intercede with Syria to stop that + country’s remaining support for Abu + Nidal. + + Hamdani, who was accompanied by Europe-North America Director + Ghoualmi and Deputy Director Souibes, took the line that this issue + is confused by the lack of a clear and widely accepted definition of + what is terrorism and what is national liberation. He said that + Algeria certainly sees the attacks in Rome and Vienna as damaging to + the Palestinian cause and noted that the GOA had let the press handle this issue through + analysis and propagation of the PLO + and Arab League condemnations of the attacks. Continuing in a + “personal vein,” Hamdani said that what really matters for + governments is to analyze who is behind the many Abu Nidal terrorist operations + which, he said with Ghoualmi’s vigorous backing, were consistently + damaging to the Palestinian cause. After much indirect accusation, + Hamdani eventually got to suggestion that Mossad is “manipulating” + Abu Nidal through + intermediaries as part of a broad Israeli policy of disrupting the + peace process. + I dismissed this canard, + saying that it was quote pure fantasy, even absurd unquote. + Referring to Hamdani our secret background paper on Abu Nidal, I said there is no + question that Abu Nidal + sets his own agenda and carries out his actions with Libyan support. + In these terms, I said that it is most important for responsible + states to make absolutely clear that these kinds of actions are + unacceptable. + + Hamdani and Ghoualmi then shifted gears, going back to the first + issue of the need to condemn terrorism publicly. With extensive + references to the FLN’s policy and + practice in its war for independence which limited itself to direct + attacks on the enemy, Hamdani maintained that Algeria does not want + to condemn publicly actions such as those at Rome and Vienna because + this hides the fact that terrorism comes from the failure to solve + underlying problems. What we should be doing, he said, is treating + the cause of an illness, not its manifestations. He granted, + nonetheless, that Arab states must focus on the issue of terrorism + and stop its damaging effects on all of us. They went on to point + out, however, that Algeria also has an important resource among all + Middle Eastern countries that it must carefully guard—its + credibility. This credibility gives the GOA entree in many camps and makes it an invaluable + interlocutor. If the GOA is seen to + take sides on certain issues, it will take itself out of that + intermediary role and thus lose its usefulness. Hamdani acknowledged + that GOA had not condemned in + public terrorist attacks such as those in Rome and Vienna (although + he insisted on taking credit for the Algerian media’s carrying of + PLO and Arab League + condemnations), but he noted also that Algeria had also not + criticized the U.S. diversion of the Egyptian airliner carrying the + perpetrators of the Achille Lauro hijacking,After the hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship surrendered to Egyptian + authorities on October 9, 1985, they boarded an Egyptian + passenger plane bound for Tunisia rather than face trial in + Egypt. U.S. fighter jets intercepted the plane and forced it to + land at the NATO airbase in + Sigonella, Italy. Documentation is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Terrorism, Part + 2, June 1985–January 1989. even though Algerian + public opinion had clamored for such a condemnation. + + Comment: I returned to our position on the need to publicly + comdemn terrorism and isolate its backers, making sure Hamdani + understood the importance we attach to the issue in our relations + with all states. I don’t think I left them in any doubt about that. + I sense, however, that the GOA + feels that it can be more helpful in the fight against genuine + terrorist acts like the Rome and Vienna airport incidents (acts of + the sort, they emphasized, the FLN + never engaged in during a bitter struggle against the French for + Algeria’s independence) by working quietly behind the scenes. + Indeed, the GOA is giving us + important cooperation in identifying and neutralizing terrorist + operatives, and we have every indication that cooperation will + continue. + + + Subsequent to this meeting, Foreign Ministry issued official + statement in “threats to Libya” (see septel).In telegram 132 from Algiers, January 8, the + Embassy transmitted the text of the Algerian statement which + read, in part, that the threats against Libya, “which constitute + in themselves a serious violation of the standards of + international conduct, are unacceptable. Their implementation + (carrying out) would generate a grave situation in the region, + would place in danger peace and international security and would + undermine the efforts of the international community to + establish a just and definitive peace in the Middle East. Under + these circumstances, Algeria, concerned about the respect for + the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as + the preservation of the gains of the brotherly Libyan people, + would not allow in any case that they be violated.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860017–0597) While statement did not specify the U.S. by + name, it was a relatively severe criticism of pressure on Libya. + GOA undoubtedly felt obliged to + make some public defense of an Arab brother, but Hamdani would at + the same time take credit with us for not having named the U.S., as + such an Algerian statement a decade ago most certainly would have + done and in even more virulent terms. + + Johnstone +
+
+ 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Algiers Nodis 1986. + Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted from text provided by the White + House; cleared by Joann Alba (S/S–S), McKinley, + Zweifel, Johnson, and Robert Pace (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information + Priority to Rabat. + + 26509. + + Washington, January 28, 1986, 0324Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Letter to Bendjedid. + +

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. Following is text of Vice President Bush’s letter to Bendjedid. Original letter to follow by courier.

+

Begin text:

+

His Excellency

+

Chadli Bendjedid

+

President of the Democratic and Popular

+

Republic of Algeria

+

Algiers

+ +

Dear Mr. President:

+

One of the more positive and enjoyable events on my 1985 calendar was the + opportunity to renew my friendship with you during your highly + successful trip to the United States in April.See Documents 147 and + 148. Your visit proved to be a + key step in the rapidly improving relations between our two + countries.

+

High level dialogue between Algeria and the United States continues to + increase; the first meeting of our bilateral Joint Economic Commission + is about to take placeThe U.S.-Algeria + Joint Economic Commission meetings were scheduled for February 17–18 + in Algiers. and technological exchanges and assistance in + such sectors as agriculture are growing. In short, Mr. President, I see + many reasons to be pleased with our bilateral relations. Impediments to + closer cooperaton are being overcome and I am convinced that 1986 will + bring us even closer together.

+

I am concerned, however, by issues which continue to cloud relations + between your country and another friend of the United States, Morocco. + As I have indicated previously,See Document 155. I continue to hope + that Algeria and Morocco will resume direct talks on questions which + divide your two countries, particularly the Western Sahara problem. I + have been pleased to learn from close friends in France that you remain + open to the possibility of such talks. We remain convinced that the + solution to this conflict can best be approached through discussions + between your two governments. I have written King Hassan to express this + view,For Bush’s letter to Hassan, see Document 436. and wish to express to you directly + my hope that such talks can take place.

+

Mr. President, I again reiterate my pleasure at the obvious growth in + understanding and friendship between our two great countries. I write to + you with the hope that the new year will bring prosperity to both you + and the people of Algeria and with the fervent wish that friendship will + grow also between those we count as friends in the vital Mahgreb + area.

+

Sincerely, George Bush.

+

End text.

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 158. Note From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + (Armacost) to Secretary of + State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official + Memoranda (02/07/1986). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum reads: “GPS.” + + + Washington, February 7, 1986 + + Mr. Secretary: + +

While it is clear that Algeria has been developing more pragmatic + domestic policies and less rigid anti-Western foreign policy, I think a + number of additional points should be kept in mind to keep the trend + toward moderation in perspective and to avoid excessively high + expectations. It serves Algerian interests to move toward us, but not + too close.

+ + + Although UN votes are only one + barometer of foreign policy positions, Algeria’s voting record in + the UN is among the worst (4.3% + coincidence with U.S. in plenary in 1984; 0% agreement on 10 key + votes; one of the few Islamic countries to abstain on + Afghanistan). + + Algeria’s genuine helpfulness on the hostage issue in 1979 and + their efforts now stem from their desire and ability to seize + appropriate opportunities to enhance their prestige and demonstrate + their credentials as a bridge between radicals and moderates.In telegram 146 from Algiers, January 9, + Johnstone reported + that in an “extraordinarily frank two-hour exchange” with + Belkheir “concerning + the future of Algeria and prospects for the U.S.-Algeria + relationship,” Belkheir + “said that the almost-completed revision of the National Charter + will usher in a new age of pragmatism and common sense in + Algerian political life and that this can and should lead to a + major amplification of the U.S.-Algeria relationship.” + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: + Lot 95D23, Algiers Nodis 1986) + + Algeria’s desire is to diversify its sources of military supply, + not to switch. We should keep this in mind. If Algeria could receive + major, sophisticated items from both the U.S. and the USSR, its non-aligned credentials + would be much enhanced, as would its political weight in Africa and + in the Islamic world. + + Michael H. + ArmacostArmacost initialed + “MA” above this typed + signature. +
+ +
+ 159. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + 2057. + + Algiers, April 20, 1986, 1723Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian Reaction to Events in Libya. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + I saw General Belkheir + April 20 at my request to get GOA + reading on events in Libya and effects on U.S.-Algerian + relations. + + Algerian Reaction:Belkheir started and ended session by reminding me + that official Algerian reaction was to be opposed to U.S. military + strikes against Libyan people (not Libyan state).On April 14, the United States bombed Libya in + retaliation for the bombing of a disco in West Berlin that + killed a U.S. servicemember and a Turkish woman and injured 230 + others, including 50 U.S. servicemembers. Documentation is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVIII, Libya; Chad. He said that Algeria could + not sanction military attacks on region no matter what the cause. He + underlined this point in an apparent effort to ensure that we did + not misinterpret Algeria’s mild public reaction.In telegram 2008 from Algiers, April 17, the + Embassy reported that on April 16 “the Politburo of the FLN, Algeria’s sole political + party, held an extraordinary session during which it ‘studied + American aggression against the brotherly Libyan people,’ + according to ‘El Moudjahid,’ the country’s leading French + language daily. The Politburo also called for the ‘urgent’ + convening of an extraordinary Arab summit in order to examine + the consequences of the American ‘aggression’ and to take + ‘appropriate collective measures.’” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860297–0676) + + Situation in Libya:Belkheir said he had been sleeping in his office + during the crisis handling the unending calls from Qadhafi. He said Qadhafi had been very unsettled, + even panicky, at the beginning, but that in the last two days he has + settled down and is now acting as a man in control of the situation. + Belkheir’s personal view + was that both the initial attacks and subsequent indications of + unhappiness in Libyan armed forces had rattled Qadhafi. There was no doubt in + Belkheir’s mind that the + raids had triggered some dissension which led to a shootout in the + general headquarters and that at one point two armored units had + moved against Qadhafi’s + apparent wishes, only to be confronted by the Air Force. Belkheir also believed that the Air + Force had refused, at one point, to deploy aircraft when ordered to + do so by Qadhafi. In his + phone calls, Qadhafi had + claimed to be under continuing attack. Belkheir looked to me to reassure him that this was + not the case, which I did. In any case, Belkheir thought that, notwithstanding these + interesting signs of dissent in Libyan military, Qadhafi was clearly back in control and probably + enjoyed substantially more popular support than previously. He took + note, however, of the inevitable distrust (mefiance) which would be + left within the Libyan military after the attack and the possible + opportunities this implied for removing Qadhafi. Belkheir left no doubt that this remained the + preferred solution to the problem provided, he hastened to add, + Qadhafi was not replaced + by Khomeini (yet another manifestation of Algeria’s concern over + fundamentalism in the region). + + Libyan Request for Support:Belkheir said that Qadhafi had called both privately and publicly for + Algerian military support and immediate union. Both, of course, were + rejected. Belkheir got in a + poke at Morocco, noting that the only promise Qadhafi has ever kept was to the + Moroccans. He shook his head over the fact that Qadhafi had said on television that + Morocco could be excused for not sending military aid because they + didn’t have much of a military capacity. He also raised an eyebrow + over the Hassan letter to Qadhafi.In telegram + 3730 from Rabat, April 16, the Embassy transmitted the text of + Hassan’s letter to Qadhafi, which reads in part: “I have learned, + both with amazement and consternation, the news of the air + attacks against the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.” + Furthermore, Hassan stated: “The conflict that today confronts + the Libyan Jamahriya and the United States of America goes + beyond, far beyond, the context of relations between those two + countries. Aggressions aimed at civilian targets, the victims of + which are unarmed, innocent people, can find no justification + and should henceforth be the object of general reprobation. The + entire international community, and in the first place the Arab + nation, find themselves affected.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860289–0844) + + Future U.S. Action:Belkheir wanted to know what we would do next. I + said I was there to solicit his advice and views. I did note that + our actions would be predicated on Qadhafi’s own actions and that we had no plans to + take further action if Qadhafi behaved himself. I opined, however, that + even stronger U.S. actions could well be possible if Qadhafi continued to engage in + terrorist actions. Belkheir + groaned, saying that he could not believe this would serve U.S. + interests. He said Qadhafi + was once again trying to establish contact with the U.S. He had + asked Algeria (again) to contact us on his behalf. Bendjedid had declined. The + Algerians understand the Maltese Foreign Minister now is seized of + the issue. I opined that we had nothing to talk about. Our + opposition to terrorism was non-negotiable and agreements with + Qadhafi were worthless. + Actions would speak for themselves. I was sure that we would pose no + risk to Qadhafi if he behaved + in a civilized way. + + Arab League Summit:Belkheir thought it unlikely to take place soon. He + said Algeria would host it only if others were unanimous in asking + for this. + + + Tunisia:Belkheir was + preoccupied by events in Tunisia. The Tunisians, he thought, were + nervous and engaged in altogether too much fratricidal positioning + for the succession. He had been disturbed by Tunisian allegations of + an imminent Libyan attack which appeared to be based purely on + hysterical speculation.In telegram 3707 + from Tunis, April 16, the Embassy reported that the Tunisian + Minister of Defense had telephoned the Embassy to report that + the “Libyans are mounting air raid on Tunisia and planes may be + en route” following “Libyan charges this afternoon reported + AFP that Tunisia permitted + U.S. to use its territory and airspace during our ‘aggression.’” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860932–0227, D860290–0526) Shortly thereafter, in + telegram 3708 from Tunis, April 16, the Embassy reported that + “threatened incursion could be by land, sea or air although land + confrontation still deemed relatively unlikely.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860932–0253, D860292–0590) + + Terrorism:Belkheir + expressed categoric disapproval of terrorism (as distinct from + Palestinian actions in occupied territories or Israel—a distinction + which means everything here). He noted that party PermSec Messaadia + had been sent to Tripoli to warn Qadhafi on the issue just before the U.S. + strikes.The Algerian warning to + Libya is in telegram 1925 from Algiers, April 14. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860284–0414) + Qadhafi flatly denied his + involvement and Algerians, although totally disbelieving, are + hamstrung by the lack of proof at their disposal. I asked to my + regret if the Arab world would now bring pressure on Qadhafi to end his support of + terrorism. Belkheir went on + at some length on the lack of any such thing as an Arab world, + noting that no group could have more diverse and incompatible + objectives. He returned to the issue by expressing hope that at + least some Arab states, certainly Algeria, would tackle Qadhafi on the issue in the + strongest terms. Possibly this, coupled with internal voices + carrying the same message, could have an effect. He asked if I + thought the U.S. would talk to Qadhafi if he would give assurances that he would + end support for terrorism. I opined that a Qadhafi assurance wasn’t worth the + time of day whereas a Qadhafi + moratorium on terrorist acts in effect for some time could not help + but improve the climate. Belkheir said he thought the effort by some Arab + states to cool Qadhafi would + be made but he appeared skeptical as to results. + + Public Opinion:In closing, Belkheir gave me the usual line about building up + Qadhafi by overt + confrontation. He said that, although there was strong anti-Qadhafi + opinion within the Algerian public, news of the strikes had + mobilized the public on his side. I used the opportunity to point + out that the press had presented a totally distorted view of events, + thereby undermining the GOA’s own + efforts at moderation. I asked how he could tolerate this. Belkheir agreed that the press had + been hysterical and + said he had personally banned further TV coverage of foreign + demonstrations, fearing that such footage would provoke problems + here. I pointed to a multitude of other press sins. He said he was + seized of the problem and that the press would calm down. + + Hamdani:Belkheir + attached considerable significance to the impending Hamdani visit to + Washington—a sign, he implied, of Algeria’s willingness to continue + business a la status quo ante. + + Comment:Belkheir is + clearly more upbeat on divisions within Libya than is his military + security chief. This may be due to genuine differences of + interpretation of events or different shading of events for our + benefit. In all our conversations here, it is clear that our action + in Libya has highlighted for the Algerians the menace posed by + Qadhafi for the regime, + but it has also reconfirmed their view that Algeria’s interests are + best served by constant contact with Qadhafi and, more importantly, the other principal + players in the Libyan political/military structure. Continued public + contact with, and private antipathy toward, the Libyans is + likely. + + Additional points contained septel.Not found. Department please pass Tunis and + Rabat. + + Johnstone +
+
+ 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and MauritaniaSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860212–0731. Secret; + Immediate. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by Murphy, Ussery, Michele Bova (S/S), Zweifel, + Johnstone, Bishop, Andrew Steinfeld (P), George Harris (INR/NESA), Borg, John Hawes (PM), and + James Collins (S/S); approved by + Armacost. Sent for + information Immediate to USUN, + Paris, London, Rome, and Cairo. + + 135968. + + Washington, May 1, 1986, 0225Z + + + + SUBJECT + Under Secretary Armacost + Meetings With Algerian Secretary General Hamdani: Libya & + Western Sahara. + + + + Secret—Entire text + + Summary: Under Secretary Armacost had wide-ranging discussions with Algerian + MFA + SecGen Hamdani on April 28. Re + Libya, + Armacost expressed USG reservations about GOA policy of engaging Qadhafi in dialogue; Hamdani + contended USG policy of isolating + Qadhafi has not worked + and repeatedly took line that Libya should be dealt with in Maghreb + context, going so far as to posit that solution to Western Sahara + conflict would obviate problem of Qadhafi (or at least issue of Algerian-Libyan + rapprochement.) Hamdani thus urged USG pressure on GOM to + encourage “political will” for resolution. He demurred on possible + Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, stating that GOA must be convinced that Moroccans are not just + trying to buy time. Hamdani voiced GOA continuing opposition to terrorism but + differentiated Palestinian struggle “inside their own country” as + distinct from terrorist activity. End summary. + + Under Secretary Armacost + hosted Algerian MFA + SecGen Smail Hamdani for + meetings in Washington on April 28. During two hour session, + discussion focused on Libya, touched on Western Sahara, Chad, and + Tunisia. + + Libya/Terrorism: Adverting to views expressed by Hamdani in + earlier, restricted session, Armacost stated that USG has no conceptual problem with regional + associations per se. However, USG + seeks to isolate Qadhafi + pending a change in his conduct; hence GOA approach of drawing him into some sort of Maghreb + configuration as a way to influence him will not be effective in our + view. At time of Oujda Accord,See footnote 2, Document 138. + King Hassan argued that he would tame Qadhafi as well, but Oujda has benefitted Libya with + no evidence of positive change in Qadhafi’s behavior. GOA should be aware of near certain negative American + reaction should Algeria persist in drawing closer to Qadhafi. USG and GOA policies + are in basic conflict on this point. + + Assistant Secretary Murphy underlined that USG efforts to combat Qadhafi are a major effort with broad public + support. Several willing intermediaries have approached USG over time with suggestions of + dialogue with Qadhafi. Our + response has been consistent; USG + will judge Qadhafi by actions + and not words. We have clear evidence of his ties to terrorist + activity. + + Hamdani said that USG set + undesirable precedent with use of military force; Armacost responded that it was + Qadhafi who set the + undesirable precedent with terrorist activity; Qadhafi has isolated himself by + attacks on Chad and Tunisia, turning Iraqis and Europeans against + him, and generally alienating governments by engaging in + increasingly widespread “global” actions. He asked Hamdani how + Libyans respond when GOA raises + issue of terrorism. Hamdani replied that Qadhafi denied that Libyans were behind these + actions. Armacost then + stated that USG will not play by + Qadhafi’s rules and thus + is engaging Libyans where they are unable to compete. He then asked + Hamdani’s assessment + as to possible Libyan domestic consequences of our recent + actions. + + Hamdani stressed he would not defend Qadhafi, only speak for GOA. GOA made clear to + Qadhafi that it opposes + terrorism. Stemming from Algeria’s revolutionary experience, GOA makes distinction between “act of + liberation in place to be liberated” and actions committed outside. + Thus GOA recognizes Palestinians’ + right to use violence “in their own country,” but not elsewhere. + GOA disagrees strongly on + USG policy of isolating + Qadhafi; contrarily, our actions have made him a hero in eyes of + Libyan public, others in Arab world. For example, Qadhafi was disliked in Algeria + before the U.S. bombings; since, voices have arisen in FLN expressing support for Qadhafi. In GOA view, Tunisia also faces more + difficult circumstances as a result of USG actions. Hamdani reiterated argument that GOA seeks to demonstrate friendship + for Libyan people which transcends differences with Qadhafi. He said he had no detailed + knowledge of internal Libyan situation, but repeated view that + Qadhafi is now a hero in + that context. + + Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun + said that attack on Libya appeared very sudden to rest of world. + “Thousands” of Americans were continuing to work in Libya. It was + not until January sanctionsReference is + to the sanctions imposed by the United States on Libya in the + wake of the Rome and Vienna airport bombings. Documentation on + the sanctions is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. that there was a perception of real + USG purposefulness in dealing + with Qadhafi. Sahnoun felt that action should + have been taken in international fora in an effort to gather + momentum and force similar to that garnered on Cambodia and + Afghanistan issues. + + Murphy took issue, noting + that our bombings had been preceded by five years’ of graduated + measures to constrain Qadhafi. It appears that Qadhafi and his immediate cohorts believe they are + untouchable. USG and GOA may differ on issue, but it is not + correct to perceive our latest actions as either unprovoked or + “sudden”. + + Hamdani lamented that an unmerited side effect of recent events + has been to create suspicion of all Arabs as potential terrorists. + He cited Italian decision to require visas for Algerians. There are + Italian, French, Spanish and Irish terrorists, but countermeasures + apply only to Arabs. Italy and Austria are countries friendly to + Palestinian cause, leading Hamdani to muse rhetorically about who + benefited from Rome and Vienna bombings; it was “not the Arabs”. + Terrorism is result, not cause of problems. If it is to be defeated, + basic issues (i.e. Palestinian issues) must be addressed. + + Borg of S/CT noted that Italian passport/visa + restrictions stem from fact that terrorists have made frequent use + of North African travel documents. Ambassador Johnstone underscored that indeed + Arab world as a whole gets + blame for Arab terrorist actions; concerted Arab action to combat + terrorism is needed if this image is to be corrected. Armacost said USG accepts need to address root + causes, among them Palestinian issues, but terrorism tarnishes image + of Palestinians and does nothing to bring closer realization of + Palestinian rights. + + Hamdani then discussed GOA call + for a meeting of Palestinian factions in Algiers. He cited need for + an initiative to help heal divisions among Palestinian groups. + GOA objective is to see one + organization with one voice “to control” all of the groups. + + Western Sahara: At several points, Hamdani raised Western Sahara + conflict as most important Maghreb issue, even in terms of dealing + with Qadhafi. He noted that + Oujda Accord had grave consequences for Algeria, forcing it to deal + with two potential military fronts. Oujda Accord benefits Morocco, + but Qadhafi even more. + “Behind” Oujda Accord is Western Sahara conflict. Hamdani several + times pressed idea that USG could + and should exert influence on King Hassan to settle Western Sahara + conflict. This would be in interest both of area stability and + domestic tranquility within Morocco—an expressed interest of GOA. If negotiated solution is found, + this “will change whole face” of Maghreb. Hamdani proposed that both + Libyan and Western Sahara issues should be handled in context of + greater Maghreb of Six—i.e. to include SDAR. + + Hamdani said that the question of a Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, + rumored in recent weeks, should be put to Hassan. GOA wants a meeting with substance, + not a Moroccan ploy to gain time as has happened before. GOA is hopeful that resumption of + proximity talks on May 5Reference is to + the next round of UN-sponsored + talks between Morocco and the Polisario. will lead to + real progress—if GOM is ready to + implement principles of UNGA + resolution including a ceasefire and referendum without presence of + Moroccan Army and administration. + + Other topics will be covered in septels.In telegrams 135820 to Tunis, May 1; 139375 to + Algiers, May 3; and 139479 to Algiers, May 3, the Department + reported on Armacost’s + discussions with Hamdani about Chad, the Middle East peace + process, and Bendjedid’s + recent visit to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860334–0410, D860342–0641, + and D860342–0796, respectively) + + Whitehead +
+ +
+ 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N860008–0210. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Richard Fisher + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Ussery, Pearson (NSC), Jay Bruns (D), + Richard Mueller (S/S), Douglas Smith + (S/S–O), and Menarchik; + approved by Murphy. Sent + for information Immediate to Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and + Nouakchott. + + 263994. + + Washington, August 21, 1986, 2218Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Conversations With Belkheir. + + + + Secret—Entire text + + Summary: Gen. Larbi + Belkheir, Algerian Presidency Cabinet Director + (regarded as GOA’s second most + important figure) requested appointment with the Vice President to + deliver a message from Pres. Bendjedid. Belkheir met twice with Vice President on 8/14; + meetings also held with DCI + Casey, VAdm + Poindexter, and Deputy + Secretary Whitehead (with + Under Secretary Armacost + attending). In first meeting with Vice President, Belkheir expressed satisfaction + with bilateral relationship, citing success of first Joint Economic + Commission (2/86) and cooperation in areas such as agriculture.See footnote 3, + Document 157. + Belkheir noted rumors of + possible Algeria-Libya union, but asserted it was out of the + question; GOA would not lightly + conclude such an arrangement without considerable groundwork and + preparation. Belkheir touched + quickly on other regional issues, principally Tunisian situation and + Western Sahara. + + In second meeting, Belkheir + introduced topic which had prompted request for appointment with + Vice President:GOA concern + over Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation growing out of + Hassan/Peres meeting.Peres visited Morocco on July + 21 and met with King Hassan to discuss the Middle East peace + process. In telegram 228781 to all Near Eastern and South Asian + diplomatic posts, July 22, the Department described the meeting + as “a positive development of great historical significance.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860559–0574) + Belkheir criticized Hassan’s + talks as unhelpful to other peace efforts, such as those of U.S. and + King Hussein. He asserted that principal product of Hassan + initiative is GOM decision to press + for a military solution to Western Sahara conflict, using Israeli + military assistance. Belkheir + cited information from “several sources” that Israeli/Moroccan + military cooperation is increasing and that there are Israeli + military advisers in Morocco. Vice President expressed surprise, + noting we have no information on such an arrangement and that it + seems highly unlikely. GOM would be + aware of extreme sensitivities raised by such cooperation, risking + adverse reactions in the + Arab world; such cooperation would cause Israel major problems with + the Congress and the administration because this “is not what + Israel’s defense is about.” + + Vice President expanded Western Sahara discussion to inquire about + possibilities for negotiated solution, taking note of UN/OAU + efforts. Belkheir voiced + GOA support of any constructive + initiatives, but doubted GOM + seriousness; Bendjedid open + to direct contact with Hassan only in “well-prepared” meeting which + would demonstrate genuine Moroccan commitment to go beyond buying + time. Meeting ended with brief exchange on terrorism and agreement + that cooperation held productive possibilities for mutual benefits. + End summary. + + Vice President granted two sessions, on 8/14, to visiting Algerian + Presidency Cabinet Director General Larbi Belkheir, who had requested appointment to + deliver message from President Bendjedid. Belkheir transmitted thanks from Bendjedid for Vice President’s get + well message following Bendjedid’s back surgery. Belkheir noted Bendjedid’s positive memories of + his April 1985 trip to the U.S. and his satisfaction with the course + of growing bilateral cooperation.See + Documents 147 and 148. + + Belkheir continued with + synopsis of GOA concerns regarding + North Africa, beginning with mention of rumors of a GOA union with Libya. Belkheir stated that such a union + is “out of the question for the time being” and that Algeria would + not conclude any union quickly and without considerable preparation + and groundwork. The Vice President interjected that Qadhafi is “crazy about unions” and + even raised the possibility of a union with the PRC in discussions + with the Chinese. Belkheir + continued that GOA had been + concerned by the potential for simultaneous problems on two fronts + (Morocco and Libya), thus prompting the dialogue with Qadhafi to neutralize one front. + Bendjedid also felt that + he should use direct contact to advise Qadhafi to moderate his behavior. + + Belkheir also touched + briefly on the worrisome situation in Tunisia and the “poisoning” + influence of the Western Sahara conflict. Responding to the Vice + President’s question, he elaborated that the GOA is concerned that the + uncertainties of the succession after Bourguiba, coupled with severe economic problems, + could lead to serious instability. + + Lacking time for further discussion, the Vice President arranged + for a second meeting with Belkheir, noting, as the first talk ended, interest + in discussing U.S. concerns about Libya and the possibilities for a + Hassan/Bendjedid meeting. + + + In the second meeting, Belkheir began his comments by expressing interest + in the Vice President’s Middle East trip,Reference is to Bush’s trip to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan earlier + in the month to discuss the Middle East peace process. + Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. stating that the effort was very + encouraging to the extent that it might lead to solving the problem + of the Palestinian people. Belkheir continued, however, that the Hassan/Peres + meetings represent an obstacle both to what the U.S. has been doing + in the region and to King Hussein’s efforts. Further, he asserted + that the GOA has information that + the central topic of discussion at Ifrane was the Western Sahara + question and, specifically, that military cooperation between Israel + and Morocco is being established. The presence of Israeli military + advisers in Morocco leads the GOA + to assume that Hassan has decided to seek a military, rather than a + negotiated, solution to the conflict. (Note: In later meeting with + VAdm + Poindexter, Belkheir left implication that + Israeli assistance would be financial as well as military; this + subject was not discussed with other interlocutors.) + + Belkheir said that + Bendjedid is highly + concerned and hopes that “our American friends” will use their + influence to avoid such a development in the region. The GOA is in favor of stability in the + Maghreb; Algeria as always been open to dialogue and there are in + fact no bilateral problems between Algeria and Morocco, except for + the “Moroccan-Sahraoui problem”. Belkeir noted GOA interest in a united Maghreb, + implied appreciation for U.S. views on such unity, but worried that + there are “other powers in the world” not in favor of a united + Maghreb; the GOA does not want to + see their intervention in the region. + + The Vice President responded that we have had extensive + discussions with Peres, + Shamir, Hussein and + Mubarak; “not a single time” was there a mention of Peres’ visit to Morocco having any + connection with the Western Sahara problem. The Vice President said + that the GOA assertion came as a + “tremendous surprise,” particularly as there was never any + suggestion of such a development during his Middle East trip. The + U.S. understands that the central focus of the Hassan/Peres talks + was the ten points presented by Peres. He continued that it would be surprising if + Morocco would even consider Israeli assistance because of the + sensitivities in Morocco itself, in Algeria, and the rest of the + Arab world. Further, military cooperation of this nature would cause + Israel major problems with the Congress and with the administration, + despite Israel’s special relationship with the U.S.—“this is not + what Israel’s defense is about.” The Vice President said that he + believes the Algerian intelligence is wrong, but that we are + interested and would appreciate any further available + information. + + + Belkheir reiterated + President Bendjedid’s + determination to settle the Saharan problem and stabilize the + region. Thus, when this intelligence was received from “several + sources”, Bendjedid felt it + necessary to send Belkheir to + discuss it. Belkheir + expressed the hope that the information is not correct. + + The Vice President asked Belkheir to assure Bendjedid that we understand his concern about a + problem which would create great difficulties in the region and put + the U.S. in a bad position. He emphasized that Belkheir should tell Bendjedid that we have had “no + hint, no evidence, nothing about this”, but that we will investigate + it. + + The Vice President shifted the thrust of the conversation to the + chances for negotiations leading to a Sahara referendum. Asking + Belkheir to assume that + the information on Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation is + incorrect, he wondered how the GOA + feels about chances for negotiations and a referendum, citing our + feeling that chances for a solution might be better than in the + past. + + Belkheir said that there + were hopes surrounding the UN/OAU initiative, but that these + demarches had no results. In 1983, Bendjedid proposed a solution to the problem within + the framework of a united Mahgreb state.See Document 21. In 1984, he + suggested another solution, a link between the King and “the + Sahraoui entity”.In telegram 844 from + Algiers, February 16, 1984, the Embassy reported that Bendjedid told Hassan they + should subsume “the problem within the Grand Maghreb, i.e. some + form of confederation between Morocco and Mauritania with + autonomy for the Sahrawis. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003–0387) These + two initiatives failed. Belkheir asked rhetorically how a referendum could + occur with the Moroccan Army and administration still in the + territory. + + Regarding a Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, Belkheir said Bendjedid is open to the possibility, but has told + Hassan that it must be well prepared to avoid an unsuccessful + meeting such as that of 1983. Belkheir expressed the hope that the UN + SYG would continue his initiative, + especially if it is supported by the U.S. + + Belkheir said that there + was another issue which he wanted to raise, i.e., terrorism. Algeria + consistently has condemned terrorist acts and has advised “countries + and liberation movements” against carrying out such activities, + especially outside their area of interest. He maintained that the + GOA has so counseled + Palestinians of different factions, the Lebanese, and other + movements; further, Bendjedid + has taken this line with Qadafi each time they have met, although + Qadhafi always denies + backing terrorists. + + Belkheir suggested that, + now that cooperation has been established between GOA and USG intelligence services, there should be more frequent exchanges of + information to better combat the terrorist threat. + + The Vice President agreed, adding that “it should be a two way + street” and we hope to be helpful to the GOA when we see a problem arising in or around Algeria. + “We must present a common front against terrorism”. By the same + token, the Vice President asked that the GOA inform us of any threats against U.S. interests + which become known to it. He also voiced awareness of the GOA’s deeply emotional commitment to + the Palestinians—“we know and respect this”, but hope that no + Palestinian group will take advantage of Algerian hospitality, + claiming they are training for one purpose when in fact they are + training for terrorist acts. + + The Vice President ended by noting his conviction that a major + goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to continue to improve our + relations with Algeria: “We have certain differences with you on + international issues” but the bilateral relationship is going well. + He asked Belkheir to tell + Bendjedid how strongly + both he and the President feel about our bilateral relations and + that we must keep talking; he expressed pleasure that the GOA felt this problem was important + enough to make a special effort to discuss it—“it is exactly in this + way that we will improve our relations.” + + Whitehead +
+
+ 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, [less than 1 line not declassified], + 1986–88, Tunis. Secret; Priority; [handling + restriction not declassified]. + + 6003. + + Algiers, November 29, 1986, 1145Z + + + + SUBJECT + Abu Nidal. + + + + Secret entire text. + + Ambassador raised continuing saga of Abu Nidal with Presidential + Advisor Larbi Belkheir + November 26. Ambassador noted that U.S. and Algerian experts on + Abu Nidal had held + first session this past week and that U.S. side had not felt that + the Algerians had been as forthcoming as they might have been.No record of the talks was found. + Ambassador acknowledged that Algerians had handed over a list of + over 200 Abu Nidal + operatives but, he noted, + to be useful such a list must be accompanied by much more + information. + + Ambassador also noted that, as had been predicted by Military + Intelligence Chief General Lakehal Ayat,No record of Ayat’s prediction was found. some elements + suspiciously close to Abu + Nidal had opened an office in downtown Algiers. + Belkheir expressed + surprise, saying that the GOA would + never allow an Abu Nidal + office in Algeria. Ambassador provided address of office, noting + that we had no evidence linking it to any specific act of terrorism + but pointing out that any office operated by a man who claimed to be + a sympathizer of Abu Nidal + exposed the Government of Algeria to both danger and + criticism. + + Belkheir said he would look + into matter and get back. + + Comment: We have been picking up stories, in the rumor mill of the + opening of an Abu Nidal + office in Algiers. This is the same office previously reported to be + at the university. Intelligence Chief Lakehal Ayat had told us about + two months ago that the university office was run by a man who had + sympathy for Abu Nidal but + who was not an active member of the group and certainly not engaged + in any terrorist acts. He had said at the time that the university + office was closing and that the sympathizer would be moving + downtown. We are certainly not satisfied with this response but + neither are we persuaded that the rumors being spun out by the local + PLO office on the Abu Nidal presence in Algiers + have much credibility. We will continue to press issue with GOA in the context of our “cooperation + program” on Abu + Nidal. + + Johnstone +
+
+ 163. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, William J. + Burns Files, Algeria 1986. Secret; + Sensitive. + + + Washington, December 4, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with the Algerian Ambassador to the US (U) + +

(S) Following are highlights of the + undersigned’s meeting with Amb Sahnoun yesterday. President Benjedid left yesterday for + Tripoli and then Tunis. + Basically, Algeria has been asked by moderate Arabs to lay the + groundwork for Arab League Summit with Libya and Syria, as well as other + Arab states, following the Islamic Conference in Kuwait in January. + Getting Iraq and Syria to participate is important. If Heads of State + agree, King Fahd will hold Non-Summit Summit with Heads of State during + Kuwait OIC meeting. If that meeting is + productive and participants are willing, then a formal Arab League + Summit would be held in Riyadh the following month.

+

(S/S) Re Iran: Sahnoun mentioned two interesting + points. On behalf of the US, Algeria had + been working directly with groups in Lebanon holding US hostages. The Algerian Ambassador to + Lebanon at that time knew these groups and was given the task. He + consulted with the Kuwaiti Government and these terrorist groups re + release of the Dawa prisoners which Kuwait refused to consider. + Apparently, they were making progress on a formula whereby Algeria + publicly would take responsibility for insuring prisoners would not be + executed although they would remain in prison in Kuwait, which would + give these groups a pretext for releasing US hostages without concessions by US or Kuwait, when all of a sudden negotiations dried up. + He is not sure if timing of this coincided with first reported arms + shipments to IranReference is to a secret + deal between the United States and Iran whereby the United States + sold weapons to Iran in exchange for Iran’s help in releasing the + seven U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon. Some of the proceeds of + the arms sales were then funneled to the contras, the anti-Sandinistas rebels in Nicaragua, in + apparent violation of the Boland amendment to the House + Appropriations Bill of 1982, which prohibited the U.S. Government + from overthrowing the Sandinistas. Documentation on the deal and the + resulting investigation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXIII, Iran-Contra Affair, + 1985–1988. (will check when he is in Algiers later + this month), but speculated if it does, that would mean the Iran + government does have control over these groups and probably told them to + stop dealing with Algeria because it was working another track (with + us). Since then the Algerian Ambassador to Lebanon was reassigned to + Saudi Arabia, and Algeria is not pursuing any negotiations with groups + for US hostage release.

+

(S) Sahnoun then mentioned that he has been asked by State + to work with Iran to secure release of the US citizen currently being held in Tehran.Not further identified. Using the citizen’s + family as his excuse, he discussed the matter with the Iranian + Ambassador to the US one-on-one. The + Iran Ambassador was not optimistic. They also talked about recent US/Iranian “overtures”, which he favors + (although Sahnoun believes he was + speaking personally, not for the Iran government) because he believes it + signals moderation and flexibility in US + policy re Iran. This said, however, he stated emphatically that timing + was all wrong for such + initiatives because there really are no openings in Iran and no one for + us to deal with.

+

(S) Re allegations of a Saudi role in + Iran/US arms supply: Sahnoun + thought Khashoggi might have been + involvedAdnan Khashoggi, a Saudi businessman, was later + implicated as the middleman in the arms-for-hostages deal between + the United States and Iran. Documentation is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXIII, Iran-Contra + Affair, 1985–1988. but discounted that the SAG would have been foolish enough to do + so given the Israeli connection and potential damage to Saudi + credibility if word of its participation leaked. He mentioned however + that SAG may be working separate deals + with Iran, possibly shipments of oil, in return for decreased Iranian + military action against Saudi interests.

+ Sandra + CharlesPrinted from + a copy that indicates Charles signed the original. + + Deputy Assistant Secretary + + NESA (Acting) +
+
+ 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United NationsSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D870162–0414. Secret. Repeated from telegram 60064 to + Algiers, March 2. The March 3 version was sent for information to + USUN. Drafted by Ellen Ivie + (IO/UNA); cleared by Zweifel; + approved by Hugh Montgomery + (IO/UNA). Sent for + information to Rabat and Tunis. + + 60064. + + Washington, March 3, 1987, 2045Z + + +

Following State 60064 rpted for your info sent action

+

Algiers info Rabat Tunis dtd Mar 2: QTE: + SECRET State 60064.

+ + SUBJECT + Ambassador Walters Visit + to Algiers. + + + + S—Entire text. + + Summary: Ambassador Walters was given red carpet treatment in Algiers, + affording him excellent opportunity to convey US position on UN and regional issues to highest levels of GOA. In meetings with Foreign Minister + Ibrahimi and President + Bendjedid, Walters underlined US concerns over Algeria’s voting + record in the UN and made clear the strength of + US views on the Cuba resolution + in the UNHRC.Reference is to UN Human Rights Council Draft + Resolution E/CN.4/1987/L.29 submitted by the United States on + February 24, which called for the Government of Cuba “to ensure + that all individuals within its territory and subject to its + jurisdiction are guaranteed effective enjoyment of basic human + rights and fundamental freedoms” and “to allow any Cuban who + might wish to leave or return to Cuba without hindrance, + especially in those cases involving the reunification of + families.” On Iran-Iraq war, Walters confronted Algerian + misimpression that US policy has a + pro-Iranian tilt stressing US + support for quote a solution in which there is no winner or loser + unquote. On Western Sahara issue Walters was supportive of UNSYG de Cuellar’s efforts. Algerians also expressed + support for UN Sahara effort. On + UN voting issues they agreed to + closer consultation and, somewhat surprisingly, to review voting + record and try to be more helpful. Ambassador Walters found President Bendjedid far more secure and + confident in his position than in any previous encounter, and the + Algerians themselves more open and less “gray” than previously. End + summary. + + Issues covered during visit: + + Irangate—Walters took on Irangate issue head on,See footnote 2, Document 163. explaining + to Algerians in each meeting that a U.S. Government could be + overturned by a domestic affair such as Watergate but that + foreign policy issue such as Iran affair could pose no + threat to government. He thought the issue would continue to + draw press attention for another three months before blowing + over. Algerians took comments on board without + comment. + + Iran-Iraq War: Issue was a preoccupation to all + interlocutors. Ibrahimi, playing something of a devil’s + advocate, said that Algeria was convinced that the U.S. was + playing the Israeli game of promoting an Iranian victory to + destabilize the Arab countries. Walters rejected the + notion, pointing out that Israel would face grave risks if + Iran emerged triumphant from the war. Walters stressed U.S. + policy of seeking a political solution which had neither + victorious nor defeated parties. President Bendjedid used same formula + in describing GOA + policy. + + Chad and Libya: Issue was touched on in all meetings. + Ibrahimi said + GOA was trying to + foster reconciliation between Habre and Goukouni as a step + that would facilitate withdrawal of foreign forces. He said + Goukouni was quite flexible, acknowledging Habre’s + leadership and expressing willingness to accept need for + French pressure in Chad as long as Libyan forces remained. + At previous evening dinner in Walter’s honor (attended by + high level representatives of MOD and MFA), + MFA + SecGen Hamdani was less + upbeat on Habre’s willingness to reconcile with Goukouni. + Hamdani thought Habre reluctant to take steps necessary for + reconciliation. Algerians all agreed that the Aouzou strip + problem should be put on ice for a while, possibly by + referring it to international arbitration. + + Middle East Peace: Bendjedid issued plea for U.S. to allow + holding of international conference as a means of + stimulating peace process. Walters reviewed U.S. policy. + + Tunisia: The Algerians engaged in much handwringing over + the succession issue, expressing hope that the Tunisians + would sort out their affairs in keeping with constitutional + norms. + + Western Sahara: Walters put the emphasis on the UN + SecGen efforts, noting + that the latter had been pleased by his recent visit to + Algeria. Walters + thought the problems would boil down to who voted in the + U.N.-controlled referendum and what would happen to Moroccan + forces. He noted that a formula had been found for Namibia + which involved withdrawal of some forces, and cantonment of + others. General Belkheir (at dinner) offered no comment to + this, whereas Ibrahimi appeared to be pressing for the + withdrawal of all Moroccan forces before a referendum could + be held. Walters + opined that the King could not accept such an action. + Ibrahimi threw + cold water on the possibility of a Hassan-Bendjedid meeting, + noting that it was too soon after Ifrane. He left the door + open to a meeting between himself and Hassan, although + complained that the Moroccans were telling others that + Algeria had rejected this Moroccan offer. Despite the + apparent roadblocks, all Algerian interlocutors expressed + hope that de Cuellar’s mission could proceed and + succeed. + + UN voting: There were + lively exchanges throughout visit on Algeria’s voting + record. Walters + pressed the point tactfully, citing statistics. Ibrahimi, after + considerable barter, said that Algeria would look to see how + the record might be improved. On South Africa, Walters defended the U.S. + voting record in the face of Algerian complaints. He pointed + out the practical irreversibility of a mandatory sanctions + vote and the fact that the U.S. was the first country to + impose sanctions. + + + Ambassador Walters + cleared the summary only of this cable. Whitehead Unqte. + + Whitehead +
+ +
+ 165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870183–0436. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by James Pierce + (PM/SAS); approved by + Zweifel. Sent for + information Priority to Rabat and Moscow. + + 68909. + + Washington, March 10, 1987, 0332Z + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting on Military Sales to Algeria. + + + + Secret—Entire text + + On 2/25/87, Interagency Group met to discuss general views and + some specific pending and past cases of military sales to Algeria. + Meeting co-chaired by NEA + DAS E. Michael Ussery and PM + DAS Vladimir Lehovich. Following is + text of a memorandum containing a partial record of that meeting, + summarizing open remarks, general themes raised by various + participants, some indications of agreement on next steps, and a + list of attendees. + + Opening Remarks—Ussery: + + State NEA is concerned + that, while USG agreed on a + case-by-case approach to Algerian military purchases with + good reasons to move cautiously, bureaucratic inertia has + unnecessarily delayed decisions in this key bilateral + area. + + A review of the bilateral relationship since 1979 + accession of President Bendjedid shows slow but steady improvement; + Algeria helped in freeing Tehran hostages and has continued + assistance to U.S. in dealing with radical regimes (note + recent help with Seib case in Iran). + + Vice President’s 1983 trip to AlgiersSee Document + 130. and Bendjedid’s 1985 visit to U.S.See Documents + 147 and 148. + accelerated improvement in relations with latter’s visit + leading to real efforts to help Algerian military + diversification as well as agreements to conclude consular + and cultural treaties and set up a Joint Economic + Commission. + + Positive aspects are encouraging, but there are real + problems and areas of disagreement: basic differences on + Middle East policy, how to handle Libya, Algerian closeness + to USSR, and Algerian + voting record in UN. + + Moroccan/Algerian antipathy, evidenced by long conflict + over Western Sahara, also a stumbling block for U.S. which + has valuable, longstanding relationship with Morocco. + + + U.S./Morocco and U.S./Algeria relations cannot be treated + as zero sum game, however, and we must concentrate on + building two bilateral relationships with reassurances of + regard and respect for both parties—not an easy task. + + We also recognize Bendjedid’s problems with internal + opposition to his efforts to move closer to the West; + combined with severe economic problems limiting GOA budgetary ability to + acquire new weapons systems, we must acknowledge that + military relationship will move slowly, even without + cautious U.S. approach. + + + Opening Remarks—Lehovich: + + Military relationship with Algeria has expanded gradually + since 1979 to include an exchange of defense attaches, + initiation of an IMET + program, U.S. Navy ship visits, commercial C–130 sales, and a + Presidential Determination making Algeria eligible for + defense purchases under FMS + procedures. + + Within the past year, we also have signed a GSOMIA and started the + training of Algerian pilots. + + These actions represent measured response to improved + bilateral relations and Algeria’s expressed interest in + diversifying its heretofore predominant dependence on the + Soviets and East Bloc for military equipment and + training. + + We have reviewed Algerian arms requests on a case-by-case + basis, taking into account the regional military balance and + security interests with Morocco. + + Record to date has been one of denying requests for + advanced weapons and approving sales only of non-sensitive + items; denying weapons and/or deleting advanced and + sensitive components from weapons systems predictably has + lessened Algerian interest in purchasing equipment. + + An interagency exchange on this subject is overdue and + today’s meeting gives us an opportunity to review the + evolution of the military supply relationship, examine + previous decisions on Algerian requests and licensing + applications from U.S. commercial firms, and discuss + possible progress in our military relationship with + Algeria. + + + Key Points/Themes Raised by Participants: + + The “shopping list” of requested military items presented + at the time of the 1985 Bendjedid visit consisted exclusively of air + force items; the air force leadership change may have + affected that service’s desires and willingness to shift + toward the West. The army may not be as interested. + + In any case, the diversification desired by the Algerians + is not, as some think, a replacement of Warsaw Pact sources + by Western sources. The Algerians are not “chasing us”, they will go slow, + and they are very picky shoppers. + + Algerians have been very specific, looking for items with + special capabilities; regarding these sensitive items, we + must address whether the presence of about 800 Soviet + advisers in Algeria remains a major worry and whether + Moroccan concerns will be aroused by such sales (Note: At + this point, DAS + Ussery reiterated + point that “Moroccan paranoia, and for that matter, Algerian + paranoia”, cannot be affected by the U.S.; we must determine + sales questions in USG + interest). + + Is anyone assuming that sales of sensitive technology to + the Algerians would result in an “automatic pass” to the + Soviets? (Note: No response offered by any participant). If + not, we should assume that we have a valid GSOMIA. + + Does a GSOMIA imply + “automatic access to a certain level of classification?” + (Note: Answer from several respondents was “no”). + + DOD is concerned that we + still do not have a good feel for Algerian “needs”. What + uses do the Algerians see for equipment. Also, we need + better guidance on how to proceed with sales issues. + + Getting each others’ feedback and improving communication + on the sales questions is indeed a problem and is a major + reason for this meeting. A regular meeting might be + profitable (bimonthly, perhaps?) and consultation among + other players outside of the meeting context would be + desirable, particularly where a sales request appears to + have opposition. Could there not be a quick consultation + before action occurs? + + Licensing process does indeed break down in giving little + feedback on the “why” and “who objected”. It is important to + remember, however, that this is not a “veto” process; a case + can be pursued further and pushed forward if arguments + overriding a denial are sufficiently persuasive. + + PM has responsibility for + managing the process, but this does not rule out active + participation of the regional bureau and the desk. + + + Follow Up Actions Agreed To by Participants: + + Sale of C–130H with some + type of EW and recon capability can be reconsidered. (Note: + shortly before meeting date, Lockheed representatives told + NEA/AFN and PM/SAS officers that they + remain interested in submitting this request and consider + Algeria their best potential customer in North + Africa). + + Parachute and paradrop kits have been approved for sale, + but present procurement timetable could mean 12–18 months + for delivery, thus lessening Algerian interest. Examination + will be made of possible expedited procurement from existing + stocks. + + + Sale of RPV (Northrop Chukar III), with photo recon + capability can be reconsidered. + + No objection voiced to sale of armored cars (Cadillac + Gage) and similar low-tech items; sale can be + reconsidered. + + Objections to TOW remain + strong. + + Upgrades of Soviet equipment (MIG 21 and T–55) are + probably moot from Algerian perspective, but are being + reviewed. + + Offices clearing munition list licenses were encouraged to + notify PM/MC that a denial letter should not be sent until + PM/MC recontacts offices which have granted approval. + + In general, climate now appears better for consideration + of Algerian purchases requests given improved bilateral + dialogue, signing of GSOMIA, and other factors. + + + List of Participants: + NEA, E. Michael + Ussery + PM, Vlad Lehovich + NEA/AFN, David E. + Zweifel, Richard V. Fisher + PM/SAS, James Pierce, Blair L. Murray + PM/ISP, Col. Denis J. + Kiely + NEA/RA, Col. John + Bircher + T, Stan Sienkiewicz + S/P, Ellen Laipson + INR/NESA, Janean Mann + ACDA/NWC, Joe Clare, Edmund S. Finegold + OSD/ISA, CDR. Tim Hartung, John Norris + OSD/DTSA/M, Len Altman, Wolfgang Maier, Robert + Witter + OSD/DTSA/MC, Howard Gardiner + OSD/DSAA, LTCOL Mike Simpson, Dave Monahan + OJCS/J5, MAJ Jerry Thompson + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 166. Information Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning + (Solomon) to Secretary of + State ShultzSource: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence + from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s + Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons: March 1987. Confidential. Drafted on March + 5 by Ellen Laipson (S/P). Solomon wrote: “Dick” next to his + name on the “From” line. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum reads: “GPS.” Pascoe also initialed the memorandum and + wrote: “3/10.” + + + Washington, March 10, 1987 + + + + SUBJECT + Improving Relations with Algeria + +

SUMMARY: Our long-term interests in North Africa + are served by a non-radical, increasingly moderate Algeria, and our + influence might help reinforce favorable trends in this direction. That + process will be long and slow, but we should move to advance the effort + begun when President Benjedid visited Washington in 1985. In particular, + we should look for ways to expand our bilateral contacts and programs in + trade and security areas. END SUMMARY.

+

Algeria: An Alternative We + Should ConsiderShultz wrote: “I agree GPS” in the right-hand margin. A typed + notation below this reads: “I agree. GPS 3/12/87.”

+

There are two reasons why we should focus on Algeria. First, the + prospects for instability in and among the countries of North Africa + suggests that we should develop as many options as possible in our + relations with the region. Experience has shown the need for + alternatives when a key country we have long relied on in a region (in + this case, either Morocco or Tunisia) becomes unexpectedly unstable. + Algeria now presents us with certain opportunities to broaden our ties + with an important North African state.

+

The second reason relates to changes in Algeria’s domestic and foreign + policies. The current leadership’s pragmatism has led to two major + policy changes since 1979: a diversification of its military supplies + and training away from excessive reliance on the Soviets; and an + expansion of economic ties with the West. The latter development reflects a change in basic + attitudes about the state’s role in economic activities, clearly an area + in which we can have influence.

+

In its foreign policy, Algeria selectively seeks to play a pragmatic role + in regional and international politics and conflicts; on other issues + (e.g. South Africa) its positions remain unshakably ideological. + Algeria’s essential middleman role in securing the release of our + hostages in Iran, its early efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, and + its current activities to + help Chad and end Libyan domination there demonstrate its concern about + regional stability, and suggest there may be additional opportunities + for us to cooperate.

+

Potential Pitfalls: There are two important policy + concerns that must be addressed in order to proceed with improvements in + our relations with Algeria. One is managing our sharp ideological + differences over certain issues, including Algeria’s willingness to + allow convicted terrorist Abu + Abbas to come to Algiers from time to time to participate + in events aimed at uniting Palestinian leadership. The Algerians must + understand that major improvements in our relationship will be affected + by their actions and policies toward Arab radical causes and the + terrorism factor.

+

The second concern is maintaining the relationship we want with Morocco. + We see no reason why an improved relationship with Algeria should affect + our ties with Morocco, and we should avoid letting our policy toward one + become linked to policy toward the other. The excellent relationship we + enjoy with King Hassan is based on Morocco’s desire to be firmly in the + pro-western camp, not on support for Morocco against Algeria. We must + avoid being drawn into the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, + especially when the protracted war in the western Sahara heats up and we + are pressured to abandon our policy of neutrality toward the war.

+

Where Can We Work Together?

+

In 1985, we agreed with President Benjedid to expand our bilateral + relations.See Document 147. The momentum in that initiative has + waned. We should reinvigorate that process, identifying ways to increase + cooperation with Algeria gradually and in non-controversial areas. + Movement may be possible on economic and trade issues, already of great + interest to the Algerians, and we should be ready to move up the ladder + on military cooperation.

+

Trade and Economic Issues: The Algerians are + rightly eager to diversify their exports away from hydrocarbons. We can + help the Algerians identify promising areas for export promotion, as we + have done with the Turks. It is important to steer them away from areas + where protectionist sentiment is high, such as steel, and try to + identify unexploited markets for their products in the U.S. Algeria is + already an important and expanding market for American agricultural + commodities.

+

We can also work together to enhance their agricultural productivity + through improved technology. We have shown our willingness to finance + pilot farm projects. This is a promising area and provides us a chance + to contribute to one of their most acute needs—greater food + self-reliance. Strengthening + relationships in the economic area also serves to reinforce + privatization trends currently favored among Algeria’s leaders.

+

Regional Cooperation: We should continue to work + together on the Chad problem. Algeria permitted overflights to resupply + Habre, and we should demonstrate support for their efforts to promote + reconciliation among Chadian factions as part of an OAU peace plan. While we are skeptical + about prospects for real Chadian unity, it is important to complement + the French-U.S. military support for Habre with a political process. Our + support for their approach on Chad now may have dividends for us later, + in Algeria and with Africa generally, if Algeria succeeds in its bid for + the OAU presidency next year.

+

Security and Arms: We, in effect, agreed to help + Algeria diversify its arms supply away from the Soviets when we made + them FMS-eligible in 1985. Since then, + we have repeatedly rejected their arms requests; and we had to deflect a + premature discussion of F–16s last year. We need to get both sides + focused on more achievable goals, such as increased training programs, + aerial surveillance equipment and low-tech ground forces equipment. + Appropriate agencies and bureaus are reexamining the list of Algerian + requests with an eye to approving some non-controversial items. We + support this, with the understanding that the long-term future of this + supply relationship hinges on our increased confidence about Algerian + policy attitudes in the Middle East and Africa.

+
+
+ 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870289–0512. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for Information to + Paris. + + 2285. + + Algiers, April 14, 1987, 1653Z + + +

Paris for Legatt. Subject: Visit of Ambassador Bremer.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Ambassador L. Paul + Bremer (S/CT) + visited Algeria April 4–5 to consult with senior GOA officials on anti-terrorism policy + and explore areas for expanded U.S.-Algerian cooperation. While + here, Amb. Bremer called + on Director of Surete Nationale, El + Hadi Khediri, and on Military Security Director Gen. + Madjdoub Lakehal Ayat. He also had extended discussion with MFA Secretary General Smail Hamdani at + dinner hosted by Ambassador. + + + Tone of visit reflected high level GOA desire to see bilateral relationship expand further + in area of anti-terrorism cooperation. Khediri and Lakehal Ayat gave their meetings with + Bremer a warm, + cooperative aura. Khediri + emphasized his past cooperation with U.S. law enforcement + authorities in dealing with hijackers and he expressed appreciation + for data from U.S. sources that have helped Algerian police deter + criminal elements. Khediri + said that he would like to improve liaison with the FBI and reacted very positively to + Amb. Bremer’s suggestion + that he visit the FBI in + Washington. Khediri also + expressed his concern at increasing use of Algeria as a transit + route for drug traffickers and expressed wish to cooperate more + closely with DEA. + + In meeting with Lakehal Ayat, current status of hostages in + Lebanon was primary topic. No new developments emerged. With Lakehal + Ayat (as with Khediri), + considerable time was devoted to discussion of terrorism and + terrorist groups. Amb. Bremer urged Algerians to be more forthright in + their condemnation of terrorist acts, and to cut whatever links they + have to Palestinian groups that use terrorism as a tactic. The + Algerians condemned terrorism against innocent civilians in + incidents such as the Rome and Vienna airports or the Achille Lauro + affair but maintained that it was acceptable for Palestinians to use + acts of violence “on the territory to be liberated”. In discussing + specific Palestinian groups, Algerians clearly regarded Abu Nidal as acting well beyond + acceptable limits. Abu + Abbas was in a more nebulous category, apparently + based on his importance within the PLO leadership and his role in any PLO unity drive (which the GOA is strongly supporting). General + Lakehal Ayat described two Abu + Nidal supporters living in Algiers as “no more than + students”. [less than 1 line not + declassified] + + Comment: As we were making plans for Bremer visit, we touched raw + nerve of competition between Lakehal Ayat and Khediri for control of turf in + security area. By visit, however, Algerians composed whatever + internal differences they had and all went smoothly. Khediri explained to us that he, + Lakehal Ayat, and head of the paramilitary gendarmerie meet weekly + with Presidential Security Advisor Gen. Greziel Benabbes to review + ongoing issues and coordinate actions. Khediri noted existence of several GOA agencies with overlapping + mandates, but he said that resulting competitive situation produced + better intelligence for the government. + + Visit provided useful exchange with Algerians on some of the more + problematic issues in bilateral relationship. Bremer continued process of + laying down markers on terrorism in which we have been engaged over + past year. Basis was built for further cooperation with both sides + of Algerian internecine intelligence/security apparatus. + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870701–0129, D870547–0407. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; + cleared by Robyn Bishop (S/S–O), + John Dobrin (AF/C), and Thomas + Benesch (AF/W); approved by + Ussery. Sent for + information to Tunis, Paris, Rabat, Nouakchott, and + Ndjamena. + + 213653. + + Washington, July 11, 1987, 1252Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian Ambassador’s Read-Out on North African + Deveopments. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Algerian Ambassdor Sahnoun + returned to Washington 7/9 from UN + meetings in New Delhi. He leaves again 7/10 for Algiers; all + Algerian Ambassadors have been summoned back, presumably to be + briefed on Algerian-Libyan dialogue and implications thereof. + + During his recent stay in Algiers, Sahnoun met with President Bendjedid among other GOA leaders. Bendjedid allegedly commented to + Sahnoun about likely + unease in Washington about the Qadhafi visit to Algiers.Qadhafi + visited Algiers June 28–July 1. In telegram 3983 from Algiers, + July 2, the Embassy reported that “senior GOA officials have spent last 24 + hours trying to telegraph to diplomatic corps that the Libyan + leader’s visit was an unwelcome imposition. An Arab Ambassador + with excellent GOA sources told + us that the Algerians were forced to accept a Qadhafi visit after his + repeated insistence on coming.” The Embassy further reported: + “Algerians say that since GOA + is seeking to bring Qadhafi under control through a broad range of + low level engagements it was necessary to keep that process on + track by letting him visit Algiers. GOA knew that he would use the occasion to thump + for a full unity agreement, but was confident that it could + handle whatever theatrics Qadhafi used to push his case.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870522–0743) He directed Sahnoun to present the Algerian position and to try + to assuage USG concerns. + + Libya: + + As have other Algerians, Sahnoun insisted that GOA is responding to Libyan + initiatives, remains suspicious of Qadhafi’s ultimate motives + and willingness to follow through on commitments, and will + proceed in very measured fashion. + + Sahnoun contends + that Qadhafi has + always been personally cool towards Algeria, unenthusiastic + about entering into relationship in which Libya would be + weaker partner. He posited that pressure for closer + relations ironically comes more from Libyan military + officers than that of Qadhafi himself. + + In recent past, a number of these military leaders have + come to Algiers or otherwise contacted Algerian counterparts + to appeal for GOA support + in lessening Libyan isolation. As portrayed by Sahnoun, the basic message is that such + support will constrain Qadhafi by strengthening positions of more + rationale Libyan leaders. + + In discussing Algerian attitudes towards quickening pace + of Libyan-Algerian relations, Sahnoun several times noted that there are + those “especially among the military” who oppose any + rapprochement with Libya. + + A document on future Algerian-Libyan relations was drawn + up during Jalloud visit (which preceded that of Qadhafi by about one week). + Bendjedid has + directed FLN Central + Committee to study this and make whatever recommendations it + pleases. (However, this was not done at just-concluded + session of Central Committee.) Any proposals agreed to by + Central Committee eventually will have to be submitted to a + party congress, thence to a popular plebiscite; this + drawn-out process is deliberate GOA maneuver to frustrate faster pace sought by + Libyans. + + As to GOA motivation for + continuing dialogue, Sahnoun mused about Algeria’s present + economic difficulties and speculated that it might be + possible to redirect Libyan revenues away from military + procurement and nefarious activities towards assistance for + Algeria. This is especially important since next year’s + repayments to Soviets for previous GOA military purchases will be particularly + onerous, and thus far Soviets are insisting on hard currency + repayments. When pressed for any evidence that Libyans might + come through with funding, Sahnoun admitted that this is more a hope + than a real prospect; GOA + recognizes that such assistance is not likely to materialize + in any significant degree. + + In conversation with Sahnoun, Bendjedid consistently spoke of + “coordination”, “cooperation”, and “Maghreb unity” (rather + than Algerian-Libyan union). He reportedly told Sahnoun that his ultimate + purpose is to be involved in such fashion in Libya so as to + “neutralize” Qadhafi. + Sahnoun + explicitly understands this term in the sense that might be + employed by Al Capone. + + As portrayed in public statements and private + conversations, GOA line is + that any further progress should take form of Libyan + adherence to Tripartite Treaty of Peace and Friendship + between Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria. When reminded that + the GOA earlier had ruled + out Libyan membership as incompatible with treaty’s call for + non-interference in affairs of others and recognition of + international boundaries, Sahnoun quickly claimed that this is + precisely the GOA’s point: + to include Libya in this Maghrebian group would imply very + significant concessions by Qadhafi on both counts. He said that while + in Algiers, Qadhafi + committed himself “in writing” henceforth to abide by these + principles. + + When in Algiers, Qadhafi pressed to address the FLN Central Committee. + Bendjedid + refused, saying that Central Committee deliberations are + strictly Algerian matter. Bendjedid likewise allegedly rejected + Qadhafi’s + suggestion that Syria should be affiliated in some sort of union with + Libya and Algeria; GOA is + not interested in crossing Maghreb issues with those of + Levant. + + Qadhafi, at GOA insistance, met with + Libyan dissidents in Algeria. (Sahnoun claimed not to know who these might + be.) + + + Chad: + + Both during Jallud + and Qadhafi visits, + there were Libyan contacts with Gokouni Ouedi. Qadhafi also met in Algiers + with an unnamed Habre emissary. + + On Aouzo Strip, Qadhafi’s position remains that unratified + early 20th century boundary demarcation should prevail over + 1935 accord which ceded the strip to Chad.Reference to the unratified + Mussolini-Laval Treaty between Italy and France that + confirmed Italy’s possession of the strip. + + GOA is willing to accept + referral of this issue to ICJ, but is confident that Libyan position + would not prevail. + + + Tunisia: + + Sahnoun surmised + that purpose of Bendjedid’s subsequent visit to Tunis was to + press Tunisians to support Libyan adherence to tripartite + accord. He noted long standing Tunisian resistance to + this. + + GOA obviously also is + pleased to have played a role in fostering at least partial + Libyan compensation for Tunisian commercial claims. + + + Shultz +
+
+ 169. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice + President BushSource: George H.W. Bush Library, + Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, + Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, + Algeria—1987. Confidential. At the top of the memorandum Bush wrote: “Don Fine report interesting Thanx GB 8–4.” + + + Washington, August 4, 1987 + + + + Subject: + Memorandum of Conversation with Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun + +

The Ambassador had just returned from several weeks in Africa, including + a trip to the OAU meeting in Ethiopia. + He had flown back from that + meeting to Algieria with President Bendjedid and they had long talks on the aircraft. The + following key points emerged: + + Algerian policy toward Qadhafi. Qadhafi has recently received + heavy setbacks. Sahnoun + said that the American attack had weakened him and had shown + that, despite spending billions on weapons, Libya was still + vulnerable to America. The recent defeats in Chad have also + weakened Qadhafi. In this + state, he sought a meeting with President Chadli and suggested + that Algeria and Libya unite politically as Libya had previously + joined with Morocco.See footnote 2, Document 168. + Bendjedid, who in + Sahnoun’s words, + “would like to get rid of Qadhafi,” rebuffed this suggestion. He + did tell Qadhafi that if + he fully repaired his relations with Tunisia, that Algeria would + consider including him in the Treaty of Friendship which + currently exists among Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. + Qadhafi is moving + toward better relations with Tunisia and has agreed to pay + reparations for those Tunisian workers forced out of Libya. If + this continues, there will be a meeting in Tunisia under + Bourguiba’s + leadership, where Libya’s reentry into the concept of Mahgreb + unity will be considered. + + Why Be Nice to Qadhafi? + Sahnoun said that the + Algerian diplomatic and military figures are receiving many + pleas from Libyan officials urging that Libya not be completely + isolated. They fear that Qadhafi, if he feels isolated, may do something + utterly foolish which could damage Libya long term. Sahnoun cited the fact that + Major Jallud had recently + visited Moscow and had proposed to Gorbachev a Treaty of Friendship identical to + that which the Soviet Union currently has with Syria. Gorbachev reportedly stated + that such treaties take time to negotiate. Jallud said that Libya would + like to sign immediately and said that the treaty he had brought + was identical to the one existing between Moscow and Damascus. + Gorbachev rebuffed + the offer, saying “but Libya is not Syria.” Sahnoun stressed that Bendjedid does not like or + trust Qadhafi and that if + he returns to a more radical stance, they will adopt a harder + line. He assured me that they remain deeply suspicious of + Qadhafi and are not + about to be taken in by him. + + I asked about Abu Nidal. Sahnoun seemed a little uncomfortable with this + subject, but answered quite forthrightly. He said he had been + told by the Chief of Algerian Intelligence that they do have + periodic contact with the Abu + Nidal Organization (ANO). Algeria does this in order to keep tabs on + what the ANO is doing, to be + able to put pressure on the ANO + in case of an outbreak of terrorism, and to seek to moderate its + stance. He insisted that no support was being given to the + ANO, that there are only + meetings with ANO + representatives when they come to Algeria. Sahnoun said he had been told + that ANO representatives had + been received at + high levels in France and Germany, and that the ANO appeared to be trying to + change its image, if not its tactics. (He was a little vague on + this.) He assured me that this had been reported by Algerian + Intelligence to CIA through + established liaison channels. + + Algeria, Morocco and the Sahara. + Sahnoun was somewhat + upset on the Sahara problem, saying that King Hassan had said + some helpful things after the recent meeting of Bendjedid, King Fahd and + Hassan.Reference is to the May + 4 Maghreb Summit during which Saudi King Fahd tried to + broker an agreement between Bendjedid and Hassan on the Western Sahara. + See Document 450. They were + particularly struck by Hassan saying that the Polisario issue is + not a problem between Algeria and Morocco and that he (Hassan) + knew that only a political solution was logical. Sahnoun said he was aware of + the Vice President’s interest in this problem and said that if a + breakthrough became virtually assured, except for one or two + final matters, Algeria might ask for the Vice President’s + help. + + The Persian Gulf. + Sahnoun knows the + Iranians rather well and says that the situation in Iran and the + Gulf is very dangerous. He says that there are people in Iran + who oppose Khomeni, but that it is terribly difficult for them + to show their opposition due to the war with Iraq. Sahnoun did not think that Iran + would make a blatant or open attack on American ships in the + Gulf or the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. He did feel that mines + would continue to be used extensively. He acknowledged that the + U.S. might be forced to retaliate against Iran if more mine + attacks were successful, but was concerned that Khomeni would + use such attacks to incite the Iranians to further actions of + fanaticism. Sahnoun said + that the deaths in Mecca were a deeply serious matter and that + the next several months in the Gulf area would be very touchy + indeed.Reference is to the July + 31 riots caused by Iranian pilgrims to Mecca which killed + over 400 people. (Charles P. Wallace, “402 Die in Clashes of + Saudis, Iranians: Killings at Shrine in Mecca Trigger + Attacks on Four Embassies in Tehran,” Los + Angeles Times, August 2, 1987, p. A1) + + Bendjedid’s Views. Sahnoun said that Bendjedid hopes very much that + you will be elected in 1988. He asked Sahnoun if there was anything + he (Bendjedid) could do + to help your campaign. Sahnoun smilingly told the President that he + “had best keep quiet” so as not to interfere in U.S. politics. + Sahnoun stressed how + highly Bendjedid regards + you. I said that you had been concerned about reports of + Algeria’s apparent warming toward Qadhafi and that it was very helpful to learn of + President Bendjedid’s + long-term motivations. +

+

Comment: Sahnoun was friendly and forthcoming and I consider this + a very useful relationship.

+
+ +
+ 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870789–0420. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen + Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared + by Ussery, Casey, Gnehm, Carolyn Huggins (S/S–O), and Michael Klosson (S/S); approved by Whitehead. Sent for information + Immediate to Tunis, Rabat, Paris, and Nouakchott. + + 298742. + + Washington, September 24, 1987, + 1842Z + + + + SUBJECT + Acting Secretary Whitehead’s Meeting With Algerian MOD Secretary General + Cheloufi—September 21. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Following is a memorandum of conversation between Acting Secretary + Whitehead and General + Mustapha Cheloufi, Secretary General of the Algerian Defense + Ministry. Cheloufi was visiting the U.S. at the invitation of ASD Armitage, following the latter’s + visit to Algeria in September of 1986.A + record of Armitage’s September 5–7, 1986, meetings with Cheloufi + and senior members of the Algerian military, during which they + signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement + (GOSMIA), is in telegram 4521 from Algiers, September 8, 1986. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860680–0680) The conversation with the Acting + Secretary took place at the Department of State on September 21 from + 5–6 p.m. Also present at the meeting were NEA + DAS + Ussery, DOD + DAS + Gnehm, D staffer Bernicat, Embassy Algiers DATT Di Leonardo and Algeria Desk + Officer Fitzpatrick (notetaker). + + Summary: Acting Secretary Whitehead September 21 told General Cheloufi + President Bendjedid’s 1985 + visit to the U.S. had ushered in a new era of good relations between + the U.S. and Algeria, and that ties continued to improve. He pointed + out, however, that the U.S. had serious concerns about easing of + Algerian-Libyan relations and about Algerian relations with + Abu Nidal. Cheloufi + told the Acting Secretary the Algerians were well aware of Qadhafi’s nature, but said the U.S. + must trust the GOA in its effort to + stablize the region. He also assured the Acting Secretary the GOA did not support terrorist + activities and took note of U.S. concern about Abu Nidal. On the Western + Sahara, Cheloufi urged the U.S. to play a role in resolving the + conflict. End summary. + + Libya + + Isolating Qadhafi. + The Acting Secretary stressed that Qadhafi must remain + isolated from the international community, and the U.S. was + therefore concerned that events such as Qadhafi’s July visit to AlgiersSee footnote 2, + Document 168. and other bilateral + efforts might encourage him and lend him credibility. + Cheloufi said the Algerians understood the need to isolate + Qadhafi but that + separating him from Africa was not the answer. Cheloufi said + the GOA’s relations with + Qadhafi were not + easy, and he agreed Qadhafi was unstable and unpredictable. + Algeria’s geographical position, however, obligated the + GOA to pursue regional + stability by dealing with him. + + The Moroccan Experience: Pointing to the Moroccan + experience with the Oujda Accord,See footnote 2, + Document 138. Cheloufi said the GOA recognized the need to be + wary of Qadhafi. + Cheloufi deemed the Oujda Accord an “unholy alliance”, + likening it to a hypothetical alliance between such + disparate states as Albania and Chile, and claimed King + Hassan’s goal had been to isolate Algeria. Qadhafi, who had harassed + the Moroccans for years to enter into a union, demonstrated + his instability when, 15 days before the accord was reached, + said he would never negotiate with King Hassan. This had + occurred when President Bendjedid had attempted to bring Qadhafi, King Hassan and + President Bourghiba together in Algiers. + + Algerians Seeking Libyan Guarantees: Cheloufi said Algeria + had few alternatives. The GOA had to try to settle the problem or find a + means to neutralize Qadhafi. The GOA could not sign a unity agreement without + guarantees. Should the GOA + sign such an agreement, it would make certain Qadhafi adhered to + it. + + Qadhafi Pushing for + Union: Qadhafi, + Cheloufi said, strongly desired union with Algeria. The + GOA had told Qadhafi it wanted time to + consider such a move. Algeria would enter into such an + agreement only with the free and democratic consent of both + the Algerian and the Libyan peoples, and the Algerian people + for their part could well reject such a union. The GOA believed Qadhafi might become more + dangerous without an outlet. Though the GOA was very concered about + Qadhafi, it + wanted to calm him down rather than oppose him + outright. + + Chad. Cheloufi said the GOA continued to pressure Qadhafi to allow the + Chadians solve their own problems, but given the conflicting + Libyan and Chadian claims on the Aozou Strip,Documentation on the dispute between + Libya and Chad over the Aozou Strip is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. the GOA believed the matter must + be resolved through international arbitration. + + Tunisia. The GOA was also + concerned about the situation in Tunisia, and had warned + Qadhafi to + refrain from actions against that country. The GOA had also urged Libya to + meet Tunisian conditions regarding reparations for Tunisian + workers expelled from Libya in 1985. Algeria had good, neighborly + relations with Tunisia, and could not accept foreign + intervention in Tunisian affairs. + + Caution Urged. The Acting Secretary responded by urging + the GOA to be very wary of + Qadhafi. Mr. + Whitehead + explained that he himself had talked with King Hassan just + after he had signed the Oujda Accord. King Hassan had + assured Mr. Whitehead + the U.S. should not worry because he the King could control + Qadhafi through + the treaty. King Hassan, however, was not able to control + Qadhafi and ended + up embarrassed. Mr. Whitehead said he hoped the GOA would not make the same + mistake. + + + Abu Nidal + + + U.S. Concerns. Mr. Whitehead raised US concerns about Algerian relations with + Abu Nidal. He + told Cheloufi the U.S. believed Abu Nidal was + responsible for a large proportion of terrorists acts around + the world, many against U.S. citizens. The U.S. found + Abu Nidal + totally undesirable and was worried he might find refuge in + Algeria.In telegram 118885 + to Algiers, April 20, the Department stated: “As post is + aware, a variety of sources have reported that both + Abu Nidal + (Sabri al-Banna) and Abu + Abbas (Muhammad al-Abbas) are (or have + been) in Algiers for the current Palestine National + Congress and the preparatory meetings which had led up + to the PNC.” The + Department instructed the Embassy “to register our deep + concern” and that “we are dismayed by reports that your + government has allowed such notorious terrorists to + enter Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870304–0541) + Cheloufi said he had been concerned about criticism of the + GOA for Abu Nidal’s presence at + the PNC this spring. The + GOA had a moral + commitment to hold an open PNC in order to foster a unified Palestinian + approach. The GOA, + therefore, had accepted everyone who wanted to participate. + Cheloufi said the GOA was + absolutely against terrorist activities. The Abu Nidal group had + promised to refrain from terrorist acts, and there had been + no acts attributable to Abu + Nidal since the PNC, Cheloufi said.Mr. Whitehead said he hoped the + GOA no longer would + welcome Abu Nidal. + He stressed Abu + Nidal remained number one on the U.S. + most-wanted list, and said U.S. intelligence services knew + Abu Nidal + continued to plan terrorist acts, even though he may not + have been directly involved in recent incidents. Mr. + Whitehead urged + the GOA to keep its + distance from Abu + Nidal, because relations with the US could be harmed if Algeria + associated with him.Cheloufi said he had taken good + note of the Acting Secretary’s concerns in this regard and + would delve into the matter further on his return to + Algiers. + + + Western SaharaCheloufi urged the U.S. to play a role in + helping to resolve the Western Sahara dispute, and to use its + influence to get King Hassan to accept the “universally accepted principle of + self-determination.” He said Bendjedid had shown Algeria’s good will and that + there was not much more the GOA + could do. The GOA, moreover, did + not oppose King Hassan and had no bilateral problems with Morocco + other than the Western Sahara, which would continue to prevent + Algeria from normalizing relations. + + U.S.-Algerian Bilateral Relations + + Improving Ties. The Acting Secretary expressed + satisfaction at improving U.S.-Algerian bilateral ties, + particularly since President Bendjedid’s 1985 U.S. visit. He asked + Cheloufi to extend U.S. good wishes to President Bendjedid. Cheloufi said + President Bendjedid + asked him to reaffirm good relations with the US and to highlight the GOA’s desire to look sincerely + for further areas of cooperation. + + Invitation to Visit. Mr. Whitehead said he had a special affection + for Algeria, because he was at Mers el Kebir with the U.S. + Navy in 1944. Cheloufi invited him to come again to Algeria + to see how things had changed. Ambassador Sahnoun noted Mr. Whitehead had an + outstanding invitation. Mr. Whitehead said he would enjoy such a + visit. + + + Whitehead +
+
+ 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870895–0604. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen + Fitzpatrick and Casey + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Ussery, Eastham, Kirby, Courtney (NSC), Laurence Pope (NEA/NGA), Stephen + Grummon (S/CT), Bush, Richard Mueller (S/S), and Carolyn Huggins (S/S–O); approved by Djerejian. Sent for information to + Rabat and Tunis. + + 339224. + + Washington, October 30, 1987, 1907Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice Presidential Letter to Bendjedid. + +

1. C—Entire text

+

2. Please deliver the following letter from the Vice President to + President Bendjedid. No/no signed + original will follow.

+

3. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: On the anniversary of the Algerian + revolution, I want to extend to you and to the people of Algeria my + sincere best wishes. The commemoration of this significant event in + Algerian history comes at a time when our two countries can take + satisfaction at the way in which our bilateral relations have + strengthened and progressed. + Your well-remembered visit to the U.S. in 1985 marked an important + milestone in that process.

+

Our growing ties make frank exchange essential as we work together to + foster greater understanding and cooperation. In this regard, I thought + it might be appropriate to share with you our current thinking on + several issues of common interest.

+

As Secretary Shultz stressed in + his October 1 meeting with Minister Ibrahimi,The + Shultz-Ibrahimi conversation is in telegram 15091 to Algiers, + October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870813–0813) the U.S. remains greatly + concerned about the situation in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. does not + wish to become involved in an escalating military confrontation with + Iran. Rather, we seek to provide protection to U.S.-flag vessels, to + help ensure freedom of navigation in Gulf waters, and to support the + security of friendly Arab states in the region. We continue to believe + that the way to bring peace to the Gulf is to press for an immediate and + negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war based on U.N. Security Council + Resolution 598.Reference is to UN Resolution 598, July 20, which + called for an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the + repatriation of prisoners of war, and for mutual withdrawal to their + internationally-recognized border. Documentation on the resolution + is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, + Iran; Iraq, 1985–1988. We support the Secretary + General in his efforts to seek full and rapid implementation of 598. The + U.N. should thus focus major attention on achieving that end. We intend + to support a follow-up resolution if acceptance of 598 cannot be + secured.

+

Over the years, Algeria has won a reputation for its skill in helping to + ease international conflicts. The U.S. recalls Algeria’s indispensable + role in the release of the American hostages in Tehran, its successful + effort in 1975 to resolve border disputes between Iran and Iraq,Reference is to the March 6, 1975, Algiers + Accord. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVII, Iran; Iraq, + 1973–1976, Document 273. and the 1981 mediation + mission between Iraq and Iran that cost the lives of Algeria’s former + Foreign Minister Ben Yahia and + so many of his colleagues.Documentation on + this issue is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XX, Iran; Iraq, April + 1980–January 1985. Your country’s international + relations with Iran provide an opportunity—as the Arab League Summit + approaches on November 8—to convey to the leadership in Tehran the need + to bring the Gulf war to a prompt end. This savage conflict has cost + thousands of lives, brought untold destruction, and has sown instability + throughout the region. Social and economic development in both Iraq and + Iran have suffered tragically as a result. Likewise, Iran has paid + dearly in terms of its relations with neighboring states. Your + government can use its influence to persuade Iran that immediate + acceptance and implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 as + agreed with Secretary General + de Cuellar is in its own best interest, and offers an opportunity to + begin rebuilding confidence and stability in this troubled area of the + world.

+

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate Algeria on its election to + the U.N. Security Council for 1988–1989. We look forward to fruitful + cooperation with you in the Council both with regard to terminating the + Gulf conflict and in all other matters relating to international peace + and security.

+

The United States is also concerned about another problem that threatens + stability: international terrorism. I take a personal interest in the + issue in my role as head of our anti-terrorism task force. I know that + Algeria shares our aversion to terrorist violence, and has worked to + secure the release of hostages held in Lebanon. That is why we urge + Algeria to refrain from embarking on a relationship with Abu Nidal; such + relations would almost certainly have an adverse impact on Algeria’s + outstanding international image. Abu + Nidal’s actions are beyond the control of any single + government.

+

These preoccupations do not diminish U.S. interest in Algeria and in the + future of the Maghreb—a region that faces significant challenges of its + own. The U.S. shares an interest in promoting stability there. National + development can contribute significantly to achievement of this common + goal. For this reason, the U.S. has sought over the years to support + social and economic progress in North Africa. The U.S. applauds the + courageous initiatives Algeria has instituted to restructure its economy + and to strengthen economic performance through encouragement of + privatization and entrepreneurship. Your recent announcement of reform + in state enterprises and the banking system reflects steady + determination to achieve those ends.

+

Durable stability in the Maghreb, however, cannot be achieved without + satisfactory resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. I think both of + our governments agree that a military solution to the Western Sahara + problem is neither possible nor desirable, and that the dispute can be + resolved only through diplomatic means. The U.S. has closely followed + recent diplomatic moves regarding the Western Sahara, including the May + meeting between you and King Hassan. The U.S. supports such steps, + including the present initiative of the UN Secretary General. In this spirit, it will be important + to encourage the efforts of the UN + technical mission when it visits the region to lay the groundwork for a + possible referendum.

+

Libya presents a significant challenge to the goal of stability in the + Maghreb. It is the U.S. view that Qadhafi has not changed; he continues to foster military + aggression, subversion and international terrorism. If he appears + conciliatory now, it is because he is feeling the pressures of isolation + and of his defeats in Chad. Actions that diminish his isolation help him out of his present + difficulties and encourage further misbehavior. Furthermore, Libya’s + role in the 1980 Gafsa attack can not easily be forgotten.See footnote 2, Document + 107. We must expect Libya will try again to exploit + discontented elements in Tunisia. In our view, the most effective way to + control such adventurism still lies in the containment and isolation of + Libya. For this reason, the U.S. does not support the idea of Libyan + adherence to the 1983 Tripartite Accord. Although we remain concerned + about the direction of Algerian-Libyan relations, we are gratified by + recent assurances from senior officials such as General Belkheir and General Cheloufi to + Ambassador Johnstone regarding + their extent and nature.

+

Though I have outlined the challenges facing us, there are also many + potential opportunities ahead as we further strengthen our bilateral + relations. The U.S. welcomes opportunities to exchange views on issues + of mutual concern as we both endeavour to increase cooperation in the + military, economic and cultural fields. In this regard, the fruitful + visit I had to Algeria in 1983,See Document 130. and occasions such as + that provided by General Belkeir’sSee Document 161. and General Cheloufi’s + visits to the U.S.See Document 170. foster growth in our relations, + while providing an important opportunity for a frank exchange of views. + The U.S. looks forward to continuing the dialogue, both in Washington + and in Algiers.

+

Please accept, Mr. President, my sincere good wishes for your future + endeavours and for the continued prosperity and progress of your + country.

+

Sincerely, George Bush

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881021–0206. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen + Fitzpatrick; cleared by Casey, Laurence Pope (NEA/NGA), Eastham (P), Stephen Young (EUR/SOV), Richard Mueller (S/S), Michael Minton (S/S–O), Gerald Feirestein (NEA/EGY), Paul Wilcox (NEA), Joann Alba (S/S–S), Gregg, Perito + (NSC), Kirby, and Wayne Miele (H); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to + Rabat and Tunis. + + 36414. + + Washington, February 6, 1988, 0125Z + + + + SUBJECT + Letter to Bendjedid From + Vice President Bush. + +

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver following letter from the Vice President to President + Bendjedid. No/no signed + original will follow.

+

3. Begin text

+

Dear Mr. President:

+

It gives me great pleasure once again to take up our secret dialogue on + issues affecting international peace and stability. In this regard, I + very much appreciated your December letter.In telegram 7604 from Algiers, December 13, the Embassy transmitted + the text of Bendjedid’s + letter, which read in part: “You know—as I have discussed with you + in detail—that Maghreb unity represents a cardinal objective for my + country and people. Without it the Maghreb will never be able to + have an optimal mobilization of its resources at the service of its + development.” To accomplish this, Bendjedid continued, “This meant normalization of + relations between Tunisia and Libya—that is happening now—and it + meant that Libya would have its place in this treaty.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D871021–0206) The following, Mr. President, are some + reflections on events that have occurred since then.

+

As you know, Mr. President, last December the United States and the + Soviet Union moved a step closer to safeguarding international peace by + agreeing to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles in + Europe.Reference to the Intermediate + Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in Washington on December 8, 1987. See + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, + 1984–1988. President Reagan was gratified by your solid expression of support + for this step. We look forward to Algeria’s continued support as we move + closer to a second summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow.Reference is to the summit scheduled to be held in + May and June in Moscow. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents + 155–164. + The INF Treaty, I believe, will make a vital contribution to greater + stability. As we prepare for subsequent meetings later this year in + Moscow, it is our intention to build on this treaty to achieve agreement + with the Soviet Union on the further reduction of nuclear weapons. To + this end, U.S. negotiators in Geneva have been instructed, along with their Soviet counterparts, + to accelerate resolution of outstanding issues to clear the way for a + treaty on strategic offensive arms.Reference is to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). See + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I. + With goodwill and determination on both sides, these efforts can and + will bear fruit.

+

Our continuing consultations on global issues have taken on even greater + significance in light of Algeria’s election to the UN Security Council. Algerian diplomacy is + justly renowned for its efficiency and effectiveness, and it has given + your country important influence in the developed and developing world. + We welcome Algeria’s presence on the Security Council, and look forward + to working closely with you.

+

In this connection, I would like to touch briefly on a key issue now + facing the Security Council. Clearly the Gulf war is a major concern. + The Gulf area, and the Middle East as a whole, is very important to me. + I made two trips to the region in 1986, including my visit in April of + that year to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.Documentation on Bush’s + visit to Saudi Arabia is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; + Arabian Peninsula. There, I sensed the need for the + United States to engage the Arab world, not only to protect American + security and economic interests, but to help our friends. As we pursue + the objective of stability in that region, the Amman summit’s call in + November for action by the international community to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 598 must not + go unheeded.See footnote 3, Document 171. We must continue to + press for urgent adoption of a follow-on, enforcement resolution by the + Security Council. While some progress has been made, the Soviet Union + continues to counsel delay in the imposition of an arms embargo against + Iran as the non-complying party, and to insist that the council discuss + its impractical proposal for a UN naval + force. The latter focuses only on one aspect of the war—attacks on + shipping—rather than on the urgent need to implement Resolution 598 as a + comprehensive whole. As Iran prepares for a new offensive which brings + the new threat of widening the war to neutral Gulf states, the need for + an enforcement resolution to help bring Iran to the negotiating table + has become even more urgent. Algeria will play a key role with the + Security Council in the period just ahead. We look forward to working + closely with Algeria in the coming weeks as we work for the earliest + possible adoption of an embargo on the transfer of arms to Iran as the + party which has refused to negotiate the implementation of Resolution + 598 in good faith. Algeria can help by urging the Soviet Union to end + its delaying tactics, and by making clear to China its concern over + continuing Chinese arms sales to Iran.

+ +

The Gulf war, however, is not the only conflict that threatens stability + in the Middle East. The tragic events we have witnessed in recent weeks + in the West Bank and GazaReference is to + the Palestinian uprisings against Israeli forces, or the First + Intifada, that began in December 1987. Documentation is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. highlight the critical need for progress + toward a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Movement + toward this objective will be possible only if all concerned eschew + inflammatory rhetoric in favor of pragmatic, realistic positions. + Ambassador Sahnoun has passed + along your interest in seeing the U.S. help move this process + forward.No record of Sahnoun’s communication was + found. I can assure you, Mr. President, the U.S. is now + intensively engaged in working for a resolution to this conflict. We + share your deep concern that reason and moderation must prevail if + progress toward peace is to be achieved. On my second trip to the Middle + East in 1986, I visited Israel, Jordan and Egypt. I negotiated six + points of agreement which showed clearly the desire for movement toward + peace that existed in those three countries.Documentation on Bush’s 1986 trip to the Middle East is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. Now, the tensions in the West Bank and + Gaza have made it clear to everyone that the status quo cannot endure. + Time is not on the side of peace. Efforts to achieve progress must be + reinvigorated. We were able to take advantage of President Mubarak’s presence here to engage in + lengthy discussions on how we might move forward in the peace + process.Mubarak made a state visit to the United States + January 26–29. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. President Mubarak, as you know, has recently proposed some ideas + which contain a number of positive elements. We were able to exchange + views in some detail and to share with him some of our latest thoughts. + We remain committed to do all we can to promote peace and we will pursue + this goal energetically.

+

The United States also shares an interest in seeing peace and stability + in the North Africa. I noted particularly the thoughts about this issue + which you outlined in your December letter. The U.S. has closely + followed recent developments in the region, including the resumption of + full diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Egypt and between Tunisia + and Libya, as well as your visits to those latter two countries. Our + long-standing policy is supportive of regional arrangements that + contribute to the stability of the area. In this, I believe, we share a + strong, common goal. Our views diverge, however, on the effectiveness of + regional arrangements that include Libya and exclude Morocco. I hope + that careful consideration is being given to how Libya’s inclusion in + the Tripartite Accord could potentially improve Qadhafi’s internal, domestic standing + and thereby increase his capacity for aggressive activities abroad, including in Chad and + promotion of terrorism. My views on Colonel Qadhafi have not changed. His international behavior + continues to be unacceptable to all Americans. It is also a shame what + he is doing to his own country—controlling his people with terror, and + squandering his country’s ample resources on frivolous and misguided + foreign adventures.

+

The U.S. has also followed with close attention the government transition + in Tunisia.Reference is to Ben Ali’s removal of Bourguiba and assumption of the + Tunisian presidency. See Document + 355. At the time of the succession in November, we + expressed our esteem for the friendship that has characterized + U.S.-Tunisian relations over the years, and reaffirmed U.S. support for + Tunisia under its new leadership. We will continue our efforts to + enhance and refine our bilateral cooperation with the Tunisian + Government. The U.S. has also taken positive note of the series of + diplomatic exchanges between Algeria and Morocco. Dialogue and diplomacy + of this sort can facilitate the kind of communication necessary to + developing understandings that are acceptable to both your nations on + issues of common interest, such as the Western Sahara.

+

The United States values its relationships with both Algeria and Morocco. + Conflict in the Maghreb is not in our common interest; it prevents and + impedes economic progress in the region. The U.S. therefore supports + diplomatic efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. In this + regard, we are following closely the efforts of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. I understand that + the UN technical team that visited the + area last November has now presented its findings to the Secretary + General. The U.S. will continue to support his initiative, and calls on + all with influence over the situation to encourage restraint and + cooperation as his efforts proceed.

+

Mr. President, I am gratified at the progress our two countries continue + to make as we build our relations in a variety of fields. In this + regard, I very much appreciated the invitation of Mr. Rabah Bitat, + President of the Popular Assembly, for a congressional delegation to + visit your country. I am sharing his letter with my congressional + colleague, James Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives. In the + economic area, the U.S. looks forward to the meeting of the joint + U.S.-Algerian Economic Commission this spring,The U.S.-Algerian Joint Economic Commission was + originally scheduled for April, then postponed until May, and + ultimately postponed until 1989. as we pursue joint endeavors + to solidify commercial cooperation. We have already made significant + progress in the agricultural area, and anticipate that this has laid the + groundwork for further economic cooperation in other fields. In this + connection, I believe such cooperation can be helpful as Algeria pursues + its plans for restructuring its economic sector.

+ +

Mr. President, I hope that our bilateral relations will continue to grow + in many areas, and that we will progress toward our shared goal of a + peaceful, stable Maghreb. Our exchange of letters provides a valued + opportunity for facilitating understanding on important questions. I + look forward to receiving your thoughts as we progress through 1988. In + the meantime, Mr. President, please accept my sincere good wishes for + continued progress and prosperity for yourself and the Algerian nation + now and throughout the new year.

+

Sincerely, George Bush

+

End text.

+ Armacost +
+
+ 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880210–0807. Secret. Sent for information to USUN, the Gulf War Collective, and + the UN Security Council + Collective. + + 1402. + + Algiers, March 10, 1988, 1245Z + + + + SUBJECT + Ambassador Walters’ + Meeting With President Bendjedid. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Ambassador Walters + accompanied by Ambassador Johnstone met with President Bendjedid March 7. Also attending + were Presidential Cabinet Director Belkheir and MFA + SecGen Hamdani. Cordial meeting + covered following: + + PLO Office in New York: + + Bendjedid + expressed concern over closing of PLO office.Reference is to “Chapter + 61—Anti-Terrorism-PLO,” 22 USC S–5201, in which + Congress determined that “the PLO and its affiliates + are a terrorist organization and a threat to the + interests of the United States, its allies, and to + international law and should not benefit from + operating in the United States.” + Walters + pointed out that Congress was forcing action and + that administration had opposed the move. Walters said he + hoped to gain some time to see what might develop. + Bendjedid + reiterated Algerian concern and cited closing as a + dangerous precedent. + + + Middle East Peace: + + + Walters + responded to Bendjedid’s concerns on peace problem + by noting that demonstrations were having major + impact on U.S. opinion. He said that there was no + going back to status quo of several months ago. + Walters + pointed to efforts being undertaken by Secretary + Shultz in + the context of UN + Resolution 242See footnote 5, Document + 111. as a demonstration of U.S. + willingness to become involved in a search for a + solution. Bendjedid commented on the + insufficiency of U.S. proposals and said he was + particularly upset over Israeli crackdown on press + coverage of West Bank disturbances. Walters counseled + moderation, noting that this was a time for a + flexible search for solutions and not for fixed + positions. + + + Western Sahara: + + Ambassador Walters spoke of his meeting with + HassanSee Document 274. and + conveyed strong U.S. support for the efforts of the + UNSYG to + organize a referendum. Bendjedid offered nothing new in + Algerian position. + + + Iran-Iraq: + + 1) Walters spoke of US efforts to get Soviets + to support a strong resolution. He said that U.S. + was offering a 30–60 day implementation delay for + the arms embargo. Walters was optimistic that Soviets + would be willing to go along with a resolution and + pointedly expressed hope that there would be no + effort to get strong resolution side-tracked. + Bendjedid + agreed but went on to explain that he had found new + flexibility in Iranian position during visit of + Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani. He alluded + to reports of Iranian note supporting 598 in UN.See footnote 3, Document 171. + Walters + countered by noting that if Iranian’s want to get + credit for supporting 598 in UN they must come out and state their + support publicly. + + 2) On Larijani visit, Bendjedid said that + Iranians had complained at alleged Iraqi + unwillingness to go along with a ceasefire. + Algerians had argued that solution was a complete + package of which ceasefire was only a part. + According to Bendjedid, Larijani had + expressed willingness to go along with ceasefire and + other elements of Resolution 598. He said the two + sides had discussed issue of war reconstruction + (reparations) and Algerians had told Iranians they + would have to make their claims more practical. He + concluded by saying that Iranian visit had given him + greater hope. He said that if Algeria undertook to + do anything (to mediate) it would be in the context + of the UNSYG + effort. + + + Tunisia: + + In course of discussion of Tunisia, Bendjedid noted that + Ben Ali + appears to have taken hold effectively. He noted + that Tunisia faced economic problems and that + Ben Ali + needed help on his debt problem. + Bendjedid + solicited U.S. review of what it could do to ease + Tunisian burden. + + + Libya: + + In short discussion Bendjedid alluded to reference in + President’s letter (delivered by Walters) on + Libya.Reagan wrote + Bendjedid: “Libyan aggression also remains an + important concern for my administration. In this + connection, the U.S. continues to encourage a + vigilant approach to Libya, and strongly + discourages integration of Libya into regional + political and diplomatic arrangements.” (Telegram + 60878 to Algiers, February 27; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880169–0188) He explained + Algerian policy along usual lines saying that + Algeria had to give priority to regional stability. + Walters + asked how stability was possible with Qadhafi and reminded + Bendjedid + of a previous visit in which he had shown Bendjedid photographs + of Libyan hardware. + + + Chad: + + 1) Bendjedid said that Algerian role in + the postponement of OAU consideration of Chad dispute had + been misinterpreted as a pro-Libya position. He + argued that Algeria had been concerned that OAU meeting would not + achieve results, an outcome that would lead to a + breakdown in the situation. He said that Algeria was + now attempting to pull together a meeting of + Presidents Bongo, Bendjedid, Qadhafi and Habre before OAU meeting in order to + explore possibilities.The OAU was + scheduled to discuss Chad during a May meeting of + its Foreign Ministers in Addis Ababa. He + thought this could prepare the way for direct + contact between Habre and Qadhafi. Bendjedid claimed + that both Libya and Chad favored such a proposal. + Walters + expressed surprise over Chadian willingness and + Bendjedid + said that Chad agreement was quote in principle + unquote. Bendjedid said that the issue now + rested with Bongo. Walters offered to discuss it with him + during his forthcoming visit.A record of Walters’s meeting + with Bongo, which took place on March 13, is in + telegram 973 from Libreville, March 19. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880713–0696) + + 2) Bendjedid noted that issue might + eventually be referred to World Court although + Libyans were hesitant. Algerians had reminded + Libyans of World Court treatment of recent + Libya-Tunisia dispute as proof that Court would + treat Libya fairly. + + + UN Voting Record: + + Meeting closed on friendly note with Walters giving + Bendjedid a + useful prod on Algeria’s UN voting record. + + + + Comment: Bendjedid was + relaxed and although clearly in strong disagreement with U.S. + Arab-Israeli policy, he did not make the issue the centerpiece of + the meeting. On balance, meeting was a useful review of + international issues even if no new ground was broken. + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared by Ussery, Joseph Lake (S/S), Gregory Delawie (S/S–O), and Bremer; approved by + Armacost. Sent for + information Immediate to Nicosia and Kuwait City. + + 114823. + + Washington, April 12, 1988, 2014Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algeria and the Hijacked Kuwaiti Aircraft. + + + Ref: + Algiers 2113.In telegram 2113 from + Algiers, April 12, the Embassy reported that Khediri informed Johnstone that the GOA had granted permission to land + the aircraft, which had been hijacked on April 5 en route from + Bangkok to Kuwait City, in Algiers “in response to personal + request of Kuwaiti Emir to President Bendjedid.” The Embassy + continued: “Algerian offer is unconditional and prior release of + hostages is not repeat not a prerequisite. So too, Algerians + have refused to accept any preconditions imposed by hijackers.” + The Embassy also noted that Khediri “said that Algerians have made it clear + to Kuwait that they would try to negotiate release of hostages + in return for safe transit (to wherever) for hijackers. Kuwaitis + were asked to not criticize Algeria if such a deal came to + fruition and they agreed.” Johnstone “reiterated U.S. position, namely that + U.S. supports firm Kuwaiti policy and opposes concessions to + hijackers. (Khederi said Kuwaitis made it clear they would not + release any of their 17 prisoners under any circumstances.) + Ambassador said U.S. regards hijackers as murderers who are + trying to release other murderers and that if at all possible + they should be captured and brought to justice.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880311–0448) + + + + Entire text is secret. + + We appreciate the rapid tranmission of information contained in + reftel. You took the right line in informing Khediri that the U.S. fully + supports Kuwaiti policy of opposing concessions to the hijackers and + regards the hijackers as murderers who should be brought to + justice. + + In addition to those ideas, please convey the following additional + points to Khediri as soon as + possible: + + The United States will not remain silent in the event that + a deal occurs in which the hijackers go free. To the + contrary, we will explain as fully as possible in public + what happened, who was involved and the implication of such + a deal, e.g. that everyone is more vulnerable because the + hijackers have eluded justice. + + This incident absolutely must end in such a way that the + hijackers do not escape or go free as a result of any deal. + It would be unconscionable if they would go unpunished. This + fundamental position does not mitigate our genuine concern + for the hostages. This concern, however, is balanced by the + need for efforts to discourage hijackings and the taking of + hostages in the future. + + If the terrorists were to go free, Algeria’s commitment to + countering terrorism would be questioned. More importantly, + serious complications in our bilateral relationship could + emerge. + + + Therefore Algeria should urge all involved parties to hold + the plane in Cyprus. + + + We agree that it would be useful to have Embassy personnel at the + airport should the plane come to Algeria. However, we believe that + Embassy personnel should not repeat not be present at the airport + command post or in any way be in a position which appears to suggest + an operational role. An Embassy presence at the airport, apart from + the Algerian command post, would be appropriate. We have tried to + assume a low profile throughout this incident and would want to + continue to do so in Algiers. We have also found that during these + crisis periods it is generally more useful to have the Ambassador at + the Embassy and other officers at appropriate sites. In addition to + keeping our profile low, such an arrangment permits more + authoritative communications with Washington and between the Embassy + and senior GOA officials.In telegram 2130 from Algiers, April 13, + Johnstone indicated + that he had “carried out reftel instructions to the letter, but + I confess to being a little perplexed by the tone of indignation + and threats of retaliation contained therein. I urge that we not + rush into any hasty public statements or actions to carry out + our threats.” He also contended “the instructions contained + reftel subordinate the safety of the hostages to the objective + of punishing the hostage takers” and recommended that “we put + our position on the record but in moderate and thoughtful tones + which acknowledge the dilemma involved.” To do otherwise, he + contended, would “seriously complicate” U.S.-Algerian relations. + (Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, + Papers of L. Paul + Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director + of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 + Hijacking 1988) + + Shultz +
+
+ 175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as + Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of + Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; + Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared in substance by Djerejian (NEA); cleared by Bremer, Mary Mochary (L), Levitsky, + Gregory Delawie (S/S–O), and Arena + (DOJ/OIA); approved by Armacost. + + 116517. + + Washington, April 13, 1988, 1814Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Hijackers and US Law. + + + Ref: + A: State 114823;See Document 174. Ref B: Algiers + 2130.See footnote 3, See Document 174. + + + + Secret entire text. + + The issues you raised in reftel are important and not to be + treated lightly. Ref A did not mean to suggest that there are not + real moral issues involved + in situations such as we are facing now. To the contrary it is + precisely on that point that our concerns turn, namely our moral + obligations to the present and the future and how best to balance + both obligations. As you point out ridding the world of the menace + of hijackings implies that we cannot give absolute priority to the + safety of hostages. How we meet obligations in both directions is + not a question for which there are easy and pat answers. In laying + out a public position, we would do it in such a manner that is + thoughtful yet makes clear our thinking. On balance, we believe our + counterterrorism policy is the right one: Concessions to terrorists + today lead inevitably to more acts of terrorism against equally + innocent people tommorrow. + + The issue in this hijacking is the immorality of permitting + murders to go unpunished. Two murders have been committed. By taking + an American citizen hostage, the hijackers have violated US law. Moreover we have just learned + that at least one of the hijackers is already wanted by the USG for aircraft piracy and conspiracy + to commit murder in the case of the hijacking of TWA 847. + + [less than 3 lines not declassified] has + positively identified one of the hijackers as Hasan Izz-al-Din. On + July 3, 1985, the U. S. District + Court in Washington D.C. issued an arrest warrant for Izz-al-Din + charging him with hostage taking and conspiracy to commit aircraft + piracy, resulting in the murder of Robert Stetham, a U.S. + citizen.Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, + was shot and killed by the hijackers of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985. Documentation on this + incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, + Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989. (Izz-al-Din + is charged with violations of Title 49, USC, Section 1472 (I) and + (K)) + + Action requested: Please inform Interior Minister Khediri urgently that since an + American citizen was among the hostages on KU–422, the hijackers have violated American law. + Moreover, one of the hijackers has been positively identified as + Izz-al-Din for whom the U.S. already has an arrest warrant for his + role in TWA 847. We want the GOA to detain this individual and turn + him over to the US authorities to + stand trial in the U.S. for crimes committed against U.S. citizens. + Our government issued a red notice through Interpol for his arrest + two years ago. We are formally asking your government today through + appropriate Interpol channels to execute that red notice. (FYI: Provisional arrest request for + Izz-al-Din will follow.) + + While we realize that Algeria is not a signatory to the Montreal + or Hague ConventionsReference is to, + respectively, the 1971 Hague Convention for the Suppression of + Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, under which a party to the treaty + must prosecute an aircraft hijacker if another state does not + request the hijacker’s extradition for prosecution of the same + crime, and the 1971 International Conference on Air Law at + Montreal, a multilateral treaty whereby signatories agreed to + prohibit and punish behavior such as sabotaging or destroying + aircraft. and that we do not have an extradition treaty + with the GOA, nonetheless the US Government understands that under + Algerian domestic law Algeria may have the authority to extradite + and we would expect the GOA to + understand our interest in this individual and our desire to see + that he be tried for his crimes in a U.S. court of law. You may + inform the GOA that the US would be prepared to provide + appropriate assistance to the GOA + to help identify and apprehend Izz-al-Din and the other + hijackers. + + You may draw on the facts given in paragraph 4 [less than 2 lines not declassified]. Also during your + presentation please allude to the fact that given the intense + interest in the 847 incident within the USG including the Congress, Izz-al-Din’s presence could + become public in just a matter of time.The Embassy reported in telegram 2161 from Algiers, April 13, + that Khediri “took note + of our démarche. I drew him out and he confided that in his view + our démarche was not useful and only served to complicate an + already complicated situation.” Khediri also “politely but flatly rejected any + U.S. assistance in the hijacking case. He said this was a matter + that would be handled without violence and through negotiations + and that GOA has all the + capability it needs.” (Department of State, Bureau of + Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as + Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of + Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking + 1988) + + Shultz +
+
+ 176. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Kuwait City and Beirut. + + 2168. + + Algiers, April 14, 1988, 1704Z + + + + SUBJECT + Kuwait Hijacking—Negotiations Status. + + + + Secret/NOFORN—Entire text. + + General Lakehal Ayat debriefed Ambassador [less + than 1 line not declassified] at airport on status of + negotiations as of 1500 local (1400 GMT) April 14. Ambassador opened discussion by + reiterating U.S. opposition to any deals which would involve freedom + for terrorists. Lakehal Ayat acknowledged U.S. position and, while + not specifically addressing it, made clear his view that U.S. policy + was ill advised. + + + Lakehal said that situation was calm. A doctor has been aboard the + aircraft which would help further ease tensions. Lakehal said the + terrorists remain adamant and would not accept any solution which + did not involve the release of the Dawa prisoners. They were + dedicated and well-trained and, in Lakehal’s view, would sooner + destroy themselves and the hostages than yield on Dawa prisoner + issue. Lakehal described Kuwait’s position as also hard. + + Despite this gloomy set of circumstances Lakehal did not appear + discouraged. He thought the terrorists were quote calming down + unquote (but not softening up) and he hinted at possible Kuwaiti + flexibility. Under questioning he offered view that Kuwait would + have to commit to some future action vis-à-vis prisoners in order to + unblock situation. He thought Kuwaiti’s would have to have + face-saving formula. He speculated vaguely about the possibility of + a hostage and terrorist release now, followed after a few months by + specific movement on prisoner issue at which time U.S. hostages in + Lebanon could be released as well. + + Lakehal said that Algerians were pressing the terrorists hard (he + went through the negotiating litany). He did not say whether + Algerians were also pressing Kuwait but it would seem clear that + they are. + + Ambassador asked for Lakehal’s best judgment as to how long + negotiations could continue before terrorists would become + frustrated and resort to Larnaca-style violence. Lakehal thought + situation would hold until about Saturday.April 16. + + [2 lines not declassified] He said, + however, that there were no repeat no terrorists aboard Kuwaiti + flight who had also been on 1985 TWA847 hijacking. (One Algerian + negotiator involved in 1985 event has been in aircraft and so + informed Lakehal.) He will double check. + + Beirut minimized considered. + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as + Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of + Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bremer; cleared by Burleigh, Gregory Delawie (S/S–O), Joseph Lake (S/S), and Perito; approved by Kampelman. + + 118592. + + Washington, April 15, 1988, 0131Z + + + + SUBJECT + Kuwait Hijacking: Negotiations. + + + Ref: + Algiers 2168.See Document 176. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + We read report of Lakehal Ayat debriefing on status of + negotiations (reftel) with great interest, particularly his vague + reference to a package deal which might eventually include the + release of some or all of our hostages in Lebanon.An unknown hand circled “great” in this + sentence. + + We of course very much want our hostages to be freed. And we have + always said we would talk to anyone or any government about their + release. However, what we will not do is make concessions ourselves + or encourage others to in order to effect their release.An unknown hand underlined the words + “concessions ourselves or encourage others to in order to effect + their release” in this sentence. Hopefully, the Algerians + understand that. + + However, it may be that the Algerians will conclude (or have + already concluded) that the way to break the current deadlock is to + dangle the bait of U.S. hostages before us to induce us to pressure + Kuwait to change its position on the Dawa prisoners. Indeed, Lakehal + Ayat’s vague speculation in para 4 of your report already points in + that direction. + + In light of where we believe Lakehal Ayat may be leading, we feel + it important that you know what the bottom line for the USG is (and is not). Any package that + would require us to make concessions ourselves or to pressure the + GOK on the Dawa 17 is out.An unknown + hand underlined this sentence. We want to head off any + such thinking right away to avoid later serious misunderstandings. + You should take advantage of your meeting with Lakehal Ayat (or + Khediri) to make this + clear to the GOA. + + Kampelman +
+ +
+ 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as + Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of + Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; + Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared by Ussery, Marc Grossman (D), Ross, Levitsky (S/S), and + David Adamson (S/S–O); approved by + Bremer. + + 128959. + + Washington, April 23, 1988, 0708Z + + + + SUBJECT + Your Meeting With General Belkheir. + + + + Secret—Entire text + + Your meeting Saturday April 23 with General Belkheir provides an opportunity to + press the Algerians for a fuller explanation of how the hijacking of + KU–422 was resolved.Early in the morning of April 20, the Embassy + learned that a deal had been struck. While the hostages had been + released and the “members of Kuwaiti royal family were taken to + VIP lounge and immediately + whisked away to parts unknown,” the hijackers remained on the + plane. The Embassy suggested that the “final deal may have + involved some form of confirmation (possibly by videotape) by + Kuwaitis that Dawa prisoners are safe, followed by release of + hostages and freedom for hijackers. GOA has promised us an official debrief later + today. In the meantime GOA + sources aren’t talking.” (Telegram 23155 from Algiers, April 20; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880336–0257) Specifically we are interested + in answers to these questions: + + What were the precise arrangements which led to the + release of the hostages and the hijackers? + + Who are the hijackers? + + Where are the hijackers? + + If the hijackers are still in Algeria, what is the GOA planning to do with + them? + + What is Algeria’s assessment of Iran’s involvement in the + hijacking? + + + Beyond that we believe that the Algerians should receive a clear + account of our views of the incident. You should draw upon the + following talking points for your presentation: + + A hijacking presents all interested parties with difficult + choices. + + The safe release of hostages is important. It cannot be + the sole goal, for that only encourages more hijackings with + ever increasing frequency. + + Bringing hijackers to justice is equally important. + + That has not happened yet in the case of the KU–422 hijackers. After + hijacking an airliner, murdering two individuals in cold + blood and + terrorizing the remaining passengers and crew members, the + hijackers reportedly may go free. + + Even more worrisome is the fact that one of the hijackers + was possibly Hasan Izz-al-Din, who was part of the team + which hijacked TWA + 847. + + We would be very concerned if the hijackers were to be + freed as part of a deal. Given the GOA’s responsibilities, if there is any way to + reverse that situation and assure that the hijackers are + brought to justice, I urge you to do so. + + For its part the U.S. intends to monitor the situation and + will make every effort to apprehend the hijackers. + + We believe that the fundamental principle that hijackers + should be brought to justice must be strengthened and made + an integral and universally accepted part of any strategy + for handling a hijacking situation. Freedom for hijackers is + not a solution. + + I bring these issues to your attention in a spirit of + frank discussion on an important subject which affects the + safety and security of not only the citizens of our two + countries but also all other countries. End talking + points. + + + If Belkheir’s version of + events contradicts that provided by Lakehal Ayat’s, we would be + interested in an explanation of why.In + telegram 2385 from Algiers, April 23, Johnstone reported that he had + met with Belkheir and + that “Belkheir described matter as a no-win situation for + Algeria. He vowed that Algeria would never again accept a + hijacked airplane even, he added pointedly, if there were 100 + Americans on board.” As for the deal, Belkheir said that “the + Kuwaitis agreed to a gesture, namely the release of 4–6 + prisoners whose terms were about to expire anyway,” but only + after the hostages were released. Regarding the whereabouts of + the hijackers, Belkheir + “disclaimed knowledge saying Lakehal Ayat was on top of this.” + After Johnstone said he + “deplored a solution which involved freedom for murderers,” + Belkheir “rejected + notion that capturing hijackers could be given co-equal priority + with safety of hostages.” (Department of State, Bureau of + Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as + Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of + Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking + 1988) + + Whitehead +
+ +
+ 179. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Armacost to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading April–June 1988. Secret. Shultz was in Geneva to meet with + Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to discuss INF + verification procedures. + + + Washington, May 11, 1988 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+

4. Whitehead in + Algeria. John Whitehead + stopped in Algeria May 10–11 on the first leg of a brief North Africa + trip. The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry claimed the Arabs + would neither criticize nor support our Middle East peace initiative at + their June 7 Summit in Algiers.The + conversation about regional issues, including the administration’s + Middle East peace initiative, is in telegram 2759 from Algiers, May + 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880787–0184, D880404–0338) John made it very + clear that we want the Kuwait Air hijackers, whose whereabouts remain + unclear, brought to justice.In telegram + 2760 from Algiers, May 10, the Embassy reported that Whitehead told Hamdani that + although the “U.S. does not want this issue [the hijacking] to upset + our relations with Algeria,” he nevertheless conveyed the United + States wanted “to make very clear in the strongest terms that it is + extremely important that the hijackers be brought to justice for the + criminal actions they perpetrated. The hijackers are criminals. They + murdered. If such criminals get away with these actions, more + hijackings are certain to follow and Americans—as well as other + nationalities—will be affected.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880407–0144) John + also expressed deep disappointment that he had been unable to meet with + President Bendjedid during the + visit to deliver your letter on key international issues.In telegram 2758 from Algiers, May 10, the Embassy + reported that Whitehead had + told Abdelghani that “failure + to meet the Chief of State had never happened to him before during + his travels and he regarded it as a slap in the face for himself and + President Reagan.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Records, 1988 Nodis + Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis) Reagan had written Bendjedid that while he “joined + nations around the world in welcoming the safe release of the + passengers held hostage aboard the hijacked Kuwaiti jet,” he + nevertheless believed “that the perpetrators of these crimes must be + brought to justice, because until they are caught and prosecuted, + the potential remains for them to strike other innocent victims + again. Hijackers are criminals, and must be dealt with as such.” + (Telegram 147397 to Algiers, May 7; Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880396–0139)

+
+ +
+ 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880498–0177. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen + Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared + by Djerejian, Edward Walker + and Ussery, Kirby, Casey, Peter Eicher (NEA/EGY), Eastham, Lynn Pascoe (S/S), Hill, and David Trotter (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat and + Tunis. + + 197973. + + Washington, June 18, 1988, 1907Z + + + + SUBJECT + Letter From the Secretary to President Bendjedid + +

1. C—Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver the following letter from the Secretary to President + Bendjedid. No/no signed + original will follow.

+

3. Begin text.

+

Dear Mr. President:

+

The U.S. followed with interest the results of the extraordinary Arab + summit you hosted June 7–9 in Algiers.A + wrap-up the summit’s proceedings, resolutions, and final communiqué + are in telegram 3249 from Algiers, June 10. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880498–0177) + Documentation on the U.S. reaction to the summit is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. In the wake of those deliberations, I + wanted to share with you some thoughts about our ongoing efforts to + achieve progress toward peace in the Middle East.

+

During my most recent visit to the region,Shultz traveled to the + Middle East from June 3 until June 7 to discuss the Middle East + peace process. the leaders I met with encouraged me to + continue with the U.S. initiative. No one suggested the time had come to + cease our undertaking. The Arab Summit itself left the door open to + continued efforts on our part to achieve further progress.See footnote 4, Document + 111. In this same spirit, I intend to + persevere.

+

Our plan for achieving comprehensive peace rests solidly on the basis of + UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 111. + All of Resolution 242’s provisions and principles—including its promise + of exchange of territory for peace—will apply to each negotiation + between Israel and its neighbors. The negotiations will be launched by + an international conference that will facilitate rather than interfere, + impose settlements, or veto agreements reached bilaterally.

+

Although the odds against a breakthrough remain high, the United States + intends to keep moving forward. The plan we have advanced is realistic + and workable. It can bring about negotiations; it can help achieve + peace. Through this process, Palestinians will achieve their legitimate rights—including + political rights—and will be able to enjoy lives of security, dignity, + and freedom. Israelis will achieve the recognition and security which + they deserve.

+

As the U.S. continues its efforts to promote peace in the Middle East, it + also wishes to express its support and encouragement for the efforts + being undertaken to increase cooperation among the states in North + Africa, particularly the resumption of full diplomatic ties between + Algeria and Morocco. The U.S. views positively regional arrangements + that can help reduce tensions, enhance economic progress, and foster a + climate in which peaceful resolution of disputes can move forward. The + U.S. remains concerned, however, about the potential for regional + destabilization posed by the regime of Colonel Qadhafi, and urges its friends in North + Africa to exercise full vigilance in order to assure that constructive + steps that have been taken toward the promotion of regional harmony not + be undermined.

+

Mr. President, the United States looks forward to continued cooperation + with you and with your government on a wide range of issues of mutual + interest and concern. In the meantime, please accept my best personal + regards, Sincerely yours, George P. + Shultz. End text.

+ Shultz +
+
+ 181. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President BendjedidSource: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office + of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, + OA/ID 30003, Folder 19868–032, Algeria—1988. No classification + marking. Attached to the letter is an Office of the Vice President + abstract of correspondence indicating that the letter was + “handcarried by our new Ambassador, Christopher Ross.” + + + Washington, September 14, 1988 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

It gives me great pleasure to write to you on the occasion of the arrival + of Ambassador Christopher Ross + in Algeria. He brings with him my warm personal regards.

+

It has been particularly gratifying to me to follow the steady deepening + of friendship between Algeria and the United States. I am certain + Ambassador Ross, who is known + among us for his diplomatic expertise and his experience in Algeria, will dedicate + himself to enhancing that relationship.

+

I have followed with great interest the progress Algeria has made toward + its national goals, and am confident that our bilateral cooperation can + be supportive of those endeavors. Our two countries can work to + strengthen relations in the economic and commercial areas, and to + increase cooperation in the military sphere. The United States also + looks forward to an active visitors exchange program with Algeria, + including future visitors from our respective legislatures.

+

The United States also values the political dialogue that has grown + between our two countries on international issues of mutual concern. + Algeria’s efforts to foster the spirit of compromise in the world + community have been highly constructive, particularly as Iraq and Iran + move to resolve their conflict and as the Soviet occupation of + Afghanistan moves toward a close. Similarly, efforts must continue to + bring about peace among Israel and its Arab neighbors.

+

I personally have welcomed the resumption of diplomatic relations between + Algeria and Morocco and appreciate your role in that important + development. Likewise, I applaud the efforts aimed at increased + cooperation among our friends in North Africa, but I must admit to some + concern about Libya and its leader. I am hopeful that the prevailing + climate of collegiality will enhance prospects for resolution of the + Western Sahara conflict. The United States supports the UN Secretary General’s efforts in this + regard. We noted with satisfaction that Morocco and the Polisario have + accepted in principle the Secretary General’s proposals for a framework + toward resolution of the dispute.

+

I will look to Ambassador Ross + to keep me informed of progress in these and other areas of mutual + concern. As Algeria’s National Liberation Front Congress approaches + later this year, allow me to express my best wishes to you and the + Algerian people.

+

We are now entering the last two months of the campaign and I am pleased + with the situation and remain confident. My visit to Algeria remains + particularly vivid in my mind and I truly look forward to a continued + close and personal relationship with you following the election.

+

With warm personal regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ George + Bush +
+ +
+ 182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense + CarlucciSource: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers, Subject + 1988: Countries, Algeria. Secret. Drafted by Palevitz. At the top + right of the memorandum, two stamped notations read: “Office of the + Secretary of Defense 88 SEP 27” and “Sec Def Has Seen Sep 29 1988.” + Carlucci wrote above + the salutation, then struck through, “Bill—Let’s have a brief + meeting with Skip et al this PM on + this. FC.” + + I–26286/88 + + Washington, September 27, 1988 + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian Multi-Mission Aircraft (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

(S) Whether to approve, in principle, the + Algerian request for a surveillance/reconnaissance capability for an + Algerian C–130 aircraft.

+

BACKGROUND

+

(S) Several months ago, the Government of + Algeria requested the U.S. provide a surveillance/reconnaissance + capability for an Algerian C–130 + aircraft. The Algerians intend to use this capability for defense + purposes and specifically as a surveillance system for border security + and curtailment of smuggling.

+

(S) In April 1988, a three man U.S. Air + Force team traveled to Algeria to receive briefings on the Algerian + requirements. At that time, the Algerians indicated their needs in [less than 1 line not declassified] for a + Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) system; but, formulation of a + specific U.S. proposal awaits a further U.S. policy decision to + proceed.

+

(S) We have very carefully examined the + technical, political, and military factors involved in this case and + have worked closely with State Department in doing so. The technical + information from our U.S. Air Force experts indicates that U.S. + equipment that might be provided to satisfy Algerian requirements under + this program would be unclassified, off-the-shelf and commercially + available, and would be rudimentary compared to the capabilities + currently employed by the U.S.

+

(S) The Air Force further concludes that + this program would be a long term one. Following the formulation and + agreement on a detailed proposal, and depending on the timing of + congressional notification, the contracting, engineering, equipment + procurement, and construction + would take nearly 4 years. Without U.S. assistance and training, it + could take up to seven years to usefully use the system beyond the + acquisition of the equipment (TAB A).Tab A + was not attached. The cost to Algeria would be approximately + $40 million, not including whatever Algerian support and facilities that + would need to be provided (TAB A).

+

(S) We also asked [less + than 1 line not declassified] and CIA to assess the military significance of this [less than 1 line not declassified] SLAR equipment + relative to the capabilities of Algeria’s neighbors, as well as the + likely political impact on our relationships with Morocco and Tunisia, + if we proceed with this project. These analyses conclude that Algerian + acquisition of this equipment will give Algeria a capability similar to + [less than 1 line not declassified], far more + advanced than [less than 1 line not declassified] + and somewhat better than [less than 1 line not + declassified]. On the political side, Morocco, in particular, + would be displeased and Tunisia may request a similar surveillance + system, but Algeria would at least temporarily lose interest in + discussing security assistance with the U.S. if we did not proceed (TAB + B).Tab B was not attached.

+

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

+

RECOMMENDATIONS

+

(S) We are faced with the difficult choice + of balancing our interests in Morocco, and to a lesser extent in + Tunisia, against those for Algeria, with the wider implications for U.S. + influence in the Maghreb. Having considered these questions thoroughly, + I recommend that we proceed cautiously with this approach to improving + our defense relationship with Algeria under the following conditions: + + Approve this project in principle subject to the completion of + a follow-on study by a U.S. Air Force team and development of a + specific proposal. + + Inform the Algerians that the new Administration will need to + implement this decision to proceed, but that we will recommend + that it do so. + + Algeria will need to use its own national funds for this + acquisition. + + The U.S. and Algeria will need to agree on security + arrangements to protect the hardware, technology, and data from + compromise pursuant to the General Security of Military + Information Agreement (GSOMIA) signed on September 7, 1986.Armitage signed the GOSMIA during his + September 5–7, 1986, meetings with Cheloufi. See footnote 2, Document + 170. + + The U.S. will work to insure that the timing of congressional + notification works to our mutual benefit and is consonant with + the prevailing political context. +

+ +

(U) If you agree, I propose to use the + talking pointsAttached but not printed are + the undated talking points, entitled “Algerian Multi-Mission + Aircraft.” Acting Secretary of State Whitehead approved the proposal. (Action memorandum + from Hare and Holmes to + Whitehead, September 27; + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot + 94D433, Nodis Documents September 1988) next under + incorporating these caveats in my discussions in Algeria on October 1 + and 2.Telegram 5355 from Algiers, October + 3, reported that “on the fringes of dinner” on October 1, after + Cheloufi inquired about the status of Algeria’s request for + surveillance/reconnaissance capability for its C–130s, “Armitage informed General + Cheloufi that the USG had reached a + political decision to sell Algeria this capability if the latter + wished it.” Cheloufi “expressed his thanks and that of the Ministry + of Defense to all those who had worked on this issue, noting that he + and his Algerian colleagues were deeply moved.” He also stated that + “this step demonstrated the good intentions of the U.S. military + towards Algeria.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Records, 1988 Nodis + Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis) DoD components + support this position. State Department is preparing a similar decision + memo for Secretary Shultz with + the recommendation for approval.Carlucci initialed “Agree.” A + stamped notation next to his initials reads: “29 SEP + 1988”.

+ Richard L. + ArmitageArmitage + signed “VR/Rich” above this typed signature. + + Assistant Secretary of Defense + + (International Security Affairs) + +
+
+ 183. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading October–December 1988. Secret. Shultz was in New York attending + the UN General Assembly + meeting. + + + Washington, October 6, 1988 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+

3. Riots in Algiers. President Bendjedid invoked martial law today to + try to stop riots in downtown Algiers. The disturbances, sparked by + economic malaise and growing frustration with social inequities, have + posed no direct threat to U.S. personnel or citizens. Rapid and visible steps are needed to + diffuse the tension. These steps might include moving against hardline + opponents or announcing steps to alleviate critical food shortages and + improve the economy. We should show quiet support for the Bendjedid regime as it seeks to restore + order.An analysis of the crisis, along + with possible implications for U.S.-Algerian relations, is in + telegram 5440 from Algiers, October 6. (Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, + 1988 Nodis Telegrams, Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

+
+
+ 184. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + 6885. + + Algiers, December 26, 1988, 1658Z + + + + SUBJECT + President Bendjedid on + Libya, Peace Process. + + + Ref: + Algiers 6869.In telegram 6869 from + Algiers, December 24, Ross reported that Bessaih had expressed “GOA’s concern over possible U.S. military attack on + the Libyan CW factory at Rabta.” + He “urged that the U.S. avoid repeating its previous ‘mistake,’ + i.e. the April 1986 strike against Libya.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881123–0053) + Documentation on Libyan chemical weapons is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + This is an action request—see para 10. + + President Bendjedid engaged + me in a few minutes of semi-private conversation in the course of a + reception following his inauguration for a third term December + 26. + + President Bendjedid + reiterated his congratulations to President-elect Bush on the occasion of his + election,Bush was elected President on + November 8. as well as his best wishes to President + Reagan. I replied with + warm congratulations on the renewal of his own presidential + mandate. + + + President Bendjedid then + expressed great satisfaction over our decision to open a dialogue + with the PLO,On December 14, after the PLO issued a statement which + accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to + exist, and renounced terrorism, Reagan announced that he had “authorized the + State Department to enter into a substantive dialog with PLO representatives.” He also + called the PLO’s statement a + “serious evolution of Palestinian thinking towards realistic and + pragmatic positions on the key issues.” For the text of the + “Statement on Diplomatic Talks with the Palestine Liberation + Organization,” see Public Papers: Reagan 1988, Book II, + p. 1627. noting that the Palestinians had taken many + steps in our direction and could be prevailed upon to take more in + the context of a serious peace process. I assured him that both the + outgoing and incoming administrations were deeply committed to + continuing the search for peace in the Middle East on a sound and + realistic basis. In this regard, I said, it was important that the + PLO maintain its rejection of + terrorism. He replied that this was precisely what he had advised + Yasser Arafat. + + President Bendjedid then + told me he wished to reiterate the words of caution that Foreign + Minister Bessaih had shared + with me concerning Libya December 24 (reftel). The region did not + need the “shock” of another military action against Libya. + Consequently, President Bendjedid said, he hoped that President Reagan and, subsequently, + President Bush would + maintain a “prudent and measured” attitude in this regard. President + Bendjedid emphasized that + his government and he personally were ready to participate in any + bilateral, regional, or international diplomatic effort to convince + Libya to act responsibly in any area that troubled us, be it + terrorism, CW, or anything else. + Already, during the visit of ‘Abd as-Salam Jallud December 25, President + Bendjedid confided, he + had raised the CW problem. + + I replied that, indeed, the Libyan CW capability concerned us greatly, and we had just + completed briefings on this capability at the Ministries of Defense + and Foreign Affairs. Anything Algeria could do bilaterally or in + concert with others to get Libya to cease and desist would be + welcome, and we hoped that diplomatic efforts would prove effective + and sufficient to deal with this threat. + + President Bendjedid closed + our conversation by expressing his confidence that we would continue + to take into account the dangers that a military action would + present for the stability of the region and that we would + consequently persist in seeking a diplomatic solution. He and his + government would be at our disposal for any help they could + give. + + Comment: We have clearly caught the attention of the leaders of + the region on the Libyan CW issue; + it is certainly no coincidence that the highest levels have + approached us in both Algeria and Tunisia and that Jallud came to Algeria December 25. + If, in the first instance, we wish to deal with this problem through + diplomatic means, we should enlist the assistance of Algeria and + other friendly parties with influence in Tripoli in the most + concrete manner possible. Specifically, we should: + + Describe in as much detail as feasible our demarches in + countries providing equipment, precursors, expertise, and + labor. Algeria might be prepared to undertake its own + demarches in such countries from the perspective of a + country that shares borders with Libya. If we judge that + such parallel demarches would be useful, we should provide + enough facts to make them credible. + + State plainly what we want from Libya. To judge from the + briefings that Messrs. Harris and Geiger presented at the + Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Libya already has + a significant capability to produce CW and, indeed, to export it. Beyond ceasing + production and exports, what should countries like Algeria + be asking Libya to do? Should they be asking it to allow + round-the-clock verification or dismantle the plant? + + Describe plainly why a one-time inspection would not end + the problem. (FYI, in spite + of the overwhelming evidence in our briefings, a number of + Algerians (and, for that matter, some of our diplomatic + colleagues) seem to want to believe that the CW plant is indeed a + pharmaceuticals plant and that Qadhafi is sincere in wanting to demonstrate + this.) + + Counter the argument, heard from both Algerian and + diplomatic interlocutors, that nothing prevents a state from + stockpiling CW weapons. + (FYI, so far, with a + few trusted interlocutors, I have answered this by pointing + out that, the questionable purposes of stockpiling aside, we + are aware that Libya has exported CW materials to at least one destination. This + has caught people’s attention.) + + + Action requested: If the Department wishes to take President + Bendjedid up on his offer + to pursue the Libyan CW issue, + please provide a detailed presentation that specifically requests + this and that includes points responsive to those raised in para 9 + above for use with the Foreign Minister.No record of a Department response was found. + + Department repeat to Tunis, Cairo, and other interested + posts. + + Ross +
+ +
+ 185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D890011–0641. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen + Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared + by Casey, Sharon Wiener + (NEA/AFN), and Timothy + Savage (EUR/CE); approved by Burleigh. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, + Tunis, Paris, Cairo, Bonn, Riyadh, and Rome. + + 3110. + + Washington, January 6, 1989, 0021Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algerian Ambassador’s Démarche on Shootdown of Libyan MIGs. + + + Ref: + State 1420.In telegram 1420 to all + Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, January 4, the + Department reported that at 5 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, “two + Libyan MIG–23’s were shot down by F–14 aircraft from the USS Kennedy” in international airspace. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D890007–0161) The telegram is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. + + + + C—Entire text. + + Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun + told NEA + DAS + Burleigh the GOA was deeply concerned that the + January 4 downing of Libyan MIGs would exacerbate regional tensions + already high because of U.S. charges about Libya’s chemical warfare + facility. Sahnoun asked if + the action against the Libyan MIGs were part of a larger operation + or an accident. Burleigh + assured Sahnoun the MIGs + incident had nothing to do with U.S. concern about the Libyan CW capability. Indeed, Burleigh said, the U.S. viewed the + MIGs shootdown a discrete incident that was now closed. Sahnoun welcomed any further + information that could assist GOA + in playing “moderating” role with Libya.See footnote 2, Document + 184. + + Burleigh outlined + information known about the MIGs downing incident at the time (just + before Jan. 4 1100 EST Pentagon + press conference—see State 1420.) Sahnoun did not press for further details, + indicating he would await the Pentagon press conference that day for + further information and asked to be kept abreast of details as they + became known. He said, however, the incident could set back + Algeria’s efforts to “contain” Libya through diplomatic means and + provide justification for Libya to use “other methods” to achieve + its goals. + + Sahnoun then turned + specifically to U.S. effort to halt Libya’s chemical warfare + production capability, stressing GOA had expressed its concern on this issue to the U.S. + Ambassador in Algiers at highest levels. He queried whether the U.S. + had considered Libya’s alleged offer to allow teams to inspect the + Rabta facility, which Libya maintained was a pharmaceutical plant + only.No record of the Libyan offer + of inspections was found. + + + Burleigh pointed out the + inconsistencies in the alleged Libyan offer, conveyed by Italian + Foreign Minister Andreotti December 24. In the offer, Libya had + agreed to attend the Paris Chemical Warfare Conference and to abide + by any inspection/verification decisions the conference might make + on CW facilities.The Paris conference on chemical weapons took + place January 7–11. However, the CW Conference will not address specific + inspecton/verificaton issues. Moreover, Libya denies the Rabta + facility is a CW production + facility. Therefore, it remains unclear whether Libya means to imply + that Rabta facility would be covered under any decisions the Paris + CW Conference might take—even + though it claims Rabta is only a pharmaceuticals production + facility. Burleigh again + stressed, however, the purpose of the Paris Conference was not to + single out any particular country, nor to develop specific + inspection/verification regimes. At any rate, inspection of such + facilities could not be a one time event by non-experts. + + When Sahnoun stressed Libya + lacked the technical capability to produce chemical weapons without + assistance from developing countries, Burleigh agreed. He pointed to U.S. efforts to cut + off such supplies through a major diplomatic effort which provided + detailed information to a number of countries, including those whose + firms were believed to be involved. Burleigh countered Sahnoun’s suggestion that friendly states such as + the FRG had disputed USG information regarding the nature + of the Rabta facility. He said that privately these countries had + not questioned the U.S. assessment. The FRG, for example, remained actively engaged in + investigating the involvement of several FRG firms in the Libyan CW effort and planned to try to tighten related export + controls. Burleigh pointed + out that even publicly the FRG had + not questioned the U.S. assessment of the nature of the Rabta + plant. + + Sahnoun said GOA planned to pursue its effort to + “contain” Libya, and therefore remained concerned about increased + tensions in the region. He asked to be kept abreast of developments + on recent events as they became known. Burleigh undertook to do so as appropriate.In telegram 177 from Algiers, January 10, + the Embassy indicated that Ross had “made follow-up demarche on shootdown + of Libyan aircraft and Libyan CW + issue on January 9 to MFA + SecGen Hamdani. On the + latter, Hamdani said the GOA + objected, not to the U.S. concern about Qadhafi’s CW capability, but to the style of + the ‘excessive’ U.S. campaign to eliminate that capability. He + asserted that it was the responsibility of the international + community, and not just the U.S., to control CW use and proliferation—on a + world-wide basis, and not just in Libya’s case. On the Libyan + aircraft shootdown, Hamdani argued that the U.S. planes had been + too quick to fire; Ambassador reviewed the U.S. pilots’ efforts + to avoid contact with the Libyan aircraft.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D890022–0721) + + Whitehead +
+
+ +
+ Morocco +
+ 186. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carlucci to Director of Central + Intelligence-Designate CaseySource: + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 83M00035R: Box 16, C–379, Morocco. Secret. + Prepared by the Chief of the Near East Division. + + + Washington, January 6, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Request by Moroccan King to Send His Emissary to the U.S. for + Discussions with the New Administration + + + + A message was received on 6 January 1981 from King Hassan of + MoroccoNot found. [less than 1 line not declassified]. In the + message the King said he wants to send a secret emissary to meet + with you and the Secretary of State between 20 and 24 January, or + earlier if possible. The purpose of this meeting would be to inform + the U.S. at the highest level about the upcoming Islamic Summit + Conference “to prevent any surprises to U.S. policy makers on Middle + East issues and to coordinate Moroccan efforts with U.S. goals and + objectives on the Palestinian issue.” (The King, particularly in his + role as head of the Jerusalem Sub-committee of the Islamic + Conference group, will presumably be able to influence strongly the + outcome of the Islamic conference in Saudi Arabia from 25 to 28 + January.) + + The King’s message, [3 lines not + declassified] that only the “highest U.S. officials” should + be informed. [less than 1 line not + declassified] the emmisary could be someone on the level of + Royal Counselor, Reda Guedira. + + [2 lines not declassified] It is very + characteristic of him to do this at this time, with a change of the + administrations. If the proposal were rejected, the King would + likely consider it a rebuff and relations between the new + administration and Morocco could get off on the wrong foot. + Accordingly, I would suggest that you agree to such a meeting. If + the timing is not convenient, you may wish to slip it a little, but + I would recommend that it be not so much as to appear to be a + put-off. + + + I would also request that you inform Secretary-elect Haig of the matter and advise his + reaction. The Ambassador should be informed and I would like to know + how Secretary-elect Haig + would like to handle this. + + Frank C. + CarlucciCarlucci signed + “Frank” above this typed signature. + + Acting Director + +
+
+ 187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Morocco (01/24/1981–04/17/1981). Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Coon; cleared by Draper, Seitz, and Jane Becker (S/S–O); approved by Goldberg. Sent for information + Immediate to Jidda, Cairo, Paris, Algiers, Tel Aviv, Moscow, + Khartoum, Baghdad, and Islamabad. + + 19287. + + Washington, January 24, 1981, 2237Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Haig’s Meeting + With Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Military Security Head + Ahmed Dlimi, January + 22. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + In his first meeting with foreign representatives after being + sworn in, Secretary Haig + received Moroccan delegation January 22 consisting of Royal + Counselor Reda Guedira and Military and Security Head Ahmed Dlimi. Also at meeting were + DAS + Draper and Country Director + Coon (NEA), Secretary’s Special Assistant + Goldberg and interpreter + Sophia Porson. + + Meeting opened with Secretary Haig stating he was aware of the importance of + positions Guedira and Dlimi + held in Morocco. He said he had long been an admirer of King Hassan, + considering him a true and reliable friend of the West. He solicited their thought + on North Africa (including Chad and Libya), problems with the + Soviets, the Islamic Conference and any other area the visitors + might want to touch on. + + Guedira launched into a lengthy explanation of purpose of visit, + starting with observation that King Hassan was touched that the + Secretary had agreed to see his representatives on first day in + office. Guedira stressed that admiration Haig had expressed for Hassan was + thoroughly + reciprocated, that King knew about Haig and was confident he would work for the best + interests of the U.S. and also for traditional friends of U.S. + Purpose of visit, Guedira continued, was not to plead Moroccan cause + since Morocco was convinced that under Haig’s leadership, the already good bilateral + relations will improve. Rather, King had considered it useful and + necessary to coordinate his policies with new U.S. administration in + view of grave problems facing the world. King felt he needed a sense + of the direction that the new administration’s thinking was taking + regarding certain problem areas considered urgent. Guedira then + described King Hassan’s role as head of the Jerusalem Committee in + the Islamic Conference and the meeting Hassan had called last + December of the committee to prepare proposals for Taif. However, + King Hassan, who will present the report, does not simply want to + repeat it verbatim but rather to present it in his own terms. Last + week he sent messages to various Arab leaders to gain their views as + a basis for helping him make as complete and objective a + presentation at the Islamic Conference as possible. Guedira had been + the King’s emissary for this purpose and had met with King Khalid + and Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia, with the Amirs of Qatar, United + Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, with King Hussein of Jordan, with Assad + of Syria, and with Yassir + Arafat. He now wanted U.S. views, recognizing that + new administration might not yet have had time to work its strategy + out in detail. The whole point was, he concluded, that the King + wanted to do everything he could to make the IC meeting realistic + and effective rather than a simple exercise in demagoguery. Guedira + then defined the main issues as (a) Afghanistan; (b) Iran/Iraq war; + (c) Middle East (including Jerusalem which gives Arab/Israeli + problem a Muslim dimension in addition to a purely Arab one); and + (d) Libya and its annexation of Chad. + + The Secretary then responded: + + Afghanistan: Secretary said we continue strenuously to + oppose Soviet occupation there and anticipate increasingly + vigorous efforts to make such Soviet activity increasingly + unacceptable to the Soviets. Secretary said he was not in a + position to say what specific steps President might decide + USG should undertake. + However, U.S. posture will be more vigorous and hopefully + more effective than it has been in the past. + + Iraq/Iran Conflict: Secretary said that U.S. has taken a + hands off and balanced view. No one should misread the + recent return of the prisonersReference is to the January 20 release of the 53 U.S. + hostages held in Iran since November 5, 1979. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran: + Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September + 1980. as signalling a prospective change in + our attitude toward the regime in Iran. As to Iraq, + President Reagan’s + view, and his own, is that U.S. interests will be served by + a steady improvement in relations, and by efforts to help + move Iraq into the family of the more moderate Arab states. Secretary + expects more vigorous initiatives toward these ends. + Established states in the area must worry not only about + revolutionary activity but most particularly about the + exploitation by the Soviet Union of these revolutionary + movements. We all hope, he continued, that some day the + leaders in Iran will share views that the rest of us hold. + This is not now the case. Secretary added that he saw no + indication that this could be possible as long as the + present situation prevailed. Unfortunately, recent events in + Iran have placed a security burden on the moderate Arab + states that the Shah used to carry in the past. + + Middle East: Secretary said that President Reagan had endorsed and + continued to support the overall framework of the Camp David + Accords.See footnotes 5 and + 6, Document 111. We were aware of Morocco’s + constructive role in seeking Middle East peace. Secretary + said he did not anticipate, in the short term, any unusual + activity in the peace process. He personally believed that + the climate required some adjustment before substantial + progress could be realized. He expressed concern that + Sadat not be + exposed to unusual pressures and added that the U.S. will + not become the proponent of new solutions—the Jordanian + option, for example. Any such departure will require + consultation with the parties concerned. The Secretary + concluded that he did not see any particular enthusiasm on + the part of any party for such changes or new + concepts. + + Libya: Secretary noted that he had been actively concerned + with the former crisis in ZaireReference is to the Angolan attack on the Shaba + Province of Zaire in March 1977. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 2, + Sub-Saharan Africa, Documents 73, 76, and + 77. and had supported French action in Chad two + or three years ago.In April + 1978, the Government of France sent 2,500 troops to Chad + to defend the capital, N’Djamena, from the Libyan-backed + FROLINAT + forces led by Goukouni Oueddei. He had been + disappointed that the French did not remain vigorous in + regard to Chad. He had recently expressed this + disappointment to GiscardNo + record of the Haig-Giscard conversation was + found.—and after that French forces had been + reinforced in the Central African Republic. The Secretary + said he believed that the matter of Qadhafi and + Soviet-sponsored activity in North Africa was a grave + problem for international peace affecting U.S. interests. + President Reagan + shared his concern. He observed that the new administration + would need some time to discuss this situation with friends + of U.S. but emphasized the urgency of issue. + + Algeria, Morocco, and the USSR: Secretary added following + observations: + + We are grateful to Algeria for its assistance in + the hostage affair.See + footnote 3, Document + 97. We are aware that Morocco is + conducting discussions with Algeria in regard to the + Sahara.In telegram + 477 from Rabat, January 21, the Embassy reported: + “In a recent interview, Hassan argued that Morocco + will have resolved the Sahara conflict militarily + by the end of the month, after which there might + be negotiations—but not with the Polisario.” + However, Hassan also said “there were no + negotiations with Algeria now.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810034–1004) We hope that our + improving relations with Algeria will serve the + interests we share with Morocco. Under no + circumstances will our efforts to improve relations + with Algeria supplant or jeopardize the historic and + long-standing friendship and common purpose we share + with Morocco. + + Secretary said he had just approved delivery of + the first OV–10 + aircraft to Morocco and had instructed the Dept to + prepare a letter to Congress which would set in + motion the process of responding to the Moroccan + request for M–60 + tanks.Not + found. The Moroccan Embassy, he said, would + be officially notified but he wanted his visitors to + bring this news to King Hassan personally as soon as + possible. (Note: Visitors, per previously arranged + schedule, left immediately after meeting for direct + flight to Morocco in order to join King Hassan who + flew Jan 23 to Islamic Conference in Taif.) + + Secretary said he was aware of Moroccan + preoccupation with what his Chinese friends call the + “polar bear”. He spoke of need to coordinate U.S. + force visits and positioning in locations that best + suited common purposes. While noting U.S. not + seeking our opportunities to poke the bear in the + cage, it must be made clear to the Kremlin that the + U.S. will not condone flagrant breaches of + international law in period ahead. + + + + Guedira showed great satisfaction and added some comments: + + Iran-Iraq Conflict: Noting that most Arab states, at least + those friendly to the U.S., support Iraq, Guedira expressed + satisfaction that U.S. evenhanded and neutral posture toward + Iran-Iraq conflict would not be affected by hostage release, + since the freeing of the hostages has raised suspicions + about a possible U.S. rapprochement with Iran. Secretary + interjected that it was likely to have the opposite effect. + Guedira noted that King Hassan had visited Saddam Hussein + and had talked to Saddam Hussein about establishing + diplomatic relations with U.S. If U.S. agrees, he is willing + to continue these efforts. Secretary replied that he could + not set timetables. The process was somewhat complicated by + the present conflict, but the long-term direction of U.S. + policy would be to seek better relations and to establish + diplomatic relations. This sort of thing always requires the + development of momentum. There is an increasing convergence + of interest between Iraq, the U.S., and the moderate Arab + states. The U.S. welcomes this and other such trends, e.g. + the growing cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, + and between Turkey and the moderate Arabs, because they are + important in strategic terms. + + + Chad/Libya: Guedira said he agreed that the matter was + urgent. Morocco sensed the urgency particularly when + Qadhafi declared + Libya’s merger with Chad.On + January 7, a joint Libyan-Chadian communiqué announced + the merger. (Ronald Koven, “Libya Announces Merger With + Its Neighbor, Chad,” Washington + Post, January 7, 1981, pp. A1, A17) The + Moroccans reacted immediately; King Hassan received Hussein + Habre last week. When Habre asked for help, Hassan got in + touch at once with Sadat and Nimfiri as well as Prince Fahd. + They all gave their consent for all possible Moroccan aid, + and the Moroccans have begun to provide this. Morocco hopes, + Guedira concluded, that the U.S. will act with it and on its + side. Secretary Haig replied that he would have to discuss + this with the President, but he expressed satisfaction that + Morocco had been willing to act. He stressed that this was a + very sensitive issue. He anticipated that in the very near + future the situation would be examined with a view to + convincing Qadhafi + “that he cannot not succeed.” + + + In conclusion, Secretary Haig conveyed again his high esteem and respect for + King Hassan. He greatly admired the courage he had demonstrated in + the matter of the Shah. He observed that affairs of state must be + built on the basis of reliability and that the King had always been + a reliable friend. + + Guedira and Dlimi expressed + their appreciation again and conveyed the King’s earnest wish that + Haig’s first visit + overseas in his new capacity be to Morocco. The meeting lasted fifty + minutes.Haig informed Reagan about the meeting in a + January 22 memorandum. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Agency File, Secretary + Haig’s Evening + Report (01/22/1981–02/03/1981)) + + Haig +
+
+ 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (02/04/1981–03/13/1981). Secret. + + + Washington, February 28, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

3. Message from King Hassan of Morocco: Moroccan + Ambassador Bengelloun met with + Bill Clark today to deliver a personal message from King Hassan.The + Department transmitted a record of the Clark-Bengelloun discussion + in telegram 52120 to Rabat, February 28. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810096–0508) Hassan asked that I try to arrange for you to + see two of the King’s emissaries in the March 10–20 period. I received + the same emissaries in January and believe it would be a misuse of your + time to see them. We are considering how we might handle the King’s + sensitivities, however, and will keep you informed.

+

Hassan also sent a moderate written message, acknowledging that Security + Council Resolution 242 and the Camp David Accords provide the only + existing basis for the peace effort. The message specified that they + were only inadequate in that they did not sufficiently consider the + “question of six million Palestinians whose national rights and + legitimate claims cannot reasonably be ignored by any responsible + Government.” (S)

+
+
+ 189. Memorandum From James + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco (1/24/1981–04/17/1981. Confidential. Sent for information. A + copy was sent to Kemp. Lenz + initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Rentschler wrote: “Jim” next to + his name in the “from” line. + + + Washington, March 13, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Dick Walters to Rabat? + (C) + +

State’s North Africa desk called me today, said Haig would shortly be sending a + recommendation here proposing that Vernon + Walters be sent to Morocco as a Special Presidential + envoy in lieu of a visit here by Dlimi and Guedira.Telegram + 66150 to Rabat, March 14, contains a message from Haig to Hassan, suggesting that + Walters visit Morocco + for direct consultations with the King. (Ibid.) In telegram 1813 + from Rabat, March 16, the Embassy informed the Department of “King + Hassan’s favorable reply.” (Ibid.) The desk said this idea + “had been discussed with you” (perhaps at Ali Bengelloun’s dinner?). (C)

+

For what it’s worth, I think the idea is a good + one. It will save the President some time and make good use of Dick Walters, who is well and favorably known to Hassan. + It will also finesse—for the time being—Hassan’s longstanding + disinclination to deal with the State Department in favor of direct + communication with the White House (Walters would go as Presidential envoy but in close + coordination with Haig & + Co.). (C)

+

Is there any guidance you might care to give me on this alleged + mission?

+

(NB. Quite apart from the 4 years I lived in Morocco, I’ve had good + contacts and dealings with Dick ever since our Paris days a million + years ago and would be happy to be helpful to him and you in any way you + consider appropriate).Below this paragraph, + Allen wrote: “Ok—I have + talked to him. He is going to come over Monday or Tuesday. I asked + him to draft a letter from P to King + Hassan. He will go as Presidential Emissary + as well as of Sec/State. RVA. + 3/14.” (U)

+
+
+ 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. + + 2013. + + Rabat, March 20, 1981, 1955Z + + + + SUBJECT + General Vernon Walters’ + Conversation With King Hassan. + + + + (S—Nodis Entire text.) + + On March 19th, a few hours after my arrival in Marrakech, I was + received at the palace by King Hassan + II. I delivered President Reagan’s letter to him and he + expressed gratitude to the President and Secretary Haig for sending me to see + him.Not found. + + He said that his primary concern in communicating with us was to + express his puzzlement and concern at the sudden breakoff by the + Algerians of the negotiations he had been conducting with them since + 1977. Nearly all of these meetings had taken place at a safe house + in Geneva except the last two which had taken place in Paris at the + Crillon Hotel. This, at the request of the Algerians. From the + beginning the Algerian negotiators had been Mr. Ibrahimi and Colonel (SI) Merbah. + They had started under Boumédiène and continued under Chadli. Last October + the negotiators on both sides had agreed that they had gone as far as they could + without bringing matters to a higher level for decision. They had + jointly prepared a working paper for delivery to their respective + leaders and it was agreed that the Algerians would contact the + Moroccans again within ten days for a meeting between the King and + Chadli in Belgium. The Moroccans heard nothing further from the + Algerians until the Ta’if Conference. Prince Fahd had asked King + Hassan to come on the Thursday before the opening of the + conference.January 22. The + conference took place in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, January + 25–29. The King did so and on his arrival the Saudis + asked if he would be prepared to meet President Chadli. The King + said he would not affront the Saudis by refusing to meet one of + their guests and was quite prepared to meet Chadli thinking that + they would discuss the working paper prepared by the negotiators. + Throughout the conference the matter did not come up again until the + following Thursday, the day the conference closed,January 29. when Prince Sultan came to + see Hassan “as white as a sheet” and indicated that Chadli would not + meet with the King and claimed he had never seen the working paper + as he had not had time to see the negotiators, even though two + months had passed. The King said that his information was that + Chadli wanted to go forward with the negotiations but had been + outvoted in the Council of the Revolution by Yahyaaui’s partisans + and pro-Soviet and pro-Libyan members. He wondered whether we had + any ideas of what were the pressures that had brought about this + sudden change in the Algerian willingness to negotiate. He himself + was sure it was Soviet and Libyan pressure. Hassan said that he had + received the Soviet Ambassador the evening before my arrival. He had + told the Ambassador in a general way what had happened and asked the + Soviet Ambassador what his government believed were the pressures + that had changed the Algerian position, thus “putting the monkey on + his back”. The King would greatly appreciate any thought we might + have on this sudden change on the part of the Algerians. + + He then expressed the hope that Secretary Haig might find time to stop in + Morocco when he returned from the Middle East.See footnote 3, Document + 3. I said that as far as I knew the Secretary’s + schedule was extremely tight and I did not know whether this would + be possible or not. + + King Hassan then discussed the situation in Saudi Arabia. He said + that the situation there was one of great concern and he wished me + to pass his views on to the President and the Secretary. Khalid the + King decided nothing, but nothing was decided without him. Fahd + decided everything, but nothing without Khalid. Sultan and Abdallah, + as full brothers of the first two, were important but Hassan trusted + Abdallah far more than Sultan—and Naif did not really count. Hassan + said French greatly distrusted young Turki and he shared that view. + Fahd had asked Hassan + whether he entirely trusted young Prince Saud indicating thereby in + Hassan’s view that Fahd did not entirely trust Saud. [3 lines not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified] + + The King then discussed the recent attempted coup in + Mauritania.On March 18, Mauritanian + radio accused the Moroccan Government of sponsoring an attempted + coup by two exiled colonels. See footnote + 2, Document 3. He said that Kader and the + others were indeed friendly to Morocco, had lived and trained here. + They had been given Mauritanian passports with which they had + entered Mauritania from Senegal, but they had not told him what they + intended to do in the way of a coup. If they had, he would have + attempted to dissuade them as the scheme they attempted had no + chance of success. + + King Hassan said that he felt Syrian President Assad was being + backed into a corner, largely by his own actions in which the only + support he had came from the Soviets and his own tiny Alawi + minority. King Hassan said that anything the Secretary could do to + stop Sadat’s public attacks + on the Saudis would be helpful. Some way should be found to bring + them together. Camp David was important but it was not all. There + were other things to do. + + King Hassan said that he had seen Israeli Labor leader Shimon Peres. Peres was relatively reasonable but + thought that his ideas should be the line of departure for any + negotiation and that might not be entirely acceptable to the other + side. Hassan spoke highly of the new Senegalese President Diouf and said that he would be + visiting him in Marrakech next week. + + Hassan agreed that it was a good idea for us to keep in touch with + moderate Algerians and did not seem excessively shocked at idea of + possible sale of C–130’s to + them. + + The King said that President Reagan had provided inspiration to free men + everywhere and Secretary Haig had imparted a new sense of confidence in + US foreign policy. He hoped that + he could meet with both men some time this year. + + The King appeared to be in good health, although somewhat more + grave and concerned than on other occasions when I had seen him. + While we spoke he took a very small pill and placed it on his + tongue. He spoke of economic and food problems Morocco would face + later this year as a result of the greatest drought of this century. + He expressed great gratitude to the President and Secretary for + answering his concerns by sending an old friend to see him. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 191. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of State HaigSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret. + + + Washington, March 24, 1981 + + Dear Al, + +

(S) As you know, the USG has engaged in an effort to obtain or + enhance access to several key air facilities in countries along the + Atlantic route to Southwest Asia.

+

(S) Facilities in Morocco, with some + improvements, could satisfy a significant portion of these requirements, + and overcome some of our present enroute difficulties. They would also + be useful in certain African contingencies.

+

(S) We are aware of the concern that King + Hassan might use such a proposal to seek a “quid” from the United + States, but recent U.S. actions have provided Morocco much of the + materiel it sought (i.e., approval last summer of the $248 million + aircraft sale, the beginning of OV–10 + deliveries in late January and the sale of M60 tanks). Moreover, your + willingness to meet with King Hassan’s emissaries during the first few + days of this AdministrationSee Document 187. and the visit of a + major U.S. naval vessel to Agadir have put us in a good position + vis-a-vis the Moroccans.

+

(S) To be sure, King Hassan is unlikely to + change his position on the Western Sahara, and we will give him an + opportunity to raise that issue in access negotiations. This is a real + problem, but we cannot hope to provide adequate logistic support to U.S. + forces engaged in a conflict in the Persian Gulf area without sufficient + enroute facilities. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that discussions + be initiated with the Government of Morocco as soon as feasible.

+

Sincerely,

+ Cap +
+ +
+ 192. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to Secretary of Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret. + + + Washington, May 9, 1981 + + Dear Cap: + +

I am writing in response to your letter concerning en route access in + Morocco.See Document 191. I agree that the time is ripe to + approach Morocco on this matter. Our recent decisions to be more + forthcoming on arms sales to Morocco and to delink them from Moroccan + participation in the Saharan peace process should improve the reception + we will receive.See footnote 4, Document 372. See also Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, + Documents 214–216, 219, 220, 222–224, 230, 232, 233, 235, 237, 242–248, and 250.

+

We will raise the issue immediately with King Hassan and propose that a + small State/DOD team make a low key survey of airfields in Morocco so + that we could consider a more precise proposal to the Moroccans, + possibly including improvements to selected facilities. We would make it + clear from the outset that we were not seeking base rights but only + access to facilities, and that we envision only a small peacetime + presence.

+

Following the survey we may need a formal approach to Morocco. I suggest + our staffs work together to define more precisely what we want from + Morocco, what facility improvements we may be willing to fund, and what + price we are willing to pay in terms of additional assistance. We would + also need them to address what we say to Algeria and other area + states.

+

With warm regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ Alexander M. + Haig, Jr.Haig signed “Al” + above this typed signature. +
+ +
+ 193. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (05/09/1981–06/05/1981). Secret. + + + Washington, May 11, 1981 + + +

Moroccan Foreign Minister’s Visit. Foreign + Minister Boucetta delivered a + warm, friendly message to us from Morocco and King Hassan this + afternoon.A record of the Haig-Boucetta + meeting is in telegram 128429 to Rabat, May 16. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Africa, Morocco (04/30/1981–06/09/1981)) We agreed that + Libya was the major source of trouble in North and Central Africa. + Boucetta did not criticize + Algeria; instead, he suggested that there were moderate elements in the + Algerian leadership, who should be encouraged. Boucetta believed that Morocco’s + position on the Western Sahara would gain additional African support at + the upcoming Nairobi OAU Summit.The OAU + Summit was held in Nairobi June 24–27. Boucetta and Bush discussed the Western Sahara issue on May 12. A + record of that conversation is in telegram 139368 to Rabat, May 29. + See Document 377. He asked that we + encourage such support. Boucetta + expressed gratitude for our efforts to secure additional economic and + food assistance. (Responding to a press query afterwards, he indicated + Morocco may seek additional military aid in the future.) Finally, + Boucetta shared our + assessment of the dangers in Lebanon. He pledged Morocco’s help for our + efforts to stabilize the situation.

+
+
+ 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981–07/21/1981). Secret; + Immediate; Nodis; Sensitive. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + 4133. + + Rabat, June 12, 1981, 1130Z + + +

NODIS. For the President from + Secretary Edwards. Dept for + White House. Subject: Secretary Edwards’ Visit: OAU: King Hassan’s Message to the + President.

+ + + + S—Entire text. + + In wide-ranging 80 minute conversation with me June 11, King + Hassan II requested that + the following message be relayed to President Reagan “discretely and securely”. + Hassan said he plans to attend the Nairobi Summit of the + Organization of African Unity O/A June 23 and he “hopes” that “now + that we are in the last round” (in the Sahara) he will be able to + bring about an end to the Saharan affair. King said he wants Egypt’s + President Sadat to attend the + meeting, “even if only for one day”. He explained that Arab/African + delegations from Algiers, Tunisia (although Bourguiba would not attend), Libya, + Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti would be there creating an + opportunity which King would like put to use. Hassan indicated that + Sadat’s presence could + help bring the Arabs closer together and—eventually—break the ice + between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. + + Hassan asked that the President approach Sadat without in any way indicating + that this was at the King’s urging. Sadat should be told that the King of Morocco + planned to attend the OAU summit, + that he would be the only leader of a non-rejectionist state there, + and that some contact could be timely and helpful. The King asked + that he be advised promptly and discretely of President Reagan’s reaction, and of + Sadat’s response if an + approach is made, via Charge Sebastian. + + Comment: I strongly recommend that such an approach be made; while + substance of my conversation with King will be communicated + separately,A record of the + Edwards-Hassan conversation is in telegram 4163 from Rabat, June + 13. (Ibid.) it is clear that King’s disposition to + administration is highly favorable (King compared President + Reagan with President + Eisenhower, “men who + inspire confidence”) and that King’s geopolitical thinking is + insightful, alert to Soviet menace, and generally consistent with + broad USG interests in Middle East, + North Africa and Mediterranean. + + Please advise soonest. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 195. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSource: + Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, King + Hassan, Morocco Meeting w/President, 10/27/81, 11:30 Luncheon at + 12:00. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by John Damis; approved by Myles + Greene. + + 243–AR + + Washington, October 5, 1981 + + +

(U) MOROCCO: PROSPECTS FOR + POLITICAL STABILITY

+

(C/NF) Summary

+

Economic difficulties and pressures for political liberalization portend + severe trouble for the Moroccan regime. King Hassan has a variety of + political assets, however, including wide acceptance of the legitimacy + of the monarchy, his special relationship with the armed forces, + disunity among the political parties, and his ability to manipulate his + political rivals. Over the short term of 1 to 3 years, Hassan’s chances + to retain his throne are 70–90 percent.

+

In the longer term of 5 to 15 years, however, prospects for the regime’s + survival are less positive. Over time, the divided nature of the + political elite, lack of national consensus on long-term political + goals, and the growing gap between popular expectations and the regime’s + capacity to meet them will work against the Moroccan monarchy’s + survival.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

+
+
+ 196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (09/22/1981–10/08/1981). Confidential. + + + Washington, October 7, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

2. Moroccan Foreign Minister. I gave Moroccan + Foreign Minister Boucetta a + strong message of encouragement this eveningNo other record of the Haig-Boucetta conversation was found. + to calm any nervousness which King Hassan may have in the wake of + Sadat’s assassination.Sadat was assassinated + by an Egyptian soldier on October 6, 1981. Documentation is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute. He believes that in the wake + of Sadat’s death moderate Muslim + countries such as Morocco, Jordan and Saudi Arabia need to stand closely + together and Boucetta promised + that Morocco will work for stability and moderation in the region.

+

Boucetta passed on a request from + King Hassan to postpone his visit to Washington until after the Arab + Summit which Hassan will host in November.Not found. The King believes that the burden of preparations + for the Summit would be great and that the visit would be more + profitable after his conclave with Arab leaders. I told Boucetta that we would work out a + mutually convenient date for the King’s visit. Boucetta also expressed appreciation + for our support of Morocco on the Western Saharan issue. He said Morocco + was now ready for a referendum of the Saharan population and was sure + that it would win. He asked that we continue to support Morocco + diplomatically in its efforts to solve the Saharan question; he was + assured of our support. (C)

+
+
+ 197. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Allen) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981–07/21/1981). Secret. Sent for Immediate + information. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum. A stamped notation above his initials reads: “The + President has seen.” Darman + also initialed the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + + + Washington, October 13, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Serious Escalation in Weaponry in Morocco + +

Ambassador at Large Vernon + Walters just calledNo record + of the Walters-Allen call was found. For additional information on + the incident, see Documents 384 and 385. to tell me that the Moroccan + Ambassador had called him in a state of high agitation to report that a + Moroccan Mirage I flying at 30,000 feet was downed by what was believed + to be a SAM–6 missile, and that a C–130 at 19,000 feet was also shot down by the same + missile.

+ +

The surviving pilots (no specific details available) indicate that the + action took place near the Mauritanian border today. The pilots also + reported the existence of tracked tanks with turrets in the region.

+

Ambassador Bengelloun of Morocco + will visit the State Department tomorrow to give full details as he has + them.A record of Bengelloun’s meeting with Veliotes, during which they + discussed the incident, is in telegram 277038 to Rabat, October 17. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810490–0383)

+

In any event, King Hassan asked that this information be made available + to us at the White House, which is what Dick Walters did.

+

We will ask the intelligence agencies to provide a report as soon as + possible.

+
+
+ 198. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Nance) to + President ReaganSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00035R: Box + 16, C–379, Morocco. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A detailed record of the + Weinberger-Hassan conversation is in telegram 9008 from Rabat, + December 5. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco + (11/22/1981–12/22/1981)) + + + Washington, December 7, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Weinberger’s + Stop in Morocco + +

Secretary Weinberger has sent + you the following report on his meeting with King Hassan of Morocco.

+

Begin Text:

+

For our refueling stop on my way to Turkey I chose Fez, Morocco, so that + I could meet with King Hassan. I had an excellent ninety minute + discussion with Hassan in which he put forward his strategic views and + proposals for our security relationship. He is under the multiple threat + of the Polisario attacks, economic difficulties and a drought at home, + and Soviet efforts of subversion. He clearly wants a closer defense + relationship with us.

+

In particular, he would like us to set up a joint military commission, + and he reaffirmed his offer for air transit facilities. On the joint + military commission, I told + the King that I would recommend to you that we start such a forum, so as + to provide a framework for our ongoing relations and to strengthen them. + Hassan asked that our Ambassador Reed convey to him a description of such a joint + military commission, prior to the visit of Al Haig, and that we get other materials on the subject + to him that we agreed.

+

On air transit bases for us, King Hassan indicated the locations they + prefer, which do not quite coincide with our preferred locations. + However, the more important issue is the about $150 million in + congressionally approved funding that we would require to prepare the + air facilities for our use. Air bases in Morocco could complement our + bases in Spain or Portugal for refueling on the way to the Middle East. + At a minimum, having the offer from Morocco may help us get a better + deal in our ongoing negotiations with Spain and Portugal. [7½ lines + not declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

+

Hassan emphasized he would prefer to have a Moroccan-Spanish defense + agreement if he granted us transit facilities. Perhaps he wants to + protect the interests of his close friend, the King of Spain, in his + base negotiation with us. I had the impression Hassan was telling us in + effect that we should not assume that, if we cannot reach agreement with + the Spanish on bases, we could automatically get what we need in + Morocco.

+

Hassan discussed his plans for a follow-up to the recent Arab summit in + Fez, which failed to produce any agreement. On a strictly confidential + basis, he mentioned he intended to host another Arab summit next + April—after the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai. His + hopes are that Egypt will join the Arab consensus.

+

Hassan also revealed his plans for negotiation with Algeria. He has some + hopes that in a meeting a few weeks hence be can induce Algeria to + cooperate with him by shifting Algerian support to the Polisario in + exchange for economic cooperation, such as gas pipelines from Algerian + fields to Moroccan ports.

+

At my departure, the King provided me a study for transmittal to you. + This study, occasioned by the visit earlier this year of the Secretary + of Energy,Not found. was prepared by + competent technicians and concerns means of assuring free movement of + petroleum from the Arabian Gulf region.

+

The King remarked to me that his visit to the U.S., probably in January, + should be a working visit. Hassan’s aim is to get to know you well, + including spending some time alone with you. We gave him a rather historic McClellan + cavalry saddle, and he said that, as a horseman of forty years’ + standing, he would like to go riding with you, and you would be the + recipient of a special saddle designed and used by the King—you would + get the second one.

+

End Text

+
+
+ 199. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, + Box 69, February 11, 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Alec + Toumayan on February 17. The meeting took place at the Royal Palace + in Marrakesh. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: + “Very Close Hold” and circled the word “Morocco” in the subject + line. + + + Marrakesh, February 11, + 1982, 7:50–8:45 p.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Private Meeting at the Palace. Secretary Haig, King Hassan II. 7:50–8:45 p.m., + February 11, 1982. Marrakech, Morocco. + +

During the preliminary part of the conversation, the King pointed out + that there are many countries in Africa that want to be and remain free. + Only the U.S. can guarantee and maintain that freedom because whenever + the Russians go anywhere they do not give money, they do not give gold + of which they have substantial reserves; they give equipment: + bulldozers, tractors, and that is really a field where the U.S. is + second to none. Rather than give to Somalia or Tanzania money which must + be accounted for, the King suggested the U.S. give them some tractors, + bulldozers and the mechanics. This will constitute a limited presence. + This is a fact that the Russians understand very well.

+

The King began the substantial part of the meeting by expressing his + great pleasure in receiving Secretary Haig at this particular point in time, which offers for + Morocco, the U.S., and the world, a propitious set of circumstances.

+

The King: This, however, is an opportunity that + must be grabbed immediately. From the Moroccan standpoint, the + consequences of the Western Saharan problem is that the Moroccan people + are asking for reliable friends and allies. From the domestic U.S. + standpoint, you have a year and a half before you start thinking of the + next election. Everything will then come to a halt.

+

The Secretary: You know us too well, Your + Majesty.

+ +

The King mentioned Europe and his perception of Morocco as part of + Europe, Gibraltar being a purely geological accident and Morocco + standing at the gateway of the Mediterranean. The King then looked at + the map: + + SPAIN: It is the King’s strong wish that in 1983 Philippe + Gonzalez not repeatAn unknown hand + crossed through the word “repeat.” not win the + election. The Spanish military is very worried. + + FRANCE: Mitterrand is + anti-communist to be sure, but he is a dangerous man. He had + said to the King, “I want things after me never to be like they + were before me.” Mitterrand does not simply want to make changes + in society, he wants to change the nature of society. In the + FRG, we have a defeatist + attitude. The German people were made for war just like the + Japanese people, but they have been forbidden to make war. The + King stated that the Secretary knew what the situation was in + Italy. +

+

The Secretary: Italy is in fact the strongest of + the three with Germany and France and that shows you how bad things + are.

+

The King: Then we have Yugoslavia, and Greece, who + no longer want to be part of the West. And we have Turkey concerned + about cultivating its poppies and producing heroin. To turn now to the + Arab countries which ring the Mediterranean on the other side. Leaving + Egypt aside, we have Libya. Tunisia is very small, then there is + Algeria, and then there is us. The Mediterranean is like a chunk of + Swiss cheese full of holes. We are more worried with European defeatism, + which is more dangerous, than Soviet penetration in the Sahara because + it is an intellectual attitude of defeatism. To whom can Morocco cling? + Mauritania to the south of us offers a dangerous situation because there + is a vacuum there but to the south of it are strong countries. Senegal + is free and wants to remain free. Guinea, under Sekou Toure, made a 180° + turn. Mohammed V has given his name to the current graduating school of + Guinea students because in Sekou Toure’s words, he was the first + liberator of Africa and Guinea wants to be free. The Ivory Coast wants + to be free, also. The U.S. doesn’t have the right to practice political + segregation. In the U.S. talk of the free world means Europe. Europe is + not the free world by itself. For the U.S., which was the new world 200 + years ago, today the new world is Africa. Tomorrow it will be Latin + America which is opposite the African continent. Because Brazil is the + world of the future, the Royal Moroccan staff must learn Portuguese. + Brazil does not know its potential.

+

The Secretary agreed that Brazil was not prepared to take the effort to + discover what its full potentialities were.

+ +

The King stated very strongly that Morocco wants and is determined to + have an alliance with the U.S., and that he hopes very much that the + answer will be yes. He wants this for his country because his country + must live on after him and Morocco stands at a very dangerous crossroads + today.

+

The King recalled at length the role played by Morocco in stopping + Turkish penetration thereby saving Europe from a Turkish pincer + movement. The King had told the Pope that Muslim Morocco had saved + western Christianity. The Pope is coming in October, not to say a Mass + for 150,000 faithful, but to address a group of 150,000 young people + because the King views the Pope as primarily an educator.

+

The King stressed that Morocco wants an alliance with the U.S. in a + realistic and courageous frame of mind and without demeaning itself. It + cannot do as much for the U.S. as the U.S. can give to Morocco, but it + will give the U.S. what its history has taught it to give. The King + would like to have the Secretary’s reaction as well as President + Reagan’s reaction.

+

The Secretary: Over the years we have benefitted + from Moroccan friendship and from the King’s own friendship. We have + just emerged from the Vietnam/Watergate nightmare. We are beginning to + understand the changes in the world. I agree that the situation in + Europe is very dangerous. Mitterrand is on his good behavior for the present but + he is a revolutionary and in a year or two, there may be great + difficulties with France. The FRG is in + a difficult situation. I had long talks with Genscher in Madrid.Haig + visited Madrid February 7–10 to discuss the status of the Conference + on Security and Cooperation in Europe with NATO Foreign Ministers. Documentation on the meeting is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, + European Security, 1977–1983. The Bundestag + endorsement of Schmidt is a + charade. Schmidt barely survived. + We can smell the death.

+

The King: Who comes after Schmidt?

+

The Secretary: Maybe Kohl who is not strong. Perhaps Genscher as a compromise candidate, + who is good and strong and who will make sure that Schmidt is able to operate.

+

The Secretary described the domestic German political situation and then + turned to Spain.

+

The Secretary: Philippe Gonzalez is strong but if + he comes to power the Spanish military will move. If the present + government sees the Socialists become the majority in the minority + group, they will turn to Fraga and the [“]Right.”

+

The King: Fraga is a close personal friend, a good + man, and our adviser on tourism.

+ +

The Secretary: We welcome your close communication + with the King of Spain. You know how they feel about Morocco.

+

The King: The Spanish Air Force Chief of Staff + told Colonel Kabbaj that if forced to choose in strategic terms between + defending the King of Spain and the King of Morocco, he would choose the + latter.

+

The Secretary: The situation in Africa is + extremely dangerous largely because of Qadhafi who destabilizes regimes with money and Soviet + military equipment. The U.S. is concerned about the central African + countries and Nigeria.

+

The King: Nigeria especially because Qadhafi was stopped in Chad by + Nigeria.

+

The Secretary: France will not play in the future + the role it played in the past in Africa. I go on pressuring them but + they are not reliable. Fate may intervene. I get reports that President + Mitterrand is gravely + ill.

+

The King: I found his complexion very sallow. He + keeps clutching his right arm. De + Marenches has given me some confidential information as + has my personal physician. The danger in medication is that it affects + the decision making process as happened with the Shah of Iran and + Boumediene. Mitterrand may die + two or three years from now but will he be making rational decisions or + will they be irrational?

+

The King commented on the marital difficulties of Mitterrand.

+

As an example of confused policies in France he said that at lunch + Mitterrand told him, asking + him to keep it a secret, that the Russian gas deal had been signed while + he, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Trade were + uninformed. Four days later, Cheysson, Prime Minister Mauroy, and Foreign Trade Minister Jobert said on French TV that they had + not known of the signing of the agreement.

+

The Secretary commented on the change in Egypt. Mubarak has limited resources. If there + is a surprise or a setback, he may panic. He is going to need help, + stability, and counseling.

+

The King pointed out that Mubarak + is a flyer, knows how to use a checklist, but is not brilliant like + Sadat. Two weeks ago, his + Chief of Intelligence came to Marrakech. No one saw him come or go. The + King wishes to see Egypt come back into the Family of + Nations on the occasion of the next Summit which will be held + in May or June, for the sake of Egypt and also for the sake of the + Saudis so that they are not alone confronting the extremists.

+

The Secretary expressed his concern about seeing the Saudis move too + quickly. He felt a setback would make them lose their nerve. We needed + them, but they needed constant reassurance.

+

The Secretary described U.S. pressure on Begin so that he will stay out of Lebanon, and the fear + of the Sinai withdrawal becoming a problem. The Secretary stated that we felt now + that it would be returned and with luck we would prevent an Israeli + attack against Lebanon. But the Soviets now understand there were + opportunities for them in the Middle East. For the first time Gromyko, in Geneva,Reference is to Haig’s meetings with Gromyko in Geneva on January 26. See Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January + 1981–January 1983, Documents 137 and 138. suggested + carving out a benign state for Palestine. Begin was itching to go in and crush the PLO. He has six months of equipment, could + defeat any combination of Arab states, and buy five or six years of + security. That was the danger in the immediate sense.

+

The King mentioned the large Moroccan Jewish community in Israel; it is + large and influential, 600,000 strong. He knew that Begin prayed daily that he would sooner + die than return the Sinai.

+

The Secretary said that Secretary Weinberger had talked to him of his visit to Saudi + Arabia.Documentation on Weinberger’s visit to Saudi + Arabia is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula. Two + agreements had been signed—one on AWACS, and one on the Joint Commission. (The King had asked + about those agreements.) The Secretary described the Saudis’ reluctance + to discuss anything publicly even in the face of new threats.

+

The King described the problems he has dealing with the Saudis: they have + no sense of time. They never embrace their friends openly and directly, + having yielded once to blackmail, they must now pay every time. The King + knows for a fact that Saudi Arabia recently gave Syria $9 billion. The + King has asked for 200 million dollars for CBU’s and 3 or 4 C130’s but the Saudis tell him to + wait.

+

The Secretary concluded that the Saudis are prompt to pay their enemies + and not to support their friends. He knows that on Weinberger’s agenda was strong + pressure on the Saudis to help Morocco. The U.S. would keep up that + pressure. The Secretary added he wanted to return to the King’s original + question. The King has been a stable friend, a strategic thinker, and an + experienced leader of the region. How best to achieve a stronger and + closer cooperation? Not by formal treaties requiring Congressional + action. We can get the same outcome or closer cooperation, + understanding, and coordinated work by other means. The Secretary had + not discussed this in detail with the President, who looks forward to + talking with the King about the dangers and the role of Morocco. The + Secretary could assure that President Reagan was not Jimmy + Carter. Changes had been made in the Department of State, + too, so that dealing with Africa was more realistic. A brief discussion + took place concerning Qadhafi.

+ +

The King then outlined the following approach concerning closer + understanding with the U.S.: first, regarding the facilities the U.S. + was asking for, these are granted. The King agreed that we (U.S.) will + get Sidi Slimane, the one we prefer. In the second place, the King + outlined a Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese mutual defense treaty which is + a very natural arrangement that no one can object to. The Secretary + agreed that this was a sound approach which Spain was willing to + consider. The new Chief of Staff has been hand picked by the King of + Spain. King Hassan said that General Aramburu had recently visited with + him and agreed to that approach.

+

Mrs. Thatcher’s strong personality + was discussed by the King in very favorable terms, with the Secretary + and the King exchanging anecdotes.

+

The Secretary concluded that he wants DOD to move quickly. The King has received many assurances + but seen little action.

+

The King said: We trust you.

+

The King pointed out that the Polisario would retreat because of Moroccan + military action and also because of the presence of the U.S. in Morocco; + Gromyko would tell Chadli, + “the more you do the more it brings the U.S. to Morocco.” The entire + Moroccan people were united, pointed out the King; the defense of + Morocco comes first.

+

The Secretary pointed out that after eight hours with Gromyko he found him confronting great + difficulties, which Gromyko did + not know how to solve. The King responded that he saw the Polish + situation as the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union.Reference is to the recent crisis when, in December + 1981, the Reagan + administration warned the Soviet Union against invading Poland after + Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law. See + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January + 1981–January 1983, Documents 116–118, 120–123.

+

The Secretary observed that for the first time Gromyko was prepared to discuss an + arrangement concerning Angola. The Secretary described the parallel + withdrawals. Both agreed that in any future Angolan settlement, + Savimbi must play a part. The + King knew that the Saudis had been asked to give Savimbi $5 million and had given + $500,000 to Savimbi. A brief + discussion of the Clark Amendment took place.Reference is to an amendment to the International + Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (1976) (CP.L. + 94–329; 90 Stat. 729), sponsored by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), + which prohibited aid to groups involved in military or paramilitary + operations in Angola.

+

It was agreed that at dinner the discussion would be general, concerning + Nairobi, the Bi-National Commission for Cultural Matters, and the + Security Assistance Agreement. A private conversation would take place + again after dinner.

+ +

The King said that CBU deliveries would + begin arriving in 48 hours. He needed a C130 and two or three + helicopters. The Saudis were sitting on these requests.

+

A brief discussion took place on Syria and the present problems in the + North. The King then introduced Professor Alaoui and requested the + Secretary’s support for a setting up of a cardio-vascular surgery + department in the military hospital in Morocco. The Secretary agreed to + support this request.

+

The meeting adjourned at 8:45 p.m.

+
+
+ 200. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Near East + and South Asia (Waterman) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of + Central Intelligence (McMahon)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C–379, Morocco. Secret. + Sent through the Chairman of the National Intelligence + Council. + + DDI–2113–82 + + Washington, March 15, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Intensification of Military Relationship with Morocco + + + + An interagency meeting was held 5 MarchNo record of the meeting was found. + under DOD/ISA auspices to + prepare for an upcoming Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting scheduled for late + April/early May. It is intended to intensify the bilateral + relationship at that time, specifically in order to provide + redundancy for those intermediate facilities required for projection + of US forces into the Middle East + proper. The JMC will deal with + facilities, usage, training, joint exercises, and FMS credits. + + DOD plans to program $3 million + from the Secretary’s Contingency Fund for immediate use. This, + combined with an anticipated reprogramming of $20 million from Air + Force funds for FY83, will serve to improve fuel storage tankage and + related facilities at Sidi Slimane Airbase. The JCS is developing plans for an overall + [$] 100 million program over several years, which will focus on air + facilities development at Sidi Slimane, Qunaitra, and Muhammad V + airfield. + + + A Special Forces (SF) + pre-deployment team has completed a report regarding training in + this field. Its recommendations will be discussed at the JMC, and may result in a SF Military Training Team (MTT) arrangement in Morocco. An + airforce training program is currently underway, and will probably + entail the stationing of one US + pilot in Morocco for a year, charged with developing their tactical + capabilities. + + Intelligence will not be discussed at the JMC. I affirmed that this aspect of the relationship is + well in hand. + + The upshot of the above from our parochial point of view is that + the relationship between ourselves and the Moroccans will soon be + both more intense and more visible because of its military + aspect. + + Charles E. + Waterman +
+
+ 201. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of State HaigSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). Secret. Copies were sent to + Jones and + Clark. + + + Washington, March 17, 1982 + + Dear Al: + +

(S) Thank you for your very helpful letter + of February 22 with regard to future en route access to Moroccan + facilities.Not found. + Considerable engineering work remains to be done before we can define + the total military construction program at Sidi Slimane. Nevertheless, I + feel that we should proceed with negotiations without delay. + Specifically, + + We are prepared to pursue with the Moroccans an access + agreement for both Sidi Slimane and Mohammed V. We are prepared + to make up to $3 million in DoD funds available in FY 82 to begin improvements to Sidi + Slimane or Mohammed V. The Air Force will serve as executive + agent for the improvement effort. + + We propose that a team be dispatched to Morocco as soon as + possible to open negotiations for an access accord. + + We also propose that facilities access be an agenda item for + the April JMC, so that our + plans can be carefully explained to the Moroccans.See Document + 203. + + We should then strive to complete negotiations urgently, so + that, as suggested in your letter, final agreement on access + could be reached in + May during Hassan’s meeting with the President. (Formal + signature and, if desired, announcement, could take place during + the visit or soon after.) +

+

(S) I believe that these actions, coupled + with the expanded program of security assistance we plan to initiate in + FY 83, will maintain the momentum + generated by your discussions with King Hassan,See Document 199. + and will be supportive of Defense interests. This course of action will + also allow us more time for longer-term JCS basing plans to be completed, and will give us the + benefit of the results of negotiations with other countries (e.g., + Spain, Portugal, Egypt). It will also permit us to phase the + improvements into our military construction planning while maintaining + Congressional support and avoiding major reprogramming actions.

+

(U) I solicit your support and suggest + that you designate someone on your staff to serve as point of contact + with my Assistant Secretary Bing + West to develop firm plans for implementation of this + course of action.

+

Sincerely,

+ Cap +
+
+ 202. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C–379, + Morocco. Secret. [less than one line not + declassified] + + DDI–3517/82 + + Washington, April 27, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Bing West Trip to Morocco + [portion marking not declassified] + + + + C/NE [name not declassified] and I + represented CIA at a meeting + convened on 23 April by Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs West, in connection with his trip on 26 April to + Rabat.See Document 203. + West will lead a delegation + to the first session of the US-Moroccan Joint Military Commission. + The meeting was intended to inform West on the current arrangement for [less than 1 line not declassified] the GOM + and to coordinate a cable + to Ambassador Reed on a + related issue. Reed had + recommended that the JMC framework + be elaborated to include an intelligence panel. [portion marking not declassified] + + ISA/Africa Chief Jim Woods + opened by referring to Reed’s cable received only a few days before,In telegram 3129 from Rabat, April 22, + Reed transmitted his + desire for West’s + “thoughts on discussing intelligence matters” during the + upcoming JMC. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820212–0876) noting that in effect it responded to a DoD + recommendation some months ago, which the ambassador had not + commented on. DoD’s reply, drafted for West’s signature, urges that the questions of an + intelligence panel be deferred until West could discuss it with COM, [less than 1 line not + declassified] and DATT. + Other subjects on DoD’s mind, Wilson continued, were the NDPC + security survey of Morocco beginning 10 May and the king’s visit to + this country at mid month. [portion marking not + declassified] + + Wilson then reviewed DoD perceptions of current objectives: to establish a military-to-military + intelligence relationship, successfully to complete the security + survey and to provide tactical military intelligence training; and + problems: the small number of Moroccans + approved for receiving US + intelligence and the GOM’s slow + dissemination of the data. He said the upgrading of Moroccan + military capabilities requires an infusion of promptly and properly + processed intelligence data. He concluded that on the Moroccan side + a way had to be found to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, while on + the US side it was necessary to sort + out the responsibilities for providing strategic and tactical + intelligence. [portion marking not + declassified] + + [1 paragraph (1½ lines) + not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (4 lines) not + declassified] [portion marking + not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (4 lines) not + declassified] [portion marking + not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (2 lines) not + declassified] [portion marking + not declassified] + + Order of battle data [less than 1 line + not declassified] may be passed by [less than 1 line not declassified] to + the Defense Attache for Moroccan military [2 lines not declassified]. The USDAO is the pegpoint for + Moroccan military request for military training. [portion marking not + declassified] + + Country team members will keep each other informed on + their intelligence disclosure activity. [portion marking not declassified] + + + [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified] + [portion marking not declassified] + + West [less than 1 line not declassified] left the room briefly + and during this time Wilson said that DoD intends to raise with King + Hassan, during his + visit to Washington, the question of access and dissemination within + the GOM. [less + than 1 line not declassified] who will accompany West on the trip to Rabat said + that one thought that had occurred to him is that the king might not + want the tactical intelligence communicated rapidly to line units, + because the Polisario threat serves his domestic political purposes. + Wilson reiterated that this would have to be discussed with the + king. He added that DoD staffers want to obtain SecDef’s account of the breakfast + meeting discussion of subject. [portion marking + not declassified] + + When West returned to the + room, [name not declassified] having departed + for another meeting, the cable to Reed was discussed. It told the ambassador that + West would discuss the + intelligence panel concept with US + officials on arrival and provided a status report on the security + survey. West asked me if + the contents raised any questions [less than 1 + line not declassified]. I noted a reference to the survey + facilitating the establishment of a military intelligence exchange + arrangement and asked for confirmation that any such program would + be the subject of separate review and determination. The DoD + officers assured me that any such arrangement would be the subject + of separate policy coordination. With that understanding, I said, + the cable did not appear to contain any contentious issues. [portion marking not declassified] + + Finally, Wilson told West + that while the [less than 1 line not + declassified] analyst accompanying him was prepared to + brief intelligence substance, he was not equipped to discuss + intelligence relations. If the latter subject was to be raised with + mission officers, [less than 1 line not + declassified] or another officer from [less than 1 line not declassified] also should go. + West said he would give + it further thought. [1 line not declassified] + [portion marking not declassified] + + [name not declassified] attended this + meeting as did: Lt. Col Mark Powe, USA, who recently represented + DA/ACSI in talks with the Moroccans on army training; Dernell Whit + of West’s office; and [name not declassified] Chairman of the + National Disclosure Policy Committee, which sponsors the security + surveys. [2 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified] + + [name not + declassified] +
+ +
+ 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Moroccan + Hassan (05/18/1982–05/21/1982). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed + from a copy that indicates the original was received in the NSC Message Center. + + 3288. + + Rabat, April 28, 1982, 1600Z + + +

From the Ambassador. Dept please pass DCI; SecDef; Secretary Baldrige; + Assistant Secretary West + (DOD/ISA); and Lieutenant + General Williams (DIA). Subj: King’s Meeting With Assistant + Secretary West and Ambassador + Reed Following Conclusion of + Joint Military Commission Sessions.

+ + + (S)–Entire text. + + Following the conclusion of the Joint Military Commission + meetings,Telegram 3210 from Rabat, + April 27, contains a record of the JMC’s April 26 opening plenary. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820217–1046) Assistant Secretary West and I met with King Hassan + for 90 minutes. Foreign Minister Boucetta, General Dlimi and Col. Maj. + Kabbaj attended as did Deputy Chief of Mission Sebastian (translator). The + following are my verbatim notes on the King’s remarks. Where + internal quotes are shown, they emphasize phrases to which, by + gesture or expression, the King gave special emphasis. + + The King seemed very pleased with the results of the initial + meeting of the Joint Military Commission which he personally hosted + in Fez. He stated that “Morocco will now have to live with + countermeasures from the Soviet and Eastern bloc as a result of our + decision to undertake this commission. The Soviets used to buy + 250,000 tons of oranges and now ‘with difficulty’ they purchase + 58,000. There will be other measures taken against us and I must be + very careful. I don’t like playing this game of ping pong. Frankly, + I don’t have that much room to maneuver.An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin + next to this and the previous sentence. What preoccupies + me is that the Soviets could put pressure on certain African and + non-aligned countries. They could put enough pressure on me to make + it very hot, and that is why I want the United States to support + Morocco. The socialist world will exercise pressure on us.” + + “The reasons that I have approved Morocco joining forces with the + United States for a Joint Military Commission are that I believe + that the Western world is in a state of immobilization and that the + Soviets have made major progress in the last few years. The + West is threatened. + What I am reaching for with the United States is a spirit of + cooperation. Certain + developments in the world have pushedAn + unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin + highlighting the portion that begins “The reasons that I have + approved Morocco” and ending with “Certain developments in the + world have pushed.” me to make my decision—Afghanistan + (N.B., King emphasized with strong body language his view that the + Soviets were ‘digging in’), Poland, Central America. It is in this + context of the shifts of balance of power that I will visit + Washington next month. You will recall that when Secretary Weinberger visited me in FezSee Document + 198. I predicted that Spain would enter NATO and that with that event Morocco + would be only 15 miles away from the nuclear mushroom. You will + recall that I talked to Secretary Weinberger about an (Morocco) alliance with Spain + and a regional alliance (Morocco-Spain-Portugal). I invited + Secretary Haig and I + developed the same thesis with him, but I went even further. I asked + General Haig (rhetorically) + why Morocco would enter into defense agreement with Spain and not + NATO.An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the + left-hand margin next to the portion of this sentence that + reads: “Morocco would enter into a defense agreement with Spain + and not NATO.” I suggested that perhaps the United States + could supply Morocco with weapons through a military arrangement + with NATO. I am concerned for my + people and offspring. When the next century comes, I want to have + Morocco be as it is today, with freedom and sovereignty. I told + General Haig that if there + were certain requirements Morocco would not hesitate to join NATO and that my only stipulation was + that the ‘N’ be dropped from the ‘NATO’ as I do not believe that the security of the free + world rests with the North Atlantic. I have been on this throne for + more than two decades; I can recall when Africa was calm because + France and Great Britain had great colonies. Then came independence + for many nations and with that independence the Soviets have found + fertile ground and have put their foot into Africa from one end to + the other. The Soviets have created a vast navy and they are looking + for territory far beyond their own land and seas. I believe we must + protect our nations from Canada to the South Atlantic and from + Norway to South Africa. That is why I don’t like the ‘N’ for NATO. I am also concerned for your + NATO alliance surviving, as + you now have a Europe that is both divided and occupied by + socialists. I will certainly talk to President Reagan about this when I see him. + I like to dream but take note that I believe that important + political acts are made of dreams. At the time of General Haig’s visit he and I talked + about a closer military relationship with Morocco and Spain. He + promised to send me Walters, who is well known to both Juan Carlos and + myself, but I understand a death in the family prevented him from + participating. I saw Juan Carlos at length, and we had a long + evening together one on one. We then saw the Spanish Foreign + Minister the next day and + spoke of a common defense pact. Both Juan Carlos and his Foreign + Minister were interested. The Spanish Foreign Minister visited + Morocco, and told him I planned to take up this proposal of a + military alliance with President Reagan and Secretaries Weinberger and Haig. As I don’t like to build castles in the sky, I + asked the Spanish Foreign Minister for a letter. When I saw that + Foreign Minister at a ceremony at El-Jadida, where we signed a major + fisheries agreement, I found him ‘hesitant on what to put to paper.’ + I then offered to write him a draft of what his letter might + contain, and we now expect this letter in early May. Please note + that the Spanish Army—ground, air and sea—is 1,000 percent with us + on this proposal. Military and economic cooperation must go hand in + hand. These are the pieces of the puzzle in my growing relationship + as a result of the visits by you, Mr. West, and Secretaries Weinberger and Haig. I am very anxious to have General Walters come to Morocco before I + go to Washington to send him to discuss this possible alliance with + Spain. ‘It is of the greatest importance.’” + + JMC:“I want to see the + points that we have agreed on in ‘document form’ with annexes. I + want the documents signed by our respective Ambassadors and perhaps + further understandings by my Minister and your Secretary. I don’t + want it to seem that this is piecework; I want to have a + sequence.” + + Access and Transit:“I would like to have a small technical + team come to Morocco, and we can work on the details prior to my + visit, but the principle remains a formal ‘yes.’ Though I would like + to keep my military understandings with you confidential, I would + hope that the Kremlin, Tripoli, Berlin and Algiers would not sleep a + week for fear of what I may be doing.”See Document 199. + + Secretary West raised the + question that there was “a French concern” over American involvement + with Morocco on the JMC and the + possibility of “access and transit.” King Hassan replied: “France + has been split into two. When I spoke with Mitterrand on my recent visit to + France, and I saw him two times on formal occasions, we did not + speak about U.S.-Moroccan relationships. In addition, he came to my + house for lunch and we talked privately and frankly for 90 minutes. + There was no mention of this issue. Recently Guedira was asked by + the Elysee to come to a meeting at our Embassy in Paris and we were + told that Mitterrand will go + to Algeria to look deeply into Chadli’s eyes and ask him if he does + or does not want a referendum. I asked Mitterrand to come to Morocco, and we have set a + date in October. We were also given a message from Mitterrand for me which stated that + the President had feelings of deep friendship and esteem for me, and + he only wished they could + be shared. Why does he say that? For a variety of reasons, but + principally because of the weight that Morocco has in the Middle + East and in the African continent. The other half of France is + represented by Jacques + Chirac, who came to Morocco where we had a good meeting. + Chirac endorsed my desire + for a strong, independent Morocco and thought that Morocco was quite + correct in searching for an alliance with America. How can you + explain this curious situation? The socialists do not speak to me of + America and Morocco, but the other half of France encourages me to + join forces with America.” + + Secretary West inquired + as to how the King viewed Qadhafi. The King replied: “If the U.S. could help + me in a certain plan, Qadhafi + could be in trouble. Egypt must come back to the Arab world as soon + as possible. I know Egypt, and they will respect their engagements. + I have sent a message to Moubarak, and I will send Boucetta in a few days to Cairo. + There are 20,000 Egyptian soldiers in Iraq . . . what a strange + honeymoon! I suggest the U.S. speak to Kuwait in strong terms. Each + time that we reach an agreement, they break it up. I am sympathetic + with their being one million people with 600,000 Palestinians, but . + . . when Iraq gets ready and gets a chance,An unknown hand wrote two vertical lines in the + right-hand margin highlighting the portion that begins “Egypt + must come back to the Arab world as soon as possible” and ending + with “when Iraq gets ready and gets a chance.” they are + going to eat Kuwait. The U.S., and Great Britain, whose influence is + still considerable, could give Kuwait a real push. It would be good + for Kuwait. You should keep Qadhafi busy. How? You could arrange to have the + OAU Summit take place someplace + else. That would be something! There will be a Non-Aligned Summit in + September, and I will go there and plan to let the group hear some + ‘home truths.’ As a co-founder of this organization four months + after my accession to the throne, I am eager to do it. At the time + of the founding I was with people like Nasser, Tito, and Nkrumah. I + will use this occasion in the fall to attack Qadhafi like a ton of bricks. + Qadhafi must be isolated + for the good of the world. I have been on this throne for 21 years, + and I put my entire experience on the scales. [2 + lines not declassified][1 paragraph + (4 lines) not declassified] + + The King concluded the audience with a special request to me to + undertake a mission to Washington to nail down all aspects of the + forthcoming “working visit.” “Reed, this is the turning point in + history. General Dlimi and + others will be following you to settle the program.” + + Ambassador’s comment: Please note that I had two private audiences + during the JMC with the King to + discuss certain aspects of the official and private sections of the + trip to the United States. The King is eagerly looking forward to + the trip and considers it a milestone. In addition to his meeting + and afternoon with the President, he is looking forward to separate meetings + with Vice President Bush, + Secretaries Weinberger, + Haig, and Baldrige, and Casey.An unknown hand wrote a vertical line in the + left-hand margin next to the portion that reads: “The King is + eagerly looking forward to the trip and considers it a + milestone. In addition to his meeting and afternoon with the + President, he is looking forward to separate meetings with Vice + President Bush, + Secretaries Weinberger, + Haig, and Baldrige, + and Casey.” He also has accepted Senator Percy’s offer to + speak before a joint meeting of the Foreign Relations and Armed + Forces Committees and plans to make a foreign policy statement + before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He confirmed + desire to accept outstanding invitations from former President + Nixon, David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and confirmed he will + proceed to Chicago. Note: Boucetta confirmed that the King would spend two + days in Canada following his visit to the US. My sense from talking to numerous members of the + court in preparatory stages for the JMC as well as at the actual meetings is that everyone + repeat everyone at all levels within the power structure has great + expectations for this forthcoming visit of King Hassan II to Washington. End + comment. + + Reed +
+
+ 204. Note From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). No classification + marking. + + + Washington, May 17, 1982 + + Dear Bill, + +

I am sending you personally this copy of “Prospects for Morocco,” an + Intelligence Community production which focuses on King Hassan and his + regime. Although published the morning of Monday, 17 May, I wish to + ensure it reaches you prior to the King’s upcoming visit. I believe the + study projects a particularly balanced view of internal and regional + issues at stake for us in Morocco.

+ William J. + CaseyCasey signed “Bill” above + this typed signature. + + + Enclosure + Interagency Intelligence MemorandumSecret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. Issued by the Chairman of the National + Intelligence Council and produced under the auspices of the + National Intelligence Officers for Near East Asia and South + Asia, Central Intelligence Agency. Prepared by and coordinated + with the CIA, DIA, INR, Treasury, and the Intelligence components of + the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Information as of + May 11 was used in its preparation. + + NI IIM + 82–10004 + + Washington, May 1982 + + +

PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO

+

[Omitted here are a Scope Note and the Table of Contents.]

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

In the coming year, King Hassan + II is likely to maintain firm control of Morocco’s + political system. Hassan probably will continue to use his proven + techniques of divide-and-rule, manipulation, and co-option of + political parties to regulate the activities of the opposition. His + domestic security apparatus will keep a close eye on dissident + activity and we expect the armed forces will remain loyal. The + military and security service will obey orders to suppress sporadic + civil disturbances. Neither Morocco’s established political parties + and labor unions, which prefer to operate within the system, nor + fringe opposition groups pose a serious threat to the monarchy in + the short run.An unknown hand + underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “Morocco” + and ending with “which.”

+

Over the next several years, however, Morocco will face a number of + extremely difficult socioeconomic and political problems as well as + the seemingly interminable conflict in Western Sahara that + cumulatively could pose a serious threat to domestic stability and + King Hassan’s survival. Many of these problems—rapidly growing + population, rising expectations, inflation, and international + debt—are common to most developing states. Although Morocco’s + economy has considerable potential for growth, for the next several + years it faces the prospect of—at best—slow growth, austerity, and a + declining standard of living.

+

Over the long term, the strains and pressures in Moroccan society + portend serious difficulty for the King, the monarchy as an + institution, and Morocco’s political system, which is heavily based + on patronage.An unknown hand underlined + the portion of this sentence beginning with “Over the long term” + and ending with “an institution.” We question whether + this system and Morocco’s limited resources will enable Rabat to + cope with its serious problems. If, as seems probable, the present + system fails to satisfy rising popular aspirations, societal + pressures probably will generate demands for major political + change.

+ +

It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures must be before + serious instability develops. The situation is not irretrievable, + but Hassan will have to demonstrate astute managerial skills to deal + with existing economic and social problems.

+

In international affairs, Western Sahara will remain the primary + focus of Moroccan attention. The threats Morocco perceives from + Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet Union also will absorb Moroccan + attention. In pursuit of Moroccan interests, King Hassan will + continue to adopt foreign policies that often parallel or coincide + with US interests.

+

Neither a military nor a political solution to the Western Sahara + quagmire is in the offing.An unknown + hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this + sentence. The economic burden of the war will remain + bearable for Morocco so long as Saudi Arabia continues to provide + financial assistance to cover the bulk of the war’s costs. The + Moroccan armed forces should be able to resist Polisario attacks but + will not be able to defeat the guerrilla forces so long as they have + sanctuary in Algeria and external sources of military assistance. + For their part, the Polisario will not be able to take control of + the Sahara by military means. Barring greater flexibility by all + parties and in the absence of minimal mutual confidence, the wide + divergence of views leaves little hope for a negotiated settlement. + None of the parties would support a referendum that did not appear + to ensure an outcome favorable to its interests.

+

Parallel interests have contributed to a recent effort by both the + United States and Morocco to intensify their close relations. The + accelerated pace of cooperation, however, risks serious regional and + bilateral misunderstandings. In the short run, and especially among + elements of the Moroccan military, the prospect of augmented US help could lead to unrealistic + expectations regarding the extent of US support and strengthen the conviction that military + victory in the Sahara is attainable. Interest in a negotiated, + settlement consequently could be set back.An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the + left-hand margin next to this sentence. Regionally, + Portugal and Spain might misperceive US intentions and assume lessened US interest in established bases in + Iberia.

+

In the longer run, unmet expectations could produce a reaction in + Morocco dangerous both to US + interests and to those of the King. An impression that the United + States had made promises to Morocco it could not keep, or that the + King had proved inept in his dealings with the United States, might + harm close US-Moroccan relations and undermine military and popular + confidence in Hassan.

+

A close US-Moroccan relationship—especially one involving increased + military aid and the granting of air transit facilities—will + complicate efforts to improve US-Algerian relations. Algerian + leaders consider US military aid to + Morocco evidence that the United States supports a Moroccan military + solution to the Western Sahara dispute. They also are concerned that US-provided + equipment may ultimately be used against Algeria. Although Algeria’s + leaders are more interested than in the past in reaching an + accommodation with Morocco, they will not abandon the Polisario and + will continue to view the developing US-Moroccan relationship with + suspicion.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+ +
+
+ 205. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Moroccan Hassan (05/18/1982–05/21/1982). + Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting + information appears on the memorandum. + + + Washington, May 19, 1982, 11:30 a.m.–12:15 p.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco + + + PARTICIPANTS: + President Ronald + Reagan + Vice President George + Bush + Alexander M. Haig, + Secretary of State + William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + Ambassador Joseph Verner + Reed, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Morocco + Nicholas Veliotes, + Assistant Secretary, State Department + King Hassan II + Ambassador Ali + Bengelloun + His Excellency Ahmed Reda Guedira, Counselor to the King + His Excellency M’Hamed + Boucetta, Minister of Foreign Affairs + +

A focus of the Oval Office discussion was on peace + in the Middle East, with special reference to the Camp David + negotiations and the King’s peace initiative to settle the Western + Sahara War. The President told the King that despite differences between + Morocco and the United States on the Camp David peace process, we hope + to find some common ground. The President received the King’s views on + the Palestinian issue and on the Iraq-Iran War. In this respect, + prospects for peace in the Gulf were discussed in detail.

+

Regarding the Western Saharan peace process, the President was pleased to + acknowledge Morocco’s continued adherence to the King’s peace initiative + for a cease-fire and referendum presented to the Organization of African + Unity.See footnote 2, Document 400.

+ +

The President and the King had lunch in the State Dining Room from 12:15 + to 1:30 p.m. A focus of the luncheon discussion was on security in the Middle East. In this respect, the President + and King talked about their common perceptions of threats to the area + and the need for increased strategic cooperation between the two + countries. Considerable time was spent on the Persian Gulf in general + and on Iran in particular. The King surmised that Iran would not end the + war until President Saddam Hussein of Iraq is replaced. The following + participated in the luncheon: + United States + The President + The Vice President + Secretary Haig + Secretary Baldrige + Edwin Meese, + III + William P. Clark + Ambassador Joseph Verner + Reed, Jr. + Ambassador-at-Large Vernon + Walters + Assistant Secretary Nicholas A. + Veliotes + Raymond Tanter, NSC + + + Morocco + King Hassan II + His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Abdallah, King’s + brother + His Excellency M’Hamed + Boucetta, Minister of Foreign Affairs + General Moulay Hafid El Alaoui, Chief of Royal Protocol + Ambassador Ali + Bengelloun + His Excellency Taieb Bencheikh, Minister in charge of Economic + Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister + General Ahmed Dlimi, + Director of the King’s Aides de Camp + His Excellency Reda Guedira, Counselor to the King + Colonel Major Mohamed Kabbaj, Inspector, Royal Moroccan Air + Force + His Excellency Abdelfattah Frej, Director of His Majesty’s + Private Secretariat +

+
+ +
+ 206. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C–379, + Morocco. Secret. [less than 1 line not + declassified]. + + + Washington, May 26, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + DCI Meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco + + + + On 20 May 1982, from 1740 to 1850 hours, the DCI met with King Hassan of Morocco at + Blair House. General Ahmad + Dlimi, Ambassador Reed and the undersigned were also present. The + principal topics discussed were as follows: + + [1 line not declassified] + + The impending OAU Summit + and Qadhafi’s + chairmanship. + + The Saharan conflict. + + Efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war. + + [1½ lines not declassified] + + Soviet activities in Morocco. + + [1 line not declassified] + + + [1 paragraph (10 lines) not + declassified] + + The DCI asked for the King’s + opinion as to a strategy for handling the upcoming OAU Summit, noting that the Egyptians + have the idea of holding a pre-summit which would be a continuation + of the aborted Addis Ababa Foreign Ministers Conference which + resulted in the seating of the Polisario. Without responding + specifically on the Egyptian idea, the King said that immediately + following his visit to Washington, he would send his Foreign + Minister Mohammad Boucetta + officially to Cairo. [3½ lines not declassified] It is + imperative that Morocco have on its side the vital one-third of the + OAU membership in order to + block a quorum. Three or four more countries are needed and the U.S. + could be helpful by using its influence on Nigeria and Kenya. The + King said it was inconceivable to think of Qadhafi as head of the OAU for the upcoming year. [2 lines not declassified] If this comes + about, he observed, it should be easier for a concerted action to be + developed against Qadhafi’s + chairmanship. + + Turning to the Sahara problem, King Hassan [8 + lines not declassified] said that the only way to get out + of the Sahara “process” was to apply the decisions of the Nairobi + summit, that is, a cease fire and referendum. The King promised to + keep the DCI informed [less than 1 line not declassified]. + + + Referring in turn to Algeria, [3½ lines not + declassified] in the framework of the Islamic conference + (IC). Hassan dismissed this idea, saying that as far as the IC is + concerned, there already is a mediation sub-committee at work under + the chairmanship of Sekou Toure, and it has been unsuccessful so + far. As for Algeria, [2 lines not + declassified]. He argued that no one has any real influence + over Iran. He had proposed to Secretary of State Haig (“the sharpest Secretary of + State I have seen”) that the U.S. sponsor a cease-fire initiative in + the UN Security Council. It would be + difficult for anyone to pose a veto, as one cannot stand against a + cease-fire and peace. [5 lines not + declassified] The King said he was hopeful that the U.S. + would make a move on 21 May for a cease-fire in the UN. [8½ lines not + declassified] + + [1 paragraph (20½ lines) not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (15½ lines) not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (17½ lines) not declassified] + + The King is worried about Soviet actions against Morocco in the + economic sphere, in reaction against Morocco’s rapprochement with + the U.S. He cited two recent Soviets actions in this regard. First, + the Soviets have reduced their purchase of Moroccan oranges from + 250,000 tons to 50,000 tons this year. Second, they have stopped + buying Moroccan wine. The King found a recent editorial in the + communist paper Al Bayane to be instructive. + The paper welcomed the King’s visit to the U.S. but added pointedly + that the rapprochement should not be at the expense of the Morocco’s + other ties. + + [1 paragraph (14½ lines) not declassified] + + [name not + declassified] + + Chief, Near East and South Asia Division + +
+ +
+ 207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Bremer) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, + Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents: Not for the + System Documents 1979–1989, Evening Reading 1980–1989, Personal + Sensitive 1979–1989: Lot 92D630, Not for the System—May 1982. + Secret. Stamped notations at the top of the memorandum read: “White + House Situation Room” and “82 May 31.” + + + Washington, May 29, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Morocco, En Route Access Agreement + +

The Agreement which the Secretary signed yesterday is substantially the + same as the draft which we forwarded to you last week.Not found. The final text of the exchange of + notes and annex is at Tab 1.Attached but + not printed.

+

The Agreement provides for rent-free access to Moroccan airfields in + emergencies and for training. It is a six year agreement that will only + expire if one party abrogates it with two years notice, after it has + been in effect for four years.

+

The King of Morocco wrote the President concerning the agreement. His + letter, which Foreign Minister Boucetta handed to the Secretary yesterday, is at Tab + 2.Attached but not printed. The + purpose of the letter is to allow King Hassan [less + than 1 line not declassified] that he has a [2 lines not declassified]. We interpret the phrase [less than 1 line not declassified] in the King’s + letter to be a vague enough formulation to permit Hassan to define [less than 1 line not declassified] as the + circumstances demand, but it certainly will include the [less than 1 line not declassified] with which + Hassan identifies. Hassan made a point of telling the Secretary that it + would not, for example, [less than 1 line not + declassified].

+

[1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified]

+

We are considering whether the King’s letter requires a response and will + make a recommendation to you next week.No + recommendation was found.

+ L. Paul + Bremer, III + + Executive Secretary +
+ +
+ 208. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Bremer) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Head of State + File, Morocco: King Hassan + II (820564–8206108). Secret. A stamped notation on + the memorandum reads: “White House Situation Room.” + + + Washington, July 10, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Moroccan En Route Access Agreement + +

King Hassan of Morocco sent a letter to the PresidentSee Document 207. + describing his willingness to provide facilities to U.S. forces in + Morocco and defining circumstances under which those facilities should + not be used. The Departments of State and Defense find the King’s + formulation of these circumstances to be acceptable and believe + therefore that no response to the King’s letter is necessary.

+

The key phrase in the King’s formulation is that the facilities [1 line not declassified]—as for instance [6 lines not declassified]. We are well aware of + the types of circumstances which would, [2 lines not + declassified]. There is nevertheless sufficient ambiguity in + the King’s formulation to accommodate necessary U.S. use.

+

Since a reply to the letter is not demanded by the terms of the letter + itself, we believe that our interests are best served by leaving the + degree of ambiguity in the King’s letter rather than either clarify or + confirm it with a formal response.

+

In accordance with the Case Act,Reference is + to the Reporting International Agreements to Congress Act of 1972, + also known as the Case-Zablocki Act, statute 1 U.S.C. 112b(a), which + requires the Secretary of State to transmit the text of any + international executive agreement to Congress, other than a treaty, + within 60 days of the agreement’s entry into force. the + Department of State will notify Congress of the agreement and will + explain the letter.

+ L. Paul + Bremer, III + + Executive Secretary +
+ +
+ 209. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564–8206108). + Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Tanter. A copy was sent to Bush. At the top of the + memorandum a stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” + Another stamped notation reads: “Signed.” Darman also initialed the top + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + + + Washington, July 26, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Letter to Moroccan King Hassan + +

At Tab ATab A was not attached. The letter + reads in part: “Your Majesty, your visit to the White House will + always be remembered as one of the highlights of my presidency. One + outcome of the visit of great import is the agreement between our + two countries for the use of Moroccan facilities. I especially + appreciate your personal efforts that led to the successful + conclusion of the agreement.” It is available in telegram 206628 to + Rabat, July 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820385–0867) for your signature is a + letter to King Hassan of Morocco in light of his recent letter at Tab + B.Tab B, letter from Hassan to + Reagan, was not + attached. See footnote 3, Document + 207.

+

King Hassan describes your discussion with him at the White House during + May as fruitful and candid.

+

The King states that as a result of common values and interests, Morocco + granted the U.S. use of its facilities in the event of Middle East + military contingencies that may require U.S. forces. The King also + defines circumstances under which use of the facilities may not be + granted. A purpose of the King’s letter is to allow him to tell his Arab + friends that he has a “secret agreement” with you that the United States + will not use the Moroccan bases to support Israel in attacks on Arab + states. The Agreement, however, does not contain any such restrictions + on American usage of Moroccan facilities, and you have not entered into + any secret agreement with the King.

+

State and Defense believe that the King’s formulation is acceptable yet + conclude that no response to the King’s letter is necessary.

+

I concur that the King’s interpretation is acceptable but believe that + you should send a letter to the King without mentioning his letter nor + addressing in detail substantive issues concerning facilities + access.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the letter at Tab A.Reagan checked and initialed the + “Approve” option.

+
+ +
+ 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). Secret; Niact + Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original + was received in the White House Situation Room. + + 7084. + + Rabat, September 20, 1982, + 0925Z + + +

Department pass the White House for the President and Judge Clark. Dept + also pass to DOD for the Secretary and + pass to CIA for the Director. Subj: + Message to the President From His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco.

+

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. The evening of September 19, King Hassan + II and Royal Counselor Reda Guedira spoke with Ambassador + Reed and General Vernon Walters by phone to inform + them that a letter would be arriving from King Hassan to be transmitted + to President Reagan. At eleven + p.m. Foreign Minister Boucetta + and Interior Minister Basri both + came to the Ambassador’s residence to deliver the letter; a translation + from the French follows below.

+

3. Begin informal Embassy translation:

+

Quote:

+

His Excellency Mr. Ronald + Reagan

+

President of the United States of America

+

Washington, D.C.

+

Message (continued):

+

Mister President and great friend,

+

I know perfectly how you feel, as a father and as a world leader + responsible for peace and war, about what has happened in Lebanon,See footnote 6, + Document 28. and it is for this reason that I am + abstaining from any comment.

+

However, I am unable to hide from you that what has happened in Lebanon + involves the responsibility of the United States, in the following way. + The Palestinians who could die, weapons in hand, defending their unarmed + wives, children, and parents who remained behind, have however left + their families, trusting in your government, even if this was not + stipulated in the agreements signed between the parties to the conflict. + In a word, they had confidence in you and I think, as I know you, that + your moral anguish is unbearable. You have been deceived by those who + call themselves your allies. We are all looking to your for redress.

+ +

The U.S.A. must, morally and politically, absolve itself of the wrong + inflicted upon it, by every means, including a military presence in + Lebanon, a credible presence for the defense of the weak and the + disarmed. What is happening in Lebanon has nothing to do with war. It is + quite ruthlessly and simply a slaughter and in the scriptures it is + written: “Thou shalt not kill”.

+

Mister President and great friend,

+

These are the painful moments that every statesman must go through in his + career. You will do so, I am convinced, with courage, determination and + wisdom. Your friend who writes these lines is close to you and prays to + God that he direct you on the right path, that of justice and + equity.

+

Please be assured, Mister President, and great friend, of my sincere + friendship and my very great consideration.

+

Royal Palace at Ifrane

+

September 19, 1982

+

Hassan II

+

King of Morocco

+

End quote.

+ Reed +
+
+ 211. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan + II of MoroccoSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King + Hassan II + (820564–8206108). No classification marking. + + + Washington, September 22, 1982 + + Your Majesty: + +

I deeply appreciated your letter of September 19 on the tragic events + which took place in Lebanon this past week.See Document 210. I share with you + feelings of outrage and revulsion over the murders of innocent + Palestinian civilians. There can be no justification for this heinous + crime which has only deepened the suffering in Lebanon and made more + difficult the goal of achieving national reconciliation, an imperative + objective shared by all men of good will.

+ +

As I told the American people on September 20,Reference is to Reagan’s September 20 address regarding the new + Multinational Force in Lebanon. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Reagan 1982, Book II, pp. 1187–1189. + Documentation on the MNF is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, + Lebanon, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March + 1984. we must and will act with all friends of Lebanon + to bring to an end this nightmare of suffering. To this end, we have + once again agreed with our French and Italian allies to constitute a + multinational force and dispatch it urgently to Beirut. If all goes + well, this force will arrive in Lebanon within the next few days. It + will have as its task assisting the Government of Lebanon to assume full + responsibility over its capital, an essential precondition for extending + its control over the entire country. It is only by beginning this + process that we can stop the cycle of violence which has swept Lebanon + for the past seven years and move forward the search for peace and a + solution to the plight of the Palestinians.

+

I am convinced the Lebanese people deeply yearn for peace and a + restoration of stability in their troubled country. Given the + opportunity and proper conditions, I believe they will bend every effort + to return to constitutional government. This has been most lately + evidenced by the election September 21 of Amin Gemayal as President of + Lebanon. An absolute precondition for the return of normality to + Lebanon, however, is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that + troubled land. I can assure you, Your Majesty, that my government will + spare no effort towards this end.

+

It is essential in the period ahead that the friends of Lebanon work + together towards our common objectives. We must all bring our influence + to bear in constructive ways to restore stability in Lebanon and create + the conditions which allow the process of national reconciliation to go + forward. I am sure that Your Majesty will do everything possible in + achieving this goal. As always, I value highly your views and wise + counsel.

+

Please be assured, Your Majesty, of my friendship and high esteem.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 212. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Reagan Library, Near + East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 + (02/22/1983–03/10/1983). Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of + Near East-South Asia Analysis and coordinated with the National + Intelligence Council. Information as of February 14 was used in its + preparation. + + NESA 83–10042 + + Washington, February 1983 + + +

MOROCCO: ISLAM AND POLITICS [portion + marking not declassified]

+

Islamic consciousness has increased in Morocco since the Iranian + revolution in 1979. But this revivalist sentiment has not seriously + challenged the dominant political-religious system—which is already + conservative in practice—nor have there been broad demands for radical + reform. In the near term, King Hassan should be able to control Islamic + extremism. [portion marking not declassified]

+

A small number of militant fundamentalist groups have formed in the past + several years, primarily in the major cities where the stress of + modernization and recent economic hardships have been felt most acutely. + Some extremists seek to wipe the slate clean and establish a “true” + Islamic state through violence. Revivalist sentiment seems to have a + certain attraction for the country’s many young people, and it is + possible that they will gravitate in greater numbers toward Islamic + extremism should they become significantly dissatisfied with the + government’s handling of key domestic and foreign policies. Closer + US-Moroccan ties, initially well received in Morocco, may eventually + become the focus of attack from fundamentalists who strongly oppose + Western influence. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

The traditions of Morocco and particularly the religious nature of the + monarchy will continue to be bulwarks against Islamic extremists. King + Hassan’s dual role as religious and secular leader of the country gives + Islam and the King preeminence in Moroccan life, making it difficult to + challenge the King without seeming to attack Islam itself. Moreover, the + tradition of tolerance found in Moroccan Islam, which allows for a wide + variety of religious practice within the faith, makes it difficult for + extremists to find a rallying cry with widespread appeal. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Morocco’s traditional religious establishment is closely associated with + the monarchy, gives strong support to King Hassan, and is not likely in + the foreseeable future to challenge the government. Moroccan religious + leaders (ulama) have strong ties to the palace and are often employed in + government institutions, which has enabled the King to co-opt and + control them. More importantly, Hassan consults the ulama frequently and visibly, allowing + religious leaders a voice in matters of policy. This has kept the + religious establishment content and has enabled the King to present + himself to the public as an observant Muslim. [portion + marking not declassified]

+

Hassan has also used his considerable political skills to keep religious + critics off balance. The King, apparently trying to draw Muslim + fundamentalists out rather than driving them into clandestine + organizations, has thus far elected to deal less harshly with them than + with secular critics on the left. To counter religious militancy, the + government is encouraging a revival of some of the traditional Muslim + brotherhoods and has established government-sponsored religious groups + to provide controlled outlets for increased religiosity. The + government’s ability to co-opt the fundamentalists greatly reduces the + potential threat posed by radical Muslim elements. [portion marking not declassified]

+

It is questionable, however, whether King Hassan’s designated successor, + 19-year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed, has the political astuteness of his + father that would allow him to manage religious detractors or other + opponents with much deftness. Should heightened religious sentiments + persist in Morocco through a succession from Hassan to his son, a + variety of exploitable issues might develop which would play into the + hands of extremists. Moreover, the King, like the late President + Sadat, could fall victim to a + religious fanatic. On balance, however, a serious challenge from + religious extremists does not appear likely in the foreseeable future. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

+
+
+ 213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco + and the United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830129–0306. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Sebastian; cleared by Veliotes, John Wolf (T), Hill, + Charles Gillespie (ARA), and + McFarlane; approved by Eagleburger. + + 63951. + + Washington, March 9, 1983, 0524Z + + +

Exdis, Eyes Only Amb Reed/DCM, London Amb. Walters only. Subject: Possible Reprogramming of + Moroccan FMS: Letter to King Hassan.

+

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. Summary: It now appears we shall have to reprogram most of Morocco’s + FY83 FMS allocation for El Salvador, + pending restoration via a supplemental.

+ +

3. We expect NSC tomorrow to take + decision to reprogram $60 million for El Salvador.No record of the NSC decision has been found. If so, money ($55 + million) will have to be taken from Moroccan FMS allocation. When this occurs matter will become + public.

+

4. To deal with this situation we are “pre-positioning” (see para 5) a + Presidential message to King Hassan. Ambassador Reed should deliver that message to + the King when, and only when, Department instructs after decision is + taken. Talking points for the Ambassador’s use on presenting the + President’s message are in para 6. We shall ask General Walters to come to Rabat as soon as + he can following reprogramming decision to reinforce with King Hassan + the expression of the President’s continuing interest in Morocco. Given + time constraints you should not rpt not await General Walters’ arrival to deliver + letter.See Document + 214.

+

5. Begin text of Presidential letter:

+

Your Majesty: I was most grateful for your account of the recent meeting + with President Chadli + Bendjedid.See Document 406. I hope that it will + mark the beginning of a new era in intra-Maghrebi relations for which, I + know, you have long worked. I also hope that it will enable Morocco and + the other parties to achieve progress towards a solution of the Saharan + problem along the lines of Your Majesty’s Nairobi offers and the OAU Implementation Committee’s + recommendations. You have the strong support of the U.S. as you proceed + with this important and constructive effort for peace.

+

Allow me now, Majesty, to turn to another problem. Our discussions have + revealed wide agreement between us on the importance of stemming the + forces of the left. These forces, strongly supported by Cuba and the + Soviet Union, are today engaged in an effort to destroy the foundation + upon which a stable and democratic government can be established in El + Salvador. This is yet another arena in which the Soviet Union and its + proxies are threatening freedom and independence.

+

Recent months had seen positive developments in El Salvador culminating + in the scheduling of elections next December. Cuba and the Soviet Union + have responded to these developments with stepped up military support + for Salvadorean guerrillas. Government forces are fighting to contain + this onslaught and repel it but are in urgent need of additional + American assistance. They now must meet ammunition and other battle + field needs. This turn of events has compelled me to allocate additional + financial resources to the support of the Salvadorean Government, + pending congressional action on a separate request for funds. We have + taken these monies from the Moroccan program but I wish to assure you + that I will do my utmost to restore them at the earliest possible + time.

+ +

I know Your Majesty will understand the circumstances which have + compelled me to take this step. I have asked Ambassador Vernon Walters to come to discuss the + details with you, confident that Your Majesty will know these measures + in no way reflect any lessening of American interest in Morocco, its + region, and of my high esteem for you and your many contributions to our + joint endeavors. Sincerely, Ronald + Reagan. End text.

+

6. Begin text of talking points:

+

As the President wrote you, we are at a crucial point in El Salvador’s + struggle to resist communist aggression and to move toward free, + democratic elections. A great deal hinges on our ability to help this + friend resist the forces that would destroy it. + + El Salvador has immediate needs for ammunition and the + training necessary to keep the initiative with its forces on the + ground. + + The appropriations passed last December cut worldwide FMS levels by over 20 percent. In + allocating resources, we have had to cut back on most of our key + programs around the world. + + The President proposes now to reallocate to El Salvador $52 + million of the $75 million in FMS guaranties provided to Morocco in the + continuing resolution. This will leave $25 million of MAP—the first grant military + assistance ever—and $23 million of FMS guaranties of which $20 million is already + committed to loans—in the aggregate $18 million more than the + $30 million in FY82 FMS. + + At the same time, the President is amending the current FMS supplemental before Congress + to provide a means to restore reprogrammed funds to Morocco + before the end of the current U.S. fiscal year. End text. +

+ Shultz +
+
+ 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + January–March 1983. Secret. + + + Washington, March 11, 1983 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

2. Reprogramming of Moroccan Funding for El + Salvador. Ambassador Reed and Dick + Walters briefed King Hassan today on your decision on reprogramming for El Salvador + which compelled us to take the money out of the Moroccan allocation. + Walters told the King we + would do our best to replenish these funds later in this fiscal year and + that this decision in no way represented a lessening of our commitment + to Morocco.In telegram 2031 from Rabat, + March 11, Walters reported + that he had informed Hassan and Guedira that the administration was + cutting FMS to Morocco and other + “African and Asiatic countries” due to “the emergency need to find + substantial sums for El Salvador which was fighting for its life + against communist aggression.” Walters assured Hassan that “this action in no way + represented a lessening of our commitment and interest in Morocco.” + (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, + Morocco 1983 (02/22/1983–03/10/1983)) Documentation on U.S. support + for the El Salvadoran Government against leftist guerrillas is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIV, + Central America, 1981–1984. Although the news came + as a shock, Hassan said he knew you as a friend of Morocco who would not + have taken this step had it not been necessary. The King noted that “it + is when you are in trouble that your friends have to help” and said he + was confident you would do your best to replenish these funds. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+
+
+ 215. Letter From the Ambassador to Morocco (Reed) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (04/01/1983–05/03/1983). No + classification marking. An attached handwritten note from Reed to Teicher reads: “HJT—We are heading + for BIG trouble. And for chips! I’ve done my best but I now need help before we + wake up to ask ‘how did this happen?’ All the best. JWR.” + + + Rabat, April 22, 1983 + + Mr. Secretary: + +

I want to call your attention to a growing problem in our relationship + with Morocco that I believe must be dealt quickly. Morocco is going + through the most severe economic crisis since its Independence; senior + civil and military officials are becoming increasingly bitter at the + pressure they are under from the United States Government and the + possible Brooke Amendment sanctions to repay their arrearages on foreign + military sales.Reference is to Section + 620(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), which + prohibits the distribution of any new foreign assistance to any + country that fails more than one year past due in servicing its debt + obligations to the United States. The money is not + there—imports are now under + strict control, government budgets are being slashed, and the Saudis are + not coming through with anticipated financing. In FY 1983 Morocco will have to pay the United + States more than $45 million for loans due and $18 million to avoid + application of the Brooke Amendment. In FY 1983 Morocco is scheduled to receive $25 million in + FMS grants and $23 million in + FMS loans, a net to Morocco $3 million.

+

The reason for the bitterness is not that we are rich and they are poor. + They rightly believe that Morocco has done more than its share to + support U.S. strategic interests. Morocco has sought political + friendship with the United States of America—The King has chosen sides! + Hassan II signed an Access + and Transit Agreement,See Document 207. in effect for + President Reagan, which was + strongly criticized by his close Advisors as a “giveaway”. Morocco is + engaged with the United States in a series of major joint military + exercises that are clearly in the interests of U.S. military commands. + U.S. Nuclear powered vessels are welcomed in all Moroccan ports and + received with great honor. As we drain their meager resources at this + painful period senior officials feel they are being “used” by the U.S.A. + Morocco knows that the United States is taking + more out of Morocco than we are putting in.

+

We must take a very hard look at converting a major part of our Foreign + Military Sales program to grants. The rationale is Morocco’s support for + U.S. military security, the importance to us of having a strong Moroccan + military as a stabilizing force in North Africa and its availability for + emergencies elsewhere. Most important at this critical time, is the role + King Hassan is playing and will be able to play in the Mid-East peace + process, both as a Chief of State and as Chairman of the Arab League. + Morocco is a strong and useful friend of the United States. This is not + the time to squeeze Morocco!

+

Just a few weeks ago the Administration needed funds for El Salvador and + took $52 million from Morocco’s 1983 FMS loans of $75 million.See + Document 214. I strongly + advocate that we restore the $52 million to Morocco in the form of + grants. For fiscal year 1984 and onward we should look at a) + rescheduling their debt and b) a much higher ratio of grants to credits + in security assistance.

+

What I am arguing for costs very little in relation to its contribution + to U.S. national security and political interests. It is inconceivable + to me that two F–15s (which cost in the range of what we are seeking) + provide more security for the United States than a strong strategic + partnership with Morocco. It is entirely within our power to maintain + and build that partnership. President Nixon, who knows Morocco well, + told me “it would cost us peanuts!”

+ +

As a former banker I’ve never been known to be the type of person who + panics, but this situation in Morocco causes me very grave concern. + Recent events have convinced me that it is imperative that a group be + set up to resolve the arrearages problem in time for the U.S.-Moroccan + Joint Military Committee meetings to be held in Washington, May + 11–12.

+ J +
+
+ 216. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco (05/04/1983–07/31/1983). Confidential. Weinberger wrote: “Bill” above + Clark’s typed name in the addressee line. + + + Washington, May 17, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Morocco Joint Military Commission (JMC) (U) + +

(C) We have just completed the second + annual U.S.-Morocco JMC. Although the + meeting took place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and candor, it was + nevertheless under the cloud of Morocco’s very serious economic + problems. As you recall, we took $52M of FMSCR away from Morocco as part of our reprogramming of + $60M for El Salvador and, at this point, the Moroccans are within a few + days of missing a $10.3M repayment on older loans, which will require us + by law to invoke the Brooke Amendment.See + footnote 2, Document 215. + The Moroccans reminded us loud and clear of the commitment made by the + President in his letter to King Hassan to do our utmost to restore the + $52M.See Document + 213. The message was strong: they expect us to + deliver on the President’s promise and are asking our help in any way we + can to assist them with their current arrearage problem, particularly as + they are facing the paradoxical situation where their repayments + virtually match our security assistance allocation.

+

(C) The Moroccans have contributed + significantly to the stability of the Africa/Middle East region, and + they have not been reluctant to support our objectives with troops, if + necessary. I believe it is in our interest to continue to support Morocco, and we + should do our utmost to assist this strong ally through this difficult + period.In a May 24 memorandum to + Weinberger, Clark + replied: “I agree with your assessment of the importance of + assisting this strong ally. We need to do our utmost to restore the + $52 million of FMSCR taken from + Morocco as a part of the reprogramming of $60 million to El + Salvador.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco + (05/04/1983–07/31/1983))

+ Cap +
+
+ 217. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco (04/27/1983–05/03/1983). Secret. Tabs B and C are attached + but not printed. Printed from an unsigned and uninitialed + copy. + + + Washington, undated + + + + SUBJECT + US-Moroccan Joint Military Commission (JMC) (U) + +

(U) In response to your tasking + memorandum, of May 24 (TAB A),Tab A is + attached but not printed. See footnote 4, + Document 216. an interagency review (IG), chaired by Assistant Secretary + Armitage, was held on June 10.No minutes of + the IG meeting have been + found. See TAB B for the list of attendees.

+

(C) The consensus of the representatives + is as follows: + + The reported GOM payment of + $10.3M eases the immediate crisis, as it delays Brooke Amendment + sanctions until at least September, when payments totaling + $10.9M (plus late charges) are due to avoid Brooke Amendment + sanctions.See footnote 2, Document + 215. + + In the spirit of the Presidential commitment to King + Hassan,See Document 213. and given Morocco’s + responsiveness to US policies, + as well as its strategic importance, it is incumbent upon the + Administration to step up efforts to restore to Morocco the $52M + diverted for El Salvador. + + It appears reasonably certain that Congress will appropriate + $22M for Morocco in the FY 83 + supplemental bill. In regard to the remaining $30M, however, we need to wait + until we have a clearer view of the extent Congress will satisfy + the Administration’s requests for El Salvador. + + Should we fail in restoring the $52M FMSCR, due to Congressional or + other actions, we would look for alternative ways of satisfying + Morocco’s requirements. Such action might take the form of + lesser sums of ESF. +

+

(C) Although not within the purview of the + IG, the group took advantage of the + assembled expertise to briefly and informally discuss Morocco’s needs + for FY’s 84–85 and the out years. An + OSD position paper on this subject, + intended for consideration by the State Department in the normal + budgetary process, is at TAB C.

+

(C) It was agreed that, although the + immediate problem has been somewhat mitigated by Morocco’s payment, it + will continue to require high-level attention, given that no relief to + Morocco’s dire financial condition is in sight for the foreseeable + future.

+
+
+ 218. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Box 11, Mtgs w/Sec + of State (Memos for the Record), Apr ’81–Dec ’85. Secret. [less than 1 line not + declassified]. + + + Washington, July 15, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + DCI and DDCI Meeting with Secretary of State, 15 July + 1983 + +

1. The following topics were discussed:

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

— Morocco: Relations with the US. The DCI cited the King of Morocco’s need for + moral support in dealing with the IMF + and regarding the reprogram to El Salvador of $52 million originally + slated for Morocco.See Document 214. + Eagleburger said that they had + some measures they could undertake to fix the situation. The DDCI suggested that the Secretary visit + Morocco to assure him of continued US + support. Shultz said he was not + eager to travel, but said that he is going to Algeria in September. The + DDCI said that if he were to visit + Algeria it would be imperative that he visit Morocco first. Shultz said he would visit Spain at + the end of this month. The DCI said + that he suggests that it would just be a hop over to Morocco and that he ought to do it. The + Secretary seemed to be persuaded.

+

Action: Per the DDCI’s request, I notified the DDI/NESA, DDI/CPAS, and + DDI/EURA, as well as DDO/NESA and DDO/EUR to be sure to provide the + Secretary with appropriate intelligence support.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+ [name not + declassified] +
+
+ 219. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSource: + Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, + Morocco 1983 (08/01/1983–12/31/1983). Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; + Orcon. No drafting information appears on the report. + + 659–AR + + Washington, August 1, 1983 + + +

(S/NF) MOROCCO: POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE REGIME

+

(S/NF/NC/OC) Summary

+

Morocco currently is beset by numerous internal difficulties that pose + potential threats to King Hassan’s regime. Above all, a number of + serious economic problems have brought the kingdom to the brink of + financial crisis. Bad harvests caused by recurrent droughts, declining + phosphate revenues, and a sharp cutback in generous financial assistance + from Saudi Arabia have combined to produce large current account + deficits. Morocco’s poor short-term financial situation undercuts the + government’s ability to obtain new credits. The economic burdens add to + other societal problems, including a growing population of unemployed + young people with little hope for a secure future. On the political + front, the country’s many parties generally are disgruntled over the + regime’s manipulation of this year’s elections.

+

Despite these difficulties, the regime has assets working in its favor, + including the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, the national + consensus over the Sahara issue, the political parties’ stake in the + present system, and Hassan’s ability to control the political process. + The military appears to be loyal, apolitical, and content with the + current conduct of the Sahara war. Even if events go badly for the + regime, it can and will resort to its effective apparatus of repression, + which will maintain it in power at least in the short term.

+ +

The King’s expedients in coping with short-term problems will damage + long-term stability, however. The monarchy’s prospects for survival are + weak because the King is not creating institutions to keep the country + on an even keel after he dies. The divisions within the political elite + stymie the political process in Morocco. In addition, the regime may + face the challenge of a strong Islamic fundamentalist movement in the + 1990s. Finally, Morocco’s limited economic potential will undermine the + regime’s ability to stave off an extended confrontation with the + movement of social forces against it.

+
+
+ 220. Message From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + (McMahon) to Director of + Central Intelligence CaseySource: Central Intelligence + Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job + 85M000364R: Box 14, C–379, Morocco. Secret. Attached to a November + 15 typewritten note from Casey to McFarlane which reads “Dear Bud, I think the + President will be interested in this message from King Hassan.” + Reagan initialed the top + of the message. Above the subject line Casey wrote “King Hassan (Morocco) thoughts on + striking back in Lebanon.” + + + Rabat, undated + + + + SUBJECT + Msg for DCI + + + + DDCI requests following be + passed to DCI as quickly as + possible: + + During 15 November meeting with King Hassan II,A record of + McMahon’s meeting + with Hassan is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Morocco, 12/13/1983–02/03/1984. + DDCI raised question of probable + Arab world/Middle Eastern response to an American retaliation for + the Beirut bombingReference is to the + October 23 bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks and French Army + barracks in Beirut that killed 241 Marines and 58 French + servicemen. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, + Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984. of the + MAU headquarters. [5¼ + lines not declassified] + + [1 paragraph (3½ lines) not + declassified] + + The King listed benefits of an “appropriate response” as + + Elevating the prestige of the US. + + Weakening the Syrians who are a negative influence + throughout the region, and + + + “Improving the balance” in the Iran/Iraq war by weakening + the Syrians and Iranians, both of whom are enemies of + Iraq. + + + [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not + declassified] + + Ambassador Reed, who also + attended audience [less than 1 line not + declassified] is preparing a similar message to the + President.Reed’s message to + Reagan is in + telegram 9409 from Rabat, November 15. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N830011–0302) [less than 1 line not + declassified] + +

End of message

+
+
+ 221. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White + HouseSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + Secto + 15075. + + Rabat, December 11, 1983, 2331Z + + +

NSC for Bud McFarlane. Dept for C. + Hill. Subject: Memorandum for the President—Visit to + Morocco; Discussion With King Hassan.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + King Hassan of Morocco received me today with his usual warmth, + candor, and interesting advice. He was much more subtle and + understanding than the Tunisians had been about our relations with + Israel.For a record of Shultz’s conversation with + Bourguiba, see Document 311. He said he + accepted with full confidence my explanation that our military + cooperation with Israel was directed against the Soviets, not the + Arabs, and that we had strongly reaffirmed to Shamir our intention to maintain + close relations with our Arab friends and our determination to + proceed with your September 1 peace proposal. + + Hassan said he knew the U.S. needed an ally against the Soviets in + the Middle East. He said, however, we could be the victim of a + torrent of criticism at the coming January summit of Islamic + countriesThe Fourth Summit of the + Organization of Islamic Conference was scheduled to be held in + Casablanca January 16–19, 1984. unless we did two things. + First, we should explain carefully our policies towards Israel. + Second, we should divert attention from Lebanon and isolate Syria by + creating new motion in the peace process. + + + He developed this latter concept in some detail. He had recently + heard from Arafat that the + PLO would undertake in writing + to support negotiations with Israel by a Jordanian/Palestinian + delegation in accordance with your September 1 proposal provided the + USG agreed to Palestinian + self-determination. (Hassan had made this same proposal some eight + months ago and we dodged it because it required unacceptable changes + in your proposals. I therefore reacted cautiously.) + + Hassan went on to say that we should deal with the Syrian problem + by creating a new focus of Middle Eastern attention on the peace + process. Syria would find itself isolated and no longer in a + position “to say yes or no on behalf of all Arabs.” He was pleased + when I said I would report these views to you. + + I told Hassan we thought this was time for us to strengthen our + relations with Iraq and asked him for his advice and support. Hassan + urged that we resume full diplomatic relations with Iraq, and + volunteered to get word to the Iraqis that the U.S. was prepared to + take this step. I accepted his offer and urged him to encourage the + Iraqis to respond. Hassan also reaffirmed his intention to bring + about the return of Egypt to the Islamic Conference, thus beginning + to establish a better moderate counterweight to Syria. + + We also took up several specific bilateral matters. I asked if he + could expedite negotiations of a new VOA agreement and he agreed. He asked for help with the + too rigorous economic conditions being imposed on him by the IMF and I agreed. Saying that he + preferred our discussion to focus on global issues, he asked if he + could send to Washington a “commission,” perhaps headed by his new + Prime Minister, to discuss the details of our economic and military + assistance and get some private investment problems straightened + out. I replied we would welcome such a group and start inter-agency + preparations immediately. Finally he spoke about his Western Sahara + problem. He asked, not that we support his right to the area, but + that we get out word that he was acting in good faith to hold a + referendum which, he explained, he was certain would verify his + claim. I replied we would not hesitate to say that we supported him + on his commitment to the OAU + referendum. + + All in all, we had a good exchange on Middle Eastern issues and on + how we can help each other in a number of specific areas. It is + clear that Hassan is looking for more economic and military help + from us. My conversation with him confirmed that our relations with + Morocco are worth our investment in them.A complete record of the Shultz-Hassan + conversation is in telegram 10269 from Rabat, December 14. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830736–0509) + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 222. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger) and the + Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and + Technology (Schneider) to + Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, + George Shultz Papers, + Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/21/1984–01/24/1984). Secret. A + stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” + Covey initialed the + memorandum in the top right corner and wrote: “1/24.” + + + Washington, January 24, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Additional Assistance for Morocco + +

We agree with NEA that more assistance + to Morocco would be useful.NEA’s recommendations are in an + undated action memorandum from Murphy to Shultz sent through Eagleburger and Schneider. (Ibid.) We do not believe NEA has made a sufficient case for $40 + million as compared with the $20 million we propose. The fact is that + the FY 1983 level was artificially high + because of the Congressional earmark on military assistance. Had the + funds not been earmarked, the FY 1983 + levels would have been $40–50 million lower to meet unmet, and higher + priority needs elsewhere, e.g., in Pakistan.

+

The add-on we propose is substantial. It is multiples above the $5 + million we allocated to Tunisia last week—in the face of very similar + circumstances. To go higher now for Morocco will also have FY 1985 implications, since we would again + face a perceived requirement to sustain Morocco’s upward aid trend. In + the global framework, this privileged status for Morocco does not seem + warranted.

+

If you believe we must provide additional funds to Morocco, there are + essentially two options.

+ + + Cut Zimbabwe ESF by $10 million and reduce the unallocated + FMS pool by $10 + million. To cut Zimbabwe further now would vitiate the + impact of our action last month. You decided then to make the cuts + and allow that action to speak for itself. It is too early to say + how the message was received, but there is little doubt that a + further cut would be read as a U.S. decision to write off Zimbabwe. + There would also be Congressional costs. While the FMS was officially described as + unallocated, we had notionally earmarked the entire sum for Lebanon. + The pol-mil team that visited Lebanon last week indicated we would + draw on the pool to pay for the tanks and artillery that the LAF now + seeks. While we will in all likelihood seek a supplemental, we need + all of the pool money as bridge financing. + + Shift $20 million ESF from Turkey to Morocco in FY 1985—We have proposed $175 + million ESF for Turkey in FY 1985, an amount we may not be able + to allocate when we actually see what we are getting from Congress. Nevertheless, + the Turks already are miffed that we are not seeking a supplemental + for the $36.5 million ESF shortfall + in FY 1984. They are inevitably + aware informally of the FY 1985 + numbers and likely would see any cut now as a political signal on + Cyprus. It may be that we choose to shift money next year, but this + is a decision whose cost we cannot measure now. DOD (and EUR) would strongly object, and you likely would have + to face off Weinberger on + the decision. + +

Recommendation

+ + + That you agree to our proposal to allocate an additional $20 + million in PL–480, D.A., and/or + ESF to Morocco for FY 1984.Shultz initialed + the “Agree” line of this recommendation. + + In addition, if you agree with NEA that an additional $20 million is necessary above + the amount we recommend:Shultz did not indicate + agreement or disagreement with either of the following + recommendations. + +

That you agree to cut Zimbabwe by $10 million and shift $10 million in + FMS to Morocco from the funds + identified for additional Lebanon requirements.

+

Alternately that you agree to shift $20 million in FY 1985 ESF from Turkey to Morocco.

+
+
+ 223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + January–March 1984. Secret. + + + Washington, March 1, 1984 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

4. Morocco: Official Visit of the Prime Minister. + Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and I met late this afternoon to summarize + the results of his visit.A record of the + Shultz-Karim-Lamrani conversation is in telegram 61214 to Rabat, + March 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840137–0085) We have signed a major + agreement, for expansion of the existing Voice of America broadcast + facility, and initialed another, a bilateral investment treaty. We have + found additional funds for FY 84 PL–480 and have restored some FMS credits. I believe we have been + successful in reassuring the Moroccans of our commitment to develop + assistance programs in FY 85 and FY 86 which take Morocco’s great needs into + account. (S)

+
+ +
+ 224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and FranceSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D840141–0670. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Karen Clark (S), Murphy, + Schneider, McKinley, and Thomas Randall + (S/S–O); approved by Kimmitt. + + 63328. + + Washington, March 3, 1984, 0441Z + + +

Rabat pass Amb Walters Paris for + Cheshes. Subject: The President’s Meeting With Prime Minister + Karim-Lamrani.

+

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. The President received Moroccan Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani at the + White House on March 1, 1984 at 1:30 p.m. Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, National Security Advisor + McFarlane and Ambassador + Joseph Verner Reed were with + the President. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Ambassador + Ali Bengelloun.

+

The President opened with a warm greeting to the Prime Minister. He asked + the Prime Minister to send his warmest regards to King Hassan II. The President said that the + U.S. is grateful for the King’s help with such matters as landing rights + and with his work for peace. The President looked forward to having the + benefits of King Hassan’s continuing assistance for his administration + and for the country.

+

Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani thanked the President for receiving him. He + said that King Hassan had asked him to come to Washington. Karim-Lamrani + said King Hassan had told him that he was giving him (Lamrani) two gifts: First to meet one + of the great men of our time; then to carry out a mission for + cooperation and peace. Karim-Lamrani said that the King had been right. + The Prime Minister wished to transmit his government’s and his people’s + warmest feelings of friendship and affection for the President and the + United States. He said that King Hassan nourishes towards the President + and the United States more than friendship—true affection. The Prime + Minister said he had been given three tasks: First, he had come as a + messenger from his Chief of State to hand the President a message (in + both English and Arabic) describing the purpose of his mission to deepen + and enlarge the economic and military cooperation between the two + countries. He and his delegation had been asked to come to the United + States to make sure the administration understands the great economic + difficulties in which Morocco now finds itself. Morocco’s problems are + many but they are all exacerbated by what is now ten years of drought. + Water is lacking not only for agriculture but for human consumption as + well. Morocco needs help to meet its current difficult situation. The + Prime Minister said that with American support and assistance for the + critical period of the next two years Morocco would see its way clear to + handle its other problems. “We count on you Mr. President.”

+ +

Karim-Lamrani closed by apologizing for having to be so outspoken. He + said that the Moroccan people feel true friendship for the U.S. and + explained that because Moroccans feel themselves to be true friends they + feel able to ask for additional assistance in such pressing terms.

+

The President responded that he reciprocates King Hassan’s feelings both + for himself and in behalf of the American people.

+

He said he knew the Prime Minister had been discussing his country’s + problems and that he (the President) was aware of them. The President + said he knew that the constraints under which we are laboring in trying + to be of assistance, has been explained. He indicated the US wants to do all it can; that we will do + our best.

+

Karim-Lamrani then said that his second message concerned a resolution + voted unanimously by the recently concluded OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) summit which + had convened at Casablanca last month. King Hassan is transmitting this + message in his capacity as the current OIC summit Chairman. The conference had discussed the U.S. + position on UNESCODocumentation on the administration’s decision to + withdraw from UNESCO is in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XL, Global Issues + I. and the King’s transmission of the resolution which + had been voted by it. King Hassan hoped that it might be taken into + consideration. The Prime Minister said that King Hassan feels that the + greatest country in the world, respected by all, must be able to + continue to make its contribution. He hoped, the Prime Minister + concluded, that the President’s decision would be taken in the interests + not only of the U.S. but of the entire free world. The President said he + would read the message with interest and would respond.

+

The Secretary of State then said that, with respect to UNESCO, the President had made his + reasons for concern very clear. We would have to withdraw by the end of + this year if the situation which generates our concern has not been + corrected by then. It is not that the U.S. does not support UNESCO. It is, rather, that it believes + the organization has strayed virtually 180 degrees from its course. We + are working with others, said Secretary Shultz, to see whether this situation can be corrected + and the problems it poses for us can be resolved. Should we fail, we + feel we would have no place in the organization.

+

The President then said he would respond to this message as well.

+

Prime Minister Karim Lamrani, + speaking personally, then told the President that everyone in Morocco is + following the American Presidential election campaign with extreme + interest. “People want to see you remain for many years at the head of + the U.S.” Karim Lamrani said + that this was not only the sense of his King and of the Moroccan + Government but also expressed the sentiments of large numbers of + Moroccans who believe that the President’s personality is a guarantee + for peace and for a better + future. The feeling is not only widespread, the Premier said but it’s + spontaneous and sincere. The President vowed to do his best to remain in + office a few more years. Karim + Lamrani, closing, said “when you are re-elected all of + Morocco will celebrate your victory.”

+ Shultz +
+
+ 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840365–1039. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to + Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, + Paris, Tangier, Tunis, and USUN. + + 5063. + + Rabat, June 6, 1984, 1309Z + + +

Dept. Pass SecDef, CINCUSNAVEUR London UK, CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg GE, CINCUSAFE Ramstein AB GE, USDOCO South Naples IT, USCINCEUR Vaihingen GE—to be treated + as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Secretary Weinberger’s Meeting With King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 4683 + (Notal).Telegram 4683 from Rabat, May + 24, contains a record of the May 17 discussion between Weinberger and Karim-Lamrani. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840339–0122)

+ + + (Secret—Entire text.) + + Summary: During discussions May 17–18 with King Hassan in Fez, + Secretary Weinberger + reviewed a broad range of bilateral military assistance and related + issues, and had the opportunity to discuss a variety of regional + security matters. King Hassan talked at length about recent + developments in Morocco’s relations with Libya and Algeria. He asked + for U.S. support for a Moroccan-Portuguese mutual defense treaty. + Discussion of bilateral matters focused on U.S. military and + economic assistance to Morocco, and the need for an increased + percentage of grant aid over the next few years. The Secretary + expressed support for increased levels of assistance in FY 85 and FY 86, and for a more favorable mix of grant aid vs. + loans. End summary. + + Secretary Weinberger met + with King Hassan late May 17 and early May 18 in two separate + sessions, preceding and following dinner hosted by the King in the + Secretary’s honor at the Royal Palace in Fez. King Hassan was joined + by Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and Royal Counselor Reda Guedira; + Secretary Weinberger was + accompanied by Ambassador + Reed, ASD/ISA Armitage and interpreter + Alec Toumayan. The pre-dinner private meeting lasted 25 minutes, + with an additional private meeting of 30 minutes following + dinner. + + Secretary Weinberger + opened the conversation by noting that the third Joint Military + Commission (JMC) meeting, which had + begun the same day in Rabat, was going well, and that its results + would no doubt be a further step forward in U.S.-Moroccan + relations.A record of the + discussions at the JMC is in + telegram 4647 from Rabat, May 23. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840335–0601) + King Hassan agreed, and said that he understood the meaning of the + Secretary’s simultaneous visit to Morocco, and appreciated the + broader political understanding which it represents. In this + context, The King commented that he had received a Libyan delegation + led by Colonel (Hafiz) Mas’ud that same morning. The Libyans had + asked Hassan about the reason for the Secretary’s visit, which the + King explained. Hassan said that the Libyans had left reassured and + “fully understanding” the reasons for the Secretary’s visit. Turning + to the mission of the Libyan delegation, the King explained that + they had come because the Libyans felt that Morocco might have been + involved in last week’s “coup attempt” in Tripoli.Not further identified. Some of those + arrested carried Moroccan passports. “I told the Libyans that those + were passports issued before July, 1983.” (Comment: The current + rapprochement between Libya and Morocco dates from July, 1983, when + Qadhafi visited the King + in Rabat.See Document 22. End comment.) + + The Secretary noted that the U.S. remains concerned about Libyan + activities around the world, and that during the recent crisis at + the Libyan People’s Bureau in London,See footnote 5, Document 41. + the Libyans had made threats against U.S. diplomats there and + elsewhere. The U.S., he stressed, continues to watch the situation + carefully. The Secretary then referred to his last meeting with + Hassan,See Document 221. when the King had expressed a + desire to cut off Libyan arms shipments to the Polisario, and asked + Hassan whether Qadhafi had in + fact stopped all arms shipments into the Sahara. Hassan said that + arms shipments from the Libyans had come to a complete stop. He then + reported that Prime Minister Thatcher had asked him to act as intermediary during + the London crisis and that, as a result, Hassan had talked with + Col. Mas’ud (who he referred to + as commander of Libyan forces during Qadhafi’s first incursion into Chad). Libya had + later given assurances to the British about the safety of British + citizens remaining in Libya, in which, Hassan suggested, Prime + Minister Thatcher could be + confident. Commenting on the Libyan economy, The King said that U.S. measures had been + successful: “Qadhafi has no liquidity, no dollars. He has had to + barter for everything with oil.” The King urged the U.S. to keep the + pressure on. The Secretary asked whether reports of internal + opposition in Libya could be considered reliable, to which the King + replied that the situation appeared very serious. Commenting on + recent developments, he said that the commando unit involved not + only had infiltrated across the Tunisian border, but had also + succeeded in seizing a building opposite the barracks where + Qadhafi resides. The plan + was revealed, however, when a driver who picked up three hitchhikers + noticed they had sand on their boots. The driver informed the local + police, who arrested the three. They were carrying a full list of + accomplices in Libya, which the police then rounded up. Hassan + commented that the Libyans consider the event as a warning. There + will be other similar attacks in the future, they believe. + + The Secretary congratulated the King on the successful conclusion + of the recent Congress of Moroccan Jewish communities held in Rabat. + The King said that it was now up to Israel and, in particular, Jews + in the U.S. to “help and understand us.” In this regard, the King + noted that Congressman Stephen Solarz, who had participated in the + Rabat meeting, had seemed to reverse his position on Morocco, and + had promised to lobby for Morocco with Democrats in Congress. The + Secretary commented that Solarz is a key figure in Congress. + + Turning to the Secretary’s meeting with Prime Minister + Karim-Lamrani earlier the same day (reftel) the Secretary said that + the meeting had been very useful. The U.S., he said, would endeavor + to secure more military and economic assistance for Morocco. In an + aside, the Secretary commented that Congressman Solarz would be very + useful in this regard. The Secretary then delivered President + Reagan’s letter of May + 14 to the King,In his May 14 letter to + Hassan, Reagan said he + was “delighted” that Weinberger would be able to attend the upcoming + JMC, which he considered + “an important manifestation of our close working relationship + with Morocco and as tangible evidence of our shared goals in + regional stability and peace.” (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Head of State + File, Morocco: King Hassan + II (820564–8206108) [3 + lines not declassified]. The King recounted an anecdote + from Moroccan Air Force Inspector Colonel-Major Kabbaj, dating from + a visit to the USS Saratoga during a joint + exercise, when a U.S. Officer had told Kabbaj that the conflict in + the Western Sahara marked the first time a regular army had defeated + a guerrilla force. The officer claimed that the U.S. military had + originally believed that Morocco could not win. The Secretary + replied that the U.S. had, in fact, been worried because of the + resupply problem, but that everything had worked out well. Recent + victories demonstrate Morocco is safe and strong. + + The King agreed, noting that there was no longer a serious + military threat to Morocco. Algeria will not intervene. Three or + four years ago he had been + worried about Algerian intervention—now he is “just concerned, not + so worried.” He added that he is determined to do nothing to provoke + the Algerians. “If we do have to fight, however, we have been in the + field for 10 years—we are well trained, and we will be more + effective.” The Secretary agreed that Morocco’s armed forces are + superior to those of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The Libyans, in + particular, have large stockpiles of weapons, but do not know how to + use them. The King said that Bendjedid had told Hassan’s recent envoy to Algiers + (presumably Royal Counselor Guedira) that “he personally had ordered + MIG 25’s to overfly Moroccan territory” and was pleased that Hassan + had sent an envoy to discuss the situation. Continuing, the King + said that he would not allow a situation to develop which might lead + to conflict between Algeria and Morocco. + + The King concluded the pre-dinner conversation with a brief + reference to the possibility that Iran, according to intelligence he + had received, might be developing “nuclear facilities.” He said that + he understood that the German company which had developed rocket + facilities in Zaire was now involved in development of nuclear + facilities in Iran, and suggested that the U.S. should look into + this possibility. + + Following dinner hosted by the King, the Secretary raised a series + of bilateral questions. He informed Hassan that the “Thunderbirds” + aerial demonstration team would visit Morocco July 6 for graduation + exercises at the Air Force Academy. The King expressed great + pleasure, remarking that he had first seen the team over New York + Harbor in 1963. The Secretary then confirmed that the U.S. would + soon be able to provide training for Moroccan military bands. A + survey team would arrive in June, to be followed by instructors. The + King thanked the Secretary and said that Colonel-Major Kabbaj would + be especially pleased, since he had long sought to reshape the Air + Force Band in the “American style,” which he preferred to that of + the French. Third, the Secretary and Ambassador Reed said it was urgent for the + King to appoint a coordinator for the weather modification program. + The King said that “you have my approval with 11 hours to spare, and + I have appointed Kabbaj as coordinator.” (Telex confirmation of the + Kabbaj appointment was received by the Embassy within 7 hours.) [4½ lines not declassified] The King pointed + out that, until now, Moroccan forces had fought in terrain with deep + gullies and canyons. “Now, if the Polisario wants to do anything, it + will have to do so on flat terrain.” + + Turning to multilateral issues, the King said that since the + Secretary would be visiting Portugal on May 18–19, perhaps he could + carry a message. Hassan said that he had urged the Portuguese to + consider a mutual defense treaty with Morocco, and that the + Portuguese appear to be well disposed. Spain, on the other hand, + seems reluctant to join in such a treaty. [4½ + lines not declassified] The Secretary agreed to inform the Portuguese + Defense Minister that the U.S. would be favorably disposed toward a + mutual defense treaty between Morocco and Portugal.In telegram 5130 from Lisbon, May 25, the + Embassy reported that Weinberger passed Hassan’s message to Eanes, who “shared Secretary + Weinberger’s + assessment that King Hassan is a skilled and intelligent + leader.” Eanes also said + “he was very interested in the situation in Morocco because of + the strategic trilateral relationship that exists between + Portugal, Morocco, and Spain. They control the entrance to the + Mediterranean and needed to act in concert to keep those waters + open in the event of an emergency requiring the rapid deployment + of forces to the Middle East.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840007–0321) + Portugal, he said, is a loyal friend of the United States. The King + said that Prime Minister Soares had told him that, while he was a + committed socialist, he was not a communist. + + The Secretary indicated that the USG looked forward to welcoming Matti Jorio, the Moroccan + Ambassador-designate to Washington, in the near future. The King + said that Jorio would soon be + in Washington. Referring to Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani’s earlier + comments, Secretary Weinberger said that the President and he are + determined to secure from Congress as much military and economic aid + for Morocco as possible. It will be difficult to obtain much more in + FY 85 but all efforts will be + expended in FY 86 to obtain + substantial increases. The State Department is involved in this + effort, as well. The President hopes to get agreement from Congress, + and to obtain a flexible and more useful combination of grants and + loans. The U.S. understands the need to avoid adding to Morocco’s + indebtedness, if possible, and therefore will work to maximize + grants and military training. + + The King expressed confidence that the President would be + reelected, and that these initiatives would become reality. He + reiterated that he fully understood the significance of the + Secretary’s visit as an expression of political support for Morocco + at an important time. Jokingly, he added that if the U.S. were not + in a pre-electoral period, he would gladly decorate the Secretary. + Given the politics of U.S. Presidential campaigns, however, that + might not be a good idea now. Closing the conversation, Hassan said + that he hoped to visit the U.S. for the opening of the Moroccan + pavilion at the Epcot Center in September and that he would like to + stop in Washington and have lunch with the President while also + seeing “old and good friends” of the administration. + + This message cleared by ASD/ISA Armitage. + + Nouakchott minimize considered. + + Kirby +
+ +
+ 226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + July–December 1984. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, August 21, 1984 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

2. Morocco: General Walters to Confer with King Hassan. + Dick Walters departs for + Morocco tomorrow to explain to King Hassan why we postponed joint + military exercises which had been scheduled for August and September. It + was our judgment that carrying out these exercises might have provoked + the Algerians to lessen their efforts aimed at release of the Beirut + kidnappees.Documentation on the + kidnappings of U.S. citizens in Beirut and Algerian efforts to + secure their release is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Parts 1 and + 2, Terrorism. Since + Walters’ trip was + conceived, the King and Colonel Qadhafi announced their “Treaty of Federation.”Telegram 7069 from Rabat, August 14, contains + the text of a joint Libyan-Moroccan communiqué announcing the union + of the two nations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D840517–0979) Although we have + been assured by the Moroccan Prime Minister and Foreign Minister that + this does not signify any shift in political orientation, it is + nonetheless a matter of some concern. We have therefore prepared points + for WaltersTalking points for Walters were not found. to raise with Hassan + making clear to the King our reservations about the potential + implications of his quickened relationship with the Libyan regime. (SENSITIVE)

+
+
+ 227. Memorandum From Robert + Kimmitt of the National Security Council Staff to + Geoffrey Kemp and Philip Dur of the National Security + Council StaffSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Morocco (03/13/1984–08/24/1984). + Secret. + + + Washington, August 27, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Shultz’s Evening + Report of:An unknown hand wrote: + “8/24/84.” + +

The following excerpt is for your information only. Please do not refer to it in any discussions.

+ +

2. King Hassan on Morocco/Libya Ties. Dick Walters met August 23 with King + Hassan to discuss the recently concluded “Treaty of Federation” between + Morocco and Libya.A record of the + Walters-Hassan conversation is printed as Document 38. See also + footnote 3, Document 226. Hassan said his action grew out of + the “isolation” forced on Morocco by the conclusion last year of a + “Treaty of Friendship” between Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania.An unknown hand wrote: “Kemp” and “Dur” in + the left-hand margin next to this sentence. Hassan said “I + have no illusions about Qadhafi. + Either I tame him or the union breaks up. . . .” Meanwhile, intelligence + reportsNot found. cite former + Foreign Minister Boucetta as + having said that the primary motivation for the treaty was economic and + that Libya had agreed to as much as $600 million “counter trade” a year + to be paid for with oil. Hassan’s explanation is, obviously, not totally + satisfying, but we should reserve judgment until after conversations + with Royal Counselor Guedira whom the King is dispatching to Washington + on September 4.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+
+
+ 228. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + July–December 1984. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, September 5, 1984 + + +

1. Meeting With Moroccan Envoy. I met today with + Reda Guedira, sent by King Hassan + II to explain the Libyan/Moroccan “Treaty of Union.”A record of the Shultz-Guedira meeting is in + telegram 267326 to Paris, September 11. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N840010–0334) His message was that King Hassan is courageous, + wise and fundamentally devoted to the same principles and values that we + uphold. Against this background, the Treaty is a vehicle by which Hassan + hopes to impel Qadhafi towards + responsible behavior. Hassan perceives himself as uniquely positioned to + play a positive role in the Maghreb, the Arab world and Africa and + believes his ability effectively to do so is enhanced by his Treaty with + Qadhafi. I asked Guedira to + convey to Hassan our deep concern about the Treaty. Qadhafi is reprehensible in every + respect and his regime should be isolated. Through the Treaty, Hassan has cast his mantle of + respectability over this mad man. I noted the possible transfer of + technology, potential compromise of US + intelligence, and the turn over of Libyan dissidents as points of + particular concern. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+
+
+ 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840593–0121. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Priority to Paris and Ndjamena. Sent for information to Algiers, + Tunis, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Cairo. + + 8140. + + Rabat, September 18, 1984, + 1854Z + + + + SUBJECT + September 17 Audience With King Hassan. + + + + (S—Entire text.) + + Monday evening, September 17, during wedding festivities for his + daughter, King Hassan granted joint half-hour interview to me, + Ambassador at Large Walters, and former Ambassadors Neumann and Duke. + + The King began by saying that he understands the difficulties that + the Moroccan-Libyan union agreementSee + Document 226. has caused + for U.S.-Moroccan relations and that he especially understands that + this is potentially difficult for President Reagan in this election year. He + said that he hopes the President and the American Government will + understand that Morocco had never before found itself as + diplomatically isolated as was the case this past summer. Hassan + said that he had seen an opportunity to break out of that isolation + and had grasped it. He said that his decision to sign the accord + with Libya related to his own sense of timing and his estimate of + Moroccan national interests and of how they could best be served. He + noted that as King of Morocco he must do what he considers to be in + the country’s best interests. He said that he is naturally sorry + that his decision has turned out to be difficult for some but that + he felt that the opportunity which he had seen was one that he + simply could not pass up. The King continued that he is working on + Qadhafi to turn him into + an “oppositionist” if need be, rather than a terrorist. Noting that + he, too, is an oppositionist when the occasion demands, Hassan said + that he wants Qadhafi to move + in the direction of + responsible opposition toward policies and events with which he + disagrees rather than remain in his longtime posture of strident, + disruptive behavior. + + Turning to yesterday’s announcement in Paris of the troop + disengagement in Chad,Documentation is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVIII, Libya; Chad. Hassan said that President + Mitterrand had called him + Monday morning to say that “everything has been concluded and will + be announced today.” The King said that troop withdrawal will occur + between September 25 and November 1. While disclaiming paternity for + the French-Libyan agreement, Hassan appeared nonetheless to be + trying to leave the impression that Morocco had played some kind of + facilitative role, if even only a minor one. In disclaiming + paternity he said that “my only genius” was to bring Mitterrand here to Morocco at the + right time and to persuade him that the moment was ripe for + Mitterrand’s brother to + visit Libya. + + The King then launched into a lengthy dissertation on Arafat. He pointed to a recent + Arafat interview with + “Der Spiegel” in which Arafat + allegedly said that he is ready to recognize Israel and go to the + negotiating table directly with Israel. (Comment: We have not seen + this interview. End comment.) Hassan said that Arafat has asked him to reconcile + him (Arafat) with Qadhafi. Hassan then said that “I + am taking full credit for managing Arafat and I hope your President will recognize + that.” Hassan implied that he would appreciate some kind of message + from the President and Secretary expressing sympathy and support for + his role in this regard. + + The King noted that he will send Royal Counselor Guedira to + Tripoli next MondaySeptember 24. + to begin working out terms of reference and the structure of the + union with Libya. Guedira and his counterparts on the Libyan side + will attempt to work out the distribution of duties under the + accord. The King then said, somewhat curiously, that Morocco and + Libya may identify some issues in their union that they do not agree + on and that these could be taken to the International Court of + Justice. (Comment: We would speculate that the King may have been + trying to signal that this could be a way of dragging out and + delaying further elaboration of the union and its structure. End + comment.) + + The King then returned to the personality of Qadhafi, saying rather sharply that + he wished the Americans generally and our media in particular would + stop referring to Qadhafi as + a terrorist and giving him a high public profile, thus making him + appear bigger and more important than he really is. The King quipped + quietly that Qadhafi is crazy + and perhaps is even a terrorist in some respects, but said that it suits nobody’s interest + to puff Qadhafi’s own sense + of self by calling him such. Hassan continued that Syria’s Assad, + not Qadhafi, is America’s + real problem: “He is a much bigger problem for you than Qadhafi.” + Hassan said bluntly that it is Assad who is the terrorist—“he + murders more people but just doesn’t say very much about it.” The + King then pointedly said that the death of U.S. Marines should be + laid at Assad’s door since he is the one who controls the Shias in + Lebanon. + + Reed +
+
+ 230. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0004, 1984 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 1, Morocco (Sep–Dec). Secret. Weinberger wrote: “Bud” above the + title Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs” in + the address line. + + + Washington, September 21, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + (U) US-Moroccan Relations Next + Steps + +

(S) King Hassan was surprised at the + overwhelmingly negative US reaction to + the Oujda Treaty and has appealed to us to help him out of his dilemma. + The following thoughts, in conjunction with Joe Reed’s message,In + telegram 8139 from Rabat, September 18, Reed reported that following his return to Rabat, + “this is how I see the current situation in U.S.-Moroccan relations. + One month has passed since signature of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty + of union. While practical steps have yet to be taken to implement + the agreement, King Hassan—although now well aware of strong U.S.G. + concern—clearly plans to test the advantages of union. In these + circumstances, I believe the USG + should adopt a somewhat more reserved profile in Morocco over the + months just ahead.” He continued that the United States should also + underscore its “serious concern while preserving basic U.S. + interests in Morocco and the long-term relationship.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840593–0261) should be helpful as we deliberate the future + of US-Moroccan relations in the aftermath of the Treaty.

+

(S) State’s informal legal assessment is + that, despite the Treaty, we still are dealing with two countries, + Morocco and Libya, and, hence, there are no direct legal consequences of + the agreement (i.e., third country transfer prohibitions continue to be + operative). However, there is + strong interagency concernNot found. + that King Hassan has not been forthcoming in his explanation of various + provisions of the Treaty, that information on possible secret codicils + has been withheld, and that the King has not been truthful with us on + the treatment of the Libyan dissident returned to Libya.

+

(S) Given our close, historic ties and + significant interests in Morocco, we believe it is important to give + King Hassan the benefit of the doubt. However, we also must get some + straightforward answers and make clear that our position has not changed + on Qadhafi and his policies of + terrorism and subversion.

+

(S) Significant, highly visible actions + taken against Morocco to signal our displeasure (e.g., immediate + cancellation of visits or exercises, etc.,) would disrupt US-Moroccan + relations, jeopardize US military + programs in Morocco—including US + access/transit rights—and force King Hassan into more radical positions + on the Middle East. Such actions would be exploited by Qadhafi and those in Morocco who desire + to destroy US-Moroccan relations as evidence that the US is unreliable and unwilling to keep + security commitments.

+

(S) Thus, we should avoid public positions + that visibly force King Hassan to put distance between the US and Morocco. Although we may want to + adopt a more reserved profile, as Joe + Reed suggests, we should not stop visits, cancel + exercises, or visibly decrease US-Moroccan cooperation in military and + economic fields.

+

(S) Instead, we should set out markers + that offer King Hassan ways to restore US confidence in Morocco and the means to back away from + the agreement with Libya. This could be done in a high level demarche to + the King to: + + Inform him that, while we will continue relations on all + levels, we are aware of Moroccan deception in handing over + Libyan dissidents to Libya. Such deception cannot continue if + US-Moroccan relations are to proceed. + + Ask King Hassan directly if there are secret codicils to the + treaty, while stating that further surprises could destroy + US-Moroccan relations. + + Obtain King Hassan’s written secret agreement that Libyan + military/intelligence officers will not be based in + Morocco. +

+

(S) Regarding the security of US technology/equipment in Morocco, an area + of major concern, we should: + + Recommend that the NDPC Survey Team, which has requested + permission to visit Morocco 12–16 November, be given utmost + cooperation by Moroccan authorities. + + + Encourage Morocco to sign a General Security of Military + Information Agreement (GSOMIA) to help reassure Administration and + Congressional officials of Morocco’s intentions. + + Strongly urge Moroccan Ambassador and other officials to meet + and present candidly their case to members of Congress. +

+

(S) Following the above plan of action + will allow us to protect US interests in + the short-term until full implications of the Moroccan-Libyan agreement + become clear. To that end, we should seek a candid explanation from King + Hassan about his comment that the union will last “one or two months” at + the most and what tangible gains he expects.

+

(S) If the Treaty is an aberrant, + short-term tactical maneuver, we will be able to take advantage of the + opportunities it presents to modify Qadhafi’s behavior (Libyan forces out of Chad; possible + reduction of immediate Libyan threat to Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia; possible + reduction of Libyan terrorist/subversion activities). There is the + possibility that we might obtain some gain for Egypt out of the entire + affair. We might urge King Hassan + II to restore formally ties with Egypt as a signal to all + (including Qadhafi). Although + Hassan would probably consult with the Saudis, we might be helpful. If + the Treaty has a longer life than we expect, we can revise our policy as + necessary.

+ Cap +
+
+ 231. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Hill) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/21/1984–11/19/1984). Secret; + Sensitive. A stamped notation below the date reads: “White House + Situation Room.” + + + Washington, November 10, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Exercise AFRICAN EAGLE with Morocco + +

An air defense combined exercise in Morocco (AFRICAN EAGLE) is scheduled + to commence November 16. Final approval for this exercise had been held + in abeyance pending our Maghreb policy review (NSSD–6–84)See Document + 45. which is still incomplete. We nevertheless + recommend that we proceed with the exercise on schedule.

+

We cannot permit King Hassan to believe that, after our initial negative + reaction to the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union, we have reverted to + business as usual. However, we also believe strongly that unilateral + actions such as the cancellation of exercises on the scale of AFRICAN + EAGLE are neither effective nor befitting our relationship with an ally + as old as Morocco. (In fact, proceeding with the exercise may well + produce some strain in relations between Qaddafi and the King which + could contribute to the unraveling of the agreement.) The King has + responded to our expressions of concern by assuring us that + implementation of the treaty will not involve actions against our + interests.

+

We must now monitor that implementation to hold the King to his word. We + will continue to maintain an open and frank dialogue with King Hassan to + ensure that he is in no doubt about our concerns and remind him that + although we have approved this exercise, and others, there remains a + tension in our bilateral relationship induced by the Treaty of Union. We + also need a clearer idea of what the King seeks to gain from the + union.

+

Continued air operations in Morocco are extremely important to the USAF. The location is convenient and does + not require tanker support during the deployment. The weather is ideal, + the ranges are close to the runways, live ordnance can be dropped, and + the air traffic is minimal. In addition, it is one of the few places in + the European Area of Operations where we can conduct supersonic + dissimilar air combat training. Cancelling AFRICAN EAGLE denies the + USAF valuable training and a + relationship between the military services which has taken years to + develop. In fact, there is concern in EUCOM that cancellation of the exercise would mean the + future permanent loss of the ranges.

+

We would appreciate formal NSC approval + of exercise AFRICAN EAGLE no later than Tuesday, November 13.No record of final NSC approval for the exercise has been found. + This request has the full support of Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger and General Vessey.

+ Charles + HillMcKinley signed for Hill above this typed + signature. + + Executive Secretary + +
+ +
+ 232. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + July–December 1984. Secret. + + + Washington, November 30, 1984 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

2. Morocco: Overtures From Moscow. King Hassan + told Ambassador Reed that a + Soviet military officer dangled before the Moroccans the possibility of + altering Moscow’s Western Sahara policy to support Morocco’s position. + The Soviet also intimated a willingness to offer Rabat + military/technical assistance at “no cost”.In telegram 10634 from Rabat, November 29, Reed reported that during a + November 27 conversation, Hassan “recounted a recent Soviet démarche + that had the stated intention of reducing U.S., and increasing + Soviet, influence in Morocco. The King assured me he was not taken + in by the Soviet enticements, but I found the boldness of the Soviet + advance potentially disturbing.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840763–0016) + Moscow has actively pursued greater visibility in Morocco over the past + year in an obvious attempt to counter U.S. influence. Soviet ship visits + have continued; trade has expanded, benefitting the GOM which has sold significantly greater + amounts of phosphates; the GOM accorded + extensive publicity to a large Soviet trade delegation in October. Aware + of Algeria’s increasing disenchantment and desire to diminish Soviet + influence, the Soviets may be reassessing their strategy in the Maghreb. + They may conclude that Morocco’s severe economic difficulties and + increasing diplomatic isolation provide fertile ground for undercutting + the U.S. Hassan assured Reed + that he is well aware of Soviet duplicity and is not taken in by Soviet + enticements. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility that + Hassan may find further warming of relations with the USSR useful. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+
+ +
+ 233. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N840014–0312. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + 11001. + + Rabat, December 11, 1984, 1228Z + + +

Dept for Secretary Shultz. Dept + please pass to White House for National Security Advisor McFarlane and Admiral Murphy. Dept please pass to + Department of Defense for Secretary Weinberger. Subj: Audience With King Hassan—Message for + the President.

+ + + (Secret-Nodis)—Entire text + + Summary: During an audience in Fes on December 10, King Hassan + dictated a message to President Reagan, urging that the United States provide larger + amounts of material assistance to Morocco. The King’s warning that + the United States is getting more from Morocco than it receives in + return undoubtedly reflects the growing domestic and international + pressures which he is under. End summary. + + In the course of a 90 minute audience December 10 at the Royal + Palace in Fes (full reports of which I am sending by septels),In telegram 11043 from Rabat, December + 11, Reed reported that + Hassan considered French-Moroccan relations “excellent.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840792–0013) In telegram 11047 from Rabat, December + 11, Reed reported that + Hassan had provided “a brief description of the current border + situation with Algeria during a December 10 audience in Fes, + down-playing the risk of direct military conflict but indicating + readiness to fight if attacked.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840792–0056) + the King, acknowledging my renewed expression of concern over + Morocco’s relations with Libya, asked me to convey “textually” the + following “question” to “my friend” the President and his senior + advisors, which he insisted that Pol Off take down verbatim. + + Begin text: “America knows it can do what it wants in Morocco. + Morocco has given you the access and transit agreement, an active + military exercise program, unrestricted ship visits, permission to + expand your Voice of America station, and a host of other programs. + I must ask, what have you done for Morocco in exchange? I value the + close relations I have with the leaders of the United States, and + appreciate the many signs of friendship I receive, but I am + disappointed to note that the friendship is rarely backed up with + corresponding substance. What is America going to do? You will have + to make a choice.” End text. + + In parting I asked Hassan why he had chosen this moment to convey + such a message rather than during the visits to Morocco last year of the Vice + PresidentSee Document 26. and the Secretary of State.See Document + 221. He responded, “I did, but, perhaps I was + too oblique. Now with Addis and New York this is the moment of + truth.” The King reiterated his desire for continued close ties, + reminding me he had given his word that the “union” with Libya would + not in any way affect the U.S. relationship. + + Hassan also observed somewhat ominously that, while he was still + unhappy with the Soviet Union and its equivocal stance on the + Western Sahara, he had received indications from the Soviet + leadership that it will soon change its policy on the Western + Sahara.See Document 232 + + Comment: In my 20 years of acquaintance, I have never seen the + King more tense or impatient than at the December 10 audience. At + several points during the conversation, I interrupted to set the + record straight with regard to substantial American assistance to + Morocco. In this connection, I noted that we have done more for + Morocco in the intelligence field than any other country, but Hassan + put this aside as “a case apart” and instance of “apples and + oranges”. He had clearly rehearsed the message he wished to deliver + and was in no mood to be dissuaded or side-tracked. As we have + reported, he is under increasing pressure at home following recent + diplomatic defeats and increased conflict in the Sahara (Rabat + 10923).In telegram 10923 from + Rabat, the Embassy reported: “a series of diplomatic defeats in + the OAU and UN, as well as stepped up military + activity by the Polisario and Algeria over the past two months, + have confronted Morocco with perhaps its most difficult foreign + policy challenge in recent years.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840781–0228) + Under such stress, Hassan is prone to react as the tribal, Bedouin, + Berber and Francophile chieftain which he is. While the Soviet Union + is clearly maneuvering to gain ground here (Rabat 10634)See footnote 2, Document + 232. Hassan—isolated and lacking other + options—is in my view using the Soviet threat as a bargaining chip + to gain leverage with us. Despite his message above, which reflects + the King’s current mood, I believe that Hassan remains committed to + continued close ties with the United States. Hassan is, however, + passing through his most difficult period in recent years, and we + will need to be alert both to our own interests and to the + possibility of unpredictable reaction to pressure. I will be + formulating recommendations on how to respond to Hassan for + discussion during consultations in Washington on December 18. + + Reed +
+ +
+ 234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850054–0426. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas Wukitsch (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel and Linda Mysliwy; approved + by Nassif. Sent for + information Immediate to Algiers. + + 22608. + + Washington, January 24, 1985, 1952Z + + +

For Ambassador. Subject: Informing King Hassan of Bendjedid Visit.

+ + + S—Entire text + + We are postponing the simultaneous USG–GOA public announcement of Algerian President + Bendjedid’s state visit + until you have the opportunity privately to inform King Hassan. + Following points are provided for your use: + + As you know, President Reagan extended an invitation to President + Bendjedid to make + a state visit in 1985. Bendjedid, accepted and a date for the visit + now has been set—April 17. + + This will be the first visit to the US by President Bendjedid, and the first + visit by an Algerian head of state since 1972 when President + Boumedienne visited. + + We welcome our improving bilateral relations with Algeria. + These relationships do not detract from our long-standing + close ties with Morocco. + + Indeed, we strongly believe that strengthened US relations with Algiers will + enhance our ability to contribute to stability and progress + in the Maghreb. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 235. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Platt) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King + Hassan II + (820564–8206108). Secret; Nodis. + + + Washington, February 1, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Relations with Morocco/Presidential Message to King Hassan + +

On December 10 King Hassan posed to Ambassador Reed (Rabat 11011-NODIS),The telegram number is in error. Reference is to + telegram 11001; see Document 233. + the question “What has the United States done for Morocco in exchange” + for access/transit, military exercises, ships’ visits, and other areas + of cooperation. Hassan stated that he is “disappointed to note that the + friendship is rarely backed up with corresponding substance.”

+

This theme has been followed up in subsequent conversations with Hassan + and high level Moroccan officials. It is now clear that the King expects + a response from the President,In telegram + 310 from Rabat, January 10, Reed reported that a day earlier, “the King asked me + if the President had responded to his message of December 10.” After + Reed explained that the + letter “was, at his suggestion, still being reviewed, the King asked + me to extend a personal invitation to National Security Advisor + McFarlane to visit + Morocco ‘as soon as possible after the inauguration.’ He said such a + visit would provide a good opportunity to review ‘where things + stand,’ as well as to provide you with an opportunity to examine on + your own the current programs of cooperation between the two + countries.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco + (09/21/1984–01/11/1985)) even though the original + conversation was cast in rhetorical terms. The King also issued + invitations through Ambassador Reed to you and to Ambassador Kirkpatrick to visit Morocco.In telegram 314 from Rabat, January 10, + Reed reported that + Hassan “extended a warm invitation (and at the end of the audience, + reiterated the point) for you and Dr. Kirkpatrick to attend the 1985 Fête du Trône.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850021–0334)

+

The Executive Branch’s FY–86 assistance + request, which essentially straightlines Morocco, will become public + when it is presented to the Congress in the very near future. We believe + it important to precede this unwelcome news with a Presidential message + assuring Hassan of the President’s continuing personal interest.

+

On January 23, Moroccan Ambassador Jorio informed the DepartmentNo record of Jorio’s discussion with the Department has been + found. that the King now wants to” send” Minister of + Information Filali to deliver a + personal message to President Reagan. Filali is + close to the King (his son, + presently with Sears World Trade in New York, was married to the King’s + eldest daughter last September) and the King likely believes that he is + better suited as an emissary, with the ability to address issues in the + “American style”. Filali is + heavily tipped to be the next Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in the + new Cabinet which the King is expected to announce on or before March 3. + In requesting this meeting, Ambassador Jorio disclaimed knowledge of the substance of the + message. He insisted, however, that delivery directly to the President + is essential from the King’s point of view, although the meeting could + be very brief. The King would like Filali to come at the earliest possible date. Ambassador + Jorio requested that this + issue be worked through the Moroccan Embassy in Washington rather than + through our Embassy in Rabat.

+

Prior to this, various Moroccan officials had broached with Embassy Rabat + the subject of high level visits to Washington. In December and again in + January, we discouraged King Hassan from pursuing a personal interest in + coming. We also questioned the utility of a visit by Prime Minister + Karim-Lamrani who had expressed the desire to bring a delegation of + ministers to “lobby” the Congress relative to FY 86 assistance levels.

+

We understand that the President has endorsed Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s acceptance of the King’s + invitation to participate in the Feast of the Throne celebrations on + March 3.In telegram 32898 to Rabat, + February 2, the Department indicated that Reagan had accepted Hassan’s + invitation to have Kirkpatrick visit Morocco for the Throne Day + celebrations, but “NSC Advisor McFarlane will not accept the King’s invitation at + this time.” Reagan, the + Department added, would receive Filali “briefly and dates are being worked out with + Ambassador Jorio.” The telegram also contains the text of a letter + from Reagan to Hassan to + that effect. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, N850002–0233) In view of this decision, + we believe it would be appropriate to leave Hassan’s invitation to you + open at this time. Ambassador Vernon + Walters will also attend as the personal guest of the + King (virtually an annual event for the Ambassador).

+

Hassan has stated that he intends to hold Throne Day celebrations in + El-Aayoune, the major population center in the Western Sahara. US policy has been not to make high level + official visits to the territory while its status is under dispute. + Criticism from some European members of the diplomatic corps in Rabat + regarding the propriety of attending official ceremonies in the disputed + area may move Hassan to dispense with the presence of the corps in + El-Aayoune but receive them formally in a Moroccan location, thus + avoiding the issue. We note that the Algerians have already weighed in + with us and others on the + subject of diplomatic representation at an official Moroccan ceremony + held in the Western Sahara.

+

The Department recommends that the President agree to meet briefly with + Minister Filali. We further + recommend that the President send a message to Hassan which could + include reference to the meeting with Filali and Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s visit to Morocco.The suggested Presidential message was not + attached.

+ Nicholas + PlattQuinn signed for Platt above this typed + signature. + + Executive Secretary + +
+
+ 236. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State + Richard Murphy, 1985: + Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, February 1985. Secret. Prepared by Teicher. The meeting took place in + the Oval Office. In a February 9 memorandum to Gregg, Platt wrote: “Hassan is increasingly sensitive to + what he judges is American coolness in the relationship since the + Oujda treaty. Confronted with mounting economic difficulties, Hassan + is turning to us for support.” Platt also noted that Bendjedid’s impending visit “provides yet another + cause for unease at a time of flux in relationships in the Maghreb.” + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, February 22, 1985, 9:50–10 a.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Filali (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Donald T. Regan + Robert C. + McFarlane + Deputy Secretary Kenneth + Dam + Acting Assistant Secretary Arnold + Raphel + Ambassador Joseph V. + Reed + Howard R. Teicher + Alex Toumayon (Interpreter) + Abdellatif Filali, Moroccan + Minister of Foreign Affairs + Maati Jorio, Ambassador to + the United States + +

President Reagan opened the discussion by congratulating + Filali on his reappointment + as Foreign Minister. He then provided Filali with a photograph of the President and His + Majesty King Hassan, and asked + Filali to carry the photograph + and the President’s warmest regards to King Hassan. (U)

+

Foreign Minister Filali began his presentation by expressing how + deeply honored he felt to be received by the President. King Hassan, + through Filali, expressed his + friendship and very high regard for the President. Noting that the King + had not yet seen the President since the beginning of the second term, + King Hassan never doubted the friendship which the President had + extended to Morocco. Filali + described the visit of the Prime Minister one year ago as a + demonstration of Moroccan cooperation and friendship.See Document 224. + King Hassan “stresses the irreversible nature of Moroccan friendship and + alliance with the United States. Perhaps from time-to-time, some + situations appear not to conform to this fact.” But Filali confirmed that no fundamental + changes could occur in Morocco’s policy. Morocco has always been a + member of the West and the Free + World. Friendship with the United States is an important tradition in + Morocco. King Hassan is convinced that the moment is opportune to reopen + discussions on bilateral issues and regional problems. King Hassan + places particular emphasis on Moroccan willingness to extend military + facilities to the United States to defend the Free World. Filali continued that the region’s + problems “require restructuring, and the United States can play a + moderating role to find solutions to problems that divide the region.” + Filali ended his message from + King Hassan by extending the King’s invitation to the President to make + a visit to Morocco in the context of the President’s trip to Europe in + May.Reagan visited Western Europe April 30–May 10. + Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, + 1985–1988. + Filali noted that it was a + tradition of Republican Presidents to visit Morocco. Eisenhower did so immediately after + Morocco achieved its independence,Eisenhower visited Casablanca on + December 22, 1959. and this example of U.S. support was a + great comfort to the Moroccan people. (S)

+

President Reagan asked Filali to convey to His Majesty that American friendship + has not lessened. The King should be assured that the U.S. values this + friendship very highly.In telegram 56991 to + Rabat, February 26, the Department reported that during his February + 21 meeting with Filali, + Shultz agreed that “it + is important to renew and reenergize periodically all elements of a + relationship. He said it is time to put problems behind us and to + move and build the relationship.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850129–0199) With + regard to a visit, the President noted the complications, but said “if + it is possible, I would like to visit.” The President thanked Filali for carrying King Hassan’s + message. (C)

+

Filali + thanked the President for his kind words for Morocco and repeated his + hope that the President would visit Morocco. (U)

+
+ +
+ 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. + + 2328. + + Rabat, March 12, 1985, 1732Z + + +

For NEA/DAS Thomas Nassif from + Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed. + Subject: Invitation to President Reagan to Visit Morocco. Ref: (A) Nassif/Reed Telcon of + March 6Not found. (B) State + 66616In telegram 66616 to Rabat, March + 6, the Department instructed the Embassy “to convey to the King + President Reagan’s deep + personal regrets that it not possible for him to accept the King’s + kind invitation to visit Morocco. In conveying this message, you + should avoid any suggestion of an invitation for Hassan to visit + Washington.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot + 95D025, Rabat 1985 Nodis) (C) + Rabat 2097.In telegram 2097 from Rabat, + March 6, the Embassy transmitted the text of a message from + Kirkpatrick to Armacost, in which she wrote: “I + strongly urge that the President stop a few hours in Morocco on his + way to or from Portugal and Spain. It would be safe and extremely + important to Morocco. Should that for any reason be impossible, I + urge that the King be invited for a State visit because it is + terrible for him to have his greatest rival, President Bendjedid, offered a State visit, + while he, who has supported us in so many ways, has only been + invited for a lower level (official) visit three years ago.” + (Ibid.)

+ + + Secret—Entire text + + Per ref (A), Mission has not yet conveyed message contained in ref + (B). We continue to hope that a means will be found to respond + favorably to King Hassan’s invitation consistent with + recommendations of Ambassador Kirkpatrick contained in ref (C). If such a response is not possible, as discussed in + ref (A), I believe that the news should be conveyed to Hassan via a + brief and personal message from the President. + + I anticipate my next audience with King Hassan, during the visit + of General Lawson, in Marrakech on March 20 after the King’s return + from a week-long tour of Southern Morocco and the Western Sahara. + The King will be out of contact in the meantime and I recommend that + I convey any message on this subject to him March 20. If the reply + to his invitation is negative, I recommend that the President’s + message make reference to the possibility of receiving Hassan should + he visit the United States later in the year. Reference could also + be made to the forthcoming visit to Washington of Prime Minister + Karim Lamrani to head + the GOM delegation to the Joint + Economic and Military Commission meetings in May. + + Reed +
+ +
+ 238. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan + II of MoroccoSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: + Lot 94D92, Exdis April 1985. Confidential; Exdis. The Department + transmitted the message in telegram 112936 to Rabat, April 13. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850143–0695) + + + Washington, April 12, 1985 + + Your Majesty: + +

I am extremely pleased that high-level contacts between our two countries + have been resumed. You know how much I value your wisdom and experience, + and I hope that our exchanges will continue to expand.

+

Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and + Walters and USIA Director Wick have informed me of the warm + welcome and traditional hospitality which you extended to them on the + occasion of their recent visits to the Kingdom.See Document 428. + Kirkpatrick’s message is + in telegram 2035 from Rabat, March 5. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850003–0318) Mr. + Wick was particularly + pleased by Your Majesty’s remarks that our expanded Voice of America + relay station at Tangier will be good for Morocco as well as for the + United States.A record of the Wick-Hassan + conversation is in telegram 2025 from Rabat, March 2. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850143–0695)

+

Regrettably, I will not be here when Prime Minister Karim Lamrani comes to Washington for + the meetings of the Joint Economic and Military Commissions; however, I + assure you he will be well received.

+

I noted with pleasure that National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane accepted your kind + invitation and had planned to visit the Kingdom April 21–23. However, I + have asked him to participate in a very important government exercise + taking place on those dates. This will necessitate postponement of this + trip. I hope that Your Majesty and Ambassador Reed can reschedule Mr. McFarlane’s trip for an early, + mutually convenient date.

+

During our fruitful exchange in February, Minister Filali conveyed to me Your Majesty’s + gracious invitation to visit the Kingdom after my May trip to Europe. + Unfortunately, the constraints on the schedule make it impossible for me + to do this, and I greatly regret missing this opportunity to see Your + Majesty and your beautiful country.In + telegram 3739 from Rabat, April 22, Reed reported that during an April 17 meeting, + “Hassan read the letter carefully at least twice before commenting. + The King told me that he was deeply disappointed that a brief + Presidential stopover even if for four hours would not be possible + during the May European trip. He said he was equally disheartened + that the National Security Advisor could not come to Morocco, + although he said he looked forward to the visit being rescheduled at + the earliest date.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850277–0884) However, I hope we + will have occasion to meet soon.

+

Mrs. Reagan joins me in sending + good wishes to you.

+

Your friend,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 239. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official + Memoranda (05/02/1985–05/06/1985). Secret. Sent through Armacost. Drafted on April 30 by + Robert Barrett (NEA/AFN); + cleared by Zweifel, Nassif, and in substance by + Loustanou (DOC) and Savitt (DOD). Neither Murphy nor Armacost initialed the memorandum. + A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” + McKinley also initialed + the memorandum and wrote: “3 May.” + + + Washington, May 3, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Morocco—Suggested Letter From You to King Hassan + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION: Whether you should send a + letter to King Hassan following his request for postponement of the + Joint Economic and Military Commission meetings.In telegram 3946 from Rabat, April 26, Reed reported that King Hassan had + decided to postpone the JMC and + EC meeting scheduled to take + place May 7–10, which reflected his “fears that Commission meetings + without tangible results would aggravate growing problems of + perception in the bilateral relationship.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850292–0342)

+

DISCUSSION: Among the steps Ambassador Reed recommended to deal with present + strains in our relationship with Morocco is a letter from you to the + King, acknowledging and expressing understanding for his decision to + request postponement of the Joint Economic and Military Commission + meetings, which were to have taken place in Washington May 7–10. We + agree with the Ambassador that such a letter is in order. Attached is a + draft for your consideration (TAB 1). It contains a few changes from + Ambassador Reed’s suggested + draft, made to remove any encouragement for Hassan to involve himself in + the Middle East peace process, (which we consider might be + counterproductive), or any commitment by you to participate in or meet + with the Joint Commissions when they eventually convene.

+

For your information, Secretary of Defense Weinberger has already sent a message to Hassan.No record of Weinberger’s message has been found.

+

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the cable message + and sign the original (to be pouched to Rabat) at TAB 1.Below this recommendation, Shultz wrote: “OK G.” A stamped + notation next to this reads: “May 6 1985.”

+ + + Tab 1 + Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Embassy in MoroccoSecret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Barrett; + cleared by [illegible] and Hill; approved by McKinley. Sent for information + to the Department. Shultz was in Bonn for the Economic Summit and + to accompany Reagan on + his state visit to the Federal Republic of + Germany. + + Secto + 9016. + + Bonn, May 6, 1985, 0117Z + + + + SUBJECT + Message From Secretary Shultz to King Hassan. + + + Ref: + Rabat 4002.In telegram 4002 from + Rabat, April 29, Reed stated “I strongly recommend that you + acknowledge and express understanding for King Hassan’s + recent decision to postpone the Joint Economic and Joint + Military Commission meetings in Washington for several + months” and proposed a draft message from Shultz to Hassan. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850297–0715) + +

1. Secret—Entire text

+

2. Please deliver following message from Secretary Shultz to King Hassan. Signed + original being pouched.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Your Majesty:

+

Ambassador Reed has conveyed + to me your decision to postpone for several months the meetings of + the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Economic and Joint Military Commissions + which were scheduled to be held in Washington from May 7–10.

+

The postponement of these meetings should, in no case, detract from + the considerable importance which we continue to attach to the Joint + Military and Economic Commissions as valuable catalysts for + strengthening bilateral cooperation in these areas between our two + countries. We will continue to address this issue in the light of + the close relationship which exists between our two countries and + the value we place upon our association.

+

We look forward to receiving your government’s suggestions regarding + appropriate new dates for the holding of these meetings, and I am + confident a mutually agreeable schedule can be established.

+

Please accept, Your Majesty, the assurance of my highest respect for + your leadership and for the historic friendship and bonds which + unite Morocco and the United States. Sincerely yours, George P. Shultz.

+

His Majesty

+

Hassan II,

+

King of Morocco,

+

Rabat. End text.

+ Shultz + +
+ +
+ 240. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Reagan and King Hassan II of MoroccoSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, + 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Exdis June 1985. Secret; Exdis. + From a copy that indicates the original was received in the White + House Situation Room. An unknown hand wrote: “For Bob Pearson” at + the top of the memorandum. The Department transmitted an abstract of + the telephone call in telegram 146819 to Rabat, May 14. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]) + + + Washington, May 11, 1985, 6:24–6:32 p.m. + + +

President Reagan’s Telephone Call + to Moroccan King Hassan II, May + 11, 1985. Call began 1824 local time and ended at 1832 local.

+

President Reagan: Your Majesty, I’m just returned from the trip, I’m back + in Washington now, and I just wanted to express my appreciation for the + invitation you had extended to visit Morocco and my regret that it + couldn’t be arranged.

+

King Hassan: Mr. President, do you listen me?

+

President Reagan: Yes.

+

King Hassan: Mr. President, I am very very touched by your call at this + hour. And I appreciate very deeply your kindness to call me. And I’m as + sad as you to not meet you on the phone on behalf of Morocco.

+

President Reagan: Well, Your Majesty, I had hoped that maybe something + would develop that I could, as you said, just fly across the + Mediterranean,See footnotes 3 and 4, + Document 237. but then not only was the schedule so full, but + I had some problems you might even have read about in your press over + there, back here that brought me back because of our budget and the + problems I’m having with the Congress.

+

King Hassan: I know all your problems, and I think that you are in the + same situation for the $14 million as President Carter was with the Angola problems + with 13 million problems.

+

President Reagan: Yes, Your Majesty, I was talking about you with our + mutual friend, King Juan Carlos.

+

King Hassan: He called me.

+

President Reagan: He did!

+

King Hassan: He told me that you give him message for me, you and Mrs. + Reagan and appreciate that + very deeply.

+ +

President Reagan: Well, I knew that he would be talking to you or seeing + you from our conversation so I had asked him to do that, didn’t realize + that he would be so prompt. But I just want you to know that I (pause) + Hello!

+

King Hassan: I shall call the King and I shall hope he will send me the + (few words unintel.) or I send him (unintel.) to give me the + (unintel.)

+

President Reagan: You know we still continue our strong interest in the + close relations between our country, our two countries. I’m especially + appreciative of our security cooperation, it benefits us very much and I + have a message, Nancy wants me to give you her very best regards. She + remembers your visit here with great pleasure.

+

King Hassan: Mr. President, like you, I have one heart and one home and + Morocco and I, we are friends of you and your country. You are in good + health, God will give you long life and I am hoping you’ll visit in + Morocco when you want.

+

President Reagan: I’m hoping for that also. I remember your invitation at + the time that you were here and . . .

+

King Hassan: Will you please for me kiss the hand of Mrs. Reagan and remind her that she + promised to make a small short visit in Morocco please.

+

President Reagan: I certainly shall do that and I . . .

+

King Hassan: Thank you.

+

President Reagan: I believe that high level dialogue is very important + and I know that my National Security Advisor McFarlane . . .

+

King Hassan: Yes.

+

President Reagan: Is I believe now he had hoped that he was coming. I + believe that he is going to try to make a visit to your country in June + and I hope so just as I hope that we shall be able to get together in + the not so distant future.An unknown hand + underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word + “just” and ending with the word “future.”

+

King Hassan: We are waiting him when he wants and I made the program to + visit the United Nations in September. Maybe at this moment I could see + you Mr. President.

+

President Reagan: That would be fine. You are visiting here in + September?

+

King Hassan: Yes. For the anniversary of the United Nations.

+

President Reagan: I shall tell our people and we shall take a close look + at our schedule before it gets too filled up with things. I would enjoy + that very much.

+ +

King Hassan: Thank you, Mr. President and God be with you and + abiento.An unknown hand underlined + “Abiento” in this sentence and placed an exclamation point in the + left-hand margin.

+

President Reagan: It’s good to talk to you and I shall look forward to + seeing you.

+

King Hassan: Excuse me for my English but it is mine.An unknown hand underlined this comment and wrote: + “Great line” in the right-hand margin.

+

President Reagan: Listen, you’re doing much better than I could do in + (laugh) someone else’s language, so I respect you very much for your + being able to do this.

+

King Hassan: Thank you, Mr. President and good evening to you and Mrs. + Reagan.

+

President Reagan: Good-bye friend, Your Majesty.At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand + wrote: “MAC—Abiento is not, of course, a bien tôt. Rather it is + dialectical Moroccan for [illegible Arabic script] a reference to + the King’s great regard for Maureen.—M.” Maureen refers to Reagan’s oldest + daughter.

+
+
+ 241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary + of State ShultzSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Papers of George + Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982–1989: Lot 89D94, + Family Group Luncheon, 1984–1985, June 14, 1985, 12:00–1:00 p.m. + Secret; Sensitive. A stamp at the top of the memorandum reads: + “GPS.” + + + Washington, June 14, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + McFarlane’s Projected Invitation to Morocco + +

I was not keen on Bud’s initial plan to visit Morocco. However, it seems + to me that having agreed to a trip, we are compounding our problems with + King Hassan by continually walking away from it.

+

If you wish to avoid having Bud go, we could ask Dick Walters to do so en route to or + from Syria should he go to see Assad. He could certainly deal + effectively with key issues like Chad and Libya.

+ +

We need to make up our minds this morning since we understand there is a + good sense Bud will raise the issue at today’s luncheon.No record of the luncheon has been found. + Moreover, it appears that the King is expecting Bud at the end of next + week. If there is not to be a visit, we should let the King know as soon + as possible.

+ Michael H. + ArmacostArmacost initialed + “MA” above this typed + signature. +
+
+ 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850255–0840. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Robert Barrett (NEA/AFN); cleared by Johnson (P), Nassif, + Raphel, Bishop, McFarlane, McKinley, Bruce Strathearn (S/S–O), and Hill; approved by + Shultz. + + 185939. + + Washington, June 18, 1985, 1839Z + + + + SUBJECT + McFarlane Visit to + Morocco. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + It has been decided at the highest levels of the administration + that a visit to Morocco at this time by McFarlane would be + inappropriate. + + President, Secretary Shultz and NSC + Advisor McFarlane have + given very careful consideration to King Hassan’s invitation to + McFarlane to visit + Morocco June 21–24. At the time of the President’s telephone + conversation with King Hassan,See Document 240. when the President + mentioned that McFarlane + would be coming, there was no expectation that the King intended to + take any steps which might further reinforce Qadhafi’s regional ambitions or + international legitimacy. On the contrary, all held the view that + Hassan was sincere in his professed intentions to limit effects of + Oujda Treaty and pursue a strategy designed to moderate Qadhafi’s behavior. + + Consequently, President and his advisors were dismayed by King’s + initiative to broaden the Afro-Arab Union to include Chad. Qadhafi’s behavior, as recently + recounted to the King, has actually grown worse since the Oujda + Accords were concluded, and there is no indication Oujda tie with + Morocco will have any restraining effect on him. Inter alia Qadhafi has launched a new campaign against Libyan + dissidents abroad,Documentation on + Libya’s campaign against dissidents and alleged role in the + attack on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo is scheduled for publication + in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. including the US, and tried to mount an attack on the U.S. Embassy in + Cairo. While Hassan had made clear to us the narrow tactical purpose + of Oujda, he had also professed that treaty, in addition to serving + GOM objectives in Western + Sahara and vis-à-vis Algeria, could modify Qadhafi’s behavior and thus serve a + purpose consistent with American interests, goals, and values. This + has not occurred and the King’s expanding cooperation with Libya + makes it undesirable at this time to resume the high level dialogue + in the manner that GOM desires. + Resumption of this dialogue will depend on USG perception that Hassan’s implementation of the + Oujda treaty will not encourage Qadhafi’s ambitions and baser instincts. As long as + the King is trying to expand the union without being able to show + any countervailing benefits for US + interests a McFarlane + visit would be counterproductive. + + With this as background you should inform Foreign Minister + Filali that the visit has + been postponed, because of our serious concern over recent + developments involving Chad and the continuing activities of Colonel + Qadhafi. You should tell + the Foreign Minister that the President and Secretary of State felt + that the timing for such a visit was inappropriate pending clear + indications concerning the outcome of the Chadian situation. You + should at the same time give him the following message in writing + from McFarlane to the + King. You may use the material in paras 3–5 to reply to any + questions from Filali. + + Message from NSC McFarlane: begin + text: + +

Your Majesty,

+

As our Embassy has informed your government I will not be coming to + Morocco this month as I had expected to. I am sorry about this change of + plans as I had been looking forward very much to the visit. The + President and Secretary Shultz + had both considered this a good occasion for a thorough exchange of + views between out two governments, an opportunity for a discussion of + the whole range of issues of mutual interest to Morocco and the US.

+

However, the great concern of the administration over the situation in + Chad and about the continuing activities of Colonel Qadhafi has led to the conclusion that + such a trip would be inappropriate at this time and until we can have a + clearer view of future developments concerning these subjects. With best + regards, Sincerely. End text.

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 243. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850428–1038. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. + + 5625. + + Rabat, June 19, 1985, 1100Z + + +

NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy and DAS + Nassif. Subject: McFarlane Visit to Morocco. Ref: (A) + State 185939;See Document 242. (B) Rabat 5605.In telegram 5605 from Rabat, June 18, Kirby asked the Department to + provide “information relating to the reasons for the McFarlane postponement and + anything you might have with respect to dates for a visit in the + future.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850428–1038)

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + While I will, of course, if Washington insists, deliver + McFarlane-Hassan message contained in ref (A) and explain to Foreign + Minister Filali the + cancellation of Mr. McFarlane’s visit along lines contained in reftel, I + see certain risks to our interests in hanging the McFarlane + cancellation/postponement so directly and completely on our concerns + about Hassan’s assumed efforts to bring Chad into the Morocco-Libya + union. Doing the latter would, I think, make it difficult to + maintain a useful dialogue with Hassan over the period just ahead on + issues of common concern. With the strong prospect of a special Arab + League summit here in Morocco a few weeks from now, we may find that + there are matters of substantial interest that we would want to + discuss with Hassan prior to, or in the general context of, such a + summit. Similarly, Washington may well wish to consider later the + value of discussing terrorism/hijackings in the Middle East with + Hassan prior to the convening of an Arab summit. Finally, delivering + message as envisaged in ref (A) could complicate, or render null, + our attempts to schedule a useful JEC and JMC at an + early date. + + My strong recommendation is that I be authorized to tell Foreign + Minister Filali this + afternoon (meeting is at 1600 local, 1100 Washington time) that Mr. + McFarlane regrets that + he cannot visit Morocco at this time but that he hopes to visit at + some future mutually convenient date.In + telegram 5660 from Rabat, June 19, Kirby reported that he had informed Filali that “unfortunately + National Security Affairs Advisor McFarlane will be unable to visit Morocco next + weekend as previously suggested. I said that while President + Reagan and Mr. + McFarlane believe + in the value of continuing the high-level dialogue with Morocco + Mr. McFarlane + currently has too many things on his plate, including the TWA hijacking, to permit him to + undertake such a visit at this time.” Kirby continued: “Filali was + clearly disappointed and said that the King would be, as well.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850433–0549) Documentation on the hijacking of + TWA Flight 847 is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism. We could cite this + heavy schedule and current preoccupations (e.g. TWA hijacking) as precluding trip at + present. I could then tell Filali in all candor that indications that Hassan + had tried to bring Chad into the Morocco-Libya union had also given Washington pause, and that + as we think about re-scheduling McFarlane visit at some future date, GOM should assume that Washington will + continue to keep Morocco’s actions toward Libyan Union under + review. + + Foregoing approach would, I think, retain the essence of the + Washington message (ref A) while encapsulating it in a somewhat more + acceptable form on the eve of the Eid al-Fitr holiday. It would also + give us a little breathing room as I try to discover from Filali this afternoon just how hard + Hassan did, or did not, push the Arab-African Union idea with Habre + while the latter was here last weekend. Until I have seen Filali, and in the absence of other + reporting, the question arises whether the cautions we earlier + expressed to Hassan about bringing Chad into the union may not have + slowed him down somewhat when he prepared for meeting with + Habre. + + I plan to try to telephone DAS + Nassif on secure phone at OOB + to see whether my instructions can be modified along lines of para + (3) above. If we fail to make contact, an immediate cable response + from Department would be appreciated. + + I recommend that telegrams on this topic continue in Exdis, or + more restrictive, channel. + + Kirby +
+
+ 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850552–0905. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by + Murphy, Johnson, Gregory Talcott (S/S–O), and James Collins (S/S–O); approved by Whitehead. Sent for information to + Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Khartoum, Ndjamena, and USCINCEUR. The document is + misnumbered in the original. + + 237782. + + Washington, August 2, 1985, 2121Z + + + + SUBJECT + Acting Secretary’s Post-Luncheon Conversation With Moroccan Prime + Minister Karim + Lamrani. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Summary: Following the July 29 luncheon,In telegram 238579 to Rabat, August 3, the + Department reported on the discussion during the luncheon, which + “was dominated by Karim + Lamrani who chose to focus on Syria’s role in the + Middle East. He bluntly labeled the SARG as ‘imperialist and hegemonistic’ and a cat’s + paw for the Soviets.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850552–0123) a + smaller group including Under Secretary Armacost and Assistant Secretary Murphy + met in Acting Secretary’s + office for a further exchange, nominally on bilateral issues. As at + the luncheon, Karim Lamrani + was voluble as he stressed Morocco’s preoccupation with Algeria and + argued that coincident USG and + GOM interests should be + translated into significantly higher levels of economic and military + assistance for Morocco. End summary. + + During post-luncheon discussion of nominally bilateral issues, + Prime Minister Karim Lamrani + spoke emotionally and at length about the perceived threat from + Algeria. He epitomized Algerian policy towards Morocco as an + “aggressive posture”, constant since Algerian independence. + Elementary rules of international morality impede a direct Algerian + attack on Morocco; hence, the GOA + has chosen to work through the Polisario. The acceptance by the + OAU of the SDAR—which controls no territory, + has no government or legal institutions, or no identified + population—sets a dangerous precedent. Over the past 20 years the + Algerians have undertaken incursions into Morocco on four occasions. + Recently armed commandos were apprehended coming from Algeria; their + mission was to create a “pre-revolutionary climate” in + Morocco. + + The order of battle is 2–10 times in Algeria’s favor, depending on + the weapons or force discussed. There is a prospect for more Soviet + support for Algeria. Morocco does not have aggressive intent, but + Algeria does. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to address the + GOM’s minimal military + requirements. The JMC is seized + with implementation of Morocco’s five year plan. The real problem is + one of finance. The GOM is cutting + back on social and economic development in order to purchase + necessary arms. However, Morocco can no longer bear the cost. There + is no hope of help from the Eastern bloc without unacceptable + political costs. The USG, as leader + of the free world, must look to Morocco’s strategic location and act + to preserve our interests there. + + Despite this threat, the PM + stated, the GOM heretofore had not + pressed for increased financial assistance. However, it is necessary + now to look at the allocation of USG resources in the area. He contended that Morocco is + strategically more important to the U.S. than is Israel. Yet, the + balance of resource allocation is dols 6 billion (sic) for Israel as + opposed to dols 179 million for Morocco. Something should be done to + meet Morocco’s needs in keeping with U.S. interests there. + + Acting Secretary Whitehead + responded that the USG is + sympathetic to the Moroccan needs and concerns; these will be taken + into consideration. Nonetheless, increasing Morocco’s military + capabilities if and as the Soviets increase those of Algeria is not + the ultimate solution to problems. Both the GOM and the GOA should + be aligned with the USG against + Soviet influence in the area. The Algerian-Moroccan dispute ultimately should give way to + the more important objective of peace in the region. The special, + longstanding USG relationship with + Israel and Egypt and assistance to those nations serves the cause of + peace. + + The Acting Secretary went on to note USG budgetary problems. With a dols 200 billion deficit + our ability to expand assistance is limited. Congress is under + pressure to reduce the deficit by dols 50 billion. This year our + global assistance will amount to dols 12.5 billion. We will be lucky + if we can achieve that amount next year; in fact, we probably will + end up with lower global levels. This is not meant to be a negative + reaction to the Prime Minister’s presentation, but we do not want to + raise GOM hopes. We are aware of + the GOM’s needs, and there is a + special friendship for Morocco. The USG “will do its best to give careful consideration” to + these needs. + + The PM responded vigorously that + Morocco will not be the instigator of any escalation in the Western + Sahara. The GOM has no problem with + Algeria. In the interest of peace, the GOM acquiesced to Algerian annexation of some of + Morocco’s historic territory. Contrarily the Algerians seek to + destabilize the regime in Morocco and “to annex Moroccan territory” + through the Polisario. Morocco is part of the free world while + Algeria’s “true colors” are as natural allies of the Soviets. + Karim Lamrani went on to + ask rhetorically what would happen if Algeria were to bomb the bases + encompassed in our mutual access and transit agreement? If more + pressure comes from Algeria, the answer will not lie alone in + military equipment. What, the Prime Minister asked, would happen if + Morocco were to be lost to the West? Then the cost would be much + greater than dols 12.5 billion; the situation would be + irreversible. + + Regarding levels of USG + assistance, Karim Lamrani + opined that if there is to be a reduction in FY 86, this should be shared proportionately among + recipients. + + In his only volunteered remarks on the Moroccan-Libyan + relationship, the PM stated that the + Polisario had received support from Algeria and Libya. The Treaty of + Union with Libya was designed to stop Libyan support. This issue was + of such importance as to warrant an “alliance with the devil”. The + treaty succeeded in neutralizing Libyan support, but Algeria has + continued to arm the Polisario. + + The Acting Secretary thanked the PM, then pointed out that the USG believes Libya to be a much greater problem than + Algeria. USG would be much more + sympathetic if the Moroccan efforts were aimed at Libya rather than + against Algeria which we do not perceive to be a serious enemy. + Karim Lamrani riposted + that Algeria is a fundamental, systemic foe of the West. The Libyan Government is a + one man affair “with a mad man at the helm”. The Libyan people on + the other hand are good. The USG + has been unable to control Qadhafi. Hassan is trying to tame him. The GOM believes Qadhafi is less dangerous than he was a year ago and + that he might further quiet down. The PM went on to assert that the reason why the recent + TWA hijacking didn’t involve + stops in Tripoli was that Qadhafi was conscious that King Hassan would not + tolerate any Libyan action to harm the American hostages. + + Armacost +
+
+ 245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy MoroccoSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850255–0840. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted with text received from the White + House; cleared by Joann Alba (S/S–S), Joseph Timbie (D), + McKinley, and Janet + Andres (S/S–O), and in draft by + Zweifel; approved by Murphy. + + 239050. + + Washington, August 3, 1985, 1727Z + + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Letter to King Hassan—S/S #8522806. + +

1. Secret—Entire text

+

2. Following for your information is the text of President Reagan’s letter to King Hassan which + Deputy Secretary Whitehead will + deliver during his forthcoming visit:

+

Quote: Your Majesty: John + Whitehead is visiting Morocco during his first trip + overseas since his appointment as Deputy Secretary of State. I am + particularly pleased he will meet you and have asked him to convey my + continuing high regard for you and the Kingdom of Morocco. He is + prepared to discuss a number of issues in the spirit of candor and + friendship which characterizes our personal and official + relationships.

+

I have asked Secretary Whitehead + particularly to raise with you two issues he discussed with your Prime + Minister in Washington on July 29.

+

The first is the Western Sahara. We have a continuing concern that the + Western Sahara dispute could spread to Mauritania or even lead to direct + conflict between Morocco and Algeria. We have discussed recent + developments with both your government and that in Algiers. Again, I + urge that every step be taken to avoid escalation.

+

Your Majesty, I am convinced that only a negotiated solution to this + problem has any prospect of durability and stability. I hope that the + direct, high-level negotiations between you and the Algerians will be + renewed and ultimately lead to success.

+ +

I have also asked Secretary Whitehead to explore with you the dangers to regional + peace posed by Colonel Qadhafi, + including his undiminished support of international terrorism. My + purpose is not to infringe in any way on your sovereign + responsibilities. As National Security Advisor McFarlane stated to Prime Minister + Karim-Lamrani,No record of the + McFarlane-Karim Lamrani + meeting has been found. while my confidence in and friendship + for you is steadfast, I remain puzzled over your strategy for dealing + with Qadhafi.

+

Nonetheless, we both must candidly acknowledge that this issue remains + the major irritant in the relationship between our two nations. I + therefore would appreciate your sharing with Secretary Whitehead your assessment of Qadhafi and his objectives. I have + publicly stated that I consider Qadhafi’s Libya as one of the five states most directly + involved in sponsoring international terrorism.On July 8, in his remarks before the American Bar + Association, Reagan + identified Iran, Libya, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, + Cuba, and Nicaragua as five state sponsors of international + terrorism. For text of the address, see Public + Papers: Reagan + 1985, Book II, pp. 894–900. I did so after reviewing + carefully what my government knows of the activities spawned in + Tripoli.

+

Last September, when General Walters first expressed to you my very deep concerns + about Morocco’s new relationship with Qadhafi,See Document 229. you conveyed through + him your hope that you could quote tame unquote Qadhafi and bring him toward acceptable + international behavior. Sadly, the record does not show that Qadhafi has modified his policies. + Rather, he continues to seek every opportunity to foment discord, to + plot against his neighbors, and to terrorize and assassinate those + Libyans at home and abroad who may have a different vision for their + country. The menace posed by Qadhafi is clear, palpable, and growing. Many of our + mutual friends in Africa feel the same way. We strongly believe that the + regime in Libya should be isolated politically and economically until + there is a real change in Qadhafi’s policies.

+

Your Majesty, you are a great and good friend who shares many values and + objectives with the people and Government of the United States of + America. We wish to continue our close relationship which has served our + common goals so well. We can best do so by maintaining our dialogue, + both through visits such as that by Secretary Whitehead and through Ambassador + Thomas Nassif, who will + arrive in Morocco shortly to take up his duties as my representative. + Ambassador Nassif has my full and + complete confidence, and I am certain he will be a most able envoy to + the Kingdom of Morocco.

+ +

I know you will accept these views in the spirit of concerned amity in + which they are sent. I have asked Secretary Whitehead to report personally to me the results of your + conversations.

+

Please accept the expressions of my highest regard which Nancy joins me + in sending. Sincerely, Ronald + Reagan. End quote.

+ Armacost +
+
+ 246. Memorandum From James + Stark of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1985 (08/05/1985–09/30/1985). + Confidential. Sent for action. A stamp at the top of the memorandum + reads: “RCM HAS SEEN.” An unknown hand wrote “TEICHER” underneath the stamp. + + + Washington, August 5, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + FMS Reapportionment for + Morocco + +

State and Defense have proposed reallocating to Morocco $5 million in + FMS originally approved for Lebanon + (Tab I). These are FY85 funds which Lebanon cannot use and does not + need, since it already has a backlog of $20 million in old FMS credits. This reallocation is + unrelated to the $18 million in Lebanese ESF which was the target of an earlier raid.

+

Normally, such a reallocation would be handled between State and Defense + with no NSC involvement. However, + because of the sensitivity of our relations with Morocco, they are + requesting your approval.

+

Without going back for Congressional approval, FMS can only be reallocated to countries which did not + receive full funding for that year’s FMS request. The table at Tab IITab II, a table listing countries eligible for + reapportionment, is attached but not printed. lists these + countries and shows the size of the underfunding for FY85. Note that the + Lebanese FMS can be reallocated at + either Treasury (commercial) rates or concessional rates (about 5 + percent), depending upon the nature of the underfunding.

+

Of the thirteen eligible countries, three—Guatemala, the Philippines, and + Turkey—are ineligible due to legislative restrictions. Congress has specifically forbidden any + additional FMS funds for Guatemala and + the Philippines. Any reallocation to Turkey would automatically entail + additional funds for Greece to conform to the 7:10 ratio. Since Greek + FMS was fully funded, this move + would require Congressional approval.

+

There are several reasons why each of the remaining countries are not + good candidates for the $5 million reallocation. Some—Dominican + Republic, Peru, and Panama—have serious debt problems and would have + trouble repaying a loan even at concessional rates. Others—Indonesia and + Malaysia—would be unlikely to process the necessary paperwork prior to + the end of the fiscal year. Oman and Malaysia already have unused FMS credits they can draw on, while + Thailand could only receive $2 million of the available funds. Tab II + reviews the specific rationale for each country.

+

Moroccan FMS was underfunded by $7 + million in FY85. Unlike most countries, the U.S. has identified for + Morocco a specific FMS/MAP funding level needed just to maintain its + existing equipment. That level was requested, but not fully funded, in + the FY85 CPD. Thus, shifting funds to + Morocco would only slow the deterioration of their material readiness, + but would not support purchase of new end items. The Moroccan Ambassador + has authority to locally sign a credit agreement which would assure + action prior to the end of the fiscal year.

+

The argument against reallocation to Morocco centers on Hassan’s ties to + Libya. Withholding these funds could be used to reinforce our other + negative signals to King Hassan over Oujda. But such a move would also + hurt the military—one of the primary supporters of stability in the + country. While a shift of funds to Morocco is not unambiguously + positive, I believe that in this case the pros outweigh the cons.

+

OMB and Treasury also support + reallocating these funds to Morocco.

+

Don Fortier and Howard Teicher concur.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you authorize me to inform DoD and State that NSC interposes no objection to the + proposed reallocation to Morocco.McFarlane approved the + recommendation.

+ + + Tab I + Paper Prepared in the National Security CouncilConfidential. + + + Washington, undated + + +

PROPOSED REAPPORTIONMENT OF $5 MILLION IN FMS FROM LEBANON TO MOROCCO

+

The Departments of State and Defense, with the concurrence of OMB and Treasury, wish to reapportion + $5.0 million in FMS credits from + Lebanon to Morocco. Other alternatives—countries with allocations + below the FY 1985 CPD level—have been studied. (Please + see attached.)See footnote 2 + above. However, it is believed that reallocation of the + funds to Morocco would be the most effective course.

+

OMB has informed State that it will + not apportion $5 million in FY 1985 + FMS credits programmed for + Lebanon. The reallocation would have no negative programmatic impact + on Lebanon. The Lebanese would still have over $20 million in old + FMS credits that are available + to them after this $5 million is moved to Morocco.

+

The reallocation of the $5 million in FMS credits will have no effect on the remaining $20 + million plus in unused FMS credits + available to Lebanon, or on Lebanon’s remaining ESF. (These credits have no + relationship whatsoever with the no year ESF funds provided to Lebanon by the U.S. Congress in + the FY 1983 Lebanon supplemental.) + We anticipate no adverse Congressional reaction to this routine + reallocation of funds.

+

There are sound programmatic reasons for such a reallocation to + Morocco. DSAA estimates a Moroccan + program sustainment level of $58 million for FY 85. The present MAP/FMS allocation is $48 million. + This reallocation would have a beneficial effect on U.S.-Moroccan + relations, particularly in light of the recently concluded JMC meeting.The JMC was + held in Washington July 27–31.

+

Since Morocco’s funding level of $3 million in FMS credits is currently below its + FY 85 FMSCR request level of $10 million, no reprogramming or + reallocation notification to the Congress would be necessary. In + addition, we do not believe that this extra $5 million at + concessional rates would have a significant adverse impact on + Morocco’s debt situation.

+

We would like to proceed with this reallocation as soon as possible. + Our past experience indicates that it usually takes Morocco about + two months to sign up for a new loan.

+ +
+ +
+ 247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading + July–December 1985. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, August 13, 1985 + + +

1. Morocco: Whitehead Meeting with King Hassan. John Whitehead met with King Hassan on + Monday.August 12. A record of the + Whitehead-Hassan meeting is in telegram 7563 from Rabat, August 13. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, [no D number]) + After presenting your letters,See Document 245. Whitehead also carried a copy of the letter + translated into French. See telegram 240694 to Rabat, August 6. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850558–0524) he told Hassan that our relationship + is being damaged by his continuing union with Libya. Hassan acknowledged + that Qadhafi’s behavior has not + improved as a result of the treaty, but argued that the union is + nonbinding and can be broken at any time, and that through it, he ended + Libya’s involvement in the Western Sahara war. John reminded Hassan that + Americans perceive Qadhafi to be + the epitome of evil; therefore, popular and informed political opinion + in the US about Morocco was damaged by + the treaty with Libya. Hassan attempted to deemphasize the importance of + the treaty, offering to explain Morocco’s position to the Congress when + he is here in October. Hassan clearly understands that this issue is a + major cause of concern for us. Turning to his perception of the United + States Government’s role in the peace process, Hassan said that he would + seek discreetly to talk to the Peres government urging greater Israeli flexibility on + the composition of the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. He believes + that a meeting between such a delegation and US representatives would constitute irreversible + Palestinian acceptance of UN resolutions + 242 and 338. Hassan noted that he was charged by the Arab League Summit + to present the results to you and Gorbachev before your November 19 meeting. Hassan plans + to be in New York in October, and clearly hopes to call on you then. + (SENSITIVE)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+
+ +
+ 248. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Morocco 1985 (08/05/1985–09/30/1985). + Secret. + + + Washington, August 15, 1985 + + Dear Bud: + +

I have just returned from an 11-day visit to the Middle East. As you + know, my last stop was Morocco, where I had a long visit with King + Hassan.See Document + 247. I delivered the President’s letter which + expressed serious concern about Morocco’s treaty with Libya.See Document + 245.

+

I emphasized to Hassan in very strong terms that this treaty puts a + serious strain on his 200-year-old relationship with the U.S. I + explained that Qadhafi is + considered here as the epitome of evil, the terrorist head of an outlaw + nation, and that the American public, the Congress, and the + Administration do not understand and have enormous difficulty in + accepting this relationship. The King seemed to understand our concerns + but explained that he had concluded the treaty in order to get Libya out + of the Western Sahara war and that this had been accomplished.

+

At the end of the formal session with the King, he took me aside for a + ten-minute private talk. He said that he could not terminate the treaty + with Qadhafi, as I had urged him + to, or they would come back into the Western Sahara war. He stated, + however, that as a result of his relationship with Qadhafi, he now has considerable + influence over him and is in a position to take specific steps to + moderate his international behavior. He offered to use his influence + with Qadhafi to advance American + interests and virtually asked for an opportunity to prove to us that his + relationship with Qadhafi would + produce positive results for the United States. “Give me an assignment,” + he said.

+

In this private talk he also said that “nothing in this part of the world + is forever,” and if the United States could help him achieve his + objective at the UN to get a referendum + on the Western Sahara, over the objections of Algeria, an achievement + which would end the war, then he would no longer need the treaty.

+

He said that he hopes to hear from you some time after August 25 + regarding your plans to visit Morocco and that he would very much + welcome such a visit. We are taking a hard look at Hassan’s comments and, of course, stand ready to + assist in every way in preparing for your own possible visit to + Rabat.

+

Sincerely,

+ John C. + WhiteheadWhitehead signed + “John” above this typed signature. + + Acting Secretary +
+
+ 249. Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to the Ambassador to Morocco (Nassif)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Records, 1985 Nodis + Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Exdis September 1985. Secret; Exdis. Drafted + by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN) on + August 13; cleared by Zweifel. The Department also transmitted the letter in + telegram 285089 to Rabat, September 17. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850658–0465) + + + Washington, September 16, 1985 + + Dear Mr. Ambassador: + +

As you assume your new responsibilities as United States Ambassador to + Morocco, I want to review our objectives there and to outline some areas + for your priority attention. These overall guidelines will be + supplemented with specific, issue-related instructions as needed. I hope + that you will be better able to approach specific issues and give them + their appropriate weight in the light of the priority areas described + below.

+

U.S. objectives in Morocco are to: (1) induce the GOM to reconsider its unity accord with + Libya; (2) pursue appropriate levels of political, military and economic + cooperation; (3) promote self-sustaining economic growth and political + stability; and (4) work to avoid escalation of the Western Sahara + dispute and to encourage the search for a political solution to that + conflict.

+

Your overarching task will be to continue the strong, traditional and + friendly relationships with the Kingdom of Morocco. Unfortunately, these + now are troubled by Hassan’s arrangements with Qadhafi. Absent abrogation of the + agreement, an immediate USG objective + is to limit areas of Moroccan/Libyan cooperation. I am particularly + concerned about the possible compromise of U.S. equipment and + intelligence, and your alertness in forestalling such will be of great + importance.

+ +

As you work with the Moroccan government, you should pay particular + attention to development of a realistic perception of the policy and + resource constraints which affect our bilateral relationship. Your + careful, critical appraisal of Moroccan assistance requests and your + recommendations on how to promote economic and social development will + be especially important inputs in our program decisions. Our overall + goal is to assist the GOM to carry out + necessary economic reform measures with particular emphasis on reliance + on competitive market forces and the private sector.

+

Our military relationship with Morocco provides the U.S. with critical + strategic assets of major importance to the United States both in Europe + and the Middle East. Continued access to Moroccan facilities is a high + priority. We recognize the importance of adequately responding to + Morocco’s legitimate security requirements, but the Moroccans must + understand that our assistance is not designed either to compensate or + to underwrite the costs of their Saharan conflict. We remain convinced + that that dispute can only be resolved through political negotiations. + We want to keep the parties to the conflict out in front and not to + identify the USG too closely with + either the Moroccan or Algerian positions.

+

The Mission’s ability to monitor issues affecting political stability + should be improved, particularly reporting on groups not associated with + traditional elites.

+

I know that you will take appropriate steps to ensure the greatest + possible physical security for all U.S. mission personnel and property + and support the morale of U.S. and FSN personnel.

+

In the course of your duties, you will have contact with many officials, + on a variety of matters, and you will receive solicited and unsolicited + advice and counsel on actions you should take. The line of authority for + any action or decision on your part flows from the President to me and + from me through the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and + South Asian Affairs to you. I look to the NEA Assistant Secretary to issue instructions in my name + and to serve as the primary communications link between us. You should + channel all messages dealing with policy proposals, policy + implementation, program activities and post operations to or through + him.

+

I look forward to reviewing the goals and objectives statement for your + mission. I am asking the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and North + African Affairs to work with you on this statement, which will be + forwarded to my office through the bureau.

+

As you undertake this challenging assignment, I wish you well in your + many duties, and I reiterate my full confidence that you will be + successful in your mission.

+

Sincerely yours,

+ George P. + Shultz +
+ +
+ 250. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850729–0163. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to USUN. + + 9721. + + Rabat, October 11, 1985, 0914Z + + +

D for Deputy Secretary Whitehead; P for Under Secretary Armacost; NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy; Dept + please pass NSC for Mr. McFarlane. Subject: King Hassan + Cancels Planned U.S. Visit.

+ + + (C—Entire text). + + Abdelfattah Frej, Secretary to King Hassan, and Foreign Minister + Filali separately + informed Ambassador October 11 that Hassan has decided not to attend + U.N. 40th anniversary celebrations as he had long planned. Both + GOM officials first attributed + Hassan’s decision to cancel to the proliferation of regional events + engaging his attention, but then obliquely made it clear that the + real reason for cancellation is GOM-USG inability to arrange a + private meeting for Hassan with President Reagan during Hassan’s projected + U.S. visit. This confirms fragmentary signals we had begun to + receive early this week from sources close to Palace that Hassan + might well cancel if Presidential meeting not in offing, but that + local rationale for cancelling would be regional + developments. + + In his speech opening Parliament late October 11, Hassan himself + announced publicly that he has decided not to go to New York “for + several reasons”. + + Prime Minister Karim + Lamrani will now lead Moroccan delegation to New York + for anniversary celebrations. He plans to leave Morocco October 18 + to arrive New York October 19. PriMin will be preceded to New York by Filali. (Septel gives further + details of their trip and hope to see senior U.S. officials).In telegram 9722 from Rabat, October 11, + the Embassy reported that Filali told Nassif that he “will return to New York next + Tuesday, October 15, to have further discussions on UNGA business (above all, Western + Sahara).” Karim-Lamrani, meanwhile, would arrive on October 19. + The Embassy reported that he “very much hopes to meet with Vice + President Bush.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850729–0172) We assume, and + strongly recommend, that PriMin + be invited to President’s October 23 reception now that Hassan will + remain here. Filali and + spouse have accepted the President’s invitation. + + Hassan is clearly disappointed at inability to arrange a meeting + with the President. From their recent comments, Hassan’s closest + associates, i.e., Filali, + tend to attribute non-meeting to continuing USG concerns about the Morocco-Libya union. While we do + not predict any dramatic + change in U.S.-Moroccan relations in the months ahead, we do think + that things are likely to remain on dead-center and that there will + not be much movement in any domain until the President and Hassan + have an opportunity to meet face-to-face for the air-clearing + discussions which Embassy recommended in Rabat 9058.In telegram 9058 from Rabat, September 25, + Nassif reported that + he had been called in by Basri, who told him that the King wanted to meet + with him later that day in order to discuss Hassan’s upcoming + visit to New York. Nassif + continued: “I assume that the King’s urgent request to see me + follows receipt by him of word from Ambassador Jorio that the President will + be unable to receive Hassan in New York.” Nassif predicted that Hassan + will “almost certainly press me hard for reconsideration of the + White House decision.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850682–0764) + Ambassador strongly recommends that Department and White House place + Hassan prominently on the list of state or official visitors in the + first half of 1986 and that we be prepared to tell GOM at an early date that we are + prepared to schedule such a visit. Our so informing the GOM would salve Hassan’s present hurt + and embarrassment as well as prepare the way for a meeting (at the + top levels of government) which should go far toward protecting and + extending U.S. interest over the years ahead. + + Nassif +
+
+ 251. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850922–0744. Secret; Exdis. + + 12186. + + Rabat, December 24, 1985, 1258Z + + +

NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy from Ambassador. Subj: Letter + of Instructions/Goals and Objectives. Refs: A) State 285089;See footnote 1, Document + 249. B) State 118267.In telegram 118267 to all Near Eastern and South Asian Posts, April + 19, the Department informed the posts that all newly appointed + Chiefs of Mission would “receive a letter of instruction from the + Secretary defining goals and objectives. Within 120 days of his or + her arrival, the Chief of Mission will confirm these instructions or + seek modifications.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850270–0645)

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + Secretary Shultz’s + September 16 letter to me, repeated in ref (A), contained + Secretary’s initial instructions, goals and objectives for my mission to Morocco. There + follow my comments on those instructions, as well as some + reflections on how we should pursue those objectives here, as + requested ref (B). I hope that in formulating a final goals and + objectives statement for this Embassy for the next 12 months, the + Department will take into account these comments on the limits of + the possible and on modalities for achieving our objectives. + + Policy objectives:I concur that the four specific objectives + listed in paragraph (2) of the Secretary’s letter are central to + U.S.-Moroccan relations and appropriate for this mission. Regarding + objective number (1), “inducing the GOM to reconsider its Unity Accord with Libya” + Washington and this Embassy need to think through, and perhaps have + a further dialogue on: (a) what would in fact constitute success in + achieving that objective; (b) the current impediments to achieving + total, fully visible success; and (c) the tactics we should pursue + in trying to achieve it. + + As recent Embassy [less than 1 line not + declassified] reporting have clearly indicated, the Union + Accord is not flourishing. It is being implemented slowly, largely + in relatively non-controversial areas, and there is strong evidence + that some senior officials like Prime Minister Lamrani are deliberately slowing + it further. Apart from Morocco’s dissatisfaction with Qadhafi, the USG can itself take considerable pride + in its own contributions to date to slowing the accord: We have + consistently argued against the wisdom, and indeed the morality, of + aligning with a terrorist like Qadhafi, and we have left the Moroccans in no doubt + that their relationship with us will not be wholly restored until + the Union Accord is past history. These efforts have enjoyed + substantial success. On the other hand, the accord is unlikely to + disappear immediately through any dramatic renunciation by Hassan so + long as he believes in its utility in preventing a renewal of Libyan + support for the Polisario. + + Under these circumstances the question arises of what U.S. tactics + and strategy should be to bring about final dissolution of the + Morocco-Libya union. It seems to me there are two basic + alternatives: (1) to continue to apply about the same amount of + pressure as we have applied to date in the hope, and indeed + expectation, that we can continue to keep Morocco off balance with + respect to the union, thus probably ensuring the Union Accord’s + prudent and less than total implementation, and its eventual demise; + or (2) to put on a full court press with the GOM at the highest levels of our two + governments designed to bring a quick end to the accord. Apart from + the fact that the desirable latter goal is probably unobtainable in + the immediate future, to adopt such a strategy would require our + being prepared to answer the almost certain GOM question of whether the U.S. is prepared to support + Morocco against Qadhafi. Such + a question would have implications for U.S. aid levels to Morocco, + for U.S.-Moroccan defense cooperation, or both. (I would note that + such + GOM figures as PriMin + Lamrani and FonMin + Filali have since mid-summer + hinted that at some point the GOM + could conceivably ask us whether we would be prepared to give + Morocco financial support to counter renewed Libyan support for the + Polisario, should Morocco dissolve the union.) In summary, as the + U.S. reflects on how it wishes to pursue our laudable objective of + putting as much distance as possible between Hassan and Qadhafi, we need to consider + clearly the limits of the possible and how much we might be prepared + to pay politically and monetarily to achieve total, visible + success. + + More briefly on other policy goals: + + To pursue appropriate levels of political, military, and + economic cooperation, and to promote self-sustaining + economic growth and political stability in Morocco + (objectives no. 2 and 3 in the Secretary’s letter) will + require the continued provision to Morocco of substantial + amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance. To pursue + those goals vigorously would require much larger inputs than + we are now making or are projected. To do any less than we + currently plan would risk seriously compromising both + objectives. Given the increasingly tight U.S. budgetary + situation, it is difficult to argue for greater assistance + for Morocco, and yet the Country Team and I believe that + objectively greater aid is necessary and warranted. + + Re the Western Sahara (objective no. 4), the U.S. should + continue its present policy of quiet encouragement to + Algeria and Morocco to negotiate a political solution which + could be put to the people of the Western Sahara for + endorsement in a referendum or similar device. Since the + present seems unpropitious for a break-through, the U.S. + should avoid any temptation to take on a mediation role and + the attendant risk of getting squeezed between the two main + parties and seeing our relations with both suffer. + + + Management objectives:Simply put, I think our objectives in + the management area should be: (1) to maintain effective management + controls to ensure that we sustain the official U.S. presence in + Morocco at the lowest possible cost; (2) to provide the greatest + possible measure of security for our personnel and installations; + and (3) to maintain employee morale at the highest possible + level. + + I have thoroughly reviewed our budget, procurement, and related + management controls (suggested goal no. 1 in para 8) and believe we + have this problem well in hand. It will receive my continuing + attention, however. I am happy to report that American and FSN + employees attest to extremely high morale; we intend to keep it that + way (goal no. 3). With regard to goal no. 2—physical security—we + need the Department’s help in ensuring timely financial assistance + and hands-on construction supervision and follow-through to ensure + that the security + enhancement plans that have grown out of the many security + enhancement visits from Washington the past two years are carried + through to early fruition. Specifically, we need money now to + purchase the land for a new Ambassador’s residence that has been + made available to us at low cost through intercession by King + Hassan. We would also like to see Washington proceed to budget for, + and draw plans for, construction on the current Embassy compound of + an annex designed to house USAID and USIS. + + Nassif +
+
+ 252. Telegram From Embassy in Morocco to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, + 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. + + 226. + + Rabat, January 9, 1986, 1347Z + + +

For the Secretary and NEA/AS Murphy. Subject: January 8 Audience With King Hassan on + Dealing With Libya.

+ + + Secret—Nodis + + Summary: King Hassan asked me to come to Marrakech on January 8 to + discuss the President’s January 7 announcementReference is to Reagan’s January 7 statement at a press + conference that he had issued Executive Order 12543 prohibiting + trade and certain transactions involving Libya. Documentation on + this decision is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. For the text of the Executive Order, see Public Papers: Reagan 1982, Book II, pp. 14–15. + and next steps to deal with terrorism. Emphasizing that the United + States reaction was “fully legitimate,” he expressed the fear that, + given the numerous expressions of solidarity with Libya and lack of + support from European allies, the U.S. measures would appear + ineffective, and Qadhafi + would seem the victor in the confrontation. Hassan told me that, in + fact, Qadhafi is deeply + concerned and had called him earlier on January 8 to tell him so. + Hassan said he was sending Royal Counselor Guedira to Tripoli to + hear what Qadhafi intended to + do to prove he is willing to respond positively to the U.S. + position. I told Hassan that the President earnestly hoped that + other countries would join with our initiative to drive home the + point that terrorism is unacceptable. I said the U.S. hoped that + Hassan, as head of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference, could + make a statement in support of the President’s initiative. I emphasized to Hassan + that words from Qadhafi were + insufficient, that only actions, for example such as expulsion of + Abu Nidal from Libya, + were of interest. I told him that one of the main United States + objectives and one of my main goals as Ambassador was to see + Morocco’s union with Libya ended. He said he hoped to talk with + President Reagan about that + matter in coming months. End summary. + + King Hassan asked me to come to Marrakech urgently on Wednesday + afternoon, January 8. We spoke for an hour in his private quarters. + The King was accompanied by Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and + President of Parliament Ahmed Osman. + + Hassan opened by telling me he had called me “as a friend” of + President Reagan and of the + United States. He said he had seen the measures against Libya + announced by the President on January 7. The United States reaction, + he noted carefully, was “fully legitimate” in his eyes. He said he + understood the U.S. attitude toward terrorism and its desire to stop + it. + + He went on to note, however, that he was concerned about how + effective the measures would turn out to be. They are economic + measures, he said, not military ones. Qadhafi, he feared, would still be able to obtain + the benefits of U.S. technology through other countries. He said he + had analyzed the reaction over the past few days to talk of + sanctions against Libya and had noted that the European allies were + not at all supportive. The Arab and Islamic communities had both + stated their solidarity with Libya. A number of non-aligned + countries were doing the same. Hassan said that the United States + position might have been better understood if its reaction had been + more decisive. “You should have sent a commando unit, and talked + about it later.” Hassan said he understood the reasons for the + President’s decision, but in the current environment, he said he + feared in the short term, the appearance would be that it is the + United States, not Libya, that is isolated on the issue. Hassan said + that he did not want to see that impression develop. The U.S. must + appear as succeeding in this matter. He said it was important to + look at the next steps. + + Hassan observed that, for the moment, Qadhafi is “strutting about” acting victorious as a + result of all the declarations of solidarity Libya is receiving. It + is a false impression, Hassan stated. Qadhafi is deeply frightened by actions the U.S. + might take. He said that the Libyan leader had called him earlier on + January 8, and was clearly shaken by the President’s speech.Reference is likely to Reagan’s January 7 press + conference, during which he accused Qadhafi of providing “sanctuary and support” for + the perpetrators of the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in + the Rome and Vienna airports. See Public + Papers: Reagan + 1982, Book II, pp. 17–24. Emphasizing that + Qadhafi had in no way + requested the visit, he said he had decided to send Royal Counselor Reda Guedira to + Tripoli on January 9 to see what Qadhafi was willing to do in response to the + President’s speech. + + I then interjected to clarify the United States position. I + explained at length the President’s January 7 statement, and the + background which had led up to it. I emphasized the deep outrage in + the United States towards terrorism, and in particular towards + Libyan support of it. President Reagan felt strongly the need to act now to stop the + terrorist threat, and his January 7 executive order was meant to do + just that. I told Hassan that the United States seeks support from + all countries in order to make its economic measures against Libya + more effective. I urged him, as President of the Arab League and of + the Islamic Conference, to join in that effort, condemning terrorism + and Libyan support of it. I left him talking points on the + President’s executive order and what we hoped friends of the United + States would do to further its goals. (State 5472)Telegram 5472 to all diplomatic posts, January + 8, contains the text of the executive order. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860015–1078) + + I commented on Hassan’s intention to send Guedira to Tripoli, + pointing out that the Libyan leader’s position was already + well-known. I noted that Qadhafi had first praised the December 27 terrorist + attacks in Rome and Vienna only later to “condemn them”.Reference is to the December 27, 1985, + terrorist attacks. See footnote 2, + Document 156. I emphasized that the United + States was not interested in words or promises from Libya. The + United States wanted to see a halt to unacceptable Libyan behavior, + for example expelling Abu + Nidal and ceasing all support for him. + + I told the King this was one issue on which every American was in + complete agreement. When he told me he wanted to try to lower + regional tension, I responded that we want to see an end to + terrorism. The King showed a renewed awareness on the depth of U.S. + feelings on the question. He told me that he was considering the + pros and cons of sending Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed to Washington + later in the week to deliver a letter from him to the President and + speak to the President, “if only for a few minutes,” on the + terrorism question. Later in the conversation, however, he said he + would only send the Crown Prince if he received an appropriate + response from Qadhafi. Hassan + went on to say he felt a personal friendship for President Reagan, and emphasized he had no + such feelings toward Qadhafi. + “I might have a treaty with Libya,” he observed, “but we have been + friends of the United States for hundreds of years.” + + Toward the end of the conversation, I confided privately to the + King that he had to understand the United States’ position. I said + that it is a USG objective and one + of my top priorities as Ambassador to Morocco to see an end to the treaty of Oujda. + I explained that anything Morocco did or said with regard to Libya + would be viewed by the U.S. in the context of the Oujda Accord. The + U.S. overriding interest was in terminating that relationship. + Hassan agreed that it was a matter he would have to discuss + personally in Washington. I then added that any discussion with the + President could usefully include an exchange of views on possible + contacts between Hassan and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (State 367280).In telegram 367280 to Rabat and Tel Aviv, + December 3, 1985, the Department agreed “that likelihood of an + early Hassan-Peres meeting is doubtful at present,” but + indicated that “it is possible that quiet communication will + continue between the two leaders.” The Department also urged the + Embassy in Morocco to “encourage Hassan and his advisors to + continue to play a constructive role” in any future discussions. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850862–0824) Hassan said that he would like + to make a brief working visit to Washington in the early spring to + pursue those questions. + + Comment: During the meeting, Hassan was relaxed and seemingly far + removed from the pressures of an Islamic Conference ministerial + meeting in Fes. I do not believe that I was convoked to carry out + any particular Arab League or Islamic Conference commitment. Hassan, + as the Department is aware, has long sought to insert himself as a + middle-man between the U.S. and Qadhafi. He also continues to attach great + importance to a meeting this year with the President and may have + regarded the ill-conceived idea of sending Crown Prince Sidi + Mohammed with a message as a first step in that process. Without + impugning the Crown Prince’s abilities, I did my best to discourage + the proposal emphasizing that the USG position on Libya would be determined by specific + actions only, not words. In fact, there is a bizarre discontinuity + between Hassan’s aspirations to play a mediator’s role and Interior + Minister Basri’s report, + shared with me on the same day, about possible Libyan terrorists + transiting Casablanca for the U.S. (Rabat 205).In telegram 205 from Rabat, January 8, the + Embassy reported that Basri shared with Nassif the text of a telegram from “Casablanca + security services reporting alleged plan by Libyan terrorists to + infiltrate the United States via Casablanca.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860018–0624) + + These contradictions and Hassan’s self-serving interest in + mediation and a meeting with the President should not, however, + obscure what I believe is a genuine attempt to be helpful on his + part. The executive order and current U.S. crisis with Libya occur + at a time of maximum friction in Morocco’s union with Libya. Hassan, + in my view, is not ready to risk resumed Libyan support to the + Polisario by an outright rupture and is worried that the crisis + could impact adversely on his relations with the U.S. His concern + that the U.S. not become isolated in the Arab and Islamic groups by + a groundswell of support for the “underdog” Libya appears genuine. I am under + no illusions, however, that the King, if he chooses to even raise + the issue, is likely to prevail with Qadhafi in seeking expulsion from Libya of Abu Nidal or other specific + indications of change in Libyan behavior. + + On the other hand, why not respond to Hassan that if he is + interested in lowering the temperature, he can take a first step by + telling Colonel Qadhafi to + publicly admit his support for Abu + Nidal, announce his imminent expulsion from Libyan + territory and an immediate cessation of further financial and + political support for him. Regardless of the potential for success, + such a role would shift the burden of lessening tension to Hassan + and call his hand on the issue of whether the union can live up to + its advertised moderating potential. It would also put more pressure + on Hassan to abrogate the treaty if he fails to pass the “test” and + is consistent with our démarches world-wide. + + Nassif +
+
+ 253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Murphy, Quinn, Oakley, Zweifel, Simeon Moats (S/S–O), and Pamela Rockwell (L/EBC); approved by Armacost. + + 10312. + + Washington, January 11, 1986, 2135Z + + +

For the Ambassador. Subject: Response to King Hassan. Ref: Rabat + 226.See Document + 252.

+ + + Secret—Nodis. + + We want to reinforce the excellent representations you made to + King Hassan in your 1/8 meeting. You should seek another audience at + earliest possible time and draw on the following points: + + We appreciate your recognition that the measures announced + by President Reagan + are “fully legitimate” and your understanding of the United + States Government’s attitude toward terrorism and our desire + to stop it. We reemphasize the important point that + Ambassador Nassif + made in his meeting with you on January 8. Our goal is an + end to unacceptable Libyan behavior. We have no confidence + in words or promises of Colonel Qadhafi. + + + The USG regrets however, + that the Government of Morocco is associated with the OIC consensus + declarations.On January 7, + the OIC released a + statement that in part proclaimed “its solidarity with + the Libyan Arab people and its active support of the + defense of its sovereignty and the integrity of its + territory and territorial waters.” The full text of the + statement is in telegram 233 from Rabat, January 9. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860020–0879) On January 9 the + OIC adopted a + second, consensus resolution “expressing solidarity with + Libya” which “toughens the earlier language adopted” by + specifically condemning “the measures taken by the + United States against (Libya).” The Embassy’s informal + translation of the resolution is in telegram 281 from + Rabat, January 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860023–0285) + These include egregious and hostile mischaracterizations of + the measures now taken by the United States. + + The USG is resolved to + make Qadhafi pay a + price for his persistent support of terrorism. In coming + weeks, we will seek other governments’ support in a series + of measures to reduce the threat of terrorism and isolate + Libya. We are encouraged by indications that European and + other governments are considering measures consistent with + these objectives. + + Morocco’s leadership role in securing approval of Arab + League condemnations of terrorism is appreciated; such a + position, however, is seriously weakened by the strong + support given Libya in Arab League and OIC fora. + + We are confident that our condemnations of Qadhafi are well founded. + His protestations of innocence cannot be believed, nor can + his word be trusted. For example, in addition to the many + terrorist actions which can be traced to the Libyan + Government, you should know that Libyan officials now are + telling Western European governments that Abu Nidal is not in + Libya, but operating from Morocco. + + We appreciate his Majesty’s thoughtfulness in raising the + possibility of a visit to the US by the Crown Prince to consider further the + possibility of moderating Qadhafi’s behavior. As Ambassador Nassif has stated, however, + we have no interest in engaging in any dialogue, even + indirectly, with Qadhafi. We do not trust his word. If he is + interested in moving toward international acceptability, let + him demonstrate that through such actions as that suggested + by Ambassador Nassif. + + We welcome His Majesty’s thoughts about Qadhafi, but remain firm in + our belief that Libya’s support for terrorism has remained + undiminished as has its threat to international + order. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 254. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official + Memoranda (01/16/1986). Confidential. Sent through Armacost. A stamped notation at + the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” McKinley also initialed the memorandum and wrote: + “21 January.” + + + Washington, January 16, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Invitation for King Hassan To Visit the U.S. + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

Whether to recommend to the NSC early + announcement that King Hassan of Morocco will be invited to Washington + during the first half of 1986.

+

DISCUSSION

+

King Hassan was among those Chiefs of State whom the Department + recommended be invited to Washington during the first half of 1986. The + White House has not announced a final decision, but we have been told + informally by the NSC that there is a + good possibility that the visit for Hassan will be approved.

+

Also, in terms of our face-off with Qadhafi, it would be to our advantage to have the visit + announced soon. We are sure that Hassan would immediately respond in + positive fashion to an invitation.In a + January 22 note to Shultz, + Armacost wrote: “I am + inclined to endorse this request. We have important interests at + stake in Morocco. Hassan has been eager to come for some time, and + the prospect of a meeting may offer some leverage on his + relationship with Libya.” He continued: “I do believe a Presidential + meeting could afford us opportunities to sow seeds of discord + between Rabat and Tripoli. While our objective, at least, should be + to precipitate a break in the Oujda Union, realistically we are not + likely to succeed simply by offering a visit, since both budgetary + and political constraints inhibit us from making the kinds of + commitments to Hassan that would precipitate such a shift in his + relationships.” (Ibid.)

+

Announcement of our invitation during Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s current trip would have the + additional political value in demonstrating to the Europeans the + continuing vitality of U.S.-Arab relations.Whitehead visited Europe + January 15–24 for consultations with the NATO countries about Libya and terrorism. Documentation + on his visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad.

+ +

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the attached memorandumNot + attached. recommending this course of action to the White + House.Shultz approved the recommendation on January + 24.

+
+
+ 255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Josiah Rosenblat (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Hill, McKinley, Gregory Talcott (S/S–O), Pearson, and Brian Curran (P); approved by Murphy. + + 65573. + + Washington, March 4, 1986, 0358Z + + + + SUBJECT + President Reagan’s + Response to King Hassan’s Letter of February 7 (8606811). + +

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. The following are texts of King Hassan’s February 7 letter to + President Reagan regarding the + Middle East peace process and President Reagan’s answer. Ambassador should deliver reply. Signed + original will follow.

+

3. Begin text of King Hassan’s February 7 letter:

+

Dear Mr. President:

+

We have met more than once since the American people have brought you to + the highest office to conduct their destiny which often happens to be + linked with that of other people. In fact, nothing humanly relating to + the peace and progress of our society today could remain alien to the + man who, dutifully aware of his responsibilities and determined to + fulfill, for the general good, the mission which, in rather historically + rare moments, is vested in him. Indeed, we are now going through a + historically rare moment full of hopes as well as numerous questionings + and deep concerns. Together, we have tackled a number of problems + related to hotbeds of confrontation and insecurity.

+

My triple capacity of current Chairman of the Arab Summit, Chairman of + the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Chairman of the Al-Quds + Committee has, in our joint reflections and our exchange of views, + naturally made us dwell more particularly on the Middle East conflict. It was then with + special attention and interest that I tried to understand your position, + seeking to grasp as much as possible of the depths of the motives behind + it. This I did with the greatest effort and the maximum degree of “fair + play”, in order to free myself from any eventual preconceived ideas + which, I had thought, might have caused so many harmful prejudices, + thereby obstructing the way of comprehension and agreement here and + there.

+

Today, I am asking you, most amicably and sincerely, to make the same + exorcizing effort so that we may, together, gradually perceive the true + significance of that which is preliminary, that which is principal, that + which is transient, that which is temporary, that which is essential and + that which embodies peace for the Middle East as well as that which may + bring about the success of such a peace or endanger it.

+

The Arab-Israeli conflict is today at a decisive turning point. Not long + ago, differences were deep; now, they are so reduced that one may hope + to achieve the goal of peace so longed for. The error of not taking + advantage of the opportunity which presents itself would be so + unforgivable and would entail far-reaching consequences, especially + that, in addition to the open or disguised war Israel and the Arabs have + been waging one against the other for forty years now, a new hotbed of + instability and insecurity has emerged along the Red Sea—something which + could put all of the nations of the region into a situation whose + evolution no one would dare control.

+

In this exceptionally strategic region, America has so many peace-seeking + friends whose progress and development are unfortunately obstructed by + the prevailing situation. Your determination to help your friends is so + known, as it obviously results from a fair appraisal of the supreme + interests of the United States of America which you value in a global + manner and, consequently, in relation to every link between your country + and the rest of the world.

+

I feel confident that you realize, as I do, that the time of hesitation + is over and that the hour of beneficially liberating decision has + come.

+

The main goal is to make a contribution—however modest—to the design of + peace so wholeheartedly called for by the entire world.

+

Being far from the region, we naturally feel free from any inhibition or, + quite simply, from anything that might hinder healthy reflections.

+

At this stage, the teachings deriving from the frequent contacts + maintained with one party or another give reason to believe and hope + that the perspective of what could be the way towards the solution has + now become relatively clear and concrete.

+

I—The aim is and remains that of installing a just, global and durable + peace ensuring full security for all and an atmosphere of quiet and + stability for the region.

+ +

II—The means, as well as the terms and conditions, of achieving it must + be negotiated between all the parties interested or concerned.

+

III—In the negotiations to be held, the Palestinian people will be + represented by the PLO, their sole and + legitimate representative, de facto and de jure. In this respect, my + deep conviction—based on utterly objective motives and rejecting any + puerile sentimentality—is that it would be illusive and absolutely + useless to think that the Arabs—and particularly the Palestinian + people—could be involved and validly committed through the appointment + or the imposition of representatives other than those legitimately + acting on behalf of the Palestinian people for over ten years now.

+

IV—Negotiations should be accompanied with an official statement + recognizing the Palestinian People’s inalienable right for + self-determination within a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, in + concordance with the agreements concluded in Amman between His Majesty + the King of Jordan and the PLO + Chairman. Simultaneously, the PLO would + confirm its adherence to the United Nations and Security Council + resolutions relevant to the Middle East conflict, including Resolutions + 242 and 338.

+

V—The valid and appropriate framework for the negotiations should be that + of an international conference which would group, apart from the parties + directly interested or concerned, the Security Council members.

+

In my estimation, these suggestions have the advantage and the merit of + drawing a nearly total consensus. In any event, so far as Mr. Gorbachev concerned, he expresses the + following in his reply of 6 December 1985 and in response to the message + I had addressed to him on the occasion of your Geneva Summit: “It is + only according to the extent to which the interests and the rights of + all parties are reciprocally taken into account that deadlocks could be + avoided in the Middle East settlement. Actually, such an objective can + be reached only within the framework of an international conference with + the participation of all parties interested, including the PLO, legitimate representative of the + Palestinian people who are the greatest victims of the Middle East + tragedy. In our opinion, there is no other alternative.”

+

Since the cardinal virtue of clarity has always made relations easier + among men, allowing for dialogue to proceed further, there is a point + which, I believe, needs clarifying.

+

The Israeli air-raid against the PLO + headquarters aimed at the physical elimination of its chairman. Wrongly + or rightly, the American responsibility has been implicated. I + personally find it difficult to think, one moment, that the President of + the United States, whom I know and appreciate, could have allowed to be + involved in such a blatant aggression act; however, I believe that a + clarification from you would + efficiently enhance and comfort the feelings of the Arab masses and + their leaders which the role attributed to the United States in the + Israeli aggression has unfortunately not left unaltered.

+

In this respect, the PLO Chairman has + asked me this: “must I still be considered sentenced to death by those + who are Israel’s support? I want to know so that the PLO could draw the adequate conclusions. + Isn’t there a contradiction between the death sentence which I still may + continue to be the object of and the fact that I am personally and + persistently asked to recognize, on behalf of the organization I lead, + Resolutions 242 and 338 so as to allow the peace process to + prosper?”

+

The suggestions which I submit to the friend and the official who, to a + large degree, holds the fate and destiny of the peoples of the countries + of the Middle East, result from a ripe reflection and a steady + concentration the various responsibilities have allowed me to + undertake.

+

Should these suggestions meet with your approval, we could join forces so + as to bring together, and unify around them, all the parties interested + or concerned.

+

Please accept, Mr. President and great friend, the assurances of my + highest esteem and consideration.

+

Most sincerely yours, Hassan II, + King of Morocco. End text.

+

4. Begin text of response. Your Majesty, Ambassador Nassif has delivered your message of + February 7. I appreciate your thoughts on the requirements for a peace + settlement in the Middle East.

+

As you know, a just and enduring peace in the Middle East remains a + paramount objective of my government. It is of great concern to me + personally, as well. I can only agree with you that a dispassionate + analysis of all the factors involved must underlie any effort to resolve + this complex and difficult problem. Otherwise, those efforts are doomed + to failure.

+

You write of “a just, global and durable peace ensuring full security for + all.” That is indeed our common goal. You also note that such a peace + must be a negotiated peace. I fully concur: an imposed solution would + not be a lasting peace. I would add, however, that such a peace must be + negotiated directly by the parties. This could take place under + international auspices, if the parties so decided and according to + mutually agreeable arrangements.

+

The internationally recognized basis for any such negotiations are those + contained in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It + is my view, Your Majesty, that all parties to negotiations would + logically have to subscribe to these fundamental principles. This + includes, of course, the representatives of the Palestinian people. During the course of + negotiations those principles—as well as others, such as the legitimate + rights of the Palestinians—would be brought to bear.

+

We in the United States followed the recent discussions in Amman with + great interest. I can only accept His Majesty King Hussein’s assessment + of the causes of the failure of those talks as he detailed them in his + speech of February 19.Reference is to King + Hussein of Jordan’s February 19 speech in Amman, in which he + announced “he was ending a yearlong effort to devise a joint speech + strategy” with the PLO. (“Hussein + Drops a Yearlong Effort to Join In Peace Bid With Arafat,” New York Times, February 20, 1986, pp. A1, + A4) I take particular note of his judgement that he is + “unable to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their + bond, characterized by commitment, credibility and constancy.” I believe + that the breakdown of the Amman negotiations, despite the valiant + efforts of King Hussein, was a significant event in the search for peace + in the Middle East. It has brought us to a period of reflection on all + sides.

+

You refer in your letter, Your Majesty, to lingering suspicion that the + United States Government may have played a role in the attack by Israeli + military aircraft on the Tunis headquarters of the PLO. I can only state once again that such + accusations are totally unfounded. My government had no advance + knowledge nor in any way facilitated the Israeli raid on the capital of + a friendly state. I would be grateful if you would convey this message + to any who remain in doubt.

+

I have long admired your efforts to encourage understanding on both sides + of the Middle East conflict. Your letter reflects your continuing + dedication to the cause of peace in that region. During this period of + reflection, in particular, the candid expression of your views is most + welcome. Please accept my sincere appreciation and best wishes.

+

Sincerely,

+

Ronald Reagan

+

End text.

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 256. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860308–0389. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Algiers, Tunis, Damascus, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, Cairo, Paris, + Madrid, London, and USUN. + + 3965. + + Rabat, April 22, 1986, 1807Z + + + + SUBJECT + Internal Debate Continues Over Reaction to U.S. Attack on + Libya.See footnote 2, Document 159. + + + Ref: + Rabat 3829.In telegram 3829 from + Rabat, April 17, the Embassy reported: “Reaction to the U.S. + raid on Libya is mixed here. After a 24-hour delay, the + political parties have come out strongly pro-Libya, and a + special session of Parliament on April 16 emphasized those same + sentiments. Privately, many Moroccans have offered a different + line, expressing understanding and sympathy with the U.S. + action, and even the hope that the U.S. goes further in + combating Qadhafi.” The Embassy continued: “many observers doubt + whether there will be much permanent benefit for Libya or damage + to the U.S. image here.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860295–0358) + + + + Confidential—Entire text + + Summary: Differences within Morocco on appropriate reaction to + U.S. military action against Libya have sharpened with the + opposition complaining that the GOM + has quashed parliamentary and popular manifestations of solidarity + with Libya. The charges have some validity and several contacts have + confirmed press reports that police rapidly cracked down on + incipient protests in various Moroccan cities. The government + controlled press has also begun to move beyond the Libyan issue. + Hassan has a strong domestic motivation for wanting to keep protests + under control and, equally important, he is anxious that no incident + jeopardize the effort to restore normalcy to relations with the U.S. + End summary. + + Moroccan reaction to U.S. military action against Libya has + increasingly become an internal political issue. Leaders of + opposition parties have complained strongly of “weak” official + Moroccan response to the April 15 attack. Mohamed Yazghi, generally + considered the second most powerful figure in the Socialist Party, + told EmbOff April 18 that he was “astounded” that King Hassan’s + April 15 letter to Qadhafi + contained no condemnation of U.S. action. He said that in April 16 + parliamentary debate, government parties, clearly acting on orders + from the Palace, had deliberately watered down a resolution on the + U.S. attack. The resolution finally approved, while denouncing the + U.S. by name for the “aggression”, confines itself to “supporting + the position of solidarity with Libya expressed by King Hassan” and + “supports any action of the King to restore peace and security in + the region.” The Istiqlal and Socialist Party press have also + strongly criticized the GOM + for preventing protests, + noting that in other parts of the Islamic world, governments have + declared official periods of mourning. + + Contacts outside Rabat confirm press reports of attempted protests + against the U.S. action. Peace Corps volunteers, especially in + northern Morocco, report isolated instances of schools being closed. + One volunteer reported that the high school in Ouezzan had been + closed for two days, and said that, at one small student + demonstration, an American flag had been burned. The stabbing of + four British tourists (resulting in the death of one) in Marrakech + on April 15 would appear to be an exception to the generally + nonbelligerent protests, although police officials insist that the + sole attacker has a history of mental problems. Police contacts + maintain, however, that student protests, while in response to April + 15 raid, also reflect a combination of grievances, such as the lack + of job prospects as the end of the school year approaches and + generally depressed economic conditions. Most protests appear to + have been concentrated in northern Morocco where economic and + political disaffection tends to be highest, but have now largely + subsided. + + The GOM has already begun to + signal its intent to put the Libyan attack behind it, at least in + terms of domestic political sentiment. On the one hand, police have + been unusually solicitous to avoid any incident involving an + American citizen. Peace Corps volunteers around the country report + that authorities have gone out of their way to offer protection, in + some cases personally visiting the PCV homes on a daily basis. In + Rabat, authorities have exceeded what the Embassy requested in terms + of protection. The pro-government press, in the meantime, has + continued straight forward reporting on Libya. While Communist Party + daily “Al Bayane” gave banner headlines to a “Washington Post” + reportReference is presumably to + George C. Wilson, “Qadhafi Was A Target of U.S. Raid: ‘Hoped + We’d Get Him,’ Official Says; At Least 1 Jet Aimed at Compound,” + (Washington Post, April 18, 1986, pp. + A1, A17). alleging that the April 15 attack sought the + death of Colonel Qadhafi, + pro-government dailies have avoided reference to the “Post” report. + By contrast, semi-official daily “Le Matin du Sahara” described in + detail inter-Arab divergences over convoking an extraordinary Arab + League meeting to condemn the attack. Equally significant was an + extensive report carried on Moroccan television on April 18 on + activities of a delegation of ten governors on an IVP trip to the United States. The + story focussed on the delegation’s meeting with USIA Director Wick,No record of Wick’s + conversations with the ten governors has been found. with + the voice-over quoting both sides’ comments on “excellence of” the + “perennial ties” with the United States. + + Comment: Hassan has several reasons to keep “displays of + solidarity” with Libya within reasonable bounds. Government + officials claim that vocal demonstrations by a small minority would + misrepresent the depth + of actual sentiment in Morocco over Libya. One senior police + official also told EmbOff that the Interior Ministry is suspicious + that demonstrations to date have been less spontaneous than they + would appear, and report that known Libyan contacts have been the + most active in fomenting protest. From the King’s perspective, it + could set a bad precedent to allow popular protests which could also + give vent to discontent over current social and economic conditions. + Additionally, the palace is also clearly anxious to protect its ties + with the U.S. and does not want to risk reactions to the U.S. attack + on Libya jeopardizing prospects for a royal visit to + Washington. + + Nassif +
+
+ 257. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Acting Secretary of State WhiteheadSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Records, 1986 Nodis + Memorandums: Lot 94D93, Exdis Files Apr, May, June, Jul, Aug 1986. + Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Ussery and John Hawes (PM). Zweifel + initialed for both Ussery and + Hawes. Murphy did not initial the + memorandum. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in + S/S at 5:25 p.m. on April + 30. + + + Washington, April 30, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + USG Reaction to Moroccan Efforts + for an Arab League Summit + +

At the April 30 morning meeting,No record of + the April 30 morning meeting has been found. you asked + whether we should consider sanctions against Morocco in light of + Hassan’s efforts to organize an Arab League Summit.In telegram 4077 from Rabat, April 24, the Embassy + reported: “MFA SecState Cherkaoui confirmed to Embassy April 24 that + emergency Arab League summit in Fes now appears likely for next + week, but not yet certain.” The Embassy continued “Cherkaoui + expressed understanding for U.S. position and assurances that King + Hassan would work against any criticism of the U.S. He offered no + strategy, however, for how Morocco might prevent such a summit from + becoming a forum for Libya.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860316–0556) For several + reasons, sanctions against Morocco would be counterproductive. + + Morocco is the venue for the highest level U.S.-host country + military exercise out of NATO. + + + Our existing access and transit agreement with Morocco has + strategic importance for our military posture in the area as + well as utility as an alternative to Spanish and Portuguese + bases or access agreements. We are building our largest global + VOA transmittal station at + Tangier. + + The GOM has been very + responsive on short notice to requests such as the designation + of Casablanca as an alternate landing site for space shuttle + flights. +

+

Since conclusion of the Libyan-Moroccan treaty, our relations with + Morocco have been marked by an appropriate coolness, but we have been + careful to protect important interests such as those cited above. In + this vein, we have signaled to Hassan that his latest efforts on the + Arab Summit further might complicate possibilities of a visit to + Washington. I believe that is where we should draw the line for the + moment.

+
+
+ 258. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Reagan Library, Elaine L. + Morton Files, Hassan Visit (12/20/1985–06/30/1986). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of + Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, + based on information received as of June 30. + + NESA M#86–20098 + + Washington, June 30, 1986 + + +

Morocco: On the Eve of King Hassan’s + Visit to Washington [portion marking not + declassified]

+

Summary

+

Moroccan King Hassan’s visit this month will be his first official visit + to the United States since 1982.See Document 205. He views the trip as + signifying that bilateral relations are back on track after a strained + period following the announcement of the Moroccan-Libyan Union in August + 1984. He will be looking for additional economic and military assistance + to help ease mounting economic pressures and as a measure of + Washington’s appreciation for his support for US interests in the region. [portion + marking not declassified]

+

The King’s hold on power is secure over the near term. Nevertheless, + deteriorating economic conditions coupled with high expectations among + the burgeoning youthful population are threats to his authority. [portion marking not declassified]

+ +

Hassan has been slow to face up to domestic problems and immerses himself + in foreign policy issues. He views himself as an international statesman + and is likely to stress during his visit that his ties with Washington, + contacts with Israel, and his position as head of the Arab League give + him the opportunity to broker a Middle East peace settlement. The King’s + foreign policy preoccupation, however, continues to be Morocco’s war + with the Algerian-backed Polisario Front in the Western Sahara—a + struggle that he appears determined to win on the battlefield despite + professing openness to a negotiated settlement in recent UN sponsored mediation talks.Reference is to the ongoing attempts by Pérez de + Cuellar to negotiate a settlement of the Western Sahara war at the + UN. In telegram 156552 to + Algiers and Rabat, May 17, the Department informed the Embassies + that “lack of progress in initial rounds of Western Sahara proximity + talks under the auspices of the SYG + is not surprising. Although we have no reason to assume that the + longer run outlook for these talks is more promising, Department + believes that there are substantial advantages to encouraging + continuation of this mediation effort.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860383–0596) For + more on these negotiations, see the Western Sahara chapter. A + sensitive issue for him is the Moroccan-Libyan Union; Hassan persists in + maintaining the accord even though the benefits to Rabat have been + limited. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+
+ 259. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. A White House Situation Room handling slip affixed + to the top of the telegram indicates that McDaniel, Pearson, Rodman, and Morton saw the + telegram. + + 6931. + + Rabat, July 15, 1986, 1159Z + + + + SUBJECT + Hassan to Postpone U.S. Trip Meet Peres. + + + Ref: + State 218582.In telegram 218582 to + Rabat, June 12, the Department transmitted talking points for + the Embassy to convey to Hassan in support of a Hassan-Peres + meeting. (Ibid.) + + + + (Secret—Entire text) + + Summary. King Hassan told me late July 14 that he would not travel + to the U.S. as planned for scheduled working visit. He said he will + meet Israeli Prime Minister Shimon + Peres on either 7/21 or 22 in Morocco to try to + relaunch the Middle East peace process. I explained that Washington had been interested in + discussing a number of issues during the visit in addition to the + Middle East. Hassan responded that a meeting with Peres to discuss the Fes Plan was + the best way to truly isolate Libyan leader Qadhafi. He said he hoped that + President Reagan would + understand, and appealed that if his initiative with Peres bore fruit, he would very + much need U.S. support later on. He said he nevertheless felt it + important for now to keep Washington free from identification with + what had to be, at least initially, an Arab-Israeli initiative. End + summary. + + King Hassan called me in late July 14 for a one-hour meeting. + Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Foreign Minister Filali attended throughout. + + Hassan opened by telling me he had “good and bad news”. He said + that he would not be able to travel to the U.S. for his scheduled + working visit in Washington to begin July 22. The reason, he + explained is that he had agreed with Israeli Prime Minister + Shimon Peres to meet here + in Morocco on July 21 or 22. + + Hassan said the two had agreed to try to re-launch the Middle East + peace process, and would meet to that end. They would discuss on the + basis of the peace plan drawn up at the 1982 Fes Summit. He reminded + me he remains president of the Arab League, and said he was still + charged by the league to defend the Fes Plan. “Who better to talk to + about it”, he asked rhetorically, “than the most interested + party?” + + Hassan said the meeting would and must take place in complete + secrecy. He said he did not want to give the Soviets a chance to say + “no”. He noted that secrecy would spare certain Arab countries—he + specifically cited Syria and Jordan—embarrassment. Similarly it + would eliminate any pressure on European countries to feel the need + to support his initiative. He was not clear on where he thought his + discussions with Peres would + lead, but added that he saw it as the beginning of a long + process. + + Hassan said he regretted having to postpone his meeting with the + President, and expressed the hope that it could be re-scheduled in + the following months. Specifically mentioning August or September as + hopeful future dates for a U.S. visit.An unknown hand underlined “August or September” in this + sentence. He noted, however, that he felt it important + that his meeting with Peres + be seen as a purely Arab-Israeli initiative, not one concocted in + Washington. To meet with the President a few days before or after + meeting Peres would + inevitably be seen by all as a U.S. plot. He said he did not want to + be perceived as plotting. He hastened to add, however, that U.S. + support for his initiative was extremely important. “The first round + may be bilateral and in Morocco,” he said, “but the second, third + and fourth may very well need to be in Washington.” He recalled that the President + in his end-of-Ramadan message to him,In + telegram 175561 to Rabat, June 4, the Department transmitted + Reagan’s Ramadan + message. The message reads in part: “I know that through your + leadership Morocco will remain a bastion of civilized values, + setting an example in the Middle East and around the world.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860432–0097) had praised the Moroccan monarch + as a leader of the Arab world. He said he was fulfilling his Arab + responsibilities, and felt sure that the President would + understand. + + I told the King that Washington, like I, would be most + disappointed by the news of the visit postponement. I conveyed to + him the points contained reftel regarding our support for a + Hassan-Peres meeting. I noted, however, that Washington had hoped to + discuss a broad range of issues of importance to both the U.S. and + Morocco. Hassan responded quickly. That he knew Washington wanted to + talk about Libya and how best to isolate that country. He said, + however, that the best way to isolate Qadhafi was precisely by supporting a Hassan-Peres + meeting. “We will be discussing on the basis of the Fes Plan,” he + recalled. “Libya was the one state that has never endorsed that + plan.” He argued that by meeting Peres. He would serve U.S. interests far better than + merely by travelling to Washington. Any discussion on U.S./Moroccan + cooperation against Libya could be taken up by visits to Morocco of + Weinberger and/or + Casey.An unknown hand drew an arrow in the left-hand + margin next to this sentence. + + After my meeting with the King, I called Foreign Minister + Filali. We met just + before midnight at his home. I explained to him my concern for the + bilateral relationship of this postponement. He said he was also + completely surprised by the King’s decision. He noted how hard he + himself had worked to bring about the visit. He asked me why the + Israelis were pressing so hard for a visit at this moment. He said + that Peres had told Hassan + that a September visit would come too late to be of electoral + assistance and needed a visit right away. I expressed our view per + Tel Aviv 9047 that a meeting would probably have no effect on the + National Unity Government in Israel although it would provide + Peres a political + benefit.An unknown hand drew a + vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. The + telegram was not found. I suggested that a meeting before + or after the Washington visit could be easily arranged given the + desire of both sides to meet. The Foreign Minister suggested that he + speak with the King the next day about his decision and would get + back to me. + + Comment: Hassan’s decision to postpone the visit may have stemmed + from two bases: first, with the U.S. centerpiece being cooperation + against Qadhafi and + termination of the Oujda Accord, Hassan may have felt he had little + to gain and much to lose, especially in light of the Libyan-Algerian dialogue.An unknown hand underlined this + sentence. Secondly, he may feel that to improve U.S. + military and economic assistance during austere times he would have + to go to Washington with a very strong hand. A successful + face-to-face with Peres would + in his view do nicely. Any Washington pique over the postponement + could be overcome by a subsequent meeting with Peres in Washington. + + Nassif +
+
+ 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Roscoe Suddarth (NEA), Ussery, Quinn, Vladimir Lehovich (M), Morton, and Laurie Tracy (S/S–O); approved by Armacost. + + 276390. + + Washington, September 3, 1986, 1901Z + + + + SUBJECT + Letter from President to King Hassan re Breaking Treaty of + Oujda. + + + Ref: + 1. State 276002In telegram 276002 to + Rabat, September 3, the Department transmitted the text of the + original version of Reagan’s letter to Hassan. (Ibid.) + 2. Rabat 8742.In telegram 8742 from + Rabat, September 3, Nassif reported: “Following his courageous + decisive action in abrogating the Oujda Accord Hassan will I + think expect his first communication from the President on this + subject to convey an indication that the U.S. is prepared to + stand by his side if need be, as he faces the uncertain future + menace from Qadhafi.” Nassif continued that the original message from + Reagan was “too mild + and will come as a disappointment to Hassan.”(Ibid.) He then + proposed revisions to the letter received in telegram 276002. + (See footnote 2, above.) + +

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. Following is approved revised text of Presidential letter to King + Hassan. No signed original will be issued.

+

3. Begin text: Your Majesty: It will be no surprise to you to hear of my + satisfaction over your decisiveness in breaking the Treaty of Union with + Libya. From the outset, I and my government have had serious + reservations about that union, and it is a measure of our abiding + friendship that we have been able to have such an open dialogue on this + issue over the past two years.

+ +

We remain committed to a firm policy of countering Libyan acts of + terrorism with all vigor. Qadhafi’s repugnant use of terrorism as state policy has + conditioned my own government’s policies towards Libya to seek to + isolate him and thus diminish his capacity for threatening the peace and + security of Libya’s neighbors.

+

Your Majesty, you are well aware of several of the actions which the + United States Government has taken in seeking to constrain Qadhafi. The USG has both the political will and military capability to + act directly against Libya if necessary. Your good personal friend and + my able Ambassador to the U.N., General Walters will be in Europe this week to consult again + with allied governments on appropriate actions which might be taken to + contain the Libyan menace.

+

I have instructed Ambassador Nassif to deliver this message and to discuss with you + and your government both the implications of this welcome decision by + Your Majesty and how we might jointly proceed to deal with threats that + might be posed to Morocco by the Qadhafi regime.In telegram + 8865 from Rabat, September 4, Nassif commented: “The King’s reaction to President + Reagan’s letter was cool + to lukewarm, possibly because he felt he had just delivered to the + U.S. the one thing it wanted most from him and expected the level of + exhilaration to match the previous level of pique.” Hassan, + Nassif continued, + “believes he had placed himself squarely in the U.S. camp with his + denunciation of Qadhafi and + his meeting with Peres. His + economic and military needs are enormous and he is looking to the + U.S. to give him substantial assistance.” (Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, + 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis) For more on + Hassan’s decision, see Document 73. For + information concerning the Peres meeting, see Documents + 247 and 259.

+

Again, please accept my heartiest congratulations on the action you have + taken. I look forward to seeing you in Washington at a mutually + convenient date.

+

Your friend,

+

Ronald Reagan.

+

End text.

+ Whitehead +
+ +
+ 261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Armitage) to the Director of the Joint + Staff (Carter)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1985. Secret. Prepared by + Hartung (ISA/NESA). + + + I–25864/86 Washington, October 1, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + US/Moroccan Defense Cooperation (U) + +

(S) The Foreign Minister of Morocco has + proposed to the Secretary, on behalf of King Hassan, that Morocco would + welcome closer cooperation with the U.S., Spain and Portugal in the + defense of the western Mediterranean/Straits of Gibraltar and in the + defense of NATO interests more + generally.According to a memorandum for + the record prepared by Hartung, during a September 30 meeting, + Filali told Weinberger: + “Morocco has taken a political decision to participate with Spain, + Portugal and NATO in defense of + the Mediterranean and Straits of Gibraltar. In order for that to be + done with dignity, the US should + think about new development and other aid. This was the King’s + message to the Secretary.” (Ibid.) I would appreciate your + views on whether Morocco could usefully contribute to these objectives, + whether there are additional areas of military cooperation beneficial to + U.S. forces that we might propose to Morocco and how we should best + respond to the King’s proposal.

+

(U) I would appreciate your response by 21 + October. My point of contact is CDR Hartung, x79745.

+ Richard L. + ArmitageArmitage + signed “Rich Armitage” above this typed signature. + + Assistant Secretary of Defense + + (International Security + Affairs) +
+ +
+ 262. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Carter) to the Assistant Secretary of + Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1985. Secret. + + DJSM 1850–86 + + Washington, October 29, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + US/Moroccan Defense Cooperation (U) + + + + (S) The Joint Staff has reviewed + your memorandumASD/ISA Memo, I–25864/86, 1 + October 1986, subject as above. [Footnote is in the original. + The memorandum is printed as Document 261.] concerning + King Hassan’s overture on regional defense cooperation and has + determined that a positive, but guarded response would be + appropriate. Morocco has the potential for substantially + contributing to regional and NATO + defense objectives by participating in multilateral exercises, + affording US/NATO units training areas, and by providing bases + access rights in times of war/crisis. While these are intriguing + possibilities, we need to determine the extent of Morocco’s + willingness to support NATO + interests, as well as the attitudes of Spain and Portugal. + Additional factors to be considered are the Western Sahara conflict + and relations with Algeria. + + (S) It is recommended that, at the + forthcoming Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks,A summary of + the JMC meeting, which took + place December 3–4 in Rabat, is in telegram 12089 from Rabat, + December 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) we discuss the proposal with our counterparts in + executive session to determine Moroccan expectations/limits. Given + the fiscal constraints on both sides, the most feasible vehicle for + pursuing the proposal in the near-term is the development of + multilateral exercises. Currently, Morocco participates in regional + defense exercises with Spain for air defense, and with the United + States for air/naval/special operations. Multilateral exercises + would enhance regional security capabilities and support King + Hassan’s long maintained position that his country is strategically + valuable to NATO. + + (S) The King’s proposal merits + serious consideration by the US + military and by the Department of State. An interagency group + (IG) should evaluate the + proposal and consider the potential ramifications on US/Moroccan + relations with regional states, NATO, and the Soviets. The IG should produce a proposed US position prior to the + JMC, evaluate the information + obtained at the JMC, and then + prepare recommendations on how the President should respond to the + King when they meet next year. + + (U) Enclosed, for your information, + is a background paper prepared for me on this subject.Not attached. + + P. F. Carter, + Jr. + + Vice Admiral, USN + + Director, Joint Staff +
+
+ 263. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Nodis. + + 11410. + + Rabat, November 19, 1986, 1450Z + + +

Dept pls pass USUN New York. Subject: + Ambassador Walters’ Meeting + With King Hassan.

+ + + Secret—Entire text + + Summary/introduction: Ambassador Walters had lengthy, cordial meeting with Hassan + November 15. King looks forward to SecDef + Weinberger visit in + December, hopes to visit U.S. in March. These and other topics + discussed are summarized below. End summary. + + U.S. economic/military assistance: Walters began by telling Hassan that although the + political climate for US-Moroccan relations is excellent in + Washington, Morocco should not expect increased assistance this + year, and will in fact probably suffer some cuts, because of tight + U.S. budgetary situation. Hassan seemed to understand. + + Weinberger visit: Hassan + said he is greatly looking forward to seeing Weinberger here since “Weinberger + is a true friend of Morocco.” + + Hassan visit to U.S.: The King said March looks like a good time + for him and that he will suggest actual dates to Embassy later. He + expressed a strong preference for an official-working visit rather + than a State visit (this runs counter to recommendation for + upgrading visit to a State + visit contained in Embassy Rabat 9174).In telegram 9174 from Rabat, September 15, the Embassy reported + that Hassan told Nassif + that “he would like to re-schedule his postponed visit + (originally scheduled for last July) for January 1987.” The + Embassy continued: “Embassy strongly recommends that official + working visit envisaged for last July be upgraded to State + visit. Hassan has not paid a State visit during this + administration and not, in fact, since the 1960’s.” The Embassy + noted that it was important that the Department “make such a + gesture after the Hassan-Peres meeting and rupture of the Oujda + Accord.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860699–0762) Hassan wants to visit + California while in the U.S. + + Other travel: Hassan confirmed his intention to visit Spain and + the U.K. in 1987. + + Moroccan internal scene: Hassan described the Moroccan political + situation as “calm,” noting that there has been some improvement in + the country’s economic prospects. + + Relations with Algeria/Western Sahara: Hassan said he is trying to + reestablish direct contact with Chadli + Bendjedid, but that the road to doing so has not been + easy. Hassan thinks Bendjedid + is gravely ill, and Hassan would like to reach some measure of + understanding with Algeria while Bendjedid is at the helm, since he does not know who + will succeed him. + + Islamic summit: Hassan considers it “madness” to hold the OIC Summit in Kuwait in January given + the presence there of so many Palestinians, the proximity of Iran, + and the potential for disruptive, terrorist activities by one or + both groups. Nonetheless, he plans to attend. + + Withdrawal from Arab League presidency: recalling his decision to + give up the presidency following criticism from some Arabs of his + meeting with Shimon + Peres,See Documents 247 and 259. Hassan said he withdrew rather than run + the risk of being asked to step down, comparing the potential + ignominy that the latter would have entailed to Egypt’s situation + upon being voted out of the Arab League. He implied that Morocco’s + continuing membership in the League is largely passive. + + Arafat/Peres: Hassan said that several months ago—prior to his own + meeting with Peres—Arafat had + asked Hassan to arrange an Arafat-Peres meeting. Hassan had sent an + emissary to Peres in the + belief that doing so was the safest, most reliable way of delivering + the message. Although he had appeared interested in the idea of an + Arafat meeting, Peres declined on the grounds that + such an encounter would entail unacceptable political risks in + Israel unless Arafat could be + brought to accept Israel’s right to exist prior to the + meeting. + + Cameroon and the Fifth Committee: After hearing General Walters’ description of + obstructionist Cameroonian attitudes and activities in the UNGA’s Fifth Committee consideration + of the G–18 report,Reference is to the Group of 18 nations + report on administrative and financial reform of the UN. Documentation on the report is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XL, Global Issues I. Hassan said he would send + an emissary to the Cameroon President to urge him to adopt a more + constructive approach. + + Nassif +
+
+ 264. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan + II of MoroccoSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, William J. + Burns Files, Morocco (02/27/1985–02/25/1987). No + classification marking. + + + Washington, December 3, 1986 + + Your Majesty: + +

I have asked Secretary Weinberger to convey to you my best wishes and those of + the American people. Secretary Weinberger’s visit to your country reflects my deep + personal commitment to the strong and enduring friendship that binds our + two nations.

+

Your courageous actions in recent months, particularly your historic + meeting with then Prime Minister Peres,See Documents 247 and 259. bear tribute to your statesmanship and + visionary leadership. I also applaud your continuing commitment to our + close bilateral security ties, a prime element of the partnership + between our countries. The security and economic well-being of Morocco + remain very important to the United States.

+

As Your Majesty is aware, the United States has entered an era of severe + budgetary restraint, limiting our efforts to help our friends throughout + the world. This situation, however, should bring us closer together to + ensure that the limited assistance provided is used effectively to + bolster Morocco’s security. The ongoing efforts of our Joint Military + Commission are a critical part of this process.See footnote 3, Document + 262.

+

Your Majesty, I remain determined to do everything possible to preserve + and enhance our friendship and solidify the bonds between our peoples + and governments. I pray this letter finds you in good health.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 265. Memorandum From William + Burns of the National Security Council Staff to the + Acting Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + (Keel)Source: Reagan Library, Near East and + South Asia Affairs Directorate, William + J. Burns Files, Morocco (02/27/1985–02/25/1987). + Secret. Sent for action. + + + Washington, December 10, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Weinberger’s + December 5 Meeting with King Hassan + +

Attached is Cap Weinberger’s + report to the President on his December 5 meeting in Rabat with King + Hassan. Cap’s visit to Morocco, the first trip to the Arab world by a + Cabinet official since the Iran affair broke,See footnote 2, Document + 163. helped counter the perception that we are + “adrift” in the region and no longer capable of being a reliable + partner. Hassan is clearly interested in broadening our security + relationship, at least in part to attract more U.S. assistance for his + stumbling economy and the Moroccan military. Cap will follow up on two + points of special interest to Hassan: (1) the possibility of eventually + basing some U.S. F–16s in Morocco and (2) the feasibility of a barter + sale of F–16s to the GOM. The UAE has apparently agreed to provide oil + to underwrite such an arrangement, in return for ongoing Moroccan + military support and advice.

+

Hassan also expressed interest in visiting Washington in the first half + of 1987.See Document + 263. We have proposed to Don Regan that Hassan be + invited for an official working visit in June/July 1987 (you may recall + that Hassan postponed a visit last summer in order to meet with Prime + Minister Peres). It would be + useful to pin down a date as soon as possible.

+

Dennis Ross, Clark Murdock, Howard + Teicher, and Frank Lavin concur.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab I),Tab I is not attached. Keel did not indicate his + preference in respect to the recommendation. forwarding + Secretary Weinberger’s report + on his meeting with King Hassan.

+ + + Tab A + Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President ReaganSecret. + + + Rabat, December 6, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + My Private Meeting with King Hassan, 5 December 1986, for + about two hours, 9:30–11:30 p.m. (before dinner) + +

I met with King Hassan, at his request, with only an interpreter + present most of the time, and then again during a long dinner, we + continued our discussions at a table for two.

+

We covered many topics, but the principal impression I have is that + the King is very anxious to resume much closer relations with the + United States and the West + in general, that he needs economic and other assistance, some of + which he is already getting from other Arab nations; that he has the + highest possible respect for you; that he is a skilled and + experienced world politician; and that we have an excellent + opportunity now to improve our own strategic position and that of + our allies as a result of the King’s attitudes and needs. It is, of + course, true that if we ignore, spurn, or react with less than a + substantive set of responses, he would probably start to look + elsewhere, although I do not think he has too many places to go that + would be consistent with his principal aim, which is the + preservation and strengthening of the Monarchy and his Kingdom.

+

Under the heading of Regional Security, the King firmly and directly + suggested he would like to become a member of NATO, probably as “sort of an + associate member, perhaps like France.” He feels Morocco can + contribute substantially to regional security, and in any event he + would like to have some kind of closer triangular relationship with + Spain and Portugal. He spoke of the exceptionally good Air Force + facilities in Morocco (which is true), and responded quite favorably + and with considerable interest when I suggested in a general way + that because of the Spanish apparent insistence on our removing our + 72 F–16s from Spain, (which I mentioned to you in my report of the + NATO meetings),Not found. these planes might be + transferred to, and based in, Morocco.

+

He said this would be quite logical, both from the point of view of + our needing to protect the Southern Flank of NATO (which would be made very difficult if Spain actually + went through with ordering our tactical air wing out of Spain), but + also because Morocco has the facilities, and because he has already + decided to buy F–16s himself.

+

This led us to the subject of this aircraft purchase. He said the + decision had been made and that the first payment of $14 million + will be made shortly, and thereafter a schedule of payments would be + drawn up. He hoped the manufacturers (General Dynamics) would be + able to offer good terms, and he was quite pleased when I told him + we had been able to drive down the price of F–16s and there was no + reason he should pay more than we did. He then wondered aloud if I + thought a barter transaction could be worked out such as his paying + for the planes with oil (presumably from UAE) rather than cash. I told him there were such + barter transactions, and there were companies that specialized in + them and that General Dynamics might agree to such a sale.

+

Concluding this topic, he said he believed that there will not just + be East-West divisions and issues in the future (that is, disputes + between the U.S. and USSR), but + that many of the problems of the future will be “North-South + problems;” and, therefore, it is important for us and for NATO to have strong support in a + country situated as Morocco is.

+

He also talked about the many economic problems they have and was + pleased at the suggestion that we might be able to reduce interest + payments on past debts, as we are trying to do with Egypt, although + he said frankly, he would much prefer to have the debt cancelled. He + mentioned the great disparity between the treatment of Egypt and + Israel and the rest of the world. He was pleased at the possibility + that we might be able to secure additional security assistance in a + Supplemental to be submitted in January. He also liked the + possibility I raised of our buying more supplies in Morocco for our + troops in Europe.

+

He inquired most sympathetically about the problems with Iran and + reminded me that in one of his recent trips to Washington, he had + spent considerable time warning us all about the risks involved from + a government such as Iran’s. He accepted my explanations of the arms + sale to Iran, and said he remained in the fullest possible support + of you and your policies, and he was most pleased when I handed your + personal letter to him. He said he hoped he may be able to accept + our pending invitation to visit Washington, perhaps sometime in the + spring.

+

In a private conversation with the Ambassador and me, he responded to + a request that had been submitted to him by the Ambassador for 20 + acres of land for a new satellite installation to upgrade and + safeguard our communications. He said he did not want any rent or + compensation for this, but that being quite a visible installation, + it would be reasonable to help strengthen their military so as to + enable them to protect our installation against possible attack.

+ +

He responded appreciatively to my compliments on the way they have + stabilized the Maghreb situation by extending defensive berms + further and further south in the Western Sahara. He is worried, + however, that the Algerians continue to support the Polisario in the + region, and while he did not seem very worried about Algerian + President Bendjedid’s visit + to Libya, some of our intelligence reporting indicates that he + should have been.Not found. He + said again that his only reason for entering into the now broken + agreement with Qadhafi had + been to prevent Libya and Algeria working together to support the + Polisario.

+

He expressed great worry about “the tragedy” that is unfolding in + Tunisia, referring to the increasing senility of President Bourguiba and the fact that there + are no successors left, since President Bourguiba has thrown all possible successors out of + the country. He feels that after Bourguiba dies, there is almost bound to be a + conflict between Algeria and Libya over Tunisia.

+

He feels that Egypt needs a great deal of support because they are + going through difficult economic times now, and while Morocco has no + official relationship with Egypt, it is important that Egypt be + helped.

+

The King did not speak of the Arab Summit coming up shortly, nor of a + reported advance “conference” he is supposed to call before the + Summit to solidify positions and presumably try to make the Summit + more successful than previous Arab Summits have been.

+

He was most complimentary about our military-to-military relationship + and of the Joint Military Commission, the meetings of which + concluded while I was there.

+

Returning to the NATO Southern + regional security, he said that he had a good friendship and a lot + of respect for the Spanish and a particularly close relationship to + Portugal, and that he considers Portugal, even though they do not + have a Mediterranean border, to be virtually a Mediterranean + nation.

+

The King has always been particularly friendly and supportive of the + United States and also very friendly and cordial in his personal + relationships with me, but he outdid himself this time, particularly + in his exceptionally strongly voiced support for you.

+

We are looking into the two points he seemed most interested in—that + is transferring the 72 F–16s to Morocco from Spain and the + possibility of a barter sale of other F–16s to Morocco—and we will + get back to him.

+

With warms regards,

+ Cap + +
+ +
+ 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Rabat 1987 Nodis. Secret; + Nodis. + + 1745. + + Rabat, February 19, 1987, 1822Z + + +

Dept pass White House and SecDef. For + the Secretary and NEA Asst Secy + Murphy from Ambassador. + SecDef for Weinberger from Ambassador. White + House for NSC from Ambassador. Subject: + Renewed Offer for U.S. Air Base in Morocco.

+ + + (S—Entire text). + + In a meeting with the Foreign Minister to discuss U.S. + representation for the Fête du Trone.Reference is to Morocco’s Feast of the Throne, which celebrates + the day of the enthronement of the King in 1933 in defiance of + French colonial rule. During King Hassan’s reign (1969–1999), + the Fête occurred on March 3. I advised that Treasury + Secretary Baker would be + head of delegation. After explaining arrival and departure dates. I + asked the Foreign Minister to give us some idea of what plans the + King has for the delegation. He advised that he would speak with the + King and try and give us a notional schedule. + + He then asked me how our negotiations with the Spanish were going + and why it was important to keep the 401st in Madrid.In telegram 1514 from Madrid, February 5, the + Embassy summarized the most recent round of negotiations between + the United States and Spain over basing and military aid, which + took place in Madrid February 3–4. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870425–0247, + D870090–0295) Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, + 1985–1988. I explained that there had been hard + bargaining and an insistence by the Spanish that the U.S. presence + be reduced due to the commitments made by Gonzales in the NATO referendum.Reference is to the national referendum held on + March 13, 1986, on whether or not Spain should remain in NATO. Spanish citizens voted to + remain in NATO. + Filali then asked why we + didn’t just move the base to Morocco. He reiterated conversation + between Hassan and Defense Secretary Weinberger.See Tab A, + Document 265. I asked the Minister whether King Hassan + was prepared to make a firm commitment to basing the 401st in + Morocco subject to negotiations should a decision be made to leave + Spain and come to Morocco. His answer was a firm yes. I explained + that our obvious strong preference was to keep the 401st in Madrid + and that if that was not possible we would consider other locations + in Europe and elsewhere, including the possible return to the + U.S. + + + I mentioned Ambassador Bargach’s discussions with DODNo record of these + discussions has been found. as a follow-up to Hassan’s + statement to Secretary Weinberger that Morocco was interested in an oil + barter deal for F–16’s. He told me he knew of no present Arab source + of funding. + + The Minister mentioned that he understood President Reagan would be visiting Italy in + May or June for a State visit. I told him that I understood that it + was in connection with the economic summit.Reference is to the 1987 G–7summit scheduled to + take place in Venice in early June. While he did not + press me further, the implication was that it may be a good time for + the President to pass through Morocco for a brief stop. I did not, + however, suggest that possibility. + + Filali remarked that the + invitation to the King for a visit in 1987 had not yet been + extended. I explained that we were considering a convenient date and + remarked that this summer was a possibility. I told the Foreign + Minister that since Hassan would be going to London July 14–17 it + might make sense for him to thereafter go to Washington in time to + celebrate the bicentennial anniversary.Reference is to the ceremony marking the bicentennial of the + U.S.-Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. I also + explained that I did not have an indication that those dates were + open for an official working visit but if he thought that was a good + idea I would pursue it. The Foreign Minister wholeheartedly + supported that suggestion and said he would feel out Hassan on the + question. + + Comment: It appears clear that Hassan’s offer to Weinberger on basing in Morocco + was not made lightly. The Moroccans see many advantages inuring to + their benefit by both the offer of a base in Morocco and the + possible acceptance of that offer by the United States.It is + also clear that the Moroccans are becoming somewhat sensitive that + in the year of the bicentennial the USG has neither extended the invitation to the King nor + offered a major celebration of that anniversary in the U.S. I + strongly urge that Secretary Baker have in hand an invitation from the President + to make an official working visit the week of July 20, 1987. I also + urge that if there are any new programs or additional aid + contemplated for Morocco, that the Secretary announce them during + his visit. + +

End comment.

+ Nassif +
+ +
+ 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, Lot 95D26, 1987 Nodis Telegrams, + Box 17, Rabat 1987 Nodis. Secret; Nodis. + + 2259. + + Rabat, March 6, 1987, 1801Z + + +

Dept pls pass Treasury for Secretary Baker, SecDef and + other addresses as desired. Subject: Secretary of Treasury’s Meeting + With King Hassan.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary: Secretary Baker delivered President’s invitation for Hassan to + visit Washington July 20No record of + Reagan’s invitation + was found. and also told King the USG will be able to provide an + additional $25 million in food aid this year. The King was + appreciative on both counts. In response to Secretary Baker’s assurance that a + purposeful, cohesive government continues in Washington, Hassan said + he had no doubt whatever and that had he been in President Reagan’s shoes, he would also have + tried opening to Iran.Reference is to + the Iran-Contra affair. See footnote 2, + Document 163. King talked in genial terms about + his desire to see established a consortium of developed countries, + oil rich LDC’s and LDC’s with meager resources to “moralize” trade + and assist the less advantaged LDC’s to solve their debt problems. + The Secretary explained how the Baker Plan was designed to assist debtor LDC’s and + described some recent developments in the framework of that + plan.Documentation on the Baker Plan is in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVIII, International + Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign + Assistance. + + While not mentioning specific arms, Hassan said he would like to + get U.S. permission to buy certain types of U.S.-designed military + equipment manufactured in Korea and Taiwan in order to save foreign + exchange. He seemed confident that Morocco can stay the course in + the Western Sahara and said Morocco urgently needs M–60 tanks. In low key, Hassan struck + his familiar theme that in strategic cooperation Morocco is doing + more for the U.S. than vice versa and said that while he did not + want to make any specific demands, he hoped U.S. would be + forthcoming on assistance. Secretary Baker assured the King that President Reagan and the USG place great value on U.S.-Moroccan + relations, that the U.S. will continue to assist Morocco, and that + he would convey the King’s views to the President.End + summary. + + Secretary Baker, + Ambassador Walters, DAS + Ussery, Ambassador, DCM and interpreter had cordial 80 + minute meeting with Hassan + March 3. Hassan was grateful for the invitation to visit Washington. + Noting that he had already accepted the idea of a visit to the U.S. + “in principle,” he said he would have to examine further the + proposed July 20 date and get back to us. + + The King seemed mildly surprised but quite pleased when Mr. + Baker informed him + that despite severe U.S. budgetary constraints, the U.S. is prepared + to provide an additional $25 million in food aid to Morocco in + FY 87. Secretary Baker noted that he would be + discussing details with GOM + Ministers (septel).A record of these + discussions is in telegram 2164 from Rabat, March 5. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870425–0247, D870172–0856) + + At the outset the King expressed the greatest respect and + friendship for President Reagan. Speaking at length in a philosophical and + often theoretical vein, Hassan said he was worried at what appeared + to be a current tendency for the U.S. press and competing political + institutions to denigrate the Presidency. Referring to the East-West + divide, which Hassan believes will long endure, he emphasized how + important it is to the West + and countries friendly to the West for the U.S. to be strong and purposeful. + Secretary Baker generally + agreed with Hassan’s analysis. He suggested that Americans do need + to learn some restraint lest the Presidency over time be + eroded. + + Mr. Baker continued + that the President and the Presidency are currently in good shape + and that the U.S. Government will continue to move with confidence + in those areas where there is an important ongoing agenda. He said + that the President had asked him to reassure the King there will no + further sales of military equipment to Iran. Hassan cut in, saying + that he wanted it to be clear he had not questioned U.S. policy + toward Iran: “The U.S. is too good a friend of Morocco for me to + cite Iran as a reference point in our relations.” Hassan continued + that had he been in the President’s shoes, he would also have + explored the possibility of an opening to Iran. He concluded this + portion of the conversation by saying that given Iran’s strategic + significance and the fragility and uncertainty in the region + stretching from the Middle East to South Asia, it is important for + the U.S. to continue its efforts in the area “if perhaps in some + better way.” + + Hassan then began to discuss the importance of developing + countries helping the more disadvantaged countries with their trade, + debt, and investment problems. He saw a need to “moralize” trade and + resource flow patterns and suggested that a consortium be set up + which would group some 15–18 countries—about a third would come from + the fully developed countries, another third would be oil producing + LDC’s, and the remaining third would be comprised of countries like + Morocco without great resources but of some strategic and political + interest to the West. Hassan described his idea + as a “pilot project” which might, if successful, be expanded over + time to embrace additional countries. Although, he was not precise + on details, he argued in general that the developed countries would + provide technology to other members of the consortium at a + reasonable cost, the oil producing countries would provide energy at + a reasonable cost, and the resource poor countries would agree to + follow sound economic policies. All members of the consortium would + enjoy reasonable growth. + + Secretary Baker said he + did not disagree with the need to ameliorate the debt and trade + problems of resource poor LDC’s. He thought it would be extremely + difficult to construct and implement the kind of plan the King was + suggesting to even out profits on a nearly global basis, given the + human tendency toward accumulation. On the other hand, he thought + that the U.S. and some other countries had already taken some steps + in the direction the King described. The U.S. has encouraged surplus + countries to do more through multi-lateral lending institutions to + help on LDC debt and resource problems. Before the decline in oil + prices, we had pressed the Saudis to be more helpful. More recently, + the U.S. has encouraged Japan to participate in IDA8,Reference is to the 8th replenishment of + funding by donor nations, approved in February, for the + International Development Agency of the World Bank. and + we have given up some of our own bank shares to bring that + about. + + The King briefly returned to his consortium scheme, saying that if + there were such an arrangement, the consortium could perhaps agree + with the multilateral institutions on the rules for economic reform + to be followed by the debtor countries in the consortium and the + latter countries might then be more prepared than at present to + accept IMF-type conditions. He registered a brief flash of annoyance + with present IMF conditions + relating to Morocco but then backed off by acknowledging that the + IMF is currently trying to be + helpful to Morocco. + + Mr. Baker then referred + to the “Strategy for Growth,” or “Baker Plan” which he and the U.S. + put forward in Seoul. He said that the U.S. strongly believes that + the only solution to the debt problem is growth. Ways have to be + found to increase production. The Baker Plan simply provides a framework for attacking + the growth/production problem. The IMF understands and appears to have accepted the + general philosophy, and in its most recent agreements (e.g., Mexico) + has been moving in the direction of growth by providing better terms + and some new money. + + The King said he wished to sound the USG informally on whether it might be possible for + Morocco to buy from Korea and Taiwan certain types of military + equipment made in those countries under U.S. license. He said that + such arms are of good quality and are cheaper and easier to obtain than from the U.S., + which often seems to provide materiel “drop-by-drop.” He thought + that Morocco might be able to work out some kind of barter + arrangement with Korea which would partially involve Korean arms in + return for fishing rights in Moroccan waters. In any case, whether + the purchases were from Korea or Taiwan, Hassan thought he would + save valuable foreign exchange. He said it was his understanding + that U.S. authorization is required for such purchases. + + The Secretary replied that the U.S. would take a sympathetic look + at Hassan’s request consistent with current U.S. laws and + regulations. We might also have to determine what the attitude of + Congress might be. In response to Mr. Baker’s question regarding the + type of arms he had in mind, Hassan said he had wanted to try out + the idea informally and would later “look at the catalogue” + depending on our response. He referred vaguely to his desire to + purchase unspecified types of missiles and rifles. + + Referring to Feb 24–25 battles in the Western Sahara, Secretary + Baker regretted + Moroccan loss of life but said he was glad that the U.S. had been + able to be helpful and responsive in a moment of need. The King + expressed profound thanks on behalf of himself and his senior + military officers. Saying that U.S. actions had demonstrated that + America is a true friend. + + Hassan noted that the section of the berm where the sharpest + recent engagement took place is the most dangerous sector since it + is close to Polisario bases in Algeria. He said that the Moroccan + military has, and will continue, to make special logistical and + other dispositions designed to deal with any further difficulties in + that portion of the berm closest to Tindouf. He said that it was + understandable that the Polisario would attack in that sector since + the extension of the berm currently going forward farther south is + too far away for the Polisario to move heavy equipment and attack in + force in the area. Noting that “only armor can fight armor,” the + King indicated that apart from the additional TOW’s and night-sight devices now on + order, Morocco also needs more tanks. He noted the current + Morocco-Algeria tank imbalance of 1:7, and said he would like to see + it improved to a 4:7 ratio. (In a separate earlier conversation with + Ambassador Walters,No record of the Walters-Hassan + conversation has been found. the King apparently said he + would like to see the ratio move to 1:4.) Hassan claimed that the + U.S. “has more M–60’s than it + needs—you have huge stocks and are even providing them to your + National Guard. Let me buy M–60’s + or help me find them elsewhere.” + + Hassan terminated the conversation with a somewhat oblique + statement designed to illustrate the depth of his friendship and + support for the U.S. He noted that he and the President had signed + an access and transit + agreement which may one day be of great importance to both + countries. He said that except for operations directed against other + Arab countries, the U.S. can use Morocco logistically as U.S. needs + dictate. He asked Mr. Baker to tell the President that Morocco has already + given the U.S. a great deal and is even prepared to offer further + facilities including possibly bases, if need be. He said Morocco has + recently agreed to provide the U.S. land for a military + communications facility which Hassan considers to be “worth more + than 100 tanks.” (Comment: The King is somewhat confused on this + issue, since he has agreed to provide land to upgrade Embassy + communications, not military communications. Embassy will clarify + this matter for him at the first opportunity. End comment.) + + Hassan asked Mr. Baker + to remind the President of the ways in which Morocco has + demonstrated its friendship. Hassan said that every other Arab + leader he knows would have asked for hundreds of millions of dollars + in return. “I am not like other Arabs. Friendship cannot be weighed + or measured but must be expressed,” he concluded. Secretary + Baker responded that + he would convey the King’s thoughts to the President. He said there + should be no doubt of the very high value that the U.S. places on + its current relationship with Morocco and on the 200 year treaty + relationship. The King labelled it a “privileged relationship,” and + Mr. Baker agreed. + + Comment. The King was very relaxed and friendly and seemed to be + exerting special effort to make a favorable impression on Secretary + Baker. Nonetheless, + at the end of the conversation, Hassan, as he has with such other + recent visitors as SecDef + Weinberger and Codel Chappell,Congressman William “Bill” Chappell Jr. + (D-South Carolina), the Chairman of the Appropriations + Subcommittee on Defense, visited Morocco November 20–21, + 1986. made it clear that he is now ready to start making + specific requests rather than general characterizations of needs, + and that while he is prepared to extend further strategic + cooperation to the U.S., it will be at a cost. He stated that he has + an immediate need for tanks, given the threat he sees from the + Polisario and Algeria. He will doubtless expect to hear from us in + the months ahead about what, if anything, we are prepared to do for + him with respect to tanks, and perhaps aircraft. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870606–0516, D870598–0037, D870294–0568. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Robert Downey (S/S–O), Quinn, Gregg, Zweifel, + and Pearson; approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Algiers and + Tunis. + + 114161. + + Washington, April 16, 1987, 0306Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President Receives Moroccan MinFin Berrada. + + + + S (Entire text). + + Summary: On 4/10, Vice President Bush received Moroccan Finance Minister Berrada accompanied by Amb. + Bargach. Warm and + friendly 45 minute conversation focused on importance of the + bilateral relationship and of continuing cooperation. Other + attendees included Don Gregg + and Doug Manarchek of VP’s staff, Bill Burns (NSC) and Mike Ussery, Roger Merrick (notetaker) and Eliza + Burnham (interpreter). End summary. + + Vice President welcomed Berrada and Bargach saying that he was happy to be able to have + them in his home. He asked that Berrada relay a short message to King Hassan: The + United States truly values its important bilateral relations with + Morocco; we have great respect for His Majesty King Hassan; we are + pleased that the Oujda Accord was abrogated; the President looks + forward to the visit of King Hassan to Washington; and we regard + celebration of the bicentennial of the U.S.-Moroccan Treaty of Peace + and Friendship as an important event which can convey greater + understanding of Morocco to the American people. + + Berrada replied that this + truly was a visit of courtesy and friendship. Moroccans value United + States’ democratic experience. He was pleased to be able to convey + personally the great esteem which King Hassan has for the Vice + President. Morocco has embarked upon a liberal democratic + experiment: private sector is being encouraged; there is less + government control; and, local institutions are being developed with + greater authority. All of this constitutes a dramatic reorientation + of Morocco’s economy. He continued that Morocco’s basic policy is to + “support peace in the world.” Visit of Israeli PM + Peres should be seen in this + light; it symbolizes Morocco’s link between West and Arab + world. + + Vice President replied that he had intended to mention Peres visit in his opening + statement. He clearly understood that this had not been an easy step + for the King. He (Vice President) had been on a visit to region at + that time and had spoken of King Hassan’s courage both in Israel and + to Arab leaders including King Hussein. He then said it would be + “wonderful” if a settlement to the Western Sahara dispute could be negotiated and + expressed hope that Algeria “would come to relinquish its last + vestiges of radicalism.” + + Berrada replied that + Morocco also wants peace in Western Sahara, but not at expense of + Moroccan sovereignty. He noted that Algeria is five times the size + of Morocco. As an economist, he appreciates the importance of better + relations and trade with Algeria. He promised to convey V.P.’s + statements to the King, particularly noting invitation for visit to + Washington and that bicentennial be given all the importance that it + deserves. + + Vice President said that in summary our bilateral relations are + extremely stable. He and President are grateful for King’s offer of + base facilities. He could not think of a greater gesture from a + friend than such an offer. He hopes, however, that U.S. will not + have to burden Morocco with such a request. He then explained how we + had tried to give additional assistance to Morocco through FY87 + supplemental, and noted that $25 million of additional food + assistance had been provided. He said that King should understand + that this is not a question of will. Administration desires to go + farther with assistance for Morocco; problem is simply a lack of + means. “There is no question about our desire to go farther.” + + Visit ended after five-minute tour of gardens at V.P.’s + residence. + + Whitehead +
+
+ 269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870641–0195, D870401–0553. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted + in NEA/AFN from text received + from the White House; cleared by Joann Alba (S/S–S), Zweifel, Benjamin Pascoe (S/S), and Michael Minton (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. + + 159266. + + Washington, May 24, 1987, 0101Z + + + + SUBJECT + Id Al Fitr Message. Please deliver following message from + President Reagan to King + Hassan at appropriate time: + + + + Quote: Your Majesty: I am particularly pleased in this + bicentennial year of our Treaty of Peace and Friendship to convey my + best wishes to you and the people of Morocco for the holy feast of + Id Al-Fitr. May you and your people be blessed with achievements and + success next year similar to those attained over the past year. I + applaud your recent + meeting with President Bendjedid, and hope that it will hasten progress + toward peace and reconciliation in the Western Sahara.I am + confident that we can continue our strong history of mutual + cooperation, which has been productive for both our peoples.I + look forward very much to your visit to the United States.In telegram 143240 to Rabat, May 12, the + Department instructed the Embassy, in discussions with Hassan, + to “underscore interest of President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and NSC in this visit. It would be + regrettable if timing again becomes ‘the’ issue.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870626–0663, D870363–0798) Your good friend, Ronald Reagan. [Unquote] + + The White House does not plan to release text but has no objection + if GOM wishes to do so. + + Armacost +
+
+ 270. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of State + and DefenseSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870606–0408. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Madrid, Lisbon, Riyadh, Paris, + Casablanca, Tangier, and USCINCEUR. + + 6723. + + Rabat, July 13, 1987, 1717Z + + + + SUBJECT + King Hassan Comments on Bilateral Military Issues. + + + + (Secret—Entire text) + + King Hassan and I discussed two bilateral political-military + issues during our July 12 meeting (see also septels):Not found. U.S.-Moroccan military + cooperation, and Moroccan interest General Dynamics’ F–16. + + U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation: I noted that Morocco had asked + us to put our own thoughts together to produce a comprehensive + proposal for U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation, notably in the + field of exercises; outlined for Hassan the process whereby + different branches of the U.S. military are evaluating their + interests for eventual coordination at the level of the Secretaries + of Defense and of State; and asked Hassan how we should proceed on + organizing such matters as site visits for the elaboration of + training or exercise proposals. + + + Hassan stressed that the issue of military cooperation is one that + involves the political will of each side and that Morocco is open to + our proposals. He noted that the Moroccan people are very sensitive + to international affairs; that he alone is capable of persuading the + Moroccan people to welcome a foreign military presence on Moroccan + soil; and that in this era of “third-worldism” and “non-alignment” + (even as fictive as Cuba’s), people would be attentive to what + benefits each side was contributing and deriving from military + cooperation. Hassan spoke dismissively of a piecemeal case-by-case + approach to military cooperation as something which would limit + activity to “the grocery store level.” He said that if Spain + remained obdurate, Morocco and Portugal could prove helpful, and + suggested such helpfulness could come in the context of a bilateral + mutual defense treaty between Portugal (as a “happy” NATO member) and Morocco. + + On the specific question of how to proceed on organizing visits + designed to further U.S. military thinking on cooperation, Hassan + said the Embassy should work through Foreign Minister Filali and General Achahbar (or in + his absence, Colonel Major Kadiri) regardless of what service branch + is involved. Hassan stressed that this procedure will ensure that he + is informed of developments and that such visits are properly + handled at the local level, i.e., cooperatively, discretely, and + positively. (Note: In this regard Hassan made passing reference to a + German request for access to a Moroccan airfield for training + purposes. End note.) + + Comment. I briefed King Hassan on this matter because he had been + briefed by General Kabbaj on the USAREUR portion and had requested + this matter be discussed with Secretary of Defense Weinberger or his envoy. I wanted + to correct the impression that the Secretary of Defense had already + approved a military cooperation program. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, and the Mission to the United + NationsSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870834–0412. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen + Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared + by William Haugh (S/S–O), Lisa + Kubiske (S/S–S), Murphy, and Richard Mueller + (S/S); approved by Shultz. + + 316492. + + Washington, October 9, 1987, 1820Z + + + + SUBJECT + UNGA: The Secretary’s Meeting With Moroccan FonMin + Filali, October 1, + 1987. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary. Foreign Minister Filali expressed pessimism on the Gulf war and the + peace process, sought U.S. support for Moroccan candidacy for the + UN Security Council, invited the + Secretary to visit Morocco as part of his upcoming Middle East + trip,Shultz visited the Middle East October + 16–19. and asked the U.S. to support the UNSYG efforts to resolve the Western + Sahara dispute. On the level of U.S. assistance to Morocco, + Filali stressed Morocco + and the administration had to make Congress sensitive to Morocco’s + special situation, but recognized U.S. budgetary problems. The + Secretary said the U.S. appreciated Morocco’s stand on the Gulf war + and its attempts to assist in the peace process, including the + Hassan-Peres meeting. He said he welcomed the invitation to visit, + but that time prevented him from paying the kind of visit that would + allow for good, reflective exchange of views. The Secretary stated + the U.S. had a traditional position of refraining from expressing a + view on Security Council candidacies at an early stage, but from his + own standpoint, would like to see Morocco on the Security Council. + End summary + + Gulf War. Filali said the + GOM was very concerned the Gulf + war would destabilize the entire region. The Iranians were + attempting to neutralize Resolution 598,See footnote 3, Document + 171. and may have succeeded in splitting the + Security Council, which would be detrimental to the credibility of + the SC and the five Perm Reps. Morocco had close relations with + countries in the region, and after the Mecca incident,See footnote 4, Document + 169. was willing to lend both political and + military aid to safeguard the stability and independence of the Gulf + area. The GOM very much appreciated + the U.S. position and the dispatching of U.S. naval vessels to + protect the area. The Secretary expressed appreciation for Morocco’s + readiness to stand by its friends, stating we had to remain firm and + strong. + + + Extraordinary Arab League Summit.A + summit of the Arab League was scheduled to take place in + November. + Filali was pessimistic the + summit would achieve concrete results, either on the Iran-Iraq war + or the Arab-Israeli dispute. He said a consensus could not emerge, + given the extent of intra-Arab problems, and the probable attempt of + some to sow disarray by introducing extraneous issues. + + Middle East Peace Process. The Secretary welcomed GOM views on the peace process, + stating there seemed to be some movement toward willingness to think + creatively on the Middle East problem. Filali stressed intra-Arab disputes impeded efforts + to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, and said the former had to be + resolved in order to focus on the latter. He characterized Israeli + Foreign Minister Peres’s + UNGA speech as moderate, and + was hopeful it could lay a foundation for progress, even though it + did not meet all Arab requirements. + + International Conference. Filali said he had discussed the summit and + the peace process recently in Jordan. The core issue of + Jordanian-Palestinian problems also had to be resolved + before an international peace conference took place. The + Secretary wondered whether King Hussein could designate + certain Palestinians as part of the delegation. Filali said such a solution + would not work. He had heard contacts among West Bank + peoples had been initiated by the people themselves, but + that Palestinian problems remained murky. The Palestinians + were subject to considerable pressures from various sources, + including Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria. + + Moroccan Role. Filali pointed to the Fez Summit and the + Hassan-Peres meeting as evidence of Moroccan attempts to + resolve both intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli problems. The + Secretary agreed the Peres meeting had been a dramatic, powerful + statement. Filali + said the Moroccans had been surprised at initial Arab + reaction to the meeting, but that things had quieted down + since then. He said the Syrians, had recently dispatched + intermediaries to Morocco to discuss gradual resumption of + ties. + + + Moroccan UNSC Candidacy. Morocco + had seniority rights over Algeria to the contested Security Council + seat, Filali asserted. + Morocco could help its friends if it had a seat on the Security + Council. The Secretary expressed the traditional U.S. position that + the U.S. did not express its views at an early stage in the + selection process, but added his own view that he would like to see + Morocco on the Security Council. + + Western Sahara. Filali + asked the U.S. to support the UNSYG’s efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute + through a UN referendum in the + Sahara region, calling this the “last chance” to resolve the + conflict. He said Algeria and its friends were reluctant to hold a + referendum because they were not used to free elections. The + Secretary assured him Morocco could rely on the U.S. to support the + UNSYG’s efforts. + + + Algeria. Filali expressed + concern about the Algerian “game” with Iran, claiming some Gulf + states also were worried about what Algeria was doing with Iran. He + also mentioned the Algerian-Libyan unity plan as a cause for + concern. + + U.S. Assistance to Morocco. The Secretary agreed with Filali that he would like Congress + to increase the level of assistance to Morocco. Filali said Morocco, and the U.S., + had to work more closely with Congress on the issue. + + Visit invitation. King Hassan was anxious to have the Secretary + visit Morocco as part of his Middle East trip, according to + Filali. The King wanted + to convey Morocco’s perspective on the Gulf war, peace process and + current Maghreb problems, and believed a visit at this time would be + most helpful. The Secretary said he very much wanted to visit, but + time was a major problem for him. + + Participants. U.S.: The Secretary, General Walters, Assistant Secretary + Murphy, Assistant + Secretary Redman, Ambassador Boeker, Country Officer Fitzpatrick + (notetaker), interpreter Alec Toumayan. Morocco: Foreign Minister + Filali, UN Ambassador Slaoui. + + Whitehead +
+
+ 272. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D871049–0414. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat. Sent for information + to Algiers, Riyadh, Tunis, Tel Aviv, Nouakchott, and USCINCEUR. Repeated to the + NSC as telegram 399068, + December 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D871053–0353) + + 12466. + + Rabat, December 23, 1987, 1740Z + + +

Military addressee treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Ambassador’s Talks + With FonMin + Filali.

+ + + (Secret—Entire text) + + Begin summary: In Dec. 22 call, Filali expressed positive interest in discussions on + US military activities; + explained that the King had not gone to Antibes because it would + contrast with his absence at Amman;References are to, respectively, the 14th Franco-Africa summit, + which took place in Antibes December 10–11, and the Arab League + summit, which took place in Amman November 8–9. said that + Saudis and UAE would soon be + visiting Morocco to discuss financing for F–16s; noted that the Algerians had been very + disappointing in bilateral talks in Rabat; and stressed importance + of King’s call for meeting of Al Quds Committee Foreign Ministers to + discuss violence in West Bank and Gaza. Comment in para 13 below. + End summary. + + On December 22, I requested a meeting with FonMin + Filali to brief him on my + meeting with King Hassan and the Joint Military Commission meetings + in Washington. Also to debrief him on the Franco-African summit and + the Joint Commission Meeting in Saudi Arabia. + +

Joint JMC and King’s Visit to the United States

+ + + I told the Foreign Minister that the JMC had gone very well in WashingtonNo record of the JMC meeting has been found. with both sides + able to discuss the outstanding problems in a very positive + atmosphere. I explained that I had spoken with King Hassan after my + meeting with the Foreign Minister and before my departure for + Washington.In telegram 11477 from + Rabat, November 29, Nassif noted that during a “relaxed” November 28 + discussion, Hassan in part “underscored Moroccan desire for a + broad political review of the long-range strategic situation and + the place of US-Moroccan relations in that picture” and + “reiterated his willingness to undertake a State visit to + Washington in 1988, noting this could be in January, February, + the end of March, or April.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870978–0184) + I had then taken both the King’s and FonMin’s messages to Washington where I shared them + with the appropriate USG + officials.In telegram 11420 from + Rabat, November 25, Nassif reported that during their November 25 + meeting, Filali “stressed + GOM interest in major long + term military relationship with U.S., their lack of interest in + relatively minor activities such as low level flights and + bombing ranges,” and expressed “great disappointment at levels + of U.S. assistance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870974–0142) I also + told the FonMin that I was in + the process of sending a message to WashingtonNot found and not further identified. + suggesting a next step in the baseline study and a suggested format + for financing future US-Moroccan military cooperation. He was very + positive in his response saying that it would signal a new change in + US thinking should we be able to + look at long-term strategic military planning together with funding + for Morocco. + +

Franco-African Summit

+ + + I explained Washington’s and the Embassy’s surprise at the King’s + failure to attend the Franco-African summit after having cancelled + Secretary Shultz’ + visit.No record of the cancellation + of a Shultz visit to + Morocco, which Filali had + suggested during his October 1 meeting with the Secretary (see + Document 271) has been + found. The Foreign Minister explained that King Hassan + did not go to France because of the inevitable criticism he would + have received from the Arabs since he had not gone to the Amman summit. He expressed + his hope that a visit by the Secretary could still take place at the + next earliest opportunity. + + The meeting with the Africans in France had gone very well and was + necessary because Morocco does not belong to the OAU and has few opportunities to speak + with African leaders. The fact that the next summit will be held in + Morocco he considered to be a very good sign and a positive step in + the Moroccan-African relationship. + +

Morocco-Saudi Joint Commission + Meeting

+ + + I asked the Foreign Minister whether the withdrawal of Pakistani + troops from Saudi Arabia and replacement by Moroccan troops had been + discussed in Riyadh. He told me that the Pakistani question had been + discussed but that the Saudi’s were not yet prepared to discuss + Moroccan troop presence in the Gulf. There will be a GCC meeting + soon in the Gulf to discuss Gulf states military cooperation. He + did, however, add that Morocco was prepared to send troops to Saudi + Arabia should they be requested. + + I then asked whether funding for an F–16 purchase had been + discussed. His response was negative but he added that both Prince + Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Shiek Zaid of the UAE would be coming to Morocco in + January and financing the F–16s would be taken up at that + time. + +

Algeria and the Maghreb

+ + + Although the Foreign Minister was absent for the talks with the + Algerians, I wanted to know if he was still as optimistic about + moving forward on the bilateral side as he had been before his + departure for Europe and the Gulf. He responded that the Algerians + again were acting strangely. They now say that the Western Saharan + problem must be resolved before bilateral issues can be addressed. + They took notes on Morocco’s positions on the bilateral problems + concerning trade and open borders but gave no responses. They do + however want to continue the talks. The Foreign Minister offered + that it would be up to Algerian FonMin + Ibrahimi to suggest a date + for a follow-on ministerial meeting.Reference is to the December 20 Algiers summit of Foreign + Ministers from Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, during which + Algeria pressured Tunisia to allow Libya to join the Tripartite + Union. See footnote 3, Document + 85. + + I asked Morocco’s view of the recent Algerian activity vis-a-vis + Libya and Tunisia. Filali’s + position was that Algeria again appeared to be attempting to isolate + Morocco. Tunisia would probably reestablish diplomatic relations + with Libya before the end of the year and he understood that Libya + would much prefer a bilateral union to adhesion to the Treaty of + Friendship between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. He added that + Qadhafi had recently + given a major address in which he referred to Algeria and in unusually glowing + terms. I then asked about the Moroccan-Libyan relationship which he + responded was good, especially on the economic side. He had been + checking with Casablanca businessmen and found that TBC Libyans are + now paying their bills. + + In response to my question about the future of a United Maghreb, + Filali posited that + Morocco was looking more to Europe and the United States because it + unfortunately could not look to its Maghreb brothers, especially + Algeria for support. There were too many problems outstanding + between them. I asked about whether the Western Sahara could be + resolved in a Maghreb context as had been suggested in Algiers at + the bilateral, and he mentioned the discussions between King Hassan + and Prime Minister Baccouche + of Tunisia. He said it was the first time there had been a + Moroccan-Tunisian discussion on resolving the Western Sahara. He + didn’t quite understand, however, Tunisia’s apparent willingness to + accept Libya into the treaty of friendship. + +

Al Quds Committee

+ + + Concerning King Hassan’s call for an Al Quds Committee meeting in + Morocco, Filali said the King + felt it was an extremely important item that needed to be discussed + in an Arab context. When I suggested that it also would be a + positive step toward Moroccan reentry into the Arab fold and the + first such meeting since the Ifrane summit between former Prime + Minister Peres and King + Hassan, Filali readily + agreed. He said that Shamir + was incredibly hard lined on the problem in the occupied + territories, but Peres and + his people are still taking a positive line. Morocco looks to the + United States to help move the Israelis on this question. The + Israelis have been incredibly insensitive and in his opinion + creating a very volatile situation throughout the West Bank and + Gaza. + + Comment: This was the first time a high level Moroccan ever + indicated that discussions with Gulf states were about to take place + on the question of financing F–16s. Although we had been told Gulf + financing would be forthcoming for many years, this was a new step. + On the question of Moroccan-Algerian relations, Filali was considerably less + optimistic than he had been at my last meeting. He again attributed + this change to the split within the FLN and the difficulty of getting a united position on + such an issue in a one party system. He did appear to hold out hope + that at a higher level progress could still be made. It was also + clear from Filali’s response + to my explanation of next steps in the baseline process that Morocco + was anxious to enter into serious long-term strategic discussions + and is desperate to find a way to increase U.S. dependence upon and + therefore increase U.S. assistance for Morocco. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880081–0376. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + William McGlynn (NEA/ECON), + Ralph Boyce (D), Benjamin Pascoe + (S/S), and Carolyn Huggins + (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. + + 28881. + + Washington, January 30, 1988, 0203Z + + + + SUBJECT + FY 88 Security Assistance + Allocations for Morocco: Special Talking Points. + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + You will have received by septel final FY 88 security assistance figures for all countries and + extensive talking points for briefing host governments.In telegram 29684 to Vienna, February 4, which + repeated telegram 29684 to all American Republic diplomatic + posts, February 3, the Department outlined the approved FY 88 security assistance + allocations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880624–0215) The following points + may also be used in briefing the GOM on the unique features of the Moroccan FY 88 program: + + Morocco did exceptionally, almost uniquely, well in a + period of major retrenchment; + + Morocco’s FY 88 ESF, MAP, and FMS + total 72 million dollars compared with 54 million dollars in + FY 87; + + In comparison, the administration’s overall request was + cut 14 percent and the net after earmarks was a 93 percent + cut; + + In 30 countries, security assistance will be eliminated; + nearly all countries, including very important ones, will + take massive cuts. For example, our ESF request for Turkey of 120 million was cut + to 32. The actual Turkish program in 87 was 100 million. + Jordan will receive 26.5 million of a requested 40 million, + a substantial cut from the 39.9 million FY 87 actual level; + + In sum, these results show, if it needed to be shown, the + high regard with which Morocco is held in the U.S. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 274. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D552, Rabat 1988 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. + + 2507. + + Rabat, March 12, 1988, 1210Z + + +

For Assistant Secretary Crocker + from Ambassador. Subject: Discussion With Hassan on Angola. Ref: State + 72889.In telegram 72889 to Rabat, March + 9, the Department transmitted talking points for further discussions + with the Moroccan Government regarding the Angolan/Namibian + negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]) + Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, + 1985–1988.

+ + + (Secret—Entire text) + + Pursuant to reftel, I sought and obtained an audience with King + Hassan in Marrakech on March 11. I explained that I had sent a + message to Washington describing the conversation that had taken + place during the Fete du Tron between King Hassan, Ambassador + Walters and + representatives of the MPLA.Telegram 2232 from Rabat, March 4, + contains the message about the Walters-Hassan-MPLA meeting. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880189–0421) I told King Hassan that our + government was interested in following up on this meeting and + obtaining further information. + + I explained that we had been invited to Luanda soon to discuss the + details of the Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) and that if we obtained + a detailed calendar for that withdrawal, Assistant Secretary + Crocker could travel + there soon. I went through the balance of the talking points + including our discussions with the Soviets and the MPLA as well as our approach on CTW, + UNSCR 435,Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution 435, adopted on + September 29, 1978, which called for a ceasefire and + UN-supervised elections in Namibia. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern + Africa, Documents 96, 98, 101–103, 112, and + 350. and NR in Angola. + + I asked Hassan whether in his opinion Kito had been speaking for + Dos Santos on NR or + whether he was speaking for himself. The King’s answer was one word, + “both.” He felt that Kito’s associate Mpayo was a powerful player. + While he did not outrank Kito, he must be very well placed in the + MPLA. Dos Santos is expected to visit + Rabat on March 25th for 24 hours. I asked whether the MPLA had responded to King Hassan’s + suggestion to bring Dos + Santos and Savimbi together. The King acknowledged he had + received a response but the response was negative. The MPLA see themselves as a legitimate + government and Savimbi as a + rebel and therefore did not want to enter into talks with him. The + King quipped, “then why do you want me to enter the talks with the Polisario?” King + Hassan feels that the question of a Savimbi-Dos Santos meeting is + more a conflict of personalities than it is a rejection of meeting + with the UNITA representatives. + He, in fact, will ask both MPLA + and UNITA to select + representatives to come to Rabat and meet with King Hassan sometime + after the Dos Santos + meeting. Savimbi will also be + invited soon but Hassan was not sure whether he would do so before + or after Dos Santos’ + meeting on the 25th. In Hassan’s opinion, there is no question but + the MPLA is ready to talk to + UNITA but not Savimbi. + + Hassan denied any efforts to arrange talks between the MPLA and the South African Government + and also replied negatively when I asked if he had been in touch + with other key African players, e.g., Nigeria, Mozambique, Cape + Verde, Kenya, Ivory Coast, on this issue. It seems unlikely King + Hassan would not have discussed this with at least one or two of his + closer African friends, since it is clear that he sees this as an + important African card. + + He asked me to request two notes verbale that he could have in + hand when Dos Santos + arrived. They would be from the U.S. Government, one taking a hard + line and one taking a moderate line. Whichever one was necessary to + use with the MPLA he would use. He + told me that he wanted to stay in constant touch with me between now + and the arrival of Dos + Santos on the 25th. He wanted me to request + permission to be received by Dos + Santos at that time. (Comment: It is obvious that + Hassan has an important need to show he is in fact working closely + with the USG on this question. He + was frank that we would be doing an old friend a big favor if he was + seen as contributing to a resolution of this problem.) I suggested + that possibly Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Crocker might be interested in + coming to Morocco and possibly during the time Dos Santos was here. Hassan said + that he felt that might be too high a profile at this time and that + Dos Santos might prefer + to be more discrete. I agreed to pass on these messages to + Washington and to respond as quickly as possible. + + Comment: I am happy to continue to assist in these discussions in + whatever low-key fashion or otherwise you might desire. I have + committed to nothing except that I would make King Hassan’s views + and requests known in Washington. It was clear during my monologue + on the background of U.S. activities vis-a-vis Angola/Namibia that + Hassan was extremely interested. It was quite unusual for him to + want to involve me so directly in discussions he was having with + another country but on the other hand, understandable given his + desire to improve his position with his African neighbors. I leave + it to you whether to prepare these notes verbale and if so, what + they will contain as well as the decision on any further + participation of mine in the discussions with King Hassan and/or + Dos Santos. I would not + rule out the possibility + of suggesting to King Hassan that I bring with me someone from the + African Bureau at a level below that of Assistant Secretary if you + think that would be helpful and appropriate. Please advise as soon + as possible. + + Nassif +
+
+ 275. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: Meetings + 03/29/88–04/02/88. Secret. A shorter version of the meeting is in + telegram ToSec 60114/104618, April 3. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880284–0069) + + + Rabat, April 2, 1988 + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting Between Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci and King + Hassan II of Morocco, + Friday, 1 April 1988 + +

The King indicated that he wished to talk to me alone and dismissed the + interpreter. After initial pleasantries, and recalling our prior + meetings, the King told me how pleased he was with Ambassador Nassif. He considered him to be + sensitive, responsive, and knowledgeable. He had heard that Ambassador + Nassif was going to leave and + hoped that that would not be the case. I told him Ambassador Nassif needed to place his children in + school and would probably leave before the end of the year.

+

In chatting about the American election campaign, the King expressed high + admiration for Vice President Bush. Bush had + shown great sensitivity at the time the King announced union with Libya, + a move he had to make in order to “buy himself two years in the Sahara + war”. He sincerely hoped that Bush would be elected President.

+

The King talked at some length about his relations with Algeria, the sum + and substance of which was that he was trying to make some moves to put + an end to the feuding between Algeria and Morocco. He felt he was making + good progress toward an agreement. He hoped that the UN effort he was pursuing with regard to + the Western Sahara could serve as an “umbrella” for such an agreement. + He got along well with President Bendjedid, but he had scant regard for Algerian Foreign + Minister Taleb Ibrahimi, a man who had not participated in the + revolution, was an “intellectual” set on trying to prove his worth. + Ibrahimi does not want + peace.

+ +

The King noted that Ambassador Nassif had given him a memorandum on our relationship + with Morocco.Not found and not further + identified. The memo was divided into short, medium, and + long-term steps. This division was inappropriate. As far as he was + concerned, the short-term and the long-term were the same. The + relationship between Morocco and the United States should be like a + marriage. Once the decision is made the friendship should last forever. + Unfortunately, he does not see that kind of commitment coming out of the + United States.

+

The King noted that Morocco was somewhat of an outcast. Many of the + neighboring countries were run by the military. Arabs in general + preferred single party states to the multi-party system in Morocco. The + King needed to feel that the security of his people would be assured + once he passes from the scene. To achieve this he needed a special + relationship with the United States.

+

I asked him how we might start to develop that relationship. He responded + that as far as he was concerned, the most important thing was for us to + let the world know that Morocco was truly America’s friend. This message + needs to be spread by “all your leaders and all your Ambassadors”.

+

I praised the King’s efforts to develop a close relationship with + Portugal. The King responded enthusiastically and asked me to help. He + said he had already had a visit from Mario Soares who was a “wonderful + person”. I urged him to establish relations with Prime Minister Cavaco + Silva as well, and he said he would. His fervent hope was that he could + develop a triangular relationship: Morocco-Portugal-NATO. Such a + relationship would ensure that the West could control the Straits of Gibraltar. Portugal + needed to understand that it was a Mediterranean nation as well as an + Atlantic nation.

+

I gave the King a review of our relationship with the Soviets, + concentrating on my meeting with Yazov and our Arms Control + negotiations.In telegram 1860 from + Bern, March 16, Carlucci + summarized his meeting with Soviet Minister of Defense General + Dmitry Yazov, noting that it covered “dangerous military activities, + military-to-military contacts, policies and doctrines, and arms + control” initiatives between the United States and the Soviet Union. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, [no D number]) The + King expressed great sympathy for what Gorbachev was trying to do and said we should help + him.Reference is to the Strategic Arms + Reduction Talks (START). Documentation on the talks is in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I. I + noted that as far as I was concerned, “the jury is still out on that + score”. I noted that Gorbachev + was trying to make substantial changes in the USSR, but those changes had yet to impact the military + establishment. The King seemed surprised when I told him the Soviets + continue to pour out offensive weapons and that I had not seen any visible signs of a change + in their doctrine. I noted that it would not serve our purposes to help + Gorbachev modernize his + economy if the end result were only a more efficient military machine. + On the other hand, I agreed we needed to maintain a dialogue with the + Soviets. I intended to continue military to military contacts and we + were all working very hard to bring about further agreements in the arms + control area. The King seemed particularly interested in verification + and I walked him through the verification issues involved in START. I + also described to him the difficulties of verifying chemical weapon + production. He noted that the Iraqis has made a “horrible error” in + using a poison gas.Reference is to the + Iraqi Government’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish city + of Halabja on March 16. Documentation on the incident is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, Iran; Iraq, + 1985–1988.

+

The King had no special message other than the usual plea for a close + relationship with the United States. It was clear, however, that he was + anxious to talk. He seemed somewhat lonely, almost thirsty for an + exchange of views on the state of the world.

+ Frank C. + Carlucci +
+
+ 276. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of State + and Defense, the Commander-in-Chief, European Command, and the Secretary + of the Air Force (Aldridge)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–90–0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Immediate. Printed from a copy + that indicates the original was received in the office of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff Information Service Center. A stamped notation + reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN MAY 22 1988.” Underneath the stamp, + Carlucci wrote: “We + ought to try to do this. FC.” + + 4315. + + Rabat, April 29, 1988, 1939Z + + +

Personal for DAS + Ussery, ASD Armitage, LTGen Brown, Gen Richards and Mr. Aldridge + from Ambassador Nassif. Subj: + F–5E for Morocco (S).Carlucci + underlined the subject line.

+ + + Entire text Secret. + + Col-Maj Kadiri, Chief, External Intelligence Services (DGED), + called on me this afternoon to relay a personal request from King + Hassan with regard to + SecDef + Carlucci’sCarlucci underlined: “SecDef Carlucci’s.” offer + of excess USAF F–5E aircraft. He + said that the King had told him specifically to ask me to intervene + and ask the USG If it could provide + ten F–5E’s in lieu of the six which were offered. He emphasized that + while he understood the price of the aircraft would be somewhere + between four hundred thousand and a million dollars that the King + had asked that we provide these ten at quote a very good price + unquote.Carlucci underlined: “Ten + F–5E’s in lieu of the six which were offered” and “while he + understood the price of the aircraft would be somewhere between + four hundred thousand and a million dollars that the King had + asked that we provide these ten at quote a very good price + unquote.” + + This highly unusual method for receiving this request from the + GOM, i.e. Kadiri to me instead + of military to military, suggests the strong personal interest of + King Hassan. It is this type of request and more importantly our + response which Hassan uses to gauge our relationship. + + Both my MUSLO Chief who had been summoned earlier to RMAF HQ’s where he received a similar + request from Acting Chief, Col-Maj R’Rani and I informed our + interlocutor that the balance of the aircrafts may have been spoken + for but would do our best to determine if more were + available. + + It is my estimation that we have an opportunity to satisfy a valid + need with material which is militarily correct and hopefully at a + very generous price. We are awaiting the King’s response to the + baseline proposal and are trying to get the exercise program off + deadcenter. A positive response to this request could put us over + the line and move us quickly in the direction we want to head + vis-à-vis our military-to-military relationship with Morocco. + + I strongly support the King’s request for four more F–5E aircraft. + There is no question that he needs them. I have no idea whether the + GOM believed that the SecDef would be offering up to 20 + aircraft before he arrived but that is a possibility. Even so the + request is a reasonable one and our ability to fulfill it for little + or nothing would be very timely. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 277. Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan + II of MoroccoSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, William J. + Burns Files, Morocco 1988. No classification + marking. + + + Washington, May 6, 1988 + + +

Your Majesty:

+

I wanted to avail myself of the opportunity of John Whitehead’s visit to Morocco to + share some thoughts about recent regional developments and to solicit + your views in return.

+

On numerous occasions, you have shared with us your keen insight into the + problems of the Middle East. I would welcome your thoughts on the + continuing conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors—a problem + which remains a key concern for my Administration. If we are to achieve + a comprehensive settlement that realizes the legitimate rights of the + Palestinians, while protecting Israel’s security, the United States is + convinced that the efforts of all involved must be redoubled. Morocco + has an essential role to play in this regard, not least by helping to + influence the debate within Arab circles in moderate directions—as you + have done so ably on many occasions in the past.

+

Your Majesty, the continuing conflict in the Gulf constitutes a + significant problem for us as well as for the moderate Arab states of + the region. Our first desire is to see this agonizing war ended through + immediate implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution + 598. The United States cannot stand by, however, and watch innocent + shipping subjected to lawless attacks when we have the means to assist. + As a reflection of our continuing commitment to freedom of navigation in + international waters, I have therefore decided to make available U.S. + assistance under certain circumstances to ships in distress, without + increasing current force levels.

+

Your Majesty, as we continue to work together to resolve the problems + that confront us, it is my sincere hope during this holy month of + Ramadan that Morocco—under your wise guidance and leadership—will offer + its collective prayers for peace, so that our peoples will one day be + able to live in a world where stability and tranquility prevail.

+

With warm good wishes,

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 278. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading April–June + 1988. Secret. + + + Washington, May 17, 1988 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+

2. Whitehead in + Morocco. John Whitehead + met with King Hassan May 12Telegram 4785 + from Rabat, May 13, contains a record of the Whitehead-Hassan + meeting. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Lot 95D552, + 1988 Nodis Telegrams, Box 7, Rabat 1988 Nodis) to convey your + letter to the KingSee Document 277. and to review regional issues. The + King criticized Shamir harshly + saying his policies were putting Israel in serious danger. He observed + that a US peace initiative in an + election year faced severe challenges, but agreed we must continue the + search for common ground. Whitehead also met with Minister of Interior Basri,Telegram 4769 from Rabat, May 13, contains a record of the + Whitehead-Basri meeting. (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, lot 95D552, 1988 Nodis Telegrams, Box 7, Rabat 1988 + Nodis) who welcomed increased cooperation in combatting + narcotics production and trafficking. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

+
+
+ 279. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–90–0080, 1988 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A + stamped notation at the top of the telegram reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN + JUL 7 1988.” In the right-hand corner of the telegram, Carlucci wrote: “I don’t + understand the issue here. We do not oppose the sale. Is he looking + for more FMS to finance them? + FC.” + + 6562. + + Rabat, July 6, 1988, 1552Z + + +

Pass NSC for Colin Powell; OVP for Don Gregg; OSD for Secretary Carlucci and ASD Armitage; State for Deputy Secretary + Whitehead and AS Murphy. From Ambassador. Subject: + F–16s for Morocco: Hassan’s Emissary to the President.Carlucci + underlined the subject line.

+ + + + Secret, Entire text. + + General Achabar, Secretary General of the National Defense + Administration, summoned me urgently July 6 to inform me that the + King was sending him to Washington as a personal emissary with a + message for the President regarding the long-standing issue of + Moroccan acquisition of F–16s. Achabar said that the Moroccan + Embassy in Washington would be making a formal request for a meeting + with the President,Carlucci placed an asterisk + in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. but that + he wanted to give me the precise reason for the King’s request for + such a meeting. He gave no hint of the content of the King’s message + on the F–16s. Achabar said he would be arriving in Washington July + 14, via London. He would be available in Washington for a meeting + with the President at any time through the following week. + + Comment: Hassan’s interest in the F–16 has a long history. In + choosing to highlight it at this moment, he may be trying to make a + last minute appeal to an administration with which he has had + excellent relations. I suspect the appeal may turn out to be some + form of linkage between acquisition of F–16s and the U.S. proposals + for expanded military training activities in Morocco, which have + been under discussion for some time. I was recently contacted by + Royal Counselor Guedira with regard to the U.S. plans. Guedira’s + message was that the King wanted to discuss them with me personally + prior to my departure from Morocco, now set for July 14, and that in + the meantime I should not discuss them with anyone else, including + Foreign Minister Filali who + has been our designated interlocutor up to this point. If my + estimate is correct, the King may use my farewell interview to + express his general views on expanded U.S. military activities, but + will reserve ultimate decisions until he has in hand the U.S. + reaction to his as yet undisclosed message to the President on the + F–16s. That, I recognize, might take us into the next + administration. But the King has indicated several times that he has + a long perspective.Carlucci drew a vertical + line in the right-hand margin next to this + paragraph. + + Comment continued: Recognizing pressures on President’s schedule, + I nevertheless strongly urge that every effort be made to find time + for him to receive King Hassan’s personal emissary on the issue of + the F–16s. Keeping a dialogue open with King Hassan is particularly + important at this time not only in view of our own plans for + military activities but also because of the rapid pace of events in + North Africa. Notably between Morocco and Algeria and our own + upcoming Presidential election. I will be in Washington on + consultation week of July 18 and would be available to participate + in such a meeting if deemed appropriate. + + Nassif +
+ +
+ 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880724–0452. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Casey, Eastham, Leonard Csensny (PM/ISP), Palevitz (DOD/ISA), Philip Zelikow (S/S), Negroponte, Perito, James Collins (S/S), and James Carragher (S/S–O); approved by Burleigh. + + 268930. + + Washington, August 18, 1988, 0201Z + + + + SUBJECT + Message to King Hassan. + +

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver the following Presidential message to King Hassan in + response to the oral message from the King to the President which + General Achahbar delivered to General Powell and Secretary Carlucci.No record of the + Powell-Achabar conversation has been found. There will be no + signed original.

+

3. Begin text. Your Majesty:

+

I received with great satisfaction your message as conveyed by General + Achahbar. I welcome the reaffirmation of your intention to acquire + F–16See Document + 279. aircraft. I am pleased to confirm to you in + turn that the United States also remains fully committed to this + proposal.

+

Your Majesty, my government’s interest in expanding military cooperation + with Morocco is based on the common defense perceptions our nations + share. As Morocco and the U.S. stood together during World War II, so + Morocco remains a pillar of security in the Western Mediterranean region + today. The fifteen-year program of expanded cooperation which was + briefed to your government in March of this year reflects the close + nature of our bilateral relations.

+

I am asking my representatives to the next Joint Military Commission + meeting to pursue these complex matters in greater detail, including the + potential benefits of expanded military cooperation—benefits which could + help facilitate our common goal of enhancing the readiness of our two + countries’ armed forces. I am also asking our Department of Defense to + remain in close contact with your government to review these and other + issues.

+

Your Majesty, in closing, permit me to extend to you my sincerest best + wishes for your well being and for the continued progress of Morocco + under your wise leadership. Yours sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

+

3. This message has been coordinated with DOD.

+ Whitehead +
+ +
+ 281. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of + Defense and StateSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC + 330–90–0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the + Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive + Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 11, + Morocco. Secret; Specat; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to + USCINCEUR, the Joint + Chiefs of Staff, and Algiers. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + Information Service Center. + + 9582. + + Rabat, September 30, 1988, + 1226Z + + +

Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. DOD for Carlucci. Dept NEA for + Murphy. CIA for Gates. NSC for Burns. + EUCOM for General Richards. + Subject: Hassan Meeting With ASD/ISA + Armitage.

+ + + Secret, Entire text. + + Begin summary: In unusually lengthy, cordial and candid discussion + Sept 29, Hassan told ASD/ISA + Armitage that he was prepared to consider all options presented by + the U.S. for future military cooperation. He asked that discussion + begin with the more demanding longer term items, since the creation + of de facto permanent bases would be a change in the nature of the + military relationship. He explicitly linked expanded programs to + provision of F–16s to Morocco. On other topics, he announced that + Royal Air Maroc would buy Boeings rather than Airbus, and said + AFERDOU 88Reference is to the planned + United States-Moroccan joint exercises scheduled for early + September. cancellation had been due to political optics + of timing in conjunction with Maghreb meetings in Morocco. Hassan + expressed his great esteem for President Reagan, for SecDef + Carlucci and former + SecDef + Weinberger, adding that he + greatly appreciated the understanding Morocco had always enjoyed in + the Pentagon. End summary. + + Hassan received ASD/ISA + Armitage in Rabat Sept 29 for nearly two hours. Also present were + Chargé, the Crown Prince, Royal Counselor Guedira, Prime Minister + Laraki, General Achabar, Moroccan Ambassador Bargach and Military Attaché in + Washington Colonel Kostali. After initial pleasantries, Hassan + launched into an extended expose of his thinking on defense + cooperation. + + Focus on Long-TermHassan noted that he had read the baseline + study which US had submitted on + military cooperation.Not found. + These were, he observed, divided into short, medium, and long term + proposals. He said he would not exclude consideration of any of the + U.S. proposals in any area. However, it was necessary first to determine what the + real issue was. In Hassan’s view, there is a fundamental difference + in the nature of U.S. military activity proposed in the long term, + from what presently exists under the 1982 access and transit + agreement. In effect, what the U.S. is seeking is one or two + military bases. The change is thus not simply a matter of + degree. + + Given the far-reaching nature of the change in the relationship + which the creation of de facto bases would imply, these proposals + need to be studied in depth. In that process, Hassan said he hoped + U.S. would consider Moroccan requirements along with U.S. military + requirements. Hassan noted that the Moroccan armed forces had always + been his private preserve. The Parliament had never discussed the + military budget, which he claimed showed absolute popular confidence + in his management of national security issues. Since he had that + public confidence, Hassan said he was willing to consider any + options, even those which, like the creation of + operational/maintenance bases, could seem to conflict with Morocco’s + other international obligations. As examples of potentially + conflicting obligations which would have to be considered, he noted + Morocco’s membership in the Arab League, the Non-Aligned movement, + the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the OAU (cited even though he noted, + Morocco is not presently participating). Such U.S. military cooperation options could + only be considered, however, on condition that he could be + convinced, and could convince his people, that they would be for the + net benefit of the Moroccan people and nation. + + Hassan recalled, for example, that he had once remarked publicly + that, if the Arab League had recognized the Polisario, he would have + withdrawn from the organization and signed a defense treaty with + Israel. Such a move would have met the criteria of being justifiable + to the Moroccan people as defending national security and + territorial integrity. Hassan contended that the Moroccan mentality + was unique in the Arab world. The Moroccan people could be counted + on to show the necessary flexibility, imagination, and maturity to + support whatever decisions are necessary. To do this, however, they + need logical, historical arguments to support any decision. If such + arguments were available, Hassan said he was prepared to discuss + U.S. long-term proposals, “and even beyond”. + + Making Use of DétenteIn response to ASD/ISA’s question, Hassan said + that Morocco was not overjoyed with the present situation with + regard to U.S. military cooperation, but was not complaining. The + primary problem is that the Congress does not understand the + importance of U.S.-Moroccan military relations. For the future, + Hassan suggested that the best approach is to seek to improve and + build on the existing access and transit agreement as much as possible, possibly + through further exchanges of letters. In the process, we should jump + over the middle term, to get directly to discussion of the longer + term. + + Hassan observed that the world was entering what promised to be a + prolonged period of détente. This was a period which should be used + to take steps to ward off future trouble. It is a good time to look + at the long term, calmly. Many things can be done together, directly + and indirectly. A study, beginning now, of the long term, would look + at how we can work together to defend our civilization, our values, + our liberties. + + Citing various examples of long-term preparation, Hassan noted + that Morocco had pursued an application to join the EC, which had been greeted + sympathetically. Clearly membership was not for tomorrow, but he + said he was sure it would come eventually. Europe, he argued, would + find itself in need of strategic depth in the political area, just + as it has found it needs strategic depth in the military field. He + noted, as another example, Morocco’s excellent relations with + Portugal, and discussions on defense cooperation. He said that + Portuguese PM would be bringing a + draft defense treaty when he visited Morocco in October. + + The F–16 QuidArmitage said that the U.S. would be prepared to + discuss long term questions, but only if it could be ensured that + Morocco would not feel that its sovereignty had been violated or its + interests neglected. We would not want to get into a position where + Morocco felt it could not support what we had discussed. Armitage + said that the U.S. had done an analysis which provided order of + magnitude ideas on the benefits to Morocco of the proposals we had + presented. There were certain direct benefits, e.g. monies spent on + military construction. There were also indirect benefits, such as + the degree to which enhanced cooperation with Morocco would make the + Congress more receptive to arguments for greater military and + economic assistance. There were also benefits from Moroccans + employed by U.S. programs. + + Hassan said that this was a simple matter. International relations + involve a balance of compensations, give and take. All that would be + required would be to ensure that he was in a position to show a + suitable counterpart to his people, which would be sufficient to + make Moroccan defense credible until 2010. In this regard, his + primary interest is in “my squadron of F–16s.” + + Armitage said that it would be up to the U.S. and Morocco together + to consider a payments schedule for such an acquisition, and how + funds might be applied against the schedule. He noted that the dols + 52 million of security assistance earmarked for Morocco this year + would not be + sufficient to the purpose. Hassan interjected that it was not only + inadequate for purchase of F–16s, but did not reflect Morocco’s + geostrategic importance. Armitage said there could be other possible + approaches. For example, one approach might be to provide F–16s on + lease, although he stressed that he was not sure this was + possible. + + Hassan concluded that he hoped ASD/ISA Armitage would inform the President and + Secretary Carlucci that + he wanted to consider the long term relationship, but that he wanted + the work on this to start now. Armitage asked if Hassan would + entertain a further US presentation + on benefits. Hassan said he would, but asked that it not be made a + subject of official correspondence, but simply be passed orally for + Moroccan representatives to take notes. Armitage said he would be in + contact with Ambassador Bargach and Defense Attaché Kostali on this. + + The Sahara and the MaghrebHassan said that there was a + promising future in the Maghreb. The conflict in the Sahara + continued for the moment. Algeria had a psychological problem, in + that they clearly wanted out of the conflict, but in a way which + would keep them from losing face, particularly in front of all the + countries they have pushed to recognize the Polisario. Morocco, for + its part, would not retreat from its demand for a referendum. The + present “atmospheric disturbances”, however, would not change the + basic movement toward resolution of the Sahara conflict. Morocco and + Algeria have signed an agreement for a gas pipeline which will make + Europe less dependent on Soviet gas. Both Morocco and Algeria have a + strong interest in the success of that accord, despite the + continuation of the conflict in the Sahara. Hassan asserted that the + gas pipeline accord had, in fact, settled the question of war and + peace in the region. + + Looking at the Sahara problem, Hassan commented that Algerian + President Bendjedid is + trustworthy, “a gentleman”. But he had not yet gained full control + of what was a very bad internal situation. The FLN Congress in December, and the + presidential election in January, were part of that process, and + Hassan said he strongly hoped that Bendjedid would win. In that campaign, Hassan saw + Bendjedid’s platform as + based on (1) economic reform; and (2) the normalization of relations + with Morocco. + + Whatever the shape of the Maghreb, Hassan asserted, Morocco will + preserve its military independence. It would be crazy to do + otherwise. Hassan added that Morocco is currently studying a + military rebuilding program keyed to the end of the Sahara conflict + and the anticipated ensuring period of détente. It should be a + period, he noted, in which the countries of the Maghreb can attend + to their reequipment needs with less concern for the reactions of + their neighbors than in a period of tension. + + + Boeing Purchase by Royal Air MarocIn the category of things + which Morocco and the U.S. can do for each other, Hassan noted that + he had decided that Royal Air Maroc would purchase Boeing 737–400s, + as replacement aircraft, rather than the competing Airbus model. He + said that the long competition between the manufacturers had come + down to packages which were essentially equal. Thus, he had to make + a political choice, which he had done on the basis that there was + insufficient U.S. private sector involvement in Morocco, in + comparison to the heavy European private sector involvement in + everything from public works to banking. Moreover, RAM has had a + good experience with Boeing planes over the years. + + AFERDOU CancellationResponding to ASD/ISA’s concern that cancellation of exercise AFERDOU + 88 might have indicated that Morocco was reacting negatively to + something the U.S. had done, Hassan said that the timing of the + exercise had conflicted with what he called the “prenuptial” period + in Maghreb relations. The Maghreb Commission will meet in Rabat in + late October. This will be followed by a Maghreb summit, which + Hassan said would also be held in Morocco by virtue of his status as + senior head of state. In this context, it would not have been good + to have the exercise go forward. But this did not mean that for the + future Morocco did not want to have an active mutually beneficial + exercise program. + + Hawes +
+
+ 282. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880891–0437. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Priority to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, and USUN. Shultz was in New York for the annual meeting of the + UN General + Assembly. + + Secto + 17070. + + New York, October 6, 1988, 0727Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting With Moroccan FonMin + Filali, 10/04/88. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Participants: US—The Secretary, Ambassador Walters, Assistant Secretary + Murphy, Assistant + Secretary Redman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Burleigh, Algeria Desk Officer + Fitzpatrick, Interpreter Eliza Burnham. Morocco—Foreign Minister + Filali, UN Permanent Representative Jaidi, + UN Mission Officer Bengelloun. + + + Summary: During their October 4 meeting in New York, the Secretary + and Foreign Minister Filali + focussed on events in the Maghreb, including restoration of + relations between Morocco and Algeria and progress toward resolution + of the Sahara dispute. The Secretary expressed full US support for the efforts of the + UN Secretary General in this + regard, and offered the full assistance of the US Mission to the UN to facilitate the effort. Filali dodged the Secretary’s + invitation to describe the outcome Morocco would like to see in the + Sahara by requesting the Secretary’s view on the current round of + Angola/Namibia negotiations. The Secretary also asked Filali to convey his personal + greetings to King Hassan. End summary + + The Secretary welcomed recent positive developments in North + Africa, including restoration of relations between Morocco and + Algeria.See Document 88. + Filali described the + resumption of ties with Algeria as the result of much patience and + painstaking effort. Morocco had succeeded in overcoming obstacles + toward improving ties and wanted to do everything possible to + encourage Algeria to open up to the free world. The Secretary + interjected that it might help Algerian President Bendjedid if Algeria were part of a + more cohesive Maghreb in participation with Morocco. Filali agreed, stating the GOM wanted to bolster Bendjedid’s reform effort. The + GOM sought to draw Algeria into + a cooperative effort with Morocco in the Western Mediterranean. + Morocco also wanted to strengthen ties with the US and with its European neighbors. The + upcoming visit to Morocco of the Portuguese Foreign Minister and the + King’s planned visit to Spain October 8 were manifestations of + Morocco’s success thus far. + + Turning to the Western Sahara issue, Filali said that in the spirit of compromise the + GOM had accepted the UNSYG’s plan to structure a + referendum on the future of the region,See Document 458. though the + plan might not have been entirely satisfactory. The GOM believed the best way to ensure a + definitive resolution to the conflict was to encourage the SYG to persist in his efforts. Morocco + had encouraged the SYG to appoint a + Special Representative to begin work on the process, and believed he + would name one soon. The GOM was + counting on the US delegation at the + UN to help if the effort + flagged. The Secretary stressed the US was ready to work with the GOM and that the US had + long supported the SYG’s efforts. + Ambassador Walters + reaffirmed USUN’s desire to be + helpful in this regard. At this point, the Secretary asked Filali to describe the outcome + Morocco desired for the Western Sahara. Filali, however, turned to the issue of + Angola/Namibia negotiations. + + + Filali stressed the GOM stood ready to facilitate dialogue + in the Angola national reconciliation effort,In telegram 20968 from London, October 3, + Crocker reported: “In + a decidedly upbeat exchange on Angola-Namibia, King Hassan + confirmed our understanding of current Black African moves + toward reconciliation in Angola.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880880–0688) + Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication + in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, + 1985–1988. but that the two parties must work + out their own solution. The Secretary agreed that national + reconciliation was key, and could not be put off, as the Angolan + Government wanted, until after the issues of South African + withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola had + been resolved. Assistant Secretary Crocker was hopeful, following current round of + Brazzaville negotiations, that an agreement might be near. The + GOM’s continued work to further + efforts toward Angolan national reconciliation would be a major + contribution in this effort. Filali affirmed the GOM would continue to cooperate in this regard. + + Shultz +
+
+ 283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880931–0728. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Burleigh, Terrell Otis + (PM), Eastham, Perito, Richard Mueller (S/S), James Carragher (S/S–O), Daniel Dolan (EB), Joann Alba (S/S–S), and Gnehm (DOD/ISA); approved by Paul Hare (NEA). + + 342158. + + Washington, October 20, 1988, 0233Z + + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Letter to King Hassan. + +

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. Following is text of letter from the President to King Hassan, which + post should deliver as soon as possible. No/no signed original will + follow.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Your Majesty:

+

I very much appreciated the kind personal greetings you conveyed via my + representative Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage following his + audience with you in Rabat.See Document 281. I was also gratified + to get a personal report of + your views on the prospects for enhanced military cooperation between + the United States and Morocco. My government and I look forward to + pursuing your discussion in greater detail in the days and months + ahead.

+

I also wanted to make special mention of the news you conveyed to Mr. + Armitage concerning your decision to acquire additional U.S. + manufactured aircraft. The U.S. appreciates the import of this action, + which will further strengthen the strong links that bind our two + countries.

+

I fully agree with your assessment of the need for vigilance as progress + toward peace is achieved in regions of the world that have been + previously plagued by conflicts. The United States and its close friends + like Morocco must remain strong to defend our shared values. We look + forward to consulting closely with you on how to enhance our defense + relationship in mutually beneficial ways. As we strive toward our shared + goal of peace and stability in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, let me + assure you, Your Majesty, of the high regard both I and the American + people have for you and your people and of the value the United States + attaches to its excellent relationship with your esteemed country.

+

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End + text.

+

His Majesty

+

Hassan II,

+

King of Morocco,

+

Rabat.

+ Shultz +
+
+ 284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881125–0854. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley + (NEA/AFN); approved by + Burleigh. Sent for + information Immediate to Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, Paris, and + Madrid. Documentation on the Libyan chemical weapons program is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVIII, Libya; Chad. + + 415651. + + Washington, December 28, 1988, 0141Z + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Démarche: Libyan Chemical Weapons Capability + + + + Entire text—C. + + Moroccan Ambassador Bargach + urgently requested a meeting with DAS + Burleigh on December 27. + Making what he described as his last official démarche, Bargach said that his government + had instructed him to say that Morocco, as a good friend of the + United States, urged restraint and moderation in the U.S. approach + to the question of the Libyan CW + production facility. Bargach + said that Rabat had noted that the briefing recently provided to the + GOM had coincided with reports + President Reagan had said + the U.S. was consulting with its allies about possible direct action + against the Libyan facility. The GOM hopes that U.S. will not act precipitately, + particularly in the light of the opening to the PLO with its potential for progress + towards peace in the Middle East. Noting Libyan assertions that the + Rabat plant was producing pharmaceuticals, Bargach said the U.S. should make + absolutely certain that the facility in question is really a CW production plant before considering + any action. Saying that Morocco was very concerned about the + proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, Bargach assured Burleigh that the GOM would monitor the situation + closely and pass on any information it developed to the U.S. + + Burleigh thanked Bargach for his presentation and + assured him the U.S. welcomed and valued Morocco’s advice. He said + that the presentation already made in Rabat had put the GOM in possession of the facts which + lead us and many of our allies to conclude that Rabat is indeed a + chemical weapons production plant. The U.S. has been conducting a + diplomatic campaign to bring world attention to focus on the threat + posed by the Libyan facility.In + telegram 12658 from Rabat, December 28, the Embassy commented: + “While Morocco is seeking to cover all its bases vis-à-vis its + Arab neighbors, it has up to now eschewed condemnation of U.S. + policy, and is bending over backwards to prevent the Libyan + CW affair from damaging + U.S.-Moroccan relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881128–0134) The U.S. + is also actively supporting the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons + and believes it is important to find ways to reinforce the 1925 + agreement banning such weapons.Reference is to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of + the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of + Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. + + Whitehead +
+
+ +
+ Tunisia +
+ 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810036–0344. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Jerrilynn + Pudschun (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Coon; approved by Draper. + + 19133. + + Washington, January 24, 1981, 0519Z + + + + SUBJECT + Hedda-Draper Tour d’Horizon. + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Tunisian Ambassador Hedda + called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Draper January 21 to discuss bilateral military + issues, Libya, and possible Middle East initiatives under new + administration. After presenting copy of congratulatory message from + Bourguiba for delivery to + President Reagan,See Document + 286. + Hedda came to point of + call—suggestion that high level Tunisian military delegation of + three to four persons visit U.S. soon to exchange information with + U.S. counterparts. Hedda + proposed late February or early March for visit, which he hopes will + include stops at various agencies in Washington as well as elsewhere + in country. Draper suggested + that March might be best, since new U.S. team should be in place by + that time. He indicated also that we would do what we could to + facilitate such a visit. + + Hedda confirmed, as + indicated earlier this week by Tunisian Military Attaché, that + GOT wants to pin down squadron + of F–5’s originally slated for Sudan.In + telegram 14723 to Tunis, January 20, the Department reported: + “Tunisian MilAtt Azzabi called at Dept late 16 January in some + excitement to report that GOT + had decided to buy squadron of F–5E/F Interceptors.” It + indicated that the Minister of National Defense had provided a + copy of a telex, which asked Northrup Grumman to accept the + order for the squadron “previously been destined for Sudan if it + is still available.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810029–0056) + Draper felt this should be + possible, since other government considering squadron now appears to + be interested in different aircraft. Hedda said GOT also + wants M–60s.In telegram 812 from Tunis, + January 30, Bosworth + reported: “Over the past several days we have had a series of + discussions with Ministry of Defense officials, including two + meetings between Minister of Defense Baly and myself, on Tunisia’s plans for the + modernization of its defense forces. The Minister has confirmed + that Tunisia wishes to buy as soon as possible 12 F–5 + Interceptors and 54 M–60 tanks. + These two purchases would meet Tunisia’s top priority needs.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810046–0351) + Draper noted that + M–60 line could be shut down at any + time and that in any case orders placed now could only be filled in + three years because of backlog. Hedda insisted that GOT could not wait that long and jokingly suggested + that they had better send Minister of Defense rather than high level + team. Draper said that + Hedda should discuss + question of M–60 availability with + General Graves at DOD. + + Hedda asked whether there + have been any changes in USG + position on Libya in view of events in Chad.See footnote 10, + Document 187. + Draper noted that some + developments were positive. We are pleased that African nations + themselves are becoming concerned and that OAU involvement is being considered. He said it was too + early to be authoritative but, speaking personally, he was confident + that, as far as U.S. relationship with Tunisia is concerned, new + administration will want to maintain strong ties. It may be + interested in taking tough stance toward Libya. Hedda pointed to Mzali speechReference is to Mzali’s December 29, 1980, speech to the + Tunisian National Assembly. Telegram 3835 to DOD, January 7, repeated the text + of telegram 35 from Tunis, January 5, in which the Embassy + included the following passage from his remarks: “We are working + to establish relations marked by deep friendship and cooperation + with Libya.” The Embassy reported, however, that privately + “Tunisia entertains no illusions” about Libya’s “power play in + Chad.” Should Qadhafi + “turn his attention to Tunisia,” Tunisian officials were + “prepared to stall Qadhafi by talking about steps toward unity + short of full fusion between the two countries.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810009–0992) as indication that GOT is trying to cool atmosphere between two countries. + He sees encouraging signs from Algeria, which he feels is worried + about Libya-Polisario connection and Qadhafi’s idea of sub-Saharan state. Finally, he + noted that though French reaction was initially slow, it has now + become very tough. + + Moving on to Middle East question, Hedda asked whether incoming administration plans + any new initiatives. Draper + again cautioned that the new administration still had to develop + specific policy guidelines. Speaking personally, he anticipated—on + basis of Secretary Haig’s + testimony—that no major new initiatives should be expected until + after Israeli elections,According to a + January 10 New York Times article, during + which he discussed his impending confirmation hearings, + Haig “refused to + discuss future policy in the Middle East, except to say that any + changes in the Camp David agreement had to be the result of + intense consultation.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Haig Stand Reflects + a Fading of Détente,” p. A1) The parliamentary elections in + Israel were scheduled to be held in June. particularly in + view of fact that Sadat + believes he cannot accomplish anything more with Begin’s government. Hedda asked about Jordanian + option.Reference is to the + so-called “Allon Plan” of 1967, which, in the wake of the Six + Day War, proposed a line of fortified Israeli settlements along + the Jordan River and the demilitarization of the remainder of + the West Bank. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. + XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, footnote 4, Document + 213. + Draper said that we were + taking a very cautious and noncommittal stance. It was a sensitive + issue for Hussein. If + it were ever to be explored seriously by any party, this would take + place after Israeli elections and much would depend on relations + between Arafat and King + Hussein. Hedda asked about + rumor he had heard that two very high level U.S. officials would + soon be going to Middle East. Draper said he has heard nothing about such a visit, + which would depend on new Secretary. Speaking as close friend of + Arab League Secretary General Klibi, Hedda + suggested that we build contacts with Arab League. Draper confirmed our great respect + for Klibi and noted that we + do have continuing contact with him, but repeated earlier position + that it would be very difficult for us to receive Klibi in Washington or to arrange + meeting for him with new Secretary. + + Haig +
+
+ 286. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Head of State File, Tunisia: President Bourguiba—Cables. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. + Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + 706. + + Tunis, January 28, 1981, 1332Z + + + + SUBJECT + (U) Letter From President Bourguiba to President Reagan. + + + + (C—Entire text.) + + Ambassador received on evening Jan 27 original copy of a letter + dated Jan 23, addressed to President Reagan from President Bourguiba.Not + found. Following is Embassy’s informal translation of + this letter from French original, which is being pouched to + Department. + + Begin quote: Dear Mr. President: As you begin to take on the high + responsibilities which the American people have entrusted to you, it + is my pleasure to express the best wishes which all friends of the + United States, and particularly Tunisia, extend to you on your + accession to the Presidency of the United States. + + In a world which is more and more threatened by lack of respect + for the principles of law and morality, as well as by the + hegemonistic and expansionist behavior of certain powers—both great + and less great—the role of the United States and of its President + becomes more essential than ever before. + + + I rejoice, in this regard, in the help which the Government of the + United States has extended to Tunisia in support of its efforts to + meet its defense needs. The fact, in particular, that the (FMS) credit proposals which have been + allocated for Tunisia in 1982 are $60 million, even though this + figure is below the levels requested by our country following many a + technical discussion with American experts in this field, + constitutes, in our view, a first response which is both positive + and promising. + + I would have also wished to discuss directly with you the problems + concerning our region, most especially those regarding Tunisian + security as well as the need to strengthen relations between our two + countries. Various reasons, however, due notably to precautions + which my health requires me to take, unfortunately prevent from + realizing this objective in the near future. + + It is for this reason that I would sincerely hope that you might + receive in Washington, as soon as possible, my Prime Minister, Mr. + Mohamed Mzali, who will + share with you Tunisia’s serious concerns regarding both its + security and the future of our region, a region which bridges the + Arab world, Africa and Europe, and whose strategic importance is + known to you. + + Please accept, Mr. President, both my warmest wishes for your + success and the expression of my highest regard. Signed Habib Bourguiba. End quote. + + Comments by septel.In telegram 705 + from Tunis, January 28, Bosworth reported: “I believe it in the US interest to invite Mzali to make a brief working + visit to Washington within the first few months of the new + administration.” Such a visit, Bosworth contended, would “reassure the + Tunisians of our continuing commitment to help Tunisia preserve + its security in the face of the growing threat from Libya.” A + visit would help “Mzali’s efforts to consolidate his position as + Bourguiba’s + successor.” Bosworth + added that while others could also succeed Bourguiba, the Embassy judged + Mzali “would follow + policies that help preserve our long-term interests here.” + Finally, the visit could be “a useful element in an overall + US policy response to the + growing Libyan threat to the stability and security of the + entire region.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) + + Bosworth +
+ +
+ 287. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810182–0823. Secret; Exdis. + + 2854. + + Tunis, April 16, 1981, 1226Z + + +

From General Walters. Subject: + (U) Meetings With Mzali and Belkhodja.

+ + + (S—Entire text). + + On April 14, with Amb Bosworth, I saw Tunisian Foreign Minister Belkhodja + and Prime Minister Mzali. + They were visibly pleased by Secretary’s gesture in sending me to + brief them. + + Both spoke of importance of relationship with the U.S. for Tunisia + and emphasized their country’s exposed position between Algeria and + Libya and its need for assistance. I told them I was going to + AlgeriaSee Document 105. and both felt this was positive + move. They regarded President Chadli and Prime Minister as relative + moderates fighting to prevail over more radical Libyan-influenced + Yahyaoui factions. Belkhodja in particular gave me much advice on + the care, feeding and handling of susceptible Algerians. I believe a + good deal of it was useful. + + Both listened with great interest to my delivery of Secretary + Haig’s messageIn telegram 2853 from Tunis, April 16, + Walters reported on + his April 15 meeting with Bourguiba, during which he delivered to + Bourguiba + Haig’s “message re + US intentions to redress + military balance, stand by its allies, consult and put financial + house in order.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D + number]) No other record of Haig’s message was found. about U.S. and + its intention to strengthen itself and its friends. Both expressed + great concern on Qadhafi’s + antics and regarded him as Soviet instrument rather than Islamic + fanatic. Atmosphere of both meetings was extremely cordial and + friendly throughout. Both asked me to reassure President Bourguiba, who is very concerned + about Qadhafi. This proved to + be an understatement. As between Algerians and Moroccans they were + definitely pro-Moroccan while feeling that my visit to Algeria could + be profitable. + + Both made pitch for grant aid and more generous terms on military + sales. Stated Tunisian military delegation would be in U.S. next + week. + + Mzali stressed need for + continuing U.S. economic assistance as well as military aid. He is + obviously hoping to be invited to the U.S. later this year. + + Bosworth +
+ +
+ 288. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 26, Tunisia. Confidential. Drafted by Colonel Eugene + Fox, U.S. Army, U.S. Military Liaison Office, Tunisia, on May 26. + The meeting took place in the Presidential Palace. + + + Tunis, May 23, 1981, 11 a.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting between Mr. West, + ASD/ISA (designate) and + President Bourguiba + + + ATTENDEES + Amb Bosworth, MOD + Baly, Mr. Habib Bourguiba Jr, LTG Graves, Dr. + Denoon, BG Granger + + + + President Bourguiba opened + by expressing his pleasure that the Sixth Fleet Commander, VADM Small, had invited the TN CNO, + Cpt. Fedilha, to his upcoming Change of Command ceremony. + + President Bourguiba then + recounted in considerable detail (to include readings from a book) + an episode from his life which took place during WW II. At that time + he was incarcerated by the French in Marseilles. He had composed a + letter to Dr. Habib Thameur + (a functionary with the Neo Destourian party) which was smuggled out + of the prison by his son. In the letter, Pres. Bourguiba expressed his strong + conviction that the Allies would win out over the Axis powers and he + directed Dr. Thameur to insure that the party members and supporters + contribute in every way possible to support the Allied cause. Pres. + Bourguiba was + subsequently released by the Germans (specifically by a Klaus Barbi + whom he described as a war criminal) and worked his way back to + Tunisia. By a sheer stroke of luck he avoided being swept up [by] + the Germans as Tunisia fell and was in Tunis when the English + arrived. He then had to convince General Juin, interim Resident + General, that he was indeed on the side of the Allies, one of the + few Arab leaders to be so. + + President Bourguiba then + took the group around his office and showed them various pictures + and mementos to include Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Kennedy, a rock from the moon + as well as a Tunisian flag which had been carried to the moon. He + also discussed a gallery of mug shots of various Tunisian fighters + in the struggle for independence. + + At this point, having clearly established his credentials as a + longtime friend of the West + and especially the US, President + Bourguiba asked what Mr. + West had to tell him. + Mr. West responded by + saying the group was honored that President Bourguiba was meeting with them—that he was one of + the great men of the 20th Century. On behalf of the Secretary of + Defense and the Deputy he wished to convey how strongly we feel our + interests are mutual and that we want to work with Ministry of + Defense at all levels—equipment, exercises, intelligence—in order to + leave no doubt about our intentions. + + President Bourguiba then + launched into a description of the Gafsa incident and Qadhafi’s efforts to destabilize + Tunisia.See footnote 2, Document 107. He said that the + insurgents had been told that they only had to fire one shot and + everyone would join them. Using Soviet arms they killed 45 new + inductees who had just been vaccinated and were in a weakened + condition. President Bourguiba said he himself was in Nefta, a short + distance away, and refused to leave the scene while the emergency + continued. In spite of wild stories on the Libyan radio about other + cities joining, no one did and all the conspirators were caught. + Thirteen were condemned to hang, President Bourguiba refused clemency, and the + sentences were carried out. + + President Bourguiba then + commented that Qadhafi had + gone into Chad.Reference is to Libya’s + 1980 invasion of Chad. He then moved on to the Jerba + AgreementReference is to the + January 1974 Djerba Treaty of Union between Libya and Tunisia. + See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents + on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120. where + he said that, in 1974, Qadhafi had taken advantage of him when he was very + sick and got him to sign a document of unification. However, it was + one of the shortest on record only having lasted 2 hours. He said he + has instructed the Prime Minister that before there will be any + cordial relations between the two countries Qadhafi must return the unification + document and permit joint oil exploitation of the continental shelf. + He closed by saying that Qadhafi is just waiting for him to die and that he + was crazy. He commented that he has as many tanks in Libya as all of + France or maybe Europe. + + Mr. West repeated + Secretary of State Haig’s + statement that the U.S. had no intention of permitting any illegal + interventions.Reference is + presumably to a Haig + statement made during a March 16 interview. In reference to a + question concerning Afghanistan, Haig referenced “ongoing Soviet activity abroad + which is illegal, interventionist, imperialist, and poses a + great threat to international stability and peace.” (Department + of State Bulletin November 1981, pp. + 23–25. He said that the recent expulsion of the so-called + Peoples RepresentativesIn early May, + the United States Government closed Libya’s “People’s Bureau” in + Washington, D.C. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVIII, Libya; Chad. In the fall of 1980, in response + to the possible renewal of a “Libyan assassination campaign” + aimed at Libyan dissident émigrés, in particular the shooting of + a Libyan graduate student in Colorado, the Carter administration asked + the Government of Libya to arrange for the departure of 19 + students and one member of the People’s Bureau from Washington. + (Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, + North Africa, Documents 140–144) was just one step to make it + clear about the unacceptable international conduct of Qadhafi – especially the + exportation of thugs, terrorists, and assassins. He also said it was + the intention of the U.S. to work with friends for peace and + security. + + President Bourguiba said + that Tunisia wants to buy the minimum necessary equipment for its + defense and will pay to the best of its ability. Mr. West said a request for increased + credits had already been sent to Congress.No record of the request has been found. + President Bourguiba indicated + that at the time of Gafsa that President Carter had sent APCs and Congress + sent a telegram of support.See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North + Africa, Document 205. He added that he wanted + to leave the Tunisian people what they need so they could fight for + themselves. Mr. West said + he expected that Bourguiba + and Reagan would be + exchanging telegrams 7 or 8 years from now and then added that the + prosperity of the people versus defense needs was worldwide—a U.S. + problem to help solve. President Bourguiba then said that Prime Minister Mzali and Bourguiba, Jr. would be coming to + the States and he hoped that an agreement on defense requirements + could be signed then.An unknown hand + drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this + sentence. + + Mr. West said he would + try. He continued by noting that President Bourguiba had mentioned support + from other countries—particularly Saudi Arabia. This was good news + because it was obvious that Qadhafi was a threat to many countries. On the + subject of an economic plan for equipment he said he wanted to + discuss it with MOD along with + other means of signaling our intentions. + + President Bourguiba closed + by saying that the Sixth Fleet was welcome to Tunisia wherever and + whenever it pleased. He also emphasized that he now felt more at + ease now having heard the reassurances of U.S. support. + + President Bourguiba at this + point presented the Order of the Republic (Grand Officer) to Mr. + West and the Order of + the Republic (Commander) to LTG Graves. + + Eugene A. Fox + + Colonel, U.S. Army + + Chief, USLOT + +

NOTE: A short press interview was held at the end of the meeting. Mr. + West said he was + heading a group from DOD for two + days of mutual security discussions. The first meeting was with + President Bourguiba, whom he + found in excellent health. President Bourguiba had discussed his close relations with the U.S. from WW II + to day. Mr. West said there + had been a cordial, frank exchange of views.

+ +
+
+ 289. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Clark to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Agency File, + Secretary Haig’s Evening + Report (10/02/1981–10/28/1981). Secret. Clark was acting for + Haig who was en route + to Cairo to attend Sadat’s + funeral. + + + Washington, October 8, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

2. Meetings with Foreign Ministers of Morocco and + Tunisia. Al Haig met + with the Foreign Minister of Morocco last nightSee Document 196. + and the Foreign Minister of Tunisia early this morning.A record of the Haig-Bourguiba meeting is in + telegram 277315 to Tunis, October 17. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810491–0324) Both + expressed profound regret at the loss of Sadat,See footnote 3, Document 196. and + deep concern about the stability of the Middle East in the aftermath of + the tragedy. Both offered to work closely with us.

+

The Tunisians urgently appealed for improved military assistance on the + basis that while threats to Tunisia are now greater, it cannot abandon + domestic economic and social progress to improve its military + capability.An unknown hand wrote: “?” + and a checkmark in the margin above this sentence. They also + pleaded that we seek prompt Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, perhaps + ahead of schedule. This would constitute an early, positive success for + Mubarak and help him + stabilize fragile Egyptian domestic and external political positions. + (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 290. Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Military CommissionSource: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. + Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1981. Secret. Printed from a + translation, dated November 13, prepared in the Division of Language + Services, Department of State. All Annexes are attached but not + printed. + + + Tunis, November 9–10, 1981 + + +

Minutes of the Meetings of the + Tunisian–American Joint Military Committee, Tunis, November 9–10, + 1981

+

The Tunisian-American Joint Military Committee, organized within the + framework of the friendly relations existing between Tunisia and the + United States for the purpose of promoting military cooperation, met at + the Ministry of National Defense in Tunis, November 9–10, 1981, under + the chairmanship of Mr. Slaheddine + Baly, Minister of National Defense of the Republic of + Tunisia, and Mr. Francis J. + West, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International + Security Affairs).

+

The following members of the Tunisian and American delegations were + present:

+

[Omitted here is the list of participants.]

+

After the opening session, the work of the committee was conducted in + four subcommittees, as follows: first subcommittee on intelligence; + second subcommittee on assistance; third subcommittee on combined + exercises; fourth subcommittee on training. The membership of the + subcommittees is given in Annex 1; the subcommittee minutes are found in + Annex 2.

+

The minutes of the opening and closing sessions of the committee are + given below.

+

Monday, November 9, 1981, 12:10 + p.m.

+

I. Opening Session

+

Welcoming remarks by Defense Minister Baly

+

Mr. West and I take pleasure in + opening the working session of the Tunisian-American Joint Military + Committee. The committee was organized to promote military cooperation + on a privileged basis between the United States and the Republic of + Tunisia. I hope that it will be able to enhance already existing + cooperation, under the direction of the Liaison Office, in the areas of + training, combined exercises, intelligence exchanges, and security + assistance. The competence and ability of the participants will + guarantee the successful outcome of the committee’s work.

+ +

President Bourguiba is determined + to equip the Tunisian armed forces to carry out their mission. The + President of the Republic has met with Assistant Secretary West and discussed his concerns with + him.See Document + 288. The present situation in the region, the drift + towards destabilization, and the deliberately hostile posture of Colonel + Qaddhafi are cause for concern by both Tunisians and Americans.

+

The Minister explained the program to equip the armed forces, and noted + that Tunisia has decided to procure materiel from the United States + because of its privileged relationship with that country.

+

President Bourguiba has discussed + his interest in modernizing the armed forces with Mr. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Assistant Secretary West, and Senator Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Services + Committee.

+

The sizeable 1982 FMS [Foreign Military + Sales]Brackets are in the + original. credit is indicative of United States concern with + respect to Tunisia. Nevertheless, the terms of repayment are too severe + for the Tunisian budget, with a 13% interest rate and relatively short + payment periods.

+

The procurement program includes 2–C130 transports, 1 squadron of F–5 + interceptors; 54 M60–A3 tanks; 19 155 mm self-propelling guns; 300 + Chaparral-F missiles; 65 TOW night + vision devices; and various types of ammunition. The program should take + into account a supplementary request for the procurement of a second + squadron of interceptors.

+

The delivery times for this equipment are inconsistent with the urgency + and imminence of the threat. I therefore request the United States + Government to reconsider its position and to shorten delivery times as + much as possible.

+

I should like to point out to Mr. West and the Committee members the Tunisian request to + acquire military equipment (other than that procured on a payment basis) + on a grant or lend-lease basis.

+

Mr. West

+

The Assistant Secretary of Defense thanked Minister Baly for his kind welcome and + clear-sighted remarks. Secretary Haig and Secretary Weinberger are aware of the potential threat to Tunisia + and welcome the formation of the Joint Military Committee, which is not + meant to interfere with the excellent work being carried out by the + Ministry of National Defense and the Liaison Office; its true value lies + in what can be learned from that collaboration.

+ +

II. Comments of Major + General Balma on the threat from the southeast:

+ + + Introduction on Libya. + + Tunisian relations with Libya. + + The threat of subversion. + + The threat of military aggression. + +

See text in Annex III.

+

Mr. West

+

Commenting on this report, the Assistant Secretary of Defense noted that + the United States is aware of the threat posed by Libya, acting with + Soviet and Cuban support. The Aden pact,Reference is to the treaty signed in August among Libya, South + Yemen, and Ethiopia. Documentation on the treaty is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East + Region; Arabian Peninsula. the recent assault on + Guelta Zemmour by the Polisario forces,Reference is to the October 13 battle between Moroccan and + Polisario forces. See Document 386. + Libyan provocations in the Sudan,An unknown + hand wrote: “Sudan.” Documentation is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. the weakening of Somalia, and the fighting + between North and South Yemen are matters of concern. Americans rely on + the efforts of their friends to counter this subversive offensive, have + over the past two years helped identify the Libyan threat, share the + same anxieties, and hope to consolidate efforts against any future + threats through cooperation in the area of intelligence.

+

Mr. Baly

+

Concurrence in the analysis of the threat. Qaddhafi’s avowed and + persistent hostility towards the Tunisian regime poses serious problems + and constitutes a threat that one should guard against. Qaddhafi has + stated publicly that the Libyan and Tunisian regimes cannot coexist and + that the latter regime must disappear. Tunisia, with its geographic + situation and its position in the forefront of the free world, is + threatened. The plan of the Soviet Union, with Qaddhafi as its executing + agent, constitutes a threat to the southern flank of NATO as well. The foothold being gained + by Soviet power in Libya and the presence of the Soviet fleet in the + Mediterranean is part of a general framework of penetration of Europe + and other areas. Strong, well-equipped Tunisian armed forces can take + part not merely in the defense of Tunisia but in that of the free world + as well, thanks to the assistance of a friendly nation such as the + United States.

+ +

Mr. West

+

Assistant Secretary of Defense West again thanked the Minister for his detailed + presentation on the threat to Tunisia, which the United States regards + as serious, and expressed certainty that a solution will be found to the + danger posed by Libya and the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The + identical viewpoints of the Americans and the Tunisians will allow the + subcommittee talks to begin in a relaxed atmosphere.

+

III. Presentation of the + procurement plans of the Tunisian Army by Brigadier General Gzara.

+ + + Plan for modernization of army units. + + Proposed procurement from the United States. + + Minimum equipment necessary for the Armed Forces. + +

IV. American assistance and + the status of FMS credits, presented by + Mr. Rudd.

+ + + Materiel already received under FMS credits. + + Outline of the IMET training + program. + + Status of FMS contracts with the + Ministry of National Defense. + + Scheduled delivery of materials already procured. + + Status of the 1982 FMS + credit. + + Payment period for proposed procurement. + + Delivery schedules for future procurement. + +

The work was continued in separate subcommittee meetings at the end of + the first session of the committee.

+

November 10, 1981

+

The Committee met at 4 p.m., in a closing session to review the work of + the subcommittees.

+

I. Reports by the + subcommittee chairmen.

+ + + Subcommittee on Intelligence: Major Gen. Balma. + + Perception of the Libyan threat: logical, plausible, and + real. + + Means taken and to be taken to warn of an attack. + + Reaction resources. + + +

See Annex II–1.

+ + + Subcommittee on Combined Exercises: Brig. Gen. Gzara. + + PHIBLEX series exercise. + + SAHEL series exercise. + + Practice gunnery at Ras Engelah and Cap Serrat. + + Low-altitude instrument navigation. + + Special Forces mobile training team. + + +

See Annex II–3.

+ +

General Lutz

+ + + Possibility of reducing the number of Special Forces mobile + training team instructors as well as the duration of the exercise by + combining the third phase into one maneuver and using Tunisian + instructors. + + Housing and transport expenses to be assumed by the Ministry of + National Defense. + +

Minister of National Defense

+ + + A priori agreement on the proposals. + + + + Subcommittee on Assistance: + Col. Machta + + Timetable of the plan of development decided on. + + FMS credits anticipated + for 1982–1983. + + Amendment of the tenders on the M60–A3 tanks and the M109 + guns in connection with the addition of the required + equipment. + + Logistical support for materiel already deployed. + + Financing of proposed procurements. + + +

See Annex II–2.

+

Mr. West

+ + + A comprehensive five-year program is a logical approach. + + It would be best to plan on the basis of a $95 million credit for + 1982 with the hope of having it increased later. + + + + Subcommittee on Training: Colonel Barkett + + Distribution of the 1982 IMET budget. + + Stay of the Special Forces mobile training team. + + Programming of the 1983 courses of instruction on the + basis of a package of between $0.7 and $1.5 million. + + Written materials from American schools. + + +

See Annex II.4.

+

General Secord

+ + + It would be beneficial to make full use of the American Liaison + Office. + + Consider the possibility of officer exchanges in the Tunisian and + American Liaison Offices. + +

Mr. Baly

+

In my view, the work of the Joint Military Committee has produced + positive results. This meeting was necessary for a number of reasons. It + was a demonstration of mutual trust and esteem and an attempt to attain + the objectives of both governments. All problems were aired, including + ones that cannot be dealt with publicly. The Americans were apprised of the current situation of + the Tunisian army, learned of conditions in the Sahara where units led + by young officers trained in the United States are stationed, were able + to assess the armament of the Tunisian army and its forward positions + opposite a very active, aggressively-inclined neighbor. The atmosphere + in which the meetings took place showed the special relationship between + our two countries. Tunisians would rather have had economic, political, + and diplomatic relations only; however, the current situation, the + presence of the USSR, and the wave of + destabilization throughout the world and in the North African region has + forced us to look to a longstanding friend for military cooperation. The + fundamental options of Tunisia are well-known. Its people’s love of + peace is matched by the commitment to their independence, well-being and + sovereignty. They are proud of these qualities and determined to defend + their interests.

+

Mr. West

+

The Assistant Secretary of Defense thanked the Minister for his + hospitality and said he looked forward to working with him in the future + and to welcoming him to Washington for the next meeting of the + Committee.

+
+
+ 291. Defense Estimative Brief Prepared in the Defense Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 26, Tunisia. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. [1 line not declassified]. A stamped notation indicates + that it was received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on + December 17 at 12:08 p.m. + + DEB–118–81 + + Washington, November 12, 1981 + + +

Defense Estimative Brief: Tunisia (U)

+

(U) Summary

+

(S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Tunisia’s aging President Bourguiba, who has maintained tight control over the + country’s political life, is expected to pass from the scene within the + next few years, and a struggle for power within Tunisia’s predominant + political party is likely. Additionally, there are serious socioeconomic + problems—especially the alienation of Tunisia’s youth—that provide + fertile ground for political exploitation, particularly by Libyan + President Qadhafi and Islamic fundamentalists. + Tunisia will continue to rely on close relations with its two principal + Western friends, France and the United States, while also strengthening + relations with Algeria as a counter to the Libyan threat. The key to + domestic security will be the loyalty of the Armed Forces, which seems + assured; however, care will be required in dealing with them to avoid + politicizing their ranks and to retain the Government’s legitimacy in + the eyes of Tunisians. The continued expansion and modernization of + Tunisia’s Armed Forces will enhance their effectiveness but fall short + of providing the capability of countering aggression by Libya. Overall, + we expect Tunisia to face serious challenges over the next several + years, but we believe the country will overcome them.

+ + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Political Situation. Tunisia’s aging and + chronically ill President Habib + Bourguiba will likely pass from power within the next + few years. Although he periodically displays remarkable vigor, + stamina, and activity for an octogenarian, Bourguiba suffers from senility. + Nonetheless, Bourguiba is + likely to continue to maintain control over Tunisia’s political + system through his well-organized Destourian Socialist Party for as + long as his faculties permit. Although the President has placed + Prime Minister Mzali in a + position to succeed him, many conservatives in the party hierarchy + are not fully reconciled to Mzali’s liberal views. Mzali has appointed men he trusts to key positions + in the Government and party; however, if Bourguiba does not actively back him or if his + liberal policies meet setbacks, opportunists like former Party + Director Mohamed Sayah will attempt to unseat the Prime Minister. + Considering the many socioeconomic challenges facing Tunisia, it is + likely that, without Bourguiba, Mzali’s position will be threatened by factions + within the ruling party, as well as by Libyan President Qadhafi’s meddling in Tunisian + affairs. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + The first “contested” election in Tunisia’s history, conducted on 1 + November 1981, was characterized by intimidation of the opposition, + claims of election irregularities, and a complete sweep of all seats + by the regime’s candidates. This will undermine the credibility of + the step-by-step liberalization process that Mzali has hoped would serve to + bridge the gap between the ruling establishment and the disaffected + younger generation. Although the three groups which challenged the + ruling Destourian Socialist Party have some hope of continued + legitimate participation in the Tunisian system, the Islamic right + was excluded from the election and has little prospect of sanctioned + participation in the political process during the Bourguiba era. The strongly secular + regime will likely continue to be intolerant of Islamic + fundamentalists despite their increasing number and influence. + Tunisia’s fundamentalists are not likely to develop sufficient + strength to successfully challenge the regime in the near term, although the movement will + appeal to elements of Tunisia’s alienated youth, poor, and + traditionalists. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Economic. The Tunisian economy continues + to grow at a fast rate (7.3 percent real GNP growth in 1980), but + there are several troubling trends that threaten not only future + growth but the relatively high standard of living and social + stability that Tunisia has enjoyed since gaining independence. + Tunisia will be faced with growing stagnation in the agricultural + sector, declining petroleum production (and revenues), growing + unemployment, and increasing requirements for defense spending in + the eighties. As a result, Tunis will find it impossible to fund + social programs at current levels, create sufficient jobs, and + maintain adequate foreign reserves. The best, although unlikely, + prospect for continuing the rapid rate of economic growth lies in + the discovery of significant new oil reserves. In addition to + petroleum and agriculture, the health of the Tunisian economy is + also dependent on foreign investment, tourism, remittances from + workers abroad, and foreign aid, as well as effective government + control over the economy. Serious problems in one or more of these + areas could stall Tunisia’s economic growth entirely. Accustomed to + a relatively high standard of living, well educated Tunisians have + developed rising expectations, which are likely to be frustrated by + an economic downturn. Such a recession could lead to social unrest + with significant political implications. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Foreign Policy. Tunisia’s moderate, + pro-Western foreign policies contrast with those of Libya, which + will remain Tunisia’s primary external threat as long as Qadhafi is in control. Friction + between the two began to emerge following Tunis’ abrogation of the + 1974 Tunisia-Libya merger accord.See + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents + on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120. + Differences over both ideology and exploitation of offshore oil will + continue to sour their relations despite superficial improvement + from time to time. Libyan orchestration of the aborted rebellion in + the Tunisian town of Gafsa in January 1980See Document + 288. and apparent Libyan involvement in Tunisian + student disorders in February 1981Not + further identified. reflect the Libyan goal of + destabilizing Tunisia. Qadhafi’s increasing suspicion of neighboring + countries with strong Western ties and his messianic drive for a + pan-Islamic state under Libyan leadership bode ill for Tunisia. To + counterbalance Libya, Tunisia will continue to develop a security + relationship with Algeria and to rely upon France and the United + States for military assistance. Frequent French and US naval visits to Tunisia’s major + ports give substance and visibility to these relations. While the + Tunisians have allowed + Soviet naval units limited use of local ship repair facilities, + suspicion of Moscow will restrict Soviet-Tunisian relations during + the next few years. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Officially, Tunis will remain hostile to Israel and sympathetic to + the Palestinians, but in the event of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli + settlement Tunisia would have little difficulty accepting a + permanent Israeli presence in the Middle East. Although Tunisia + broke relations with Egypt over the Camp David Accords and now + provides the headquarters and president for the Arab League, Tunis + will continue to maintain close unofficial ties with Cairo, in large + part as a deterrent to Libyan adventurism. Tunis will also seek to + maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan + while not alienating any of the radical Arab states. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Military. Tunisia’s Western-equipped and + -trained Armed Forces will remain too small to effectively deter or + counter the military threat posed by Libya despite efforts to expand + their size and upgrade the quality of their weaponry. Since the + Libyan-backed trouble at Gafsa in 1980, Tunisia has become + increasingly aware of the inability of its poorly equipped + 25,000-man Armed Forces to defend against potential threats. + Significant increases in US military + assistance, together with an expanded indigenous effort, will lead + to substantial improvement in Tunisia’s military potential. Obsolete + and often non-operational systems, such as the M41 light tank or the + F–86 fighter, are being replaced with more modern systems, such as + the M60 medium tank and the F–5 aircraft. Also, continued receipt of + new systems, such as Chaparral and TOW, will provide Tunisia with new air defense and + anti-armor capabilities. At best, however, force modernization and + expansion efforts will only enable the Tunisians to field a force + capable of delaying a Libyan attack long enough for French or US assistance to arrive. In fact, the + Tunisians will want to avoid creating a force strong enough to + provoke their larger neighbors. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + The Armed Forces are expected to remain apolitical and loyal to the + Tunisian political system. In the event of a serious succession + crisis following Bourguiba’s + departure from the scene, the Armed Forces would attempt to remain + uninvolved. Should serious social disturbances break out, the Army + would obey orders to restore calm. + + (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) + Morale problems caused by low pay and inadequate benefits, cronyism, + poor leadership, a lack of modern weaponry and a general feeling of + neglect will continue to characterize officer and enlisted personnel + at all levels. The morale problem is particularly severe in the Air + Force where pilots have resigned in large numbers, thereby raising + the spectre of not having the necessary pilots to man the + US-supplied F–5s when they arrive in the first half of 1984. Although poor morale will + continue to undermine efforts to build up Tunisia’s military + capabilities, it is not likely to be sufficiently serious to provoke + coup plotting among the Armed Forces. + +
+
+ 292. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (01/05/1982–01/29/1982). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation + reads: “White House Situation Room,” and indicates that it was + received in the White House Situation Room at 11:02 p.m. Stoessel was acting for Haig, who was in Jerusalem to + discuss the Egyptian-Israeli peace process with Begin. + + + Washington, January 28, 1982 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

2. Courtesy Call on President Bourguiba of Tunisia. Together + with General Dick Walters, I + made a call today on President Habib + Bourguiba of Tunisia and his Foreign Minister, Caid Essebsi.A record of the conversation is in telegram 25913 + to Tunis, January 30, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820053–0876) The + President has been in Washington and Philadelphia to obtain medical + treatment.In telegram 187 from Tunis, + January 11, the Embassy reported: “It has just been announced in a + communiqué from the Office of the President signed by two physicians + that President Bourguiba is + ill and is to go abroad for treatment.” His ailments included “a gum + infection and a partial paralysis of the right arm.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820016–0138) He is still so incapacitated by his ailments + that we could not have a substantive discussion. Bourguiba said he would soon return to + Tunisia because of the pain he was suffering in his mouth and arm. I + assume that he will not be able to stay for the meeting you have + tentatively planned with him on February 10 (we will confirm this). + Foreign Minister Essebsi + afterward discussed Tunisia’s continuing wariness of Qadhafi. He made an anguished plea for + concessional terms for Foreign Military Sales this year, placed in the + context of Tunisia’s need for defense against Libya.

+
+ +
+ 293. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Bremer) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. + Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 (February–March 1982). + Confidential. + + + Washington, March 30, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Objectives For the Working Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister + Mzali + +

We propose the following objectives for the working visit of the Tunisian + Prime Minister in late April:

+

1. Reaffirm our traditional + friendship for Tunisia and President Bourguiba.

+

President Bourguiba led Tunisia to + independence in 1956 and has dominated it ever since. His personal + friendship for the U.S. is largely responsible for Tunisia’s openness to + us and the anti-Soviet cast of its foreign policy. The aging President + is trying to link his country’s destiny to that of the U.S. before he + passes away.

+

2. Reaffirm our Support for + Tunisia’s economic, social, and political development.

+

Tunisia has had dramatic success in improving the economic and social lot + of its people since independence in 1956. The Tunisian government is + very concerned that it not have to divert resources from economic to + military purposes before the economy has found a stable footing. The + US has contributed about $1 billion + to economic development since 1956, and is extending $10 million of + PL 480 Title ITitle I refers to concessional sales of + agricultural commodities in U.S. dollars with a generous repayment + scheme. in FY 82. Development + projects will also continue for several years, although new + appropriations ceased in FY 81. + Mzali was the architect of + elections held last November in which opposition groups were allowed to + participate for the first time since independence in 1956.

+

3. Reaffirm our support for + Tunisia’s security.

+

Relations with Libya deteriorated after an abortive declaration of unity + in 1974.See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents on North + Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120. In 1980, Tunisians + trained and backed by Libya attacked the Tunisian city of Gafsa.See footnote 2, + Document 288. + Qadhafi made a state visit to + Tunisia in February 1982, + resulting in limited rapprochement.Reference is to anti-Israel movement created by the PLO, Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Yemen + in 1977 after Egyptian President Anwar + Sadat’s visit to Israel. The Front also rejected + UNSC Resolutions 242 and + 338. The Tunisians nevertheless remain wary of Qadhafi and are continuing to build up + their neglected military defense. The U.S. formed a Joint Military + Commission with Tunisia last year and is extending $85 million in + Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to + Tunisia in FY 82.

+

4. Encourage Tunisia to + continue working for moderation in the Arab-Israeli imbroglio.

+

Although voting with the Arab bloc in Arab-Israeli matters, Tunisia plays + a moderating role behind the scenes within the bloc. It was an early + advocate of recognizing Israel’s right to exist and it refuses to attend + the meetings of the extremist Steadfastness Front.In telegram 2269 from Tunis, March 25, the Embassy + informed the Department that the Tunisian Government had instructed + its Ambassador in New Delhi to register its reservation to the + Puerto Rican portion of the communiqué issued by the NAM at its Ministerial Conference in + New Delhi. The communiqué called for Puerto Rican self-determination + and independence from the United States. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810141–0657) Privately, Tunisia welcomed Sadat’s initiative to bring peace to + the Middle East. As the provisional seat of the Arab League, Tunisia is + in a position to exert a moderating influence out of proportion to its + small size.

+

5. Encourage Tunisia to + continue its moderation in the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, + the OAU, and other international + forums.

+

Tunisia is one of the more temperate non-aligned countries. It was of + great help to us during its term on the UN Security Council in 1980 and 1981. It cast the decisive + vote for sanctions against Iran during the hostage crisis and voted to + condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example. Last year it + entered a reservation to the unhelpful Non-Aligned declaration on Puerto + Rico and did not participate in the drafting of the hostile UN communique of the Non-Aligned + Movement.In telegram 4615 from the + USUN, December 11, 1981, the + Mission reported that Tunisia, along with 15 other nations, had + voted against a “tendentious draft” NAM communiqué “on ‘threats’ to Nicaragua” from the + United States. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810601–0309, D810589–0120) We expect + Tunisia to be helpful in managing the planning for the OAU Summit in Tripoli, and will want to + consult closely with Mzali on + this issue.

+ L. Paul + Bremer, IIIDeputy Executive Secretary Alvin Adams signed for Bremer above this typed + signature. + + Executive Secretary +
+ +
+ 294. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, + Job 83M00035R, Box 17, C–384, Tunisia. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Prepared in the + Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near East/South + Asia Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, using information + available as of April 23. + + NESA M#82–10152 + + Washington, April 23, 1982 + + +

TUNISIAN PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION [portion + marking not declassified]

+

Summary

+

Tunisia’s aging President Habib + Bourguiba is spending less time directing policy, + although he continues to dominate it. Bourguiba’s wife Wassila and various ministers, + including Habib Bourguiba, Jr., + will continue to compete with Prime Minister Mzali for power and influence in the period preceding + Bourguiba’s departure.In telegram 2752 from Tunis, April 8, the + Embassy reported: “Although the Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali has had his ups and + downs, the regime is probably stronger now than when he took office + two years ago. He has been the prime force behind Tunisia’s process + of political liberalization.” The Embassy continued: “Despite their + somewhat ambivalent relationship, Mzali retains Bourguiba’s support as the best qualified Tunisian + to lead the country once Bourguiba’s rule ends.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820186–0124) Although these individuals exert varying + degrees of influence, [3 lines not declassified]. + The resulting inconsistencies have encouraged a government of sycophants + and have alienated labor and political opposition groups seeking reform. + [less than 1 line not declassified] the + slogans of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party are seen as + increasingly irrelevant by Tunisia’s youthful population. [portion marking not declassified]

+

When Bourguiba departs the scene, + the Prime Minister, currently Mohamed + Mzali, is the constitutionally designated successor for + the remainder of the current National Assembly term which runs to + November 1986. The timing of the succession will be a crucial factor in + Mzali’s ability to + consolidate his position and to win his first presidential election. + Mzali’s success in gaining + support and respect from the ruling party, labor, and opposition groups + will determine the duration of his time in office. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Although Tunisia’s military expenditures are increasing, the military + remains small and apolitical. It will probably be loyal to any legal + successor. Widespread popular revolt is also unlikely. [portion marking not declassified]

+ +

Tunisian foreign relations under Mzali would emphasize the country’s nonaligned and + pro-Arab status. Neither Mzali + nor other presidential contenders would align Tunisia with the USSR. Tunisia almost certainly will + continue to look to the US and Western + Europe for military support and economic investment. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+
+ 295. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, PM + Mzali, 04/29/82 + (04/03/1982–04/23/1982). Secret. Copies were sent to Haig and Clark. The date of the + memorandum is in error; [less than 1 line not + declassified]. + + + Washington, April 28, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed Mzali + + + + I met todayA record of the meeting is + in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 83M00035R: Box 17, C–384, + Tunisia. [1 line not declassified] + who was somewhat apprehensive about the outcome of the visit of + Prime Minister Mzali. + Basically, it appears that there is a group of Tunisian Ministers + who favor closer ties with Libya, as opposed to Prime Minister + Mzali, and who would like + to see the Mzali visit to + Washington be something less than a success in the eyes of President + Bourguiba. + + [1 paragraph (11 lines) not + declassified] + + What is important here [less than 1 line not + declassified] and I understand that this coincides with + U.S. views and objectives, is that Bourguiba perceives the Mzali visit as a success. [less + than 3 lines not declassified] you may be able to solidify + Mzali’s position through + a private letter from you to Bourguiba, and allow Mzali to carry this letter back to his + President.See Document 298. [less than 1 + line not declassified] such a letter should simply contain + a reaffirmation of your support for the Bourguiba regime and a statement indicating that it + is now clear to you that Bourguiba was wise to select Mzali as the man to implement his, + Bourguiba’s, + principles. + + William J. + CaseyCasey signed “WJ Casey” above this typed + signature. + + Director of Central + Intelligence +
+ +
+ 296. Memorandum From Raymond + Tanter of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Africa, Tunisia (04/28/1982–04/29/1982). Confidential. Sent for + action. A copy was sent to Tyson. Wheeler initialed the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + + + Washington, April 28, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Memcon of Weinberger + Meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali on April 27, 1982 + +

At Tab A is a memorandum of conversation from the Secretary of Defense + regarding his meeting with Prime Minister Mzali of Tunisia.

+

A key point in the memorandum concerns Foreign Military Sales credits. + The Administration has requested $140M for FY–83, half of which would be on favorable (concessional) + terms, i.e., at interest rates lower than commercial rates. I believe + that the Administration should push very hard to obtain favorable rates + for the Tunisians.

+

The Tunisians, however, should not be given the impression that Congress + will approve the $140M request nor the proposal for $70M on concessional + terms. Indeed, State informally has indicated to the working level + Tunisians that they should anticipate receiving only about $85M instead + of $140M.

+

The Secretary of Defense’s memo states that the Tunisians: “hope that in + addition to the $70 million in FMS, the + other $70 million could be provided ‘as you do for Israel’ (i.e., + forgiven). Secretary Weinberger + said that ‘essentially, this is the formula we are urging on the + Congress.’ We hope Congress will approve this, but we cannot make such a + promise.”

+

Unfortunately, this exchange suggests that the Administration is + requesting that $70M be forgiven, which is not true. To clear up this + confusion, I suggest that Michael + Wheeler send to State a copy of the Secretary of + Defense’s memcon and let State straighten out this matter. Otherwise, + the Tunisians will go into the meeting with the President with the false + idea that the Administration has asked for the Congress to approve $70M + in forgiveness for the Tunisians.

+

Another issue is the Tunisian request to seek another U.S. Navy ship of + similar displacement to the current Tunisian flagship. The Prime + Minister will be raising this issue directly with the President.Mzali + did not raise the issue of the Tunisian flagship during his meeting + with Reagan. See Document 297. The Navy has advised + the Secretary that no ship is presently available for transfer. The Secretary promised to see + if anything suitable can be found and said he will have further + information before the Prime Minister meets with the President on + Thursday, April 29. The Secretary will send under separate cover a paper + addressing the request for another flagship.Not found.

+

Chris Shoemaker concurs.

+

Recommendation

+

That Michael Wheeler send a copy + of the Secretary of Defense’s Memcon to State.Poindexter + approved the recommendation for Clark. Tab I, a memorandum from + Wheeler to Bremer, is not + attached.

+ + Tab A + Memorandum of ConversationSecret. + Drafted by James Woods, + (DOD/ISA); approved by + Weinberger. The + meeting took place at Blair House. Also sent under an April 28 + covering memorandum from Weinberger to Clark. + + + Washington, April 27, 1982, 11:30 + a.m.–1:40 p.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting between Secretary Weinberger and Prime Minister Mzali of Tunisia (U) + + + Principal Participants + + US + Caspar W. + Weinberger, Secretary of Defense + Ambassador Walter + Cutler, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia + MG Carl Smith, Military Assistant to the Secretary of + Defense + Mr. James + Woods, Director, Africa Region, ISA (Notetaker) + Mr. Alec Toumayan, Dept of State (Interpreter) + + + Tunisia + Mohamed Mzali, + Prime Minister + Slaheddine + Baly, Minister of Defense + Mahmoud + Mestiri, Secretary General, Ministry of + Foreign Affairs + Habib Ben + Yahia, Tunisian Ambassador to the + U.S. + Colonel Mokhtar Gmati, Military Attache + Colonel Brahim Boudabous, Chief, Liaison Bureau, + MOD + + +

(U) Prime Minister Mzali opened the meeting by noting + Minister of Defense Baly’s + invitation to Secretary Weinberger to visit Tunisia. Secretary Weinberger said that he had not + thus far had the opportunity to visit Tunisia but would very much + like to do so. The Prime Minister said “You will be most + welcome.”

+

(C) Secretary Weinberger noted that Tunisia + occupies a strategic and important location and that the U.S. is + very conscious of this. Prime Minister Mzali responded that Tunisia has noticed with + pleasure an “increasing + interest” on the part of the Government of the U.S. in Tunisia, + especially since President Reagan came into office. The Tunisian people and + President Bourguiba + personally are very grateful for this. Secretary Weinberger said that this was a + very correct perception and that President Reagan is a great admirer of + President Bourguiba. The U.S. + appreciates Tunisia’s importance and its support, in the UN and elsewhere, of the same + principles as the U.S. President Reagan is looking forward to meeting the Prime + Minister, he emphasized.

+

(C) President Bourguiba’s attitude is not + dictated by events, but is a constant attitude based on principle, + the Prime Minister said. President Bourguiba has always supported and been supported by + the United States, since independence. Tunisia would always be on + the side of the West and of the United States, and attached to peace + and freedom. Tunisia would never attack the United States, like some + states which regrettably find it “fashionable” to do so. Secretary + Weinberger said that + the U.S., and President Reagan personally, were quite aware and appreciative + of this. We are, in turn, anxious to be as helpful as we can. We are + happy to have been able to provide more FMS credits in FY82 and want to do much more in the + future. But to do so we must first persuade Congress. I have had + very fine reports on Tunisia from Mr. Carlucci and Mr. West following their visits + there,For West’s conversation with + Bourguiba, see Document 288. Records of West’s May 23 and 24, 1981, + conversations with Mzali + and at the Ministry of Defense, respectively, as well as + Carlucci’s July + 14, 1981, conversation with Guiga, are in Washington National + Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 + Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and + Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the + Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 26, + Tunisia. said the Secretary, and these only add to my + desire to visit Tunisia myself; I hope that I can therefore accept + Minister Baly’s kind + invitation soon.

+

(C) Prime Minister Mzali then explained that Tunisia + has, since independence, devoted the bulk of its resources to + development—health, education, etc. Over 40% of the Tunisian + national budget goes to development. Tunisia had not emphasized + defense, but the Libyan-inspired attack on Gafsa (January 1980)See footnote 2, + Document 288. reminded Tunisia that an + effective military force was needed as a deterrent. But military + equipment is very expensive, and while Tunisia must do more for its + military it cannot thereby jeopardize its commitment to development. + In this light, “we appreciate your credits very much, but the terms + are heavy, and we hope they can be made lighter in the future.”

+

(C) Secretary Weinberger said that the U.S. + understood that good social conditions make for good soldiers; + however, it is also true that we must maintain our deterrence + against mischief-makers like Libya and the Soviet Union. The terms + of FMS are a disappointment to many + countries. We are seeking + in FY83 to make a larger part of the program concessional, with much + better terms. But the Congress is not yet fully persuaded. We are + glad that FY82 is at $85 million and hope we will get our full $140 + million in FY83, as requested; we “know it will go to a good + cause.”

+

(C) Prime Minister Mzali responded that, with respect + to FY83, they are interested both in the proposed increase in volume + (to $140 million) and in improving the terms, since “current terms + are draconian.” They hope that in addition to the $70 million in + FMS, the other $70 million + could be provided “as you do for Israel” (i.e., forgiven). Secretary + Weinberger said that + “essentially, this is the formula we are urging on the Congress.” We + hope Congress will approve this, but we cannot make such a + promise.

+

(S) Prime Minister Mzali said this was all the more + urgent since “our Saudi friends, on whom we count so heavily, have + not given us an answer on more help.” He had talked with Prince Fahd + after the Gafsa incident, and Fahd had promised $500 million in + financial support for military purchases. $50 million was provided + soon after, but nothing for the past two years. Prince Fahd is + “personally benevolent” and says that the security of Tunisia is + closely linked to the security of Saudi Arabia, but “we see slowness + in their responding to our request which is, after all, only a drop + in the ocean to them.” The Prime Minister said he had discussed this + problem previously with Mr. Carlucci and with Mr. West and now wanted to discuss it personally with + Secretary Weinberger.

+

(S) Secretary Weinberger noted that, + unfortunately, the situation described was becoming typical of the + Saudis with respect to several countries. We will, he said, + encourage them to fulfill their plans to support your country. We + hope too that they will find persuasive the arguments we make with + our own Congress, in seeking higher support for your program.

+

(S) Prime Minister Mzali said that he wanted to give + an example of how the Tunisian development effort is linked to + defense. Our main enemy is unemployment, he said. After the recent + visit by Colonel Qadhafi, + Tunisia reopened its border with Libya.See Document 13. In one month, + 34,000 young Tunisians crossed into Libya in search of jobs. So + countries like Libya will receive our youth, and train and arm some + of them and send them back by infiltration. This, not tanks and + missiles, is our main threat. For example, only last month, we + picked up seven young Tunisians who reentered from Algeria, after + military training in Libya. So our main problem is subversion and + infiltration; development is the answer and harsh FMS terms handicap our efforts to + improve the economy!

+

(C) Secretary Weinberger agreed that the + example was a good one. We understand and this is another reason we + want to be as helpful as + we can. We want the economies of our friends to be healthy, and that + is why we extend economic as well as military assistance. We know + the strains that FMS puts on your + economy. We see the internal danger you face, and the threat of + infiltration.

+

(S) The Prime Minister continued his + example. Of the 34,000 young men, six or seven thousand came back + soon after; they found that Libya was “no El Dorado.” Jobs are short + there too, and Libya is going through economic difficulties. Libya + has laid off many Tunisian workers from the oilfields. But there is + also an ideological dimension: the Libyans appeal to these young, + unemployed men to join in “just causes,” such as the cause of the + PLO. This is tempting to some + of these unemployed men, and may cause them to join the Libyan + military forces.

+

(S) Prime Minister Mzali then turned to a new subject. + He wanted to state how pleased he was with two of our efforts in + particular. The first was military training. The U.S. has assisted + Tunisia for years in this area, and it has been of great benefit to + all the services; he hopes it will be continued. Second is “that + confidential area we don’t discuss in public,” namely joint + exercises. He approves of them and they are very helpful. The + Secretary replied that we are pleased to hear this and we certainly + want both training and military joint exercises to continue; we are + grateful to Tunisia for the opportunity for joint training.

+

(C) Prime Minister Mzali then said he had been + instructed by President Bourguiba, to seek a replacement of the Tunisian + flagship, The President Bourguiba, with another + U.S. Navy ship “of the same displacement,” about 700–1,000 tons. He + was instructed to raise this personally with both Secretary + Weinberger and + President Reagan. President + Bourguiba has made this a + very personal matter; “he feels it deeply as a matter of personal + prestige.” Secretary Weinberger responded that President Reagan has a deep appreciation for + President Bourguiba and would + certainly want to help. Unfortunately, Navy has advised that no ship + is presently available for transfer. We will pursue this to see if + we can find anything at all suitable. New construction might be a + possibility; if Tunisia were to have a ship built in Europe, we + would of course like to see American equipment on it. The Prime + Minister thanked the Secretary for this information.

+

(U) At this point, the formal meeting + ended, and a signature ceremony took place, with Secretary Weinberger and Minister of + Defense Baly signing the FY82 + FMS loan agreement for $85 + million.

+

(S) After the signature ceremony, a + working luncheon was held, with an extensive exchange between the + Prime Minister and Secretary Weinberger. Principal points were: + + Continuing heavy pleas, by Prime Minister Mzali, for better FMS terms in the + future. + + + A further strong request for help on the problem of a + replacement for flagship President + Bourguiba; Secretary Weinberger said that he + would ask the Navy to make an immediate further review of + this matter, so that he would have their further advice + before the Prime Minister met with President Reagan on Thursday. + + Agreement on the very serious situation in the Middle East + at the present time, particularly with respect to the + Iran-Iraq war. Prime Minister Mzali voiced the strong fear that, if this + war is not settled soon, the results could be destabilizing + to the entire Gulf. +

+

(U) The luncheon ended at 1:40 p.m. + with Prime Minister Mzali + again urging that Secretary Weinberger plan to visit Tunisia soon.

+ James L. + WoodsWoods signed “J.L. Woods” + above this typed signature. + + Director, ISA + Africa Region + +
+
+ 297. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, PM + Mzali, 04/29/82 + (04/29/1982–05/10/1982). Confidential. The meeting took place in the + Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the + memorandum. + + + Washington, April 29, 1982, 11:40 a.m.–12:10 p.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister + Mzali + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Ronald + Reagan + Walter J. Stoessel, + Deputy Secretary of State + Robert C. McFarlane, + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + Walter Cutler, U.S. + Ambassador to Tunisia + Nicholas Veliotes, + Assistant Secretary, State Department + Raymond Tanter, Senior + Staff Member, NSC + Prime Minister Mohamed + Mzali + Slaheddine Baly, Minister + of Defense + Mestiri, Secretary of State + for Foreign Affairs + Mohamed Hachem, Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister + Kamel Rekik, Staff Assistant, Office of the Minister of National + Economy + Moncaf Ben Abdallah, President of the Investment Promotion + Agency + Mohamed Gherib, Minister Counselor at the Embassy + + +

The meeting began at 11:40a.m. in the Oval Office.

+

The President welcomed Tunisian Prime Minister + Mzali to the United States, + praised Tunisian President Bourguiba as a steadfast friend of the United States, + and expressed regret that his health precluded a meeting with the + President. He praised Tunisia’s development strategy of seeking private + American investment capital to replace declining U.S. economic + assistance. The President gave strong support for Tunisian security.

+

The Prime Minister thanked the President for his + warm words of welcome. The Prime Minister gave the President best wishes + from President Bourguiba. The + Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the President’s reaffirmation + of friendship with Tunisia, support for Tunisia’s development strategy, + and U.S. concern for Tunisia’s security. The Prime Minister said that + the Tunisian economy is very fragile. There are impoverished areas in + Tunisia, especially along the borders with Algeria and Libya. From the + standpoint of Tunisia’s economic development plans, it is very important + that it receive U.S. Foreign Military Sales credits on concessional + terms. Otherwise, the defense burden would pose an unacceptable tradeoff + with economic development. Tunisia does encourage private investment and + appreciates the praise given by the President for doing so. The Prime + Minister told how some of his closest associates are in touch with U.S. + business executives to identify alternatives for investment in + Tunisia.

+

The President acknowledged Tunisia’s economic + problems and said that the United States would do as much as it could to + assist Tunisia.

+

The Prime Minister said that Tunisia wants to + increase the number of its students in the United States. He very much + admired the American educational system and wanted to encourage + Tunisians to study in the States. Tunisia needs help in order to + increase the number of students studying in America.

+

The President replied that he was unaware of the + issue of Tunisian students in America and would discuss it with the + Secretary of Education and other relevant officials. He remarked that it + sounds like a good idea to increase the number of Tunisians studying + here and would like to get comments from his advisors as to how the U.S. + might be of assistance.

+

The Prime Minister mentioned the Libyan threat to + Tunisia as a very serious matter. He said that the Libyan threat fully + justifies the Tunisian request for Foreign Military Sales credits. The + Prime Minister suggested that Tunisia be treated by the United States as + it treats Egypt and Israel. For example, Tunisia would like to receive + half of its Foreign Military Sales credits in the form of loans at lower + than commercial interest rates and the other half would be forgiven.

+

The President replied that he understood that the + Prime Minister had met with the Secretary of Defense, and that he would + do the very best to make sure + that Tunisia receives good terms that will enhance its security.See Tab A, Document 296.

+

The Prime Minister said that he was very concerned + with the threat Libya poses to Tunisia.

+

The President replied that the United States + shares Tunisia’s concern with the Libyan threat and would like to be as + forthcoming as possible in helping Tunisia meet this threat.

+

The Prime Minister said that Foreign Military + Sales on concessional terms allow Tunisia to spend more on economic + development. Too many Tunisians are going to Libya because there are + greater opportunities to find work there than in Tunisia. When young + Tunisians come back from Libya, they are radicalized.

+

The President said that the West has not been as successful in + selling freedom as in marketing products. Nations such as Singapore and + Taiwan have chosen the path of freedom and are thus better off + economically than other nations.

+

The Prime Minister asked about the President’s views on broader issues in + the Middle East. He said that President Bourguiba was interested in hearing about the U.S. + attitude on the Iraq-Iran War, especially regarding Iran and Syria’s + collusion against Iraq. Tunisia is very concerned about the threat to + the Gulf as well as about peace in Lebanon.

+

The President responded that he was going to + discuss these wider issues during the luncheon and the discussion about + these issues was deferred. The President ended the discussion by telling + a story about the need for foreign language competence to which the + Prime Minister enthusiastically concurred.

+

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane adjourned the + meeting at 12:10 p.m., at which time the group went to the President’s + residence for the luncheon.

+
+ +
+ 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850275–0584. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Drafted from + text received from the White House; cleared by Adams (S/S–S), Flaten (NEA/AFN), and Schneider; approved by Veliotes. + + 144544. + + Washington, May 26, 1982, 1737Z + + +

For Ambassador. Subject: Letter From President Reagan to President Bourguiba (S/S 8214850).

+

1. Please deliver the following letter from President Reagan to President Bourguiba

+

2 (A) Begin Text: Dear Mr. President: The visit of your Prime Minister, + Mohamed Mzali,See Document 297. + is a tangible expression of the friendship between our two countries. I + very much appreciated the visit.

+

(B) As you know, it had been my hope to see you when you were here in + January.See Document 292. It had been my intention to tell you + personally that the constancy of the friendship between our countries is + very important to me. I was happy to convey this to you through your + able and eloquent Prime Minister.

+

(C) We are all deeply impressed by the + exemplary development of Tunisia, which you have led into full freedom + and the modern world. As Americans, we are proud to have been your + partners in that adventure. I hope the next decade of our friendship + will be as productive for us both as the last years have been.

+

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End + text.

+ Stoessel +
+ +
+ 299. Letter From Tunisian President Bourguiba to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Tunisia: President Bourguiba (8205139–8302312). No + classification marking. Printed from a translation prepared in the + Division of Language Services, Department of State. + + + Tunis, June 17, 1982 + + Mr. President: + +

The close, friendly relationship between our two countries prompts me to + inform you of the extent of my concern about recent developments in the + Middle East. The avowed purpose of the Israeli attack on Lebanon, which + is greater in scope than all similar previous operations against that + country, seems to be the total destruction of the Palestinian + resistance.

+

This aggression—which borders on genocide—has aroused the indignation of + all countries and people who love freedom and justice. The already + intense indignation of the Arab countries is compounded by a feeling of + legitimate frustration about such flagrant violations of the principles + of law and international ethics.

+

For this reason we deeply appreciated the unanimity initially expressed + by the Security Council in establishing a direct link between the need + for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Israeli troops.

+

I must tell you, however, that we were surprised by your delegation’s + veto of the resolution presented to the Security Council by Spain, a + Western friend.Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution S/15185, + June 8, which demanded that Israel withdraw its forces from + Lebanon. This action disappointed and disturbed all those who + share with the United States the same values of justice and liberty.

+

I am convinced that the irresponsible acts of the Israeli government + threaten not only to make the peace to which we all aspire less + attainable but also to satisfy the ambitions of all those who count upon + the frustration of the Arab peoples to establish their influence + decisively throughout the Middle East, the Arab world, and the Islamic + community.

+

That is why I am appealing to you personally, in the name of our common + ideals, so that there may be a clear and categorical end to the schemes + of Israel and its government, schemes whose fanaticism only serves the + interests of the enemies of freedom.

+

I greatly fear that if the United States does not fully assume its + responsibilities in this matter, the countries which enjoy its + friendship will find + themselves in a situation that is at best awkward and at worst + untenable.In telegram 4506 from Tunis, + June 14, the Embassy reported that Bourguiba’s recent public “expression of ‘profound + regret’ at US support for Israel in + the aftermath of the invasion of Lebanon” was “not Bourguiba’s style, particularly + where the US is concerned, and the + fact that Bourguiba + authorized Mzali to make the + statement is an indication of how upset he is. The statement also + reflects the Tunisian Government’s efforts to deal with the public’s + bitterness over the Israeli invasion and U.S. policy.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820310–0033)

+

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration.

+ Habib + BourguibaPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. + + President of the Tunisian + Republic +
+
+ 300. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 + (June 1982). Secret. Drafted by Tanter. A stamped notation indicates that the + President saw the memorandum. Another stamped notation reads: + “signed.” + + + Washington, June 24, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Letter from Tunisian President Bourguiba Concerning Lebanon + +

At Tab A for your signature is a letter for President Bourguiba of Tunisia. It responds to + his letter at Tab BNot attached, printed as + Document 299. regarding the situation in Lebanon.

+

A key element of President Bourguiba’s letter is that American Tunisian relations + could be damaged by a prolonged occupation by Israel of Lebanon. Your + Ambassador to Tunisia considers this message to be a very serious + statement. He feels that the Tunisians are not the type of people who + generally threaten their friends or who choose such words lightly.

+

I believe that you should not respond directly to Tunisian threats to + alter its friendly relations with the United States because of the + situation in Lebanon. Your letter acknowledges the value you place on + relations with Tunisia and expresses grief over the human suffering in + Lebanon.

+ + + Tab A + Letter From President Reagan to President BourguibaNo + classification marking. + + + Washington, June 25, 1982 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

Your letter concerning the recent tragic events in Lebanon is a + tribute to the depth of friendship between our countries.

+

All Americans are deeply grieved by the enormous human and material + losses which the Lebanese people and innocent Palestinian residents + of Lebanon have sustained in this terrible two weeks of war. For + this reason we must continue to stress the humanitarian dimensions + of the crisis and work to bring relief to the suffering.

+

We exerted our best efforts during the past year to maintain the + cease-fire negotiated by Ambassador Habib. Israel and the other interested parties well + understood our position.

+

As I hope you recognize, we cannot dwell on the past. Much must be + done and quickly if Lebanon is to have a future. Ambassador + Habib has been extremely + active during the past two weeks. He has had discussions with + Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese leaders and has been in close + consultation with me throughout this period. These efforts were + directed at achieving a cease-fire. We are making every effort to + see that it holds and that the danger of a wider war is averted. For + the last several days Ambassador Habib and Secretary Haig have been acting on my instructions to exert + every effort to broaden the cease-fire and to halt the fighting + between Israeli and PLO forces. We + will not rest until we have succeeded and the guns are at last + silent across Lebanon.

+

While an effective cease-fire is an essential first step, the + cease-fire is only the beginning. The United States remains + committed to Lebanon’s independence, unity, sovereignty, and + territorial integrity. We want compliance with security council + resolutions 508 and 509 with all reasonable speed.UN Security + Council Resolution 508, June 5, and UN Security Council Resolution 509, June 6, + respectively called for the immediate end of hostilities between + the PLO and Israeli forces in + Lebanon and demanded that Israel withdraw its forces from + Lebanon. We seek a Lebanon reunified, strong, and free of + foreign military forces.

+

Beyond this, however, I believe the task of assisting Lebanon to + reconstruct itself physically, politically, and spiritually must + begin immediately. A return to the conditions which existed before + June 5 would not serve the interests of the region as a whole. In + time, I fear, the same unstable situation which led to the present + tragedy would only + reassert itself. Instead, this opportunity to restore Lebanon’s + territorial integrity must be seized and the Lebanese Government + must be enabled to expand its authority throughout the country as + quickly as possible.

+

At the same time, we cannot return to a situation in which the PLO again can rocket or shell Israel’s + northern villages. This will require an effective mechanism to + police an enlarged zone in southern Lebanon and imaginative and + creative thinking from all of us.

+

Finally, the recent events in Lebanon must serve also to refocus our + energies on making early progress toward a resolution of the + Palestinian problem. The United States is determined to press ahead + on fulfilling the promise of the Camp David framework and to build + on the progress already made. We will be resuming efforts toward + that goal as soon as conditions permit.

+

The United States highly esteems its friends in the region, + particularly Tunisia, and will continue to consider their well-being + in grappling with the arduous task of helping to bring peace and + justice to the area now in turmoil.

+

Mr. President, enduring friendship bids me heed your kind words on + behalf of your country and the search for peace. Your sincerity + makes me regret still more that we did not have the opportunity to + meet and discuss the situation in the Middle East earlier this + year.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan + +
+
+ 301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 + (June 1982). No classification marking. Sent for action. Drafted by + Tanter. A notation in an + unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum + indicates that Reagan signed + the letter on August 5. + + + Washington, July 31, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Your Reply to Tunisian President Concerning Lebanon + +

At Tab A for your signature is a reply to President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who wrote you + about the situation in Lebanon (Tab B). He suggests that you take action + to bring the siege of West Beirut to an end.

+ +

Your response expresses concern for the suffering of innocent people, + states that Phil Habib is doing + his best not only to bring the siege of West Beirut to an end but also + to enable the Lebanese to rebuild their country without outside + interference.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the letter at Tab A.Reagan checked and initialed his + approval of the recommendation.

+ + Tab A + Letter From President Reagan to President BourguibaNo + classification marking. + + + Washington, August 5, 1982 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

Your letter of July 9 concerning events in Lebanon is an eloquent + statement of the tragedy facing the region.In telegram 6081 from Tunis, August 16, + Cutler reported that + the “French Ambassador, who saw Bourguiba at his summer residence in Monastir + shortly after he received President Reagan’s second message to him on Lebanon, tells + me that he appeared to be quite pleased by it. ‘President + Reagan holds me in + high regard,’ Bourguiba + said. He was still upset by the situation in Lebanon, but made + clear to the French Ambassador that he had not by any means + given up hope in the U.S: ‘If the Americans don’t defend + justice, who will’?” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820409–1055) The + quality of your friendship and the traditional balance of your + approach to the problems of the region add special weight to your + communication. You were in the forefront of those leaders in the + Arab world who counselled an approach based on mutual understanding + at a time when to do so required special courage.

+

We share your humanitarian concern for the people in Lebanon, and we + will spare no exertion to help bring an end to the fighting. + Disengagement with honor for all parties continues to be the theme + of Ambassador Habib’s + diplomacy. The United States is pursuing vigorous initiatives to + enable the Lebanese to rebuild their country without + interference.

+

As I told the American people on June 30,Reagan made the + remark during a June 30 news conference in which he was asked to + respond to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. + 826–834. we intend to persevere in our continued efforts + to resolve the underlying problem of the Palestinians once and for + all as soon as we have attained our more urgent objectives. We are + under no illusion that this task will be easy. Patience and wisdom will be put to the + test on all parts. We will need the advice and cooperation of our + friends, especially good friends such as Tunisia, if we are to + succeed. We hope to benefit from your goodwill and your insight in + the long labor of helping to bring a just, enduring peace to the + Middle East.

+

I deeply appreciate the concern which inspired your message to me and + look forward to a continuing dialogue with you in the spirit of the + values we share.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan + + + Tab B + Letter From Tunisian President Bourguiba to President ReaganNo classification + marking. Printed from a translation prepared in the Division of + Language Services, Department of State. + + + Tunis, July 9, 1982 + + Mr. President: + +

The state of siege that continues around West Beirut is, over the + short term, a terrible threat to the lives of thousands of people + and, in the long run, will exacerbate a situation that could + deteriorate into a conflagration of incalculable consequences.

+

This is why I turn to you again in the context of the consultations + that continue between your country and mine and, in particular, + between you, Mr. President, and myself.

+

Your ambassador has informed my government that the United States + does not wish to humiliate or to destroy the leadership of the + PLO. It considers that once the + Lebanese problem is settled, the PLO leaders and the Palestinian people will be able to + safeguard their interests and work towards achieving their + aspirations of nationhood.

+

Your ambassador reassures us that your government is doing everything + possible to spare other human lives, whether Palestinian or + Lebanese.

+

Convinced, therefore, of your determination to prevent the worst from + happening, I appeal to you and to your great country for a rapid end + to the current situation. It is high time for you to take vigorous + action to bring the siege of West Beirut to an end and to ensure + that reason will prevail over brute force.

+ +

We who share the same belief in the ideals of freedom and justice + know full well that brute force will never prevail over the + determination of a people to defend its most sacred rights, + especially its right to exist.

+

We are dutybound to do everything possible to prevent needless deaths + and a catastrophic deterioration of the situation in that region, + which would only serve the interests of those who oppose + freedom.

+

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my friendship and my high + consideration and esteem.

+ Habib + BourguibaPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. + + President of the Republic of + Tunisia + +
+
+ 302. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820439–0532. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. + + 6295. + + Tunis, August 24, 1982, 1426Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisia’s Security Needs. + + + Ref: + (A) Tunis 6247,In telegram 6247 from + Tunis, August 21, Cutler + reported that, during their August 21 meeting, “Bourguiba asked + me to convey to President Reagan congratulations on achieving resolution + of Beirut crisis. He was glad Tunisia could play useful role by + receiving large number of PLO, + including Arafat.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D820435–0662) + (B) Tunis 6202.In telegram 6202 from + Tunis, August 19, the Embassy reported: “Interior Minister Guiga + told Ambassador August 19 of strong Tunisian interest in + screening PLO members coming to + Tunisia before their arrival.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820431–0600) + + + + (C—Entire text.) + + Summary and action requested. Deteriorating relations with Libya + and arrival of PLO contingent from + Beirut pose a substantial security burden on Tunisia, for which + GOT looks to USG for relief.In telegram 6035 from Tunis, August 12, the + Embassy reported: “The announcement late August 10 by Foreign + Minister Caid Essebsi + that Bourguiba had agreed + to a request from Arafat + to accept what was described as the ‘first wave’ of Palestinians + to evacuate Beirut came as a considerable surprise to Tunisians. + It is still early to assess reaction, but many Tunisians, in the + political establishment and out, seem to be puzzled and worried. + Emotional identification with the Palestinian cause coexists + here with a very strong distaste for the politics of the eastern + Arabs and a belief that, considerations of principle aside, + Tunisia should keep them at arms length.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820419–0208) Tunisian officials, from Bourguiba on down, have recently cited increased + security needs, and this theme can be expected to be raised in + upcoming high-level discussions with USG. Although GOT has + been cautioned repeatedly that funding level for FY–83 might well be limited to a + continuing resolution authority, U.S. security assistance at same + level as last year instead of at increased level of $140 million + will be a disappointment, particularly in view of current economic + weaknesses which make military modernization even more of a burden. + Action requested: Recommend Department review question of + concessional financing, which could compensate to some degree for + lack of increase in new appropriations for Tunisia. End + summary. + + Prime Minister Mzali and + Defense Minister Baly, in + separate conversations with me August 24, argued strongly for higher + levels of U.S. assistance (septels).Records of Cutler’s + conversations with Mzali + and Baly are in telegram + 6359 from Tunis, August 25 (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820441–1028) and telegram + 6356 from Tunis, August 25. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850629–0455, + D820441–0954) Both pointed to severe difficulties in + financing military modernization at full levels without additional + U.S. help. It is clear that President Bourguiba has issued firm instructions to move ahead + rapidly on this issue, but that GOT + is hard pressed to find adequate funding within its own budget. + (Baly indicated there + were no other potential sources of financing at present—e.g., Saudi + Arabia.) + + Our recent conversations indicate that GOT views increased security requirements in light of + (A) growing Libyan threat as result of discord over abortive OAU summitBecause a two-thirds quorum did not attend, the OAU meeting scheduled for August 5 + in Tripoli was canceled. News reports indicated that “most of + the absentees were protesting admission to OAU membership of the Polisario + guerrillas in Western Sahara.” Others had “misgivings about + Colonel Qaddafi’s assumption of the OAU membership for 1982–83;” they considered his + policies in Africa “too radical.” (Geoffrey Godsell, “OAU Summit + Fizzles in Qaddafi-land,” Christian Science + Monitor, August 9, 1982) and (B) imminent + arrival of 1,000 PLO fighters from + Beirut. Tunisians consider that their policies on these issues have + benefited U.S. aims, and feel it is therefore logical that GOT should look to USG for additional help under new + circumstances. President Bourguiba pursued this general theme in our August + 21 meeting (ref A), as did FonMin + Essebsi separately and in + more detail same day. Interior Minister Guiga, in discussing PLO arrival with us on August 19, also pressed for U.S. help + in meeting new security burden arising from PLO presence (ref B). + + Embassy believes Tunisian security concerns should be taken + seriously. We understand that Libyan threats have become more + explicit recently, with Qadhafi personally telephoning warnings of dire + consequences because of Tunisian unwillingness to support him on + OAU summit in Tripoli. Libyan + rhetoric against states receiving PLO contingents has also been sharp, as Dept is aware. + Of equal if not greater concern to GOT are possible consequences of presence here of 1,000 + PLO fighters, who could well + create internal security problems over time. We see considerable + merit in Tunisian argument that USG + has been an important beneficiary of Tunisian policies vis-à-vis + both OAU and PLO. We also share Tunisian view that + the security burden will be disproportionately heavy in comparison + with Tunisia’s modest resources and currently weakened + economy. + + In view of fact that higher levels of security assistance do not + appear likely in near term, I strongly recommend that further + serious consideration be given to seeking concessional financing for + the funds which are being appropriated. Such concessional funding + would help ease somewhat Tunisian problems in implementing the + military modernization program. In addition, it would provide a + clear political signal at a critically important time that the U.S. + continues to support Tunisia’s moderation, thereby encouraging the + GOT to play a supportive role + with respect to Middle East peace efforts. + + USG will need to be prepared to + address Tunisian concerns re the level and terms of U.S. security + assistance in upcoming high-level bilateral discussions, such as + during Defense Minister Baly’s attendance at Joint Military Commission meeting + in September and his subsequent meetings in Washington, as well as + during FonMin + Essebsi’s expected bilateral + at UNGA. + + Cutler +
+ +
+ 303. Memorandum From Robert + Lilac of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Geoffrey T.H. + Kemp Files, Subject File, Tunisia 1982 (September–December 1982). + Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Teicher, Kemp, North, Helm, + and Boverie. + + + Washington, September 7, 1982 + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Joint Military Commission + +

The second annual U.S.-Tunisia Joint Military Commission (JMC) met in Newport, Rhode Island on + September 2–4, 1982.No minutes of the + meeting were found. The U.S. delegation was headed by + Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing + West and the Tunisian delegation by Minister of Defense + Slaheddine Baly. I + represented the NSC Staff. The meetings + included a comprehensive threat briefing by the Defense Intelligence + Agency (DIA), and committee sessions on + security assistance, combined exercises and military training. The + subject of access or prepositioning did not come up other than in the + context of that inherent in the agreement to continue combined + exercises. The JMC was a very useful + exchange of views on our security assistance programs. It focused on + repeated pleas from the Tunisians for more security assistance funding + by the U.S.

+

Minister Baly presented a detailed + report on the depth of commitment made by President Bourguiba in aligning with U.S. + interests globally and in the region. Baly stressed the threat from Libya. Tunisia’s + participation in the solution of the West Beirut problemReference is to Bourguiba’s decision to allow Arafat and the PLO to leave West Beirut for Tunisia. + See Document 302. and their part in + the failure of the O.A.U. summit have resulted in a worsening of + relations with Libya. He stressed that while the U.S. 6th Fleet is a + guarantee, President Bourguiba + insists that Tunisia must remain sovereign and have the means to defend + itself. He pointed out that this decision, and the one of political + alignment with the U.S. were very difficult for Tunisia. Tunisian + resources must be dedicated to their domestic problems. Therefore he + summed up in asking for more assistance in building a credible military + defensive capability. He asked for FY 83 + increases in grants, loans on better terms, FY 82 supplemental increases, and reprogramming of any + excess FY 82 funds from other countries + to Tunisia.

+

Defense did an excellent job of pointing out that the President had + requested $95 million in FY 82 and $140M + in FY 83. The Congress reduced the + FY 82 figure to $85 million. + Congress had removed any FY 82 supplemental funds for + Tunisia. He pointed out that Congressional action to date in FY 83 indicates a level less than the + President’s request. The possibility of a Continuing Resolution (C.R.A.) + at the FY 82 level of $85 million was + also discussed. Minister Baly and + Ambassador Ben Yahia plan to + make calls on the Hill during + the week of September 6 to urge support for Tunisia.

+

The possibility of obtaining help from their Arab friends, such as the + Saudis, was discussed. The Tunisians said that the Saudis have not been + very forthcoming in this area.

+

The discussion on combined exercises went well. The two ongoing annual + exercises, one with the 6th Fleet and one with U.S. unconventional + warfare elements in Europe will continue in 1983. There were no major + problems in this area. The training committee reviewed requests for more + funding (IMET) and increased numbers + of Tunisians in the U.S.

+

Defense will be working on the specific issues raised during the JMC. It was obvious that the Tunisian + delegation was seriously disgruntled only in the area of security + assistance funds available from the U.S.

+
+
+ 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850439–0532. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority + to Algiers, Paris, Rabat, and Rome. The document is misnumbered in + the original. + + 6978. + + Tunis, September 18, 1982, + 2250Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Démarche re Beirut Massacre. + + + + Foreign Ministry Secretary General Fezzani (in the absence of + Foreign Minister who went to Paris today with President Bourguiba) called me in urgently + tonight, September 18, following reported massacres of Palestinians + in Beirut.See footnote 6, Document 28. He said Bourguiba had personally telephoned + from Paris with instructions that he convey to the U.S. Government + Bourguiba’s “shock, + consternation and indignation” upon hearing the news from Beirut. + Bourguiba also urged that + the members of the multinational force “honor their + responsibilities.” Fezzani said he was conveying the same message + from Bourguiba to my French + and Italian colleagues here. + + + I told Fezzani the U.S. Government shared President Bourguiba’s sentiments, as clearly + evidenced by President Reagan’s public statement today expressing outrage + and regrets concerning the killings.In + his September 18 statement, Reagan said he was “horrified to learn this + morning of the killing of Palestinians which has taken place in + Beirut. All people of decency must share our outrage and + revulsion over the murders, which included women and children.” + Reagan also + announced that he had demanded “that the Israeli Government + immediately withdraw its forces from west Beirut to the + positions occupied on September 14.” Public + Papers: Reagan, + 1982, Book II, p. 1181) I noted further the President’s + call for immediate Israeli withdrawal from West Beirut followed by + withdrawals of all foreign forces from Lebanon. + + In response to my query, Fezzani said Bourguiba did not specify exactly what he expected + the three members of the multinational force to do. I reminded + Fezzani that the force’s mandate was limited in scope and did not + encompass maintenance of Lebanese internal security, which was the + responsibility of the Lebanese Government. Fezzani said he + understood this, but observed the situation had been radically + altered by the Israelis move into West Beirut, which he viewed as a + violation of the agreements worked out by us with Israel and + Lebanon. He urged that we use all possible means to bring the + Israelis into line. + + Noting the rather graphic coverage of the killings in Beirut on + Tunisian television that evening and the claim that 1,400 + Palestinians had been murdered, I said that all the facts were + apparently not yet known and expressed the hope that Tunisians would + exercise caution until they were. I also took the occasion to + express my satisfaction regarding the excellent cooperation we had + received from Tunisian security officials in handling the volatile + public reaction to events in Lebanon throughout the summer, and my + hope that such cooperation would continue. Fezzani assured me it + would. + + Comment. Fezzani’s démarche was generally low-key and obviously + was made on rather sketchy instructions from Bourguiba. We can probably expect + to hear more from the GOT as + developments unfold.In telegram 7015 + from Tunis, September 20, Cutler reported that in regard to Reagan’s September 18 + statement, “Bourguiba had been encouraged by the President’s + strong reaction to the massacres and his insistence on Israeli + withdrawal. Bourguiba had + also appreciated our determination not to be diverted from + pursuing the Middle East peace process.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820485–1129) Fezzani’s reference to the emotional impact + which the killings are likely to have on PLO fighters dispersed in Arab countries probably + reflected one of the GOT’s + principal concerns. He did not indicate, however, whether the PLO contingent in Tunisia had yet + reacted. + + Cutler +
+ +
+ 305. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820517–0927. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shultz was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly. + + Secto + 13072. + + New York, October 7, 1982, 0539Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Oct. 5, 1982 UNGA, + Bilateral With Tunisian Foreign Minister Essebsi. + + + + (S—Entire text). + + Summary: The Secretary received Tunisia’s FonMin + Essebsi for half-hour + bilateral on Oct. 5. Essebsi + raised the Palestinian problem, outlining past and current actions + by his government to further a solution lying “between” the Arab + League’s Fez Summit plan and the President’s Sept. 1 + principles.See footnote 2, Document 114. + Documentation on the initiative is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. + Essebsi urged an equitable + approach towards the Palestinian people and praised the courage of + the President’s principles which have earned Tunisia’s support + despite its imperfections “because we have faith in the U.S. and its + leaders.” Essebsi also + adverted to the threat posed Tunisia’s security by Qadhafi’s Libya and urged + additional U.S. efforts on the terms of our credits which, with the + absence of tangible help from Saudi Arabia, was onerous to the point + of compelling Tunisia to rethink its development plans. End + summary. + + The Secretary received Tunisian FonMin + Beiji Caid Essebsi in New + York on Oct. 5. Essebsi was + accompanied by Tunisia’s Ambassadors to the U.S. and the UN Messrs. Ben Yahia and Slim. Assistant Secretary Veliotes, NEA/AFN Director and Alec Toumayan + (interpreter) also sat in. + + Essebsi opened with + congratulations on the Secretary’s accession to his current + responsibilities.Shultz became Secretary of + State on July 16 after Haig resigned on July 5. He pointed out + that Prime Minister Mzali and + MOD + Baly had recently come to the + U.S. to present Tunisia’s views on key issues—particularly Tunisia’s + security situation. Unfortunately, Tunisia’s relations with Libya + had been deteriorating for the last three years and Libya is heavily + armed by the Soviet Union. His government, Essebsi said, considers Libya at + present to be a direct threat. He noted that this threat had + compelled Tunisia to plan for the procurement of additional military + equipment. This is an expensive undertaking and had forced Tunisia + to rethink its development plans. Essebsi pointed out that Tunisia’s Saudi friends + have not been helpful materially in this context and even a well + disposed U.S. provides military credits only on commercial terms. The FonMin hoped that the U.S. would be + willing to make a further effort in 1983 particularly insofar as the + terms of its credits are concerned. + + Essebsi then summarized + Tunisia’s involvement in the Middle East problem since 1965 when + President Bourguiba pleaded + for an equitable solution based on the region’s realities (i.e. + Israel).During a March 9, 1965, + press conference in Jerusalem, Bourguiba had said that Arabs could cooperate + with Jews. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXIV, + Africa, footnote 3, Document 147. This Tunisian + attitude, which had been and remained a constant, had been well + received in the U.S. though not in the early years by the Arab + world. In 1982 Tunisia involved herself once more. It backed up + American Ambassador Habib’s + efforts;See footnote 2, Document 17. agreed to receive + PLO combatants which helped + induce other Arab states to do likewise and tried to assist with the + development of the Arab League’s Fez peace plan based on President + Bourguiba’s ideas of + record. + + Tunisia had noted President Reagan’s Sept. 1 principles “and had worked to + assure for them a not unfavorable Arab response.” In part as a + result of these activities, the Fez Summit’s Committee of Seven + would come here to explore the U.S. principles further and to offer + clarification on the Fez Summit peace plan. + + Tunisia reacted positively to President Reagan’s principles not because + they are complete but because they show an American political will + to find equitable solutions. The principles, in Tunisia’s view, are + incomplete because they call up Israel to deal with Arab countries + when they should call on Israel to deal with the Palestinian people. + Tunisia fears that the President’s proposals may be seen by some as + a continuation of the Camp David Agreements (CDA)Reference is to the framework of agreements signed by Egypt and + Israel on September 17, 1978. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December + 1980, Second, Revised Edition. in that they + seem to imply a continuation of indirect contacts with the + Palestinians, this time through Jordan and Egypt. + + Tunisia is concerned that in such a case the desired results would + continue to fail of achievement. However, the President’s principles + recognize a U.S. responsibility for the situation in the Middle East + and the Tunisian Government has faith in the US and in its leaders. It therefore feels the need to + give the President as much support as it can. This is reflected in + the letters which President Bourguiba sent President ReaganSee Document 299 and Tab B, Document + 301. and which, while praising President Reagan’s courage and assuring the + latter of President Bourguiba’s support, calls for a (MidEast) solution + “falling between the Arab and the American peace plans.” Tunisia has thus acted on this + issue with faith in the future while wondering what the future will + bring. + + The Secretary responded that the USG appreciates the constructive initiatives Tunisia + has taken which have contributed to a better atmosphere more + conducive to a solution in the region. + + With regard to the CDA there are + matters of strategic import to keep in mind. Israel had signed its + name to a document calling for the achievement of Palestinian rights + and subscribed to a process leading to self-government for the + Palestinian people. To abandon CDA + would be to let go of this Israeli commitment. That would be a + mistake. + + The Secretary continued that the interpretation given the CDA stipulations by Israel are + incorrect. Hence we have cast our proposals in terms of the CDA but give them a different + interpretation which, we believe, can lead to a very different + situation on the West Bank and Gaza. + + Political developments, the Secretary said, take place in stages. + Problems must first be recognized before they can be resolved and + the Israelis now know that there is a Palestinian problem which + needs to be addressed. As a consequence, there are now many people + planning on how these problems are to be dealt with. It is our view + that after the next round of consultations, including the visit to + the president of the Fez Summit’s Committee of Seven, the stage of + position-taking will have ended and the search for compromises + between the positions will have arrived at the negotiating table. It + is at this stage, the Secretary said, that it is important for King + Hussein with Palestinian support and that of others to be able to + enter the talks so that the process originally envisaged can begin + to move. When this occurs, people will look to a different future in + the region and compromises will become possible. + + The Secretary then reiterated the gratitude of the U.S. for + Tunisia’s help and its hope that Tunisia and its Foreign Minister + would keep telling people to be realistic and to become part of the + solution rather than remain part of the problem. + + The Secretary said that we understand Tunisia’s concerns about + Libya “and we will support you.” We welcome the strengths of our + bilateral ties. + + In closing, Essebi urged an equitable approach to the Middle East + problem. He said that the Israelis clearly are entitled to their + security and asserted that this was well understood throughout the + Arab world. On the other hand, the Palestinian people are also a + reality and are entitled to similar “rights and obligations.” There + will be no solution in the region unless there is equity in the + treatment of the Palestinian people, he said. + + Bilaterally, Caid Essebsi + said in closing, there are no problems except Tunisia’s problems of + security and in this context Tunisia hopes not to have to face its + burdens alone. + + + As the Secretary escorted FonMin + Essebsi to the door the + latter thanked him for the cordiality of his reception and urged him + to come to Tunisia. The Secretary said that he would like to do + so. + + Shultz +
+
+ 306. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading, + January–March 1983. Confidential. + + + Washington, January 20, 1983 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

2. Tunisian Defense Minister. Ken Dam, Bill Schneider and Dick Walters met with Tunisian + Defense Minister Baly today.Records of these discussions are in telegram + 23456 to Tunis, January 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830046–0772) The Minister + argued that the military threat to Tunisia from Qadhafi was mounting and that President + Bourguiba counted on the + US to supply enough security + assistance for Tunisia to finance the military equipment it had agreed + to purchase from the US. The Minister + was told that Tunisia was a close friend whose security remained very + important to us but that Congressional action on our request for + security assistance would probably preclude extending this year all the + aid for which the Tunisians were asking.In + his personal record of his meeting with Baly, Dam + wrote: “One meeting which may have significance for the future was a + meeting with the Tunisian Defense Minister, who came to complain + about our present level of foreign aid and justified his complaint + by the assertion that Libya was getting very close to a major + incursion into Tunisia. This may very well be the case, and frankly, + it is not the executive branch which is unable to deliver the level + of military assistance to Tunisia that we had already promised. The + result of our present embarrassment vis-à-vis Tunisia is simply the + fallout of a Congressional budget process where foreign assistance + bills do not seem to get voted on by the Congress.” (Personal Note + Prepared by Dam, January 20; + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, + Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. + 1983) During a January 21 meeting with Weinberger, Baly repeated his “previously stated concern in + regard to the seriousness of the Libyan threat to Tunisia.” He + “pleaded for increased grant aid saying that Tunisia is as much + threatened as other countries which receive a large portion of + assistance in grants. ‘Tunisia is in the advance front of the Free + World and defends also the interests of the US.’” (Memorandum of Conversation, January 26; + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC + 330–85–0023, 1983 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the + Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive + Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 25, + Tunisia 1983) (C)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 307. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President BourguibaSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Tunisia 1983 (01/25/1983–05/19/1983). No classification + marking. + + + Washington, February 3, 1983 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I have chosen to write to you because it has become our practice to + communicate matters of the highest importance directly with one another. + This personal exchange arises naturally from the friendship and esteem I + have come to feel for you, who have guided Tunisia so wisely through its + history of accomplishments, and reflects the amity which binds our two + peoples.

+

The visit of General Walters, my + trusted personal emissary, reinforces the message of this letter:Walters visited Tunisia February 13–15. See Document 308. the United States + continues to stand by your side as a friend and a supporter. We will + continue to do all that we are able to safeguard a free and prosperous + Tunisia. We owe this both to friendship and interest. Moreover, it is + important that Tunisia stand among the new nations of the world as an + example of the benefits of enlightened leadership.

+

Because of the worldwide economic recession and related economic + hardships facing the United States, Congress has not granted us all the + resources we requested for security assistance this year. This + development will require us to begin this year’s assistance program at + somewhat lower levels in many countries, including Tunisia. You have my + personal assurance, however, that my government and I will seek + additional funds from the Congress for Tunisia so that we may make a + greater contribution to Tunisia’s legitimate defenses. I remain + confident that the long-term, integrated military modernization program + we have worked out with the able attention of Prime Minister Mzali and other concerned ministers + will remain a valid plan for Tunisian defense against any would-be + aggressor. We also recognize the urgency of the threat you face and your + need for a rapid supply of military equipment to meet that threat.

+

I also want you to know how grateful I was for your support of my + September 1 proposal for peace in the Middle East.See footnote 2, Document + 114. It was personally gratifying to be supported + by such a steadfast friend of the United States. And it was heartening + to be supported by a leader whose political judgment, particularly + concerning the Middle East, has earned him unparalleled international stature. I expect to + benefit from your wise counsel as I work toward peace in the Middle + East.

+

I hope the new year has found you happy and well. Nancy and I send you + and Mrs. Bourguiba our best + wishes for you and your people.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+
+ 308. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830089–0164. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Algiers and Rabat. Sent for information Immediate to + Khartoum. + + 1352. + + Tunis, February 16, 1983, 1652Z + + +

Dept. for S/AL. Khartoum please pass Ambassador Walters. Subject: Visit to Tunisia of + Ambassador Walters.

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + Summary. During visit here February 13–15, Ambassador Walters reassured President + Bourguiba and his + principal advisers that, despite severe congressional cuts in FY–83 security assistance funding, the + administration was committed to seeking additional funds for Tunisia + and to pursuing the long-term military modernization program worked + out by our two governments. Bourguiba reacted very positively to President + Reagan’s messageSee Document + 307. which, like Walters’ presentation, struck just the right note in + both substance and tone. While the Tunisians remain anxious + regarding the pending shortfall and only cautiously hopeful as to + prospects for a supplemental, Walters’ visit was notably successful as a timely + demonstration of our continued political as well as material support + of a long-time friend and ally. End summary. + + Ambassador-at-large Vernon + Walters’ visit to Tunisia February 13–15 included + separate meetings with Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi and Defense Minister Baly; a working + lunch with Caid Essebsi, + Baly, Interior Minister + Guiga and Military Security Chief, Gen. Balma; and a meeting with + President Bourguiba in the + southern oasis of Nefta, in which Mzali, Caid + Essebsi and Baly also participated. The visit was given + prominent coverage by Tunisian media. + + + In his meetings with the ministers, Walters reconfirmed the bad news they had already + received: that because of severe congressional cuts in global + security assistance funding for FY–83, the amounts available for a number of our key + friends and allies, Tunisia included, are less than what the + administration had sought or anticipated. Walters stressed, however, the + administration’s determination to work hard to obtain from Congress + supplemental funds adequate to carry on our assistance programs at + levels originally programmed. He made clear this effort would not be + easy and offered no predictions as to results; but he assured the + Tunisians that the administration was committed to do its very best. + We fully recognized, he said, the security problems facing Tunisia, + particularly with respect to Qadhafi, whose policies of terrorism and attempted + subversion of neighboring countries had in our view not changed. It + was inconceivable that the U.S. and other friends of Tunisia would + remain indifferent should Tunisia’s security be seriously + menaced. + + The Tunisians, for their part, made clear their disappointment and + dismay with regard to the reduced level of U.S. assistance. Prime + Minister Mzali said that he + had been “astonished” by the reduction, that he did not know how the + GOT could fill the large, + unexpected cash gap which that reduction had created. On the other + hand, all of Walters’ + interlocutors were low-key in making their points—friendly regret + rather than irritation or anger—and all responded very favorably to + his assurances, both general with regard to the steadfastness of our + overall support and specific with regard to our doing all possible + to secure additional funding for FY–83. + + This same general reaction of disappointment with action taken, + understanding of why it was necessary, and hope that it will soon be + rectified carried over into Ambassador Walters’ meeting with the President. Bourguiba greeted Walters warmly as the old friend + that he is, and was obviously pleased by the special attention which + Walters personified. In + this respect, Bourguiba + commented that it seemed like a long time (i.e., last + September)No record of a personal + communication between Reagan and Bourguiba in September 1982 has been + found. since he had received any personal communications + from our President. As is his custom, Bourguiba read President Reagan’s letter slowly and out + loud, interjecting at several points his own words of satisfaction + with the assurances of support it contained. Upon finishing, + Bourguiba said, I + understand. You have had difficulties in supplying all the help we + need, but you will do all you can to provide what is not now + available. That’s good. I will count on your assurances.” He went on + to recount what those needs are—planes, tanks, missiles—and to note + the importance of strengthening however, press for accelerated deliveries of the M60 + tanks, perhaps reflecting the counsel of his advisers. (Essebsi had told Walters beforehand that the + GOT’s raising the tank-delivery + issue with the Egyptians was not rpt not a viable option; and that, + in any case, it would serve only to advance deliveries to Tunisia by + a few months.) + + In response to Mzali’s + prompting, Bourguiba did + raise the issue of a U.S. replacement for the aging flagship Habib + Bourguiba. Baly recalled for Bourguiba that last year the U.S. had identified + five possible replacement ships, none of which had been deemed + suitable, and that discussions were continuing with Tunisian + representatives in Washington. Walters noted some of the problems we had + encountered, including the shortage of diesel-powered ships + appropriate to Tunisian needs, and the possibility of the GOT’s acquiring third-country + manufactured hulls for fitting with U.S. armament. Walters assured Bourguiba that we would keep this + matter under active review and said he would look into it + personally. Bourguiba + expressed his appreciation, noting with a half smile that each year + his birthday is celebrated with salvos from his flagship equivalent + in number to his age, and that the number is getting to be pretty + high. + + Bourguiba also raised the + Middle East peace effort, expressing concern about the slow pace of + the Lebanon negotiations and Israeli defiance of our call for a + freeze on additional settlements in the West Bank. He blamed + Begin for this + intransigence, which jeopardized prospects for peace negotiations. + Walters assured + Bourguiba that the U.S. + remained serious in its determination to move ahead quickly in + Lebanon and expressed optimism that this could be accomplished. The + problems of the occupied territories and the eventual status of + Jerusalem were difficult and would require patience and hard work by + all parties to resolve. But the very fact that President Reagan had lent his own name to + the September 1 proposals meant that he fully intended them to + succeed. Bourguiba could + count on our persisting. + + There was a final discussion of the GOT’s program, instigated personally by Bourguiba, to increase dramatically + the number of Tunisian students studying at U.S. universities. + Caid Essebsi noted that, + despite language and other obstacles, the overall academic + performance of these students was excellent. Bourguiba noted the high cost of + this program to the GOT and + appealed for greater U.S. assistance in the form of scholarships. I + observed that the USG had limited + resources in this field, but that private sources, such as + foundations and U.S. companies with interests in Tunisia, could be + of some help. For example, a U.S. company, Jacobs Engineering, soon + to be involved in developing Tunisia’s phosphate resources, had + already offered to sponsor training of Tunisian engineers. + + + Comment. Ambassador Walters’ visit provided just the right touch at the + right time. The Tunisians have been worried by rising domestic + problems, both economic and political, and by continuing tensions + with Qadhafi next door. They + have been aware of the attention we have been according Algeria and + Morocco (Bourguiba mentioned + the latter specifically) and have noted in contrast the relative + absence of high-level visitors coming to Tunisia. The severe cut in + our FY–83 FMS/MAP program to levels + well below FY–82 came as an + unexpected jolt and threatens to create a serious financial problem + for them at a time when their own budget is stretched thin. The fact + that they received Ambassador Walters with such cordiality, refrained from any + table-pounding, and responded favorably to his presentations + reflects not only the solid rapport he has long enjoyed with + Tunisian leaders but also the notable effectiveness with which he + handled the sensitive issues now before us. The Tunisians of course + understood beforehand that Walters was not in a position to bear good news of + any concrete nature. But there is no question that they were + genuinely pleased by his visit and encouraged by President Reagan’s personal assurances that + we would strive to do our best by them. While we do not believe they + are under any illusions as to the difficulty of securing + supplemental funding (and Walters was careful not to raise expectations in + that regard), tactically they will be looking to the administration + to fulfill its assurances to do its best before they start + considering alternative financing options. This, we believe, + explains their lack of interest in discussing such options during + Walters’ visit. From + the standpoint of strengthening the long-standing political bonds + between the U.S. and Tunisia Walters’ visit was an outstanding success. As I have + already recommended, following up this visit with further high-level + demonstrations of U.S. support would serve our interests + well. + + This message was drafted following Ambassador Walters’ departure from + Tunis. + + Cutler +
+ +
+ 309. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Hill) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Head of State File, + Tunisia: President Bourguiba + (8302445–8408275). Confidential. + + + Washington, April 6, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Message to President Bourguiba of Tunisia + +

Under Secretary Eagleburger will + travel to Tunisia and Algeria during the week of April 11.For a summary of the trip, see Document 310. A major purpose in Tunisia will be + to reassure President Bourguiba + and his government of U.S. support for Tunisia’s security.

+

President Bourguiba, who regards + politics in intensely personal terms, is proud of his personal contact + with U.S. Presidents as far back as Eisenhower. Previous letters from President Reagan have impressed him enormously, + and we feel that a similar Presidential imprimatur is called for on + Under Secretary Eagleburger’s + basic message of reassurance.

+

We accordingly request that you approve the attached letter for Under + Secretary Eagleburger to + deliver to President Bourguiba.

+ Charles + HillShirley + signed for Hill above + this typed signature. + + Executive Secretary + + Attachment + Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President BourguibaNo classification marking. + + + Washington, April 8, 1983 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

It is a pleasure to extend to you my warm greetings in the spirit of + personal friendship we have developed. Ambassador Walters has reported to me that + his recent meetings with you and your able Prime Minister, Mr. Mzali, fully reflected the + closeness of our two governments.See + Document 308.

+

I have asked Ambassador Eagleburger to visit North Africa in view of our + important interests there. Tunisia is an important stop because of + our friendship, the strength of the ties that link our two + countries, and your enlightened leadership. The Under Secretary + carries a message from me and the people of the United States: we + stand with you and the people of Tunisia as friends and supporters + of your security and independence in these times of trouble.

+

As we have discussed in previous letters, I believe that the peace + proposal I enunciated on September 1 of last year contains the best + hope of resolving a dispute which brings sorrow to so many nations + and peoples.See footnote 2, Document 114. I also believe that + we must free Lebanon of foreign forces for a resolution of the + conflict to endure. Be assured of my resolve to pursue the goal of + peace consistently and vigorously in the time ahead. I hope that I + can rely on your frank and sage advice as we move forward on this + issue of truly global importance.

+

The United States was pleased to note that Tunisia played a part in + the recent diplomatic activity that promises to make the Maghreb a + more harmonious part of the world.Reference is presumably to Bendjedid’s March visit to Tunisia. See footnote 4, Document 20. We + hope that this auspicious development will continue with the benefit + of your counsel and wisdom.

+

With warmest regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan + +
+ +
+ 310. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830215–0115. Confidential; Priority; Stadis. + + 3040. + + Tunis, April 18, 1983, 1240Z + + +

For P and NEA from Ambassador Cutler. Subject: Under Secretary Eagleburger’s Visit to Tunisia: + Follow-up.

+ + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Under Secretary Eagleburger’s visit to Tunisia April 13–15 provided + timely, high-level consultations on both bilateral and regional + issues. Together with the recent stop here by Agriculture Secretary + Block,A record of Block’s conversation with Mzali is in telegram 2499 from + Tunis, March 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D830173–0355) + Eagleburger’s visit went a + long way in assuaging concern among Tunisia’s leaders that + traditionally close U.S. friendship and support were showing signs + of atrophy; that the U.S. with all its preoccupations in the region, + was beginning to take its long-time Tunisian friend somewhat for + granted. These anxieties should for now be mostly allayed, although + we must anticipate the need for further high-level contacts, + particularly as Tunisia faces the increasing uncertainties + surrounding transition from Bourguiba to a new political era. + + Eagleburger’s + discussions, reported separately, were notable on several + counts.A record of Eagleburger’s conversation + with Bourguiba and + Mzali is in telegram + 3053 from Tunis, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0112) First + and foremost, they revealed the extend of GOT concerns regarding the future of our military + assistance program. Prime Minister Mzali made a particularly impassioned plea, + reflecting not only a genuine concern for the fate of Tunisia’s + military modernization efforts in the face of continuing Libyan + threats, but also the political implications, both international and + domestic, of U.S. failure to live up to perceived commitments. + Tunisian leaders fear that the perception of faltering U.S. support + will serve to encourage Tunisia’s enemies abroad (e.g., Qadhafi), will damage both Tunisian + and U.S. credibility, and will subject the government to domestic + charges that the highly-touted “U.S. connection” is not paying off. + Mzali, Bourguiba’s heir-apparent and an + outspoken advocate of close U.S.-Tunisian ties, is particularly + vulnerable to such charges. + + Both Mzali and Defense + Minister BalyA record of Eagleburger’s conversation with Baly is in telegram 3055 from + Tunis, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0322) also made clear + that, in addition to the military and political implications of cuts + in U.S. security assistance, the GOT will be faced with serious, unexpected budgetary + problems as well. Here + the immediate focus is on the payments due in June which, without + supplemental FMS/MAP funding or some other form of relief, they + claim the GOT will not be able to + meet. + + The Tunisians welcomed Eagleburger’s reiteration of the administration’s + commitment to do its best to obtain supplemental funds to increase + FY 83 FMS/MAP from its current + level of $67 million to the $140 million originally requested. At + the same time they were reminded again that obtaining a supplemental + would not be easy, given U.S. economic conditions and congressional + attitudes. While I doubt Tunisian leaders expect to see the full + $140 million, they will be looking for some increase—up to last + year’s level of $95 million at a minimum. I consider it important to + our interests here that the administration seek all possible ways of + effecting some such increase, either through a supplemental or, + failing that, through reprogramming. Meanwhile, we should be + exploring ways to alleviate the more immediate problem of the June + payment gap, preferably by deferring payment pending a supplemental + or the availability of FY 84 + funding. + + Considering Tunisia’s financial difficulties, the apparent + likelihood of major shortfalls in U.S. security assistance funding, + and the political as well as economic importance of maintaining a + credible level of support for Tunisia, we should consider other ways + by which we might help the GOT. + One, which I strongly recommend, is to respond positively and + promptly to the GOT’s appeal for + additional PL 480 assistance. + (Our specific recommendations are contained in septels.)In telegram 3360 from Tunis, April 29, the + Embassy reported that Cutler and Ahmed Ben Arfa, the Tunisian + Secretary of State for International Cooperation, “signed and + exchanged letters extending the American offer of blended credit + and conveying Tunisian acceptance of the offer.” In a press + release, the GOT announced + “This arrangement on agricultural credits together with the + long-standing PL–480 program + represent a continuation of the close relationship between the + United States and Tunisia.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830241–0850) + Another is to respond favorably to the GOT’s proposal that $2 million of Tunisia’s ESF funding be used for financial + support of Tunisian students in the U.S. This program, initiated + personally by Bourguiba with + a view to breaking out of the French orbit and tapping into U.S. + technology, carries with it both long-term political and commercial + advantages for the U.S. and therefore warrants our support. + + Finally, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the + high-level political consultations mentioned above, I would urge + Secretary Shultz to stop + here when he visits Algeria later this year. Prime Minister + Mzali made an appeal to + this effect during his meeting with Under Secretary Eagleburger. A stop here, even + overnight of for a matter of hours, would yield significant + dividends in terms of our overall political relationship. + + Anderson +
+ +
+ 311. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White + HouseSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + Secto + 15066. + + Rabat, December 10, 1983, 2201Z + + +

For S/S. Subject: Visit of Secretary + Shultz to Rabat—My Meeting + in Tunisia, December 10, 1983.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + I spent six working hours in Tunisia December 10 and met with + President Bourguiba,A record of the Shultz-Bourguiba + conversation is in telegram Secto 15070 from Rabat, December 11. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830730–0088) Prime Minister MzaliA record of the + Shultz-Mzali conversation is in telegram 9290 from Tunis, + December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0434) and Foreign Minister + Essebsi.A record of the Shultz-Essebsi conversation is + in telegram 9291 from Tunis, December 12. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830731–0397) + + They had prepared two basic messages—linked by the perception of + the threat which all agreed Qadhafi represents—which every interlocutor + addressed. One of these dealt with Tunisia’s economic difficulties + and related requirements for softer U.S. assistance—particularly + military assistance terms. The other concerned Arab perceptions of + the imbalanced reinforcement of our relations with Israel after the + Shamir visit.Shamir + visited the United States November 27–30. See Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. This struck them as dangerous to their + interests as well as ours. + + Prime Minister Mzali + carried the ball on the terms-of-aid issue. He pointed to the + exponential curve of Tunisia’s indebtedness to the U.S. as a result + of the commercial interest rates under which we allocate FMS credits and pled for concessional + terms. He reviewed the rationale for Tunisia’s arms purchases + “imposed upon us by Qadhafi’s + Gafsa raid” and was at pains to highlight the Tunisian budget’s + primary emphasis on education, health and development, to illustrate + the modesty of this country’s unavoidable but essential military + outlays. President Bourguiba + put it in a nutshell when he said Tunisia needed help half in + credits, half in grants. I told the Tunisians we were aware of the + problem and would be seeking approval for more concessional and + grant aid from the Congress, and I was hopeful we would be in a + position to present more favorable terms next year. + + + Foreign Minister Essebsi + spoke to me at length about our “enhanced” relations with Israel. + Taking the decision announced after the Shamir visitIn remarks + after his November 29 meeting with Shamir, Reagan announced that the two nations “have + agreed on the need to increase our cooperation in areas where + our interests coincide, particularly in the political and + military area.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 1984, pp. 30–31) as his + point of departure Essebsi + found them comprehensible only as evidence of Washington’s sense + that a strong Israel was the best and only barrier to Soviet + expansionism in the Middle East. Tunisia and other moderate Arabs + could not share this American view. To the contrary, they believed + that Israeli nationalism, competing with Palestinian nationalism for + the same soil, had found expression in the rejection of the + promising Reagan plan (“we + thought that a solution was finally in sight”); had led to the + invasion of Lebanon exacerbating the turmoil there; had turned Syria + “which came to Fez and Washington believing at the time that Moscow + could do nothing” back towards the Soviets for support. Tunisia, in + short, saw an aggressive Israel as the agency through which the + Soviets were enabled to exploit new opportunities in the region. + Essebsi urged not an + abandonment of Israel “whose right to exist is not challenged,” but + more balanced American relations with the countries of the region. + Such balance would best protect American interests, he said, as well + as those of our Arab friends. Bourguiba echoed this theme and so did Mrs. + Bourguiba, in a state of + high emotion on the subject of Arafat’s tribulations, which the news of Israeli + raids on Lebanon kept on everyone’s mind. + + I said that the U.S. has had, has and will have strong links to + Israel. I told all of my Tunisian friends of the important “Arab + side” to our policy which, in fact, has the balance they desire. I + stressed we had explained to Shamir in Washington that Israel’s willingness to + withdraw from Lebanon and to negotiate the status of Gaza and the + West Bank would, ultimately, make or break any negotiation which + might yet come to pass. I spoke repeatedly about our awareness of + the centrality of legitimate Palestinian interests and our intention + to seek an improvement of the quality of Palestinian life. + + I believe I was heard. However, we clearly confront a strongly + skeptical Arab reaction to recent events in the Levant and shall + need to show by what we do and say that our policy towards Arabs and + Israelis is indeed balanced and responsive to need. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 312. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State + (Dam)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S–I + Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of + Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. Secret. + Shultz summarized + Dam’s meeting in a + January 4 memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading, January–March 1984) + + + Washington, January 4, 1984 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

I met with Tunisian Ambassador Ben + Yahia this afternoon. He came in to brief me on the food + riots in Tunisia that have followed the more than doubling of the price + of bread and of rice in Tunisia. This was a budget measure agreed upon + by President Bourguiba, who seems + to have made a serious mistake in introducing the price increase all at + once. Ben Yahia of course + emphasized their suspicion that the Libyans were either behind the riots + or at least taking advantage of them.In + telegram 20 from Tunis, January 3, the Embassy reported: “President + Bourguiba called in + Chargé January 3 to request that U.S. accelerate deliveries of + military equipment as a deterrent to Qadhafi, whom he saw as being behind disturbances in + Tunisia.” Essebsi also said + “GOT could get over current disturbances, but that Tunisian military + feared Libya and looked to U.S. for support.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840004–0137) He had a series of requests, including a + request for intelligence-sharing on what the Libyans were up to, as well + as various financial measures to assist Tunisia. I agreed that we would + provide them, at least on a foreign office to foreign office basis, with + information that we had and that we certainly would look at a variety of + measures that might be conceivable on the financial side, including the + acceleration of military deliveries under our security assistance + program. But I suspect there is very little we can do, and I did not + hold out a great deal of hope.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 313. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President BourguibaSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Tunisia: + President Bourguiba + (8302445–8408275). No classification marking. + + + Washington, January 9, 1984 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I have sent Dick Walters, a + trusted aide, to speak with you about my concern over the recent unrest + in Tunisia. I applaud your courage in facing up to Tunisia’s economic + challenge and I understand how difficult it was to deal with the + disorders. Tunisia’s friends will now want to consider how they can help + your government and we in the United States are considering ways to do + so.

+

With regard to the external threat, I have requested General Walters to share with you our latest + assessment of Libyan activities in the region, and to reassure you of + our continuing efforts to monitor Libyan activities. The United States + remains concerned for the continued security and territorial integrity + of Tunisia.

+

I know you will speak candidly to Dick + Walters and I look forward to a report from him upon his + return.For a record of Walters’s visit, see Document 315.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 314. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger) and the + Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and + Technology (Schneider) to + Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, + George Shultz Papers, + Official Memoranda (01/11/1984). Confidential. A stamped notation at + the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” In the top right-hand + corner, Covey wrote his + initials above Shultz’s + stamp. + + + Washington, January 11, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + Additional Assistance for Tunisia + +

We have real problems with Tunisia in the wake of the bread riots. Much + of the problem is psychological, rather than economic, stemming from + Tunisia’s understandable tendency to see a Libyan hand everywhere and + uneasiness over the Bourguiba + succession. Nonetheless, we need to respond quickly with a solid gesture + that demonstrates to the Tunisians we are willing to help.

+

Vernon Walters is now in Tunisia + with a package consisting of 1) improved terms for our $134 million CCC + credit (bureaucratically no mean achievement, but worth little over + $500,000), and 2) agreement to increase deliveries of some military + equipment. While Alan Wallis + believes this is sufficient, we disagree.On + January 10, Wallis wrote + Shultz that he did “not + concur in the additional PL–480 + Title I. We have provided Dick + Walters a respectable package to go along with a + basically ‘hand-holding’ mission. The improved blend on CCC credits + was a significant concession not lightly obtained. In addition, we + are manipulating the military credits and deliveries to Tunisia’s + advantage.” (Ibid.)

+

There are two ways to supplement this package—PL–480 (I) reserve funds and ESF. PL–480 (I) has the + advantage of meeting the proximate cause of the riots—the increased + price of bread. It is also easier to deliver in that it does not require + painful reallocation of limited ESF + funds. On the other hand, the Tunisian Ambassador, supported by Senator + Percy, has appealed for ESF funds. His + preference is both expected and understandable. ESF is essentially budget support, and would give the + Tunisians more flexibility. Further, there is no doubt the Tunisians + could use the money, e.g., to repair damage to the transportation system + caused by the riots.

+

NEA believes, and we agree, that the + best course is to provide Tunisia with $5 million from the PL–480 (I) reserve immediately. Bill + Schneider thinks OMB can be convinced + of the need. We think Tunisian and Congressional pressure for ESF can be managed by a timely offer of + PL–480 (I).

+ +

In anticipation of the Moroccan delegation’s visit next month, we will be + sending you shortly a separate memo on Morocco, which of the two has the + greatest need for ESF.See Document 222. + In both cases, we must recognize that, faced with sizeable ESF shortfalls worldwide, not only is + ESF for Morocco or Tunisia a + zero-sum game, but it will also require painful reallocations elsewhere, + e.g., Oman, Middle East regional, or Zimbabwe. However, the Moroccans + cannot go back empty-handed, and some ESF, in addition to PL–480, may be our only recourse.

+

Meanwhile, we recommend that General Walters be authorized to tell the Tunisians that we are + prepared to provide an additional $5 million in PL–480 (I). If you agree, we will try to + push this through the interagency process before Walters leaves tomorrow.Shultz + approved the recommendation. A stamped notation next to his initials + reads: “JAN 11 1984.” Below the recommendation. Covey wrote: “NEA AND T alerted. JC 1/11.”

+
+
+ 315. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840019–0378. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to + Algiers, Paris, Rabat, and the White House. Sent for information to + USCINCEUR. + + 221. + + Tunis, January 11, 1984, 1421Z + + +

Please pass White House for Vice President and Department for S/AL from + Walters. Subject: + Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. + Walters’ Meeting With Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + On January 11, accompanied by Chargé Anderson, I called at the + President’s palace at Carthage. We were initially received by + Foreign Minister Caid + Essebsi and I told him in broad terms, without + mentioning figures, what the purpose of my mission was. I mentioned + the President’s letterSee Document 313. and his and the + Secretary’s concern for the security, independence and territorial + integrity of Tunisia. He seemed pleased and indicated that the + Tunisians had just been through a most traumatic experience. We were + then received by President Bourguiba at 0900 in the presence of Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Essebsi and Habib Bourguiba, Jr. + + I then expressed my gratitude for being received so promptly after + my arrival by the President and his ministers, and our satisfaction + that much of the tension surrounding recent events seemed to have + dissipated (though armed soldiers and armored personnel carriers + were in evidence near the residence and the palace). I went on to + say that we understood the dilemma in which they found themselves in + trying to end the costly subsidies while achieving steady economic + development. We were aware of the fact that they faced difficult + challenges both internally and from potentially unfriendly + neighbors. President Reagan + had therefore directed me to come to Tunis to deliver a letter to + President Bourguiba and I was + pleased to do so. I then handed over the letter together with a + French translation done by the Embassy. Bourguiba started to read it but had difficulty and + the Foreign Minister read it to him. + + After President Bourguiba + had read the letter, I expressed the United States’ concern for the + stability, security, independence, and territorial integrity of + Tunisia. Bourguiba + interrupted to say that these were defended by arms. I replied that + I would come to the matter of defense equipment at once. What I + would give them was a preliminary report on what we would do in the + light of the situation that had developed over the past few days in + Tunisia. The Department and DOD had + agreed that 15 M60A3 tanks would be delivered in March instead of in + October. (in consultation with Chargé and Country Team we had + decided that the tanks would be the most reassuring option for the + Tunisians since the APCs are scheduled to be delivered in March + anyway.) I said that I understood that the agreement for the MTT and the TAT had already been + signed by them and they confirmed this. I pointed out that the + radios might not be available at the time of the delivery of the + tanks but that they could be installed later. I confirmed that for + FY–84 there would be a $87 + million credit and $18 million in MAP grants and that these funds would now be available + for drawdown at once. + + Prime Minister Mzali said + that the advance date of delivery of the tanks was the only new + element in the program, with which they were familiar. Their real + problem was the immense amount of money they had to spend to service + their debts and which prevented them from carrying out the economic + programs that would lessen unemployment and give the young the sense + of a future in which they could participate. Credits were helpful + but what they really needed was some oxygen in the form of grant aid + that would not further increase their indebtedness. President + Bourguiba strongly + supported this statement and said that their problems would not be + solved by going further into debt. He reiterated his request for 50 + percent grants in security + assistance. The measures he had announced would give them three + months’ breathing space, but then they would have to find solutions. + He emphasized the permanent threat from Libya which they had to + face. He said Tunisia was a showcase of a moderate Arab state. They + were under attack because they were the friends of the United + States. + + I then said that in the field of agriculture, I was pleased to be + able to tell them that in the blended credits of 132.8 million the + proportion of interest-free credits had been raised from 14 to 19 + percent. This would enable Tunisia to buy wheat with a much larger + interest-free portion of the credit. We could not go to the 20 + percent they had requested for a variety of reasons. I asked them to + hold the fact of the 19 percent interest-free credit in great + confidence. A number of other countries had asked us for similar + treatment and we had been obliged to refuse. They promised to keep + this matter to themselves. + + Bourguiba then asked if I + was aware of the blowing up of the pipeline in southern TunisiaIn telegram 184 from Tunis, January 10, + the Embassy reported that “after briefing the U.S. Chargé, the + French Ambassador, and various press representatives, the + Tunisian Government went public with the sabotage of the + Algerian-Tunisian oil pipeline at a point just inside the Libyan + border” perpetrated by, the Tunisian Government contended, “four + armed men wearing sandals, and that they returned to Libyan + territory after carrying out the operation. A note had been sent + in this regard to Libyan authorities.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840016–0381) and I assured him that I had talked to + Col. Landy Nelson, our military + attaché, who had visited the site the previous day and he had given + me a full account with color photography of what had happened. + Bourguiba was convinced + that the Libyans or Tunisian dissidents trained and equipped by the + Libyans had done this. All in all my impression was that they + emphasized any Libyan participation in the recent rioting less than + I had expected in the light of their previous claims. + + I then proceeded to give them a briefing on the situation in + western Libya for which they were grateful. I indicated that we had + no indications of abnormal military moves in Libya and we would + continue to remain watchful for any such moves and would promptly + advise them. Bourguiba noted + that while we could perceive any substantial military moves we could + not pick up individual commando-type raids. + + Mzali then made an + impassioned plea for more grant aid, both military and agricultural. + I said that we were preparing to do something in respect to PL–480 but I did not have precise + figures but hoped for something on the order of slightly less than a + million dollars but would try to see what could be done beyond that. + I explained that we had many legislative constraints that limited + the ability of the executive to do certain things. Habib Bourguiba, Jr. then pointed + out that in the case of Israel the aid proportion to grants was + about 50 percent and + wondered why small friendly country in danger could not do as well. + Then he answered his own question by saying that they simply did not + have a sufficiently large Tunisian lobby in the United + States. + + Mzali then said that much + of the recent troubles was due to the large unemployment figure in + excess of 20 percent, especially involving young people coming out + of school and with no hope of a future. The service of Tunisia’s + debts to us, to the French and to others was so large a burden that + it prevents them from developing programs that would aid development + and provide new jobs to stimulate the economy. He said that he had + made these points recently to Vice President BushSee Document 27. and to the + SecretarySee Document 311. when he was here. Prime Minister + Mzali commented that they + were currently talking to the Kuwaitis about more assistance from + Tunisia. He asked, seconded at once by Foreign Minister Essebsi, that we urge the Kuwaitis + and the Saudis to be more helpful to them. The Prime Minister + commented with satisfaction that Ambassador Cutler was a friend and understood + Tunisia’s situation well. + + President Bourguiba then + invited me to lunch with him superseding the planned luncheon by the + Foreign Minister and I accepted. + + During a session with Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Essebsi and Habib + Bourguiba, Jr., the Prime Minister raised the + possibility of our lending them some military equipment on an + emergency basis. I said that l would transmit this expression of his + interest but was not in a position to make any commitment. + + Comment. The Tunisians were grateful that I had been sent but + basically they felt I was not bringing too much that was new, that + their danger was great, that they should be a showcase to show how + successful a moderate Arab state could be and most of all they + pleaded for a much greater percentage of grant aid. I said that I + would certainly transmit their views to the appropriate U.S. + authorities, but they must understand that the demands on us were + very great. They asked if I would make a short statement to the + press, which I did on leaving the palace.No record of Walters’ public statement was found. The + President said that it was most friendly of President Reagan to have sent me at this + difficult time. I will have further discussions at lunch and will + see Defense Minister Baly + this afternoon. On the basis of my previous visits to President + Bourguiba, whom I have + known for 30 years, I found him in relatively good shape. He was not + unduly emotional. He was less visibly disturbed by the recent events + than I might have expected and the trembling of his hands was no + greater than the last time I saw him about six months ago. He + obviously had difficulty in reading the translation of President + Reagan’s letter but other than that it seemed + to be one of his better days. He was obviously pleased and grateful + that I had been sent to him with a friendly personal letter from + President Reagan. End + comment. + + Anderson +
+
+ 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840262–0649. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by + Schneider, Richard + Kauzlarich (S/S), and Teicher; + approved by Gregg. Sent for + information Priority to Rabat, Algiers, and Paris. + + 117333. + + Washington, April 21, 1984, 0009Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Ambassador Ben + Yahia’s Call on the Vice President. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Habib + Ben Yahia called at his request on the Vice President + April 16. AFN Director Sebastian also participated. The Ambassador reviewed + both U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and Tunisia’s regional + relationships. On bilateral matters, Ben Yahia emphasized the need for greater U.S. + security and economic assistance. On regional affairs, Ben Yahia reviewed recent Libyan + activities and concluded that Qadhafi continued to pose a serious and perhaps + enhanced threat to Tunisia. End summary. + + Ambassador Ben Yahia + called on Vice President Bush at the former’s request on April 16. AFN + Director Sebastian sat in. + The Ambassador opened with a statement of appreciation for the Vice + President’s visit to Tunis last year,See Document 27. noting that + the Vice President had had a powerful and positive impact and + expressing hope he would find it possible to return. The Vice + President said he remembered his sojourn in Tunis and the + hospitality extended to him with pleasure and would gladly consider + another visit should the opportunity present itself. + + Ambassador Ben Yahia said + that much had happened since last September. The January riots had + had both internal and external causes, but the country had recovered + its perspective under the wise leadership of President Bourguiba, “our George Washington”. + The President was fully involved in the political decision-making. + The Prime Minister was in + charge of the day-to-day administration of the government. Reform + measures favoring the disadvantaged classes of Tunisian society and + the less favored regions of the country were under way. Clearly, + Tunisia’s leaders had under-estimated the pressures in the + environment when it discussed the bread price reforms. Adjustments + were nonetheless being made, the Ambassador said. Tunisia was + grateful for the prompt American response. + + Reverting to President Bourguiba’s health, Ben + Yahia said that Bourguiba is holding up well, despite his 82 years. + Bourguiba had just gone + through a cataract operation (in Lyon) which had been successful. He + would return to Tunisia after a few days of rest in France. The Vice + President asked that his best wishes for President Bourguiba’s rapid and complete + recovery be conveyed to him. + + The Ambassador then addressed the external dimension. In response + to the Vice President’s question, he said that Qadhafi had unquestionably played a + role in the January unrest. Three thousand Tunisians had been + expelled from Libya just prior to the riots in Tunisia. While the + attempt to double the price of bread had triggered the + demonstrations, others had been prepared to make trouble too. + Tunisia, however, was not looking for scapegoats. + + Expanding on the Libyan threat, Ben + Yahia said that Qadhafi’s intention remains hostile. He seeks to + destabilize Tunisia. The situation in this respect is deteriorating + because Qadhafi is becoming + more aggressive. He has now disrupted the flow of Libyan tourists to + Tunisia and the Tunisian authorities have the distinct impression + that he is “cooking something”. The GOT is also disturbed because in Qadhafi’s March 28 speech, he + offered facilities to the USSR + (“another power”). Ben Yahia + pointed out that Qadhafi made + this speech as an official statement of policy at a meeting with the + Ambassadors of all Mediterranean powers.Not further identified. His objective is to alarm the + regional powers, the NATO Allies + and the U.S. He is using a combination of carrots and sticks, + however, as in last week’s announcement, intended to entice the + attention of consumers and deter them from action, of a huge new + offshore oil find. The GOT judges, + Ben Yahia said, that + Qadhafi feels under + pressure following the bombing of Omdurman and seeks to break out of + his isolation in his own way. Tunisia must take seriously the danger + he represents. He is unpredictable. The GOT, therefore, requests the U.S. to monitor the area + closely. The Vice President undertook to pass this request along. He + noted our continuing interest in Tunisia’s security. The Ambassador + then amplified on his earlier remarks, saying that the time had come + to do more than react to Qadhafi’s transgressions. Ben Yahia said that his government + is in close touch with the Sudanese, Egyptians, Algerians and Moroccans. Tunis is, + however, concerned over Morocco’s rapprochement with Libya. + + The Vice President enquired whether Tunisia felt King Hassan was + being taken in by Qadhafi. + For our part, we do not think so and believe the Moroccan-Libyan + rapprochement to be purely tactical. Ben Yahia said the GOT was surprised when King Hassan sought publicly to + justify Qadhafi’s presence in + Chad. “That is going too far.” The Vice President agreed. He said + that we understand Tunisia’s concerns about Libya. Ben Yahia said that his government + had discussed with the Moroccans their rapprochement with Algeria in + order to sensitize the Moroccans to Tunisia’s security concerns with + respect to Libya. Tunis does not want to draw closer to Algeria at + the expense of relationships with its other friends. The Vice + President replied that we understand completely. Ben Yahia amplified that it is + Tunisia’s policy to “contain” Qadhafi. If Tunisia had not been on better terms + with Algeria, January’s “events” could have had catastrophic + consequences. Tunisia, in short, seeks enhanced stability in the + region and hopes that Morocco will join in the effort sooner or + later. + + On the bilateral side, the Ambassador said there had been some + hold-ups in the promised early delivery of U.S. military equipment. + AFN Director interjected that problems had been worked out and that + most of the equipment remaining to be delivered would be turned over + shortly to the Tunisians at the point of origin. Ambassador + expressed appreciation at this news. He then said that GOT had been surprised at reduced + level of FY–85 security assistance + requested by the administration for Tunisia. The GOT hoped for upward adjustments of + levels and improved terms. The Vice President responded that the + administration was faced with the need to spread available resources + and stressed that the reduction of requested aid levels for Tunisia + in no way reflected any reduction in American interest in Tunisia’s + security or well-being. The Vice President added that the + administration would remain alert to opportunities to improve this + situation in the future. The Ambassador thanked the Vice President + and said he hoped for the Vice President’s help with A.I.D. to bring + the latter to view Tunisia not repeat not as an A.I.D.-graduate. The + Vice President repeated that while the administration had had to go + forward with the figures known to the Ambassador, Tunisia’s needs + would retain the administration’s full attention. + + Dam +
+ +
+ 317. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Reagan + Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, + Reference File 1984. Secret; [handling + restrictions not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of + Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and coordinated with the + Directorate of Operations based on information received as of July + 16. + + + NESA 84–10249 Washington, August 1984 + + +

TUNISIA: MOVING TOWARD CRISIS [portion marking not declassified]

+

The prospects for stability in Tunisia are poor. President Habib Bourguiba shows no inclination to + address the grievances of disaffected youth and the unemployed, the + urban and rural poor, and those wanting to revitalize the Arab-Muslim + character of Tunisia. Disorders similar to the economic riots last + January could occur with little provocation and accelerate the erosion + of government authority. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

Senior officers, struggling to maintain the apolitical character of the + armed forces, and moderate leaders of the country’s growing Islamic + fundamentalist movement continue to be forces for stability. Their + strength is eroding, however, under popular pressures for reform. + Bourguiba’s paternalistic + rule has created a sycophantic political elite that has acquired + privileges resented by the poor. The aged President’s failure to build a + constituency beyond this group is encouraging the trend toward + radicalization and thus invites foreign, particularly Libyan, meddling. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

Prospects for stability appear even worse should Bourguiba die in office. Bourguiba’s constitutionally designated + successor, Prime Minister Mohamed + Mzali, has shown little ability to build a broad base of + support. His blatant efforts to weaken his rivals have damaged his + political standing even in official circles, setting the stage for a + prolonged and bitter struggle after Bourguiba’s death. Such a crisis may prompt the armed + forces to step in to secure an orderly transfer of power or to ensure + that their own favorite assumes the presidency. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Opposition to US policies among newly + radicalized Tunisians is growing and may soon prompt the government to + give additional emphasis to the Arab and nonaligned aspects of its + foreign policy. Although ties to the United States and Western Europe + probably will remain important for defense support and economic + investment, Tunisia’s need to demonstrate its nonaligned credentials may + push it closer to the Soviet Union in the post-Bourguiba era. This—in the worst + case—could jeopardize the unrestricted passage of US naval vessels through the 140-kilometer + strait between Tunisia and Sicily. NATO would then have to devote more assets to keeping this + vital sea lane open during a confrontation with the Soviet Union. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is a map of Tunisia and the body of the assessment.]

+
+
+ 318. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, + Department of Defense, and the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Tunisia (02/02/1983–01/28/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed + from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White + House Situation Room. Poindexter also initialed the + telegram. + + 31039. + + Cairo, October 14, 1984, 1047Z + + +

White House for the President. Department for SecState Shultz. Department + of Defense for DepSecDef Taft. + National Security Council for Mr. McFarlane. Personal from Secretary Weinberger. Subject: My Visit to + Tunisia.

+ + + (Secret—Entire text.) + + I have just completed a 24 hour visit to Tunisia as a guest of the + Minister of Defense. Our discussions were remarkably friendly, warm + and straightforward, and included talks with the Defense + Minister,A record of the + Weinberger-Baly conversation is in telegram 8028 from Tunis, + October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840659–0022) Foreign + Minister,A record of the + Weinberger-Essebsi conversation is in telegram 8027 from Tunis, + October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840659–0013) Prime Minister and + the President of Tunisia, Habib + Bourguiba.No record of + Weinberger’s + conversations with either Mzali or Bourguiba were found. I passed to + President Bourguiba your + personal letterIn a September 28 + letter, Reagan wrote + Bourguiba: “Allow me to reaffirm that the security and + territorial integrity of Tunisia are of fundamental importance + to the United States. We rely on our strong friendship to help + ensure peace and promote stability throughout the region.” + (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, + Tunisia 1984 (07/06/1984–11/28/1984)) and followed up + with an oral message of support and admiration for Bourguiba’s accomplishments in this + moderate Arab state from you. He has unbounded admiration for you + and for America. + + + The Foreign Minister made three points. He expressed continued + dismay at the Oudja union of Qadhafi and King Hassan of Morocco and its impact on + the regional balance. I indicated that we followed this very closely + and were equally concerned. He then raised Jordan’s restoration of + relations with Egypt, but I did not sense any permanent unhappiness + that Jordan had broken from Arab League consensus by taking such + action. He made it clear that Tunisia has longstanding ties to Egypt + and regards its role in the Middle East as pivotal in finding a + resolution to the problem of a lasting peace. Lastly, the Foreign + Minister expressed his strong hope for flexibility on the part of + new Israeli Government in resolving the Palestinian question. I told + him that I had high hopes your initiative would now be able to be + realized given the new Israeli Government’s decision to withdraw + from Lebanon, and Jordan’s action in recognizing Egypt. + + The majority of the talks concerned Tunisia’s economic problems + and, in particular, the difficult burden of debt servicing. Tunisia + faces severe demographic problems with approximately 70 percent of + the population under 25 years of age. Tunisia faces high + unemployment, higher underemployment, and rising expectations from + its population. This is combined with the stirrings of Islamic + fundamentalism, particularly among the young. + + Added to these economic difficulties, Tunisia has as its neighbor + the unpredictable Libyan, Col. + Qadhafi. Qadhafi has been the cause of + unrest in Tunisia and is constantly looking for opportunities to + destabilize this strategically important country. The Libyan threat + drives the need for Tunisia’s military modernization. We have + engaged in a five-year plan with Tunisia and have completed 56 + percent of it. However, the major thrust of the Defense Minister’s + remarks concerned an appeal for better financial terms to help + Tunisia meet its security requirements without further damaging + Tunisia’s fragile economy. Tunisia’s interest repayments will double + within a few years and will soon exceed the amount of annual + payments of aid. Although I offered no guarantees, I agreed to + explore in Washington the possibility of obtaining better credit + terms and additional grant aid, and did reaffirm your commitment to + assist both in economic and military terms to our greatest possible + extent. + + President Bourguiba was + most effusive in his praise of you. He was complimentary of the + support which Tunisia has received from your administration. I + mentioned to him that I had recently seen a new biography of + President Eisenhower in + which Bourguiba was + prominently mentioned. It was the Eisenhower administration which was the first to + recognize the newly independent Tunisia in 1956. Bourguiba is particularly proud of + autographed photographs he has from you and from President Eisenhower.During an + October 19 breakfast meeting at the Pentagon, Weinberger told Casey and the other attendees + that Bourguiba “was + physically weak; that after sitting down it took him awhile + before he could bring his hands down to the level of the table; + finally, that President Bourguiba spent a great deal of time reading + inscriptions on photographs he had been given by earlier US Presidents. The Secretary noted, + however, that the people around the President are sharp and + energetic.” (Memorandum for the Record, October 19, 1984; + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 89B00224R, Box 11, Mtgs w/ Sec & Dep See + Defense (Memos for the Record), May ’81–Dec ’85) He also + asked me to be sure to convey his warm regards to “Nancy + Reagan.” + + Bourguiba is most + distrustful of Qadhafi and + very wary of his habit of saying one thing and doing another. + + The President presented me with a decoration, the grand order of + independence, which I accepted in the name of the American + people. + + My final meeting was with Prime Minister Mzali, who is the constitutional + successor to President Bourguiba. He primarily stressed economic issues and + mentioned that perhaps a commission could be established to review + the problem of debt servicing for Tunisia. Additionally, we + discussed ship repairs which are performed on Soviet ships in + Tunisian yards. This is a big source of foreign exchange and + provides approximately 2000 jobs. I indicated that I’d see if the + USN could have more of their + necessary work performed in Tunisian yards so as to reduce the + Soviet presence in Tunisia. + + In sum, they are looking to us to help them avoid potential + domestic unrest as a result of poor economic conditions while they + continue to need our help to improve Tunisia’s military + capabilities. The question of the post-succession period and + Tunisia’s survival as one of the few forces of democracy and one of + our few friends in the area also weighs heavily in their minds. In + this context, the degree to which we continue our military support + and provide economic relief through far better FMS terms may well decide not only + Tunisia’s survival but the future of our bilateral relationship. End + comment. + + Veliotes +
+ +
+ 319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840738–0042. Confidential; Priority, Exdis. Drafted by Nassif; + cleared by Raphel, Zweifel, Robert Clarke, Covey, and Robert Ayling (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to + Rabat, Paris, and Algiers. + + 342369. + + Washington, November 17, 1984, 1545Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting With Tunisian Defense Minister Baly on November 14. + + + + (C—Entire text). + + Summary: Tunisian Defense Minister Slaheddine Baly met November 14 with the Secretary + in advance of the convening of the 4th U.S.-Tunisia Joint Military + Commission. The discussion focused on the Libyan threat to Tunisia + and the GOT’s concern that regional + developments, including the Moroccan-Libyan accord and Libya’s troop + withdrawal from Chad, would increase the Libyan security threat to + Tunisia. Baly also reiterated + Tunisian requests for larger levels and increased concessionality of + U.S. security assistance. The Secretary told Baly that the U.S. shares Tunisia’s + view of the Libyan threat to the region and that the U.S. would do + what it could, within severe budgetary constraints, to help Tunisia + with its continuing security needs. + + Baly opened the + conversation by expressing President Bourguiba’s happiness over the reelection of + President Reagan. President + Bourguiba also remembered + fondly his last meeting and conversation with Secretary Shultz in Tunisia.See Document + 311. + Baly had met with the + President just before coming here. He said that the President’s + recent heart troubles had constituted a “warning” to be careful, but + the President was recovering and doing fine now. + + Baly went on to express his + appreciation for the scope and quality of U.S. assistance. Tunisia + needed to develop itself economically, socially and militarily. But + Tunisia needs assistance if it is to develop in all three areas. Its + defense must be global, a well-equipped army and people. There + cannot be just a diplomatic component without a civil and military + component. + + Tunisian foreign policy was based on non-interference but that + policy was not shared by other countries. The threat from Libya is + blatant. Since the Gafsa incident the Tunisians concluded they must + arm themselves. They tried to restore relations with Qadhafi but Qadhafi believes the Tunisian + regime must be brought down and that the two regimes cannot coexist. For Tunisia Qadhafi is the enemy. Qadhafi uses every opportunity to + reiterate that Tunisia is plotting to harm his regime. Qadhafi will not forgive President + Bourguiba for allowing + the Nimetz to make a port call in Tunisia + after the Gulf of Sidra incident.Reference is to the August 19, 1981, Gulf of Sidra incident, + when, after being fired upon, two U.S. Navy F–14 Tomcats shot + down two Libyan SU–22 Fitter fighter jets. Documentation on the + incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. + Qadhafi also believes that + the May 8 attackIn telegram 135419 to + Brussels, London, Rome, Tunis, and Cairo, May 9, the Department + noted press reports about “an armed attack on the barracks in + Tripoli where Col. + Qadhafi is said normally + to reside. Department does not, rpt not, have detailed + information on the alleged attack, but believes some sort of + military action, either by Libyan dissidents or aimed against + them, may have taken place May 8 in Tripoli.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840300–0322) was fomented by Tunisia, plotting with the + U.S. and UK. He alleges that the + participants received asylum in Tunisia and crossed into Libya from + Tunisian territory. Qadhafi + accuses Tunisia of boycotting the OAU meeting in Tripoli in order to prevent Qadhafi from becoming president of + the OAU. + + Baly said that the + Moroccan-Libyan Union was also directed against Tunisia. Some + countries believe that Qadhafi can be reclaimed by improving their + relations with him. Tunisia must now face Qadhafi’s hostility against it, the + Moroccan-Libyan Union, and European overtures to improve their + relations with Qadhafi. + Libyan troops that withdrew from Chad are now on Tunisia’s border + yelling anti-Tunisian slogans. When Foreign Minister Essebsi went to Libya he was + greeted by threats from Qadhafi. The appointment of Masmoudi to the UN is a hostile act inimical to + Tunisian interests. Qadhafi + has made statements privately and publicly that a union with Tunisia + will occur in spite of the Tunisian Government, but not with the + Bourguiba regime. + + Baly went on to talk about + the Soviet naval presence in the harbor off the coast of Tunisia. He + told the Secretary that Tunisia was an outpost of the West constantly endangered by the + Soviet fleet. The Soviets are looking for a warm water port in the + Mediterranean. Their presence would pose a serious danger to NATO and provide a base from which to + attack Europe. + + Baly summarized by asking + the Secretary to review the terms and mix of our assistance on + FMS so that they would be able + to bear the costs of their defense. He also stated that President + Bourguiba wanted to + develop the south of Tunisia, an area in which the Libyans are + fomenting discontent. + + Secretary Shultz told + Baly that the U.S. shares + the Tunisian view of Qadhafi. + We are upset over the union and have made that known to the + Moroccans. We don’t share the view of other countries like Italy + that + Qadhafi will be changed by + going along with him. Our strategy is to isolate him. He is a + terrorist and an aggressor. The Secretary went on to say that the + U.S. wants to be helpful to Tunisia, which is on the front line of + the problem. We continually review our programs but are constrained + by our budget. The Secretary added that when Finance Ministers come + to this country they are always telling us to get our deficits down. + On the question of promoting development in the south, the Secretary + said he had not been aware of that request. It sounded expensive but + as plans were formed we would be willing to talk about that. + However, Tunisia should not expect to see large sums of money going + into that development. The Secretary added that President Bourguiba should also know that he + has a friend in Washington and one who shares his views on Qadhafi. + + Baly added that the U.S. + policy of isolating Qadhafi + is made more difficult by actions of those who wish to boost + Qadhafi’s image, for + example by the Moroccan-Libyan Accord, and the increasing European + audience. This has enabled Qadhafi to become more daring toward Tunisia. + + Participants at the meeting included Arnold Raphel, Thomas + Nassif of NEA, + Arnold Kanter of PM and M/G + Burns of DOD/ISA. + + Shultz +
+
+ 320. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 9, Tunisia (Nov–Dec). Secret. + + + Washington, November 28, 1984 + + Dear George: + +

(S) We have just completed the fourth + US-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meeting.No minutes of the meeting have been found. + During our two days of discussions, Tunisian Minister of Defense + Baly made a strong plea for + increased US military and economic + assistance for FY 86. He stressed + Tunisia’s increasingly severe internal economic problems and the rising + external military threat from + Libya. I am very sympathetic to Tunisia’s situation, and believe that + more should be done for Tunisia in terms of economic aid.

+

(S) Recent analyses of Tunisia’s economic + situation appear to support this view.Not + found and not further identified. Tunisia’s external debt + situation has been worsening as markets declined sharply for Tunisia’s + principal foreign exchange earners—petroleum, phosphates and tourism. + Tunisia’s debt service ratio was pushed to 18.5 percent in 1983 and it + is expected to be higher, closer to 25% in 1984 (not counting the + military debt to the US). In addition, + our unspoken, but well-recognized concern for Tunisia’s stability is + based on the deteriorating health of Tunisian President Bourguiba and the uncertainty that in + his declining health he, or his designated successor, will be able to + maintain stability in Tunisia.

+

(C) Currently, the FY 86 integrated budget with OMB pegs $54 million for FMS—half at concessional rates, $16 million MAP and $15 million ESF. Perhaps we together could suggest a + greater ratio of concessional credits.

+

(S) In addition, I would like to ask you + to consider an increase in the FY 86 + ESF request for Tunisia from $15 + million to $30 million. The additional $15 million would allow us to + initiate a four-year, $40 million program to establish a security belt—a + series of “kibbutz-like” agriculture settlements for nomadic tribes in + southeastern Tunisia along the Libyan border. Minister Baly raised this idea in discussions + with me on the first day of the JMC. + While I made no commitments to him on this proposal, it makes a lot of + sense both from an economic and a security standpoint.

+

(C) Tunisia’s case is a serious one. I + hope that together we can explore every opportunity to assist Tunisia + and aid in some measure the stability in the Maghreb.

+

Sincerely,

+ Cap +
+ +
+ 321. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, Reference File 1984. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. + Approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board based on + information received as of November 27. + + NIE 63–84 + + Washington, December 1984 + + +

PROSPECTS FOR TUNISIA

+

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

+

SCOPE NOTE

+

This Estimate examines Tunisia’s political, economic, and societal + problems, the likelihood of further unrest, and the prospects for + President Bourguiba’s regime over + the next two years. Given Bourguiba’s stature in Tunisia, questions regarding + stability had tended to focus on the post-Bourguiba era. The January + 1984 bread riots, however, illuminated a more pressing question—will the + state survive Bourguiba’s + continued reign? The youthful populace and the disadvantaged do not + perceive the regime or the ruling Destourian Socialist Party as + responsive to their needs and aspirations. Libyan-supported subversion + and the Islamic resurgence add to the regime’s challenges. This Estimate + addresses the implications for the United States in the event of + domestic upheavals which produce a new government, and examines + alternative scenarios.

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

Prospects for more political instability in Tunisia are high: + + President Bourguiba has + shown no inclination to address fundamental economic, social, + and political grievances that trouble many Tunisians. Bourguiba’s mental and physical + capabilities are declining—he recently entered a hospital + suffering from heart spasms—but the 81-year-old President shows + no sign of stepping down voluntarily. His continued rule will + stifle desperately needed change and increase the likelihood of + violent change. + + Although many Tunisian leaders recognize the need for reforms, + they are unwilling to confront Bourguiba directly. Instead, many officials are + content to adopt measures that appear responsive to the public, + but fail to meet growing public demands for real change. +

+

Given Bourguiba’s inflexibility, + the subservience of his officials and the decline in political + institutions, Tunisia’s future is likely to be increasingly turbulent, + although we do not think the regime will be toppled as long as Bourguiba remains alive and in control. + Nevertheless, the boiling point for dissension may have been + substantially and permanently + reduced; future unrest may be touched off by a far less momentous + event.

+

Opposition forces, while growing in strength, are not well organized. The + legal, secular opposition seeks only an expanded role in the + decisionmaking process and a broadening of the political process. The + illegal opposition—particularly the Islamic fundamentalists—is growing, + but remains poorly organized, factionalized, and publicly committed to + nonviolent change.

+

The likelihood of serious instability and chances for an abrupt change in + regime will increase greatly once Bourguiba dies, however. His constitutionally designated + successor, Prime Minister Mzali, + has little popular support. Many of Tunisia’s elite—clan patriarchs, + government officials, and party leaders—fear that the unpopular + Mzali’s accession would + trigger widespread unrest and ultimately threaten their wealth and + positions in Tunisia. Thus, Bourguiba’s heart spasms precipitated vigorous efforts + to encourage the President to alter the constitutional succession + procedure or to replace Mzali as + Prime Minister.

+

The President has long hoped that his son, Habib, Jr., would replace him; however, the latter has + previously opted out of the contention. The cause of Minister of Public + Works and Housing Sayah is also being pressed. Such a substitution might + smooth the way for succession in the post-Bourguiba era; however, it + offers little hope of reform to the disadvantaged and alienated, who + will view the power struggle as the elite’s attempts at protecting + itself. As long as Bourguiba + retains his grip on power, substantial change cannot be expected, and + this will increase the pressure for violent change. For his part, Prime + Minister Mzali will intensify + efforts to garner support.

+

Bourguiba’s death in office and the uncertainty surrounding the + succession process would give Islamic fundamentalists and secular + radicals opportunities to extend their influence and perhaps take over + the government. Younger Tunisians—about 70 percent of the population is + under 26—and the growing number of unemployed are increasingly turning + to the fundamentalists and would probably be willing to support them in + a succession crisis. Bourguiba’s + secular policies and the Westernization of the privileged classes have + given Islamic fundamentalism credibility among the disadvantaged and + alienated. Although the strength of the Islamic Tendency Movement—the + most prominent fundamentalist group—is difficult to measure, its appeal + to the youth is evident and is likely to increase. The Movement’s more + radical members are well placed to exploit discontent.

+

Moreover, the turmoil likely to surround the succession process would + offer external actors—particularly Libya—chances to interfere in + Tunisian politics. Libya’s Qadhafi remains intent on developing a Tunisian + dissident organization capable of fostering armed revolt. While he has had little + success to date, if he does develop such an organization, it could + provide him with the pretext for invasion.

+

The Tunisian military, traditionally apolitical and under tight civilian + control, may become a significant factor in the succession process. + Although uneasy with riot-control duties, the military has obeyed + civilian direction, and we believe it will continue to do so while + Bourguiba is in power. The + military could potentially become the dominant element in choosing + Tunisia’s next leader.

+

The military’s role in the succession process will depend on how that + process unfolds. If the succession process proceeds smoothly and + according to law, we doubt that the Army will intervene. In the face of + prolonged instability or unrest generated by squabbling over the + succession, however, the military could feel compelled to + intervene—provided it does not fragment—and take power. Moreover, the + possibility of a coup by radical younger officers cannot be ruled out. + [1½ + lines not declassified]

+

Within the near term, Prime Minister Mzali is the strongest candidate as Bourguiba’s replacement, provided the + constitutional process operates. Barring a serious miscalculation, + Mzali is likely to retain + Bourguiba’s confidence. + Should Mzali lose his office, + possible alternatives—other than Public Works and Housing Minister + Sayah—include Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) Director Baccouche and Foreign Minister + Caid Essebsi.

+

Tunisia’s relations with France and the United States would not change + substantially under Mzali or any + other PSD successor. Political reality will force the successor to rely + upon and maintain relations with Tunisia’s traditional friends. Tunisia + will have to adhere closely to the broad Arab consensus on regional + issues; however, under Mzali or + another PSD figure, Tunisia would be likely to remain a voice of + moderation in Arab and nonaligned fora.

+

From the US perspective, the most + favorable scenario would be a peaceful transition to a constitutional + successor government dedicated to widening the political process and + correcting inequities. A broad-based government of national unity would + be an acceptable alternative, but such a regime would have great + difficulty operating effectively over the longer term. A + military-controlled government might prove the only one capable of + ensuring stability; however, it would be no more desirable than a + civilian regime and no more adept at solving Tunisia’s problems.

+

The accession of an Islamic fundamentalist government would reduce + Western influence; however, an eventual modus vivendi with the United + States and the West could be + possible. Such a regime would probably prove less harmful to US interests than a radical leftist + regime.

+ +

Finally, the seizure of power by a patently anti-Western regime would + adversely affect US interests in the + Maghreb and beyond. Such a development would be widely perceived as a + severe blow to US prestige and policies. + Should such a regime perceive itself weak and threatened by the United + States and the West, it might + turn to the USSR with ominous + implications for vital US and Western + security interests.

+

Tunisia’s economic woes, partly the product of the international + recession, will remain a problem throughout the decade. Oil revenues + probably will decline slowly, and the growth in worker remittances from + abroad will be slight. The prospect of worker migration to Europe and + the wealthier Arab states, a traditional relief valve for excess labor, + is declining. At the same time, economic growth in Tunisia cannot + accommodate the 3.8-percent annual increase in the manpower pool. + Tunisia increasingly will be unable to afford the large foreign exchange + expenditures for food imports. Thus, increased agricultural productivity + will be crucial to future balance-of-payments stability.

+

Petroleum production, a mainstay of the economy, probably has peaked at + 120,000 barrels per day. Although production from fields still under + development should allow overall oil production to approximate current + levels over the near term, the rapid growth of domestic requirements + will cut into net oil export volume. Tunisia will probably become a net + oil importer by the end of the 1980s, further worsening the financial + pressures. The troubled financial picture, coupled with the elite’s + unwillingness to share its wealth or broaden access to economic + opportunities, will increase the difficulty of reallocating resources to + neglected economic sectors.

+

The USSR’s principal interest in + Tunisia is to neutralize its pro-Western orientation and to maintain and + expand access to port facilities—part of an overall objective of + expanding regional access. Moscow must view the Bourguiba succession issue and other + domestic problems as opportunities to advance Soviet political and + military interests. Although there is no evidence of overt Soviet + destabilization efforts, Moscow would clearly benefit from the damage to + Western interests that might proceed from a radical change of regime in + Tunisia. Libyan subversive activities against Tunisia also serve + Moscow’s longer term interests.

+

Unable to keep pace with Libyan and Algerian military modernization and + expansion, Tunisia’s military goal has been to develop only a force + capable of delaying an invading army until foreign assistance arrives. + The Bourguiba regime has forged + tacit security relationships with France and the United States and, more + recently, improved ties with Algeria to counter the Libyan threat. + Algiers would respond to a Tunisian request for assistance. Likewise, + France would employ its armed + forces to repulse any encroachment of Tunisian sovereignty. An + unequivocal French and US commitment to + Tunisia’s security remains the best guarantee against direct Libyan + aggression.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

+
+
+ 322. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, Box President’s Evening Reading, + July–December 1984. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, December 3, 1984 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

2. Meeting with Tunisian Official. Ken Dam met briefly today with + Mahmoud Mestiri, Tunisian + Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to discuss Libya’s role in North + African politics.In his record of the + meeting, Dam wrote: “I also + met with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia and + the Foreign Trade Minister of Romania, in each case discussing + issues involving that country. In the case of the Tunisians, we also + discussed Libyan actions in the region, and our analyses of + Qadhafi’s policies seemed + quite similar—namely, that he is an opportunist who seeks to expand + power in any direction whenever at all possible and that therefore + Tunisia is not in immediate danger, although Qadhafi is trying to bring pressure + on the Tunisian Government.” (Personal Note Prepared by Dam, January 20; Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I + Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of + Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984– June 1985) + Mestiri suggested that the + Morocco-Libya union will persist as long as both Libya and Morocco + perceive major problems with Algeria. The Tunisian government does not + anticipate a frontal attack from Libya, but subversion will be a fact to + deal with so long as Qadhafi is + around. Mestiri noted that + Qadhafi’s earlier threat to + expel as many as 98,000 Tunisian workers is in abeyance pending further + bilateral discussions. Although Qadhafi could not expel so many over night, he is + capable of such action over time. Massive expulsions would be a disaster + for Tunisia. Mestiri also painted + a dark picture in discussing the Tunisian economy and financial + prospects. He concluded by saying that the situation is “difficult, but + in hand” and made a non-specific appeal for “help from our friends.” + (C)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 323. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Platt) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: + Lot 94D92, Nodis February 1985. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by + Stephen Eisenbraun (NEA/AFN); + cleared by Zweifel, Nassif, Johnson, and Selwa Roosevelt (S/CPR). + + + Washington, February 27, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Request by Tunisian President Bourguiba for Private Call on President + +

Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba + February 16 asked that Ambassador Sebastian convey Bourguiba’s desire to make a visit to the U.S. later + this spring. The centerpiece of such a visit would be a private call on + the President. Bourguiba, at + least eighty-three, is increasingly anxious to pay his respects to the + President; Bourguiba for health + reasons was unable to accept the President’s invitation for a private + meeting two years ago.

+

Since suffering heart troubles last November, Bourguiba has seemingly become more conscious of his + advancing age and the need to set in place as firmly as possible the + future direction of Tunisia’s foreign policies. One of his concerns is + to solidify further U.S.-Tunisian relations, which under Bourguiba have always been close and + productive. If the visit materializes, we assume that Bourguiba’s entourage would include + several of his ministers who would pursue substantive meetings here.

+

Even though Bourguiba’s health is + fragile and may ultimately preclude a visit, the Department strongly + recommends that the President agree to receive Bourguiba during a private visit to + Washington in late spring. The Department proposes sending the attached + draft cable conveying this message to the GOT.Not found.

+

Attached also is Tunis 1467, which expresses Ambassador Sebastian’s strong views on the + desirability of a visit.

+ Nicholas + Platt + + Executive Secretary + + + Attachment + Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSecret; Immediate; + Nodis. + + 1467. + + Tunis, February 16, 1985, + 1259Z + + +

Pass White House. Subject: President Bourguiba Asks to Meet President Reagan. Refs: Tunis 1386In telegram 1386 from Tunis, February 14, + Sebastian reported + that Mzali had told him + that “Bourguiba had wanted for some time to come to the U.S. to + visit with ‘his friend’ President Reagan. Ill health had interfered but he now + felt sufficiently recovered and ‘is badgering FonMin’ to arrange the visit.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, N850002–0468) and previous.

+ + + (Secret/Nodis—Entire text.) + + Summary. President Bourguiba wants to make a symbolic sentimental + visit to Washington to meet with President Reagan. He has suggested May. + His intimates and physicians remain opposed to the idea given + his health but have proved unable or unwilling to dissuade the + President. We do not see, now, how we can refuse Bourguiba’s request, which was + couched in all the warm feelings this devoted friend holds + towards the U.S. We recommend that we promptly respond with an + agreement in principle for a private visit at a date in the + spring to be agreed upon later. End summary. + + This is an action message (see para. 9 and 10). + + President Bourguiba + asked to see me this morning (February 16). We talked for about + twenty minutes. Prime and Foreign Ministers were present. + + President Bourguiba + said that he had last been in the United States two years ago. + It had been a private visit and he had gone to consult an + eminent dentist—Dr. Amsterdam of Philadelphia. President + Reagan had been kind + enough to invite him to stop by to see him then, but he + (Bourguiba) found + himself in bad oral shape (“my teeth were mush”) and had had to + decline. “Now I am 81, Bourguiba said, and cannot live much longer” (et + la mort n’est pas loin). He had met virtually every President + since Eisenhower (FonMin was sent off to find + Ike’s photo with a warm dedication) and “If President Reagan wants to see me” he + (Bourguiba) would + have closed the circle, viz, seen the last President likely to + be in office before his own passing. May seemed like a good + month for his trip, Bourguiba continued. It would be warmer then and + the President would have a clearer calendar than at + present. + + + I told Bourguiba that I + felt certain President Reagan would be delighted to receive him at the + first mutually convenient moment. I knew that as a dean of world + leaders and a staunch friend of the U.S. since prior to + Tunisia’s independence, the President held him (Bourguiba) in high esteem—as + witness also his 1982 invitation to stop by. I would report his + desire promptly. Bourguiba then said that he “and my wife” really + looked forward to the trip and sent the President his warm good + wishes “for a second term as pace-setting (retentissant) as the + first term had been.” + + Comment: Before I was taken in to see the President I had a + few minutes in the ante-chamber with Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi. The latter knew + the Prime Minister had seen me and may well have known what was + said (reftel) but I cannot be sure. Operationally, we shall have + to ascertain ASAP whether the + Prime Minister’s request is or not overtaken. In any event we + will wish to shape our responses in ways which do not/not make + it appear that the sending of physicians is in anyway a polite + substitute for the requested meeting—or, worse, a checkup to see + whether President Bourguiba seems likely to survive pending this + possible trip to the U.S. + + Foreign Minister Caid + Essebsi, in alerting me to the likely tenor of + President Bourguiba’s + démarche, agreed that any visit which might materialize would + need to be structured to allow a maximum of flexibility. This + suggests a private visit at an agreed date undertaken pursuant + to assurances that during it, the President would be most + pleased to receive President Bourguiba for, say, lunch (FYI—lunch with Bourguiba and visitors at + Carthage usually lasts one hour from start to finish). The + likely (and, indeed, necessary) presence of Wassila Bourguiba would also permit a + more intimate get together—should the White House prefer—to, + say, tea in the family quarters. In short, assuming we are + prepared to accept a visit on some such terms, the format would + need to meld personal contact between the principals with + settings responsive to the limitations imposed on Bourguiba by his infirmities. + End FYI.) + + Recommended action—President Bourguiba’s request speaks for itself. He made + clear in his comments this morning that he feels keenly the + passing parade of Arab leaders through Washington (“the + President has seen the Saudi King, Chadli Bendjedid is going and Mubarak. . . so if he wants to + see me. . . etc”). In his eyes these men are all much his + juniors and have far to go before their friendship for the U.S. + and what it stands for can compare with his. Of course, all + those who benefit from the status quo here will be reluctant to + see him go, given the inherent risks, but arguably Bourguiba probably draws more + vitality from his continuing sense of political centrality and + relevance than from the cautions of his physicians or + intimates. + + + I do not see how we can decently do other than welcome him at + a mutually convenient date for a private visit. As the date + approaches he either will or will not be able to travel. If he + can, we buy some risk but surely should the trip prove too much + for him the world will place responsibility for its effects on + those who let him go rather than those who would honor and + receive him at his request during a “private” sojourn. + Alternatively, we could, of course, temporize or refuse to + accept him, but he has an old man’s tenacity and, justifiably, a + view of his own achievements which would lead him to perceive an + overly delayed or less than welcoming response as a serious and + undeserved slight. Our relationship would suffer the + consequences. Given this cost-benefit calculus, therefore, I + hope that President Bourguiba’s request will be granted and would + welcome an early favorable reply in principle pending agreement + on a mutually acceptable date “this spring.” + + Sebastian + +
+
+ 324. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to Secretary of State WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 1, Tunisia. Confidential. A stamped notation at the top + of the memorandum reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN MAR 11 + 1985.” + + + Washington, March 8, 1985 + + Dear Cap: + +

I very much appreciated your letter of November 28th in which you + expressed your concern for the continued stability and security of + Tunisia as the Bourguiba era + draws to a close.See Document 320. We are closely following events + there and share your concern and sympathy for Tunisia’s difficult + economic circumstances and complicated security environment. As you + noted, Tunisia’s economic and security needs are inter-related, and we + fully share your desire to contribute to Tunisian development while + minimizing the negative impact of our security assistance on Tunisia’s + increasingly burdensome foreign debt.

+ +

Fortunately, the foreign assistance proposals for Tunisia contained in + the FY–86 budget submission to the + Congress will contribute considerably to Tunisian economic development + and security. The $22.5 million ESF + proposal, for example, is an increase over the $20 million FY–85 earmark and represents a substantial + jump from earlier years. At the same time, combined FMS and MAP proposals of $69 million are somewhat larger than the + $65 million of the previous year, and, more importantly, concessionality + has been improved.

+

In the area of economic development, we are keenly aware of Tunisia’s + need to concentrate its resources on rural development. However, + Minister of Defense Baly’s + requestBaly made the request to Shultz during a November 14, 1984 + meeting. See Document 319. during + his visit here last November for our assistance in developing a series + of settlements designed to enhance security in the Saharan region of + southern Tunisia is an ambitious and costly proposal. While the value of + extending government services to the nomadic people in the area is + self-evident, it is far less certain that the proposed settlement scheme + would work or could ever have a positive security value. Our experience + with similar settlement schemes in this and in other areas of the world + suggests extravagant per capita costs and a very high probability of + failure. Without overwhelming evidence to the contrary, we would be + reluctant to use economic assistance funds for these settlements.

+

In our meetings last November, while I assured Minister Baly that we would be willing to + discuss the project again as it takes shape, I was not in a position to + commit a U.S. contribution. Subsequent consideration by AID and the State Department has led us to + conclude, based on what we have seen so far, that other projects to + which we are already committed are more promising and cost-effective + vehicles for USG economic development + or security assistance funding than this settlements project would + be.

+

In the meantime, you can be assured that we remain very much interested + in assisting Tunisia through this difficult transition period by the + most effective means available.

+

Sincerely yours,

+ George P. + ShultzShultz signed “George” above + this typed signature. +
+ +
+ 325. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia 1985. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of + Near Eastern and South Asia Analysis. + + NESA M#85–10121 + + Washington, June 11, 1985 + + +

TUNISIA ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA’S VISIT TO + WASHINGTON

+

Summary

+

Tunisian President Bourguiba will + be making his third official visit to the United States when he comes to + Washington this month. Bourguiba + sees his visit as highlighting the close ties Tunisia has had with the + US since Tunisia gained its + independence in 1956. Bourguiba + is aware of US concern about his poor + health and almost certainly will seek reassurances that Washington will + protect Tunisia from domestic turmoil and external aggression once he + passes from the scene. He also will be looking for additional military + and economic assistance to help ease mounting economic and security + pressures and as a measure of Washington’s appreciation for Tunisia’s + consistent support for US policies over + the years. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Bourguiba’s visit comes at a time of unprecedented challenges to his + rule. His government is viewed by a growing share of Tunisians as out of + touch and insensitive to their concerns, particularly declining living + standards, rampant corruption, and record unemployment. These problems + will complicate the government’s efforts to ensure a smooth succession + process when Bourguiba dies. The + longer he lives and fails to address Tunisia’s economic problems the + greater the possibility of widespread unrest and a radical regime coming + to power. Any successor probably will be more reserved toward the United + States, if only to establish an identity separate from Bourguiba. Short of a regime tied to + Qadhafi, a post-Bourguiba + government is likely to maintain Tunisia’s currently pro-Western + orientation. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading, + April–June 1985. Confidential. + + + Washington, June 17, 1985 + + +

1. Tunisia: Discussion with Foreign Minister Essebsi. In my conversation + with Essebsi, he appealed for + our comprehension of Tunisia’s difficult economic circumstances and an + increase in assistance levels.No other + record of the Shultz-Essebsi meeting has been found. I + expressed our understanding of the issues, but noted that we cannot + commit ourselves to increased levels at this time. Essebsi termed Libya a real and + present threat to Tunisia, and noted that the existence of training + camps in Libya for subversives is of special concern to Tunisia. Tunisia + is not happy with the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union, and I told him we + also see this as a negative development and, while not overreacting, we + have made our views clear to the Moroccans. Essebsi expressed mild optimism about the Middle East + peace process. I briefed him on the state of play and urged Tunisian + support for King Hussein. With regard to the hijacking,See footnote 2, Document + 150. + Essebsi said that he would send + a supportive message to Nabih Barri and others in Lebanon as soon as + possible and was confident that President Bourguiba would also contact President Gemayal on the + problem. I then suggested he might even call Barri to urge the earliest + possible release of the remaining hostages. Essebsi said he would attempt to do so immediately after + our meeting. Tunisian Ambassador Ben + Yahia subsequently called the DepartmentNo record of the Ben + Yahia call has been found. to report that + Foreign Minister Essebsi and Mrs. Bourguiba “have done their duty . . .” He was not sure + whether this meant that they had succeeded in talking to Barri and/or + Gemayal. (C)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850442–0242. Secret; Priority. Drafted by O’Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Murphy, McKinley, and Jonathan Benton; + approved by Shultz. Sent for + information to Algiers, Amman, Damascus, Rabat, the Joint Chiefs of + Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. Shultz summarized the meeting in a June 20 + memorandum to Reagan. + (Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading, + April–June 1985) + + 192277. + + Washington, June 22, 1985, 1716Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s June 20 Meeting With President Bourguiba. + + + + On June 20 Secretary Shultz met briefly with President Bourguiba at the residence of the + Tunisian Embassy in Washington. With President Bourguiba were Minister Bourguiba, Jr., Foreign Minister + Caid Essebsi, Minister + of Plan Khelil, Ambassador Ben + Yahia, Ambassador Karoui, Mohamed Gherib, Deputy + Director for the Americas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and + Hassen el Ghouayel, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister. + Accompanying the Secretary were Ambassador Sebastian, NEA Assistant Secretary Murphy, PM Acting + Director John Hawes, NEA/AFN Director Zweifel and Tunisian Desk Officer + O’Neill. + + President Bourguiba opened + the session by reminding the Secretary that the purpose of his visit + was to obtain greater levels of assistance, particularly military + assistance, and he inquired about the U.S. response to this request + “after all we (the Tunisians) have done” in North Africa. Secretary + Shultz presented the + President with a signed letter from President Reagan extending congratulations + on the occasion of Id al-Fitr. President Bourguiba expressed gratitude for the sentiments + expressed by President Reagan. + + Secretary Shultz then + began to review the “very positive” results of this visit. He said + that President Reagan was + pleased with the substantive discussion of matters of common concern + to the two countries as provided against the background of our + historic relationship.No record of the + conversation between Reagan and Bourguiba, which according to the President’s + Daily Diary for June 18 took place from 11:35 until 11:52 a.m., + has been found. Reagan, + Bourguiba, and U.S. + and Tunisian officials also met from 11:52 a.m.–12:20 p.m., and + then participated in a working lunch from 12:20 until 1:36 p.m. + (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of those + conversations was found. In his personal diary, dated June 18, + Reagan wrote of + their meetings: “They were good sessions & he is really a + friend of America. Tunisia is the only Moslem or Arab country + that practices Monogamy & gives women equal rights. The + Pres. is also a declared enemy of Quadaffi. He is 85 yrs. old, + in bad health.” Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, p. + 336) He said that on the question of Qadhafi and Libya, the views of the + two countries are quite parallel and the U.S. wants to be as helpful + as it can to Tunisia. With regard to the requests for aid financing + included in the memorandum + given to the Secretary by Foreign Minister Essebsi on June 17, the Secretary + said that similar problems confront other governments friendly to + the U.S. The GOT presentation + deepened USG comprehension and will + be carefully studied. We cannot say for sure where we will come out. + The USG wants to be “as helpful as + we can.” President Bourguiba + responded that he hoped that once back in Tunisia he would not be + disappointed. He said the Tunisians were counting on his trip. “I + cannot go back empty-handed,” he said. + + The Secretary continued that President Reagan had expressed admiration + for the prompt and clear statements of support on the hijacking of + TWA flight 847. He added that + the U.S. knew that President Bourguiba had sent his Ambassador to Lebanon back to + Beirut, and President Reagan + appreciated these acts of assistance on the part of the + Tunisians. + + President Reagan was also + interested in the discussion on the peace process that he had had + with President Bourguiba and + in learning the long-standing view that the Tunisian President held + that in the end there had to be direct negotiations. The United + States, he said, would welcome Tunisia’s encouragement to King + Hussein on this matter. President Bourguiba responded that Hussein was in a delicate + situation with little maneuvering room because of the opposition of + the Syrians and some PLO + dissidents. Bourguiba (with + Foreign Minister Essebsi + chiming in) opined that Hussein’s “courageous stand” exposes him to + the threat of assassination. “His life is at stake,” he said. The + Secretary noted that additional Arab support would provide King + Hussein with more room for maneuver; he agreed that it is necessary + to produce progress in the peace process that would rebound to + Hussein’s benefit to offset his critics. + + The Secretary continued that President Reagan had benefitted from hearing + President Bourguiba’s views + on the situation in the Maghreb and especially with regard to + Qadhafi and the + Polisario. The Secretary said that this exchange, following so + quickly on the exchange the President had with President Bendejdid, + was especially helpful. + + The meeting was interrupted when the Secretary was called to + attend an urgent meeting at the White House. In bidding farewell to + the interlocutors, President Bourguiba reminded Assistant Secretary Murphy that it was necessary that + he return to Tunisia with concrete and positive results to his + requests for assistance. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850471–0504. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Rosemary O’Neill + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + William Kirby (NEA/MEN); + approved by Zweifel. Sent for + information to Algiers, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Paris, + Rabat, Rome, and Tel Aviv. + + 203796. + + Washington, July 3, 1985, 1845Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Bourguiba Visit: A + Wrap-up. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Summary: In meetings with the President,See footnote 2, Document + 327. and Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger,No record of the Weinberger-Bourguiba meeting + has been found. President Bourguiba reiterated GOT requests for increased U.S. economic and military + assistance at more concessional rates. In a memo prepared by + Minister of Planning Khelil, the GOT requested military assistance comprised of 50 + percent in MAP grants and 50 + percent FMS in concessional + credit.The memorandum, dated June + 17 is in Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Tunisia President Habib + Bourguiba (June 1985). We have responded + that the economic/financial problems confronting Tunisia are shared + by other countries; we want to do what we can, but cannot say + precisely where we will come out. We expressed understanding for + Tunisia’s problems in dealing with Qadhafi. Bourguiba and his delegation issued supportive + statements on the hostage situation and on the issue of direct talks + between Israel and the Arab parties. President Bourguiba also dispatched a + separate emissary to Beirut to confer with Nabih Berri on the + American hostages. The Tunisians seemed cautiously optimistic about + the Middle East peace process. President Bourguiba appeared glad to have had the opportunity + to make his aid requests to the senior-most levels of the U.S. + Government, but clearly he is reserving judgement on the overall + utility of the visit until such time as the administration responds + positively to these requests. End summary. + + During his official visit to Washington, June 14–26, President + Bourguiba met with + President Reagan, + Secretaries Shultz and + Weinberger, House + Speaker O’Neill, President Pro Tem of the Senate Thurmond, and other + Members of Congress. He also met with the Presidents of the World + Bank and IMF, selected business + leaders and had a routine medical examination at Walter Reed + hospital. Mrs. Wassila Bourguiba, Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Foreign + Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, + and Minister of Planning Ismail Khelil accompanied the President. + The Ministers had separate meetings with NSC, State, Defense, Treasury, Agriculture and AID officials. During the visit, Bourguiba, Jr. also addressed the + American Enterprise Institute and the Foreign Minister held a + seminar at Brookings. + + Although his movements were stiff (perhaps from the medication he + was taking), President Bourguiba was in excellent health during his visit + and in feisty spirits. The results of the medical examinations at + Walter Reed indicated that he is in generally good health. In + deference to the President’s age, official meetings were scheduled + only during morning hours, and with the exception of his call on + President Reagan, all + meetings were held at the residence of Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia. + + Through this visit President Reagan, senior administration officials and Members + of Congress had an opportunity to send an important signal to Tunis + and other North African capitals of the high regard in which they + hold President Bourguiba and + their concern for Tunisia’s security and territorial integrity. The + Tunisians were pleased at the warm reception they were accorded at + the White House and the solicitude extended to President Bourguiba. President Reagan was particularly gratified + that during the visit Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi issued a statement condemning the + hijacking of TWA flight 847 and + that President Bourguiba + dispatched his Ambassador to Lebanon back to Beirut to confer with + Nabih Berri. + + In connection with President Bourguiba’s visit, Minister of Planning Khelil + prepared a memorandum outlining the difficulties confronting the + Tunisian economy and requesting increased U.S. economic and military + assistance. This memorandum was distributed to various + administration officials during calls on Bourguiba and at meetings with the Tunisian + delegation. Specifically, the memorandum requested that the U.S. + reconsider the phasing out of CIP and development assistance + programs for Tunisia, requested an unspecified increase in ESF levels with greater programming + flexibility, and urged a reversal in the downward trend of PL480 + Title I assistance to be stabilized at 15 million dollars over + several years. President Bourguiba stressed the need for a qualitative + improvement in military assistance (from 50 percent in MAP grants and 50 percent FMS in concessional credit, an + increase in IMET, and a commitment + “for coming years” to insure full financing of U.S. military + equipment). In his presentation at various stops, Minister of + Planning Khelil spoke to the fact that Tunisia is repaying the + US 200 million dollars a year, + twice what Tunisia was receiving in new aid; he said that without + softer concessional terms Tunisia will reconsider continuing its + military modernization program with the U.S. + + Secretary Shultz in + reviewing the aid requests noted that similar economic and financial + problems confront other governments friendly to the U.S. The + Tunisian presentation strengthened U.S. comprehension of the problem and will be + studied. The Secretary, Secretary Weinberger and NSC + Advisor McFarlane + separately answered the Tunisians that “the U.S. wants to be as + helpful as possible.” However, no precise commitments were made, and + it was stressed that the USG will + focus on FY 87 in whatever we might + do. President Bourguiba + appeared glad to have had the opportunity to make his requests to + the senior-most levels of the U.S. Government, but clearly he is + reserving judgement on the overall utility of the visit until such + time as the administration responds positively to these + requests. + + The Tunisians characterized Libya as a “clear and present danger + to Tunisia,” and said that Qadhafi’s threats imposed on them a burden to + modernize Tunisia’s military at the expense of agricultural and + rural development. Foreign Minister Essebsi noted that traditional Libyan markets for + Tunisian exports had been closed and Libyan threats to expel some + 100,000 Tunisian workers is a “sword of Damocles.” To forestall such + action, it is necessary to sustain a dialogue with Libya. President + Bourguiba was more + explicit about the Libyan threat, telling President Reagan that Qadhafi is waiting for Bourguiba’s death before attacking. + Essebsi thought that in + the event of such an attack, assistance would come from Morocco + (perhaps belatedly) and Algeria, (portrayed as a not entirely + welcome insurer). He emphasized that military preparedness would not + suffice to put down instability in Tunisia in the absence of + economic reform. Essebsi + spoke of the necessity of a Maghrebian “ensemble;” this would be a + form of economic community, not repeat not a political union. + Essebsi went on to note + that the Western Sahara question was the most important issue + dividing the North African states. + + The Tunisians were cautiously optimistic with regard to the Middle + East peace process. In the statement to the press following his + meeting with President Reagan,A record of + Bourguiba’s remarks + is in Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, + pp. 776–778. President Bourguiba noted that he had advocated negotiations + between Arabs and Israelis within the framework of pertinent UN resolutions as early as 1965 and + that his judgement had been vindicated by the Fez Summit. Foreign + Minister Caid Essebsi told + NEA Assistant Secretary + Murphy that the PLO is committed to going forward in + the peace process with King Hussein and that the Tunisians support + this. He urged quick action to take advantage of the February 11 + accord between Hussein and Arafat (i.e., an early meeting between U.S., + Jordanian, and Palestinian representatives) and a speedy follow-up + meeting with the Israelis thereafter to maintain momentum in the + peace process. Caid Essebsi + said that in a first phase non-PLO Palestinians are acceptable to + the PLO, although it was important for the PLO to be tied into a preliminary + conversation. While the PLO might + be able to distance itself from non-PLO Palestinians in an initial + phase, he doubted that it could do so in a subsequent phase + involving the Israelis. He was confident that some formula could be + worked out to resolve the problem of representation in Phase + I. + + Comment: Though low-key, the Department believes this visit + signalled to the Tunisians and their neighbors that we share the + GOT’s concerns about Tunisia’s + security and economic viability. It is clear however that they + eagerly await a positive response to their pleas for assistance. The + measure of success of this visit to GOT eyes will be in terms of additional aid for Tunisia + gleaned from an already tight USG + budget. End comment. + + Shultz +
+
+ 329. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff (Carter) to the + Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + (Armitage)Source: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC + 330–88–0058, 1985 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and + Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the + Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 2, Tunisia 1985. Top + Secret. + + DJSM 1794–85 + + Washington, September 3, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisia Security Situation (U) + + + + (S) Reference your memorandumReference: ASD /ISA Memo, I/20745/85, 22 Aug 85, “Tunisia + Security Situation.” [Footnote is in the original. The + memorandum has not been found.] soliciting comments and + recommendations regarding US support + to Tunisia in its current crisis with Libya. + + (S) The following are offered for + the circumstances you outlined: + + (S) Current situation. + + Despite the harsh rhetoric from Libya, DIA reportsNot found. that Libya has + not moved forces or made any preparations to take + military action against Tunisia. We do not rule out + further deterioration of the situation, given + President Bourguiba’s strong feelings and + Qadhafi’s + penchant + for violence, but our expectation at this point is + that Libya will continue to expel Tunisians in the + near term, and then the crisis will fade.In telegram 7504 from Tunis, + August 21, the Embassy reported that Baly “repeated GOT’s growing conviction + that Qadhafi making major effort to + destabilize Tunisia. He predicted that more + Libyans, including diplomats, would be expelled if + expulsion of Tunisian workers continued. + Ambassador reiterated that we awaiting GOT’s suggestions on how + we might be of help.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850594–0860) + + This appraisal notwithstanding, President + Bourguiba + clearly feels exposed in the current situation and + would greatly appreciate any support provided during + the crisis.In telegram + 7605 from Tunis, August 23, the Embassy reported + “Minister of Defense Baly called in Ambassador urgently + afternoon August 23 to request USG assistance in three + areas to help GOT + meet Libyan threat,” including intelligence, + surveillance aircraft, and TOW night + sights. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850601–0923) If State and OSD desire, USCINCEUR is + prepared to schedule a major USN combatant port visit + to Tunis in the near future as a symbol of US support. Admiral + Watkins’ visit on 4 September 1985 will also be + perceived as a strong signal. + + There is little in the security assistance + pipeline that could be accelerated. However, + sixty-five TOW + night sights, which have been identified + by our ambassador as a possible priority + requirement, could be provided on an expedited basis + after depot conversion. The conversion would be + necessary because the appropriate configuration, the + AN/TAS 4C (Export Model), does not exist in Army + inventory. The 65 night sights would be + incrementally available during a 45 day period after + program implementation. Limited numbers of jeeps, + armored personnel carriers, and heavy machine guns + could also be provided from SDAF stocks, as well as + selected ammunition items. Mortar ammunition, 105mm + ammo for the M60A3 main gun, 155mm HE, and limited + quantities of 7.62mm linked ammunition are + available. Other support would require diversion + from Army stocks or active/reserve units. Security + assistance funding or Section 506(a) authority would + be required for items coming from Army inventory. + For those items not coming from Army inventory, + security assistance funding would be + required. + + + (S) Increased hostilities. The most likely threat from + Libya is subversion by agents hidden in the recent flood of + deportees. Tunisia’s simmering labor problems are expected + to generate strikes and unrest this fall. If Qadhafi orchestrates + widespread confrontations like the 1980 Gafsa incidentSee footnote 2, Document 288. in + conjunction with this unrest, the army would be stretched + thin. Ideally in such circumstances, a Franco-Tunisian or + Algerian-Tunisian joint exercise that introduced an excess + of helicopters and + trucks could increase the mobility of the Tunisian armed + forces. In circumstances of domestic unrest where Libyan + provocations were veiled, it would be best for the US not to have its own forces + in Tunisia. + + (TS) Conventional military attack. + + If, however, Libya conducts a large scale + offensive into Tunisia, we should be prepared to + support a French military response, if requested by + the GOT. After the + credibility loss France suffered in Francophone + Africa last year over Chad,Reference is presumably to the + September 17, 1984, agreement between France and + Libya, under which both countries agreed to + withdraw their troops from Chad. Documentation on + the accord is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; + Chad. we believe the GOF would be + strongly inclined to assist Tunisia. A US Navy CVBG operating off + Libya as intimidation should satisfy both French and + Tunisian interests for support of French actions. In + the case of smaller scale border raids, Paris is + likely to offer increased military assistance but + try to avoid direct involvement. In either case, + France would resent the US taking the lead. + + No specific CONPLAN exists addressing a Libyan + attack on Tunisia, although a general + retribution-on-Libya plan is in preparation. A + CONPLAN to assist Tunisia as directed by NSDD 168See Document + 53. has not been started, pending + OSD/State guidance on what joint planning with the + French, and perhaps the Algerians, is authorized. + Your assistance in coordinating with State on this + matter is requested. + + + + (U) The above has been coordinated + with the Services and DSAA. + + P. F. Carter, + Jr. + + Vice Admiral, USN + + Director, Joint Staff +
+ +
+ 330. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Armitage) to the Director of the Joint + Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Carter)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0058, 1985 Official Records (Top Secret) of + the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive + Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 2, + Tunisia 1985. Top Secret. + + I–35382/85 + + Washington, September 4, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisia Security Situation (U) + +

(S/S) I appreciate your response to my + memorandum regarding US support to + Tunisia in its current crisis with Libya.See Document 329. However, your + response regarding the third scenario—conventional Libyan attack—is + incomplete in that it does not address possible unilateral US actions, other than visits and providing + specific security assistance articles.

+

(TS) While one aspect of the problem does involve working with our + allies, such as France, we also should be prepared to address this + problem if we have to do it alone. Therefore, I request you provide more + specific unilateral military actions that could be considered if events + in the region take an unexpected turn for the worse. For example, what + role would you envision for the US Navy + CVBG off the Tunisian coast—just + “show the flag” to intimidate or actively engage in reconnaissance or + other activities; should joint/combined exercises be included in the + spectrum of responses; do we provide air cover/combat air patrol in + order to free limited Tunisian air assets? Because of his comments on + this subject to President Bourguiba during his June visit,See Document 327. + the Secretary has expressed an interest in your response.

+

(S) Regarding contingency planning in + conjunction with our allies, I intend to ask State to chair a meeting on + this.No record of such a meeting has + been found. In the interim I would appreciate your response + as soon as possible, not later than 9 September 1985.The response was not found. The ISA point of contact for this request is + LTC Jim Carney, NESA, x75173.

+ Richard L. + ArmitageArmitage + wrote: “Many thanks” below the last paragraph of the memorandum + and signed “Rich Armitage” above this stamped signature. + + Assistant Secretary of Defense + + (International Security Affairs) + +
+ +
+ 331. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary + of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive + Secretariat Sensitive (10/01/85). Secret. A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Quinn initialed the top of the memorandum and wrote: + “10/1.” + + + Washington, October 1, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Call on Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi + +

Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid + Essebsi expressed to me in strong terms his government’s + reaction to the Israeli air strike against the PLO facility near Tunis.The + Department of State received confirmation from the Israeli + Government about the attack at 1000 hours. NESA believed that while + Israel wanted to “signal” King Hussein of Jordan “that he must crack + down on Fatah activities in Jordan,” the “choice of PLO facilities in Tunis as a target + instead of PLO targets in Jordan, + however, indicates that for the time being Peres’ prime motivation remains to + limit the damage that retaliatory attacks inflict on the peace + process.” (Spot Commentary, October 1, 1985; Reagan Library, Near + East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Israeli Airstrike on PLO camps in Tunisia (9/30/85): + (10/01/1985–10/02/1985)) + Essebsi was shocked and + disappointed by press reports of the U.S. reaction, which he + characterized as supporting or rationalizing the Israelis “aggression” + against Tunisia. He asked what our position was.

+

I conveyed our condolences and sympathy for the loss of Tunisian lives, + but told him that a definitive U.S. reaction had to await a fuller + clarification of the facts. He expressed appreciation for the + condolences, noting with some bitterness that the statements of + Larry SpeakesIn telegram 302819 to USUN, all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic + posts, and Beirut, October 2, the Department reported that on + October 1, Speakes said in + part: “We’re distressed by and deplore the cycle of violence in the + Middle East, of which this latest incident is a part. It underscores + the urgent need to work for peace in the Middle East. As a matter of + U.S. policy, retaliation against terrorist attacks is a legitimate + response and expression of self-defense.” He also said the United + States was not warned in advance of the Israeli attack. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850699–0582) In telegram 303005 to all Near Eastern and South Asian + diplomatic posts and multiple addressees, October 2, the Department + transmitted excerpts from the October 1 press briefing, at which + Redman commented: “We deeply deplore the rising pattern of violence + of which this latest incident is a part. It underscores the need to + work on the peace process.” The Department also repeated Speakes’s comment about the + legitimacy of self-defense against terrorist attacks. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850700–0238) and other spokesmen had been disappointing in + their failure to express any sympathy for Tunisia as a friend of the + U.S.Later that day, Shultz wrote Reagan: “Tunisian + Foreign Minister Caid + Essebsi made it clear to Mike Armacost today that he was shocked and deeply + disappointed by press reports of the U.S. reaction. Essebsi said that he personally + did not believe this could accurately represent the U.S. position. + Essebsi expressed + appreciation for our condolences but said that Tunisia considers + itself a victim of an act of aggression and ‘state terrorism,’” and + that “Tunisia’s policy to consistently condemn terrorism, whatever + its source, and that Tunisia hopes for the same attitude from the + U.S. Tunisia has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to ask for + condemnation of Israel’s act and to seek reparations.” (Memorandum + from Shultz to Reagan, October 1; Reagan Library, + George Shultz Papers, + Executive Secretariat Sensitive (10/01/85)

+ +

Essebsi went on to make the + following points: + + Tunisia considers itself a victim of an act of aggression and + “state terrorism” that has resulted in a significant number of + innocent dead and wounded, mostly Tunisians (60 dead, 100 + wounded at the latest count). + + Tunisia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have been + violated and its security threatened. Excuses for Israel’s + action are not convincing. Tunisia was in no way involved in the + actions at LarnacaOn September 25, + during the Jewish Holy Day Yom Kippur, gunmen from the + PLO’s Force 17 unit + hijacked an Israeli yacht off the coast of Lanarca, Cyprus, + killing all three Israeli citizens aboard. and there + was no evidence that Tunisian territory had been used to plan or + direct that action. + + Tunisia’s policy on terrorism is clear and consistent—it + condemns terrorism, whatever its source. Every time the U.S. has + been a victim of terrorism, Tunisia has been quick to condemn + the act and to express sympathy. The TWA hijacking was only the most recent example. + Tunisia hopes for the same attitude from the U.S. + + In 1982 Tunisia had acceded to the PLO’s request to receive its headquarters after the + U.S. had encouraged it to do so in the context of facilitating a + U.S. effort to break an impasse in Lebanon. Its agreement to do + so had been a gesture on behalf of peace, not an expression of + support for terrorism. + + Israel’s action was clearly directed against the peace + process, as its timing (while King Hussein was still in + Washington) makes clear. This being the case, all who work for + the peace process should condemn the attack as directed not + against Tunisia, but against the peace process as a + whole. + + Tunisia has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to ask for + condemnation of the act of aggression and of the aggressor and + to seek reparations. Tunisia hopes for support from all its + friends, including the U.S. +

+

In addition to extending our condolences, I told Essebsi that: + + The USG had no prior + knowledge or involvement in the incident. + + + We have deplored the cycle of violence in the region, of which + this action is an example. It confirms our view that moving the + peace process forward is imperative. + + We know that there are people on all sides of the issue who + wish to derail the peace process. + + The Israelis see their action as a response to the terrorist + incident in Larnaca, for which a PLO faction has claimed responsibility and + consequently see their action as directed against the PLO, not against Tunisia. We + understand why Tunisia feels that its sovereignty has been + violated and recognize that Tunisians have been killed. This we + deeply regret. +

+

I assured Essebsi that I would + see that his government’s reaction was conveyed to the Secretary and to + the President. I reiterated that the rising cycle of violence is of + great concern to us because the peace process is its principal victim; + that the US had expended a tremendous + amount of energy and political capital on the peace process; and that we + remain committed to moving the process forward.

+ Michael H. + ArmacostArmacost initialed + “MA” above this typed + signature. +
+
+ 332. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State, + Secretary of State Shultz in New + York, and the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850700–0690. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; + Specat, Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Paris, Tel Aviv, + Rabat, and USCINCEUR. The + document is misnumbered in the original. + + 9028. + + Tunis, October 2, 1985, 1217Z + + +

Military address handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Ambassador’s + Meeting With President Bourguiba: Israeli Raid and the American Position. Refs: (A) Tunis + 8966,In telegram 8966 from Tunis, + October 1, Sebastian noted + that he would meet with Bourguiba and recommended “(a) strong public USG statement condemning raid on + Tunisian target and deploring Tunisian casualties, (b) message I can + pass to Bourguiba on subject, + and (c) a U.S. position in UNSC + making clear that U.S. was unwitting, would have opposed raid if + asked, supports compensation for Tunisian victims, and condemns + cycle of violence which undermines peace efforts.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850698–0104) (B) Tunis 8964,In + telegram 8964 from Tunis, October 1, the Embassy reported: “In + relatively friendly atmosphere, GOT + has signaled its dismay over Israeli raid. President Bourguiba is convoking Ambassador + Wednesday morning. The GOT is + fearful that public reaction to the bombing will undermine close + ties with the U.S., and hopes the USG will help assuage the Tunisian public. Qadhafi, GOT believes, will attempt to use the incident to + condemn GOT and force wedge between + U.S. and Tunisia. GOT leaning + toward calling for Security Council meeting.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850698–0051) (C) Secto + 19057,In telegram Secto 19057 to Tunis, October 2, the + Department transmitted the text of a message from Reagan to Bourguiba which read in part: “The + difficult circumstances through which you and the people of Tunisia + have lived during the last twenty-four hours have caused me great + sorrow.” After expressing his “heartfelt condolences and sympathy to + you and your people,” Reagan + closed by reassuring “that the U.S. Government is sincerely devoted + to the security and stability of Tunisia and that we will continue + to work for these noble objectives.” (Reagan Library, Near East and + South Asia Affairs Directorate, Israeli Airstrike on PLO camps in Tunisia (9/30/85): + (10/01/1985–10/02/1985)) (D) Secto 19055,Telegram Secto 19055 to Tunis, October 2, + included talking points for Sebastian. It reads in part: “The U.S. Government + strongly deplores the pattern of violence of which the Israeli + attack on PLO facilities near Tunis + is a part. Such acts of violence are contrary to our shared + objective of a peaceful, stable Middle East” and “this pattern of + violence cannot be allowed to harm the positive and mutually + beneficial relations between our two countries.” The Department also + included the following talking point: “I want to make it clear that + the Israeli Government did not inform or consult the U.S. Government + concerning this attack, and there was absolutely no, repeat no, U.S. + involvement in it.” (Ibid.) (D) Sebastian-Armacost telecon + Oct. 1.Not found.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary. President Bourguiba expressed strong concern and + disappointment over U.S. attitude toward Israeli attack, in meeting + with me October 2. He was especially disillusioned by White House + approval of the raid, expressing view USG must have given advance blessing. I insisted that + U.S. had not been consulted nor had we participated in any way, and + presented President’s message and talking points in full. Bourguiba pessimistically foresaw + U.S. veto in Security Council, which would have “devastating” effect + on our relations and show our previous warm words of support to be a + “sham.” Prime Minister Mzali, + also present, strongly urged U.S. abstention in UNSC.In + telegram 9077 from Tunis, October 3, the Embassy reported that + “Senior GOT official has + accused ‘someone’ in USG of + lying in denying foreknowledge of raid. President Bourguiba was also reportedly + further angered when told that U.S. had undertaken to ‘dissuade’ + Israel from such an act. Although current high-level Tunisian + threats to re-evaluate relations with U.S. should be seen partly + in current heated atmosphere, U.S. veto in UNSC would accelerate + deterioration of U.S.-Tunisian relationship.” (Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, + Nodis October 1985) The United States abstained from the UN Security Council vote, which + took place on October 4. (Telegram 2528 from USUN, October 5; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850710–0833) + + Habib Bourguiba, Junior, + commented separately after meeting that his father was + broken-hearted over U.S. attitude, which negated life-long efforts + of friendship with U.S. End summary. + + I was summoned and received for just under an hour by President + Bourguiba at Carthage + Palace this morning (Oct. 2). Also present were: PriMin + Mzali, Special Counselor + Habib Bourguiba Jr.; + Acting FonMin Mestiri; + MinCabinet Chief at Presidency Skhiri. President Bourguiba looked drawn but was + calm, spoke at some length and was in full command of his faculties. + Atmosphere was courteous but burdened by scope political problem now + posed Bourguiba and more + generally GOT as friends of the + U.S. in Arab world in wake Israeli strike on PLO facility here. + + President Bourguiba opened + by stating that Tunisia’s sovereignty had been brutally infringed by + Israeli strikeSee footnote 3, Document 331. of + which White House Spokesman had approved forthwith. This prompt + expression of American support which tended to legitimize the raid + against an urban target inhabited largely by Palestinian “refugees” + (qte the ‘big cheeses’ of the + PLO weren’t there and weren’t + caught unqte) and by Tunisians must have had advance American + blessing. The United States had thus taken position in favor of + Israel—no surprise—but at the expense of Bourguiba and Tunisia, notwithstanding our long + friendship and the President’s assurances of U.S. interest in + Tunisia’s security and integrity during his last Washington visit + and since (viz. in the context of Tunis confrontation with Libya). I + interrupted the President at this point to insist that the U.S. had + neither been consulted by Israel on the raid nor had had any part + whatsoever in it. + + President Bourguiba went on + to deplore both the terror and the tenor of the Speakes statement: What would, what + could he say to the Tunisian people in its wake? Habib Bourguiba Jr., manifestly + [under?] emotional pressure, then pulled + out scrap of paper and read what he described as quotes attributed + to President Reagan + approving of the raid. (FYI + VOA newscast heard here in English + at 0700 local Oct. 2 quotes the President’s informal comment to + press characterizing raid as justified. End FYI.) This launched President Bourguiba into a rerun of the + points already made. I was thereafter invited to respond. + + I read the President’s message (ref C) carefully translating it + into French. Last point elicited reaction from almost everyone + present to effect that it was incompatible with position we had + taken on the raid. I then used all talkers (ref D) emphasizing once + more unilaterality of Israeli act, our non-involvement in any way + whatsoever and our desire + to work closely with Tunisia in upcoming UNSC consideration of Tunisia’s complaint. President + Bourguiba picked up on + this point saying he assumed that the outcome of the Security + Council proceeding would be an American veto. If so, the effect here + would be devastating because the Tunisian people would see in it the + confirmation that the U.S. approved of the blow inflicted upon + Tunisia and feel that our earlier warm words of support for himself + and Tunisia had also been a sham. + + The Prime Minister then said that, thinking about the future, if + we could manage an abstention in the UNSC, it would give the GOT a little something to work with, “a little balm for + the Tunisian heart.” + + President Bourguiba and the + Prime Minister then returned to the issue of the White House + statement. Could we not have waited to form a judgment? Silence + would have been better than this. + + I then tried, on personal basis, to invite consideration of the + scope and seriousness of terrorism as a contextual problem, urging + cooperation towards the goal of direct negotiations between the + parties to the Middle East conflict as the sole means of extirpating + the hatreds on which it fed. It got me nowhere: we had approved the + ravaging of Tunisia’s sovereignty and talk of terrorism was an + unacceptable excuse. I was then dismissed courteously, the President + expressing appreciation for the efforts I would not fail to make to + “make people (in the U.S.) understand what we are feeling.” + + Habib Bourguiba Jr., + escorted me from the President’s office. Once in the hall he said he + needed to tell me what his father could not. Bourguiba Jr. said that the events + of which we had expressed approval could kill his father who was + brokenhearted. Bourguiba Sr. + had held fast all of his life to the ideas of reasoned dialog and + alignment with the democratic West. The Israeli raid had made a shambles not only + of the PLO compound but of + Bourguiba’s life’s work. + “How can he continue to defend our friendship? Your position is a + betrayal (“il est cocu”).” The Tunisian people are angry. Already + the police are feeling the pressure rising against Americans and the + Jewish community here. The French are gleefully exploiting the + opportunity handed them. Qadhafi is gloating: “that’s what you get for being + the friends of the U.S.” We could at least have warned Tunisia of + what was coming. It was simply not credible that the U.S. Sixth + Fleet, etc., was unaware of an Israeli squadron flying the length of + the Mediterranean here. + + I answered the correspondent’s questions at the exit with a short + statement saying I had heard President Bourguiba’s sorrowful views on yesterday’s Israeli + raid, had delivered a message from President Reagan and offered verbal + amplification of our views. Acting FonMin + Mestiri was preparing a + separate declaration which seems likely to be hardhitting. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850724–0876. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by + Murphy, Carol Thompson, + and Quinn; approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, + Cairo, Algiers, Rome, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Shultz + summarized the meeting in an October 9 memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading, July–December 1985) + + 312882. + + Washington, October 10, 1985, 1825Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisians Still Smarting Over Israeli Raid. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Secretary met briefly afternoon of October 9 with Tunisian FonMin + Essebsi. Appointment had + been set up prior to the October 1 Israeli raid as an opportunity to + express USG support for the GOT in dealing with the threat from + Qadhafi. Intervening + Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters + and Achille Lauro affair preempted earlier + planned discussion. + + Essebsi began by stating + his distress that our friendship has been put to such a severe test + as a result of the bombing in Tunis. He then went on to state very + firmly GOT’s political will to + continue the dialogue with USG, in + spirit of friendship. Essebsi said that we must look to the future and + find ways to put this event behind us. + + Secretary asked Essebsi to + relay to President Bourguiba + President Reagan’s high + regards and friendship. He also drew FonMin’s attention to our statements during the UNSC debate which clearly + demonstrated our support for Tunisia. + + Apart from bombing event, USG + believes that Libya poses a continuing threat Tunisia which we must + jointly resist. President Bourguiba knows our concern in this regard and our + willingness to be helpful. + + Escalating pattern of violence in the area is the greatest enemy + of peace. We must deal effectively with terrorism or peace process + will come to a halt. In this regard, USG disagrees with the Egyptian Government’s handling + of the Achille Lauro incident; the terrorists + should be held, tried, and penalized. It is likely that an American + was murdered. The USG looks to the + GOT and other governments to + take a clear position that justice must be served and that these + terrorists should not escape unpunished. + + Essebsi responded that he + shares our abhorrence of the Achille Lauro + incident. GOT policy against + terrorism has been constant, forceful. Unfortunately innocents pay + the price of terrorism. Israeli attack must be seen in this context + as well. Tunisia committed no violation of international law. GOT admitted the Palestinians in 1982 on the clear + understanding that PLO would not + interfere in internal Tunisian affairs or act against international + law. Now innocent Tunisians have suffered, and, he noted testily, + GOT had not received the + benefit of real understanding from its friends. This has resulted in + real frustration. Tunisians now are asking whether they made the + right choice in pursuing friendship with the US. (Essebsi + left this question unanswered.) + + Closing on a better note, Essebsi stated that the Israeli bombing did not + justify action such as the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. + + Shultz +
+
+ 334. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, President’s Evening Reading, + July–December 1985. Secret. + + + Washington, October 22, 1985 + + +

1. John Whitehead’s Meetings in Tunisia. In + meetings with the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and + President Bourguiba,A record of Whitehead’s meetings is in telegram 9713 from Tunis, + October 22. (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Tunisia 1985 (10/07/1985–12/11/1985)) John got + an earful of Tunisian indignation about our perceived involvement in the + Israeli raid on the PLO base in Tunisia + and our reaction to it. As the day went on, however, the atmosphere of + bitterness and resentment seemed to steadily improve. Although the + Tunisians are pessimistic about the peace process and continue to be + bitter toward Israel, all John’s interlocutors made strong pledges of + continued friendship and cooperation with the US. Significantly, they agreed that they will not allow + Abu Abbas into the country + as long as there is any doubt at all about his involvement in the + hijacking.See Document 333. All indications are that the + Tunisians consider the mission to have been a success. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 335. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff, Department of State (Rodman) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State + Richard Murphy, 1985: + Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, October 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on + October 22 by Richard Sokolsky (S/P); cleared by Raphel and Zweifel. A copy was sent to Whitehead. Quinn initialed the memorandum and + wrote: “10/29.” + + + Washington, October 29, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + The Future of U.S.-Tunisian Relations + +

SUMMARY: We thought it might be useful to examine + the implications of recent developments in U.S.-Tunisian relations for + the near-term succession process and our interests in post-Bourguiba + Tunisia. Any successor regime is bound to distance itself from the + United States. Our reaction to the Israeli raid has accelerated this + development and temporarily undermined Tunisian leaders who favor closer + relations with us. However, Tunisia’s need for U.S. aid and support + against Qadhafi, combined with + its desire to counterbalance its growing dependence on Algeria, will + limit the degree to which Tunis strays from its American connection. END SUMMARY.

+

The Outlook for Tunisia

+

It is likely that there will be a constitutional succession to Bourguiba and, at least initially, an + orderly transfer of power. There is little reason to assume, however, + that Prime Minister Mzali will + have the prestige, as Bourguiba + has, to manage all of Tunisia’s challenges or that he will be able to + consolidate power. Moreover, it is doubtful that Tunisia’s + underdeveloped political institutions will be able to mobilize the + political groups that were excluded from political participation under + Bourguiba to support the new + regime.

+

Indeed, the underlying political, economic, and social trends suggest + that the potential for significant instability is very high and that + Tunisia may well experience severe turmoil even before Bourguiba’s death. Among the more + serious problems are: a high level of political alienation, especially + among the country’s youthful population; the ruling party’s loss of + support and declining effectiveness; severe unemployment and + underemployment particularly in urban areas; rapid population growth; a + stagnating economy; and enormous regional economic disparities.

+ +

The Succession and U.S. Interests

+

Faced with these problems, the successor regime will likely pursue a + foreign policy that is more responsive to Tunisian public opinion, which + was expressing growing opposition to the government’s support for U.S. + Middle East policies even before the Israeli raid. In addition, the + regime will wish to avoid any moves which would add to its domestic + problems or limit its room to maneuver. Thus, even a regime committed to + maintaining Bourguiba’s pro-U.S. + policy will adopt a more publicly nonaligned posture and adhere more + closely to the Arab consensus on regional issues.

+

Nonetheless, as long as Tunisia perceives a serious threat from Qadhafi, the desire to establish a more + independent foreign policy will be tempered by Tunisia’s continued + dependence on U.S. military and economic aid. While Tunis will express + more vocal opposition to U.S. Middle East policies, our security + programs and joint military cooperation should remain largely intact, + although the GOT may act to limit the + visibility of our military presence in the country.

+

Implications of the Israeli Raid

+

Our reaction to the Israeli raid will only hasten what was bound to + happen anyway—pursuit of a more nonaligned posture, at least publicly, + toward the United States. We have temporarily weakened the position of + Tunisian leaders who support a closer relationship with us. Moreover, it + will take considerable time to restore Tunisian trust in us. + Nonetheless, our actions have contained much of the damage caused by the + Israeli raid and overt Tunisian anger has already begun to dissipate as + it refocuses on the Libyan threat.

+

Indeed, Tunisia’s crisis with Qadhafi has brought about a major change in its policy + toward Libya that may not be significantly affected by recent events. + Until recently, Tunisia followed a policy of accommodation designed to + expand economic and commercial interests in Libya. As part of this + policy Tunisia sought to publicly distance itself from our anti-Libya + policy.

+

Despite their doubts about U.S. credibility, Tunis seems determined to + maintain its firm line toward Qadhafi. Our reaction to the Israeli raid has probably + slowed down, but not arrested, the trend toward closer U.S.-Tunisian + ties set in motion by the current crisis with Qadhafi. Tunisia’s tougher stance + toward Libya enjoys the broad support of the Tunisian people. Although + Mzali’s position towards + Qadhafi has been sometimes + ambivalent, his room to maneuver on this issue will be limited. Thus, + while Mzali may tone down + anti-Libyan rhetoric, the GOT likely + will use our common opposition to Qadhafi and our reaction to the Israeli raid as levers + to obtain more assistance from us.

+ +

Our handling of the Israeli raid will, however, impel Tunisia to reduce + the visibility of its American connection for some time. Instead, + Tunisia will probably seek even greater security cooperation with + Algeria and Egypt. This is a sensible policy for Tunisia to follow given + the political costs of close association with us and our own constraints + in meeting all of Tunisia’s security needs.

+

We should not push Tunisia in the direction of more visible military + cooperation despite our desire to enlist Tunisian support for our Libya + policy. Such cooperation could further inflame Tunisian public opinion + and weaken more pro-American Tunisian leaders. Tunis is obviously the + best judge of what the political traffic will bear. We should not + complicate its already serious public opinion problem, however, by + making statements that heighten popular perceptions that the Bourguiba government is a U.S. client + incapable of conducting an independent foreign policy.

+

We should look for additional ways to quietly support Tunisia and thus + restore its confidence in the credibility of our security commitments. + Such low-key steps as upgraded intelligence sharing and contingency + planning will reassure the GOT without + posing domestic and regional problems that attend overt cooperation with + us. In addition, we should give even greater emphasis to expanding + cultural, educational, and economic ties in ways that will directly + benefit the Tunisian people. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we + should go the extra mile to increase our aid to Tunisia even though we + face serious budgetary constraints.

+

It is perhaps too early to evaluate the full impact of the Tunis raid on + U.S.-Tunisian relations. The political fallout and Tunisian mistrust + will linger for some time. But while the present strains are serious, + they are probably not permanent. Indeed, after the Tunisian leadership + assuages public opinion and overcomes their own feelings of hurt and + disappointment, they may well resume their search for a greater U.S. + security commitment that was started several months ago. In the last + analysis, Tunisia’s vulnerabilities, coupled with its strong distrust of + Algeria and political constraints on cooperation with Egypt, give it a + strong stake in preserving its American option.

+
+ +
+ 336. Message From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Embassy in TunisiaSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–008, 1985 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia 1985. Secret; Immediate. Sent + for information to the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of + Staff, USCINCEUR, the Defense + Attaché’s Office in Tunisia. Printed from a copy that indicates the + original was received in the DOD + Message Center. + + + Washington, November 15, 1985, 1946Z + + + + SUBJECT + SecDef Meeting With Defense + Minister Baly (U). + + + + (S) Principals met for thirty + minutes after full honors were accorded Minister Baly on 13 November. Meeting was + very cordial with main theme being current state of crisis in + Tunisia, and how important it is for President Bourguiba to restore Tunisian + people’s confidence in his government. Ambassador Sebastian attended. + + (S) After SecDef welcome, Minister Baly discoursed on dire situation + in Tunisia, stressing that major threat is Libya. He iterated now + familiar list of problems Tunisia currently faces, summing up by + saying Libya is portraying Tunisia as part of a US/Israeli plot. + Qadhafi is not calling + for revenge, but calling on Tunisians to overthrow their Western + leaning government. MOD stated that + Tunisians do not understand position of their government as a friend + of the US which supports Israel. + Tunisian Government must work very hard to restore the confidence of + the people in their leaders. He added that Tunisia needs grant aid + at greater than 50 percent rate requested last year to improve its + military and make it possible for Tunisia to defend itself, and to + allow Tunisia to participate as partner in defense of free + world. + + (S) SecDef said we would do all we could in the context of + our own budget restraints. He continued that he had directed ASD Armitage to work hard in JMC to maximize Tunisia’s benefits + from current assistance levels and noted that Congress seems + inclined to increase grant aid and concessionality for Tunisia. + SecDef pointed out our own + lack of an appropriations bill and said some have forecasted + upcoming foreign assistance levels as lowest in a long time. He + summed up saying that although our resources are constrained, our + relationship is extremely important and we will do all we can to + strengthen Tunisia’s defense capabilities, including joint + contingency planning if Tunisia wishes. + +
+ +
+ 337. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis. Secret; Priority; + Nodis. + + 1369. + + Tunis, February 12, 1986, 0956Z + + +

Department also for D, T and NEA + from Ambassador. Subject: Cuts in the Tunisian Military and Economic + Assistance Accounts. Refs: (A) Tunis 983,In + telegram 983 from Tunis, February 3, Sebastian expressed appreciation that Ussery had said “we will be alert + to any opportunities for the administration to restore funds for + Tunisia.” Sebastian noted + that the Embassy did not want to raise “GOT hopes” regarding + additional FY 86 funding but + cautioned that “American credibility is very much at issue in any + possible restoration of funding levels initially endorsed by the + administration.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860085–0150) (B) Tunis 1007.In telegram 1007 from Tunis, February 3, the + Embassy reported that Essebsi had “convoked Ambassador February 3 to + complain about the USG decision to + cut Tunisia’s FY 86 security + assistance allocation” and alluded “to the ‘very regrettable’ + reduction he had learned of from his Ambassador in Washington.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860085–0504)

+ + + Secret—Entire text.Summary and action requested:Reftels + reported GOT reactions to our FY86 + funding levels for Tunisia and mission’s hope that reductions could + be obviated at the first opportunity from fall-out funds. This + message focuses on emerging political cost to us here of our FY86 + funding level decision-making and urges earliest restoration of + small sum involved. We assume that Congress would be receptive to + restoration urged herein given its interest as reflected in + legislative history of the appropriation. + + I should like to register my concern over the impact of our + decision-making on ESF and MAP cuts in the Tunisian account. + These cuts were triggered by Gramm-Rudman-HollingsSee footnote 7, Document + 65. and congressional underappropriation of + MAP. They have involved + reductions of almost 10 percent in the Tunisian FY86 accounts, as + follows: + (1) FMS–C from $27M [to] + $25.839M; (2) MAP from $40M + to $33.495M; (3) ESF $20M + first to $19.14 and now to $18.974M and (4) IMET from $1.7M to + $1.435M. + + + It is obvious that we are talking here about comparatively small + sums. Accordingly, my concern centers on the outsize political + impact of the event rather than on the pain inflicted by the + unanticipated $9M reduction as such. + + + In Tunisia’s case, our reductions, most particularly those (levied + beyond the GRH cuts) reallocating + resources from Tunisia to Guatemala, fly in the face of support + commitments made in general terms by our most senior decision-makers + during and following Bourguiba’s visit to Washington,See Document + 328. to the top leadership of this country. They + conflict with what we have had to say at high levels following the + Israeli raid last October. They contradict our frequently and + publicly expressed concern over the threat represented by Qadhafi to our friends and our + interests. They symbolically emphasize rather than mitigate harsh + and now critical decline in Tunisia’s economic and financial + circumstances accelerated by the collapse of oil prices and the + resulting socio-political impact on this country’s stability in + which we have both a bilateral and a regional stake. + + This is the more preoccupying since our public rationale is bound + to lack credibility in Tunisian ears: We appear to have told them in + Washington that these cuts represent “last-minute decisions” which + “took everyone by surprise.” We have said that LG Gast, DSAA (then visiting Tunis) was “not + even aware of them” and that the cuts were the result “of a purely + budgetary approach” divorced from “political reasons.” + + The Tunisians can scarcely be expected to credit an assertedly + apolitical, purely budgetary approach which allegedly comes “as a + surprise” to the administration after they have been assured + repeatedly at the highest levels of the USG of our willingness to help and continuing interest + in their security and stability. No wonder Ambassador Ben Yahia professed himself unable + to understand these decisions. + + I think we need to stand behind the administration’s repeated + pledges—even if they were formulated in non-specific terms. Tunisian + confidence in our leadership is too precious a commodity to be + breached for a piddling sum of money. I know we needed to scrape the + barrel and can appreciate how tough it has been to distribute the + shortfall but this is a case in which political content of systemic + reallocation decisions is too high to rely on the “purely budgetary + approach.” In short, the situation here is sufficiently tenuous so + that we can ill afford to accept the reduced levels in MAP, IMET (especially IMET) and ESF as final if, + as seems likely, cost to us in the GOT will include an additional loss of trust by our + friends and exploitation by our opponents of this further indication + of U.S. indifference—as they will put it—to Tunisia in its hour of + need. I urge therefore that the sum cut be promptly restored. + Fallback remains, obviously, positioning the Tunisian account for + fallout funds if latter become available but in my book price we may + well pay for delay involved in that scenario seems much too + high. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 338. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President BourguibaSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Tunisia 1986. No classification marking. + + + Washington, March 7, 1986 + + Great Patriot and Good Friend: + +

It is with real satisfaction that I greet you on the occasion of another + visit to your wonderful country by Vice President George Bush.See Document 339. + His presence in Tunis serves once again as a demonstration of the + friendship that exists between our two governments and peoples and the + importance that I place on those relations.

+

Vice President Bush’s trip comes + at a time of particular tension and turbulence in North Africa. Much of + this stems from the policies pursued by Colonel Qadhafi. The latest attacks by rebel + forces in Northern Chad,Reference is to the + abortive February 10 attack by Libyan and GUNT forces aimed at taking Ndjamena. Documentation is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XLVIII, Libya; Chad. clearly encouraged and + supported by Libya, are but another example of Qadhafi’s determination to destabilize + neighboring governments. Such actions, and his equally evident and + unremitting pursuit of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, are + clearly unacceptable.

+

Your visit to Washington last June was a memorable occasion for me.See Document + 328. At that time, I pledged to continue to support + Tunisia politically and through economic and military assistance + programs. I take pride in the fact that, despite very difficult + budgetary restraints, the U.S. government assistance levels to Tunisia + in 1986 reflect that commitment made to you.

+

Mr. President, I wish you good health, and wish the people of Tunisia the + tranquility and prosperity that they so richly deserve.

+

With sincere regards and respect,

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+ +
+ 339. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860183–0377. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Algiers, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, and Rome. + + 2360. + + Tunis, March 10, 1986, 1533Z + + +

Department please repeat to USCINCEUR Specat Exclusive. Following repeat sent action + Lisbon March 8th repeated for your action/info. Quote. For the Vice + President’s Party. Subject: The Vice President’s Visit to Tunisia: An + Overview.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + The Vice President’s March 8 visit to Tunisia was strongly + welcomed by PriMin + Mzali in the plenary + (closing) session for which he had assembled most to the Cabinet. + Mzali said that some time + in which to discuss current issues and views face to face humanized + facts and figures and made reality more comprehensible. He thanked + the Vice President for coming. + + The Vice President’s stop over did give GOT’s senior members an opportunity to put their + concerns directly to the administration at leadership level and this + was appreciated. It permitted the Vice President to express + confidence in Mzali, in words + the latter needed to hear. It provided an occasion in which concerns + by both sides with Qadhafi + could be aired and shared. Indeed, we now have an advance expression + of Bourguiba’s support for + any Gulf of Sidra penetration we may choose to make to illustrate + the international nature of these waters.See Document 338. In + telegram 2359 from Tunis, March 10, the Embassy reported that + Bourguiba “reiterated + Tunisia’s long-standing, firm friendship for the United States. + He concurred in the need for a strong stand against Libyan + threats and territorial claims.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860183–0704) + + The Vice President telephoned Habib + Bourguiba Jr., an old friend, to greet him. Bibi had + not expected to participate in the event and had called me earlier + to decline (with regret) to come see A/S Murphy “socially” at the + residence on the grounds that, as a private person, he had really + nothing to say to him. But the Vice President’s call moved him + deeply and he appeared at the initial session (where his father + asked him to translate President Reagan’s letter) and at the lunch. Unfortunately, + father and son had another falling out for reasons as yet unclear + after we had retired to the restricted afternoon session. Still, + Bibi knows that we remain interested in him and in his well-being + and that is potentially quite important. + + + Mme Wassila Bourguiba did not appear. Mme Mzali did the honors for Mrs. + Bush. Mme Bourguiba, however, sent a touching + letter to the Vice President and Mrs. Bush bidding them welcome, in very dignified + language, as warmly as she had been welcomed to the U.S., and citing + her health as the reason for her absence. + + President Bourguiba was in + relatively good form. He drifted occasionally back and forth between + the Libyan threat to his new social housing program—currently + uppermost in his mind—and reviewed his responses to the Israeli + bombing, but the theme was unchanged: Tunisian friendship for the + U.S.—as deep as Israel’s. His sense of relationship to President + Reagan, whose warm + letter he would certainly answer and his expectation of + understanding and support from the U.S. He ate somewhat untidily but + amply at lunch and did not fail to invite the Vice President’s + attention to the fact that he (Bourguiba) remained erect in his posture and his + walk. . . . + + Substantively, Mzali made + the expected pitch for extra aid; he could not—in Tunisia’s current + circumstances—do otherwise. The potentially major novelty in the + Tunisian line was the FonMin’s + invitation to us to consider Tunisia as a confrontation state + (vis-à-vis common enemy Libya). While this clearly had self-serving + aspects, it nevertheless deserves careful reflection in Washington + because new factors adduced in its support are real enough there has + been introduction of new and more highly sophisticated weapons; they + do change the tactical and perhaps even the strategic givens; events + including the Israeli raid and Libyan challenges are tending to + expand the problems of the Machreq into the Maghreb; and, finally, + there are new grounds for concerns of an East-West nature in Soviet + support for Libya at present.In + telegram 76106 to Tunis, March 12, the Department reported that + Bush “took Prime + Minister Mzali aside and + told him privately” that “far be it for me to interfere in + Tunisian internal affairs, but I want you to know that you have + my personal confidence whatever happens and, of course, none of + can read the future, but should you assume the Presidency you + can be assured of my personal support and assistance and that + your calls to the White House will always be answered. I am + saying this to you and nobody else.” Mzali “expressed gratification and assured the + Vice President if God should will him to have the burden of the + Presidency descend upon him, he would faithfully pursue and + follow ‘Bourguibism.’” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 + Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis) + + Request clearance of Vice President’s party and retransmission to + appropriate addressees with Tunis as an info addressee. + + Sebastian +
+ +
+ 340. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of + State ShultzSource: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence + from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s + Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron April 1–30, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted + on April 9 by Sokolsky; cleared by Ledsky, Zweifel, and O’Neill. Sokolsky initialed for + Ledsky, Zweifel, and O’Neill. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Quinn initialed the memorandum and + wrote: “4/10.” + + + Washington, April 10, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Dealing with Post-Bourguiba Tunisia + +

SUMMARY: Tunisia faces unprecedented political, + economic, and social problems, which will come to a head with Bourguiba’s death. A successor regime + will find it difficult to govern effectively and to sustain Tunisia’s + American connection.To protect our interests in Tunisia, we should + support Prime Minister Mzali and + use our assistance to encourage political liberalization and economic + reform. END SUMMARY

+

Political Malaise

+

Tunisia’s political process is moribund. The aged Bourguiba (now 84) is out of touch with + public attitudes, and widespread perceptions of corruption have eroded + public support for his government. The ruling Destourian Socialist Party + has failed to broaden its base. Prime Minister Mzali, Bourguiba’s constitutional successor, faces strong + opposition within the party, is unpopular with the military, and has a + narrow political base. Popular participation in the political process is + virtually non-existent. And as long as Bourguiba remains in control, the government is unlikely + to pursue meaningful political liberalization.

+

The absence of a viable opposition movement and legitimate channels of + dissent will almost certainly complicate a peaceful transition of power. + The moderate opposition parties are weak and disorganized and have + little credibility among younger Tunisians, who are turning to more + radical alternatives. All the ingredients exist for serious polarization + and political instability once Bourguiba departs the scene.

+

Bleak Economic Outlook

+

The Tunisian economy is a mess. Declining oil revenues, a slump in + phosphate exports, poor agricultural performance, rapid population + growth, a growing foreign debt, a drop in worker remittances, high + unemployment, and a reduction in foreign aid have all combined to create + a stagnant economy. Over the next two years, the government will have to cope with almost + zero economic growth, belt-tightening, and a severe financial crisis. + According to a recent World Bank study, correcting Tunisia’s economic + problems will require a sweeping structural adjustment program of + considerable political risk.

+

Growing Social Mobilization

+

A high degree of political alienation exists at all levels of society. + The frustration of the lower classes was evident in the 1984 bread + riots.See Document + 314. More disturbing is the growing alienation of + the middle class—the traditional bulwark of support for the regime—as a + result of the squeeze of economic austerity. Moreover, sympathy for + Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise among students and unemployed + youth. Mzali’s crackdown on + Tunisia’s main labor organization will fuel greater popular discontent + by closing a legitimate channel of political expression.In telegram 3070 from Tunis, March 27, the Embassy + contended that while “Tunisia is still far from becoming a police + state, the breakdown of popular channels for expressing dissent has + been matched by the increasing use of an expanding security + apparatus to repress any signs of dissidence.” Mzali in particular “continues to + be unpopular,” since “he has used threats such as that posed by + Libya to justify the security forces’ actions towards trade unions + and student opposition.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860240–0427) In this + environment, a government decision to raise food prices could touch off + large-scale unrest which extremist groups and Qadhafi could easily exploit.

+

The Politicization of the Tunisian Armed + Forces

+

The Bourguiba government still + commands the loyalty of the generally pro-American senior officer corps. + However, the officer corps is increasingly unhappy over economic + austerity, high-level personnel changes and Tunisia’s pro-Western + policies. Moreover, there is growing discontent at lower levels of the + Tunisian military, stimulated by poor leadership, corruption, and + equipment shortages. These problems could pave the way for the growth of + Islamic fundamentalism in the regular Army and a breakdown of its + reliability in the post-Bourguiba period.

+

The Libyan Threat

+

The Libyan threat to Tunisian security has intensified over the past year + and will probably increase as the situation in Tunisia deteriorates. + Bourguiba has pursued a + strong pro-U.S. stand in our confrontation with Libya. Most recently, + Tunisia refused to support the Arab League’s condemnation of U.S. + actions in the Gulf of Sidra. Qadhafi has warned Tunisia that it will be a target if + the U.S. attacks Libya, and Qadhafi will almost certainly use his assets in Tunisia + to stir up trouble.

+ +

The Future and U.S. Policy

+

Mzali is likely to succeed + Bourguiba when he dies or if + is incapacitated. The longer Bourguiba lives, the more time Mzali has to expand his personal power + base. However, Mzali’s staying + power and ability to contain the severe turmoil that is likely to attend + Bourguiba’s demise are + uncertain. Mzali has little + popular support. He is widely regarded as a tool of the ruling elite, + committed to perpetuating the status quo and unwilling to press for + urgently needed economic reforms, social justice, and meaningful + political participation. Mzali’s + use of the security apparatus to repress dissent and his crackdown on + the opposition have laid the groundwork for a serious challenge to his + leadership. His position would be further undermined if he were forced + to rely on the Army and security forces to contain unrest in the + post-Bourguiba period.

+

As NEA has suggested in its memo + “Tunisia at the Crossroads”,Not + found. we should give priority to alleviating the root causes + of political and social unrest. This is easier said than done. Tunisia’s + needs are massive, and our assistance levels will fall far short of the + government’s requests for increases in economic aid (from $20 million to + $100 million) and military assistance (from $70 million to $800 million + over a seven year period).

+

Our policy toward post-Bourguiba Tunisia will also have to adjust to the + fact that U.S.-Tunisian relations will probably + cool as Mzali realigns + Tunisian policies with domestic public opinion and the Arab world. We + will want to show a degree of understanding if Tunisia adopts a more + independent foreign policy—expressing our concerns privately but + avoiding public recriminations.

+

We should also support constitutional succession, despite our concerns + over Mzali’s weaknesses and + prospects. To do otherwise would be to introduce another unsettling + element in the situation. Moreover, there is a reasonable prospect that + Mzali, once he feels secure, + will permit some opening of the political process. He was instrumental + in promoting the limited political liberalization that has occurred, and + at one time expressed an interest in opening a dialogue with the + opposition.

+

Our support for Mzali should not + be unconditional. Nor should we convey the impression that Mzali is our hand-picked choice. The + theme we want to emphasize is U.S. support for Tunisia’s constitutional + process. The following approach, while not without risks, may be the + most effective way of helping Mzali muddle through the transition while keeping our + options open in case he falls on his face: + + We should buck up Mzali + through continued high level contacts, such as that provided by + Vice President Bush + during his recent visit to Tunis. + + + We should support political liberalization and encourage + Mzali to help + establish a credible centrist opposition. This will be a touchy + issue and we must ultimately let Mzali determine the timetable for implementing + democratic reforms. + + We should use the leverage of our aid program to promote + economic reform and structural adjustments, especially a rapid + reduction in the current account deficit and external debt, deep + cuts in public spending, increased agricultural productivity, + and an opening up of the economy. We should not push Mzali to adopt a wrenching + austerity program, given its potential for causing political and + social upheavals. + + We should try to bolster our image among the Tunisian people. + USIA should be urged to + expand our cultural and educational programs, and we should + publicly express support for democratic reforms and economic + progress. + + We should not push for an increase in visible U.S.-Tunisian + military cooperation. We should try to dampen Bourguiba’s enthusiasm for a + high U.S. profile and support Mzali’s more cautious approach. Where possible, + we should let Mzali be + the final judge of what the political traffic will bear. + + We should ask our European and Asian allies to help Tunisia. + France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea should all be + encouraged to provide more foreign aid on highly concessional + terms. +

+
+
+ 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, A Bureau, Department of State + Central Foreign Policy Files: Lot 12D215, Top Secret Hardcopy + Telegrams. Top Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis Special Encryption. + Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Poindexter and Quinn and in S/S–O; + approved by Shultz. + + 115614. + + Washington, April 14, 1986, 2146Z + + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Action Against Libyan Terrorism (TS). For Chargé from + Secretary. + + + + Top Secret—Entire text. + + The President has directed that U.S. military forces attack + terrorists and terrorist-related targets in Libya in the very near + future. These attacks are being undertaken with land and sea based + U.S. military aircraft. Chargé is instructed to draw on text below + to alert personally the + highest ranking, appropriate host nation officials as soon as + possible after 2359 GMT on April + 14. No reference should be made to this cable or appointment + requested prior to 2359 GMT. + + Talking points as follows: + + In the past we have had significant circumstantial + evidence of Libyan plans for terrorist action against the + United States. A number of these activities have been + undertaken in European, Middle East, and African + countries. + + We now have confirmation of direct Libyan-sponsored + activity against the U.S. in both BerlinReference is to the bombing of La Belle + discotheque in West Berlin on April 5 in West Berlin + that killed a U.S. service member and a Turkish woman + and injured 230 others, including 50 U.S. service + members. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. and + Paris.Reference is to three + bombings that took place in Paris February 3–5 at + popular bookstores and shops. The bombings wounded + approximately 20 people. French police defused another + bomb discovered at the Eiffel Tower on February 3. + (Richard Bernstein, “Bombing in Paris Wounds 9, 3 + Badly,” New York Times, February + 6, 1986) In both of these operations, the Libyan + goal was to inflict maximum numbers of indiscriminate + casualties. + + We have additional information that Libya is well underway + in planning further operations against U.S. citizens in + twelve other countries. We have good reason to believe that + some of these operations in Sudan, West Germany, Turkey, + Syria, Spain, Central African Republic, Kenya, and in + several Latin American countries will take place in the + immediate future. + + Despite our efforts to warn our citizens and host + governments in advance, it is inevitable that unless + something is done to stop Qadhafi now, other innocent victims will + die. + + Because the evidence we have on direct Libyan involvement + is so convincing and our information on Qadhafi’s future plans is + so threatening, the President has reluctantly taken the + decision to use U.S. military forces to attack targets in + Libya that are involved in the conduct and support of + terrorist activities. + + The President has also authorized attacks against certain + command and control functions and logistics support for + terrorist operations. Our military will also undertake + limited suppression missions in order to defend our own + forces. + + I am instructed to assure you that we are not targeting + civilians, economic facilities, or regular military troop + concentrations. + + The USG has no illusions + that these actions will eliminate entirely the terrorist + threat posed by Qadhafi. We are however, convinced that we must + demonstrate that officially sponsored terrorist actions, + undertaken by the Libyan Government, incur a significant + cost. + + Over the longer term, we expect that Qadhafi and others like + him, who support and sponsor terrorism, will come to realize + that the costs are higher than they wish to bear. + + We also believe that the measures we have decided to take + will inevitably weaken the ability of terrorist + organizations to commit their criminal attacks as we work + through diplomatic, political, and economic channels to + alleviate the more fundamental causes of such + terrorism. + + In the past, Qadhafi has been able to claim that he + conducts these activities with impunity and without risk. He + has lied to his own people and intimidated his moderate + neighbors, because there has been no response to his + one-sided pattern of violence. + + The President believes that this is a crucial time for the + Western democracies and other moderate governments. Citizens + of many countries, and American tourists, servicemen, and + diplomats are being brutally murdered by Qadhafi’s terrorists. The + United States feels a special responsibility because we are + in a position to act decisively. + + The President has asked me to alert you to this military + operation and ask for your support in this undertaking. He + hopes, for all of us, that it will be forthcoming. + + After we have taken military action, the President will + address the American people regarding our operation. I will + provide you with a text of his statement as soon as we have + it. + + + Appropriate enhancements to normal security measures should be + undertaken as necessary immediately after U.S. military strikes + against Libya. SecState will advise via Flash cable once strikes are + underway.In telegram 3643 from + Tunis, April 15, the Embassy reported that after hearing the + Ambassador’s presentation of the U.S. position, Acting Foreign + Minister Mestiri + responded: “Tunisia uncomfortable. It shares U.S. views on + terrorism, particularly Qadhafi’s. But U.S. strike made for + non-combatant casualties which RAI–UNO (Italian television seen + here) showing this morning, leaving impression Libyan Arabs + being massacred. This likely upset Tunisian public.” Mestiri continued: “Tunisian + Chancery and residence damaged by U.S. raid; former severely + (‘rendered unusable’) and latter had windows blown out.” The + Embassy concluded: “City remains calm at this writing.” + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis + Telegrams: Lot 95D23. Tunis) + + Whitehead +
+ +
+ 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: George + H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National + Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners + Files, OA/ID 19817, Folder 19817–104. Secret; Immediate. Sent for + information Priority to Cairo, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Algiers, + Rabat, Khartoum, and Ndjamena. Printed from a copy that indicates + the original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + 141465. + + Washington, May 6, 1986, 0440Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Meeting With Tunisian Amb. + + + + Secret entire text. + + Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Ben + Yahia met on May 1 with Vice President Bush to deliver a personal letter + from President Bourguiba to + President Reagan.Telegram 142256 to Tunis, May 6, contains the + text of Bourguiba’s + letter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860350–0157) President Bourguiba’s salutary letter + (reported septel) is in response to President Reagan’s letter which the Vice + President had presented during his March visit to Tunis.See Document + 338. The Ambassador followed delivery of the letter + with an updated view of U.S. actions on Libya and Tunisia’s + situation vis-à-vis Libya and a call for supplemental and + accelerated U.S. assistance to Tunisia to help the GOT in its deteriorating economic + situation. End summary. + + Ambassador Ben Yahia gave + Vice President Bush a + letter from President Bourguiba to President Reagan in response to the President’s letter which + was presented by the Vice President during his March visit to Tunis. + The Ambassador again expressed the GOT’s deep appreciation for the Vice President’s visit + and President Reagan’s + letter. He asked to apprise the Vice President of developments since + his visit and began by noting that political party conventions will + be in June and parliamentary elections in November. He stated that + this is a “delicate time” for Tunisia following U.S. action on Libya + and economic difficulties and with the current economic + difficulties. + + Ben Yahia encouraged the + U.S. to continue economic, diplomatic and military pressure on + Qadhafi which he said is + making Qadhafi nervous. + Ben Yahia added that + Qadhafi is reinforcing + the militia against the regular army and buying more weapons. He + stated that Tunisia is “doing its part” having broken diplomatic + relations with Libya and helped “reinforce the opposition inside + Libya in May, 1984,” and by maintaining an embargo on Libyan + deliveries, however, Ben + Yahia said Tunisia is becoming isolated; Algeria is + moving closer to Libya over oil and Morocco continues its + relationship with Libya because of the Polisario: Libya remains in + Chad and is improving its situation in Sudan. + + + Turning to the economic situation Ben + Yahia said Tunisia was not in the “red line” but + would have to be careful as foreign currency reserves have dropped + this year from a three month to a six day reserve. He asked for + “special emergency support” which he said PM + Mzali had raised with the + Vice President. He specifically requested supplemental funds and + accelerated an immediate disbursement of all FY86 funds. + + The Vice President responded that the U.S. would look into the + situation and see what could be done to help Tunisia. He told + Ben Yahia we believed + Qadhafi was in control in + Libya but only following some turmoil. The Vice President commented + that resolving Qadhafi + problems also would permit Tunisia to utilize more of its resources + for other priorities. + + Whitehead +
+
+ 343. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 86. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not + declassified]. + + 7228. + + Tunis, July 22, 1986, 1401Z + + + + SUBJECT + Conversation With MinInt Zin el + Abidine Ben Ali. + + + Refs: + A. Tunis 7126,In telegram 7126 from + Tunis, July 18, the Embassy reported it was “picking up + indications that departure of ex PriMin + Mohamed Mzali has led + perhaps significant stratum of Tunisian public opinion to + anticipate evolution of GOT’s + relations with Libya and Algeria” given that Mzali had taken a “very strong + anti-Libyan posture. In so doing he shifted markedly from the + traditional Tunisian attitude of flexibility he espoused until + last year’s Libyan worker expulsion and letter bomb campaigns.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860554–0679) In telegram 6701 from Tunis, July 8, + the Embassy reported Bourguiba had “dismissed” Mzali and replaced him with + Sfar. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860527–0861) + B. Tunis 7144.In telegram 7144 from + Tunis, July 18, the Embassy provided an analysis of Ben Ali’s “rapid rise to the + center of political power” in Tunisia. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860554–0983) + + + + S—Entire text.1A. This is an + action cable, see para 7. + + Summary and introduction: I had unprecedented 90 minute one-on-one + conversation with BG Zin el Abidine + Ben Ali, MinInt of GOT, at latter’s invitation, July 21. We met in his + Tunis office. His putative + purpose was to elicit my (read: the U.S.) assessment of Tunisia’s + internal situation. The tenor of his questions was singularly + impolitic and one of the issues flowing from the conversation is + Ben Ali’s true + motivation: why was it held? My answers to the questions were framed + in an acute awareness that they might be recorded or misused to + Ben Ali’s possible + private purposes. Be that as it may, my tentative assessment—which + may evolve—is that Ben + Ali’s charge—internal security—has led him into the heart + of Tunisia’s domestic political conundrum and that he felt acute + need to explore American perception of dramatic transformation of + country’s political geography. (FYI: He’s not alone; everyone is asking what we think about + “the changes”.) While I responded as carefully as possible, I also + decided not/not to sidestep issues Ben Ali raised, as his position, potential and + current standing in GOT warrant an + effort to dialog and perhaps ever to develop a closer (but correct) + relationship with him. Indeed, Ben + Ali said after our talk that he had found the + exchange valuable and hoped for more soon. + + A number of operational issues emerged during our talk, + particularly with respect to [less than 1 line not + declassified] the Libyan opposition and the Palestinian + presence here. They will be reported in septels or other + channels.Not found. + Agraniants did not arise. This message gists the essence of the + conversation. A full memcon will be pouched to NEA/AFN.Not found. End summary and + introduction. + + Ben Ali began by saying + he wanted this talk to be “private” viz., between us as political + men and not between the Tunisian MinInt and the U.S. Ambassador. He + then asked me about my assessment of the Tunisian internal security + situation. I responded with an honest but generalized description, + focussed on the long term socio-economic trends, the exacerbation of + stress built into the current economic situation and the impulse + which would be given all manner of “Oriental” options were the + Western-oriented socio-economic model to fail. Ben Ali agreed but, to my + surprise, then asked what the solutions might be. I responded it + would need to be a mix of measures decided by Tunisian political + authority to foster consensus, confidence and participation across + the political spectrum. This suggested need to free up market place + of ideas so that PSD could defend its choices and benefit from + critiques in a political dialog conducted along generally recognized + norms of legitimacy. “At present most safety valves appear to be + tied down.” Ben Ali + agreed: “I tell them we are sitting on lid of a volcano, if pressure + keeps building it will blow.” + + Ben Ali then asked + blandly whether I thought new PriMin + Sfar could do the job? I + responded by listing his many widely agreed positive qualities, and observed it seemed + clear President intended continue hold on to central decision making + power. This suggested Bourguiba looking to new PriMin first of all for help with economic crisis. His + leadership role thus might well be complementary to President’s. + Limits of PriMin’s capacity + could be judged only if and when, ultimate authority came to be + vested in him. PriMin’s most + important task now, I thought, was to generate that public + confidence which was necessary to successful economic + recovery. + + Ben Ali then turned to + the succession: What did I think about a possible constitutional + amendment? I said we had heard talk about a proposed amendment, + still in gestation, creating a Tunisian Vice Presidency designed to + fit Habib Bourguiba, Jr. Its + utility seemed open question since much clearly depended upon degree + to which confidence and responsibility would be shared between + incumbent and his successor and/or PriMin in current or any future constitutional context. + Ben Ali, I assumed, + was well aware of widespread speculation about Bourguiba’s ultimate intent with + respect to current PriMin. Did + President contemplate further changes around upcoming November + parliamentary elections? For present seemed clear that President + Bourguiba had vested + confidence in new PriMin + Sfar whom constitution made + ipso-facto his successor. Both thus now at center of Tunisian + political reality and changes to succession, if enacted, would + clearly involve new political relationships as well. + + Ben Ali then turned to + PLO. What did I think of its + presence here, which he ascribed to Wassila Bourguiba: “She invited + PLO to come here.” I thought + outside world saw “Tunisia’s invitation” to PLO as GOT effort to + demonstrate Arabism and sympathy to Palestinian cause during + Israel’s Lebanese adventure. Since PLO’s arrival, events had changed context and weakened + organization. ALCON had had to adjust. PLO’s presence in Tunisia had been reduced. Absent + direct threats against Americans here, question became complex, + regional and political. I went over our position on eventual dialog + with PLO. PLO remains a problem for us as long as its leadership, + weakness and related internal contradictions inhibit peace process. + Ben Ali then said he + had tightened down on PLO gradually + for years. Fighters had left. GOT + had received Oued Zarga camp. PLO + efforts create autonomous capabilities in Tunisia (e.g. police) had + been nipped-in-bud. PLO notables + comings and goings remain under close scrutiny. Total Palestinian + presence in Tunisia, including families, now less than 500. While + presence of PLO political + headquarters/Wafa as such not a problem for GOT now, Ben + Ali said he inclined tighten down further. He asked + for my reaction, explaining that he was uninstructed and raising + issue on his own. I said I would secure “authoritative” response. He + asked I do so “discreetly.” I noted that PLO + HQ in friendly Tunisia had, I + thought, conceivably some + advantages for us to PLO in, say + Aden, but I would get back to him. Action requested: Please instruct + on reply I am to make, bearing in mind Ben Ali purports to speak for + himself alone. + + Ben Ali asked me to + speak to the Tuniso-Libyan relationship. What were our views? I said + we were aware that PriMin + Mzali’s departure had fuelled + expectations that there might now be opportunity for normalization + of relations (ref A). We had even heard Libyan delegation expected + “today” in Monastir. Ben + Ali said 74 Libyan sportsmen had asked for visas “in + Arab League context.” Bourguiba had turned them down flat, reiterating + GOT position: No relations; no + access; no visas; no visitors—until Qadhafi goes. No/no change in GOT position therefore in + offing. + + I reminded Ben Ali of + what our posture had been: we had recognized Tunisia’s need to deal + with disagreeable, dangerous neighbor as best it could. We had never + urged course of action on Tunisia, believing that GOT knew best what protection its + vital interests required. We had understood and sympathized with + GOT’s decision to sever its + ties with Tripoli in 1985. There had been ample cause. On other + hand, we were aware of impact on southern Tunisia of resulting + absence of Libyan trade and tourism. We had finally offered + assurances GOT would not face + Libyan invasion alone. Our views on Qadhafi regime were known. They remained unchanged. + If GOT came to feel some adjustment + in its posture towards Libya were to become necessary, we would, I + felt sure, welcome opportunity to consult before final decisions + were made. + + Sebastian +
+
+ 344. Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate + 63–84Source: Reagan + Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia + Reference File 1985–1986. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. Approved by the National + Foreign Intelligence Board based on information received as of + August 22. + + + Washington, August 1986 + + +

PROSPECTS FOR TUNISIA

+

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

+

SCOPE NOTE

+

NIE 63–84,See Document 321. published in + December 1984, examined Tunisia’s political, economic, and social + problems, the prospects for the regime of President Bourguiba over a two-year period, and the implications + for the United States. It predicted an increasingly turbulent future for + Tunisia. Developments in Tunisia since the publication of the NIE, including heightened political and + economic tensions, recent changes in the cabinet and the prime ministry, + and Bourguiba’s increasing + infirmity and capricious behavior, pose new questions about the + country’s political stability over the near term.In telegram 9100 from Tunis, September 17, the + Embassy reported: “There has been dramatic slippage of Bourguiba’s image among the + Tunisian populace. This has been brought on by his perceived + excesses in public, as well as in his private life. He is + increasingly seen as senile and manipulated by a new clan of + politically inept maneuverers.” The Embassy continued: “It is + unclear whether Bourguiba + will produce one of his patented bold strokes to defuse the + situation. Indeed, we must question whether he is any longer capable + of doing so.” (Department of State, S/S Records, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis + Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis) This Memorandum to Holders + focuses primarily on the viability of the Bourguiba regime, especially in light of the President’s + recent dismissal of his designated successor, the likely course of + Tunisian politics during the next 18 months, how these trends may effect + the transition after Bourguiba’s + death, and the implications for the United States. The paper also + addresses the outlook for Tunisia over the longer term when appropriate. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is a map of Tunisia.]

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

Economic, social, and political problems in Tunisia continue to build + dangerously as the ailing and aged President Habib Bourguiba fails to treat them. Action to redress + major grievances will not come as long as Bourguiba remains in power, and the longer he remains at + the helm, the more intractable these problems become. [portion marking not declassified]

+

The threat of revolutionary change still remains + low, but there are now greater chances for a breakdown in public order + that would severely tax the capabilities of the regime of the + 83-year-old President. The lack of political unity within the + government—reflected in Bourguiba’s sudden change in prime ministers recently—makes + a turbulent transition of power more likely and + increases the chances of military intervention.

+

— Regardless of who succeeds Bourguiba, Tunisia’s traditionally close ties to the + United States will weaken, and Tunisia—at a minimum—will shift toward a + more nonaligned posture. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

[less than 7 lines not declassified] the country’s + many problems. These include: + + A deteriorating financial position. + + Indications of discontent within the military and security + forces. + + The growing appeal of Islamic fundamentalists. + + + Alienation of political, labor, and student groups. + + Continuing threats from Libya. [portion + marking not declassified] +

+

Tunisia’s unprecedented economic crisis (largely the result of plummeting + oil prices) is adding to political tensions, but government fears that + new austerity measures will prompt a repeat of the bloody January 1984 + food riots have so far held Tunis back from effectively addressing + Tunisia’s economic woes. These same fears will also probably hamper a + timely implementation of the government’s proposed IMF program. Tunis will likely temporize + as long as possible on potentially explosive reforms (food price hikes, + for example) to avoid a popular backlash, but ultimately will be forced + to adopt much stricter austerity measures to obtain crucial foreign aid. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

The longer term economic prognosis for Tunisia is grim. Low oil prices, + declining reserves of exploitable petroleum, the unlikelihood of new + discoveries of oil or other natural resources, and demographic pressures + will work against any quick reversal of economic trends, even if the + government decides to make comprehensive structural reforms. [portion marking not declassified]

+

The regime perceives a significant threat to domestic stability and will + likely continue its turn toward authoritarian + policies to maintain its grip on the country. To deal with negative + political and social reactions, the government will probably have to + intensify its crackdown on both organized and unorganized opposition. + The most likely result will be heightened political tensions before the November election—[less than 1 line not declassified]. Although this will hasten + a decline in the govern- ment’s legitimacy in the short term, Bourguiba’s turn to harsh methods + probably will prove effective in suppressing the political opposition. + Opposition groups do not have the charismatic leaders capable of + rallying dissidents and none feel strong enough to challenge the regime + in the streets. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

In contrast, the potential for mass-based violence + stemming from economic grievances will remain high. The greatest danger + is the threat that disorder will provide internal opponents and Libya + with fuel to foment regime-threatening violence. We believe the security + forces are not strong enough to contain rioting if it became widespread, + and the government’s use of combat troops to restore public order would + produce further tensions within the armed forces. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Qadhafi has long provided support + for Tunisian dissidents and undoubtedly has agents of influence in + place, but he cannot precipitate a revolution. During widespread + disorder, however, Qadhafi has + significant capability to worsen Tunis’s problem through terrorism, + dissident raids, propaganda, and military posturing. He is unlikely to + invade Tunisia during the period of this estimate because he fears + US, French, or Algerian reaction. + [portion marking not declassified]

+ +

Bourguiba’s demise during the next 18 months would produce political + infighting and could lead to an open power struggle, raising + considerably the prospects for military intervention: + + Even though the Tunisian military has been apolitical by Arab + standards, officers are increasingly frustrated with the + government’s inability to cope with Tunisia’s problems. While + the military almost certainly would rally before an open Libyan + threat, discipline within the ranks would dangerously weaken if + troops were repeatedly called upon to put down internal + disturbances sparked by the same economic concerns that worry + officers and conscripts. + + A military-controlled government might prove the only one + capable of ensuring stability but it would be no more adept at + solving Tunisia’s problems. [portion marking + not declassified] +

+

Bilateral ties to the United States will remain close as long as + Bourguiba is in charge, + despite increasing public hostility toward the United States and the + President’s own misgivings over what he believes to be shortcomings in + US economic and military aid. + Bourguiba’s stance, however, + poses increased dangers for US + interests. His dual strategy of leaning on the United States and the + West for financial + assistance, while cracking down on dissent at home, will tend to + identify the US Government with + Bourguiba’s unpopular + policies. However, any attempt by Washington to cultivate relations with + opposition groups or lobby the government to open up the political + system would anger Bourguiba, our + closest friend in the country, and possibly signal vacillating US support for the regime to the + opposition. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

The President’s demise will almost certainly lead to a government more + committed to developing Tunisia’s nonaligned credentials and reducing + high-visibility ties to Washington. The current group of civilian + contenders for the succession would try to broaden ties to other Arab + states and the Soviet Union but they would not want to jeopardize vital + economic and security links to the United States and France. While a + regime controlled by senior military officers + probably would try to maintain good relations with the United States + because of its political inexperience and need for foreign support, we + doubt that such a government could long afford to rule much differently + than a civilian successor. A government led by junior officers would more likely be less sympathetic or even + hostile to the United States, but not necessarily more amenable to + Soviet interests: + + If in the longer term, a successor regime, or regimes, is + unable to consolidate power and rectify the country’s problems, + we believe revolutionary change and a more fundamental + realignment on international issues is likely. [portion marking not declassified] +

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. + + 8818. + + Tunis, September 10, 1986, + 1540Z + + + + SUBJECT + GOT Decision to Participate in + Joint Contingency Planning. + + + + Secret/Entire text. + + The apparently unequivocal GOT + decision to accept the ten month-old U.S. proposal for Joint + Contingency Planning came as something of a surprise.See Document + 336. That decision, conveyed to Assistant Secretary + of Defense ArmitageIn telegram 8682 + from Tunis, September 5, the Embassy reported that during + Armitage’s September 4 meeting with Bourguiba, “Baly briefed President on opening + session of JMC, including + GOT’s indication of + readiness to discuss joint defense planning with US. Bourguiba ratified his previous decision in that + regard.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: + Lot 95D23, Tunis) Baly + notified Armitage of his government’s decision on September 3. + (Telegram 8636 from Tunis, September 4; ibid.) with the + request that it be kept in deep confidence and coupled with the U.S. + decision to recommend sale of Stingers to the GOT, resulted in an extremely + productive sixth meeting of the Joint Military Commission. This + message attempts to delve into the reasons that led the GOT to proceed with joint contingency + planning. + + The Minister of Defense, Slaheddine + Baly, advised ASD + Armitage confidentially of the GOT + decision at the beginning of the visit. The highly positive tone of + subsequent working meetings served as a further sign that the word + had obviously gone out to cooperate with the U.S. The senior + Tunisian military officers in the know have termed the decision an + “historic” one, which makes interesting the apparent lack of + internal GOT debate surrounding + it. + + There is no indication that any of the other national security + leaders outside of the MOD had any + substantial input into the decision. Min Int Ben Ali did not participate in + any of the Armitage sessions, FonMin + Caid Essebsi was absent, and + PriMin + Rachid Sfar acted as if he + were hearing the proposal for the first time when Baly briefed him on ASD Armitage’s meeting with President + Bourguiba (which + Sfar did not attend). + Baly told us the decision + was made “some weeks ago.” Another senior military officer told us + the decision had been fully studied and staffed within the military + over past months. The original U.S. proposal having been made at the + 1985 JMC, he explained, it was only + “natural” that the GOT response be + given at this year’s meeting. When we pointed out that several crises had arisen in + the course of the year during which GOT had asked how we might help, our interlocutor + replied that the GOT had not wanted + to take the decision while “under pressure.” We believe that + Baly having assessed the + new atmosphere and conscious of support for the proposal among his + Chiefs of Staff, simply bided his time and ran it by his President + in the certitude that the latter, given his pro-American leanings, + would approve. + + That said, the single most important factor in leading the GOT to its decision was the removal + from the scene of former PriMin + Mohamed Mzali.See Document + 343. + Mzali’s Arab-leaning + tendencies and his sensitivity to opposition views not only made him + chary of a close relationship with the U.S.; he appeared at times to + nurture the image of someone willing to resist us. Ironically, it + was his mischievous hypothetical questions posed to us in late + September 1985 that led to our own proposals for joint + planning. + + To be sure, the country’s economic straits argue for some + adjustments in Tunisian defense planning. The GOT may have accepted part of our + rationale that joint planning could reduce their own expenditures. + The realization also appears to have come home that credits likely + to be available from USG are simply + not going to permit acquisition of past GOT wish lists. Hence a desire to please the U.S and + particularly DOD, which is seen as + more “appreciative” of Tunisia’s strategic value to the U.S. in + pushing for additional funds than is the State Department. PriMin + Sfar was rather blatant on + this point during his meeting with Armitage (Tunis 8684).In telegram 8684 from Tunis, September 5, the + Embassy reported: “In hour-long and animated discussion with + Assistant Secretary Armitage, PM + Rachid Sfar gave + energetic exposé of Tunisian positions on US-Tunisian military + cooperation, Tunisia’s economic problems and their impact on + country’s security posture, position of Palestinians in Tunisia, + and current Maghreb politics.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860677–0376) + + Baly repeatedly stressed + the need for tight secrecy surrounding the upcoming planning + discussions, for reasons relating to Tunisia’s internal situation + and regional relations. We must honor that request. It is true that + the GOT decided to be totally up + front in its media coverage of the JMC meeting. But this does not mean that it can afford + to ignore its political vulnerabilities, even though President + Bourguiba apparently does + not pay much heed to them. New incidents in the region, ranging from + another bombing of Libya, sudden improvements in the Libyan-Tunisian + relationship, or pressures from an Algeria likely to frown on U.S. + forces exercising in Tunis, could alter the political context in + which the GOT has taken decision to + proceed with us. + + One other matter needs to be addressed. Although we believe that + GOT leaders understand the + distinction between a formal mutual defense pact and contingency planning designed + to facilitate subsequent—ad hoc—political decisions to employ U.S. + assets, it will be necessary to reinforce that understanding as the + opportunities present themselves in coming months. + + Department please pass as appropriate. + + Brown +
+
+ 346. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President ReaganSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0040, 1986 Official Records (Top Secret) of + the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive + Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, + DOD 1986. Top + Secret. + + + Washington, November 28, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Weekly Activity Report + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

Meeting with Tunisian Ambassador: On Wednesday, + Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia asked + to meet with me to convey the following message from Defense Minister + Baly.In telegram 7853 from Tunis, November 25, Sebastian reported that on November + 24 Mabrouk informed him: + “President Bourguiba would + like the President and SecDef to + know of his satisfaction with tenor and progress of recently + conducted joint planning talks.” Bourguiba, he commented, also “remains committed to + ultimate reliance on the U.S. in case Tunisia’s security is + threatened by Qadhafi. He + wants talks to proceed and clearly hopes that, notwithstanding + conditional and contingent nature of results, U.S. interest in + Tunisia’s security and integrity will be further strengthened.” + (Ibid.) Regarding U.S./Tunisian contingency planning + initiated earlier this month between European Command and Tunisian + military officials, the Minister expressed his deep satisfaction with + our progress thus far, and with our mutual commitment to Tunisia’s + security that is implied through these planning talks. Secondly, he + asked for our support in doing what we can to keep Tunisia’s FY 1987 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from being cut. I responded that + FMS are a problem for us in many + countries, which is why it is important for us to find ways to make our + dollars go farther, such as through planning efforts and exercises, to + improve Tunisia’s military capability.

+ +

The Ambassador then stated that Minister Baly had asked him to convey President Bourguiba’s full support for this + initiative and his interest in continuing such cooperation. President + Bourguiba wants us to know + that he believes the challenge and the menace are no less than they used + to be, and therefore we must remain vigilant. I assured him that we + share this view of the Libyan threat completely. Finally, Ambassador + Ben Yahia stated that he had + been asked to convey, on behalf of both the President and Defense + Minister, the fullest sense of U.S./Tunisian credibility to us at a time + when they know U.S. credibility is being questioned. President Bourguiba wants us to be assured that + Tunisia has the fullest confidence in, and fully supports, us. I + expressed my gratitude for this warm and welcome message, noting that I + would pass it to you directly.

+

This was a welcome meeting and message. We need the Tunisians, and I was + delighted that they feel our joint work with them is helpful. (TS)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+ Cap +
+
+ 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no + D number]. Confidential; + Immediate. Drafted by Rosemary O’Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Ussery, Marion Creekmore (NEA), Hawes + (PM), Robert Bauerlein (T), Donald Adams (AID/PPC/PB), Mueller + (S/S), Peter Covington (S/S–O), Gaffney (DOD), Irwin Pernick, and Marc Grossman + (D); approved by Shultz. + + 398326. + + Washington, December 25, 1986, 0531Z + + + + SUBJECT + Letter to FonMin on Security + Assistance Levels for Tunisia. + +

1. Confidential—Entire text.

+

2. Embassy is requested to deliver letter from Secretary Shultz to FonMin + Hedi Mabrouk as follow-up to + notification of FY 87 security + assistance allocation for Tunisia (being provided septel).Not found.

+

3. Begin text.

+

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

+

Ambassador Sebastian will have + informed you on United States Government assistance to be made available + for Tunisia in FY 87. The assistance to be extended to Tunisia + reflects severe cutbacks mandated by Congress for both military programs + and the economic support fund.

+

Our friends and allies should understand that a strong and vibrant US economy is essential, not just to our + own security and prosperity but to economic stability and growth + throughout the world. Federal expenditures have an important effect on + the state of our economy, and this year the Congress took steps to + impose some discipline on the levels of expenditure in the Federal + budget. The result is that the total budget that the Congress approved + for fiscal year 1987 is considerably less than that which the President + originally requested.

+

I do not take issue with the principle that we must curb expenditures and + adhere to budget limitations. I believe, however, that the foreign + affairs portion of the budget has absorbed more than an equitable share + of this year’s reductions. I intend to do everything I can to restore + our foreign affairs programs to equitable levels.

+

I recognize that the reduced economic assistance levels came at a time + when your government is proceeding with implementation of its courageous + and difficult economic structural adjustment plan. We need, therefore, + to work particularly closely with your government to devise ways in + which these resources can best be utilized to support this endeavor.

+

With respect to military assistance, while it has not been possible to + meet our planned levels, we have been able to follow through on our + commitment to President Bourguiba + for greater concessionality. Military funding for fiscal year 1987 will + be on a totally grant basis.

+

Mr. Minister, reduced levels of United States assistance do not reflect + any lessening of our commitment to Tunisia’s security and economic + wellbeing. Our shared interest in those objectives remains the + cornerstone of our close and cooperative bilateral relationship.

+

Sincerely yours, George + Shultz

+

End text.

+

4. There will be no signed original.

+ Armacost +
+ +
+ 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by O’Neill; cleared by Gregg, Pearson, Quinn, and Laurie Tracy (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to + Algiers, Rabat, Ndjamena, Cairo, Paris, and Brussels. + + 23812. + + Washington, January 28, 1987, 2058Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Ambassador’s Call on Vice President Bush. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Introduction and Summary: On January 23, Vice President Bush met with Tunisian Ambassador + Ben Yahia to accept on + behalf of President Reagan a + personal message from President Bourguiba.Bourguiba’s + message was not found. In relaying message, Ben Yahia assured Vice President + concerning Tunisian contacts with Libya and expressed GOT satisfaction about U.S.-Tunisian + military contingency planning.See Document 345. Discussion also + focussed on Chad, Libya’s relations with Morocco and Algeria, + Bourguiba’s health, + Tunisia’s economy and U.S. assistance. + + Libya. Ben Yahia opened + conversation by referring to Qadhafi’s isolation in North Africa. Rapprochement + with Algeria had not gone well, and Libya had suffered serious + defeats in Chad. Ben Yahia + said he had been instructed by Bourguiba to advise President Reagan that GOT is not about to “save” Qadhafi from his isolation by + normalizing ties with Libya. There will be no normalization without + Libyan compensation for expelled Tunisian workers and for $200 + million in seized assets. Ben + Yahia expressed GOT’s conviction that Qadhafi will be unable to meet Tunisian + demands. + + To Vice President’s query about Morocco’s relations with Libya, + Ben Yahia responded that + Hassan had told GOT + FonMin + Mabrouk that GOM’s break with Libya was final. + Meetings between Algeria and Libya had been a signal to Morocco. + Qadhafi’s flirtation with + Morocco is over. With regard to Algerian-Libyan ties, Ben Yahia noted that while GOA recognizes that Libyan situation + is a “mess,” Bendjedid is + reluctant to condemn Qadhafi + in part because of situation in Western Sahara. Libya and GOA share positions in OPEC; that is + their only common interest. + + Chad. Ben Yahia expressed + GOT satisfaction at losses + Qadhafi has suffered in + Chad and for U.S. and French support for Chad. He said Bourguiba had discussed Chadian + situation with Mitterrand and + Chirac during his recent + visit to Paris. Tunisians are gratified to see change in Mitterrand’s attitude toward Chad. + With French logistical + support, Habre dealt a severe blow to Qadhafi. GOT is + concerned as to how Qadhafi + might respond to this defeat. At present, only pressure being placed + on him is from Chad. + + Contingency Planning. Bourguiba also instructed Ben Yahia to relay to President + Reagan his gratification + over good work accomplished by US + and Tunisian military on joint contingency planning. Meeting at + Stuttgart in November resulted in a new phase in USG-GOT cooperation + that will assure Tunisia’s security in event of Libyan aggression. + He expressed hope that next meeting in March in Tunis will be + equally successful. + + Vice President expressed appreciation on behalf of President + Reagan for messages on + Libya and USG-GOT military cooperation and inquired about President + Bourguiba’s health. + Speaking to Bourguiba’s + continuing attention to detail in governing Tunisia, Ben Yahia referred to President’s + vision in initiating structural adjustment program to turn around + Tunisia’s economic crisis. He said that with US help 1987 will be a better year than 1986 for + Tunisia. + + U.S. Assistance. Referring to the U.S. budget squeeze, Vice + President said that Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger had complained bitterly about cuts which + their departments had to absorb. Despite foreign aid reductions, + USG remains determined to try + to assist Tunisia. Noting that U.S.-Tunisian relations are built on + mutual respect for shared values, Vice President asked Ben Yahia to convey to President + Bourguiba President + Reagan’s assurance of a + U.S. commitment to Tunisia’s prosperity. + + Shultz +
+
+ 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870072–0385. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Rosemary + O’Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared for + information by Ian Peters (AID/MENA), Denis Kiely (PM), Robert Bauerlein (T), and Gene Griffiths (NEA/ECON), cleared by Quinn, Zweifel, and Robert Downey (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. + + 25273. + + Washington, January 29, 1987, 2304Z + + + + SUBJECT + Foreign Minister’s Correspondence With Secretary Shultz. + + + Ref: + 85 State 398326.Reference is in + error. The reference should read “86 State 398326.” See Document 347. + + +

1. In January 27 meeting with Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Tunisian Ambassador + Ben Yahia transmitted + response to Secretary Shultz’ + December letter to Tunisian Foreign Minister Mabrouk. Following is text of letter:

+

2. Begin text.

+

Mr. Secretary:

+

I have received your message regarding the assistance that the United + States Government is prepared to furnish Tunisia during fiscal 1987.

+

I thank you for your consideration, indicative of the excellence of our + political relations, and while I do not consider myself qualified to + evaluate in any way the choice of the American Government, I find it + comforting “that the reduction imposed by Congress on the budget + submitted by President Reagan + should be equitably distributed among the various chapters of the + federal budget.”

+

For it would be, in my view, in the interests of the United States to + restore the cooperative programs administered by the Department of State + to a level that will confirm the reputed economic solidity of the United + States and its leading role in the international arena. We will, + therefore, work in close cooperation to make the most judicious + determination of how amounts already approved will be used and, at a + time when the government of President Bourguiba is courageously striving to implement its plan + of economic structural adjustment, I believe it necessary to work + together so that the assistance of the United States Government for the + current fiscal year will contribute substantially to the success of that + plan.

+

Tunisia is the first country in the world to conclude with the United + States a new PL 480 agreement (Title + I–Section 108 and 106Title I–Section 106 + permits the proceeds to be used for economic development. Section + 108 allows repayment in local currencies. The United States could + then put the proceeds in accounts in international financial + institutions, which would then re-lend the money to the private + sector in the recipient nation. for the promotion of the + Tunisian private sector). In addition, it has always committed U.S. + financial assistance well before the September 30 deadline. Thus, I feel + that additional assistance under the Economic Support and Food Aid Fund + (PL 480, Section 416) would + express, in practice, the political willingness of the high American + authorities to support my country’s efforts to restructure and develop + its economy.

+

And, while I thank you on behalf of President Bourguiba for the quality of the military assistance and + your gesture in illustration thereof for fiscal 1987, I must draw your + attention to the fact that the military debt is exerting ever-increasing + pressure on our balance of payments and that it would be highly desirable to envision + relief for those contracts already concluded under our military + cooperation program.

+

Such cooperation, which assures Tunisia of America’s firm commitment to + its security, in accordance with the wishes of President Bourguiba, could be improved in terms + of both volume and quality by the granting of fully concessional FMS credits.

+

I look forward to meeting with you whenever you are available, and assure + you, Mr. Secretary, of my highest consideration.

+

Hedi Mabrouk.

+

End text.

+ Shultz +
+
+ 350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987. Secret; + Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Paul Wilcox (NEA), Andrew Steinfeld (P), John Arbogast (L/NEA), James Bindenagel (S/S–O), and Pascoe (S/S); approved by Murphy. Sent for information to + Tel Aviv. + + 72156. + + Washington, March 12, 1987, 0219Z + + + + SUBJECT + GOT Claim for Ex Gratia + Compensation From Israelis. + + + Ref: + (A) Tunis 2394;In telegram 2394 from + Tunis, March 9, the Embassy reported: “GOT Deputy Foreign + Minister Taieb Sahbani + convoked Chargé morning March 6 to raise question of + compensation to Tunisia as a result of October 1, 1985, Israeli + attack on PLO Headquarters at + Hammam Chatt.” The Embassy continued: “Security Council + Resolution called for compensation and that Tunisia had the + consequent right to go back to the Security Council.” The + Embassy also reported that “Sahbani reviewed background on + question” and noted that “Sahbani’s main point was that Tunisian + losses incurred at Hammam Chatt continue to be a domestic + political issue for the GOT + with ramifications for US-Tunisian relations.” (Ibid.) + (B) 86 Tunis 5052.In telegram 5052 from + Tunis, May 22, 1986, Sebastian reported that he had told Essebsi “in our good offices + capacity, we have made some progress on the question of possible + ex gratia payment in compensation for Tunisian losses flowing + from Israeli Oct. 1 raid. PM + Peres has told us that he + is prepared without commitment at this stage to study detailed + listing of Tunisian casualties and/or property damage stemming + from the raid.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams. N860005–0542) + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Department agrees with Embassy speculation (para 4 reftel) that + renewed GOT pressure for ex-gratia + payment from Israelis well might stem from publicity surrounding Pollard + affair.Reference is to Jonathan + Pollard, a former intelligence analyst who pled guilty in 1986 + to spying for Israel. On March 4 he was sentenced to life in + prison. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute. It is therefore + especially imperative that we not imply to Tunisians that USG was responsible either for the + raid or obligated in some manner to compensate for damages. + Accordingly, any suggestion that aid funds be labeled as + compensation for the Israeli bombing is totally unacceptable. We + also want to avoid implying to GOT + that we see much chance that Israelis will respond positively to a + Tunisian request. Indeed, we believe the chances of this are + virtually nil. We are willing, nonetheless, to go back to the GOI on this if GOT wishes us to do so. + + Accordingly, Embassy Tunis should go back to Sahbani with following points: + + As GOT knows, 10/1/85 + attack on PLO headquarters + in Tunis was an Israeli action without any USG involvement. Likewise, any + decision on ex-gratia payments must be one for the Israelis + alone to make. + + It is entirely inappropriate to suggest that USG funded programs, whether + aid or otherwise, be labeled as compensation for the Israeli + attack. To accept such a proposal would incorrectly imply + that USG was responsible + for damage which resulted from Israeli raid. + + Such a proposal thus would run counter to the + understanding, voiced by President Bourguiba and other top + ranking GOT officials, that + matter of Israeli attack is not a U.S.-Tunisian bilateral + issue. + + If the GOT wishes to + continue to pursue the question of possible compensation + from Israel, we believe the best course would be to put + together the specific data earlier requested by the Israeli + Government (FYI reftel B). + Again, although the USG + cannot predict what ultimate Israeli decision might be, we + remain willing to relay Tunisian data relevant to GOI consideration of this + matter. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870072–0385. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared + by Ussery, Steinfeld (P), Pelletreau, Peter Covington (S/S–O). Deborah Graze,, and Quinn, cleared for information by + Robert Rackmales (HA); approved by Murphy. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, + Rabat, Paris. Sent for information to the Secretary of + Defense. + + 126190. + + Washington, April 27, 1987, 2211Z + + + + SUBJECT + Assessment of Washington Visit by Tunisian FonMin + Hedi Mabrouk. + + + Ref: + 1) State 122253,Telegram 122253 to + Tunis, April 24, contains a record of the Shultz-Mabrouk + meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870314–0020) + 2) State 120965.In telegram 120965 to + Tunis, April 22, the Department noted that in his meeting with + Murphy, “Mabrouk + voiced strong Tunisian support for international conference on + Middle East peace; Murphy explained USG’s skeptical willingness to contemplate such a + conference if it leads to direct negotiations. There was + consonance of views on Iran-Iraq war; Mabrouk will lead Arab League + démarche in Beijing on subject, pressing for ceasefire and + return to ante-bellum boundaries. On North African topics, + Mabrouk reiterated + GOT’s willingness to come + to terms with Libyans under certain circumstances. He foresaw + little movement on Western Sahara dispute. On resource issues, + he made low key, general appeal for more support and asked + whether it might be possible to review issue of FMS debt relief (Murphy did not respond). + Finally, Mabrouk stated + his interest in reviving Joint Economic Commission (for which + there is little USG + enthusiasm).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870310–0367) + + + + Secret (entire text). + + Summary: FonMin + Mabrouk did not pursue a + particular agenda during his 4/20–24 visit to Washington. Rather, + his approach was to respond to issues which were put to him by + various interlocutors. This he did with Cartesian elegance. Our + purposes were to reenforce friendship for Tunisia, assure Mabrouk of continuing USG support within budgetary + constraints, caution against too-fast rapprochement with Libya, + sensitize GOT to our growing + concerns about human rights situation in Tunisia (without taking + position on specific cases), and exchange views on a range of topics + of regional concern. Overall, visit should have been gratifying from + Mabrouk’s point of view. + We achieved most of our objectives, although our position on human + rights issues may be attenuated—if not misinterpreted—for GOT and Tunisian public consumption. + End summary. + + In developing program for Mabrouk, we responded to GOT requests for very high level meetings. This was + designed to honor Mabrouk + (partly with an eye to his post-Bourguiba leadership potential). At + Tunisian request, we arranged for extensive photo coverage of + meetings; on other hand, they deliberately turned aside + opportunities to interact with American media. + + + Having spent a rest day consulting with his astute Ambassador, + Habib Ben Yahia, + Mabrouk was well-primed + to handle USG questions about + current, troubling events in Tunisia, especially those surrounding + arrest of Muslim fundamentalists.In + telegram 3866 from Tunis, April 8, the Embassy reported that + “Tunisian Government (GOT) + actions to crack down on Islamic opposition, following earlier + squeezes against union leadership and opposition parties, have + increased concerns among non-Destourian Tunisians that no + dissident political activity will be tolerated by GOT in current circumstances.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D870272–0164) The Neo Destour was the political party + headed by Bourguiba. Tunisian Embassy was at pains to + shield FonMin from sharp + exchanges or criticism. For example, it was only after Department’s + repeated urging that Mabrouk + finally arranged a meeting with Congressman Wolpe. Tunisians + candidly admitted that they thought Wolpe would be sharply critical + of human rights situation, and Mabrouk allegedly was prepared to be stiff in reply. + In the event, meeting was a productive and friendly one. Mabrouk had two, controlled public + appearances (with Heritage Foundation and with Georgetown’s Center + for Strategic and International Studies). Incident at latter forum + underscored Tunisian sensitivities. One CSIS invitee (Dr. Abdulgader + Ali Muttardy) posed a rather hostile question after having + introduced himself as a Libyan. Tunisian Embassy subsequently (and + clearly on instruction of FonMin) raised this with Department in terms of security + concern—that Muttardy or anyone else could have “brought in a bomb . + . .” + + Despite Mabrouk’s apparent + lack of specific agenda, he had a clear objective: to reenforce for + GOT and Tunisian public the + close identification between USG + and Bourguiba government. + This was achieved with our active involvement. On touchiest issue, + that of deteriorating human rights situation in Tunisia, Secretary + Shultz sought to + sensitize Mabrouk to USG’s concern by pointing to GOT’s historic adherence to an open + political system, rule of law, and respect for rights of the + individual. Tunisian media, presumably guided by GOT, trumpeted this as firm + endorsement for GOT as a laudable, + democratic government. + + Mabrouk also had one + specific, close-hold message: to reassure us that GOT leadership is working closely to + assure smooth transition to post-Bourguiba government (details by + septel, notal).In telegram 122280 to + Tunis, April 23, the Department reported: “In a one-on-one + session aside, Foreign Minister Mabrouk told Secretary Shultz that a decision has + been made on how to handle the transition following Bourguiba’s death. The plan + calls for the Prime Minister to be named President (in + conformity with constitutional provisions), but for an interim + period only. This caretaker government will immediately call for + elections in eight months time.” Furthermore, “the caretaker + government meanwhile would undertake no treaties or other + permanent forms of legislation. Mabrouk did not indicate who, including + Bourguiba, has agreed + to this plan, and he did not identify major parties.” + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis Telegrams: + Lot 95D26, Tunis Nodis 1987) + + + Mabrouk did not press hard + on resource issues, although he noted untimeliness of a reduction in + assistance coincident to implementation of GOT’s structural adjustment program (which USG strongly supports) and continuing + heavy FMS debt burden. Among few + issues he raised was proposal for revitalization of Joint Economic + Commission. Department, AID, + Treasury and Commerce all were relatively noncommittal in response, + noting that other venues for discussion of specific issues might be + more productive. However, we are prepared to examine issue if GOT continues to press for another + JEC meeting. + + In sum, we believe that Mabrouk left with a sense of accomplishment. He + should feel reassured of close relations which USG intends to pursue with GOT, but not overly optimistic about + increased levels of assistance. Despite manner in which GOT appears to portray visit for its + domestic purposes, we believe that Mabrouk clearly understood our reservations about + Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement and our concern about the current + course of events as the GOT pursues + its internal security concerns. + + Shultz +
+
+ 352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870767–0634, D870726–0519. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Casey; cleared by Ussery, + Eastham (P), Joyce Barr (HA/HR) and Mueller, and + in substance by John Craig (NEA/ARP); approved by Djerejian. Sent for information + Priority to London, Paris, and Riyadh. + + 276215. + + Washington, September 3, 1987, 2113Z + + +

For Pelletreau. Subject: U.S. + Posture re Fundamentalist Trials. Ref: A. Tunis 9726 (Notal);In telegram 9726 from Tunis, September 1, the + Embassy reported that Pelletreau had met with Mestiri, the Secretary General of the opposition + Social Democratic Movement (MDS), + on August 31. Mestiri wished + “to solicit US intervention to help + save MTI leader Rachid Ghannouchi + from execution. Mestiri’s + presentation was based on his certainty that Ghannouchi will be + found guilty of a capital offense even though the government’s case + against him rests on the shakiest of evidence—i.e. general + statements of support for the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and + political activities since his release from prison in 1984.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D870763–0078, D870716–0557) B. Tunis 9605 + (Notal).In telegram 9605 from Tunis, + August 28, the Embassy reported that an MTI representative, “making what he called an official + statement, told PolOff August 27 ‘the MTI is not like Hizbollah in Lebanon, not like Iran . . + .all of our actions up to this point have been non-violent, but a + (State Security Court) death sentence against (MTI President Rachid) Ghannouchi would + be the point of no return.” The representative also said “the MTI was engaged in a re-evaluation of + its goals and tactics, and that a death sentence would convince + MTI moderates that violence was + the only way to express their views.” He also denied involvement in + the August 2 hotel bombings. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870758–0659, + D870706–0050)

+ + + + S—Entire text. + + Following are our reactions to issues raised reftels concerning + trial and possible execution of Tunisian Islamist Rachid Ghannouchi. + They are provided as possible background for your anticipated + meetings with former PM Bahi Ladgham + and others. We welcome your comments. + + Re appeal to you by opposition leader Ahmed Mestiri for U.S. + intervention to save Ghannouchi from execution, we are concerned + that U.S. intervention could be construed by the GOT as explicit U.S. support of or + sympathy for the Tunisian fundamentalist movement. We anticipate + GOT would be particularly + sensitive on this question since the U.S. (to our knowledge) has not + so intervened in the past. Moreover, GOT’s decision to bring Ghannouchi to trial along with + those accused of involvement in the August 2 hotel bombings + complicates efforts to maintain distinction U.S. has scrupulously + drawn between lawbreakers and peaceful oppositionists. Additionally, + as you have rightly pointed out, it is important to avoid + appearances of having arrived prematurely at conclusions about + Ghannouchi’s culpability or about the validity of the Tunisian + judicial process. + + Rather than focusing U.S. concerns on the outcome of the trials + (which may be problematic) or on the fate of a particular + individual, we believe it would be more productive to emphasize our + often-expressed interest in a stable future for Tunisia, focusing on + what we perceive as the need for mechanisms of political + participation and expression as an integral part of maintaining + stability. We believe it might be time to encourage GOT in a quiet and low-key fashion to + start thinking in terms of a more active political program to + parallel its no-nonsense approach to violence and to lawbreakers. + For example, it appears to us that the GOT, in making a determined effort to control Islamic + activism and to stamp out associated violence, is overlooking the + question of whether fundamentalism may not reflect a broader + political malaise that stems from a lack of safety net features, + such as opposition press, independent trade unions, etc. To our + thinking, a pure law and order approach is unlikely to make + Tunisia’s Islamic problem disappear, and may well exacerbate GOT’s woes, especially if the + fundamentalists decide to up the ante (ref B). A dual-track strategy + might help alleviate mounting political pressures. + + + UK Embassy here raised Mestiri approach to British + Ambassador in Tunis regarding Ghannouchi’s fate. We told UK Embassy U.S. was currently in a wait + and see posture pending outcome of the trial, and that any action we + might rpt might undertake would likely focus on broader concerns + such as U.S. support for human rights, political tolerance, and U.S. + concern for Tunisia’s political future. UK Embassy indicated that UK was disinclined at this point to take up + Ghannouchi’s case on its own, but could envision joining an EC démarche based for example on + concern for human rights and on the need for political good + sense. + + We would be interested in learning whether or not Saudi Arabia + might be contemplating action regarding Ghannouchi, given past Saudi + discussions with GOT on Tunisian + Islamism and given presence of exiled Tunisian Islamist Abd al-Fatah + Mourou in Saudi Arabia. As a possible alternative to a U.S. démarche + on Ghannouchi’s behalf, we might wish to consider the utility of + approaching interested Arab countries such as Morocco and Algeria to + inquire of their intentions. We also wonder whether President + Bourguiba, who we believe + values his country’s reputation in the Socialist International, + might be open to thoughts from that quarter.In telegram 10821 from Tunis, September 28, the + Embassy reported: “The State Security Court sentenced 7 Islamic + fundamentalist defendants to death, two in custody who had + admitted to committing violent acts, and 5 in absentia. MTI leader Ghannouchi received a + life sentence, and others received from 2 to 20 years in prison. + There were 14 acquittals.” The Embassy also reported: “Most + observers expected much harsher sentences for Ghannouchi and + other MTI leaders, and initial + reaction in Tunis seems to be general relief. The sentences, + unlike the charges, differentiated between individual + responsibility for violent acts and political opposition are + likely to be seen by most Tunisians as just.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870798–0027) + + Reftels repeated to info address. + + Whitehead +
+ +
+ 353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870850–0781. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Casey and Rosemary O’Neill + (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Eastham, Richard Whitaker + (INR/NESA), Klosson (S/S), and Huggins (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to + Algiers, Cairo, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Rome. + + 322446. + + Washington, October 16, 1987, 0717Z + + + + SUBJECT + Ben Ali Nomination: + Implications for the U.S. + + + Refs: + A. Tunis 11489In telegram 11489 from + Tunis, October 9, the Embassy reported that “Bourguiba’s abrupt + dismissal of Sfar and + elevation of Interior Minister Ben Ali again demonstrates President Bourguiba’s personal control of + power in Tunisia. Ben + Ali’s appointment puts a strong man in the Prime + Ministry and a heartbeat away from the Presidency.” The Embassy + also stated “U.S. interests are well served by Ben Ali’s appointment since + it will enhance stability in the near and longer term. While he + is not ‘America’s Man,’ he carries no ideological baggage which + would impede close working relations. U.S. interests are also + served by Ben Ali’s + tentative opening to critics which should be encouraged.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D870758–0659, D870833–0457) + B. Tunis 11526.In telegram 11526 from + Tunis, October 9, Pelletreau reported that in his initial call on + Ben Ali, Ali + “sketched broad lines of Tunisian policy which parallel closely + our thinking on the major Tunisian and regional issues treated.” + After working to improve the economy, Ali said he wished to + improve “public order,” which “will allow him to work for an + internal political dialogue to which he claimed he and President + Bourguiba are + committed. On relations with Libya, he said GOT would go cautiously, stopping + short of full normalization, while at same time strengthening + security cooperation with U.S. Tunisia will also improve its + relations with Egypt.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870834–0057) + +

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. Department appreciated receiving thoughtful analysis (ref A) of + implications of Zine Ben Ali’s + appointment as Prime Minister of Tunisia. Over the coming months, we + will want to monitor developments closely as Tunisia adjusts to + Ben Ali’s stewardship. The + following points come to mind as issues we both will need to address in + our continuing analysis of the situation.

+

Tunisia’s Islamic challenge reflects not only discontent with the + dominant but out-of-touch Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), but also + dissatisfaction at the lack of credible alternative political + institutions to the PSD. As non-PSD institutions like the trade union + movement and the opposition lost ground over the past several years, + Tunisia’s Islamic challenge has grown. How will Ben Ali address this basic + problem?

+ + + Ref A describes circumstances of PM + Sfar’s abrupt dismissal; + questions of competence appeared to have little to do with it. What + assurance do we have that Ben + Ali is not equally vulnerable to such treatment? Why should his hold on the + Prime Ministry be any more secure than that of his predecessor or of + his predecessor’s predecessor? + + Ben Ali now holds both + the interior and Prime Ministry portfolios. His ability to keep + order is likely to affect his success rate as Prime Minister + significantly. Doesn’t this, in fact, impose a double burden on him? + What are his prospects if the security situation should worsen + rather than improve? + + Ben Ali was the man + Tunisia looked to in 1978 and again in 1984 for order in times of + violence and civil strife. During the intervening period of calm, he + was removed from the political scene and dispatched as Tunisia’s + Ambassador to Poland. Is there a possibility this pattern could + repeat itself? + + Ben Ali has solid + experience in the security field but little where such matters as + economics, foreign policy, and socio-political reform are concerned. + How effectively will he handle these aspects of his + portfolio? + +

Ben Ali’s previous responsibilities afforded him little opportunity for + building the political support critical to his success as Prime + Minister. The position he took on the Islamic trials and his subsequent + meetings with human rights activists offer a good beginning in the right + direction. He must still, however, deal with the legacy left by his 1978 + encounter with the trade union movement. How will he overcome this and + other similar problems? To what extent can he count on support from + within the PSD, especially with hardliner Mahjoub Ben Ali at the helm of the PSD? Will + erstwhile competitors of broader political experience (e.g. Education + Minister Sayah) rally around him or seek to sabotage his efforts?

+ + + Ben Ali is the first + military officer to be named PM and + thus nominal successor to Bourguiba. Does this have fundamental implications + for the nature of the Tunisian regime? Has a red line been crossed? + Has Ben Ali’s appointment + had an effect on possibilities for the rise of the military to power + in Tunisia? If one military officer can be named Prime Minister, why + not another, such as the ambitious Saida Sassi protege, Air Force + Chief Naaman? + +

Finally, what impact will Ben + Ali’s appointment have on Tunisian rapprochement with + Libya, given his undoubted interest in the impact such a move would have + on internal security, and in particular the prospects it offers for + Libyan exploitation of Tunisia’s present difficulties with Islamic + activists.

+ Whitehead +
+ +
+ 354. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President + (10/30/1987)–11/29/1987). Secret. Drafted on November 7 by Casey; + cleared by Ussery, Eastham, and Murphy. A stamped notations + reads: “87 NOV 9P 3:05.” + + + Washington, November 9, 1987 + + + + SUBJECT + Takeover of Power in Tunisia + +

What Happened

+

Zine Ben Ali, who was named + Prime Minister only last month,See footnote 2, Document 353. + relieved President Bourguiba from + power at dawn November 7 by having him declared medically + incapacitated.In telegram 12553 from + Tunis, November 7, the Embassy transmitted an informal translation + of Ben Ali’s communiqué + “announcing the removal of President Habib Bourguiba and the formation of a new + government.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870920–0219) The immediate catalyst + for the bloodless action was apparently President Bourguiba’s insistence on retrying + Islamic leader Ghannouchi in order to have him sentenced to death—a + development likely to have precipitated severe civil unrest.See Document 352. + Ben Ali immediately named + leading PSD moderate Hedi + Baccouche to succeed him as Prime Minister, and replaced + his opponents in government with people he can trust. A military officer + and former director for national security, Ben Ali presently appears to have + the full backing of the Tunisian armed forces. Many elements across + Tunisia’s political spectrum have welcomed the move.

+

What It Means

+

Ben Ali is well thought of, but + lacks experience in critical areas. He will need to rely heavily on his + advisors, and has already moved to install or retain competent + professionals such as the new Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri. Ben Ali’s key problem is that he has + no political base of his own. For the moment this is not critical, as + the country, anxious about its future, closes ranks behind him. Because + of his military background, Ben + Ali can probably count on the continued support of the + Tunisian military, but he may have to fight rearguard action by PSD + hardliners like Mohamed Sayah (now under house arrest), who can be + expected to attack the constitutionality of his action, to exploit + Bourguiba’s continued + in-country presence, and to utilize key parts of the party apparatus + they still control. Over the long term, Ben Ali will + have to establish his own political legitimacy, presumably by calling + for new elections.

+

Implications for the US

+

Ben Ali is pro-U.S., and can be + expected to seek our assistance as he confronts the challenges that will + face him in the days to come. We will want to continue our traditional + close support for Tunisia, without appearing to intervene in what is + going on or to lend our support to the individual personalities + involved. We will want to be alert to possible Libyan efforts to exploit + the situation, although Ben + Ali’s tough anti-Libyan views should help put Qadhafi on notice. Ambassador Pelletreau in Tunis has met with new + Foreign Minister Mestiri,A record of Pelletreau’s November 7 conversation with Mestiri is in telegram 12554 from + Tunis, November 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D870920–0223) a long time friend + of the United States, who conveyed Tunisia’s desire to maintain its + close cooperation with us, and said Tunisia would seek U.S. help if + Libya became a problem. We will also want to stay in close touch with + the French government as developments unfold. We have issued a statement + reaffirming US friendship for Tunisia, + our support for its territorial integrity and security, and urging + continued calm and moderation. The Embassy convened its emergency action + committee to keep the public security situation under close review. We + are also sending the customary messages from you and others.

+

Internal Implications

+

The loss of Bourguiba will be a + shock to the Tunisian political system, but we can expect a period of + consolidation as the country pulls together to manage its affairs + without his leadership for the first time since 1956. Anxious to + preserve its reputation as a moderate and reliable country, Tunisia is + striving to create the appearance of business as usual. The composition + of the new cabinet is designed to foster confidence at home and abroad. + While the presidential palace and the homes of Ben Ali opponents are surrounded, + the GOT has refrained from putting the + army onto the streets. Any uncertainty among the Tunisian public appears + to be outweighed by relief that a prolonged period of political + sclerosis is finally over. Ben + Ali publicly promised new legislation on political + parties and the press, as well as increased citizen participation in + government. This, along with the November 7 meeting GOT held with key members of the + opposition, should help alleviate the immediate concerns of Tunisians + about the political future of their country.

+
+ +
+ 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870921–0701. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Drafted by + O’Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by + Casey, Ussery, Eastham, Pascoe (S/S), Courtney (NSC), and + Adamson (S/S–O); approved by + Djejerian. + + 349229. + + Washington, November 9, 1987, 0630Z + + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Message to Ben + Ali. + +

1. Please transmit following message from President Reagan to President Ben Ali at earliest possible + time:

+

Begin text:

+

Mr. President:

+

At this time, I want you to know of my personal commitment to continued + close relations between our two countries. Just as the United States + supported Tunisia at independence and throughout its continuing struggle + to achieve social and economic progress for its people, so will the U.S. + support Tunisia in the challenges it now confronts. We remain committed + to Tunisia’s independence and territorial integrity and to its continued + economic, social and political development.

+

The future holds promising opportunities. The strengthening of Tunisia’s + economy and its traditions of political pluralism can open new horizons + of progress. As you begin this important task, Mr. President, please + accept my best wishes. Sincerely, Ronald + Reagan. End text.

+

2. There will be no signed original. White House does not intend to + publish text, but has no objection should GOT chose to do so.

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 356. Letter From Tunisian President Ben + Ali to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, + William J. Burns Files, + Tunisia 1986–1987. No classification marking. Sent to Stevens under a November 27 + covering memorandum from McElhany. (Ibid.) Printed from a translation + prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of + State. + + + Tunis, November 12, 1987 + + Mr. President: + +

It was with deep satisfaction and great pleasure that I received the + cordial message Your Excellency sent to me upon my accession to the + Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia.See + Document 355.

+

Allow me to offer my warm thanks and to tell you how pleased I am to see + a great and friendly country welcome a calm transition in a country that + is fiercely devoted to the rule of law and mindful of preserving, with + order and discipline, the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic + of Tunisia. Our commitment to insure continuity with stability, to which + you have lent support and encouragement, has no other purpose than to + assure harmonious development for our democratic institutions and to + reaffirm the achievements of the nation and the right of the Tunisian + people to dignity, well-being, and progress.

+

Under such circumstances, it was natural for us to anticipate the support + of friendly countries like the United States which have spared no effort + to support us, as much in our struggle to recover our independence as in + the building of a modern society. We are delighted, yet not surprised, + by the generous feelings expressed in your warm message and your + provisions to continue and strengthen the close and friendly relations + between our two countries.

+

We also share the optimism about the future which you have so cordially + noted. We hope this future is bright and full of promise for the + development of the bonds of friendship between our two countries.

+

Accept, Mr. President, my sincere wishes for your personal good health + and happiness and for the well-being and prosperity of our friends, the + American people.

+ Zine El + Abidine Ben AliPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. + + President of the Republic of + Tunisia +
+ +
+ 357. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Ben AliSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia + Affairs Directorate, William J. + Burns Files, Tunisia (02/01/1988–07/31/1988). No + classification marking. Negroponte forwarded to Reagan the letter and a letter to + Bendjedid under a + February 23 memorandum, which read in part: “The letter to Ben Ali, your first substantive + letter to the new Tunisian leader since he came to power last + November, is a particularly important means of reiterating U.S. + support for Tunisia and the sound domestic and foreign policies that + Ben Ali is pursuing.” + (Ibid.) Negroponte recommended Reagan sign copies of the letters to both Ali and + Bendjedid. + + + Washington, February 25, 1988 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I am pleased that my good friend Dick + Walters can personally convey my best regards to you and + your government. The United States applauds the courageous political + steps your government has taken during the past four months. The + proposals set forth in your November statement can help foster the kind + of political stability important to a secure defense against foreign + intervention.

+

The United States has also been reassured by Tunisia’s reaffirmation of + its desire for continued close ties with the West, and looks forward to our + on-going cooperation. As we communicated to your government in close + consultations in recent months, Libyan aggression remains an important + concern for my Administration.In telegram + 25712 from Tunis, January 28, the Embassy reported that on January + 22, Armacost told Ben Yahia: + “The US strongly discouraged + Tunisia’s cooperation with Algeria to bring Qadhafi into the Tripartite + Agreement. The US had worked to + isolate Qadhafi with some + success. There was no evidence that his ambitions had changed” and + the U.S. worried that “the overall effects of Tunisian policy was to + loosen the effort to isolate Qadhafi.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880073–0364) In + this connection let me assure you Tunisia can continue to rely on U.S. + support for its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The United States + encourages your government to exercise continued vigilance in its + bilateral relations with Libya, and strongly discourages efforts to + integrate Libya into any regional political and diplomatic + arrangements.

+

I would also like to congratulate you on your courageous structural + adjustment program. The Tunisian people have been asked to make many + sacrifices to restore their country’s economy. Despite our own severe + budgetary restraints, the United States will continue to support + programs designed to strengthen the Tunisian economy.

+

Dick Walters’ visit to Tunisia comes at a time of serious turmoil in the + Middle East. Events on the West Bank and in Gaza have demonstrated that + the status quo cannot endure. The U.S. has therefore engaged in a series + of active diplomatic consultations as a means of reinvigorating the + process necessary for progress toward peace.

+ +

The U.S. looks forward to discussing these and other key issues during + Foreign Minister Mestiri’s visit + to the United States later this month and during Secretary Carlucci’s anticipated visit to + Tunis. In the meantime, Mr. President, please accept my warm good wishes + for your continued endeavors as you and your government build for + Tunisia’s future.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+
+ 358. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880199–0519. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the + Department of State, Cairo, Ndjamena, Rabat, and USUN. + + 1324. + + Algiers, March 8, 1988, 0928Z + + + + SUBJECT + Ambassador Walters’ + Meeting With President Ben + Ali on March 5. + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Summary: In his March 5 meeting with President Ben Ali, Ambassador Walters reviewed the current U.S. + initiative in the Middle EastReference + is to the Shultz’s + proposal for a three-year transitional phase of limited + self-rule for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza + Strip. Documentation on the proposal is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute. and elucidated U.S. + policies on the Maghreb and in the UN. Ben Ali + expressed pessimism about resolution of the Western Sahara conflict; + affirmed that he had taken a tough stance toward Qadhafi; and noted + that former President Bourguiba was being well cared for. End + summary. + + March 5 President Ben + Ali received Ambassador Walters, accompanied by Ambassador Pelletreau, for a one-hour + exchange of views on regional and UN + Security Council issues. Ambassador Walters also presented a Presidential letter to + Ben Ali.See Document + 357. Tunisia Desk Officer-designate Kunstadter + attended as notetaker. + + Western Sahara: Ambassador Walters reiterated U.S. support for the SYG/OAU + initiative.See Document 455. + Ben Ali said Tunisia was + trying to get both sides + to make goodwill gestures, but there was a stalemate. He believed + Morocco and Algeria would have to normalize relations before it + would be possible to resolve the issue. + + Libya: Ben Ali stated + that in a recent lengthy meeting with Qadhafi he had bluntly told the Libyan leader to + shape up. However, he was under no illusions that Qadhafi would soon become more + reasonable. Because of Qadhafi’s instability, Ben Ali doubted whether Libya + would push for entry into the Tripartite Pact. Ben Ali acknowledged Ambassador + Walters’ point that a + regional treaty excluding Morocco would not make sense. + + Chad: Ben Ali said he + had reproached Qadhafi for + using mercenaries. Qadhafi + was now trying to get rid of them since they were evidently causing + problems for him with his own troops. The OAU Ad Hoc Committee was ineffective and the matter of + the Aouzou Strip would have to be referred to the ICJ. However, it was not certain the + ICJ would decide in Chad’s + favor, since the French had apparently told Qadhafi that the Aouzou belonged to + Libya. Ambassador Walters + responded by pointing out that France had never ratified the + Franco-Italian colonial agreement transferring the Aouzou to Italian + Libya. + + Middle East: Ben Ali was + supportive of U.S determination to continue its current initiative, + but was skeptical that Israel would move forward to a definitive + peaceful settlement. + + Iran/Iraq: Ben Ali did + not seem entirely convinced that either the French or Soviets had + supplied the guidance system for the missiles Iraq was currently + using. He queried Ambassador Walters about Khomeini’s health and wondered whether + someone other than Khomeini was now making the key decisions about + waging the war. He expressed interest at Ambassador Walters’ offer to send + information on the current military situation for a briefing by + Ambassador Pelletreau. + + Tunisia: Anticipating a question about Bourguiba, Ben + Ali said the former President was very comfortably + installed and well cared for. Owing to unemployment, drought and the + resulting poor harvest in 1987, it would not be easy to carry out + the November 7 program. Nevertheless, the GOT was determined to move ahead. + + This cable was cleared by Ambassador Walters. + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 359. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Reagan + Library, Frank Carlucci + Papers (SecDef), Subject: + Meetings 3/18/88. Secret; [handling restrictions + not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Near + East/South Asia Analysis. + + NESA M 88–20032 + + Washington, March 18, 1988 + + +

TUNISIA: HIGH MARKS FOR BEN ALI’S PERFORMANCE [portion marking not declassified]

+

Summary

+

The government of Tunisian President Zine + el-Abidine Ben Ali is stable after four months in power, + and the prospects are good that Ben + Ali will consolidate his position. The public disorder + and disruptive political maneuvering that marked the last days of the + Bourguiba era have + dissipated. Ben Ali is + pursuing the market-oriented structural adjustment program adopted by + the previous government and is gradually introducing reforms that will + allow greater political freedom. Tunis also wants close ties with + Washington as a complement to its efforts to deflect pressure from + Algeria and Libya. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

Ben Ali has performed well in + his political honeymoon period; his willingness to open up the political + process and ability to invigorate the economy will now come under close + scrutiny. He has yet to decide on the status of the Islamic + fundamentalists or the proper role of organized labor—potentially the + most powerful political groups in the country. There also are signs of + intra-regime friction about how to create jobs and sustain economic + growth. These problems will persist for years to come. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 360. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: + 02/01/88–07/31/88. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by + Burns. + + + Washington, March 30, 1988 + + + + SUBJECT + General Powell’s Meeting + with Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud + Mestiri, March 29, 1988, 4:10–4:30 p.m., The White + House + +

After welcoming Foreign Minister Mestiri to Washington, General Powell noted that he and other senior + Administration officials followed events in Tunisia closely. Powell recalled the meeting that he had + had with Ambassador Ben Yahia on + November 7, 1987,No record of the meeting + has been found. shortly after President Ben Ali’s accession, as one of the + most memorable moments in his tenure at the White House. Ben Yahia had handled his difficult + task very skillfully, and Presidents Bourguiba and Ben + Ali both deserved great credit for the dignity with which + the change of power was conducted. Powell congratulated Mestiri on the success that the new regime has enjoyed + since November. He emphasized continued U.S. support for Tunisia, and + for the efforts of President Ben + Ali at political liberalization and economic reform.

+

Mestiri thanked Powell for his remarks, and said the + GOT was determined to continue + along the progressive path that Ben + Ali had charted. The Foreign Minister added that he had + had a very good meeting with Secretary Shultz, reviewing the full range of bilateral and + regional issues.A record of the + Shultz-Mestiri meeting is in telegram 99606 to Tunis, March 31. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880274–0185) He had handed the Secretary a letter + from President Ben Ali to + President Reagan,Not found. responding to the message which + Dick Walters had delivered + in early March.See Document 357. + Mestiri said he had also met with + Secretary Carlucci, an old + friend with whom he had shared service in the Congo.No record of the meeting has been found. He + and Carlucci had discussed + Tunisia’s FMS debt problem at some + length; Carlucci had promised + to get in touch with Secretary of the Treasury Baker to see what more might be + done to help Tunisia and other FMS + debtors.

+

Powell responded that the + Administration as a whole had been concerned about the FMS debt problem for some time. Making + good on his promise to Mestiri, + Carlucci had raised the + issue with Secretary Baker on + the margins of a meeting at the White House earlier on March 29. Powell said he would urge Baker and other senior officials to + do everything we could to ease the military debt burden on friendly + countries like Tunisia, but acknowledged that Baker had a number of serious + obstacles to contend with. Chief among them was the worrisome + precedential effect of FMS debt relief + for the Treasury’s huge domestic loan portfolio.

+

Powell then inquired about the + GOT’s efforts to establish a + National Security Council, similar to the U.S. model. Mestiri said Tunisia’s NSC experiment seemed to be working well, + although it was still in the development stage. In addition to the + President and the Prime Minister, the Tunisian NSC included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and + Interior. The group was served by a very small secretariat, whose + purpose was to coordinate decisionmaking.

+

Powell observed that he had two + main responsibilities as Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs. The first was to make the interagency process work. + This meant ensuring that the President received an honest, objective + presentation of options and issues for decision. The second was to + advise the President, based on the balanced decision package that had + been assembled. He often had to walk a delicate line between his + coordinating and advisory functions.

+

Turning to regional issues, Powell + asked Mestiri about the state of + Tunisian-Libyan relations. Mestiri said the GOT + sought more normal relations with Qadhafi, but was keeping its guard up and resisting + pressures (especially from Algeria) to force the pace of normalization. + Qadhafi had been on good + behavior during his recent official visit to Tunisia; he had seemed + quiet and reflective, at times almost depressed. But then he had + returned to Tunisia with President Bendjedid for a brief ceremony commemorating Algerian + and Tunisian independence, and had disrupted the event with a vitriolic + speech denouncing the U.S. and extolling the virtues of Arab unity. + Tunisia had subsequently informed Algeria that it had no intention of + admitting Libya to the Tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation + anytime soon. Qadhafi simply + couldn’t be trusted. Bendjedid + had told Ben Ali he understood + Tunisia’s position, but Algeria through FLN Chief Messadia was still pressing for greater GOT flexibility toward Libya and seemed to + be moving toward an interim Algerian-Libyan unity agreement of some + sort.

+

Mestiri continued that the + Algerians seemed to have a variety of motives for closer relations with + Libya. They could be seeking Libyan support for the Polisario, and in + Algeria’s overall rivalry with Morocco; perhaps they hoped to attract + Libyan financial support; some elements within the Algerian leadership + were great proponents of “unionism” and were receptive to Qadhafi’s appeals for Libyan-Algerian + unity. Mestiri said all of this + made Tunisia nervous, and a little suspicious of Algerian intentions. + Algerian FLN party chief Messaadia had + recently come to Tunis and + criticized the GOT’s moves toward a + multi-party democracy; the GOT had been + “amazed” by Messaadia’s comments. Nevertheless, Mestiri concluded, Tunisia was pleased + with the generally good relations that it had with Algeria and its more + normal relationship with Libya. Powell urged continued Tunisian caution in dealing with + Qadhafi.

+

The meeting concluded at 4:30 p.m. Foreign Minister Mestiri was accompanied by Ambassador + Ben Yahia, MFA advisor Bouzayen, and DCM Gharbi. Ambassador Robert Pelletreau, Bob Oakley, and + Bill Burns also sat in.

+
+
+ 361. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading. April–June 1988. Secret. Shultz was en route to Moscow to + discuss preparations for the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev summit + scheduled for May 29–June 2. + + + Washington, April 19, 1988 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

2. Tunisian Appeal. The Tunisian Ambassador asked + Mike Armacost for our + support for Tunisia’s appeal to the UN + Security Council on the alleged Israeli murder of Abu Jihad and the + violation of Tunisian territory.No other + record of the Armacost-Ben Yahia discussion has been found. Khalil + al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad (“father of struggle”), the PLO’s most senior military official, + was assassinated in Tunis on April 16. (Alan Cowell, “P.L.O. Accuses + Israel in Killing of Senior Arafat Deputy in Tunis,” New York + Times, April 17, 1988, p. A1) In telegram 4354 from Tunis, + April 22, the Embassy reported: “For the first time since Nov. 7, + President Ben Ali is + confronting serious domestic political criticism as a direct result + of the killing of Abu Jihad April 16. Most embarrassed by the attack + are GOT’s security forces where + suspicions of U.S. complicity are widespread.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]) The Ambassador + recalled the October 1985 Israeli attack on PLO headquarters; we abstained on the Security Council + resolution. Saying that we have condemned this political + assassination—prohibited in the U.S.—Mike asked the Tunisians to supply + us with any evidence on this action that was available. The Tunisian + Foreign Minister is on his way to New York to attend a Security Council + session on this issue, which could take place as early as Wednesday + morning. We will continue to urge the Tunisians to moderate their + approach in the Council and to avoid a formal resolution.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+
+ +
+ 362. Electronic Message From Robert + Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to + William Burns of the + National Security Council StaffSource: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: + 02/01/88–07/31/88. Secret. + + + Washington, April 22, 1988, 3:07 + p.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Prof Note to General Powell + on Tunisian Security Council Resolution + + + + Security Council debate on the Abu Jihad resolution + continues.The draft resolution, + Security Council Resolution 611, which did not specifically + mention Israel, in part condemned “vigorously the aggression + perpetrated on 16 April 1988 against the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the + Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of + conduct.” The UN Security + Council voted 14–0 to adopt the resolution on April 25. The + United States abstained from the vote. The text of the + resolution is in telegram 1191 from USUN, April 26. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880354–0855) + USUN does not anticipate a vote + before Monday morning, although the situation remains fluid and a + vote could come late today. + + The latest version of the Tunisian draft, which has been already + sent to Secretary Shultz, is + much improved. It makes no reference to “terrorism,” and contains no + mention at all of Israel in its operative paragraphs. USUN is still negotiating with the + Tunisians to tone down references to Israel in the preamble, but in + general I believe that this latest draft is very close to what we + have been looking for. + + It remains true that there is yet no incontrovertible material + evidence of Israeli responsibility for Abu Jihad’s assassination, + other than the undisputed presence of Israeli 707 off the + coast,In telegram 1191 from USUN, April 26, the Mission + reported: “Tunisia was turning over to the UNSYG a dossier of its + investigation. The dossier related principally to the logistics + support provided by the Israeli plane tracked near Tunisian + airspace by Italian authorities. Malta had also informed the + Tunisian delegation that the Israeli aircraft had overflown + Maltese territory.” (See footnote 2, above.) but I don’t + think there is any doubt in anybody’s mind that Israel carried out + this operation. Before the MOA signing, none of the Israelis + disavowed it during a chat about the event in which they complained + about accuracy and detail of the Washington + Post storyThe Washington Post reported on April 22 that + sources in Jerusalem said that the raid “was approved by the + inner cabinet and carried out by a special Israeli commando + squad.” (Glenn Frankle, “Festivities, Security Alert Help Israel + Turn 40,” p. A11) on how Israeli inner cabinet made the + decision. + + It is also true that events have taken a turn for the worse for + U.S. interests (and Israel) in the Middle East. The continued + violence in the Occupied + Territories and hardened Israeli attitudes,Reference is to the First Intifada, an uprising + by Palestinians against Israeli occupation forces, which began + in December 1987 and lasted until 1991. Documentation on the + First Intifada is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute. the fact that our peace initiative is + seen as having run aground, our previous vetoes of UNSC resolutions against Israel, and + now the assassination of Abu Jihad have all contributed to a very + heated environment. We need to do what we can to cool it down, or at + least avoid doing things that will make it boil over. + + On the basis of Tunisia’s latest draft—with whatever further + improvements we can make—I strongly recommend that we swallow hard + and vote for the resolution. + +
+
+ 363. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Ben AliSource: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: + 02/01/88–07/31/88. No classification marking. + + + Washington, May 6, 1988 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I was pleased to receive your replySee footnote 4, Document 360. to my + letter of February 25, 1988, and wished to take advantage of John Whitehead’s visit to write + again.See Document + 357. For Whitehead’s May 11–12 visit to Tunisia, see Document 364.

+

The United States was glad to maintain a close dialogue with you during + the recent United Nations Security Council debate.See Document 362. + I can assure you personally that the United States had no knowledge of + the assassination committed in violation of your country’s territorial + integrity. Our condemnation of such acts has been clear and unequivocal, + as has our support for the inviolability of Tunisia’s sovereignty.

+

The discussions held during Foreign Minister Mestiri’s Washington visit in March,See Document 360. + and Secretary Carlucci’s + subsequent meeting with you in Tunisia,See + footnote 6, Document 360. + reflected our common interest in furthering a close and cooperative + relationship.

+ +

The United States will continue to participate in efforts to offset the + damaging drought now confronting Tunisia. Despite our own budgetary + constraints, we will support Tunisia’s structural adjustment program. We + also place a high premium on our programs of military cooperation with + Tunisia. As Tunisia pursues its goals of political and economic reform, + be assured of our full support.

+

I look forward to discussing these and other issues with you during your + anticipated visit to Washington in September. I am delighted to invite + you to meet with me at the White House on September 19. In the meantime, + you have my best wishes during the holy month of Ramadan.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+
+ 364. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Armacost to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading, April–June 1988. Secret. Shultz was in Geneva meeting with + Shevardnadze about INF verification procedures and the upcoming + Reagan-Gorbachev summit scheduled for May 29–June 2. + + + Washington, May 12, 1988 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

+

4. Whitehead + Visit to Tunisia. During his visit to Tunisia May 11–12,A record of the Whitehead-Ben Ali meeting, + which the Embassy described as “characterized on both sides by + friendship and common sense,” is in telegram 5195 from Tunis, May + 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D8803418–0605) + John Whitehead presented + President Ben Ali with your + letter inviting him to Washington in September.See Document 363. + John signed a $15 million Food for Peace agreement and the U.S.-Tunisian + Consular Convention. He also announced the revitalization of the + U.S.-Tunisian Joint Economic Commission.

+
+ +
+ 365. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Powell) to the White + House Chief of Staff (Duberstein)Source: Reagan Library, William J. + Burns Files, Tunisia: 08/01/88–08/31/88. Secret. + Copies were sent to Oglesby, Courtemanche, and Ryan. + + + Washington, August 23, 1988 + + + + SUBJECT + Cancellation of Official Working Visit of Tunisian President + Ben Ali + +

The Tunisian government formally requested on August 18 that President + Ben Ali’s September 19 + official working visit be postponed until later this year.In telegram 8599 from Tunis, August 19, the Embassy + reported that Ben Yahia had + summoned the Chargé to explain that “internal political affairs have + assumed a new urgency.” The Embassy further reported that “regional + developments have further infringed upon Ben Ali’s schedule—notably, + Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement and the ensuing progress toward + Maghreb unity, developments in Tunisian-Libyan relations (Chadian + leader Habré is expected in + Tunis about Aug. 25) and settlement of the Western Sahara dispute.” + The Embassy continued that the possibility the Palestinian National + Council could move from Algiers to Tunis “would entail major + security problems for the Government of Tunisia.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880730–0754) We responded on August 23 that postponement was + impossible,Not found. and that + we were very disappointed that the GOT + was unable to fulfill a commitment that it had made to us months ago. + The Tunisians subsequently confirmed that they would be unable to keep + the September 19 date.

+

Both domestic and foreign policy considerations probably influenced + Ben Ali’s unfortunate + decision to back away from the visit. Tunisia’s domestic calendar is + overloaded this fall; Ben Ali + has just reshuffled his Cabinet, and is preoccupied with completion of + political reforms prior to the November 7 anniversary of his assumption + of power. He is also actively involved in a would-be mediation effort on + the war in Chad.

+

Neither of these concerns, however, has prevented Ben Ali from going ahead with a + state visit to France September 12–15. What may have swung the balance + against a Washington visit was the fact that it would have occurred at + exactly the same time as the upcoming meeting of the Palestine National + Council in Algiers. In the wake of the 1985 Israeli bombing of the + PLO and the assassination of Abu + Jihad in Tunis four months ago,See footnote 2, Document 361. the + GOT may have decided that the + potential gains of a Washington visit were not worth the political risk + of having its President in the U.S. while the PLO was meeting to consider major issues like a declaration + of independence or a government in exile.

+
+ +
+ 366. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: + 09/01/88–12/31/88. Secret. Although no drafting information appears + on the memorandum of conversation, Burns sent it to Schott + Stevens under a September 12 covering memorandum + recommending that Schott + Stevens approve it. There is no indication that + Schott Stevens approved + it. + + + Washington, September 9, 1988 + + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Outgoing Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia + + + PARTICIPANTS + Colin Powell + William J. Burns, NSC Staff + Peter Burleigh, Deputy + Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + Ambassador Habib Ben + Yahia + Mr. Hedi Gharbi, Deputy Chief of Mission + +

Ambassador Ben + Yahia paid a brief farewell call on General + Powell on September 9 + following his photo opportunity with the President.In a five minute meeting in the Oval Office, + Reagan “expressed + appreciation for Ambassador Ben + Yahia’s distinguished service in Washington” and + promised “that the Administration would continue to work to + strengthen bilateral ties with Tunisia.” (Memorandum of + Conversation, September 9; ibid.) + Ben Yahia + thanked Powell for his support + for Tunisia, and pledged that he would do all he could in his new + position in the Foreign Ministry to further strengthen U.S.-Tunisian + ties.

+

Ben Yahia + then explained at some length Tunisia’s approach to relations with + Libya. He said recent progress toward greater Maghreb cooperation + offered a means of “regional containment” of Qadhafi. At the same time, there was a great deal of + “fermentation” inside Libya. Qadhafi’s partial relaxation of some internal controls + had allowed Libyans a glimpse of what more open societies had to offer. + Since the GOT opened its borders with + Libya in 1987, fully one-third of the Libyan population had visited + Tunisia. Their experiences in Tunisia only reinforced their interest in + pressing for further loosening of Qadhafi’s economic, social, and political controls.

+

Ben Yahia + emphasized that the Tunisian government’s profound distrust of Qadhafi had not diminished one bit. But + Tunisia had to co-exist with Libya and movement toward increased + regional economic integration and related changes inside Libya gave the + GOT a way to come to grips with the + threat that Qadhafi posed. + Tunisia remained deeply concerned about Qadhafi’s CW program, + his support for Palestinian extremist groups, and his habitual efforts + to destabilize his neighbors. + The best strategy for countering that threat, from Tunisia’s + perspective, was to build regional restraints on Qadhafi’s behavior and encourage the + process of internal Libyan change that was underway. This did not mean + open-ended political agreements with Qadhafi; Ben Yahia stressed that “we won’t make + the same mistakes Morocco did in signing the Oujda Accord.”

+

In the meantime, Ben + Yahia said, Tunisia remained firmly committed to + close consultation with the United States on Libya. Ongoing cooperation + with DOD and CIA would continue. The U.S. needed to trust Tunisia’s + judgment on Qadhafi. “Benign + neglect” might be the best U.S. approach to dealing with Qadhafi—since it denied him the + international attention that he thrived upon, and that magnified his + role out of all proportion to his real importance.

+

General Powell responded that the United States had full + confidence in Tunisia’s judgment. We too preferred that Qadhafi’s role not be hyped. At the + same time, Ben Yahia was well + aware of U.S. concerns about Qadhafi’s continuing troublemaking. His CW programSee + footnote 1, Document 284. + and support for terrorists were very serious matters. So long as these + activities continued, it was dangerous to grant him political + respectability—and we hoped Tunisia would not give him credibility and + legitimacy that he did not deserve, and had not earned.

+

Ben Yahia + reassured Powell that the GOT would continue to deal very carefully + and cautiously with Libya. He added that President Ben Ali was determined to push ahead + on a bold program of domestic political liberalization and economic + reform. Greater democracy and privatization—borrowing from the U.S. + model—were very important goals for Ben + Ali. General Powell said the U.S. applauded + Tunisia’s efforts.

+

Finally, Ben + Yahia explained that Ben Ali had been very disappointed + that he had been unable to visit Washington in September. Three main + concerns had prevented him from coming. First, Tunisia’s domestic + political calendar was overloaded, as Ben + Ali sought to complete a series of reforms prior to the + anniversary of his assumption of power on November 7. Second, Tunisia + was heavily involved in regional diplomacy, particularly efforts to + mediate a settlement between Chad and Libya and to promote a resolution + of the Western Sahara conflict. Third, the PLO had still not made up its mind whether to hold the fall + PNC meeting in Tunis or Algiers. A + Tunis venue would create massive security headaches for the GOT, and Ben Ali—a “very security-minded fellow”—felt he could + not make any extended foreign trips while this question remained.

+ +

General Powell noted that he was sorry that Ben Ali had been unable to come to + Washington as planned. This had caused some temporary administrative + problems, but would have no negative effect on the strong U.S.-Tunisian + relationship. He concluded by congratulating Ben Yahia again on his new + appointment, and reiterating the U.S. Government’s deep appreciation for + Ben Yahia’s superb service + in Washington.

+
+
+ 367. Letter From President Reagan to Tunisian President Ben AliSource: Reagan Library, William J. Burns Files, Tunisia: + 09/01/88–12/31/88. No classification marking. Powell forwarded the letter to + Reagan under an October + 26 covering memorandum, recommending Reagan sign the letter. The memorandum reads in + part: “The attached letter reiterates our support for Ben Ali’s program of political + and economic liberalization in Tunisia, and our commitment to a + strong U.S.-Tunisian relationship. It also notes our continuing + concern about Qadhafi.” + + + Washington, October 28, 1988 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

As you approach the conclusion of your first year in office, I wanted to + be among the first to convey my sincere good wishes on this anniversary + occasion.

+

Tunisia can take full satisfaction in the changes that have occurred + since November 7, 1987, a date that marked an important milestone in + Tunisian history.Reference is to Bourguiba’s removal from office. + See footnote 3, Document 354. + The United States applauds Tunisia’s continued commitment to political + and economic reform.

+

The United States also welcomes the growing cooperation among the North + African states. Such efforts can promote the stability and economic + progress we both deem desirable. America will strive to ensure that + bilateral cooperation with its friends in North Africa is conducive to + these goals.

+

As you know, the United States does not see Libya as a force for + constructive diplomacy—in North Africa or elsewhere. Libya’s efforts to + present a reformed image are unfortunately not matched by its continuing + deeds. Libya continues to make numerous overtures to the United States + for improved relations. Our response remains steadfast: concrete evidence of durable change in + Libya’s terrorism policy is a prerequisite for any dialogue.

+

I take deep satisfaction in knowing that U.S.-Tunisian relations have + flourished during my Administration. Tunisia can be confident of + continuing American support as you and your government build toward a + strong and promising future for your countrymen.

+

I appreciated the kind words you wrote in your August 30 letter. While I + had hoped to have the opportunity to review issues of common interest + with you directly, our exchange of letters has been valuable. I am + confident that the bonds of friendship linking our two countries will + strengthen with each passing year. As you celebrate this important + anniversary, please accept my very best wishes and those of the American + people for your continued success and well-being.

+

Sincerely,

+ Ronald + Reagan +
+
+ 368. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, [less than I line not declassified], + 1986–88, Tunis. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. + + 13092. + + Tunis, December 23, 1988, 1622Z + + +

Recat to [less than 1 line not declassified] per + State 414953. Subject: President Ben + Ali Discusses Cooperation Against Libya.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + This report should be read in conjunction with Tunis 13091Telegram 13091 from Tunis, December 23, + reported that “President Ben + Ali gave clear assurances that Tunisia is not + being taken in by Qadhafi. Normalization is part of Tunisia’s + defensive strategy, the President said. Tunisia wishes to + cooperate with the U.S. in developing the best possible + information on Libya’s CW + capability, but the President cautioned against military action + to remove it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D881120–0642) reporting the + bulk of my December 23 conversation with the President on + Libya. + + + President Ben Ali said + he wished to repeat the assurance that he had given the U.S. a year + ago.Not found. [less than 3 lines not declassified] Until + then, Tunisia would remain vigilant and treat its normalization with + Libya as part of its over-all defense strategy. There was no change, + Ben Ali said, in + Tunisia’s “strategic choice” of close relations with the United + States. + + [1 paragraph (12 lines) not + declassified] + + For S/S: Suggest you share para 4 with Director INR/IRE [name not declassified]. + + Pelletreau +
+
+ +
+ Western Sahara +
+ 369. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810038–0350. Confidential. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, + Algiers, Bonn, Dakar, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tunis, and + USUN. + + 555. + + Rabat, January 24, 1981, 0830Z + + + + SUBJECT + Comments on Hassan’s Hard Line on the Sahara. + + + Ref: + Rabat 477.In telegram 477 from Rabat, + January 21, the Embassy reported: “In a recent interview, Hassan + argued that Morocco will have resolved the Sahara conflict + militarily by the end of the month, after which there might be + negotiations—but not with the Polisario. The King saw an + evolution in Algerian policy and expressed the belief that + Morocco now has less reason to be concerned about OAU condemnation. He said there + were no negotiations with Algeria now.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810034–1004) + + + + C—Entire text. + + The Embassy offers the following comments regarding King Hassan’s + purposes and objectives in taking a hard line on the Sahara conflict + in his recent “Der Spiegel” interview (reftel). They coincide with + those of two very high level government officials who, while not + direct participants in the King’s current Sahara planning, possess + the position and background to offer particularly well-informed + judgments. In the interview Hassan spoke of winning the war + militarily by the end of the month, continued to rule out talks with + the Polisario as such and highlighted the danger to all posed by + Qadhafi’s rogue regime. + He also said that negotiations are not now in train with Algeria + (which country he avoided criticizing.) + + Our contacts believe, as do we, that the interview had major + tactical aspects and that the possibility of a meeting with Algerian + President Chadli Bendjedid at + Ta’if was an important determinant of its content; clearly, a + Moroccan projection of strength is to be expected as contingency + planning before any possible meeting with Chadli. We have learned + that it was decided at time of interview (Jan 8) that it would be + embargoed until Jan 21, and it is clear that date of its release was + picked with King’s imminent departure for Ta’if summit,In telegram 370 from Algiers, January 24, the Embassy reported: + “Such summits always stimulate speculation” that Hassan and + Bendjedid “will meet + and perhaps settle the Western Sahara issue. The Algerian + precondition for such a meeting so far has been that there must + be an agreed agenda, meaning that Algeria would agree to such a + meeting only if it were a prelude to Morocco-Polisario + negotiations.” The Embassy concluded: “Even if the two chiefs of + state do meet bilaterally we doubt that they will address the + Western Sahara problem directly.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810037–0950) + in mind—where efforts have been underway to bring him together with + Chadli and where, additionally, Gulf state donors are due a reading + on the results of their heavy donations to Morocco’s defense budget. + The accession of the new American administration was also + undoubtedly relevant to interview’s timing, as was French PriMin’s visit beginning Jan + 22.French Prime Minister Raymond + Barré visited Morocco January 21–24. + + Part of the interview was directed at Europe. As noted above, it + was given Jan 8 immediately following King’s conversation with Lord + Carrington (1/6)British Foreign + Minister Lord Carrington visited Morocco January 5–6. and + FRG Chancellor Schmidt (1/7).Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany + Helmut Schmidt + visited Morocco January 6–7. As we know, King struck + certain themes during these talks which reappear here, viz., + Morocco’s military progress in Sahara; need for greater European + support for Morocco’s efforts there and for its future economic + viability (e.g, on question of Morocco’s exports to EC); need for equitable MidEast + solution which would take account of Palestinian rights, given that + US will not abandon Camp David + and that (as Hassan believes) MidEast peace not achievable without + some form of Soviet participation; the desirability for active + European role in MidEast to strengthen hands of moderate (read: + Morocco) to achieve all this. + + The interview also quite naturally reflects the evolution of + situation on ground, viz., expansion of Moroccan system of + fortifications in Western Sahara which Polisario has been able to + slow but not prevent; increasing control of Moroccans over key + Saharan population centers and an improved sense of security there; + growing concern in Africa and beyond over Libyan activities in Chad + and over Afghanistan; approaching presidential election in France; + Saudi effort at Ta’if to heal rifts dividing Moslem world and + collapse of Begin government + in Israel. Finally, the interview provides an assessment of the + results of five years of fighting clearly meant to influence + political parties and reassure the local population, which has + tended increasingly to perceive Moroccan economic and financial + problems as war-related. In sum, the King’s interview was addressed + to several audiences: + Moroccan, American, Algerian, European and that of the Ta’if summit + participants. Hassan, at this juncture, has persuasive reasons for + wanting to look like a winner to all of these: Bendjedid whom he could face across + a negotiating table; the Saudis and other supporters; the new + American administration (Morocco which has soldiered on without much + American help is a winner, worthy of support and with much to offer + in African and MidEast arenas); Moroccans concerned about their + daily bread; and Europeans to whom he presents himself as the Arab + spokesman. + + Treatment of negotiation issue seems worthy of particular note. + The King does not say that there have been no contacts with + Algeria—and, indeed, statements to the contrary have been bandied + about for months—nor does he assert that there will be none, only + that there are no negotiations being held with Algeria now. + Polisario, he adds is not fit interlocutor because it is not + Moroccan. Obviously, the long-standing Moroccan thesis that peace + requires a prior understanding with Algeria would have been fatally + weakened had the King left open the possibility of Polisario + negotiations while the Algerians continue to decline to participate + publicly in talks. Significantly, he asserts that he will see once + he has won who his interlocutors will be. Any feint in that + (Polisario) direction would not only have produced domestic discord + and dismay but would also have tended to validate the Algerian + thesis that Morocco’s quarrel is with the Polisario, not Algeria. + Any indication that contacts with the Algerians were continuing + would have offended the Algerians, who have maintained publicly that + there aren’t any; raised suspicions among Moroccan politicians that + a deal—which they would be asked to endorse—was being concocted + behind their backs by Hassan and Chadli; and, finally, raised to + unrealistically high levels public anticipation of a “miracle” + meeting at Ta’if between the two heads of state, which if not held + or unsuccessful risked the danger of dealing with disillusionment. + In sum, we think Hassan clearly still wants to meet with Chadli and + that his denial of current contacts with Algeria seems to have been + designed precisely to keep open the possibility of a productive + meeting with his Algerian counterpart. + + Unsurprisingly, in view of the above, the King was as tough as he + has ever been on the question of negotiating with the Polisario. One + new element was Hassan’s redefinition of the Polisario: its Saharan + component is authentically Moroccan—though only one of ten + “authentic” Saharan groups. As Moroccans, its members can be + pardoned but never accepted as negotiators. + + The OAU referendum element of + problem is notable by its absence in King’s presentation. It is not + at all clear whether Hassan judges that Libya’s activities in Chad have so alarmed key OAU states such as Nigeria that the + pressure for implementing the “Wisemen”In telegram 6384 from Rabat, September 12, 1980, the Embassy + reported that an ad hoc, six-member “Wisemen” meeting on Western + Sahara in Freetown proposed a “six-point recommendation for a + peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara conflict,” which + included “a ‘just and general’ referendum” organized by the + OAU “with UN assistance,” as well as a + ceasefire monitored by the UN. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D800435–0765) recommendations has eased—or + whether, on the other hand, Hassan for his own reasons wants to + preserve the concept of a popular consultation staged among + increasingly more secure Sahara population. Our contacts believe the + King’s eventual decision on “consultation” will be an ad hoc one, + subject to the full range of relevant factors as they emerge this + spring. + + Duke +
+
+ 370. Memorandum From the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Kramer) to Secretary of Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret. + + + Washington, January 24, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Port Visit + +

(S) As you are aware, Secretary Haig would like to offer to Morocco a + visit in the first week of February by elements of the Mediterranean + Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to a Moroccan port south of Tangier.No record of Haig’s offer has been found. The main + objective of the visit would be to signal the Soviets who, since January + 16,The date is in error. In telegram + 184 from Rabat, January 10, the Embassy noted a DAO report of “the presence of Soviet + naval ships off the Western Sahara coast. On or about January 5, a + Soviet minesweeper reportedly crossed the 12-mile limit off Cape + Baras (Western Sahara), an area considered by Morocco as territorial + waters. The Moroccans may not be aware of this intrusion. A Soviet + frigate moved in on Jan. 6 close to the limit near Dakhla, where one + Cuban and three Soviet trawlers are being held.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810015–0874) have been keeping a destroyer, frigate and + oiler off Western Sahara + waters apparently in response to the Moroccan seizure of 3 Soviet + trawlers, 1 factory ship, and 1 Cuban ship which were fishing inside + Moroccan-claimed waters.In telegram 9345 + from Rabat, December 8, 1980, the Embassy reported: “General + Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan + Commander in the Sahara, has confirmed to AFP that the Moroccan Coast Guard has taken in to + Dakhla one Cuban and two Soviet fishing vessels. Dlimi mentioned that one Soviet + seaman had been wounded when the Moroccans fired warning rounds at + the vessel found illegally in Moroccan waters.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D800585–0311) We do not know if the Moroccans have asked for + such a visit or whether it is Secretary Haig’s idea to offer to them.

+

(C) The United States has long had an + excellent port relationship with Morocco. Visits generally occur every + two to three months. The last visit was by three ships into Tangier, + September 29–October 3. The next scheduled visit is by two ships of the + Mediterranean ARG, the USS EL PASO (LKA–117) and the USS NEWPORT + (LST–1179), into Tangier February 7–9. These ships have a combined crew + of 579 and 330 embarked Marines.

+

(S) The seized Soviet and Cuban ships are + being held at Dakhla, which is in the territory contested between the + Moroccans and the Polisario. A visit to Dakhla would be viewed as a + sharp tilt to the Moroccans in this struggle, a stance we have tried to + avoid because we are interested in building our relationship with + Algeria (which has substantial economic ties with the United States) and + because recently there are intelligence reports that Morocco and Algeria + are about ready to settle the dispute. It is fair to say that we have, + from time to time, tilted toward the Moroccans in the past, most + especially through the provision of weapons (F–5s, OV–10s, etc.),See footnote 2, + Document 100. but we have done so largely to avoid + a tilt in the military balance in the Western Sahara against the + Moroccans. Our calculation has been that, without our military + assistance, King Hassan might be unable to cope with either the + Polisario or internal pressure and it definitely is in our interest that + Hassan retain his throne. At the same time we provided military + assistance, we pressed the King to settle the dispute and avoided + gestures which indicated we agreed that the Moroccans had sovereignty in + the Western Sahara. In the current situation, there is no need to take a + position in the Polisario context and strong reasons—avoiding disruption + of our Algerian relationship and the possible settlement—not to do so. + Accordingly, we recommend against a visit to Dakhla.

+

(S) There are other ports south of Tangier + which the ships could probably be rerouted to, e.g., Casablanca (JCS and Navy are looking at the technical + feasibility). None of these are very close to Dakhla. However, because + we do not usually visit these ports, the Soviets should notice the change and there is some + possibility that they would take it as a signal, although the distances + are sufficiently significant (and we have occasionally had port visits + to Casablanca—one frigate in last year) so that they likely would miss + the point. Assuming (as is likely) the technical feasibility of + visiting, for example, Casablanca, there is little reason not to do so + if such a visit would be satisfactory to the Moroccans. Normally, port + visits are scheduled a month or more in advance, but short-notice + procedures do exist and such a visit could be accommodated from their + side if they wish. On the other hand, if the point is to impress the + Soviets, the Moroccans might well wish the ships to come further south + and, as indicated above, such an action would have significant + drawbacks. In short, while a visit to Casablanca has few drawbacks, an + offer to visit Casablanca might get us into waters we’d rather + avoid.

+

(S) There is an alternative which would + make the point to the Soviets, yet avoid the drawbacks of a visit to + Dakhla. We could operate either by ourselves or in conjunction with the + Moroccans in the vicinity of the Soviet fleet. (The JCS and CINCLANT could be tasked to come + up with an appropriate mix of ships.) If the problem persists over time, + we could shorten the interval between our regularly scheduled port + visits to Morocco (although I would note the Moroccans and Soviets are + negotiating over the disposition of the fishing vessels and we have + indications that the dispute will be solved reasonably soon, with the + Soviets paying a fine and leaving).

+

(S) In sum, I recommend against altering + our currently scheduled port visit. I would instead propose that we + explore with the Moroccans the desirability of our operating in the + vicinity of the Soviet warships.In telegram + 21635 to Rabat, January 28, the Department reported: “The Secretary + with concurrence of DOD has decided + that a well-publicized US naval + visit to Agadir would be desirable in order to send a signal to the + Soviets in response to their positioning of three naval vessels off + Dakhla, Western Sahara following Moroccan seizure and detention of + several Soviet fishing vessels in December and January.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810040–1154) Agadir is approximately 285 miles from the Western + Sahara-Morocco border.

+ Franklin D. + Kramer + + Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Acting) +
+ +
+ 371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco + and NigeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810070–0610. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Coon; cleared in + draft by James Roach (S/P), R. Grant + Smith (IO/UNP), and Borg; cleared + by Princeton Lyman (AF/I); approved + by Draper. Sent for + information Priority to OAU + Collective. + + 38353. + + Washington, February 14, 1981, 0107Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara and the OAU + Ministerial. + + + Refs: + (A) Rabat 980;In telegram 980 from + Rabat, February 9, the Embassy reported on February 6 that + Tazi “asked for + US diplomatic support in + capitals for GOM efforts now in + course to block Algerian moves designed enhance status of + Polisario ‘government’ (SDAR) in OAU. He + said Moroccans would fight efforts of Algerians and others in + NAM to introduce Saharan + issue into proceedings.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810065–0417) In telegram 657 + from Algiers, February 15, the Embassy reported: “In a joint + FLN-Polisario communiqué published in Algiers February 11, the + FLN ‘reaffirmed the total + and unconditional commitment of the Algerian revolution to the + struggle carried on by the Sahrawi people under the leadership + of its sole and legitimate representative, the Polisario Front, + for national liberation, for the achievement of its national + independence, and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity + of its state. The FLN considers + that the SDAR constitutes + a factor of equilibrium and stability and that respect for the + SDAR is a condition + for peace, cooperation and concord in the region.’” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810073–1181) + (B) Lagos 1806.In telegram 1806 from + Lagos, February 12, the Embassy agreed “that every effort should + be made to forestall moves to secure SDAR admission to OAU at the Addis meeting.” The + Embassy also commented: “There appears little appreciation in + the GOM of the strength of + Nigerian opposition to the present situation in the Western + Sahara.” The Embassy continued: “On the other hand the Nigerians + do not want to see an open split in the OAU and will go to some length to avoid a + confrontation over the issue.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810067–0804) + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Department is concerned that if issue of Western Sahara is raised + at Addis OAU MinisterialThe OAU + Ministerial meeting was held in Addis Ababa February + 23–25. and attempts made to admit SDAR, debates will be highly + divisive and deflect from current OAU efforts to seek removal of Libyan forces from Chad. + In addition, debates on this issue would impede progress towards + settlement of the Saharan dispute within the OAU framework, and would in particular + hinder our own efforts to bring the Moroccans to the negotiating + table. + + For Lagos: In light of current Nigerian efforts to seek resolution + of Chad problem, we suggest following points be made to Nigerians at + level and in manner you consider most appropriate: + + As you know, the USG + strongly supports OAU and + Nigerian efforts to secure withdrawal of Libyan forces from + Chad.References are to, + respectively, the OAU’s + call for Libyan withdrawal from and the holding of free + elections in Chad made at the November 1980 OAU meeting in Lagos and + Nigeria’s attempts to secure Libya’s withdrawal from + Chad. + + + We realize the importance of African unity on this issue + and recognize the leadership role which your government is + playing in maintaining that unity. + + Efforts to raise the issue of SDAR membership at the + upcoming OAU Ministerial + could have divisive effect on African unity and detract from + the efforts you and other African governments are making to + secure the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad. + + We think we have made some progress with Morocco on the + Western Sahara issue. This administration wants to explore + subject further with the GOM in order to see how it can best help lay + the groundwork for a solution within the OAU framework. + + Meanwhile it would be helpful if the OAU Wisemen could use the + period between now and July summit to attempt to engage the + Moroccans in steps following up in the Moroccan GA statement last fall.In telegram 5035 from USUN, November 12, 1980, + the Mission reported that the Moroccan representative + “insisted on its right and duty to defend its + territorial integrity, and declared the UN resolution on the Sahara + null and void.” Reference is to the Albanian resolution + which called for a popular referendum in Western Sahara. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D800544–1044) + + For all these reasons, it would be helpful if the issue of + SDAR membership + were not debated at the Addis summit, both to avoid dividing + OAU at critical + juncture, and in order not to limit our and the OAU’s options for achieving a + negotiated settlement. + + + For Rabat: You should inform Tazi or other GOM + official of foregoing. At your discretion, you may also pass on the + suggestion that Morocco send a special representative to Lagos (para + 8 ref B). + + For info addressees: We expect to authorize at least some of you + to weigh in along comparable lines but prefer to await initial + feedback from Lagos and Rabat before giving green light. Meanwhile + you may if you wish send Department your in-house reactions to + foregoing. We would also appreciate your comments on Lagos’ + suggestion that a Moroccan delegation be sent to shore up support + among other African moderates. + + Haig +
+ +
+ 372. Information Memorandum From the Acting Under Secretary of Defense + for Policy (Kramer) to Secretary of Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & + Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the + Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret. A stamped notation + indicates that it was received in the Secretary’s office at 10:57 + a.m. on February 27. + + + Washington, February 27, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Report of IG on the Western Sahara + Situation, February 25, 1981 + +

(U) Bob + Pelletreau attended the Interagency Group (IG) meeting on the Western Sahara + yesterday, accompanied by Jim + Woods, Director of the ISA Africa Region. Joint Staff was represented by BGen + Granger (J–5). Assistant Secretary of State (designate) Nick Veliotes chaired the + meeting.No minutes of the meeting have + been found.

+

(S) Most of the meeting was devoted to + developing background information to bring decision-makers up to date on + the situation and policy options available to the U.S. The discussion + focused principally on diplomatic options (whether to take a passive, + active, or wait-and-see stance with respect to the search for a + negotiated settlement of the war). Principal conclusions: + (S)—Militarily, the Moroccans + are in much better shape than a year ago; conversely, the POLISARIO are feeling the + pinch (lower morale, some depletion of combat strength, + difficulties in recruiting). + (C)—But the economic costs of + the war are very great ($2 million a day or more) for Morocco; + and the POLISARIO + continue to have the edge on the diplomatic front (with the + OAU, in the UN, and with the “non-aligned” + states generally). + (C)—Therefore, the only + practical solution remains a negotiated diplomatic settlement + acceptable to all the principal parties (Morocco, Algeria, + POLISARIO). +

+

(S) How active a role the U.S. should play + in this negotiating process remained unresolved; the discussion paper is + to be reworked and presumably another IG + meeting will be called to pick up the discussion.Not found. There is no indication that another + IG meeting took place. + (The pace may pick up as a consequence of a Congressional hearing called + to review the Administration’s proposal to sell 108 M–60 tanks to Morocco. This hearing, + chaired by Mr. Zablocki, will be held March 3, on behalf of the + Sub-Committee on Africa and the Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs + of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.The + hearings, entitled “Arms Sales in North Africa and the Conflict in + the Western Sahara: An Assessment of U.S. Policy,” took place on + March 25. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981) + Witnesses will include ex-Ambassador Duke, ex-Ambassador (Algeria) Haynes, and ex-NSC staffer + Bill Quandt. So far, a Defense witness has not been called.)

+

(U) Points made by Defense representatives + at the meeting: + (S)—The need for better + national intelligence on this situation, and especially on the + POLISARIO; a higher priority must be assigned and more resources + dedicated if we are to have the kind of intelligence + appreciation needed to support policy formulation. + (S)—The necessity to consider + Morocco as a strategic factor in our en route military access to + the Middle East and Persian Gulf; particularly in light of our + continuing difficulties in obtaining satisfactory access + assurances from Spain and Portugal, the need for an approach to + Morocco is becoming urgent (Mr. Veliotes accepted, in principle, the importance + of facilities access in Morocco and is receptive to initiating + an interagency review of the feasibility of such an approach; a + paper we are now preparing will address this issue and propose a + formal approach to State). + (S)—The desirability of + developing other contingent options for support of Morocco in + its military struggle (ISA will + develop such a list, in consultation with Joint Staff).No record of the list of options has + been found. + (S)—Fundamentally, the need to + consider more broadly our basic national security interest in + the outcome of the war (i.e., is it really a matter of + indifference to us whether the result of future negotiations is + the creation of an economically unviable, Marxist-oriented and + Libyan-supported mini-state on the Atlantic). +

+

(S) No specific action responsibilities + were assigned at the meeting; as noted above, we are working separately + on the facilities access question and on the preparation of a list of + possible additional military support measures for Morocco.

+ Franklin D. + Kramer + + Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Acting) +
+ +
+ 373. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff + (Wolfowitz), and the + Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to the Under Secretary of + State for Political Affairs (Stoessel)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Africa + General (03/10/1981–04/14/1981). Secret. Drafted on March 19 by + Coon; cleared by Burt, Pelletreau, Palmer (JCS), Rentschler, Ames (CIA), Smith, John Maresca (EUR/WE), Richard Baker (P), Joseph Montville (INR/NESA), Flaten, and James Michel (L). + + + Washington, March 23, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Policy Toward Morocco and the Western Sahara Conflict + +

ISSUE

+

At a recent IG meetingIn a March 21 memorandum to Stoessel, Veliotes noted that on February + 25, the IG recommended that the + United States “delink our arms policy from progress toward + negotiations on the Saharan issue.” (Ibid.) No minutes of the + meeting have been found. a virtually unanimous consensus a + emerged that U.S. strategic interests and + determination to stick by its friends require a strong bilateral + relationship with Morocco, and that these factors, not the conflict over + the Sahara, should determine our arms supply toward + Morocco. This contrasts with the arms + supply policy of the past year and a half, which + was based on a linkage between our willingness to + supply certain kinds of arms and Moroccan willingness to negotiate on + the Sahara dispute.

+

There was, however, some disagreement in the + IG meeting over what kind of a diplomatic strategy would best suit U.S. + bilateral and regional interests. To what extent should the U.S. play—or + be seen to play—a relatively active role in bringing the Moroccans and + their adversaries to the negotiating table? After further exploring + relevant issues, we have concluded that we can best + define our options for a specific U.S. diplomatic strategy later; meanwhile we should be taking certain + intermediate steps.

+

Two HFAC + Subcommittees are holding a joint hearing on our + Moroccan arms policy and the Western Sahara conflict on March 25.See footnote 4, + Document 372. We believe we should publicly state the new basis for our arms supply + policy toward Morocco at that time, recognizing that it will be + strongly opposed by those Congressmen who have insisted that our + willingness to deliver arms to Morocco be linked to positive Moroccan + steps to negotiate a compromise political settlement of the Sahara + conflict. We should also make + it clear at this hearing that we will be reviewing our diplomatic + objectives and options, and eliciting the views of other interested + parties on prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

+

The relationship of our Moroccan arms policy to the Western Sahara + conflict has long been a matter of sensitivity with the Congress, in + part because of questions under international and domestic law. These + legal questions, and the historical context in which they have arisen, + are described briefly at Tab 2.Not + attached.

+

This memorandum proposes that you (a) approve our + recommended basic posture toward arms sales to Morocco; (b) authorize us + to base our public testimony at the March 25 HFAC hearing on this posture; (c) authorize us to take + certain defined intermediate steps; and (d) agree to our analyzing and + defining our diplomatic options for future SIG consideration.

+

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE

+ + + Agreement on Fundamentals. At an + Interdepartmental Group meeting February 25 there was broad + agreement that the following elements of our position with respect + to the Western Sahara should be emphasized in articulating our + policy: + + Morocco’s importance to us, already + great, will grow in the years ahead. DOD has defined a strategic + requirement for DOD access + to Moroccan military air facilities to support both + Mideast/Persian Gulf contingencies and certain NATO contingencies.See Document + 372. In addition, we value Morocco’s + role as a regional strong point and stabilizing force in + Africa (Shaba, etc.). + + Morocco has been a reliable friend + over the years, pursuing moderate and constructive policies + on many issues that concern us, and demonstrating a + readiness to stick its neck out at some risk to its + interests. We need to make it very clear that this + Administration is determined to stand by America’s friends, + both in terms of our Maghreb policy, and to send a clear + signal of American reliability to Sadat and others around the + world. + + Morocco’s stability, as well as a + stable balance of power in the region, is of great + importance to us as well as to other friends like France, + Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, and Senegal. + + We should not, therefore, link our willingness to supply + Morocco arms to Moroccan willingness to compromise its + political position on the Saharan issue, as we have done in + the past. Such a posture directly undercuts our global + interest in achieving a stronger security relationship with + Morocco and encourages inflexibility on the part of + Morocco’s adversaries. (We continue, of course, to retain + the right to + withhold individual weapons sales to Morocco, as to any + other country, at any time.) + + We should continue to maintain the public posture that a) we favor a peaceful + solution of the conflict, involving further expression of + the wishes of the indigenous population, as a prerequisite + to a future settlement; and b) that we are studying the + question of how our diplomacy can best contribute to our + objectives in the region, including that of a peaceful + settlement. Meanwhile we should solicit views of other + interested parties but refrain from active efforts to + contribute to a peace process or settlement. + + We continue to have an interest in strengthening our ties + with Algeria and certain other countries in the region and + we should do what we can, bilaterally and regionally, to + support such interests, but without compromising our primary + strategic objective of strengthened ties with + Morocco. + + + Agreed Next Steps. There was general + agreement at the IG meeting that the + following early steps should be undertaken in order to serve one or + more of the following purposes: to maintain the level of dialogue + with all the interested parties needed to sustain our ability to + influence them on matters of concern to us; and to provide the new + Administration with an improved base from which to plan its future + strategy. We are already beginning to move on some of these + measures. + + Consultations with the French at the working level, + specifically on the Western Sahara. + + A trip to the area by a State Department representative + later this month to obtain the views of the parties. A + similar mission currently being considered for Sub-Saharan + African states in connection with Libya/Chad strategy could + also seek African views on the Sahara problem. + + Meanwhile we will examine how best to approach the + Moroccans concerning military access. + + [3½ lines not declassified] We plan + a joint examination by State, DIA and CIA to + explore ways to task appropriate collecting agencies with + specific requirements at appropriate levels of + priority. + + DOD and State also intend + jointly to examine prospects for upgrading the effectiveness + of our military program to Morocco without appreciably + increasing our profile there (e.g., by helping their + military logistic and repair capabilities). + + Further develop diplomatic strategies to be considered by + the SIG. This should be + done promptly so as to minimize chances that passage of time + might foreclose any individual options. + + + Defining a Diplomatic Strategy. At the + February 25 meeting and in subsequent discussions, three possible + basic approaches emerged: + + Play a relatively active role in + contributing to efforts to reach a peaceful + solution. This approach holds that a continuation + of the war in the Western Sahara runs directly counter to + U.S. strategic interests, both regional and global. Our + strategic interests are engaged in + Morocco; we need to move forward on military access to + Moroccan facilities in connection with RDF. Morocco is a strong point + in our strategic network, yet the war in the Western Sahara + affects negatively both Morocco’s stability and our + offensive on the Chad/Libya issue, complicates our relations + with Algeria, raises new problems with Mauritania and + exacerbates general problems of public and Congressional + acceptance of our arms supply policies. The issue is + therefore of such importance to our interests that the U.S. + must be seen as contributing to a peaceful solution. + + Proceed somewhat more cautiously than + the above option, beginning with the next steps + indicated in the previous section of the memorandum, but refraining meanwhile + from any significant commitment of + U.S. influence or prestige pending further review. + Underlying this option is the assumption that we may well + conclude that a more active role in bringing about a peace + process has some chance of being effective, in which case we + will be predisposed to give it a try since our regional + interests can best be served by a stance that gives us some + influence over how a peace process develops, and keeps us + talking to Morocco’s adversaries as well as to Morocco + itself. + + Follow a policy that would stress + bilateral relations with the countries of the region + (especially Morocco) while avoiding an activist posture + toward the Western Sahara dispute. Under this + option, U.S. strategy would give priority to our support for + Morocco, and compensate with Algeria and others by being + forthcoming within the framework of these bilateral + relationships. We would deliberately forego U.S. emphasis on + achieving a near-term negotiated settlement of the Western + Sahara dispute on the grounds that: (1) the conflict is not + amenable to diplomatic solution at this time; (2) the level + of violence has been tacitly reduced by the parties; and (3) + the U.S. could not pursue an active intermediary role + without exerting intense pressure on Morocco, and + simultaneously alienating Algeria and Nigeria, both + countries of considerable importance to us. + + +

It became clear during our discussions that before choosing among these + options we needed a better data base. Most importantly: + + It was felt that the DOD + requirement for military access facilities in Morocco needed to + be refined and reviewed from the point of view of its political + implications, and a scenario developed for approaching the + Moroccans. In addition, we need a better sense of the relative + importance of alternative facilities for enroute access, and the + best available estimate of the cost of necessary improvements to + the Moroccan facilities. + + It was generally acknowledged that more information is needed + on the actual conduct of the war, morale and aims of the + Polisario, Libyan and Algerian roles and support, and certain + related issues. +

+

On balance, therefore, we have concluded that our most sensible course of + action at this time, if you approve, is to accord priority to our + bilateral relationship with Morocco and go ahead with the immediate + steps we have described, while undertaking a thorough analysis of + possible diplomatic options for SIG + consideration.

+ +

Recommended Action:Stoessel drew a bracket in the left-hand margin from + “Recommended Action” to the bottom of the memorandum.

+ + + That you approve the following statement of policy: + “U.S. strategic interests and our determination to stand + by American friends require a strong bilateral relationship + with Morocco. These factors, along with Morocco’s legitimate + military requirements, rather than the conflict over the + Sahara, should be the principal determinants of our arms + supply policy toward that country.”Stoessel initially checked the “Approve” + option, then checked the “Disapprove” option, then + struck through both and wrote: “nothing marked” in the + left-hand margin. + + +

Or, alternatively, defer public announcement of a + policy until we have a request from Morocco for Sahara-related + weapons.Stoessel checked the “Approve” option. It was + stamped “24 MAR 1981.”

+ + + That you approve the talking points at Tab 1Not attached. as the basis for the + Administration’s public statement at the March 25 HFAC Subcommittee hearing.Stoessel checked the “Approve” option. It was + stamped “24 MAR 1981.” + + That you approve the six specific intermediate steps described + above.Stoessel checked the + “Approve” option. It was stamped “24 MAR 1981.” + + That you agree in principle that (a) we should plan to hold a + SIG when we have adequately + defined our options for a diplomatic stance vis-a-vis the Saharan + conflict; and (b) that until a decision is made as to what our + stance should be we should refrain from diplomatic initiatives or + other moves that would tend to commit us to any specific + course.Stoessel checked the + “Approve” option. No record of the SIG meeting has been found. + +
+ +
+ 374. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810148–0903. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to + Algiers, Dakar, Nouakchott, and Paris. Sent for information to + Madrid and USUN. + + 2223. + + Rabat, March 30, 1981, 1215Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Saharan War: A New Phase in Prospect? + + + Ref: + (A) Rabat 2023See footnote 3, Document 3. + (B) Rabat 2057In telegram 2057 from + Rabat, March 23, the Embassy reported receiving information + concerning the deployment of Moroccan troops to Agadir, which + “suggests that direct original planning link between coup + attempt and movement of this force unlikely.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810137–0942) + (C) Paris 9021.In telegram 9021 from + Paris, March 26, the Embassy reported that a member of the + French Foreign Ministry “was concerned about the future of + Mauritania after the coup attempt.” The Embassy continued: “the + speed with which Algeria provided military assistance, among + other factors, led him to believe that the GIRM and the Algerians were + expecting something.” The official also speculated: “It is + possible that Mauritania may soon slip decisively away from its + avowed policy of neutrality” in the Western Sahara. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810143–1090) + + + + S—Entire text. + + Summary: The Sahara conflict seems about to enter a new and more + worrisome phase, marked by a wider area for military confrontation + and possibly the use of more sophisticated weaponry. Escalation + would not only foster the fragmentation of the weakest contestant + but would harm U.S. interests in the region. We urge countervailing + U.S. initiatives and suggest several. End summary. + + As Department will be aware, the nasty Saharan conflict in + northwest Africa appears to be poised on the threshold of a new + phase. If its history and current indications are any guide, it + seems likely to expand both geographically and become more classical + in terms of the weapons involved. + + Where for the last 2-1/2 years this desert war involved + essentially hit-and-run scrimmaging between Moroccan regulars and + handfuls of Polisario guerrillas in a northern portion of the + ex-Spanish Sahara, these hostilities have meanwhile expanded + territorially to involve southern Morocco proper and the Tiris + el-Gharbia. Other powers—Libya as well as Algeria—are now more + broadly involved. The conflict now seems ready to transform + classical Mauritania’s northern regions into a new “live” + front. + + Where the Polisario once relied essentially on mobility and small + arms, they now feature the use of heavy artillery including rockets + and advanced + anti-aircraft missiles. The Moroccans have increasingly transferred + more equipment from the north until roughly 80 percent of their + military strength is now concentrated in the south. The + Algerians/Libyans (B) are busily arming Mauritania. + + It is not the purpose of this message to try to assign + responsibility for this trend to which all of the parties have to + some degree contributed. It may, however, be helpful, as we ponder + what these developments may mean for the United States, to spotlight + some essential aspects of the war’s dynamic. + + On the Moroccan side there is a politically determinative + deepseated consensus that Algeria, since Moroccan assistance during + its war for independence, has betrayed Morocco.See Document + 140. Moreover, there is also the sentiment that the + colonial powers, principally Spain and France have wronged Morocco: + its territories were occupied only to be returned in the post-war + era to the King’s legitimate sovereignty grudgingly, under pressure + and in bits and pieces. France is also blamed for creating a related + latent territorial conflict between Morocco and Algeria by + assignment [of] former Moroccan territories to the jurisdiction of + the French residency in Algiers. Paris thus ultimately created + today’s Algeria (consolidated by Ben Bella’s betrayal after Ferhat + Abbas’Reference is to Ferhat Abbas, + who was the first President of Algeria’s constitutional assembly + following independence. Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria’s first + President, subsequently expelled Abbas from the Front de Libération Nationale, + Algeria’s ruling party, and placed him under house arrest from + 1964 until 1965. fall and sanctified by the OAU in its post-colonial frontiers) at + Morocco’s expense. The Moroccans, then, see themselves in the + Western Sahara as reclaiming their own, having already paid a heavy + political and territorial price in ‘73 at IfraneThe date is in error. Morocco and Algeria + signed an agreement in 1972 demarcating a common boundary. See + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents + on North Africa, 1973–1976, Part 1, Document 87. + Negotiations began at Ifrane in 1969 after the two nations + signed the Treaty of Fraternity, Good Neighborliness, and + Cooperation. in agreeing to relinquish “their” Algerian + lands. + + We defer to our colleagues in Algiers for any discussion of the + basic reasons which have moved both the Boumédiène and the Bendjedid governments to allow a rebellious third + country political movement to use Algerian territory to attack a + neighbor and to support the Polisario in its endeavors with + everything necessary for the conduct of “its” hostilities. Clearly, + one reason will be Algeria’s response to the Moroccan perception, + i.e., its interest in a Morocco so weakened and otherwise occupied + further west that it will not reopen the latent territorial issue + with Algeria (Rabat never ratified the Ifrane Accord, charging Algerian + non-compliance with some of its terms) referred to above. + + Morocco’s annexation of the Tiris el-Gharbia,Reference is to Morocco’s 1978 annexation of + the Tiris al-Gharbia (Gharbiyya) region of the Western Sahara, + which had been annexed by Mauritania in 1975 after Spanish + forces left the area. Mauritania withdrew from the region after + three years of Polisario guerrilla activities. For more on + Mauritania’s decision to withdraw, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North + Africa, Documents 234–236. finally, + has brought Rabat’s self-proclaimed sovereignty up against the + traditional borders of Mauritania, a weak and artificial state also + created by the former colonial power, in which the Polisario seems + about to play the role of the Palestinians in Lebanon. All the + ingredients for Mauritania’s fragmentation now exist as eloquently + described by our colleagues in Nouakchott. + + First French security guaranties, the GIRM’s withdrawal from the conflict and its follow-on + posture of neutrality assured Mauritania a degree of protection from + external shocks and internal political imbalances. The withdrawal of + that protection, the ascendancy of GIRM’s pro-Algerian/Polisario Requibat wing and Algiers + (as well as Tripoli’s) apparent eagerness to try to exploit new + opportunities which this affords, seem from here the principal + operative elements of the new situation which now confronts the + parties. These elements appear to us more significant than Morocco’s + role—whatever that turns out finally to have been—in the failed + March 16 coup in Nouakchott, because whatever Morocco’s + miscalculations, Rabat’s initiatives look to us essentially + reactive. Morocco, in short, appears to have perceived (or perhaps + misperceived the extent) Mauritania’s slide towards the embrace of + its enemies, Algeria and Libya, and may have moved to stop this + evolution in its tracks. However that may be, a domestically + polarizing Mauritania used by the key belligerents to exploit + perceived advantages (Algeria, Libya) or to preempt (Morocco) + virtually guarantees the growth of the conflict in the + region. + + What to do? If the players are left to their own devices, the + war’s expansion/escalation seems very likely further to damage inter + alia our bilateral and regional interests. Whether Mauritania as now + constituted will remain viable in such circumstances is anybody’s + guess. From here, its Chadianization seems rather more probable (cf + Paris 9021).See footnote 4 + above. The OAU Wiseman + option also becomes more difficult of execution and Morocco, our + friend, becomes more deeply enmeshed in a war that it can ill afford + over a cause it will not and cannot abandon. Given this unpleasant + outlook we would urge the Department to consider countervailing + measures. These might include some form of demilitarization or guaranteed + respect by all the parties of Mauritania’s northern frontier; a new + “neutral” Western (if France remains unavailing) commitment to the + GIRM for protection against + Polisario incursions, thus supporting that government’s + loudly-proclaimed desire to keep the Polisario out; encouragement to + the OAU to get on with its Wiseman + option by taking the actions recently suggested in DAS + Draper’s March 25 + congressional testimony;Draper’s + testimony, based upon the issues discussed in Document 373, is + in telegram 76358 to multiple posts, March 26. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810142–0536) a US effort + to engage Algeria and Morocco directly in active dialogue on ways to + limit and eventually to end these hostilities. (Dept’s 77983 was + received and welcomed after this was drafted.)Printed as Document 4. + + Sebastian +
+
+ 375. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in AmmanSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810165–0136. Secret; + Immediate. Drafted by Thor Kuniholm (NEA/AFN); cleared by William Imbrie (NEA) and Sylvia Blumenthal (INR/INC/IC); approved by + Coon. Haig was visiting Amman and + Riyadh to discuss the Middle East peace process. + + Tosec + 20154/87810. + + Washington, April 7, 1981, 1929Z + + +

For Draper and General Walters. Following CIA 040048Z Apr 81, sent action DIRNSA + Dept of State DIA Treasury Dept White + House NSC + CIA Office of Current Operations, being + repeated for your info. Subject: Indications of Moroccan Readiness to + Pursue Polisario Forces Into Mauritania.

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+ + + [3 lines not declassified] + + In early April, [1 line not declassified] + Moroccan King Hassan II has + decided that Moroccan forces will be permitted to pursue Polisario + units into Mauritanian territory if the Polisario again launches a + major attack from Mauritania against Moroccan positions in the + Western Sahara. [less than 1 line not + declassified] the King had made this decision after receiving “solid + evidence” that Polisario forces had come from positions inside + Mauritania prior to launching their late March attack against the + Moroccan garrison at Guelta Zemmur. The King added that Morocco was + prepared to take this action despite the probability that relations + between Algeria and Morocco would worsen as a result.In telegram 2174 from Rabat, March 26, the + Embassy reported: “Rabat Core Country Team assessment is that a + Polisario attack did take place on Guelta Zemmour on or about + March 23–24, that Polisario forces very likely did at least + cross Mauritanian territory, but that the attacking force was + considerably smaller than the Moroccans have publicly claimed.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810143–0813) [less than 1 + line not declassified] comment: [less + than 1 line not declassified] did not specifically state + what form the Moroccan pursuit would take, but implied that the + Moroccan forces would launch air attacks against retreating + Polisario units if they are found in Mauritanian territory.) [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: + [1½ lines not declassified] the King has + decided to permit Moroccan forces to attack the Polisario inside + Mauritanian territory if the Polisario again uses Mauritania as a + staging area for attacks against Moroccan positions. [less than 1 line not declassified] the + initial Moroccan response would be air attacks against Polisario + units found in northern Mauritania, but if such strikes “did not + solve the problem,” ground troops would be committed across the + border.) + + [2 lines not declassified] + + There continues to be a heavy, urgent build-up of Moroccan armed + forces in the combat zone of Smara and Guelta Zemmur in preparation + for “a special mission.” In late March–early April elements of the + 6th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (RIM) located in the Boucraa and + Smara zone were reinforced with the following equipment: 42 assorted + trucks to transport munitions, supplies and water; ten + LandRovers/Jeeps; twelve 130mm cannons. The 4th Royal Artillery + Group (GAR) in the Smara zone also received the following additional + equipment: 47 assorted trucks, 23 LandRovers/Jeeps, three 105mm + cannons, three 89 mm Lance rocket launchers, twelve 14.5mm machine + guns, twenty 12.7mm machine guns, and 13 unspecified anti-aircraft + machine guns. Accompanying both of these reinforcements of vehicles + and arms was an assortment of support equipment, such as radio + transmitters and receivers, fuel and food. ([less + than 1 line not declassified]) comment: Moroccan forces in + the combat area have been placed in a high state of readiness in + preparation to conduct a special mission to block off Polisario + forces in the area between Smara and Guelta Zemmur. The 4th GAR, and + 6th RIM will conduct sweep operations in coordination with a special + task force currently + located at Guelta Zemmur. These Moroccan units will be ready to + pursue Polisario forces if they retreat into Mauritanian territory.) + [3 lines not declassified] + +
+
+ 376. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810179–0882. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information + Priority to Paris. + + 1694. + + Nouakchott, April 15, 1981, 1615Z + + +

Tunis for General Walters. Subj: + Western Sahara: Thoughts for General Walters’ Meeting With President Bendjedid. Ref: (A) Algiers 1473;In telegram 1473 from Algiers, April 13, the + Embassy reported: “As the Western Sahara conflict drags into its + fifth year, there is still little sign of movement toward + negotiation. The U.S. is caught up in a situation not of its making, + where we have limited leverage, but where we should do what we can + to contain the conflict and move it toward a peaceful resolution.” + The Embassy continued: “As long as the war goes on it bears the + risks of escalation (as we see now in the Mauritanian affair) and + presents the United States with difficult policy choices in + balancing its relations with Morocco and Algeria, both of which are + important to us for different reasons.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810176–0221) (B) FBIS + Abidjan R 141219Z Apr 81.Not found.

+ + + (C—Entire text) + + Embassy fully supports points made reftel, particularly those + aimed at preventing escalation of conflict onto Mauritanian + territory, a prime short-term policy goal, in our opinion. + + Furthermore, Embassy proposes one more policy option: Since + Morocco refuses to deal directly with the Polisario, and Algeria + refuses to deal only with Morocco, and the Polisario want to deal + only with Morocco, why not suggest that all parties to the + war—Polisario, Morocco and Algeria—sit down together. Algeria is a + co-belligerent, whether admitted or not, since it provides equipment + and, more importantly, a sanctuary. If all three parties were to get + together—and a format could be determined—they would, at least + insofar as Moroccans and Polisario were concerned, be making an + initial accommodation which, in our opinion, would be viewed + favorably by African and international opinion. + + + Note that we leave Mauritania for the time being out of the + negotiating equation: ref FBIS + item contains statement by Mauritanian Foreign Minister Zamel + concerning Mauritanian merger with Saharan state. Zamel is quoted as + saying that “if objective reasons for the formation of a federation + between Mauritania and the Saharan state exist, there is no reason + why it should not be created.”In + telegram 98132 to multiple diplomatic posts, April 16, the + Department indicated that it was “intrigued by” the Embassy’s + “quote of GIRM Foreign + Minister Zamel which appears to leave door open to formation of + a federation between Mauritania and a future SDAR.” The Department + continued: “we are curious whether basic idea could conceivably + provide a new basis on which to seek a negotiated compromise + peace settlement. Without implying U.S. support for the idea in + discussions with foreign officials, posts are encouraged to + provide any analysis or further information which is relevant.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810182–0897) This represents farthest + statement along these lines we have seen by GIRM official. This could then be one + of the factors to be negotiated by the three parties concerned. We + believe that Mauritania would not object to the tripartite + negotiations, since they would feel that their interests would be + well-represented by both Polisario and Algeria. + + These three-sided negotiations would also serve to preclude Libya, + since it would not technically qualify as a belligerent and does not + have a common border with the disputed area. + + It would appear to us that if anyone is going to have to pay the + price of peace, it is going to be Mauritania, or at least part of + its territory; in this regard, GIRM Foreign Minister is now on the books as not being + opposed to some sort of arrangement, which a conference of the other + three parties could determine. + + Schrager +
+ +
+ 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810251–1030. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Kuniholm; + cleared by Flaten, Seitz, Rentschler, Nance, and Dennis Sandberg + (S/S–O), and in substance by + Richard Baker (P); approved by + Veliotes. Sent for + information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Dakar, + Libreville, Kinshasa, Lagos, Freetown, Khartoum, Nairobi, Abidjan, + Conakry, Cairo, Bamako, Dar es Salaam, Paris, and + Lomé. + + 139368. + + Washington, May 29, 1981, 0111Z + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Foreign Minister’s Meetings With Vice President Bush and Under Secretary + Stoessel. + + + Ref: + Rabat 3491.In telegram 3491 from + Rabat, May 16, Sebastian + said Boucetta had called + him in “to say how much he had appreciated courtesies shown him + during his recent sojourn in Washington” as well as the + “extensive substantive exchanges afforded him” by Haig, Stoessel, “and their + collaborators concerned with Morocco’s part of the world.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810232–0671) + + + + S—Entire text. + + Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta held discussions with Vice President + Bush and Under + Secretary Stoessel on May + 12. The meeting with Vice President Bush was a brief but useful visit attended by + Secretary Haig, Assistant + Secretary Veliotes, and + Admiral Murphy (the Vice + President’s Chief of Staff), Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs Richard V. + Allen and NSC Senior + Staff Member James M. + Rentschler. Boucetta delivered King Hassan’s message to the Vice + President.No record of Hassan’s + message to Bush has + been found. In his exchange with the Vice President + Boucetta stressed the + danger of Qadhafi’s + subversive activities in North Africa. + + Sahara Background. With Under Secretary Stoessel, Boucetta reviewed the evolution of + the Sahara issue in the OAU, + confirming Morocco’s acceptance of both a ceasefire and a + UN-supervised referendum. Boucetta said last year 16 or 17 OAU members would have joined Morocco + in walking out if SDAR had + been admitted, including Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Sudan. He + said there were 26 members who recognized the SDAR. He said there are about + 60,000 people left in the settled areas of the Sahara. + + Sahara Consultation. While Boucetta pointed out that modalities for the popular + consultation still needed to be worked out, he envisaged a procedure + similar to the one used in West Irian.Reference is to the so-called 1969 “Act of Free Choice,” + whereby inhabitants of Papua and West Papua (West Irian or + Western Guinea) were allowed to vote in a referendum on whether + or not they wished to become independent from Indonesia. + In conducting a consultation the 1974 Spanish census could provide a + useful tool, he said.Spain controlled Western Sahara until it + gave joint control of the region to Morocco and Mauritania in + 1975. In response to a question by Stoessel on the nature of the + consultation, Boucetta + replied that it would give the population a choice between + independence or the status quo. In response to a follow-up question, + Boucetta confirmed that + the official Moroccan position was to accept some form of + consultation under UN or OAU supervision in which Saharans + would be given an option of independence or joining Morocco. He said + Morocco will consider any formula for the consultation and + supervision. He left clear impression, however, that Morocco does + not have proposal of its own, but is awaiting proposal from the + OAU. + + Algeria. Boucetta said that + the Algerians were reluctant to get involved in negotiations for + fear of being confronted with questions about the justice of + territorial adjustments made by France during the colonial era in + which Morocco lost some of its patrimony to Algeria. Boucetta acknowledged that + Moroccan-Algerian discussions had taken place in France, Switzerland + and Taif. Algeria, like Morocco, agrees to support the OAU’s call for a ceasefire and + referendum. Boucetta said it + is in the interest of Algeria and Morocco to work together. + + OAU Summit. Regarding the + possibility of SDAR membership + in the upcoming OAU summit in + Nairobi, Boucetta said this + would destroy current efforts to implement the OAU Wisemen recommendations; Morocco + seeks an honorable solution. He said the issue of SDAR admittance to the OAU must await the completion of the + procedure on the Wisemen recommendations. He hoped that the U.S. + could support Morocco particularly in the Anglophone countries of + Africa. + + Mauritania. Boucetta + stressed that Morocco had no territorial design on Mauritania + wishing only that it remain neutral in the conflict. + + UN. In discussing Morocco’s + acceptance of a UN supervised + referendum in the Western Sahara, Ambassador Bengelloun noted that SecGen Waldheim was proceeding very + cautiously in this regard because of the forthcoming UN Secretary General election. + (Bengelloun said that + Morocco preferred OAS SecGen + Orfila over Tanzania’s UN + representative, Salim, whom he described as a Marxist). Boucetta said that the UN had not approached Morocco about + holding a referendum. In response to Veliotes question he said the Algerians continue to + prevent the UNHCR from conducting + a census of the refugee camps in Tindouf. + + Military Situation. In reply to a question about Polisario + military activity, Boucetta + told Stoessel that the + Polisario have sophisticated weapons but they lack manpower and were trying to recruit in + Mauritania. Boucetta said + that Libya is the main arms supplier to the Polisario and the chief + financial, political, and diplomatic supporter as well. (He said + that the Moroccans had captured some equipment still bearing Libyan + stencils.) He claimed that the Polisario are being trained in Libyan + camps assisted by Soviet advisors. + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+ Haig +
+
+ 378. Memorandum From Dennis Blair of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Allen)Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981–07/21/1981). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for + action. + + + Washington, June 23, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Message from King Hassan of Morocco + +

Casey’s memo gives an accurate account of King Hassan’s gambit at the + OAU summit. Although the idea of a + referendum in the Western Sahara is in line with our policy, it is by no + means clear that Hassan’s particular proposal will succeed in gaining + majority support. There is considerable support in the OAU for the idea of recognizing the SDAR,In + telegram 14164 from Nairobi, June 27, the Embassy reported: “All of + the SDAR’s major supporters + have endorsed King Hassan’s call for a referendum in the Western + Sahara, although Libya has remained silent. A committee on + implementation of the referendum began work as soon as it was + appointed; the draft resolution it has prepared is certain to be + controversial.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810303–0437) The text of the resolution is in + telegram 14236 from Nairobi, June 29. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810304–0423) and + if Hassan walks out, he may take only one or two more states with him. + We need to involve the State Department in this issue, deciding how much + public support we will give to Hassan, and at what level it will be + expressed. This is not a matter which Casey and the President should be deciding alone without + other input. (S)

+

Fred Wettering concurs, as does + Geoff Kemp.

+ +

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.Allen + checked and initialed the “Approve” option on June 23. An unknown + hand wrote: “Hand carried orig to Darman’s ofc.”

+ + Tab I + Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Allen) to + President ReaganSecret; Sensitive. Sent for + information. + + + Washington, June 23, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Message from King Hassan of Morocco (U) + +

Bill Casey has sent you a + detailed memo on King Hassan’s plan for a Western Sahara referendum. + The King intends to present his plan on June 25 at the Organization + of African Unity (OAU) summit in + Nairobi. He requests a message from you at that summit publicly + supporting the plan. (S)

+

We have a few days to analyze the advisability of such a message to + the King. A referendum in the Western Sahara is in line with our + overall policy, however it is by no means clear that King Hassan’s + plan will carry the day at the OAU. + In addition, it is not clear whether you should personally send the + letter to Hassan at the summit or it should be sent at a lower + level. We should discuss the issue with State and reach a consensus + position.At the bottom of the + memorandum, Reagan + wrote: “I’m willing to do this unless there is some pressing + reason why I shouldn’t. RR.” To the right of Reagan’s notation, an unknown + hand wrote: “done—w/ [illegible] 7/1.” (S)

+ + + + Tab A + Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President ReaganSecret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: + “The President has seen.” + + + Washington, June 23, 1981 + + + + SUBJECT + Re, King Hassan’s Western Sahara Peace Initiative at + Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit + +

On my April visit to Morocco, King Hassan told me: he would make, in + June at the OAU summit a peace + initiative to settle the war with the Polisario in the Western + Sahara. He said he would need the help of his friend and would + provide details of the peace initiative as soon as he formulated + it.

+

[8 paragraphs (28 lines) not declassified]

+

The King believes it would aid his cause greatly in Nairobi if you + were, immediately following his speech, to send him a supportive + public message congratulating him for his proposal. He stressed that + this is not a “pressing request.” If you find it premature of [or?] inopportune, let it go. Nevertheless, + when the King first told me about his proposed initiative back in + April, he said he would want help from his friends and he clearly + wants a gesture of support from the United States.

+

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

+

The question is what should you do. He is very anxious that the + formulation of his proposal not be disclosed before he makes it + public and asked that his request be presented directly to you. [less than 1 line not declassified] The State + Department will recommend to you whether a message should be sent + and what it should say. Perhaps State should check with other + countries when Hassan’s statement becomes public. Hassan would + probably be satisfied by a statement that his proposal appears to be + a hopeful first step down the road of a peaceful solution over the + conflict of the Western Sahara.

+

As a matter of timing + + [1 line not declassified] + + Hassan will speak on Thursday.June 25. + + State should advise on the response on Thursday. + + Stoessel and + Veliotes are + informed and will get papers as soon as they come in from + Morocco. +

+ +
+ +
+ 379. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (06/06/1981–07/02/1981). Secret. + + + Washington, June 26, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Western Sahara.]

+

3. OAU SUMMIT. + King Hassan today proposed a “controlled referendum” for the Sahara in + his address before the Nairobi OAU + Summit. Mauritania and Sudan endorsed the proposal. However, each made + recommendations which will be unacceptable to Morocco. The Polisario + rejected Hassan’s proposal out of hand. The French Foreign Minister + today issued a statement endorsing Hassan’s idea in the context of + self-determination which will give Hassan trouble. We are preparing + recommendations concerning our best public posture along with a proposed + reply from you to Hassan’s oral message of a few days ago.See Document 380. + (C)

+
+
+ 380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N810006–0124. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Veliotes; + cleared by Crocker, Nance, Seitz, Robert Stern (S/S–O), and in substance by Stoessel; + approved by Haig. Sent for + information Immediate to the White House. + + 170682. + + Washington, June 29, 1981, 1511Z + + +

For Chargé. Subject: Message From President.

+ + + (Confidential—Entire text) + + A few days ago King Hassan sent an oral message to the + PresidentSee Tab I, Document + 378. [less than 1 line not + declassified] soliciting the President’s support for the + referendum proposal on the Sahara which the King planned to make at + the Nairobi OAU Summit. Please pass + the following oral message from the President to the King as soon as + possible. + + + The President wishes again to thank Your Majesty for your + message which described your intention to propose a + referendum at the Nairobi summit. The President wishes you + to know that we very much appreciated the receipt of the + full text of your planned remarks. + + The President extends his congratulations to Your Majesty + for this important and courageous initiative which, he + hopes, will lead to the desired peaceful resolution of the + Western Sahara matter. The President wishes to bring to Your + Majesty’s personal attention the public statement of the + Department of State concerning this matter.Begin text: + The United States welcomes the proposals made by King + Hassan II of + Morocco on June 26 in his speech to the OAU Summit concerning the + modalities for compliance with the objectives of the OAU’s Wisemen recommendations. + The United States believes that the King’s proposals + constitute an important step in seeking a peaceful + resolution of the contentious issue of the Western Sahara + and hopes that plans for the proposed referendum can be + formulated and accepted by the parties concerned in the near + future. End text. + + The President hopes that Your Majesty will find our public + position helpful to HIM on + this auspicious occasion. The President wishes to express + his deep appreciation of Your Majesty’s sincere and deep + friendship and to assure Your Majesty that these sentiments + are fully reciprocated by the President and his entire + administration.In a July 2 + memorandum, Allen informed Reagan that Hassan had + told Sebastian he + had received Reagan’s message and was “delighted with + the ‘warmth of its tone and the friendly sentiments + which permeated it throughout,’ and asked that his + reaction be conveyed to you. He was delighted there were + no objections by the White House to publishing the + entire text.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Head of State + File, Morocco: King Hassan + II (820564–8206108)) + + + Haig +
+ +
+ 381. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec ‘81). Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. + + + Washington, July 18, 1981, 1156Z + + +

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY + Country + Algeria/Western SaharaAn unknown + hand underlined “Algeria/Western.” + + + SUBJECT + FLN Affirmation of Algeria’s + Willingness to Impose a Political Settlement on The Polisario + FrontAn unknown hand underlined + a portion of the subject line beginning with “Algeria’s + Willingness” and ending with “Polisario Front.” [less than 1 line not declassified] + + + Source + [4 lines not declassified] + +

+ + + [1½ lines not declassified] the Front of + Liberation National (FLN) recently + characterized Algeria’s current position on the Western Sahara as + follows: Algeria has become persuaded that a continuation of the war + in the Western Sahara will not benefit Algerian national interests + and that regional developments dictate an end to the conflict as + quickly as possible.An unknown hand + underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “Algeria + has” and ending with “interests.” Algerian President + Chadli Bendjedid has + definitely concluded that the Polisario must abandon the idea of + continuing military hostilities indefinitely, and if need be, a + political solution must be imposed on the Polisario. + + Following the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Kenya and the most + recent meeting of the FLN Central + Committee, both of which events had an important effect in framing + Algerian policy toward the + Western Sahara. Algeria is prepared to accept a settlement in the + Western Sahara with the following three caveats:An unknown hand underlined “Algeria is prepared + to accept a settlement in the Western Sahara with the following + three caveats.” + + + Algeria wants at all costs to prevent Libyan leader + Muammar Qadhafi + from developing a controlling influence over the Polisario + Front; + + Algeria will not accept a ceasefire in the Western Sahara + without the agreement of the Polisario Front; + + Algeria will not require that the Polisario accept less + than recognition of the Western Sahara’s territorial + independence.An unknown + hand placed a question mark in the right-hand margin + next to this point. + + + [less than 1 line not declassified] + Comment: The meaning and importance of [name not + declassified] three caveats has been a matter of + speculation in the FLN. There is + general agreement in the FLN that + the Algerian Government is in fact prepared to bring its full weight + to bear in influencing the Polisario to accept a ceasefire. This + influence would be in the form of a reduction of military + assistanceAn unknown hand + underlined “a ceasefire” and “reduction of military assistance” + and wrote: “KEY MOVES” in the left-hand margin. on the + one hand, and guarantees of continuing Algerian political and + economic support of the other. Within the FLN, there is a consensus that while territorial + independence is an essential element to a settlement, the amount of + territory which would be involved is a Saharan entity is definitely + negotiable.An unknown hand + underlined “The amount of territory which would be involved is a + Saharan entity is definitely negotiable” and wrote: “MAYBE THE + PART OF SAHARA WHICH MAURITANIA ONCE HELD” in the right-hand + margin. The caveats, therefore, should not obscure the + fact that Algeria is committed to an end to hostilities in the + Western Sahara, and prepared to show considerable flexibility in + arriving at a political settlement.)An + unknown hand placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to + this sentence. + +
+ +
+ 382. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Defense Intelligence + AgencySource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec ‘81). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A + stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “AUG 14 1981 + DEP SEC HAS SEEN.” Rixse + initialed the top of the report. + + + Washington, August 13, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Western Sahara.]

+

3. SAHARAN POLISARIO MAY BE LOSING ALGERIAN AND + LIBYAN SUPPORT (S/[handling restriction not + declassified])

+

REF:None of + the reference reports were found. [2 lines + not declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

+

POLISARIO leaders are divided and + depressed, and there is a general sense of drift among the rank and + file. Much of this is the result of the June meeting of the Organization + of African Unity (OAU),See footnote 2, Document + 378. which gave the POLISARIO greater international visibility and created a + sense of false optimism but which did not lead to any significant + concession from Moroccan King Hassan. On the contrary, it enabled Hassan + to play on the national interests of both Algeria and Libya in such a + way as to make both these countries deal with the POLISARIO in new and, from the + POLISARIO angle, disturbing + ways. POLISARIO currently + believes that neither Algeria nor Libya can be counted on to continue + their previous strong support for Saharan self-determination and + sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

+

In recent talks between POLISARIO + leaders and Algerian Government officials, the Algerians used new + phrases, such as “supporting the POLISARIO while protecting Algerian interests.” The + guerrillas reportedly fear that this is shorthand for withdrawing + military support, demanding that the POLISARIO curtail its military activity, and providing + financial support under increasingly restrictive conditions. For the + first time, POLISARIO must + conclude that its interests and Algeria’s no longer coincide.

+

The Saharan guerrillas’ alarm at this development is accentuated by a + similar trend in its dealings with Libya. During a recent trip to Libya + for the purpose of requesting military aid, the so-called Minister of + Defense of POLISARIO was, in + effect, rebuffed by Libya’s leaders. The Libyans he met did not refuse + to consider his request, but they clearly specified that no military + assistance will be provided in the near future. The Libyan spokesmen who met with the + POLISARIO leader spoke + favorably of the concept of a referendum in the Western Sahara and urged + POLISARIO to remain patient + and avoid military action until the meaning of Hassan’s referendum + proposal becomes clear.

+

[3 lines not declassified] French spokesmen also + said that neither Algeria or Libya appears ready to respond to any + French initiative on the issue at this time.

+

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

+

We have no doubt that somehow the mood and the + situation in North Africa has changed regarding POLISARIO. Only recently, we + received information that Hassan and Libyan leader Col Qadhafi have quietly agreed to + reestablish formal diplomatic relations—a development that suggests + a lessening of Libyan support to POLISARIO.

+

We are, however, less certain that Algerian support is + waning significantly. While we believe that Algeria is looking for a + solution to the Saharan quagmire, the country is not likely to drop + so quickly a cause it has supported for over 5 years. POLISARIO launched a major + operation against Morocco on 11 August. This must be viewed as + illustrative of the problems that still plague the Saharan scene. + The attack may also be aimed at showing Algeria and Morocco that + POLISARIO must be + included in any negotiations aimed at a political + settlement.

+
+
+ 383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810419–0146. Secret. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Ralph Graner + (AF/I), Morton, Smith, and Flaten; approved + by Constable. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, + Paris, Madrid, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi. + + 238561. + + Washington, September 5, 1981, 0805Z + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Ambassador Requests U.S. Support on Western + Sahara. + + + + (S) Entire text. + + On September 1 at his suggestion, Ambassador Bengelloun reviewed the recent + decisions taken at the OAU + implementation meeting in Nairobi (Nairobi II)In telegram 2572 from Addis Ababa, August 28, + the Embassy reported: “OAU Asst SecGen + Onu has described the + recently concluded Nairobi Heads of State meeting on the Western + Sahara as a limited success, with the OAU perceiving some light at the end of the tunnel. + However, the official reactions of Morocco and the Polisario to + the OAU decision have not been + received and problems could arise.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810405–0166) with NEA + Assistant Secretary Veliotes. DAS + Peter Constable, AFN + Director Robert Flaten, and + Moroccan Country Officer, Thor Kuniholm participated. After + describing the results and recommending King Hassan’s August 29 + speechIn telegram 6210 from Rabat, + September 1, the Embassy reported that in his August 29 address + to the nation, Hassan “presented the outcome of the Nairobi II + as cause for great satisfaction, due to its vindication of + Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara, in general, and of + Hassan’s recent initiatives for settlement, in particular. He + emphasized as important gains for Morocco the de facto + recognition at Nairobi II of the Moroccan administrative and + military presence in the Sahara, i.e. there was no request for + its withdrawal.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810410–0395) as essential to + a full understanding of Morocco’s position Bengelloun asked for our + assessment. We told Bengelloun that we were pleased with the progress + made at Nairobi II and with the constructive role played by King + Hassan. In response to our question about official acceptance of the + Nairobi II decisions, Bengelloun replied that Algeria and Morocco had + accepted the results while the Polisario was holding out for direct + negotiations. + + Bengelloun also asked for + our assistance to limit the size of the UN presence in the Western Sahara; in fact King Hassan + would prefer an OAU peace-keeping + force, he added. We responded that while UN presence need not be large, some UN participation is important to ensure + international acceptance of the referendum. We added that we believe + it unlikely that the UN would decide + upon an excessively large and costly presence. + + Concerning Algeria, Bengelloun asked for our assistance with the + Algerians to lean on the Polisario for its acceptance of the + ceasefire. He said that he hoped the Algerians would accept the + Spanish census as the basis for voter eligibility instead of + countering with exaggerated demands for a larger electorate. + (Bengelloun commented + that Morocco believes that 110,000 should be the upper limit of + eligible population.) We told Bengelloun that we would continue to urge all of the + parties to cooperate with the OAU + mediation effort, otherwise we made no specific commitment to + intervene with the Algerians. + + For Embassy Rabat: You may share our preliminary upbeat assessment + of the Nairobi II outcome including our appreciation of the + constructive role played by King Hassan. We believe that the King + deserves special credit for stepping down from his original call for + an “affirmative referendum” and agreeing to a vote on the issue of + independence or integration with Morocco. You may tell the Moroccans + that we are pleased with the outcome. You may mention that we are + also in touch with the Algerians on Nairobi II and that we shall + recommend they urge the Polisario to respect the ceasefire. Finally, + you may tell the Moroccans that we expect to encourage UN participation in the referendum but + believe that the UN presence in the + Western Sahara need not be large. + + Stoessel +
+ +
+ 384. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (10/02/1981–10/28/1981). Secret. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + + + Washington, October 14, 1981 + + +

1. Message from King Hassan of Morocco.The text of Hassan’s letter to Reagan is in telegram 277329 to + Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa, October 17. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810491–0336) Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun passed on urgent message to + you from King Hassan concerning the destruction of two Moroccan aircraft + flying at high altitudes over the Sahara.In + telegram 7444 from Rabat, October 14, the Embassy reported: “King + Hassan convened Parliament in extraordinary session October 13 to + launch a new diplomatic offensive in the wake of the shooting down + of two Moroccan aircraft yesterday morning and the sighting of + Polisario armored vehicles. Hassan’s message to 29 world leaders and + heads of international fora described the incidents and alleged that + Polisario’s use of newly acquired tracked armored vehicles and SAM + missiles was an effort to introduce a ‘new dimension’ into the + Saharan conflict.” The Moroccan Parliament subsequently “condemned + Algeria and Libya for the attack.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810483–1152) He + sent similar messages to the UN and the + OAU. The King believes that the + Libyans have introduced sophisticated surface to air missiles (SAM–6 or + SAM–8) into the Polisario inventory. More importantly, Hassan believes + that no African personnel are able to manage these weapons, suggesting + that Cuban, East German or even Soviet personnel might now be involved. + Under the circumstances the Moroccans have requested a public statement + from us reaffirming our support and continuing close consultations as + the situation on the ground worsens. I took the occasion of my public + remarksNot found. at Joe Reed’s swearing in to make some + appropriate comments, as did the Department’s press spokesman today also + in answer to questions.Not found. + (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+
+ +
+ 385. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (10/02/1981–10/28/1981). Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, October 16, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+

3. Algerian Views on Western Sahara Fighting. On + Thursday,October 15. Assistant + Secretary Veliotes raised with + Algerian Ambassador Malek our + serious concern about the escalation of fighting between Morocco and the + Polisario in the Western Sahara—especially the destabilizing effect of + the introduction of advanced SAM missiles.A + record of the Veliotes-Malek discussion is in telegram 276044 to + Algiers, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810489–0146) + Malek said he could deny + categorically the Moroccan assertion of participation by “non-Africans,” + i.e., Soviets, Cubans or East Germans. Malek attributed the latest fighting to a desire on the + part of the Polisario to make a “statement” on the eve of the expected + UN debate on the Sahara. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+
+ +
+ 386. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple RecipientsSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810498–0751. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Rabat, Nouakchott, Algiers, + Nairobi, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos, Freetown, + Dakar, and Jidda. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN); cleared by Flaten, Bishop, Kaplan, and Richard + Sherman (S/S–O); approved by + Veliotes. Sent for + information Priority to Madrid, Paris, and USUN. + + 281066. + + Washington, October 22, 1981, 0038Z + + +

Nouakchott for Asst Sec Crocker. + Subject: Western Sahara: Moroccan-Mauritanian Tensions. Ref: A) Rabat + 7641,In telegram 7641 from Rabat, + October 20, the Embassy reported that Hassan had received a warning + that “while after the Guelta Zemmour attack the King had restrained + Moroccan forces from hot pursuit of Polisario units escaping into + Mauritanian territory, the GIRM + will be held liable for any future Polisario incursions into the + Western Sahara. The warning was in the form of an open letter” to + Mauritanian President Ould Haidallah. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810496–0678) B) + FBIS NC 2022041,Not found. C) Nouakchott 5020,In telegram 5020 from Nouakchott, October 20, the + Embassy reported that Haidallah replied to Hassan’s open letter. + According to the Embassy, Haidallah responded that it was “‘clear + that Your Majesty’s accusations were aimed at justifying an + aggression against our country . . . in case this should + unfortunately happen, Your Majesty will bear the entire + responsibility and should know that our army and our people will be + in a position to defend our territorial integrity.’” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810496–0756) D) State 277390 (Notal),In telegram 277390 to Nairobi, October 17, the + Department instructed the Embassy “to seek urgent meeting with + Foreign Minister to convey Secretary’s concern” about an escalation + of the Western Sahara conflict and “urge Kenya as Chairman of OAU to take urgent measures to counter + current threat to OAU mediation + efforts, possibly by immediately reconvening the Implementation + Committee in order to begin negotiations toward cease fire called + for in Nairobi II Resolution.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810490–0728) E) FBIS NC 211500,Not found. F) State 280002.In telegram 280002 to Algiers, October 21, the + Department reported on Malek’s October 20 meeting with Veliotes. Malek “agreed that OAU Implementation Committee was a + logical forum for negotiations involving the belligerents. He did + not repeat not press Polisario demand for direct talks with Morocco, + but rather agreed that indirect negotiations were more practical.” + Malek also claimed + “Saharans alone were involved in the Western Sahara fighting and + said he knew from his experience in Moscow that Polisario contacts + with the Eastern bloc were limited.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810495–0503)

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + Tensions caused by the Oct 13–16 battle between Moroccan and + Polisario forces at Guelta Zemmour in the Western Sahara have now + spread to include Mauritania. King Hassan has warned the + Mauritanians against use of its territory by the Polisario (ref A) + and Morocco’s General Dlimi + has reportedly claimed that Morocco’s Air Force has struck at Polisario forces + inside Mauritania (ref B). Mauritania’s President Haidalla has + denied both the King’s allegations and Dlimi’s claim. (Ref C.) + + These developments increase the urgency of action on the part of + the OAU Implementation Committee to + begin negotiations on the cease-fire envisioned at Nairobi II. The + Secretary has already recommended that Kenya’s President Moi take the lead in this regard. + (Ref D.) We are aware of press reports that Moi has sent a message to the + Polisario (and presumably other parties) urging an end to the + fighting (ref E) in reply to which the Polisario has reiterated its + demand for direct negotiations. We believe that the Implementation + Committee itself provides a viable forum for negotiations to this + end, and that the Polisario’s demand, and Morocco’s refusal, to + negotiate a cease-fire directly should not rpt not delay the opening + of negotiations. + + For Nairobi. Citing the increasing tensions between Morocco and + Mauritania, you should once again raise our suggestion that the + Implementation Committee convene to begin negotiations towards a + ceasefire. You should seek information on and express appreciation + for efforts President Moi has + undertaken and encourage the Kenyans to persist despite procedural + obstacles, i.e. direct vs. indirect talks. (You may share with the + Kenyans indications we have from the Algerians that they would not + rpt not support the Polisario demand for direct talks. (Ref + F.) + + For Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos and Freetown. + Based on public information, such as ref E, of renewed call for + ceasefire negotiations you should reinforce at appropriate levels in + Foreign Ministries the approach we are making to the Kenyans, if you + believe it will be helpful. You should not rpt not characterize + Kenyan effort as US + initiative. + + For Rabat: Septel provides guidance for urging Moroccan restraint + in dealing with Mauritania.In telegram + 281064 to Rabat, October 22, the Department instructed the + Embassy to inform the Moroccan Foreign Minister of the U.S. + démarche to the OAU (see + footnote 5 above), adding: “In light of October 21 statement + that its forces have gone into Mauritanian territory, you should + also express our concern that the situation not be permitted to + escalate further.” The Department continued: “You should + reassure the Moroccans that we continue to support His Majesty’s + initiative toward a ceasefire and a referendum. We are most + concerned that further military operations in Mauritania may + unravel the process so hopefully begun in June.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810498–0344) + + For Algiers. You should encourage the Algerians to use their + influence with the Polisario to calm the situation in the area and + to encourage Polisario participation in negotiations under + Implementation Committee auspices (i.e. indirect talks) to bring + about a ceasefire. + + + For Nouakchott. Express our hope that Mauritania can remain a + non-belligerent and take all measures within its capabilities to + insure that its territory is not exploited by any foreign + forces. + + For Dakar and Jidda: You should describe to Governments of Senegal + and Saudi Arabia diplomatic efforts USG is taking to help prevent further deterioration of + situation. Since SAE and GOS were recipients of special pleas from + King Hassan, which GOM has shared + with us, we would like to work with them in any way they feel useful + to help defuse situation. While the exact situation on the ground is + a subject of contradictory reports, it is clear that tensions have + dramatically escalated and we hope friends of Morocco and Mauritania + can be helpful in resolving the problem. + + Clark +
+
+ 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official + Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary + of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec ‘81). Secret; Flash; + Nodis. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Flaten, Rudd (DOD/DSAA), Bremer, Morton, Ted Strickler (S/S–O), George Harris (INR), Burkhalter, Arnold Kanter (PM/P), Graner (DOD/JCS), Richard Secord (DOD/ISA), Carlucci, Constable, Walters, and Richard Aherne + (T); approved by Haig. + + 286550. + + Washington, October 27, 1981, 1903Z + + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Haig’s Message + to King Hassan on SAM–6 Request.An + unknown hand underlined the subject line. + +

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. The Secretary has approved the following message for delivery by + Ambassador Reed to King Hassan + in response to a letter from Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun requesting assistance to + counter the use of SAM–6s in the Western Sahara:

+

Begin Quote: Your Majesty: I have read with great concern the recent + letter from your Ambassador to Washington describing the introduction + for the first time of more sophisticated weapons into the fighting at + Guelta Zemmour. I am disturbed by this escalation in the technology + employed in the Saharan + conflict at the very moment the OAU + isAn unknown hand highlighted + “disturbed by this escalation in the technology employed in the + Saharan conflict at the very moment the OAU is.” endeavoring to arrange a ceasefire + preliminary to holding a referendum in the Western Sahara.

+

Ambassador Bengelloun’s letter of + October 16 contains specific requests for assistance to meet the new + situation.An unknown hand highlighted + “the new situation.” I have authorized the following actions + to be taken in response: + + The Department of Defense will make available a team of + specialists to provide advice on tactics to use against the + SAM–6.An unknown hand bracketed + this paragraph. + + The Defense Department will do everything possible to expedite + delivery of ammunition that already has been ordered by + Morocco. + + We agree to sell an appropriate number of CBUs for use against + SAM–6 systems. +

+

Additional decisions will be communicated to you separately.Not found. We will continue to consider with + you and in close collaboration with Ambassador Reed other steps, that can be taken to + be helpful to Morocco at this time.

+

Let me take this opportunity to repeat my deep respect for the + imagination and courage of Your Majesty for having taken the initiative + within the OAU on behalf of peace. The + recent incident demonstrates the urgency of proceeding with the + negotiation for the ceasefire which was proposed by Your Majesty and + endorsed by the OAU. Sincerely, + Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End + quote.

+

2. Ali Bengelloun’s letter to the + Secretary dated October 16 follows:

+

Quote: Dear Mr. Secretary: As you are aware, developments this week in + the Sahara have escalated the situation and caused grave concern within + our government. On the afternoon of October 13, 1981, Moroccan forces + near the town of Guelta-Zemmour were attacked on force by Soviet armor + and a large number of troops. The battle was continued for several days. + The opposing forces have proved quite formidable, especially with the + increasingly sophisticated equipment being used. Of greatest concern to + us is the introduction of the SA–6 missile, its associated equipment, + and very well-trained and experienced missile operators. You will recall + similar concern raised by Israel when they discovered the same threat in + Lebanon earlier this year.

+

To date Morocco has lost 3 aircraft and crews—a C–130 and 2 Mirage F–1’s. The fact that the Mirage aircraft + was shot down at over 30,000 + feet, while supersonic, indicates to us that the SA–6 operators are + quite experienced and well-trained.

+

Morocco has no counter to the SA–6 missile system. We therefore must give + up air superiority and support for our forces in the area. Morocco + urgently requires the support and immediate aid of the United States to + meet this escalation and neutralize the new equipment. Specifically, we + need: + + Reconnaissance information on opposing forces and equipment, + specifically EOB (electronic order of battle) and GOB (ground + order of battle) information. This should include quantity and + location. + + ALO–119 jamming pods with the velocity gate pull-off (VGPO) + program to counter SA–6. Without these programs the pods will + not help. B–10 are needed immediately with proper technical + support and logistical support. More may be needed later. + + CBU’s including the Rockeye + (anti-armor) and CBU–58 + (anti-SAM site). We need 100 x CBU–58 and 400 x Rockeye immediately. + + 30 anti-radiation missiles (ARM)—to counter the SA-6 radar. + Additional cockpit wiring and operational support as + necessary. + + Immediate delivery of 155 mm and 105 mm + projectiles/ammunition. + + USAF logistical support, + tactics and advice on operations to use against the SA–6. + + Any type of stand-off jamming capability to be used against + SA–6 acquisition radar.Mr. Secretary, the use of such + sophisticated weaponry and tactics is an undeniable escalation + of the Sahara situation. It is obvious that strong support is + being made available from the Libyan side to give our opposition + their new capabilities. Without a counter to this sophisticated + equipment, we urgently need the help of the United States + Government and people. As a long-standing ally, I respectfully + request your earliest response in this time of heightened peril + to Morocco and the stability of North Africa. With warm personal + regards, Ali Bengelloun. + End quote. + + [2 paragraphs (9 lines) not + declassified] +

+ Haig +
+ +
+ 388. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (10/29/1981–11/28/1981). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation + indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at + 11:12 a.m. on October 31. + + + Washington, October 30, 1981 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+

2. My Meeting with King Hassan’s Special Emissary. + In our meeting today, King Hassan’s special emissary, Reda Guedira,A record of the Haig-Guedira discussion is in + telegram 292159 to Rabat, November 3. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810519–0532) said + that Morocco’s recent military defeat in the Western Sahara saw the + introduction of SAM–6s and heavy armor for the first time in the war. + The Moroccans are convinced that the SAM–6s were supplied by the Libyans + with Soviet approval. Guedira asked us for help at the UN to get a resolution sponsored by the + Organization of African Unity tabled supporting a ceasefire and + referendum. I agreed. He also asked us to warn the Russians that the + U.S. is not indifferent to the fate of the Western Sahara. I assured + Guedira that I would make this point to Ambassador Dobrynin + Saturday.Haig and Dobrynin met on October 31. According to + telegrams 291727 to Moscow, October 31, and 293442 to Moscow, + November 4, they discussed Cuba, Afghanistan, arms control, + Kampuchea, and Angola. The issue of Libya’s and the Soviet Union’s + alleged role in arming the Polisario with SAM–6s was not raised. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, [no N number] and N810009–0015, respectively) + Finally, he requested immediate U.S. assistance to counter the Polisario + SAM-6 capability. I referred to my recent message to King HassanSee Document + 387. and noted that a high-level DOD team will visit Morocco next week + which will consider additional actions we might take. Finally, on your + behalf I asked Guedira to assure King Hassan that we consider him an + ally and irreplaceable world leader. Guedira appeared reassured by my + remarks. He left a personal congratulatory message from King Hassan to + you on your AWACS victory, which is + being forwarded separately.The letter has + not been found. Hassan referenced the Senate’s October 28 rejection + of a resolution disapproving the administration’s decision to + approval the sale of five Airborne Warning and Control System + aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Documentation on the sale is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East + Region; Arabian Peninsula. (S)

+
+ +
+ 389. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810526–0206. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Hull; cleared by + Kuniholm, Flaten, Dietrich + (INR), Herbert Hoffman (DOD/ISA), and Richard Erdman + (S/S–O); approved by Constable. + Sent for information to Rabat. + + 295362. + + Washington, November 5, 1981, 2218Z + + + + SUBJECT + Allegation of US Military + Involvement in Western Sahara. + + + Ref: + A) Algiers 3893,In telegram 3893 from + Algiers, November 2, the Embassy reported that at a recent + social function an Algerian Foreign Ministry official “remarked + to an Embassy officer present that if he would come to the + Foreign Ministry ‘proof’ would be produced that U.S. military + personnel are providing technical assistance to Moroccan combat + units in the Western Sahara. EmbOff expressed skepticism.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D810518–1052) + B) Rabat 8043.In telegram 8043 from + Rabat, November 3, the Embassy informed the Embassy in Algiers: + “There are no rpt no US military + personnel providing technical assistance to Moroccan combat + units in Western Sahara,” adding that U.S. “personnel may not + rpt not provide services to FAR + in contested territory but must confine their operations to + Morocco-proper, as USG defines + it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810521–0154) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + In response to allegation reported ref A, Embassy is authorized to + make flat denial that there are any US military personnel in the Western Sahara providing + technical assistance to Moroccan combat units. + + Haig +
+
+ 390. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (Cohen) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + (Stoessel)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, + [text not declassified]. Secret; + Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified. + + + Washington, November 6, 1981 + + +

 

+
+ +
+ 391. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810609–0435. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Rabat. The document is misnumbered in the + original. + + 4597. + + Algiers, December 22, 1981, 1650Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algeria’s Attitude Toward Morocco and the Polisario. + + + Ref: + Algiers 4591.Telegram 4591 from + Algeria, December 22, contains a record of Newlin’s December 21 meeting + with Benyahia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D810608–0738) + + + + (S—Entire text). + + From my Dec 21 conversation with FM Benyahia (who apparently has + been Algeria’s principal interlocutor with the Moroccans on the + Western Sahara) the following impressions emerged: + + Algeria is actively searching for a political solution in + accordance with the OAU + decisions. + + Algeria is unwilling to negotiate publicly with Morocco on + the Western Sahara since it is not a party to the + conflict. + + Algeria is prepared to act a as a go-between (as it did + during the hostage negotiations) and to discuss the Western + Sahara privately with Morocco in the broader context of + regional cooperation, something that would benefit all + parties. + + The recent parade of high-level U.S. visitors to Morocco + and our post-Guelta Zemmour military assistance has alarmed + Algeria which fears the possibility of counter-move by Libya + and, perhaps, the Soviets. This alarm is expressed obliquely + by opposition to U.S. military involvement in the + conflict. + + + Current Algerian national policy as enunciated and practiced is to + concentrate on regional stability abroad and domestic development at + home. Neither of these overriding objectives is served by a + continuation of the Western Sahara conflict. Algeria thus supports + the OAU referendum process and + states it will accept the wishes of the Sahraoui people. + + At the same time, Algeria insists that the referendum be + “serious”. That is, the modalities of the referendum must ensure to + the extent possible a genuine expression of the wishes of the + Sahraouis. In the recent bilateral discussions that have taken + place, Algeria apparently doubts King Hassan’s commitment to a serious + referendum.In telegram 4597 from + Algiers, December 22, Newlin reported that Algeria “supports the + OAU referendum process and + states it will accept the wishes of the Sahraoui people. At the + same time, Algeria insists that the referendum be ‘serious.’ + That is, the modalities of the referendum must ensure to the + extent possible a genuine expression of the wishes of the + Sahraouis. In the recent bilateral discussions that have taken + place, Algeria apparently doubts King Hassan’s commitment to a + serious referendum.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810609–0435) The + implication of Benyahia’s remarks was that Algeria was prepared to + continue its private bilateral contacts with Morocco with a view to + working out the modalities of the referendum which both Morocco and + the Polisario could accept (presumably at the planned January + meeting of the OAU Implementation + Committee). + + From here, the various positions seem to be: + + Algeria is prepared to work quietly for a serious (i.e. + honest) referendum and will abide by its outcome. + + Morocco is unwilling to agree to terms of a referendum + which might result in a majority vote for + independence. + + The Polisario—unclear the Polisario gives lip service to + the OAU decisions, but is + known to have doubts about a referendum and insists on + direct negotatiions.In telegram + 4221 from Algiers, November 28, the Embassy reported: + “The Polisario is carrying on an intensive and + unprecedented diplomatic and propaganda campaign urging + direct Morocco-Polisario negotiations and alleging U.S. + military assistance to Morocco is an obstacle to OAU and UN peace efforts.” + Continued U.S. military assistance to Morocco, the + Polisario charged, “will inevitably lead to escalation + of the Sahara conflict.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D810566–0443) If Algeria and Morocco were to + agree on modalities, it would be up to Algeria to try to + sell such an arrangement to the Polisario. Should the + Polisario balk, it would be difficult for Algeria to try to + impose the arrangements given its traditional position on + the Western Sahara and its general posture of support for + liberation movements. Algeria will therefore be cautious in + its discussions with Morocco. + + + Only one thing seems reasonably clear: As long as they are going + on, Moroccan-Algerian exchanges offer the best prospect for eventual + progress on this issue. This suggests that Washington discussions + with the King should be designed to encourage continued bilateral + discussions with the Algerians and eventual indirect talks with the + Polisario at the OAU Committee + meeting. + + Newlin +
+ +
+ 392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + KenyaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820014–1005. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by William Hudson (AF/W) and Hull; cleared by Robert Bruce (AF/W), Marie Huhtala (AF/C), Flaten, Richard Roth (AF/E), and Bishop, and in substance by Albert Fairchild (AF/I and for information by Douglas + McElhaney (IO/UNP); approved by + Crocker. Sent for + information Immediate to Paris, Lagos, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es + Salaam, Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott, USUN, London, Khartoum, and Freetown. + + 6618. + + Washington, January 9, 1982, 2316Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara Status of Negotiations: Implementation Committee + Meeting. + + + Refs: + (A) 81 State 300474,In telegram + 300474 to multiple recipients, November 11, 1981, the Department + reported: “At this juncture it is critical both that no party + believe it can successfully pursue a military solution to the + conflict in the Western Sahara and that the momentum generated + by the OAU summit this summer + and the subsequent meeting of the Implementation Committee not + be allowed to lag. To this end the USG will supply Morocco, in the framework of the + long-standing US/Moroccan military relationship, with defensive + equipment which will allow it to counter the sophisticated + weaponry recently introduced in the Western Sahara. At the same + time, we seek to encourage the OAU to get ceasefire negotiations underway as soon + as possible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810534–0625) + (B) 81 State 314187.In telegram + 314187 to Rabat, November 26, 1981, the Department instructed + the Embassy to emphasize “that the primary policy of the United + States with regard to the Western Sahara conflict is support for + the OAU process which is based + on the King’s initiative and which aims at a peaceful solution + of the conflict through a referendum.” However, the Department + stressed, “we do not rpt not believe a military solution is + feasible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D810563–0093) + + + + (Secret—Entire text.) + + Department is in process of evaluating where the OAU’s Western Sahara peace initiative + stands and how we might be helpful. As part of this process, we + believe it would be useful to solicit in a frank exchange of views + President Moi’s thoughts on + what he sees as the next steps in the OAU’s peace efforts in the Western Sahara. At the same + time, we could share with him our assessment of Algerian and + Moroccan positions—as we currently understand them—on resolution of + the Western Saharan conflict which may be valuable to him as he + focuses on an agenda and strategy for the reported January OAU Implementation Committee meeting. + We could also take this opportunity to reiterate our desire that + there be progress in the OAU’s + efforts in the Western Sahara and that the modalities of a + cease-fire and referendum be well established before the OAU chairmanship is scheduled to be + taken up by Qadhafi this + summer. + + + You should seek a meeting with Moi to share with him our assessment of the Moroccan + and Algerian positions on resolution of the Western conflict as + outlined paragraph four. Ref B outlines U.S. position. You should + also solicit Moi’s views on + what he hopes to accomplish at the January Implementation Committee + meeting. Will the focus on the meeting be on provisions for a + cease-fire and groundwork for a referendum? In this context, we + would be interested in the outcome of his consultations with the + UN + SecGen. Does he think the + consensus decision is enough to move ahead and fulfill the Nairobi + II resolution? Finally, how does President Moi see the Western Saharan peace + process unfolding in the next six months? Does he think it can be + sufficiently in place to prevent interference by Qadhafi when he is scheduled to + assume the OAU chairmanship next + summer? + + Post should draw on paragraph 3 the following talking points and + reftels for meeting with Moi: + Assessment of Moroccan and Algerian positions on Western + Sahara: + + We are aware of high-level contacts between the + Moroccans and Algerians before, during and after the + Fez Summit.Reference is + to the Arab League Summit held in Fez November + 6–9, 1981. We understand that the Western + Sahara was discussed within the context of regional + stability and cooperation. These series of bilateral + contacts now seem to have been suspended, but it may + have contributed to an improvement in bilateral + relations. + + Both the Moroccans and the Algerians have + emphasized to us their continuing support for the + OAU peace + process. There are serious differences on thorny + issues related to the modalities of the proposed + referendum. While not minimizing these differences, + it is reassuring that a commitment to the process + remains despite the escalation of fighting last + October. + + Both parties seem concerned that a solution be + achieved over the next six months while the + Implementation Committee is led by Kenya. Both + parties seem to believe that useful negotiations + might continue under the auspices of the + Implementation Committee. + + U.S. concerns: + + We agree with Moroccans and Algerians that the + interests of all parties are served by continuing + progress of the OAU + Implementation Committee’s peace initiative in the + Western Sahara. + + + In this regard, we believe that progress in the + next six months is crucial in order to ensure (a) + the interested parties do not opt out of the peace + process and decide to pursue their goals through + renewed fighting and (b) the modalities of a + cease-fire and referendum are well established to + minimize interference by Qadhafi. + + + + FYI for Ambassador Harrop. You + will receive septelNot found. + instructing you to emphasize to Moi the continuing importance of Chad in the OAU framework. This message will be in + response to your conversation with Biwott (Nairobi 28825).In telegram 28825 from Nairobi, December 31, 1981, the Embassy + reported that Biwott said + “Moi’s first OAU priority will + be Western Sahara which is in fact a more urgent and more + important problem” than Chad. “Moi,” Biwott continued: “is responsive to Hassan’s + urgent desire to resolve this issue while a compatible moderate + chairs the OAU. When Qadhafi becomes chairman, no + progress will be possible.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820001–0942) + We realize Moi faces a + formidable task of dealing simultaneously with two issues of + critical importance to the OAU, + Africa and the international community. We continue to believe we + should press him to remain active on both fronts.In telegram 1466 from Nairobi, January 20, the + Embassy reported that in response to the U.S. démarche, “in + addition to ceasefire, President Moi expects Sahara Consultative Ministerial + (February 3–6) and Summit (February 7–8) will discuss voter + registration rolls question, interim administration, and other + modalities for referendum in Sahara.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820032–1072) End FYI. + + For info addressees: Any relevant information on proposed January + Implementation Committee would be appreciated. + + Haig +
+ +
+ 393. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original + was received in the White House Situation Room. + + 302. + + Algiers, January 24, 1982, 1610Z + + +

For Deputy Secretary Designate Stoessel from Ambassador. Subject: Western Sahara: + Encouragement of Negotiations. Ref: A) Rabat 474,In telegram 474 from Rabat, January 19, the Embassy + commented that Hassan’s decision “to undertake an unprecedented + alignment with the US stems from his + increasingly pessimistic appraisal of Morocco’s problems. The course + of developments in Europe and the Maghreb, together with Morocco’s + own socio-economic conditions, have induced him to table the option + of a break with the Kingdom’s traditional non-aligned stance.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, N820001–0487) B) State 18162.In telegram 18162 to Rabat, January 23, the + Department provided a summary of Guedira’s January 21 meeting with + Stoessel, noting: “King + Hassan wants to examine carefully the possibility of an alliance + relationship with the U.S. either bilaterally or in an + inter-regional context. He would like a discussion with Secretary + Haig in Morocco to + further prepare for a dramatic move to result from his visit to + Washington.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820039–0699) Haig and Hassan discussed this on February 11. See + Document 199.

+ + + S—Entire text. + + We would like to comment briefly on a few points in reftels from + the perspective of Algiers. + + In para 8 of ref A, it is stated that Morocco has accepted the + OAU resolution and Algeria is + seeking to reinterpret it.See footnote 2, Document 378. + Without going into a detailed examination of the respective + positions (which are laid out in the cable traffic), we would simply + like to say that it is natural, in a negotiating situation, that + each side will interpret a basic text in a way favorable to itself. + While Algeria pressed a UN + resolution which called for direct negotiations in order to + demonstrate international support for the Polisario position, + Morocco has as yet shown little inclination to accept a fair + referendum, as called for by the OAU. In any case, these differences are matters to be + resolved in future negotiations. + + Para 8 of ref A states that “Algiers must be persuaded that + prolonging war by postponing a settlement will be resisted by + Morocco to point of unpredictable repercussions, which could prove + dangerous and damaging to Algeria itself”. If we use this language + with Algerian leaders, it will seem to them a threat to escalate the + war through greater U.S. assistance to Morocco, perhaps even through + U.S. intervention, unless the conflict is settled on Morocco’s + terms. Since we have + little leverage with Algeria, such a threat would not help resolve + the conflict and would only worsen U.S.-Algerian relations to no + purpose. On the other hand, we certainly have no objection to + repeating our exhortations to Algeria to work for a peaceful + solution which would enhance regional stability, and will continue + to encourage Algeria in this direction at every opportunity. We must + be very careful in the language we use with Algeria, particularly + since in the Algerian view it is Morocco which is refusing to settle + the war through organization of a fair referendum. + + Our recent exchange of messages indicated that for the time being + neither Morocco nor Algeria can settle on terms acceptable to the + other side. We therefore need a U.S. position which will be viable + for a considerable period of time, pending political changes in + Morocco or Algeria which will make a peaceful solution possible. + Current U.S. policy strikes us as right for the long term: Limited + assistance to Morocco to help the King, neutrality on the final + outcome, support for the principle of self-determination, and + encouragement of all to seek a peaceful solution (which at present + means support for the OAU + resolutions). It is dangerous to believe that any particular U.S. + action, such as pressure on Algeria (or on Morocco) can resolve the + problem quickly. Should diplomatic activities in the OAU context and bilateral + Algeria-Morocco discussions bring the sides closer together, there + will be time enough to consider how the U.S. can use its leverage to + close the gap. + + In para 6 of ref B Royal Counselor Guedira is cited as stating + that Morocco’s desire for a close alliance with the U.S. has nothing + to do with the Western Sahara problem. Whatever judgement one might + make as to Guedira’s sincerity, we would note that Algeria would + certainly view a U.S.-Moroccan alliance in the light of the Western + Sahara conflict. + + Department repeat as desired. + + Newlin +
+ +
+ 394. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State + and the Embassies in Morocco and TunisiaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D820041–0859. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. + + 328. + + Algiers, January 25, 1982, 1511Z + + + + SUBJECT + Status of Polisario Relations With Algeria and Libya. + + + Ref: + A) [less than 1 line not declassified], B) + [less than 1 line not + declassified] + + + + S—Entire text. + + We would like to draw Department’s attention to the two referenced + [less than 1 line not declassified] + reports, which highlight a critical element of the Western Sahara + conflict—Libya’s present denial of arms to the Polisario following + its June accord with Morocco.Reference + is to the June 17 meeting between Hassan and a Libyan diplomat + regarding a rapprochement between the two countries contingent + upon Libya ending its military support for the + Polisario. + + Ref A reports [less than 1 line not + declassified] that fundamental differences exist between + the Polisario, Libya and Algeria over how to proceed in the Western + Sahara conflict. While the Polisario wishes to press forward + militarily to achieve its objectives, Algeria and Libya are urging + reliance on the OAU negotiating + process. With regard to Algeria this seems to us an accurate reading + for, as we have noted before, Algeria increasingly sees its + interests in terms of regional stability and economic cooperation. + In addition, the U.S. response to Guelta ZemmourSee Document + 385. has probably convinced Algeria that military + escalation is a no-win proposition and gravely risks superpower + involvement. + + On the other hand, Libya’s denial of sophisticated arms to the + Polisario seems more fragile than Algeria’s policy of restraint. + Libya’s purpose last June, as we understand it, was to secure + Moroccan acquiescence to Libya’s chairmanship of the OAU and an end to Moroccan military + assistance to Habre. We doubt Qadhafi has much faith in OAU efforts to reach a Western Sahara settlement or + would hesitate to resume supplying sophisticated weapons to the + Polisario if he thought it in his interest to heat up the + “situation”. + + [less than 1 line not declassified]. It + seems to us that the paramilitary training which General Dlimi has reportedly agreed to + provide anti-Qadhafi elements is exactly what Qadhafi would regard as grounds to + break the June accord. If that occurs, it could have a profound + effect on U.S. and + Moroccan interests in a peaceful settlement of the Sahara conflict. + This is only one part of the picture, but one we hope will be taken + into account in our discussions with Morocco on its future relations + with Libya. + + Newlin +
+
+ 395. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Agency File, Secretary + Haig’s Evening Report + (02/02/1982–02/27/1982). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at + the top of the memorandum indicates it was received in the White + House Situation Room at 9:15 p.m. on February 10. Haig was in Madrid on February 10 + to attend the CSCE follow-up meeting and later that day traveled to + Lisbon to meet with Portuguese officials. + + + Washington, February 10, 1982 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+

2. Western Sahara. The Organization of African + Unity (OAU) concluded its summit + meeting on the Western Sahara on February 9, adopting a draft proposal + for a ceasefire and referendum.The text of + the proposal is in telegram 3283 from Nairobi, February 10. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820074–0496) Neither the Polisario Front nor + Morocco has accepted the proposals and the burden now falls on the + OAU chairman to negotiate their + agreement and set a date for a ceasefire. Secretary Haig will meet with Moroccan King + Hassan tomorrow,Haig was in Marrakesh February + 11–12. See Document 199. and + Assistant Secretary Veliotes + will meet with the Algerians on Saturday.February 13. For a report on Veliotes’s meeting, see Document + 396. These talks will be important in our + assessment of the situation.

+
+ +
+ 396. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820082–0254. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Priority to London, Jidda, Nairobi, Paris, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate + to Rabat and Tunis. + + 688. + + Algiers, February 14, 1982, 1435Z + + + + SUBJECT + Highlights of Veliotes’ + Algiers Discussions February 13. + + + + S—Entire text. + + Herewith are highlights of Assistant Secretary Veliotes’ Feb 13 in-depth + discussions with Foreign Minister Benyahia, Acting DefMin + Col. Belloucif and MFA Secretary General Dembri. + + The hour and twenty minute discussion with Foreign Minister + Benyahia was the last, but most significant, of Assistant Secretary + Veliotes’ meetings in + Algiers, taking place in the evening immediately after Benyahia’s + return from Nairobi. Veliotes was accompanied by Ambassador, AFN Director + Flaten and DCM Lorenz. + + Benyahia spoke heatedly and with great pessimism about what he + considered the deteriorating situation in the Western Sahara. He + believed it ridiculous to assume that Nairobi had succeeded. It had + failed.Reference is to the OAU Foreign Ministers’ meeting in + Nairobi February 8–9, during which the OAU agreed for the first time to seat the SADR delegation, thereby + granting de facto recognition to the Polisario’s political wing. + Morocco and 16 other OAU + members walked out in protest. Morocco insists on a + confirmatory referendum contrary to the OAU’s decisions, and wants to organize the referendum + instead of the OAU or UN. The reason for Morocco’s + unwillingness to accept a political settlement was clear: U.S. + military aid had led Morocco to believe it could win the Sahara + conflict and there was therefore no reason to search for a peaceful + solution. Because of Morocco’s obstinacy the conflict was likely to + continue for 5, 10 or 15 years. It would almost certainly escalate, + each stage of escalation carrying with it an increasing threat of + great power confrontation. + + Benyahia strongly criticized the recent decisions taken at + Marrakech regarding the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship.See Document + 199. Algeria viewed these decisions with + “enormous concern.” He termed the Joint Military Commission and the + decisions on access rights “a quantitative and qualitative + augmentation” of that relationship. Veliotes explained that the JMC and the access understandings could in no sense be + so interpreted. The JMC was no more + than a useful mechanism for managing our bilateral military aid + relationships—one which worked well in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman and + Egypt. As for access rights, their sole object was to counter the + threat of Soviet military intervention in the Gulf. This had nothing + to do with northwest Africa. + + Veliotes continued that + while the recent agreements with Morocco were not a substantial + augmentation, the U.S. was determined to maintain an equilibrium in + the area and to continue support of its old friend, Morocco. He + noted that equilibrium depends on both sides: The military balance + had been significantly altered last fall by the introduction of + SAM–6s, and the U.S. intended to restore that balance. Benyahia + responded that the U.S. concept of equilibrium in the region was to + allow Moroccan aircraft to roam at will throughout the Western + Sahara. + + Benyahia said that Algeria had no quarrel with America’s close + relationship with Morocco. Indeed, Morocco was Algeria’s friend too. + What Algeria did object to was a military aid relationship of such + magnitude that it impeded a political settlement of the Sahara + conflict. + + One of Benyahia’s main points was that the U.S. had no real need + of transit rights in Morocco in a situation involving threat to the + Gulf since it already had such rights in the Azores, Spain and + Italy. Veliotes explained at + length the need for redundancy. Nevertheless, Benyahia clearly + perceived the base rights as an opening wedge for massive U.S. + assistance to Morocco in the Sahara conflict. Veliotes concluded this part of + the discussion with the comment that he knew he was not going to + persuade Benyahia now, but was confident that with the passage of + time Algeria would acknowledge America’s constructive contribution + to a Sahara settlement. (The discussion then turned to other issues, + including Chad, the Middle East situation, Angola and Poland, which + will be reported separately.)Records of + Veliotes’s + discussions with Dembri and Bengelloun on these issues are in telegram 695 + from Algiers and telegram 698 from Algiers, both February 14. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820082–0256 and D820082–0261, + respectively) + + Accompanied by Ambassador, AFN Director Flaten and PolCouns Thompson, + Veliotes had 90-minute, + wide-ranging talk with the SYG of + the MOD Belloucif (in reality, in + day-to-day charge of the Defense Ministry since President Bendjedid holds the Defense + portfolio.) + + Algero-American Relations. Belloucif stressed Algeria wished to + have good relations with the U.S. as well as all other countries. + Algeria recognized the great U.S. contribution to international + cooperation. He was critical of U.S.-Moroccan discussions re RDF transit arrangements as + inconsistent with Morocco’s avowed non-alignment. Algeria did not + want to see a military presence by the super powers in North Africa. + Such military cooperation made it more difficult for Algeria to + resist Soviet pressures + for military facilities. If Algeria were to sign such an agreement + with the USSR, Belloucif was sure + King Hassan and the U.S. would not be pleased. He did not ask for a + response since he knew this to be true. + + Veliotes stressed the + strategic nature of our access discussions and the practical + advantages of the mixed military commission. He noted that the + access discussions were not related to the Western Sahara. Belloucif + listened closely but did not seem to be reassured. + + Western Sahara. Belloucif reiterated Algeria’s position that the + belligerents were Morocco and the Polisario. He did not hide + Algeria’s support for the Polisario but also agreed with the + Ambassador that this gave Algeria leverage vis-à-vis the Polisario. + Belloucif cited the high rank and large number of recent U.S. + officials visiting Morocco and said Algeria sometimes has the + feeling it is considered as a hostile state. Veliotes denied this was the case. + (For political aspects of the Western Sahara, see below.) + + On Libya, Belloucif said Algeria tries to moderate Qadhafi’s actions and added that + the thought the U.S. was making a mistake in building up Qadhafi by so much publicity. He + stated Algeria had told Tunisian PM + Mzali + Qadhafi had been warned not + to attack Tunisia. Moreover, Algeria was helping the GUNT and supporting the OAU effort in Chad, but the basic + problem was lack of precision on the role of the PKF. Belloucif made it clear Algeria + sought to keep Libya out of Chad and from interfering with its other + Maghreb neighbors. Finally, Belloucif stressed that Algeria had paid + too high a price for its own independence to allow Cuba, the USSR, East Germany or any outsiders + into the Western Sahara. + + Same U.S. participants plus DCM + attended working lunch hosted by acting Foreign Minister Dembri. + Director of West European and North American Affairs Benouniche and Deputy Director for + North America Mekideche also was present. + + Western Sahara. Dembri was quite forthcoming re results of Nairobi + III. (But this was before Benyahia had returned with his much more + pessimistic personal evaluation.) It was necessary, Dembri said, for + President Moi to follow up + quickly with the parties to get the OAU-UN presence in place, to + agree on the modalities of the referendum, to arrange a ceasefire + and, finally, to supervise the referendum. Dembri hinted that + indirect Moroccan-Polisario contacts could take place via an OAU intermediary and cited the example + of the Iran hostage negotiations. Benouniche noted that neither Morocco nor the + Polisario had yet formally responded to the committee + recommendations. + + U.S.-Moroccan Military Cooperation. Veliotes gave Dembri essentially same explanations + he had given Belloucif. Dembri said Algeria considered neither King + Hassan nor the Moroccans to be enemies. Algeria was determined to remain + friends with Morocco despite the Western Sahara. However, + U.S.-Moroccan miliary cooperation risked polarization, super power + intervention and radicalization of the Polisario. In response to + Benouniche’s question + Ambassador said we had irrefutable evidence that the Polisario had + SA–6’s and SA–9’s in addition to other sophisticated military + equipment. + + Middle East. Veliotes gave + an in-depth description of the status of the Middle East peace + process and the dedication of the U.S. to progress on the question + of Palestinian autonomy. The Algerians responded with their known + position. Concerning the prospects for reconvening the Fez Arab + League Summit, Dembri indicated Saudi Arabia, Algeria and SYG + Klibi would meet in Tunis to + see what could be done. Dembri spoke in rather positive terms of the + Fahd plan as a possible basis for an Arab position. + + Iran-Iraq. Dembri reviewed Iran-Iraq developments along the lines + of his recent conversation with the Ambassador (Algiers 546).In telegram 546 from Algiers, February 7, + Newlin reported: “On + instructions, I raised possibilities of negotiations concerning + Iran-Iraq war with Algerians with forthcoming results.” Dembri + “commented on what Algeria sees as favorable trends in both + countries which may present opportunities for an intermediary + role.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820067–1075) Documentation on the war is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XX, Iran; Iraq, April 1980–January 1985. He + said Iranian FM would arrive in Algiers Feb 14 for discussions. + Dembri and Benouniche smiled + when the Ambassador observed that it would be good to get back to + something along the lines of the 1975 Algiers Accord.See footnote 4, Document + 171. We shared with Dembri our assessment of + the Iran-Iraq situation (State 31329).Telegram 31329 to multiple recipients, February 5, repeated the + text of telegram 29508 to multiple recipients, February 4, in + which the Department offered an assessment of recent military + activities between Iran and Iraq. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820064–0562) + + Comment. These conversations revealed both the positive and the + negative elements in our current relations with Algeria. The Western + Sahara continues to be the principal negative element, and Benyahia + at least appeared very pessimistic that Nairobi III would lead to an + early settlement. Clearly the Algerians are extremely upset over the + announcement of our access discussions with Morocco and the + establishment of the Joint Military Committee. Although they talk of + the danger of superpower military involvement in the Maghreb, we + expect the Algerians will continue to resist any pressures from the + Soviets for similar arrangements here. Their presentation on this + point was somewhat self-serving and ambivalent, but the strongest + theme was a focus on Algerian nationalism and independence. + + + Assistant Secretary Veliotes arrived just after announcement of our + expanded military cooperation with Morocco and Algeria’s presumed + disappointment with Nairobi III.See + footnote 3 above. Despite their frank criticisms, the + message that Algeria would like to have better relations with the + U.S. was also communicated. + + Newlin +
+
+ 397. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple RecipientsSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820105–0962. + Secret; Immediate. Sent to Cairo, Monrovia, Libreville, Addis Ababa, + Lagos, Ouagadougou, Tunis, Rabat, Lilongwe, and Nairobi. Drafted by + Fairchild; cleared by Larry Williamson (AF/I), Hudson, Flaten, Samuel Peale (NEA/EGY), and Sherman; approved by Bishop. Sent for information to + OAU Collective. + + 52115. + + Washington, February 27, 1982, 0025Z + + + + SUBJECT + OAU Ministerial and Western + Sahara. + + + Ref: + (A) Rabat 1577,In telegram 1577 from + Rabat, February 26, Reed + indicated that Sebastian + received “an urgent request,” from a member of the Foreign + Minister’s cabinet for “the earliest and most vigorous possible + US representations to Egypt, + Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Upper Volta, urging them to + leave the current OAU + Ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa. With fifteen states having + already walked out, by Moroccan count, departures of these + countries would deprive the OAU + meeting of a quorum and would nullify OAU Secretary-General Kodjo’s admission of the + Polisario to participation in the meeting.” Reed closed by saying he + “strongly” supported these representations. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820104–1068) + (B) Addis Ababa 791.In telegram 791 + from Addis Ababa, February 26, the Embassy reported: “Three more + states (Comoros, Gambia, and Somalia) have joined the walkout + for total of 15. Three more are needed for preventing quorum. + Some states who have had ambivalent positions might be turned + around. Most likely appear: Upper Volta, Gabon, and Egypt. + Whereas blocking Third World would not reverse Polisario/SDAR seating, it should cut + off current technical discussions and possible political + resolutions. More importantly, it would publicize opposition and + encourage cooperation of moderates in preparation for Tripoli + meetings.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820105–0069) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Department concurs with suggestion made in para. 4. reftel A, and + requests action addressees (except Addis) to make démarches outlined + below at highest appropriate level to insure action before final + OAU Ministerial plenary session in + Addis, afternoon of Saturday, February 27. + + For all posts (except Addis): Embassies should inform host + governments that U.S. is increasingly concerned that the OAU peace initiative in the Western + Sahara may be severely hampered if not rendered meaningless by the + OAU Secretariat’s recent + unilateral decision to seat the SDAR at the ministerial meeting still underway in Addis + Ababa. You should state that our concerns are clearly shared by a + significant number of member countries of the OAU who have dramatically demonstrated + their opposition to the Secretariat’s action by refusing to + participate in the ministerial meeting. FYI, these countries are: CAR, Cameroon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, + Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Zaire, + Comoros, Gambia and Somalia. You should also note that seating the + SDAR as a member state of + the OAU could prejudice the + referendum process approved earlier by the OAU and all parties involved in this conflict, and thus + could well destroy the hope for a peaceful resolution of this + problem. You should urge that host governments send immediate and + unambiguous instructions to their delegation heads in Addis to join + those African states refusing to participate further in this + meeting. + + For Tunis: We believe the statements made by the Tunisian + delegation have been positive and very helpful, but request you + raise the issue once again with the GOT with a view to encouraging them to suspend their + participation in the final plenary session as a protest against the + action taken by the OAU + Secretariat. + + For Cairo: We appreciate the Egyptians discussion with us in Addis + per Addis Ababa 794.In telegram 794 + from Addis Ababa, February 26, Roberts, in reference to seating the SDAR, commented: “Time for + helping Moroccan initiative to organize a blocking vote at the + Ministerial is perhaps too short for practical.” He continued: + “I have contacted Egyptian del and found them very reluctant to + commit themselves, especially if they were the deciding factor.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D820105–0330) In light of seriousness of the + Secretariat’s action and the importance we attach to the OAU mediation effort, however, we + request you raise issue with the Foreign Office to encourage GOE to + send instructions to Egyptian delegation to suspend participation in + final session. + + For Rabat: Re Rabat 1577, you may inform the GOM that we are following up with the + listed countries plus Kenya and Upper Volta (requested by Ambassador + Bengelloun) and Tunisia. + Believe, however, the request is for assistance with Malawi rather + than Mali per reftel. The Department believes that most effective + presentation to Egyptians can be made by Moroccans themselves. + Suggest you urge GOM to make direct + request to Egyptians at suitably high level. + + + For Addis: You should contact delegation heads of action addressee + countries, note that U.S. is making démarche at high level in their + countries, and encourage them as appropriate along lines presented + in para. 6. + + For Nairobi: You will know best how to present this in most + effective manner to Kenyans. + + As appropriate Embassies may wish to refer to previous telegrams + on this subject for further talking points.In telegram 811 from Addis Ababa, February 28, + the Embassy reported: “Thanks to last-ditch efforts by Embassies + Monrovia and Ouagadougou, the Upper Voltan and Liberian + delegations received instructions early Sunday morning 2/28 to + walkout of the OAU Ministerial + conference,” which meant that a quorum would not be reached. The + Embassy commented: “The walk-outs, even if they do not stop the + conference in its tracks, represent a modified victory for + Morocco while not reversing the Polisario/SDAR seating.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820107–0531) Ref. B outlining latest state of play in + Addis being repeated FYI. + + Haig +
+
+ 398. Telegram 1642 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. + Secret; Priority; [handling restriction not + declassified]. 1 page not declassified. + + + Rabat, March 1, 1982, 1722Z + + +

 

+
+ +
+ 399. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820178–0757. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis + Ababa, Lagos, Nouakchott, Paris, and Rabat. Sent for information + Priority to Nairobi. + + 1509. + + Algiers, April 5, 1982, 1246Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara—Algeria Asserts Polisario Accepts Principle of + Referendum. + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Ambassador took advantage of talk with Benouniche, Director of European and North American + Affairs, on other subjects April 4 to ask how Algeria saw future + prospects for the Western Sahara after the Nouakchott meeting.Mauritania hosted the Sixth Conference of + Saharan States, which included Libya, Mali, Algeria, Chad, and + Niger, March 28–29. In telegram 1560 from Nouakchott, March 30, + the Embassy reported: “Despite trappings of outward unity, + conference was characterized by backstage bickering over the + Western Sahara and the SDAR. The SDAR did not seek admission, but its specter + dominated the proceedings, even in such a small regional + grouping.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820168–0273) + + Benouniche began by saying + that the admission of the SDAR + to the OAU was an irreversible + fact. He noted that there was talk of a restricted summit meeting to + discuss the matter, but he doubted such a gathering would be very + credible. + + I then asked if the Nouakchott communiqué meant that the problem + had been returned to the OAU + Implementation Committee to carry forward on the Nairobi + decisions.In telegram 1560 from + Nouakchott, March 30, the Embassy reported: “The final + communiqué of the Heads of State encouraged the OAU Implementation Committee to + undertake negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.” + (Ibid.) No other record of the communiqué was found. + After much circumlocution, Benouniche affirmed that this was the case. + + In response to probing on the current position of the Polisario, + Benouniche said the + Polisario accepted Nairobi I and II, that is, the principle of a + general, free and regular referendum. The Polisario did not accept + Nairobi III but, after the “balancing action” at Addis, there was + now a possibility for progress. + + Benouniche rehearsed + Algeria’s strong doubts about King Hassan’s sincerity. He then went + on to compare the situation with the hostage crisis after Khomeini’s + famous four points were announced. Each side could accept the + principles, but their respective difference in interpretation was so + wide that there was, in fact, no agreement. + + + Seizing on this analogy I said what was needed was some + intermediary activity, possibly by President Moi or others, to do what Algeria + had done in the hostage negotiations. Benouniche confirmed that Polisario FornMin Ibrahim + Hakim had met President Moi + in Nairobi and he considered this to be positive development. + + I again strongly urged if Algeria and the Polisario had doubts + about Moroccan sincerity to test this factor through the + Implementation Committee process. + + Comment: While Benouniche + was negative on the idea of a restricted summit and defensive + concerning the SDAR’s + admission to the OAU, it was + interesting that he implied the action at Addis Ababa now permitted + the OAU to carry forward discussion + on the modalities of a referendum and a ceasefire. + + Newlin +
+
+ 400. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple RecipientsSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820241–1164. + Confidential; Immediate. Sent to Bamako, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, + Conakry, Khartoum, Freetown, Rabat, Algiers, and Dakar. Sent for + information to Nairobi, Nouakchott, Addis Ababa, Jidda, Cairo, + London, Paris, USUN, Tunis, + Gaborone, and the Mission at Geneva. Drafted by Hudson; cleared by + Graner, Flaten, and in + substance by Richard Roth (AF/E); + approved by Bishop. + + 125206. + + Washington, May 8, 1982, 0430Z + + +

Geneva for Assistant Secretary Crocker. Subject: Kenyan Mediation Efforts on the + Western Sahara. Ref: A) Nairobi 9494,In + telegram 9494 from Nairobi, April 22, the Embassy reported: + “Discussions about moving toward a negotiated ceasefire and + referendum in Western Sahara seem persistently to skirt the real + problems now blocking progress.” The roadblock stemmed from the + Polisario’s demand for direct negotiations with Morocco and the + Moroccan willingness to engage only in “indirect” or “proximity” + talks “under OAU or OAU Implementation Committee + auspices.” The Embassy suggested that if the Algerians believed that + the Moroccans would not negotiate, that Algerian officials should + “be urged to put Morocco to the test by inducing the Polisario to + accept some sort of indirect formula for discussions under OAU auspices.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820211–0895) + B) Algiers 1818,In telegram 1818 from Algiers, April 26, the + Embassy noted that Moi had + endorsed the “sensible suggestion that the parties should be induced + to engage in indirect discussion on the modalities for a ceasefire + and referendum” contained in telegram 9494 from Nairobi. (See + footnote 2 above.) The Embassy also indicated its previous support + for this idea, adding that Moi “is the ideal person to make progress on this + issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820217–0442) C) Nouakchott 1827,In telegram 1827 from Nouakchott, April 15, + Schrager reported: “We + share everybody else’s bleak outlook (with the possible exception of + the Polisario) concerning the OAU + mini-summit at Lagos and doubt that anything worthwhile will come + out of it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820197–0357) D) Nouakchott 2140,In telegram 2140 from Nouakchott, April 30, + Schrager reported that + Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ould + Minnih “instantly ruled out extraordinary summit + saying that approval by two-thirds of Chiefs of State was + impossible. He said that GIRM view + was that OAU Bureau had no + authority on the matter in any event, thus its deliberations were + non-binding.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840810–1012, D820228–0820) E) Algiers + 1889,In telegram 1889 from Algiers, May + 3, Newlin reported that he + had reminded Benouniche that + during an earlier meeting Benouniche “had agreed that the communiqué of the + Nouakchott meeting of the Saharan states meant that the OAU Implementation Committee should + continue its efforts to resolve the Western Sahara problem. I then + noted that the Nairobi meeting of the OAU Bureau did not appear to have had significant + results.” Benouniche replied: + “The important result of the bureau meeting in Nairobi was that + there was no question of suspending the OAU membership of the SDAR, and any political difficulties could be dealt + with at the Tripoli summit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820230–0142) F) Nairobi + 10846.In telegram 10846 from Nairobi, + May 6, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office Political + Director said that Ouko “was + embarking on a major diplomatic mission” to seven African nations + and that “Western Sahara would be primary topic of these talks.” The + Embassy commented: “We can only hope that Ouko intends to make a try at + consultations leading to ceasefire and referendum in Western Sahara + as mandated by OAU Implementation + Committee.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D820238–0994) Paris for Cheshes, London + for Lanpher.

+ + + C—Entire text + + We continue to seek means to reinvigorate OAU Implementation Committee peacemaking efforts in the + Western Sahara and are encouraged by OAU Chairman Moi’s apparent determination to follow up on Nairobi III + (reftel F) as well as indications that the parties may be ready to + receive President Moi or his + envoy (reftels D and E). + + Our efforts are based on the premise that U.S. interests will be + served by a public demonstration by the parties of their willingness + to support the OAU mandate to + engage in discussion on the modalities for a ceasefire and + referendum under the auspices of the Implementation Committee. + Should the Polisario refuse to participate in OAU sponsored talks, the current + tendency to blame the 19 countries who walked out of the Addis + meeting could be transferred to the Polisario and its + backers. + + + The most apparent means for the U.S. to assist the OAU peace process at this juncture + will be for a strong U.S. démarche to the Implementation Committee + members and parties to the conflict urging them to support Moi’s efforts to follow up on + Nairobi III. + + Action addressees should seek early meeting with host governments + to make following points: + + Underscore U.S. support for the OAU peace initiative in the Western Sahara and + the decisions taken at Nairobi III and express our concern + that the decision to seat the SDAR, taken unilaterally by Sec General at + Addis, not be allowed to call into question or frustrate + plan for referendum and ceasefire as laid out by + Implementation Committee. + + Express U.S. hope that progress continue and that the + Implementation Committee resume responsibility to undertake + its mandate to implement a ceasefire and referendum in the + Western Sahara. + + Express the hope, as an interested outsider, that in this + connection President Moi’s efforts to fulfill his + responsibilities under the mandate of Nairobi III will be + fully supported by Implementation Committee members and will + be met with cooperation from the parties to the + conflict. + + Encourage host government as member of Implementation + Committee to make these points to Moi or his emissary. + + + For Algiers: We realize that recent death of Foreign Minister and + many of his aidesIn telegram 1920 from + Algiers, May 4, the Embassy reported that Benyahia and his + colleagues died in a plane crash in Iran. The Algerian Politburo + called them martyrs to the cause of peace for their efforts to + end the war between Iran and Iraq. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820232–1032) + might handicap GOA ability to + respond to Kenyan initiative. For this reason, we believe it is all + the more important for Embassy to reiterate US position to acting Foreign Minister and MFA’s Director for African Affairs at + earliest appropriate opportunity. + + For Rabat: In making your démarche, you should stress importance + of GOM’s continued cooperation with + Implementation Committee. (As you know, Congressional Committee are + actively engaged in considering foreign assistance levels and + debating the Moroccan program with renewed focus on the Western + Sahara.) + + In discussions with host governments, Embassies should avoid any + indication that we are aware of upcoming Ouko trip (reftel F). + + Eagleburger +
+ +
+ 401. Editorial Note +

King Hassan II of Morocco made a + state visit to the United States, May 19–22, 1982, during which he + discussed bilateral and regional issues, such as the status of the + Western Saharan conflict and the proposed Organization of African Unity + referendum, with United States officials. See Documents 205 and 206.

+
+
+ 402. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820319–0786. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, + Casablanca, Nouakchott, and Paris. + + 4691. + + Rabat, June 18, 1982, 0915Z + + + + SUBJECT + Berm in Western Sahara Completed—Or Is It? + + + + (LOU) With the announcement that the “berm” (the earthen wall + which GOM has been building in + southern Morocco and the Sahara) was completed between Boucraa and + Boujdor on June 12, Hassan + II sent a laudatory letter to General Ahmed Dlimi, Commander of Moroccan + forces in southern Morocco and the Sahara.In a May 14 memorandum, the CIA reported: “The seven-year old + ground war over the Western Sahara is virtually at a standstill. + The tides of military fortune do not shift as freely as they + once did because Morocco’s recently completed defense + perimeter—an earthen wall called a ‘berm’—has imposed a new and + more static military strategy” that the Agency contended would + make a conclusive battlefield victory “elusive.” (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco + 04/18/1982–04/20/1983) “We are happy”, the King said, “to + see that our officers and valiant soldiers have completed this work + over the past months with exemplary courage and resolution.” + + (LOU) With the reported completion of this section of the berm, + the Moroccans claim that the Tan-Tan—Boujdour “axis” is now fully + protected from Polisario incursions. The area involved is therefore + reportedly open to unhindered movement of people and goods. + + (C) Comment: The efficacy of the + system of berms protecting the “useful Sahara” has surprised once + skeptical Western observers. GOM, + however, has not publicly addressed the inconsistency between + protecting the relatively small section of the Sahara which it deems + “useful” and the recent statement by FonMin + Boucetta that Morocco “will + not give up one inch” + of the Sahara. Furthermore, we understand that in spite of the + public announcements cited above, the Boucraa-Boujdor section of the + berm is not yet complete: 15 kilometers of earthworks for which + completion has been claimed are not yet in place; and no mines, + radar, barbed wire, or observation posts have yet been constructed + along the entire segment. End comment. + + Reed +
+
+ 403. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820441–0833. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis + Ababa, London, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Paris, Oran, Rabat, Tunis, and + USUN. + + 3429. + + Algiers, August 25, 1982, 1255Z + + +

For Asst Sec Veliotes from + Chargé. Subject: Algerian Policy Towards the Sahara in the Aftermath of + Tripoli. Refs: A. [less than 1 line not + declassified] B. [less than 1 line not + declassified] C. [less than 1 line not + declassified].

+ + + C—Entire text. + + During a recent talk with MFA, + Secretary General Azzout, dealing mainly with other subjects, I + asked Azzout what he thought the effect would be of the disarray at + the OAU SummitReference is to the abortive OAU summit scheduled for August + 5–8, which was canceled after a quorum failed to attend. See + footnote 3, Document 17. + on the search for a Sahara settlement. Azzout reflected a bit (he is + so new on the job that canned policy does not leap immediately to + mind) and gave me what I believe is an honest answer. He said all + Algeria’s efforts are focused on trying to restore unity within the + OAU. He found it hard to + believe that there would be real movement on the Sahara in the + Implementation Committee or any place else before a summit took + place healing the wounds of Tripoli. + + Starting from this kernel of Algerian policy, it may be useful to + examine the concrete interests that the GOA is now, and probably will be pursuing, in the wake + of the Tripoli meetings. The main threads would seem as follows: + + Algeria’s overriding interest has got to be to rebuild its + influence in Africa (and it follows among the non-aligned), + given the fact that it is viewed by many Africans of all persuasions as a + major culprit in causing the troubles that beset the OAU. Algeria has brought on + itself this disfavor by its fervent and dogmatic support of + SDAR admission + into the OAU at Addis Ababa + and Tripoli. It is not to be thought that in pursuing its + interest in African unity (or put another way, the assertion + of Algerian influence in Africa) Algeria will abandon its + position on SDAR + admission. At least it will never admit it has abandoned + it. + + Algeria went to the lengths it did in pressing SDAR admission for + several reasons, the dominant reason is unquestionably a + determination to maintain Algerian control over the + Polisario and not allow it to slip into waiting Libyan + hands. Thus Algeria’s total inflexibility on the SDAR issue at Tripoli, + which led purposefully to the summit’s failure, stemmed + directly from Algerian-Libyan rivalry. That rivalry of + course encompasses much more than control of the Polisario: + It is based on a profound distrust of Qadhafi’s territorial + ambitions and radical Islamic beliefs by a pragmatic and + basically conservative military regime. (It is a regime, of + course, which sees radical Third World rhetoric as a natural + adjunct of its pursuit of influence internationally and of + security at home.) + + Interestingly, one objective which Algeria has pursued + with great consistency under Bendjedid is to maintain as normal relations + with Libya as are possible given the two countries’ sharply + conflicting interests. Algeria maintains that it is much + better able to influence Libya if business-like relations + exist, and cites as evidence its important role in getting + Qadhafi out of + Chad. [less than 1 line not + declassified], we understand that after Foreign + Minister Ibrahimi had + given the coup de grace to the summit at the preceding + Foreign Ministers’ meeting, President Bendjedid spent five days + at the doomed summit buttering up Qadhafi—to the point that + relations between the two countries are again on an even + keel. + + + If control over the Polisario is a dominant Algerian concern (and + SDAR admission a means to + that end), what are the implications for Algerian post-Tripoli + policy on the Western Sahara conflict? First, as implied by + Secretary General Azzout, a serious effort to move towards a + diplomatic settlement seems momentarily on the back burner. (This + despite the fact that we believe such a settlement is the only kind + Algeria sees as realistically possible.) Second, all indications + point to an effort to keep the lid on the Polisario militarily. + There is no evidence that Algeria has provided sophisticated + equipment to the Polisario in recent months. In fact, recent + intelligence indicates that Polisario leaders are becoming restive + under the lack of Algerian guidance and direction in the + post-Tripoli period (ref A). In short, it would seem that the + Algerians believe they have their work sufficiently cut out for them + in Africa without stimulating a Polisario dust-up with Morocco. + Finally, in the + consultations related to another effort to convene an OAU summit, we doubt that Algeria will + again press SDAR admission to + the point of a breakdown—so long as the venue is other than + Tripoli. + + Comment: It is ironic that at Tripoli Algeria should have helped + achieve U.S. (and Moroccan) objectives because of its distrust of + Libya while at the same time pursuing a policy diametrically opposed + to ours on the question of SDAR admission. U.S. and Algerian interest clearly + converge at important points even though the rhetoric remains far + apart. This paradox obtains on matters other than the Western + Sahara: In Lebanon, for example, the public Algerian line vigorously + opposes U.S. policy, yet by accepting a large contingent of PLO combatants the GOA contributed to the success of the + Habib Mission. There are + of course many areas of convergence between U.S. and Algeria which + are more straight-forward, one of the most important being the + recent breakthroughs in LNG + negotiations. If the Department is of the view (as we are) that + immediate progress towards a Sahara settlement is not a vital U.S. + interest, we conclude that the time is ripe for initiatives to + cement and improve U.S.-Algerian relations.) + + Lorenz +
+
+ 404. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820617–0630, D820577–0284. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis for + Reed. Drafted by + Schneider; cleared by McFarlane, McManaway, Robinson (S/S–O), + and Mayhew (DOD/ISA); approved + by Veliotes. Sent for + information Immediate to Tunis, Algiers, CINCEUR, and DOD. + + 313691. + + Washington, November 7, 1982, 0145Z + + +

For Ambassador from Veliotes. + Subject: Visits by Senior U.S. Military Officials to Western Sahara.

+ + + (C) Entire text. + + I understand that King Hassan may intend to invite General Smith + to visit El Aaiun in Western Sahara following the General’s + observation of the coming joint military exercise. General Smith (or + any other officer present in connection with the exercise) should + not rpt not make such a visit to the Western Sahara. Such action + would be read as indicating U.S. military involvement in the Western + Sahara in association with + Morocco. Not only would this be an unnecessary provocation in our + relations with Algeria but also, whatever King Hassan’s intention, + it would damage the basis for U.S.-Moroccan relations. Important + elements in the Congress, on which we are dependent for assistance + to Morocco, would strenuously object to policies they would infer + from the visit. Please assure that this USG position is strictly applied at the time of the + coming exercise.In telegram 8406 from + Rabat, November 8, the Embassy reported: “The Moroccans were + unhappy not to be able to make their case—which they believe is + a good one—but we have explained to our hosts and our + distinguished visitors the policy problem of having visits and + briefings take place during the joint exercises.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820607–0963, D820578–0533) + + Shultz +
+
+ 405. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + YugoslaviaSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830002–0611. Secret. Drafted by Fairchild; cleared by + Ann Korky (NEA/AFN) and George + Humphrey (EUR/EEY); approved by + John Davis (EUR/EE). Sent for + information to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lagos, + Lusaka, and USUN. + + 160. + + Washington, January 3, 1983, 1705Z + + + + SUBJECT + US and the OAU. + + + Ref: + Belgrade 10008.In telegram 10008 from + Belgrade, December 27, 1982, the Embassy reported that in + private conversations with Yugoslav diplomats “a surprising + number of African countries are advancing the Libyan contention + that the USG is exploiting + OAU internal differences in + order to get at Qadhafi.” The Embassy therefore requested + “background information for use with Yugoslavs and African + diplomats” in reply to charges. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D820668–0934) + + + + Secret—Entire text + + The following paragraphs (3–5) contain background information + requested reftel. Para 6 offers guidance for your conversations with + Yugoslav and African interlocutors. + + The OAU, Africa’s 19 year old + political body, is currently experiencing a severe organizational + crisis. It is divided over the issues of membership in the + organization for the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR—the political wing of the + Polisario) and the unsuccessful bid in August by Qadhafi to become OAU Chairman. While we were obviously not pleased at + the prospect of Qadhafi’s + chairmanship (which would have been his by tradition as host for the + 1982 OAU Summit meeting had a + quorum been present in Tripoli), we also believed that any overt + action to sabotage that meeting would have been counterproductive. + We did speak often, however, to the issue of the Western Sahara, + noting our support of last year’s OAU peace plan involving a referendum. Seating the + SDAR as a “member state” + of the OAU—which occurred by virtue + of the arbitrary decision of the Secretary General at a February + Foreign Ministers meetingSee footnote 2, Document 396.—is + clearly incompatible with such a plan. Our corridor lobbying on the + Western Sahara at that meeting eventually contributed to the + evaporation of a quorum, which subsequently led to a number of + anti-U.S. comments by some members on our “meddling” in OAU affairs. In August there were + enough OAU members who either + agreed with our logic on the Western Sahara or who disliked + Qadhafi sufficiently to + prevent the two-thirds quorum required by the OAU Charter to hold a summit meeting. + Perhaps because of the February events or “normal” suspicions about + the unseen American hand, we were accused by several member states + (mostly the radicals) of having sabotaged the Tripoli Summit. + + Our policy has been characterized by carefully limited involvement + with the OAU per se and support for + the OAU’s earlier peace plan for + the Western Sahara, which is focussed on a ceasefire followed by a + referendum. This policy served a number of purposes up to now: (a) + it kept the pot boiling on the issue which was the most effective + yet indirect means of frustrating Qadhafi’s plan to become OAU Chairman, thus denying Qadhafi an institutional basis for inserting himself + into African problems in which the OAU Chairman might conceivably be given a role; (b) it + preserved our relationship with and interests in Morocco; (c) it + allowed us to maintain a noninterference posture toward the OAU, which deflated potential + criticism and kept us on good terms with a number of African states + and leaders whose help is vital to us on important issues like the + Namibia/Angola negotiations.Documentation on the negotiations on Namibia and Angola is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + XXV, Southern Africa, 1981–1984, and Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, + 1985–1988. + + Clearly shocked at the ongoing disunity in the organization, the + vast majority of members—on both sides of the SDAR issue—appeared to favor + holding a summit in November to reunite the OAU. They were also apparently willing to pay the price + of holding the summit in Tripoli and having Qadhafi as chairman. A pre-summit + ministerial meeting was eventually called for November 15 in Tripoli + to make preparations for a November 23–26 summit. The major stumbling block to + holding a summit seemed to have been removed since both the + Polisario and Algeria agreed that the SDAR would not attend these meetings. “Tripoli II” was + also a failure, as was its August predecessor, but the issue which + blocked a quorum in November was which Chadian delegation to seat: + that of the actual government of Hissène + Habré or that of the Libyan-backed former President + Oueddeye Goukouni. In the end virtually the same group of moderates + aligned earlier against the SDAR seating refused to participate in the November + meetings because Libyan-led radicals held out for not seating any + Chadian delegation. + + Our public position on the OAU + can be summarized as follows: + + The U.S. has always supported and continues to support the + OAU as African’s + principal political organization. + + We believe it has made many positive contributions to + peace and stability in Africa, and has the potential to make + further contributions. + + The U.S. actively supported the OAU peacekeeping effort in Chad. + + We believe that the OAU + Implementation Committee’s peace plan for the Western + Sahara, founded on a ceasefire and a referendum, offers the + best hope for resolving that conflict. + + The U.S. continues to believe that Qadhafi, because of his + well known adventurism throughout the world and his active + destabilization efforts against his African neighbors,In telegram 45276 to the OAU Collective and + multiple recipients, February 17, the Department + reported: “Following the Tripoli II failure, Qadhafi vowed to + increase his assistance to the Polisario. The inventory + of tanks and other conventional weaponry in Polisario + hands has, in fact, increased over the past several + months, and most of it probably comes from Libya.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830092–0370) is an + inappropriate spokesman for the continent. We also + recognize, however, that the choices of a summit site and a + chairman for the OAU are + for the membership of that organization to decide. + + We regret the current state of disunity within the OAU and hope that responsible + efforts to restore the unity lost twice at Tripoli will be + successful. + + The U.S. did not lobby anyone in an effort to prevent a + quorum at Tripoli. We believe that the failure to produce a + quorum resulted directly from the contentious issues which + split the OAU membership + and from many members’ doubts about a Qadhafi + chairmanship. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 406. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no + D number]. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. + + 961. + + Algiers, March 6, 1983, 1615Z + + +

Dept please repeat to the following posts for info: Nairobi, Nouakchott, + Paris, Rabat. Subject: Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara. Ref: State + 59329.Telegram 59329 to Algiers, March + 4, repeated telegram 1746 from Rabat, March 3, which contains a + record of Walters’s meeting + with King Hassan, who reported on his meeting with Bendjedid. According to the + Embassy, Hassan “told the Algerians that only two real problems + divided them: the Western Sahara and the Saharoui people. With + respect to the former, the flag and the stamps must be Moroccan, + everything else is negotiable. As for the latter, Hassan is prepared + to accept the results of a referendum. He expects to win easily; but + will honor a loss. He could not accept a small Saharoui state; but + suggested the two Saharoui factions meet to reconcile their + positions, thereby preventing a loss of face for anyone in a + referendum. Chadli promised to study the suggestion.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N830002–0210)

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + We appreciated receiving repeat reftel which throws additional + light on the Bendjedid-Hassan Feb. 26 summit during which the two + sides reportedly had several hours of discussion. + + Frankly, we wonder how King Hassan squares the position he + reportedly outlined to Bendjedid with his formal acceptance of the OAU Implementation Committee’s + resolution providing for a referendum of self-determination, with + the options being independence or integration with Morocco. + + It would appear that King Hassan’s statement that the flag and the + stamps must be Moroccan together with his rejection of an + independent Saharan state contravene both the letter and the spirit + of the OAU decisions. + + We have noted the King’s suggestion that the Polisario hold talks + with the Moroccan-backed Saharan group—presumably within the context + of a Moroccan state—and the reported Algerian promise to consider + the proposal. Since Algeria maintains that the Western Sahara is not + a bilateral Algerian-Moroccan problem, this may turn out to be the + face-saving mechanism, if the Polisario is willing to accept the + ground rules. In any case, Algeria can be expected publicly to + support the principle of self- determination as it is contained in + various OAU and UN resolutions. + + Finally, we would agree with the comment of the Moroccan official + who said it was much more difficult for Bendjedid to agree to the summit than for Hassan. It + means that Bendjedid and + company are putting + Algerian interests in better relations with their Maghreb neighbors + ahead of their support for Polisario aspirations. As to the question + of “why now” we are tempted to see opposition to Qadhafi’s troublemaking in addition + to Saudi and Tunisian peacemaking efforts.In telegram 1122 from Algiers, March 14, the + Embassy reported that Polisario official spokesman Ould Salek had four + conversations with the Spanish Ambassador to Algeria. Salek reported that the + “Polisario is extremely bitter over the Bendjedid-Hassan summit + but vows to fight on to total victory.” The Spanish Government, + the Embassy commented, was “also worried over possible Polisario + attacks on Spanish fishing vessels off the Western Sahara coast + and the possibility that the Polisario might resort to terrorism + in Spain.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830140–0329) + + Newlin +
+
+ 407. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830327–0872. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to Paris. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Conakry, + Djibouti, Khartoum, Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Rabat. + + 1972. + + Addis Ababa, June 9, 1983, 0820Z + + +

Paris for Assistant Secretary Crocker. Subj: OAU + Summit: Success From the Jaws of Failure and Its Implications. Ref: + Addis Ababa 1967.In telegram 1967 from + Addis Ababa, June 8, the Embassy stated that the 19th “OAU Summit + convened at a few minutes before eight p.m. Addis time with all + delegate seats filled except Libya’s, and with no representation or + seating arrangement for SDAR.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830326–0156)

+ + + (C—Entire text.) + + Summary: Sekou Toure is the summit’s unsung hero (though it could + have turned out differently) because he rallied opposition to the + seating of the Polisario and carried the day. But the choice that + Mengistu and other + radicals made when they decided to break with Qadhafi over the SDAR seating issue has important + implications.In telegram 1926 from + Addis Ababa, June 6, the Embassy reported: “The Ethiopians have + clamped tight control over the Polisario and the Goukouni + delegation. Polisario Foreign Minister Hakim told reporters on + June 4 that he would hold a press conf at the Hilton morning + June 5. The Ethiopians canceled the press conference but a + Polisario rep told reporters that the SDAR Chief of State would + make a declaration on arrival later same day; but when he + arrived, the Polisario leader was given a bouquet of flowers and + hustled off to his limousine.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830319–0242) + We may not necessarily + have an easier time of it with Mengistu, but the chairmanship of the OAU should make him more cautious + toward his neighbors. And he has shown that where he sees clear + evidence of benefit to himself and to Ethiopia he is ready to cast + off the more extreme version of radicalism. End summary. + + The OAU Summit opening last + evening can claim place among the finest examples of cliffhangers, a + classic case study in the snatching of success from the jaws of + failure.In telegram 1936 from Addis + Ababa, June 7, the Embassy reported: “The OAU Summit has, as expected, run + into trouble over the SDAR + seating issue, but the trouble has been compounded by Qadhafi’s unexpected attendance + which has stiffened the SDAR’s insistence on being seated. Moi has formed a Group of 21 to + try to come up with a solution. A pall of pessimism has begun to + form over the summit but few here are yet ready to write it off + as failed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830321–0505) When the diplomatic + corps, journalists and mid-level delegation members arrived at + Africa Hall late in the afternoon of June 8, the universal + expectation was still that the pro and anti Polisario blocs were + headed for a showdown. Conjecture centered around whether the + Guinean led moderate bloc, which was still at that moment meeting at + the Ghion Hotel, would be able to hold on to enough members to + prevent a quorum’s being reached. + + How the Polisario was brought to the decision to withdraw from the + summit, who played what role and what deals were struck, will + probably become clearer when delegations return home next week and + recount their experiences, and when we have the opportunity to talk + with some of the African actors here. The result will be of more + than strictly historical interest. It may tell us a lot about what + we can expect from the various parties further down the road. What + can be said now with reasonable certainty is that the shaping of the + outcome began on the afternoon of June 7 but things did not actually + come together until fairly late in the day of June 8, and that the + Committee of Nine composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, + Congo, Uganda, Cape Verde, Mauritania and Zambia played a major + role. By its composition this group was well placed to talk reason + to the Polisario. A different turn of events could have made Sekou + Toure the villain of the summit and dashed hopes for a Conakry + meeting. As it turned out, he is the summit’s unsung hero. By + rallying the opposition to the Polisario he made the majority face + up to the prospect of a split in the OAU if it continued to insist on the Polisario’s being + seated, and he carried the day. + + The stunning humiliation delivered to Qadhafi by the collective African leadership when + faced with the choice between his insistence on seating of the + Polisario and the possible break up of the + OAU is a lesson that will be + remembered for a long time in all quarters.In telegram 2038 from Addis Ababa, June 14, the + Embassy commented: “But the success of the 19th Summit has + heavily mortgaged the 20th which without serious progress toward + settlement of the Western Sahara dispute (and for most, progress + means a referendum) faces uncertain prospects at best.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830337–0825) There was probably at work here + a kind of collective survival mechanism. Almost everyone realized + that this was the OAU’s last chance + and thus the course down which Qadhafi wanted to direct the organization meant + likely, if not certain, disaster. But some interesting choices had + to be made by the radicals, in particular Mengistu. At Mengistu’s dinner for delegation + heads June 7, there were dour mutterings among members of the + Egyptian delegation that Mengistu, faced with choice between the interests of + the OAU and his friendship with + Qadhafi, had chosen + Qadhafi. This conclusion + turned out to be premature. We do not know yet what role Mengistu played in the talks that + led to the Polisario’s stepping aside—probably it was + significant—but had he decided to give Qadhafi his support the outcome would very likely + have been entirely different. Mengistu had good reason to do what he did. He had + staked a lot of prestige, both domestically and internationally, on + a successful summit, and a deadlock would have hurt him. His + hesitation to split with Qadhafi is probably what caused the struggle that + preceded the convening to become so protracted and so bitter. + Mengistu did not want to + part ways with his Libyan ally if any other solution were possible. + It was probably only when other avenues were foreclosed that he was + ready to make his choice. + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+ Korn +
+ +
+ 408. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + EthiopiaSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830362–0425. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Fairchild + (AF/I); cleared in draft by + Kenneth Scott (AF/W) and Sebastian; + approved by Bishop. Sent for + information Priority to Rabat, Algiers, and USUN. + + 177093. + + Washington, June 24, 1983, 2138Z + + + + SUBJECT + OAU and Western Sahara + Problem. + + + Ref: + Addis Ababa 2137.In telegram 2137 + from Addis Ababa, June 22, the Embassy reported: “OAU Interim + Secretary General Peter + Onu considers the Western Sahara the most urgent + issue facing the OAU and is + taking a serious and apparently constructive approach to it.” + Onu also “asks that + the USG encourage Morocco to + agree to meet with the Polisario in the aim of preparing the + ground for a cease-fire and referendum.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830355–0599) + + + + Department believes that acting on Onu’s suggestion that U.S. weigh in with Morocco in + favor of continued informal talks with Polisario would not be + appropriate or effective at this time. GOM public position remains opposed to such talks, even + though it is well known secret that such talks have occurred. Our + assessment is that future of direct GOM-Polisario contacts is + extremely delicate at this point, especially in wake of OAU Summit resolution,The text of the resolution, which called for + “direct negotiations” between Morocco and the Polisario, is in + telegram 2019 from Addis Ababa, June 11. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830333–0593) but that contacts will probably continue. + GOM has always been extremely + prickly on this subject, even with U.S. interlocutors. GOM is also well aware of often stated + U.S. position favoring cease fire followed by referendum and that + action responsibility should remain with OAU Implementation Committee, in accordance with 1981 + Nairobi Agreement. We thus must pass on Onu’s suggestion at this time. + + Embassy is therefore requested to thank Onu for his intervention on this + issue and to explain along above lines why we are not prepared to + act on it at this time. Embassy should also tell Onu that USG values his views as acting Sec Gen and as veteran + observer of African scene, and that we trust that our less than our + disinclination to comply with his suggestion on this occasion will + not inhibit his offering us his thoughts on this and other issues in + the future. + + Dam +
+ +
+ 409. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Hill) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Africa, + Africa General (07/01/1983–07/30/1983). Confidential. A stamped + notation indicates the memorandum was received in the White House + Situation Room at 11:51 p.m. on July 20. + + + Washington, July 20, 1983 + + + + SUBJECT + Letter to The President from Polisario Chief Mohamed + Abdelaziz + +

We transmit for the record a letter addressed to President Reagan from the “President” of the + “Saharan Democratic Arab Republic,” the Polisario “government.” It was + delivered to our Embassy in Algiers June 27. We understand that the + Polisario addressed similar messages to all the permanent UNSC members.

+

The letter is artfully crafted to assert for the SDAR the status of a fully accepted + entity. In fact, the administrative action taken by the Organization of + African Unity Secretariat to seat the SDAR as a member state precipitated an 18 month crisis + during which the OAU was unable to + convene a summit. The crisis was resolved only last month when the + Polisario’s representatives agreed not to attend the Addis summit.See footnote 2, + Document 407.

+

Both the fact of the letter and its text attempt to prejudge the outcome + of the referendum on the future of the Western Sahara that Moroccan King + Hassan has accepted and we support. The letter distorts the force of the + Western Sahara resolution adopted at the Addis Summit,See footnote 3, Document + 408. blurring the resolution’s “urging” that the + parties to the conflict (Morocco and the Polisario, not the SDAR) enter into direct negotiations + on a ceasefire with its “direction” that the Implementation Committee + resume its charge to organize the referendum that is to follow the + ceasefire.

+

Any response or acknowledgment by the USG of this letter would tend to grant a degree of + acceptance or recognition of the status which the author claims for + himself and his “government” that would conflict with our longstanding + support for the OAU’s + ceasefire/referendum approach to resolving this conflict. Consequently, + we recommend there be no reply.

+ Charles + HillCovey signed his name above + Hill’s typed + signature. + + Executive Secretary + + + Attachment + Letter From President of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic + Abdelaziz to President ReaganNo classification + marking. Printed from an unofficial translation prepared in the + Division of Language Services. All brackets are in the + original. + + + Hauza, June 25, 1983 + + Excellency: + +

The war between the Saharan people and the Kingdom of Morocco, + sparked by Moroccan military aggression against our country, is one + of the most serious crises that the world is facing at this + time.

+

At its 19th summit conference held June 6–11 at Addis Ababa, the + Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), to which the Saharan + Democratic Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco belong, made an + important decision to end this conflict.

+

You are surely aware, Excellency, that Africa’s major concern is to + spare our continent and the world the dangers that this war + represents in terms of undermining peace, and to ensure respect for + the sacred principle of the people’s right to self-determination and + independence, a right elevated by the U.N. and O.A.U. Charters to + the level of a standard of jus cojens.

+

Resolution 104 (AHG XIX) takes a position both on the grounds for the + conflict and the appropriate manner of settling it. The + participation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the + Kingdom of Morocco in the decision-making process made it possible + for this resolution to be unanimously adopted.

+

The emphasis placed on a referendum by the Saharan people for free, + general, and just self-determination, on terms and conditions that + must be negotiated directly by the two parties to the conflict, the + Polisario Front and Morocco, clearly indicates the O.A.U.’s desire + to contain this conflict within its natural, just, and true + dimensions as a case of decolonization of an African country that is + the victim of an expansionist neighboring State.

+

The requirement by the 19th O.A.U. summit conference that the two + parties to the conflict enter into direct negotiations before + December 1983 with a view to a cease-fire and to establish the terms + and conditions of the referendum for self-determination and + independence indicates the path chosen by the O.A.U. to settle the + conflict.

+

The firmness and clarity of Resolution 104 (AHG XIX) express the + unanimous desire of the African States to eliminate the difficulties + that have been + deliberately created by Morocco to impede O.A.U. action to ensure, + in conformity with the sacred principles of its Charter, a + political, peaceful, and permanent settlement to the war between the + Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco while + respecting the people’s right to self-determination and + independence.

+

The motives that induced me to send you this letter are based first + on the fact that the United States, as a permanent member of the + Security Council, has a great international responsibility to + promote peace, stability, and respect for the sacred principles of + the U.N. and O.A.U. Charters, and also on my conviction that you + could intervene personally in this situation to ensure the + implementation of Resolution 104 in conformity with the will of + Africa.

+

Insofar as my government is concerned, I can assure you of its + complete willingness to proceed immediately with the implementation + of this resolution, for any delay or evasiveness in this respect + would seriously complicate and impede the African peace plan.

+

In addition, we avail ourselves of this opportunity to warn Morocco + against any attitude that might hinder or impede the implementation + of this plan in any way.

+

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of our high consideration.

+

Hauza (Territories liberated by the Saharan Democratic Arab + Republic),

+

June 25, 1983

+ Mohamed + AbdelazizPrinted from a copy that indicates Abdelaziz signed the + original. + + President of the Saharan Democratic Arab + Republic + + Secretary General of the Polisario Front + + [Presidential stamp] + +
+ +
+ 410. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830435–0385. Confidential. Drafted by Jeffrey Davidow (AF/I); cleared by Thomas Williams + (AF/W), Sebastian, and Bishop; approved by + Crocker. Sent for + information to Lagos, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Cairo, Conakry, Dar es + Salaam, Dakar, Freetown, Khartoum, Nairobi, Paris, Rabat, and USUN. + + 214438. + + Washington, July 30, 1983, 2257Z + + + + SUBJECT + Crocker-Yaker Meeting on Western Sahara. + + + + (C) Entire text. + + Following is summary of Western Sahara portion of memcon of July + 29 conversation between AF Assistant + Secretary Crocker and + Algerian Ambassador Yaker. + + Yaker cited King’s speech + of July 9In telegram 5547 from Rabat, + July 15, the Embassy reported: “Morocco is now fully engaged in + a display of unanimity on the Western Sahara question. The + campaign to put forward a united front received new impetus from + the King’s July 9 address, in which he announced postponement of + parliamentary elections to focus on the referendum on the + Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D830404–0347) and large scale + military operations triggered by Moroccan attacksReference is to the July 10 Polisario attack at + M’Sied, near Tan-Tan in Morocco proper. In telegram 1731 from + Casablanca, July 15, the Consulate reported that it “was the + most significant military action in the south in well over a + year.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830404–0470) as “showing Morocco + in contradiction with spirit and letter” of Addis OAU Saharan resolution. He urged the + U.S. to use its influence on Morocco in favor of compliance with + OAU resolution.See footnote 3, Document + 408. He noted in passing, that American + political, diplomatic, and military support for the King fueled the + war. Hassan’s July 9 statement, Yaker asserted, prejudges referendum thus voiding it + of its content. This and Moroccan military activities creating + increasingly “risky” situation which could expand, drawing in other + countries, transforming conflict into an East-West confrontation, + and ruining opportunities for regional cooperation. Though claiming + not to speak for Polisario, Yaker stated his belief that once good faith + negotiations began “between the parties and with help of + Implementation Committee” the level of violence would seriously + diminish. + + During the course of the eighty-minute conversation Crocker, accompanied by AF + DAS + Bishop and NEA/AFN + Peter Sebastian, countered + that it is not Morocco which is responsible for the current fighting. Those with + influence on Polisario should make that organization realize that + current attacks make it more difficult for the OAU process to proceed. We are not + about to press the King to participate in a negotiating process + which both he and the U.S. have already welcomed as providing for a + resolution of the conflict. We tend to read the King’s recent speech + as designed for the many audiences which he, as any statesman, must + address. It could of course be read simply as an expression of + Moroccan confidence that the referendum will produce a result + favorable to its interests. In our view, the ball is in the court of + the OAU Implementation Committee + whose mandate we support. + + Yaker agreed that the + OAU Committee could play an + important role in indirect encounters between Morocco and the + Polisario to clear away the underbrush. But indirect talks, he + insisted, could only be useful in the initial stages of negotiation. + Unfortunately, GOA has yet to see + Morocco take steps to begin process of implementing Addis OAU resolution. Crocker responded that pragmatism + is key. Progress will require compromise. If Polisario objective is + limited to form, viz., to appear as co-equal party, progress will be + difficult. Yaker closed with + reiteration that Morocco needs to begin to talk to other party. + GOA cannot negotiate for + Polisario but desires to help and remains committed to OAU solution and process of + rapprochement with Morocco. + + The meeting was a cordial one. Crocker invited Yaker to meet with him again next week to continue + the conversation and to discuss Chad. The brief exposition of + Algeria’s position on Chad which Yaker provided in the July 29 meeting seemed rigidly + wrong-headed. + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 411. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830440–0544. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to + Algiers, Casablanca, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. + + 3624. + + Nouakchott, August 3, 1983, 1449Z + + + + SUBJECT + The Sahara Issue—Mauritanian Views. + + + Ref: + A. Rabat 5894,In telegram 5894 from + Rabat, July 28, the Embassy reported: “During the past three + weeks there have been sustained military operations by the + Polisario within Morocco. The attacks, centered in the area of + M’Seid (inside Morocco proper) appear to signal a change in + Polisario military strategy. Moroccan policy to date has been to + meet all attacks firmly, but not to counter-attack on the ground + or allow the conflict to interfere with the referendum process + or long-term rapprochement with Algeria. On the other hand, + current Moroccan willingness to view continuing rapprochement + and Algerian acquiescence, if not open support, for Polisario + operations as separate tracks could be eroded if fighting is + prolonged at present levels.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830430–0158) + B. Algiers 3188,In telegram 3188 from + Algiers, July 31, the Embassy reported: “Algeria remains firmly + committed to the process of rapprochement with Morocco, although + movement has stalled because of lack of progress in resolving + the Western Sahara conflict. GOA leaders were especially surprised by King + Hassan’s July 8 [9] speech which + reinforced the perception—shared by many in the OAU—that the King is basically + insincere concerning a genuine referendum of + self-determination.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435–0559) + C. Algiers 3189.In telegram 3189 from + Algiers, July 31, Newlin + wrote: “Reflecting on the above messages, I am struck by the + fact that there appears to be an articulated desire on the part + of both Hassan and Bendjedid to arrive at a compromise settlement + on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435–0561) + + + + (S) Entire text. + + Summary: As a participant with relatively little input but with a + potentially major stake in the outcome, Mauritania is watching + events in and around the Sahara with growing concern. In particular, + what is seen as Morocco’s hardening stance has dashed Mauritania’s + hopes for a near-term OAU-style solution. In this context, Chief of + State Haidalla urges the US to + reiterate forcefully its support for a settlement along Addis + guidelines. End summary. + + The thoughtful and perceptive analyses of developments in the + region contained in reftels arrived shortly after the Ambassador was + convoked by Haidalla for a brief meeting, sandwiched with difficulty + between other engagements, at which he discussed the same general + subject. For the GIRM, the Western + Sahara issue has long and understandably been the primary external + concern (with very significant internal aspects as well). Until + recently, there was a tendency to react with somewhat unrealistic + optimism to any indications of progress in the direction of a peaceful resolution. Thus + the February 26 meeting between Bendjedid and Hassan,See Document 19 in which both + the Saharan conflict and the resultant Moroccan-Algeria estrangement + were viewed as virtually resolved, kindled high hopes in Nouakchott. + (A series of high-level Algerian emissaries overcame Mauritania’s + initial fears that both it and the Polisario had been abandoned in + the process.) The GIRM’s quiet + elation, however, faded away as it became clear that nothing really + significant had occurred as far as the Sahara was concerned. The + process was restarted on the occasion of the OAU summit, which the GIRM initially seemed to believe had + removed all obstacles, a euphoria soon replaced by a growing fear + that things were waxing worse instead of better. In all of this, + Mauritania ceaselessly worries that its own interests might be + sacrificed to smooth the way for a settlement. + + In his meeting with the Ambassador, Haidalla expressed profound + disappointment and concern over what he described as Moroccan + intransigence. Until quite recently, he said, he had been hopeful + that the summit’s consensus resolution,See footnote 3, Document + 408. coming in the wake of the SDAR’s comportment at Addis, and + coupled with Algeria’s forthcoming position on bilateral issues, + would have been sufficient to convince Hassan that the best + interests of his nation and the entire region would be served by + accepting the recommendations. The advantages accruing to all the + peoples of the area were so compellingly obvious, he added, and the + cost of continuing the war so high, that he was taken completely + aback by the July 8 [9] statement. + + Haidalla said that Moroccan inflexibility had already produced the + one thing that everyone had hoped to avoid: renewed military + activity. No longer convinced that the path of diplomacy offered + much hope, the Polisario had felt obliged to remind Hassan that it + still has a military option. According to Haidalla, the attacks on + M’Seid were not a direct reaction to the July speech,In telegram 3267 from Algiers, August 6, the + Embassy reported: “According to a reliable Arab journalist who + met Aug. 3 with Polisario’s Algiers representative Ould Salek, Polisario is very + pessimistic on possibilities for peaceful resolution of the + conflict. Salek said King + Hassan has shown that he does not accept the most recent OAU Summit Resolution; in such + circumstances, the Polisario offensive at M’Sied is to make the + point that without negotiations, the war will continue.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830450–0545) but to the continuing evidence + of a Moroccan decision to ignore the summit resolutions almost from + the time of their issuance. The fact that the attacks took place + inside Morocco, he added, indicate that they are also a signal from + Algeria that the status quo is just as unacceptable as the announced + Moroccan position on future developments in the Sahara. + + + The situation is hopeless, Haidalla went on, if even those few + countries that are still able to discuss the issue with Hassan are + unable to persuade him to abandon a specious claim to territory + belonging to a group whose claims are recognized by almost the + entire world. He pointed out that the US has been one of the major contributors to Moroccan + economic development and military capabilities and has had a close + and productive relationship with Hassan since he came to the throne. + He urged that we seek to encourage the King to be pragmatic and + flexible on the Saharan issue and that we use our access to insure + that he is aware that we strongly support the OAU resolutions. + + The Ambassador reminded Haidalla that the US has continuously and publicly endorsed the position + adopted by the OAU on the Western + Sahara and had promptly announced its support of the decision + reached at Addis. Morocco is in no doubt whatsoever as to our policy + on the subject but, as a sovereign nation, makes its own decisions. + Haidalla said he only wished to suggest that “Hassan be fully aware + that virtually no one supports his position”. The Ambassador replied + that although the Sahara question is very important, it is only one + aspect of our very broad overall relationship with Morocco. + + Comment. The GIRM suspects Rabat + would be happier with a government in Nouakchott that tilted a + little more toward the Moroccan position. Haidalla has on occasion + indicated that he fears the Moroccan objective is considerably more + than just a similarity of views on various issues. In a French radio + interview, published July 26, responding to a question, how he + viewed challenges to Mauritanian existence Haidalla said, “as far as + I know, the existence of Mauritania has not been disputed except by + one of our neighbors”. This appears to be a reference to Morocco + and, however paranoid, seems to be a belief shared by many in the + leadership, who point to the failed coup of February 81 as a + concrete illustration of Rabat’s intentions.See Document + 3. + + Haidalla therefore sees a continuation of the impasse in the + Sahara as increasing the threat to his regime as well as the dangers + to the region. Nevertheless, he was also very evidently interested + in putting his observations on the situation in a positive light. He + agreed that if [it] hadn’t been in Algeria at the Maghreb summit, + they would have met and talked, and he reminded the Ambassador of + the July 10 speech in which he stated that the current lack of + diplomatic relations is a temporary aberration in brotherly ties. In + short, Haidalla knows he has to do his best to get along with the + King, but he sees little to work with either in the bilateral + context or, of perhaps far greater significance, in the Saharan + context. + + + On the latter issue, he was quite somber, giving the impression + that he has little hope that Hassan will change his announced + stance. He made only a passing reference to the US arms supply program, and did not + voice any criticism of our policy. He appeared to be very interested + in being reassured that the USG’s + position has not changed, even though he seems to believe that + Morocco itself has vitiated the OAU + process. + + Peck +
+
+ 412. Editorial Note +

September 11–16, 1983, Vice President George H.W. Bush visited North Africa to discuss + bilateral issues, the status of the Middle East peace negotiations, and + the conflict in Western Sahara. Bush visited Morocco September 11–13, Algeria September + 13–15, and Tunisia September 15–16 before departing for Yugoslavia. For + a record of his September 12 meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco, see Document 26. On September 14, Algerian Foreign + Minister Ahmed Ibrahimi gave + Bush “further details of + the Bendjedid-Hassan Feb 26 meeting and stressed Algeria’s desire to + find a peaceful solution” to the conflict in the Western Sahara. + (Telegram 3943 from Algiers, September 15; Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830534–0254) The subject of + the Western Sahara was not raised during Bush’s September 14 meeting with Algerian Prime Minister + Mohamed Abdelghani. A record + of that conversation is printed as Document 130. A record of his + September 15 meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali is printed as Document + 27. For the full text of Bush’s + statements, addresses, and remarks during the North African portion of + his trip, see Department of State Bulletin, + November 1983, pages 10–15.

+
+ +
+ 413. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830551–0573. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to Algiers, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, + Lagos, Paris, and Rabat. + + 3534. + + Addis Ababa, September 23, 1983, + 0833Z + + +

S/S/O please deliver to appropriate officers opening of business. + Subject: Western Sahara Implementation Committee Meeting Fails. Ref: (A) + Addis Ababa 3520,In telegram 3520 from + Addis Ababa, September 22, O’Neill reported that the “Ethiopian + Ambassador to Sudan, who is attending the Implementation Meeting on + the Sahara, told me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the + meetings have been adjourned. He said that the Moroccan delegation + would not talk to the Polisario either face-to-face or through + intermediaries. There is now some attempt to reinstitute a smaller + meeting but the Ambassador feels that this is highly unlikely.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D830548–0534) (B) Addis Ababa 3521.In telegram 3521 from Addis Ababa, September 22, + the Embassy reported: “The Moroccans almost from the beginning + stated that they were in Addis Ababa under the Nairobi OAU meeting guidelines. The other + members of the Implementation Committee stated that they were in + Addis Ababa for this meeting under the 19th OAU guidelines; the latter which requires negotiations + between Morocco and the Polisario. This was the first clash and was + the sign of troubles to come.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830550–0115)

+ + + (C—Entire text) + + The OAU Western Sahara + Implementation Committee meeting collapsed on the afternoon of + September 22nd after the Moroccan delegation refused either to sit + at the same table or in the same room, and some say in the same + building, with the Polisario delegation to negotiate over the + Western Sahara. + + From OAU sources, Tanzanian + diplomats and others we have the following sketchy outline of what + happened. OAU sources state that + the Moroccan delegation included a group of Saharans who, they said, + were competent to discuss the Western Sahara problem with the + Polisario. According to OAU + sources, the Polisario agreed to negotiate with the Moroccan + Saharans on the Western Sahara provided that the Moroccan delegation + would sit at the same table with the Polisario. The Moroccans + adamantly refused to do so. Tanzanian source did not provide such + detailed information but did confirm that Morocco refused to + negotiate in any way with the Polisario. + + According to OAU sources, Sekou + Toure tried to have documents presented by the various factions to + the Implementation Committee, which the Implementation Committee declined to + accept.In telegram 3554 from Addis + Ababa, September 25, O’Neill reported that as a result of + information “secured during a meeting at airport” that there + were “assurances given by Sékou + Touré’s Ambassador, in Addis Ababa, definitely + verbally and some say in written form, that Morocco would + negotiate with the Polisario. It was on this basis that the + meeting was called. The Moroccans vehemently deny that they gave + any such assurance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830555–0370) At this + point, a substantial majority of the Implementation Committee agreed + that Morocco was avoiding all OAU + agreements agreed to at the 19th OAU session. + + When Morocco remained adamant, Tanzania, Mali and Ethiopia pushed + for immediate adjournment and cancellation of further meetings. + Toure, Peter Onu and the + OAU Staff, plus some friends of + Morocco, tried to mount a salvage operation, but Nyerere’s departure + late afternoon of September 22nd squashed that option. By the + morning of September 23, the Sudanese, Malian and Tanzanian + delegations had left Addis Ababa with the remaining parties expected + to depart shortly. + + Comment: There is consternation at the OAU and puzzlement among diplomats in Addis Ababa why + the Moroccans would send a large delegation, led by the Crown + Prince, to say no to what was commonly believed to be a pre-arranged + face-saving situation for Morocco. Also, concern is already being + expressed in the African diplomatic community over prospects for the + 20th OAU summit conference in + Conakry. + + O’Neill +
+ +
+ 414. Article in the National Intelligence DailySource: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Maghreb 1983 + and 1984. Top Secret. [codeword not + declassified] + + + Washington, December 28, 1983 + + +

MOROCCO-ALGERIA-WESTERN SAHARA: The War Grinds On

+

The chances of a political resolution of the + eight-year-old war in Western Sahara, which were increased somewhat + by a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria earlier this year, + have diminished in recent months. As the deadline for an + OAU-sponsored referendum this month runs out, the disputants have + stiffened their positions. King Hassan remains under pressure to + find a solution to the conflict, however, and Algeria is anxious to + keep alive prospects for a settlement. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Hassan tacitly accepted an OAU + resolutionSee footnote 3, Document 408. last summer that named + Morocco and the Polisario Front as the parties to the conflict, but he + has steadfastly refused to hold public talks with the insurgents. [less than 4 lines not declassified]

+

In a recent letter to African heads of state, Hassan reaffirmed his + willingness to hold a referendum in Western Sahara. He insisted, + however, that the OAU first has to + arrange a cease-fire.No record of Hassan’s + letter has been found. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Algerian Position

+

During the past year, Algeria has begun to direct its policy in North + Africa away from confrontation with Morocco in an effort to promote + stability in the region. [handling restriction not + declassified] [less than 1 line not + declassified] has included a decision to seek a negotiated + settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. (S)

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] that Algeria + no longer favors an independent Saharan state because it could introduce + a new element of instability in the area. Instead, [less than 1 line not declassified] that the solution to the + Western Sahara problem could be found in some kind of confederation + scheme with Morocco and Mauritania.In + telegram 5414 from Algiers, December 9, the Embassy reported: “There + have been private indications Algeria is prepared to work for a + compromise of less than independence for the Sahrawis within the + context of the grand Maghreb ideal if Hassan will negotiate openly + with the Polisario.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D830726–0663) [less than 1 line not declassified] Algeria is willing to + assist in negotiations by “working on the Polisario.” [handling restriction not declassified]

+ +

Algerian President Bendjedid, + however, is constrained by the Army and other less conciliatory elements + in the government and by Algeria’s longstanding commitment to the + principle of self-determination for the territory. As a result, Algiers + will continue to support the Polisario’s position that Rabat deal + directly with the insurgents rather than through Algeria, as Hassan + would like. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

While the recent fifth party congress of the National Liberation Front + strengthened Bendjedid’s + authority, he is still unlikely to adopt policies that offend the + Army—his main power base. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

In any event, Algiers is unlikely to take any new initiatives in the next + several months. Among other things, the Algerians are increasingly + preoccupied with the presidential election to be held next month. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Other Pressures

+

African states are anxious to see progress in settling the conflict + before the OAU summit scheduled for May + in Conakry, Guinea. The interim Secretary General of the OAU says the Polisario leaders have agreed + not to attend a ministerial conference in February to avoid further + disrupting the organization. He expects, however, that the insurgents + will insist on attending the summit and claiming a seat.In telegram 4674 from Addis Ababa, December 9, + Korn reported: “Onu says + that in any event he expects the Polisario to stick to its pledge + not to attend the February 1984 OAU + Ministerial Meeting. The Polisario will insist on attending the + summit, and Sekou Touré may choose to postpone the summit—otherwise + scheduled for May—rather than have to face a decision on this + issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D830726–0904) [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Morocco’s moderate African supporters, who thus far have gone along with + Rabat’s insistence that the Polisario not be seated at the OAU, are restive over Morocco’s position + on implementing the OAU resolution. If + the Polisario’s self-declared “republic”—recognized by 27 of the OAU’s 50 members—is admitted as a member + state at the summit, only a few other members would be likely to follow + Rabat in its probable walkout. [handling restriction + not declassified]

+

Rabat’s serious financial difficulties, which are caused in part by the + cost of the war, may eventually add to the pressures on Hassan to + compromise. Although acquisition of Western Sahara remains a popular + cause among Moroccans, the continuation of economic austerity measures + could cause political problems for the King. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Aid from Saudi Arabia, which earlier had helped offset military expenses, + has dropped off over the past two years. In recent months, the Saudis reportedly have + [less than 1 line not declassified] + encouraged all parties to seek a solution to the conflict in the + interest of regional unity. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Military Outlook

+

Polisario insurgents are likely to continue the sporadic but + well-organized military attacks they began in July in the hope of + forcing Morocco into direct, public negotiations. Their tactics have + included efforts to breach the Moroccan defensive barrier, but they do + not have the ability to hold territory actively defended by Moroccan + forces. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The guerrillas also probably will increase harassing attacks with the + intention of luring Moroccan forces outside the barrier. In addition, + they may continue efforts to shoot down Moroccan aircraft, which + frequently attack Polisario camps in Western Sahara. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

The recent start of Moroccan construction to extend the barrier to the + Mauritanian border will further frustrate the Polisario and reinforce + its determination to fight on. Without increased support, however, the + Polisario is unlikely to be able to put enough military pressure on + Morocco to force it to compromise any time soon.In telegram 10491 from Rabat, December 22, the + Embassy stated “some 2,000 Moroccan military drawn from two brigades + moved into the Amgala area on December 21 assembling over the past + weeks at Bou Craa. Their mission is to secure the area in order to + extend the berm and enclose the Amgala region.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D830755–0432) [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Algeria probably will not increase substantially the Polisario’s military + capabilities or loosen the controls that inhibit the insurgents’ access + to Moroccan territory. On the other hand, the Algerians are likely to + have approved heightened guerrilla activity in the past six months. They + may calculate that Rabat will not be ready for a compromise solution + until after Moroccan resources have been strained further by the + conflict. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

[Omitted here is a map of the Western Sahara.]

+
+ +
+ 415. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840033–0602. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, + Casablanca, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tunis, Rome, USUN, Tangier, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR. + + 490. + + Rabat, January 17, 1984, 1130Z + + +

Rome please pass to Codel + Lantos. Military for Polads. + Subject: King Hassan’s Views on the Western Sahara Issue. Ref: A) Rabat + 407 (Notal),In telegram 407 from Rabat, + January 13, the Embassy reported on the “extraordinary effort by + King Hassan and the Moroccan Government to demonstrate their + interest in the Codel and their + friendship for the United States.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840026–0244) B) + Rabat 404 (Notal).In telegram 404 from + Rabat, January 13, Reed + reported that he had conveyed the talking points to King Hassan + contained in telegram 8877 (see footnote 3, + Document 417). (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840026–0051)

+ + + (C—Entire text.) + + Codel + Lantos spent January 12 in + Casablanca where the Congressmen had lengthy meetings with Prime + Minister Karim-Lamrani and many members of the Moroccan Government + followed by a long meeting with King Hassan II (see reftel A). This cable reports on King + Hassan’s comments on the Western Sahara. + + During the meeting with Codel + Lantos, Congressman Pickle of + Texas asked what the United States might do to help resolve the + Sahara problem. He also asked what would help Morocco most, MAP, FMS or to have the United States say publicly that it + is on Morocco’s side. + + The King responded that the problem of the Sahara is a political + one and its neighbors have made it a military one. He explained that + when Morocco wanted a solution it went to the United Nations, the + International Court of Justice and noted that the Treaty of Madrid + had been sanctioned by the United Nations. He said that as Morocco’s + neighbor insists on military solutions, he had to react in a + military manner although the final solution could only be + political. + + Turning more directly to the question of what is expected from the + United States, the King said that he hopes that the United States + will give him the “oxygen” he needs to be able to keep hold + militarily of the situation. He added that even more important was + the political support of the United States. He said the United + States should state that Morocco is correct because it wants to hold + a free and fair referendum. “Here we need the help of the United + States.” He noted that the + adversary who asked for a referendum for years no longer wants it + despite all guarantees by the OAU + and UN observers. The King said that + he believes the referendum should take place now. He argued that the + opposition has opted for a subversive war because they want Morocco + to have a financial hemorrhage. Pointing out that with its natural + gas Algeria earns $15 billion per year and Morocco does not have + $500 million. “Algeria wants to lead us to bankruptcy.” The King + added that Morocco is very troublesome to some countries because it + has freedom of the press, labor unions, a constitution which + guarantees freedoms and in two months will hold legislative + elections. The King wryly remarked that Morocco is a subversive + state in the other direction. He concluded his answer by saying that + Morocco was in an undeclared war Morocco must win, and to do that it + must be strong on the field. + + Congressman Seiberling asked the King what was preventing Morocco + from going ahead with the referendum without waiting for Algeria and + others to support it. + + The King responded that the reason is simple. When he went to + Nairobi and made the offer for the referendum, he made it clear that + he wanted to have no responsibility in organizing it. For the + referendum to take place the Implementing Committee had to come to + determine when and where it would be held and to agree on questions, + and to put in its observers or UN + observers. “When I say that it is time to have a referendum, the + other side says no.” The King said that Morocco has no role to play + in organizing a referendum but that he would make resources + available to the OAU. The King + closed by saying that Morocco’s adversaries now pose arbitrary and + trumped up reasons why the referendum cannot be held at this + time. + + Minimize considered Nouakchott. + + Reed +
+ +
+ 416. Memorandum From [name not + declassified]Source: + Department of State, INR/IL + Historical Files, Morocco, [text not + declassified]. Top Secret. 2 pages not + declassified. + + + Washington, February 22, 1984 + + +

 

+
+
+ 417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840120–0441. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kenneth Scott (AF/W); cleared by Sebastian, Edward Perkins (ADF/W), + James Vincent (AF/I), Edmund van + Gilder (AF/W), Schermerhorn, + Raphel, and Schneider; + approved by Bishop. Sent for + information to Addis Ababa, Abidjan, Accra, Algiers, Conakry, Dakar, + and Nouakchott. + + 53901. + + Washington, February 23, 1984, 2224Z + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Request for U.S. Support for GOM Position on Western Sahara Dispute. + + + Ref: + A) Rabat 1648In telegram 1648 from + Rabat, February 21, the Embassy reported: “Foreign Minister + Belkeziz reiterated Morocco’s request for more active U.S. + support on the Western Sahara dispute during a February 20 + meeting with Ambassador Reed.”(Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840113–0132) + B) State 8877Telegram 8877 to Rabat, + January 12, 1984. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D840021-0534) + C) State 32456.In telegram 32456 to + Algiers, February 2, the Department repeated telegram 1116 from + Dakar, February 2, which reported that Senegalese Foreign + Minister Moustapha Niasse had warned that at the next OAU Summit, scheduled for later in + the year in Conakry, “it would not be surprising if the + radicals—led by Madagascar—turned the tables on the moderates at + Conakry” on the issue of seating the SDAR. The Embassy continued: + “By that he means that the radicals have more than a ‘blocking + third’ and there is therefore a real risk that the summit may + not take place unless some of the radicals can be wooed away.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840072–0331) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Department believes that sharing information with Foreign Minister + Belkeziz on the Western Sahara issue is most appropriate. This + message provides an interim response to FonMin’s request. We expect to follow up with more + extensive discussion of Western Sahara at Belkeziz-Eagleburger + meeting in Washington next week. + + Reftel A suggests that Belkeziz is already aware of the latest + developments regarding the Conakry summit, particularly its possible + postponement until + fall 1984, and of the general expectation that the SDAR will not press its case at + the ministerial but will go all out at the summit to be seated. + Specific talking points conveying information gained from + discussions with selected African officials follow later in this + cable. + + We are concerned, however, by Belkeziz’s request that the U.S. + “undertake diplomatic soundings” prior to the ministerial and + “encourage” various African countries to “refrain from supporting a + Polisario move to be seated at the OAU ministerial”.In + telegram 877 from Nouakchott, February 25, the Embassy reported: + “Chief of State Haidallah called in the Ambassador Feb 25 to + advise that the GIRM will + extend diplomatic recognition to the SDAR on the 27th. He wanted + the USG to know that in taking + this step, after long and careful study, Mauritania hoped to + advance the cause of peace and reduce tensions; it does not wish + to see an intensification or prolongation of the fighting.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840124–0538) We believe that his specific + request that the U.S. approach countries such as Algeria, Ghana, and + Mauritania is impractical since the U.S. has little or no leverage + on this issue with such countries. In addition there is the danger + that these states might use charges that the U.S. is “pressuring” + OAU members on Morocco’s behalf + and interfering in the internal affairs of the OAU to undermine Morocco’s own efforts + to carry out its strategy. Such démarches would also risk eliciting + further requests for the U.S. to weigh in with King Hassan and use + what African countries consider to be our considerable influence + with the GOM to make the GOM “more reasonable” on the issue of + negotiating directly and publicly with the Polisario. As Embassy is + aware, we have already been asked to intercede with Morocco several + times and have demurred. We recall also Senegalese FonMin Niasse’s admonition to the + U.S. (repeated ref C to Rabat and others): “be discreet, even + invisible” on the Western Sahara issue during the months preceding + the next summit. In sum, we believe that our interests and Morocco’s + are best served by continuing our discreet low-key discussions with + friendly and knowledgeable key players on the Western Sahara and + keeping the GOM informed of the + results. The following talking points reflect the useful discussions + we have had in Conakry and Dakar and in Addis with members of the + OAU Secretariat since the + Secretary’s conversation with King Hassan. + + Talking points: + + We find our continuing dialogue on the Western Sahara + dispute very useful in keeping abreast of an issue of great + importance to Morocco and the U.S. + + Following the Secretary’s discussion with King Hassan on + January 12,The date is in + error. Shultz + and Hassan met in Rabat on December 11, 1983. See Document 221. we asked + our Ambassadors in selected key African countries to discuss the + Western Sahara issue at the highest levels. In response to + your specific request of February 20, I would like to share + with you now what we have ascertained from these discussions + about the February Foreign Ministers’ meeting. + + The general expectation is that the SDAR will not seek + admission to an OAU meeting + before the 20th summit. Presumably this would apply to the + February 27 Foreign Ministers’ meeting, which is expected to + focus primarily on OAU + budgetary matters. + + Having said that, however, some radical African states may + seek to have the SDAR + seated at the ministerial. We understand that the OAU Secretariat wants to avoid + controversy at the ministerial and hopes that the SDAR will stay away. It + is always possible, however, that an SDAR delegation may show + up in Addis Ababa and claim a seat, even if the SDAR has not been + extended an invitation. + + We understand that the Polisario intends to pursue its + claim to a seat at the 20th summit, particularly if it + voluntarily absents itself from the Addis ministerial. As + you remarked during our last meeting, there is a possibility + that the summit may be postponed until November; this would + give Morocco more time to deal with the situation within the + OAU. We fear that + unless there is some progress in resolving the Western + Sahara dispute there may be erosion in the diplomatic + support which Morocco has enjoyed from key members of the + OAU, who, as a result, + may acquiesce in the seating of the SDAR at the Conakry + Summit. + + We will, of course, continue our discussion with key + interlocutors. But we have little influence in this area + with three of the countries you mentioned in our February 20 + discussion (and Ivory Coast is Morocco’s friend), and + believe an initiative on our part on this issue with them + could be counterproductive to the interests of our two + countries. + + We look forward to hearing the results of Morocco’s + continued efforts with its friends in the OAU to deal with this + question, in particular its strategy for handling the + Polisario’s likely move to claim a seat at the summit. We + look forward to discussing this and other aspects of the + Western Sahara issue with you in Washington during the Prime + Minister’s visit. Under Secretary Eagleburger will be + hosting a breakfast for you on March 1No record of the Eagleburger-Reed + breakfast meeting has been found. and hopes to + have a thorough discussion of the Saharan issue at that + time.In telegram 1930 from + Rabat, February 29, the Embassy reported that in + Belkeziz’s absence “Tazi expressed appreciation for the + message” expressed in telegram 53901, “and made no + further request for U.S. political support.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840133–0382) + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + GuineaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840195–0274. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Scott; cleared by + Perkins, Sebastian, Van + Gilder, Vincent, and Bishop; approved by Crocker. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. + Sent for information to Rabat, Addis Ababa, and Dakar. + + 87650. + + Washington, March 24, 1984, 2008Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara and the OAU: Sekou Toure’s Next Steps. + + + Ref: + Addis 1330 (Notal).In telegram 1330 + from Addis Ababa, March 20, the Embassy reported: “OAU official + with responsibility for Western Sahara tells us that the OAU Secretariat is making plans, + under instructions from interim Secretary General Peter Onu, for another Western + Sahara Implementation Committee meeting in late April or May. + The planning does not yet have the blessing of OAU Chairman Mengistu but Onu will discuss this + initiative with Chairman Mengistu when he (Onu) returns to Addis Ababa later this month.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840182–0152) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Last week AF and NEA completed a series of + consultations with the Algerian Commerce Minister,In telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16, the + Department reported that on March 12, Khellef told Shultz “that Morocco’s + hardening position on the Sahara, in particular its apparent + choice of military rather than political means to achieve a + solution, risked further deterioration in Morocco’s already + difficult domestic situation.” The GOA, Khellef + said, had tried “to promote a political solution by enabling + Hassan to agree to the direct negotiations with the Polisario + that are necessary for a settlement,” but “the King had chosen + not to do.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806) + Peter Onu,In telegram 83506 to Addis Ababa, March 22, the + Department reported that during a March 16 meeting with + Crocker, Bishop, and Lyman, Onu informed them that, with + regards to the OAU Ministerial, + “there were no prospects for breaking the impasse over the + SDAR issue, which is + preventing the name of a summit date. SDAR supporters are demanding + prior assurances that Guinea allow the SDAR to attend the summit + and, if the SDAR is + seated, to pose no obstacles.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840186–0566) + Guy Penne,In telegram 78878 to Addis + Ababa and Paris, March 17, the Department noted that during a + March 14 meeting with Crocker, French Presidential African Affairs + advisor Guy Penne “commented that prospects for holding the + Conakry summit were not at all clear because the SDAR recognition issue may + constitute a serious obstacle.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0337) + and the Nigerian Foreign Minister.In + telegram 79210 to Lagos, March 17, the Department indicated that + on March 15, Nigerian Minister of External Affairs Ibrahim + Gambari told Shultz that + “Nigeria wants to see movement” on the Western Sahara, + “especially to ensure that it and the Chad question do not + prevent the holding of the OAU + Summit. As a member of the Implementation Committee, Nigeria is + looking for something to implement. It wants to see movement + from Morocco and the other parties involved.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840177–0599) Each discussion dealt with, in varying + degrees of intensity, the Western Sahara issue and its effect on the + upcoming Conakry OAU Summit. This + week Sekou Toure carried his personal OAU diplomacy to + RabatIn telegram 2520 from Rabat, + March 19, the Embassy reported on Sékou Touré’s visit to Morocco indicating that, + according to Moroccan officials, “he remains committed to + holding the summit on schedule and that his visits to Fez and + Algiers are an effort to resolve the diplomatic impasse over the + Western Sahara.” Furthermore, “Belkeziz summarized that there + were two options for the Conakry summit: either failure on the + order of the abortive Tripoli summits or an acceptable formula + to manage the Sahara issue. The summit, he said, must convene + and study the issue without pre-conditions on admission of the + SDAR.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840179–0362) and Algiers.In + telegram 1426 from Algiers, March 21, the Embassy reported that + Sékou Touré, upon + departing Algeria, “proclaimed himself wholly satisfied with his + visit” to Algiers, “but said that the two sides had ‘somewhat + divergent views on some problems.’” The Embassy commented: + “Although GOA still professes + its willingness to assist in reconciliation of Western Sahara + problem, it shows no sign of falling off its minimum requirement + for direct contact between the Polisario and Morocco.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840185–0687) The Department believes that now + is the time to engage Toure in a searching discussion of the Western + Sahara and the prospects for staging a successful summit in Conakry + this year. + + You have seen from the cables reporting the Washington discussions + that the OAU appears to be at an + impasse over the issue of seating an SDAR delegation at the summit. We remain concerned that + Morocco will be isolated in the OAU + and, indeed, may be alone in walking out of the summit should the + SDAR be seated. At the + moment, we do not envision an active role for the U.S. in dealing + with this imbroglio; we believe, however, that it is essential to + learn Toure’s views and intentions as OAU Summit host in light of his recent consultations in + Algiers and Rabat and the need for him and the OAU Secretariat to set a summit + date. + + You should therefore seek an appointment with Toure as soon as + possibleOn March 26, Sékou Touré died while + undergoing a cardiac procedure at the Cleveland Clinic in + Cleveland, Ohio. In telegram 2835 from Rabat, the Embassy + commented: “The unexpected death of Guinean President Sékou Touré is a serious blow + to Morocco’s diplomatic position on the Western Sahara which has + depended in large part on confidence that, with Sékou Touré at the helm of the + OAU, Morocco would gain the + upper hand in subsequent discussions.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840200–0356) and put before him the following questions: + + A) Will the summit take place o/a May 25, as originally + scheduled, or will there be a delay? If there is a delay, + when will it be rescheduled? + + B) Would a delay help in defusing the dispute over the + seating of an SDAR + delegation? + + C) Would Sekou Toure allow an SDAR delegation into the + country? + + D) Will two/thirds of the OAU members show up in Conakry? + + + E) Will the SDAR be + seated? + + F) Is there any possibility of a conditional seating of + the SDAR that would + not prejudice the holding of a referendum? + + G) Is there anything that can be done between now and the + summit that could head off the seating of the SDAR? + + H) Might some kind of diplomatic activity (such as shuttle + diplomacy by a respected African) provide enough appearance + of movement to make the seating of the SDAR less likely? + + I) Has Peter Onu + seen Toure since Toure’s visits to Rabat and Algiers + (Onu told us here + that he planned to spend several days with Toure before + returning to Addis Ababa, but that presumably was disrupted + by Toure’s travels in North Africa). + + J) Is there a possibility of successfully convening a + meeting of the Implementation Committee prior to the summit + to deal with the issue of negotiations between Morocco and + the Polisario? + + K) What is the potential for the Chad issue to delay or + disrupt the summit?. + + L) Is there anything that the U.S. can do to be helpful, + in Toure’s view? + + + For Dakar and Addis Ababa: Department would appreciate your posing + questions, at your discretion, along the lines of those above to + your interlocutors in the GOS and the OAU respectively.In + telegram 3161 from Dakar, March 27, the Embassy reported: “While + we are not privy to the details of their conversations,” Senegal + “is clearly carrying on an active triangular diplomacy with + Morocco, Algeria and the SDAR.” The Embassy continued: “We will do our best + to learn the tenor of all these conversations, but the + Senegalese clearly don’t wish to share the details with us for + the moment, at least.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840202–0315) + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 419. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, + NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 1984. Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. 3 pages not declassified. + + + Washington, April 19, 1984 + + +

 

+
+
+ 420. White House Situation Room NoteSource: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential + Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, + Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, Algeria—1984. + Secret. + + + Washington, May 21, 1984 + + +

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

+

Algeria Perceives Change in U.S. Western Sahara + Policy

+

In discussions yesterday with Deputy Assistant Secretary Nassif,Telegram 2421 from Algiers, May 21, contains a record of the + Nassif-Kerroum conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840329–0640) Algerian + Foreign Ministry Secretary General Kerroum characterized Secretary Weinberger’s May 18 remarks in + RabatAn unknown hand underlined + “Secretary Weinberger’s May + 18 remarks in Rabat.” See footnote 4 below. as a change in + U.S. policy on the Western Sahara, “embracing the most extreme Moroccan + theses.”In a May 22 memorandum to + Gregg, Eckert reported on Weinberger’s Rabat speech, noting + that Weinberger had said in + part: “We offer our continued support for a peaceful settlement of + the problems in the Western Sahara, a settlement based on the + Nairobi resolutions of the OAU.” Eckert continued: “What Secretary Weinberger did here was refer to + the Nairobi OAU resolutions (which + called for a cease-fire and referendum, as proposed by King Hassan) + without reference to the later Addis OAU resolutions that identified the parties to the + dispute as Morocco and the Polisario (not Algeria) and ‘urged’ those + parties to enter direct negotiations (Hassan will not publicly + acknowledge talking to a ‘band of rebels created by Algeria’). What + Weinberger should have + said is our standard line that ‘we support OAU efforts.’” (George H.W. Bush Library, Vice + Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. + Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, + Algeria—1984) + + + The government of Algeria had expected a more neutral U.S. + position—rather than exclusive references to the OAU’s Nairobi resolution as if the 19th OAU summit had never occurred, the + U.S. should have stuck to previous formulations of general + support for OAU efforts. + + This new U.S. policy will reinforce Moroccan illusions that + the war can be won militarily and prolong the conflict. + + Algeria fears that Rabat’s berm expansion program may lead to + Moroccan attacks on Mauritania, in which case the Algerians + could not fail to react.In telegram + 3932 from Rabat, April 27, the Embassy reported: “Moroccan + forces continue to expand the berm as Polisario shelling of + Moroccan positions fails to slow the pace of construction. + As berm construction turns westward toward Smara, the + likelihood of direct Moroccan-Algerian confrontation + diminishes. Algerian and Moroccan forces remain, however, in + close proximity in the southern part of the common border.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840276–0130) +

+

Our embassy comments that Kerroum’s remarks were delivered without rancor and with his + usual wit, but with the clear conviction that the U.S. has indeed + altered its Western Sahara policy.An + unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to + this sentence and underlined “with the clear conviction that the + U.S. has indeed altered its Western Sahara policy.” Following + on previous demarches encouraging Algeria and Morocco to place less + emphasis on form and more on substance in trying to resolve the problem, + Secretary Weinberger’s remarks + are viewed in Algiers as the logical progression in what appears to be a + growing U.S. public embrace of traditional Moroccan theses. + + In the Algerian analyses, such a change could only reinforce + Moroccan perceptions that the war can be won militarily, thus + prolonging the stalemate even further. (S) +

+

Algiers 2421, PSN 55456For telegram 2421, + from Algiers, see footnote 2. PSN55456 was not found.

+
+ +
+ 421. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff (Rodman) to Deputy + Secretary of State DamSource: Department of State, + S/P Records, + Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, August 1–15, 1984. Secret; + Sensitive. Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the memorandum. + Drafted by Morton; cleared by Kaplan. Kauzlarich initialed the + memorandum and wrote: “8/10.” + + + Washington, August 10, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + US Policy Toward Morocco, Algeria and the Western Sahara + +

We understand that the issue has been raised of whether the US should begin to play a more active role + toward achieving a settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. Our policy + judgment is that the US should not + depart from the policy toward North Africa established at the outset of + this Administration: that we should emphasize our bilateral + relationships with Morocco and Algeria and subordinate settlement of + what is essentially a regional dispute to our larger strategic + objectives in the region. The following background information may be of + use as you make your own determination.

+

BACKGROUND

+

Western Sahara. Basic US policy toward the Western Sahara dispute has been that + (1) we acknowledge Moroccan administrative control of the area but not + Moroccan claims to sovereignty; (2) we wish to see a negotiated solution + to the dispute but are neutral with respect to its eventual modalities; + and (3) we prefer OAU to UN mediation efforts.

+ + + Before 1979, US arms sales policy + toward Morocco was relatively unforthcoming and was crafted to + prevent Moroccan use of US-supplied arms in the Western Saharan + conflict. + + In 1979, this policy was changed.For + Carter’s decision + to provide OV–10s and arms to Morocco, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North + Africa, Document 49. + US arms sales were expanded to + include weapons that could help Morocco maintain its administrative control over the Western + Sahara, pending a negotiated solution. Specifically, and for the + first time, OV–10 helicopters, a + weapon particularly suited for anti-guerrilla warfare, were sold to + the Moroccans. + +

The 1979 policy change was designed to position the US to follow a self-consciously two-track policy of promoting negotiations, on + the one hand, and using US military + assistance to prevent what then seemed to be imminent Moroccan military + defeat, on the other. It was anticipated that a stronger military position would give + Morocco the confidence it needed to pursue the negotiating track. The + Presidential Directive outlining the 1979 policy change contained + stipulations (never fully communicated to the Moroccans or to the + Congress) that required the Moroccans to negotiate directly with the + Polisario and made delivery of the OV–10s contingent on a demonstrated + Moroccan willingness to negotiate.

+

In 1981, the Reagan + Administration changed US policy toward + Morocco and the Western Sahara. Emphasis on the negotiating track became + muted on the ground that Morocco is a staunch friend of the US having helped the West in Zaire, being + willing to provide strategic access, and taking moderate positions on + issues pertaining to the Middle East. Any effort by the US to bring about a negotiated solution was + judged to have the potential of forcing us to “lean on” Morocco, to the + harm of that friendship. Emphasis on the military track was increased, + partly to enhance Morocco’s strategic and regional security position, + partly to aid Morocco in establishing a stronger military position in + the Western Saharan war. US security + assistance [1½ lines not declassified] have + contributed to a strengthened Moroccan position in the usable Sahara, + which is being effectively integrated into Moroccan society.

+

The Region. The Reagan Administration policy of emphasizing bilateral + relationships and eschewing the policy of pressing the parties to the + Western Sahara dispute to negotiate has served US interests well. Morocco has scored military and + diplomatic successes and the US-Moroccan bilateral relationship has + strengthened to our mutual advantage. The US-Algeria bilateral + relationship continues to improve, and the Algerians place their own + pragmatic interests above solidarity with the Polisario. Most important + from a regional perspective, the Moroccans and Algerians have improved + their own bilateral relationship and secret talks are underway between + them toward the end of settling the Western Sahara dispute. (We believe + that the Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement is transitory and was designed, + in part, to show Morocco’s pique at Algeria for not dropping its + insistence that the Moroccans engage in direct talks with the + Polisario.)

+

US POLICY

+

We believe that interjection of the US + into the Western Sahara dispute would serve only to antagonize each of + the major parties—Morocco and Algeria. Trying to work with each to find + modalities for solution of the dispute would be misinterpreted as + exertions of pressure. Each side would probably misperceive the US role as being that of secretly siding + with its adversary and the capital that we have built up in each of the + two bilateral relationships would be squandered. Finally, an election + year is probably not the appropriate time to undertake a new initiative, the purposes of + which could be misperceived in the region and at home.

+

American efforts to try to resolve the Saharan conflict also would run + the risk of causing us to bear the burden if failure occurs. On the + other hand, a naturally evolving solution to the Western Sahara dispute + would enable the US to improve its + bilateral ties with both Morocco and Algeria—free of current Moroccan + perceptions that we are doing too little to aid them on the Western + Sahara and perceptions by the Algerians that we are doing too much. Premature efforts to resolve the dispute, under + whatever auspices, could lead instead to the creation of an unviable + Polisarian “mini-state” that would contribute to continuing instability + in the region, provide a potential staging ground for Polisario attacks + into Moroccan territory, and potential Soviet strategic access to + facilities on the eastern coast of the Atlantic.

+

You have already received a joint AF-NEA memorandum on this subject + (attached at Tab A). S/P supports + Options (1) and (3) which, in combination, constitute a continuation of + present US policy. S/P recommends disapproval of Option (2), + believing that the US should not play a + more active role in the negotiating process until the Moroccans and the + Algerians are closer to finding their own + solution—and then only if both parties take the initiative in asking for + US “good offices”.

+

In this framework, resolution of the Western Sahara dispute could serve + US interests by contributing to + stability in the region and enabling Morocco to devote fuller attention + and more substantial resources to its pressing internal economic + situation. Healing of the rift between Morocco and Algeria would permit + each to play a more vigorous role in counter-balancing Libya and in + protecting weaker states of the region from Libyan + aggression—particularly Tunisia and Niger. Regional economic benefits + could also be obtained if Morocco and Algeria were able to take + advantage of inherent complementarities in their economies and the + benefits that would accrue to Algeria from Moroccan-facilitated access + to the Atlantic. But these benefits only would accrue if Morocco (and + Algeria) sought our help in seeking an agreement.

+

As for the concern expressed by NEA and + AF about the possibility of Moroccan + diplomatic isolation at the OAU and + UNGA, this has been a perennial + problem and one that usually is met by an eleventh-hour solution. Even + if a worst-case scenario were to transpire and Morocco were to walk out + from the OAU without being joined by + others, the negative effects, both for Morocco and for the OAU, are not likely to be long-lasting. + While it would set an unfortunate precedent with respect to other + entities like the PLO, seating of the + SDAR by the OAU (1) may not actually happen, and (2) + if it does occur, the seriousness of this event + for US interests does not merit rushing + head-long into a US-sponsored Saharan negotiating effort designed to + head it off. In any case, Embassy Rabat has concluded that, for the King, “there is + no choice between claims to the Sahara and OAU membership: Morocco clearly intends to walk out, with + or without company, if the SDAR is + seated.”In telegram 6799 from Rabat, + August 4, the Embassy contended that “options for U.S. mediation + remain limited,” and recommended, based on recent developments, “at + a minimum reassessment and, possibly, some modest tailoring of + present policy.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D840498–0024)

+ + Tab A + Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for + African Affairs (Crocker) to + the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 1 by + Bishop and + Schermerhorn; cleared by Nassif, Perkins, Zweifel, and Jeffrey Davidow (AF/RA). An unknown hand initialed + for Murphy. Kauzlarich + initialed the memorandum and wrote: “8/10.” Attached but not + printed are a map entitled “Polisario Activity April 16–22, + 1984” and an undated paper entitled “The Western Sahara—U.S. + Policy” prepared in NEA/AFN. + + + Washington, August 6, 1984 + + + + SUBJECT + The Western Sahara—U.S. Policy + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

Whether the U.S. should take some initiative to stimulate positive + movement on the Western Sahara dispute prior to the UNGA and the next OAU summit, expected to occur in + November.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the only international entity engaged in + efforts to resolve the Western Saharan dispute which dates from + 1977. Because most OAU members view + Moroccan refusal to negotiate directly with the Polisario as the + principal obstacle to a settlement, we expect a majority to + acquiesce in the seating of the putative Saharan Democratic Arab + Republic (SDAR) by the OAU at its next summit, for which the + target date is November.

+

From the U.S. perspective, seating the SDAR is objectionable for a number of reasons. First, + the SDAR is not a state and + recognition of an armed political movement as a state is an + undesirable precedent with implications well beyond the OAU, namely in a UN context. Secondly, seating the + SDAR would further + internationalize the dispute, “legitimizing” military assistance to the + Polisario by radical and east bloc countries. The abandonment by the + OAU of its support for + negotiation/referendum solution to the question of legitimacy would + put us at odds with an African majority which would include a number + of states whose regard we value. And finally, it would tend to + isolate Morocco diplomatically and widen the dangerous cleavage + between Morocco and Algeria.

+

Morocco, which previously has demonstrated diplomatic resourcefulness + presenting its case internationally, appears to be preparing itself + for the inevitability of loss of its diplomatic support. Morocco’s + apparent willingness to forego African support may stem from the + improvement of its military position established through successive + extensions of the “berm” which now prevent Polisario attacks + throughout most of the Western Sahara.

+

THE OPTIONS

+

Our longstanding policy has been to support the OAU’s peace keeping activities by + urging the Moroccans and Algerians to be cooperative and the OAU to be energetic. No party has + asked us to be an intermediary (although the Algerians and others + have suggested that we put pressure on the Moroccans to negotiate + directly). We have taken the view that others are better positioned + in terms of interests and culture to play such a role; e.g., the + Saudis. We have given the Moroccans quiet diplomatic support. We + have made the point that admission of the SDAR to the OAU would be inconsistent with the + ceasefire/referendum the OAU itself + has repeatedly said should determine the status of the Western + Sahara.

+

Since the origin of the dispute, we have supported the principle of + self-determination. If the outcome of a referendum were an + independent Sahara, however, we believe such an entity would not be + viable and its creation could undermine stability in Morocco. At the + same time, we believe it is in the interests of both the Moroccans + and the Algerians to reach a modus vivendi in + order to settle the impasse definitively. This implies a negotiated + settlement which has substantial international acceptability.

+

In the likelihood that there is no settlement prior to the UNGA, the 4th Committee will again + consider resolutions condemning Morocco. The eleventh hour + compromise resolution language which prevented us from having to + take sides in 1983 is unlikely to be repeated unless there has been + considerable movement on the issue.

+

The U.S. government could become more active itself in promoting a + settlement. As a first step, we should undertake in house to devise + a strategy which we think could lead to an outcome acceptable to all + parties. One possibility is a Saharan autonomous region within + Morocco but set in a + network of political and economic arrangements with real appeal for + Algeria. This would perforce mean that we would put forward our own + proposals in substantive points which would inevitably be seen as + partisan. Indeed there would be considerable inclination to favor an + outcome most acceptable to Hassan, a result which might put us at + odds with a number of friendly African governments, particularly the + Algerians.

+

Once devised, a more forward USG + strategy could be used as a basis for engaging Hassan and Bendjedid in discussions aimed at + defining with each of themAn unknown + hand underlined “defining with each of them.” a realistic + outcome consistent with our and their other regional interests.

+

Independent of efforts to devise and promote a settlement, we could + explore with the Moroccans procedural tactics to head off the + seating of the SDAR at the + OAU later this year. There is + some margin for maneuver. For example, Morocco’s natural allies + within the OAU could capitalize on + well-crafted statements of Moroccan intentions. Rabat could agree to + talks with a formula close to the OAU’s urging but likely to provoke a Polisario + rejection—shifting the onus to the Polisario and its Algerian + backers for blocking the peace process. This option, if it becomes + public, would provoke charges that we have become a wholehearted + proponent of the Moroccan position. Side negotiations with the + Moroccans could be inferred by Hassan to constitute a USG commitment to ensure an outcome + which meets his objectives.

+

Another potential negative consequence of becoming engaged as an + intermediary is that we would “Americanize” a dispute in which our + role heretofore has been limited. Escalating US involvement risks Soviet response and the burdening + of the Soviet-American agenda with yet another dispute. A more + direct USG role could remove the + impetus from the Algerians and the Moroccans to continue high level + direct, secret discussions on the issues. Given the intractable + nature of the problem, we must also assess the political and other + costs should our efforts fail. Thus, by assuming a higher + responsibility, we might set ourselves up for a foreign policy + defeat.

+

However, it is not likely that a purely military strategy on + Morocco’s part can, in fact, lead to a stable result or a + settlement. To be durable, and enhance Moroccan and regional + security, we believe there needs to be a process that obtains + legitimacy—something Morocco cannot do by itself. In the absence of + a probe by the US, it is difficult + to test either Morocco’s or Algeria’s bottom line or to explore the + basis for a “pre-cooked” compromise that might defuse the + situation.

+ +

RECOMMENDATIONS

+ + + That we continue our present course, quietly encouraging as + opportunities arise all parties to work toward the OAU-mandated + negotiated political settlement. + + That we examine possibilities of a strategy for achieving an + outcome acceptable to all parties, thereafter that we discuss + this with Hassan and Bendjedid. (AF + and NEA support this + option). + + That we consult now with the Moroccans on procedural steps + which might be taken to avoid SDAR admission to the OAU later this year.Armacost did + not approve or disapprove the recommendations. + + +
+
+ 422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840669–0212. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Addis + Ababa, Algiers, Cairo, Rabat, and USUN. + + 8157. + + Tunis, October 19, 1984, 1506Z + + +

Department repeat as desired. Subj: The Outlook for the OAU Summit: Conversation With Peter Onu.

+ + + (Confidential—Entire text.) + + Summary. In conversation with Ambassador, OAU + SYG + Peter Onu elaborated on his + concerns that precipitous OAU + Summit could well lead to OAU split + of the type envisioned prior to Tripoli Summit collapse. Onu believes that various maneuvers + being planned may lead more moderate states to join Morocco in walk + out—thereby fragmenting organization.In + telegram 4737 from Addis Ababa, October 16, the Embassy + reported: “We have heard from a number of sources, including + senior officers of the OAU, + that the Polisario reps in Addis Ababa have advised their + friends in the OAU Secretariat + that they will take their seat at the OAU Summit in November. Polisario officials are + saying that, if they are not seated at this summit, they will + lose any chance of ever being seated. The Polisario reps are + calling this ‘a do or die effort.’” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840660–0414) He thinks current OAU Chairman is unlikely to seek compromise formula + which might preserve OAU Unity. + Onu has shared these + perceptions with GOT (MFA + Essebsi is going to Tripoli + on October 18 and will visit Morocco in near future) and asked + Bourguiba + in role of elder statesman + to contact other African heads of state to help avoid + radical/moderate confrontation over SDAR issue. End summary. + + I had 80 minutes evening October 17 in private with acting OAU + SYG + Peter Onu, whom I have known + for about ten years. Following emerged. + + Onu, in response to my + questions, said that as date of summit approaches indications are + growing that a number of OAU-member governments are getting worried + about the outlook. He (Onu) + had seen the Moroccans and Libyans (Treki) in UNNY. The Moroccans + had told him the organization and its members should brace for a + surprise. The Libyans had been unclear as to their intentions in + conversation with him, but he (Onu) had pieced together indications of a scenario + “which the Algerians would find it difficult to cope with.” One + should never underestimate King Hassan, Onu mused. + + Onu then said that there + seemed to be a plan to introduce a “Moroccan” motion at the outset + of the conference which would seek to define the attributes of a + state (territory, control, sovereignty, etc.) which the + Polisario/SDAR could not + meet. This motion would fail. Upon its failure, another motion would + be introduced which would raise the OAU Charter issue—the organization is to be open to + states—in the light of the anticipated failure of the first motion + (viz. if you are unwilling to pass a motion which describes the + attributes of a state—seeking membership—in ways which would exclude + the Polisario, what is it you are prepared to admit by seating the + SDAR?). If the SDAR were subsequently seated, + these motions would have laid the basis for a walkout different from + that inherent in the Western Sahara conflict. That, Onu said, could in turn bring the + walkout with Morocco of a far greater number of states. + + In all of this, Onu pointed + out, the Libyan attitude remains important. The Swazi representative + had just told Onu that Libya + had urged delay in convening the summit “since the issue of the + Western Sahara is not yet ripe for settlement.” Libya had told the + Swazi, waving a list of states allegedly ready to walk out that an + untimely summit risked the fragmentation of the OAU. The Swazi had shared his fears + for the organization’s future with Onu after hearing the Libyan warning. Onu had taken note—there were other + such straws in the wind—but repeated that Treki had waffled in + conversation with him. + + Onu deplored the situation + in which the organization now found itself. A premature summit which + saw the SDAR seated would at + best give Algiers a pyrrhic victory. Morocco having left the OAU, the problem would not merely + remain unsolved on the ground—but the Nairobi resolution would + become a scrap of paper. The excessive OAU focus on direct negotiations between Morocco and + the Polisario had caused members to overlook certain key aspects of + the Saharan conflict, viz. that Morocco had accepted a referendum + “at any time” but the + Polisario had not/not “ever” done so and that Morocco’s reservations + on “direct negotiations” had been entered ab initio having been + repeatedly cited since. Fragmentation of the OAU remains a very real possibility, + Onu said, and would + represent a loss to all of the members attached to the survival of + the organization. Finally, the Chairman (Mengistu) is not likely to pick up + a pilgrim’s staff to go to capitals to drum up support for a + temporizing measure, e.g. a new set of Wisemen to replace the + immobilized eroding Implementation Committee. + + Comment: Onu is + understandably afraid for the survival of the OAU. He believes that rising time + pressures, uncertainties over Libya’s use of its link to Morocco and + influence with clients, Moroccan maneuvering, Algerian intransigence + and Mengistu’s rigidities + may be steering the organization on the rocks. Right or wrong, he is + far from sure that Morocco’s withdrawal “with one or two friends” is + all that will happen if the SDAR is seated. It has penetrated that any Algerian + summit success could comport a heavy price to OAU members without solving the + problem in situ. + + Onu has shared some of this + with Tunisian FonMin + Caid Essebsi who is going to + Tripoli today—and reportedly to Morocco shortly—as well as with + Bourguiba. Bourguiba has promised “as doyen + d’age” of all of Africa’s leaders to write a letter to his peers + urging them to avoid splitting the organization. We shall seek + GOT’s reactions to Onu’s visit and report further as + warranted. + + Sebastian +
+
+ 423. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840715–0763. Secret; Immediate. + + 5230. + + Addis Ababa, November 8, 1984, 0532Z + + +

Department pass OAU Collective. Subject: + Outlook for the Twentieth OAU + Summit.

+ + + (S—Entire text) + + The OAU Summit, the twentieth + since the organization’s founding, is headed for convening on + schedule next Monday, November 12. Unlike the nineteenth summit, + which was a cliffhanger, it looks like a relatively easy one, with few potential + disruptions in prospect. Following in brief is the prognosis five + days before the scheduled convening: + + Western Sahara: After much hemming and hawing, the + consensus now is that the Polisario will be treated as a + full member from the start. Latest word is that its + admission will not even be a subject of discussion by the + heads of state in their informal session just before + convening; we are in fact told that the Polisario will join + this session and go on from there to take its seat, with + nameplate and flag, like everyone else. The Polisario’s + supporters have turned the tables this year and are + threatening a walkout if it is not seated from the start. + Without their presence there can’t be a quorum (last time it + was the opponents of the Polisario who deprived the summit + of a quorum at Tripoli and threatened to do the same in + Addis). Most other African governments are simply sick and + tired of seeing the OAU + deadlocked at every turn by the Western Sahara problem. They + are ready to go along with seating the Polisario in the hope + that that will set to rest, even if only momentarily, the + dispute that has so long raged over the issue. + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+ + + For the results, check back this time next week.In telegram 5300 from Addis Ababa, November 13, + the Embassy reported: “The opening session of the Twentieth + OAU Summit unfolded exactly + according to forecast,” adding “the Polisario made its entry + along with the other delegations and took its seat in front of + its nameplate—RASD—and its flag. Mengistu excoriated constructive engagement” on + South Africa “and lambasted Morocco for failing to implement the + nineteenth summit’s Western Sahara resolution.” The Embassy also + noted that “the session closed with a speech by the Moroccan + delegate announcing his government’s withdrawal from membership + in the OAU because of the + seating of the Polisario. Zaire spoke eloquently in support of + Morocco and declared suspension of its participation though not + its membership. ‘A few’ more may walk out November 13 but not + enough to put the quorum in jeopardy.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840724–0088) + + Korn +
+
+ 424. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence + and Research, Department of State (Montgomery) to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. Secret; Sensitive. 3 pages not + declassified. + + + Washington, November 20, 1984 + + +

 

+
+ +
+ 425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria + and MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D840796–0666. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel and Schermerhorn; cleared + by Nassif, Cassius Johnson + (S/S–O), and Covey; approved by + Armacost. Sent for + information Priority to the Secretary of Defense, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR. Sent for + information to Tunis, Nouakchott, London, and Paris. + + 366367. + + Washington, December 13, 1984, 0529Z + + +

London for Raphel, Paris for + Cheshes. Subject: Western Sahara: Démarches to the Algerian and Moroccan + Ambassadors. Ref: (A) State 363217In + telegram 363217 to Algiers and Rabat, December 11, the Department + instructed both Embassies to make the points “to the highest level + of authority available” that “various sources available to us + indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in + Moroccan-Algerian relations,” that “we are particularly concerned + over the increase in military forces in the border area,” and the + U.S. feared “misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; + escalation is a clear danger.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840789–0766) (B) State + 351001.In telegram 351001 to Algiers, + November 28, the Department reported that on November 23, Kerroum told Armacost that “the GOA is pleased with SDAR seating in OAU, but fully recognizes this does + not solve Western Sahara issues. GOA continues to believe that solution should and can + come only through negotiation.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840759–0574)

+

Military address handle as Specat Exclusive

+ + + (S—Entire text). + + Summary: Per ref A, Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Armacost made démarches + to Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors separately on December 11. + Neither expressed surprise at our expressions of concern over + increasing tensions between the two countries over the Western + Sahara and both accepted as reasonable our fear that by mischance an + unfortunate incident could develop. End summary. + + Meeting first with Sahnoun, + Under Secretary Armacost + adverted to the November 23 conversation with Foreign Minister + Secretary General Kerroum in + which this same topic had been discussed (ref B). We accepted at + face value the GOA’s assurances + that it has no aggressive intentions towards Morocco. Nonetheless, + we are worried that the mere presence of sizeable military forces in + the border area could lead to clashes which might get out of hand. + Accordingly, we hope the GOA will + exercise caution and seek in every way to avoid military + conflict. + + The Under Secretary also noted the GOA intentions to send a special envoy to Rabat, inter + alia to discuss the Western Sahara. He invited Sahnoun’s views on the prospects + for these discussions. + + + In response, Sahnoun said + that he had received information which essentially confirms that + there have been border incidents and that the situation is tense. He + reiterated that the GOA does not + seek conflict with Morocco and is still hopeful that either a + personal advisor to President Bendjedid or Foreign Minister Ibrahimi will be received in Rabat. + He has no concrete information as to whether and when such a meeting + might take place. + + Under Secretary Armacost + thanked Sahnoun for these + reassurances and again stressed that our démarche stems from our + concern for valued relations with both the Algerians and Moroccans. + He noted that we would carry out a parallel démarche with the + Moroccan Government. Ambassador Sahnoun thanked the Under Secretary for this + friendly expression of views which he promised to relay to his + government. + + Armacost later told + Ambassador Jorio that as a + friend, we would be remiss in not expressing our concern over the + deterioration in Algerian-Moroccan relations and the increase in + tensions in the border area. While we take seriously his + government’s professions of lack of aggressive intent, we believe + that the possibilities for mischance are now greater. We hope that + both governments will exercise caution, and we have given Ambassador + Sahnoun the same message + earlier. He asked Jorio if + the contacts which we understood Morocco and Algeria had over the + past eighteen months will continue. + + Ambassador Jorio explained + that the situation has become quote very difficult unquote after + Morocco’s problem in Addis. The contacts would as far as the + Moroccans are concerned remain alive but we must understand the + history. At each stage, he said, the GOM has researched the problem and tried to respond. + Each time the Moroccans have made the concession asked, the + Algerians have considered it as a gain and then asked for something + else. The GOM considers the + conflict over the Sahara as a pretext for Algerian hegemonic + ambitions, not the basic problem itself. Algerian ambitions have + been a problem since 1963. The whole history is a series of + concessions which have not given rise to reciprocal concessions on + the Algerian part. + + For Morocco, he said, the problem is now an internal one. The + country as a whole does not understand the moderation and + conciliation which the government has exercised. The government will + continue to pursue negotiation quote as long as we can unquote but + there are domestic concerns to be taken into account. + + Under Secretary Armacost + concluded by noting that our démarche is not in response to a + particular party’s actions or concerns; rather, every buildup + increases the potential for direct confrontation. We are speaking in + an evenhanded manner to both sides. + + Dam +
+ +
+ 426. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + N850001–0342. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + 189. + + Algiers, January 13, 1985, 1212Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algeria Says it Will Make Major Effort to Break Western Sahara + Impasse. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary. Kerroum says + Algeria is prepared to make a major effort to break the Western + Sahara deadlock. Although the Jan. 8 visit of Guedira and Filali made no substantive + progress, high-level contacts will continue. Algeria is prepared to + make King Hassan an offer which takes full account of his + preoccupations. At the same time, Algeria is deeply concerned that + the King might not want a peaceful settlement for domestic reasons. + Kerroum reiterated that + no Algerian Government could accept Moroccan military annexation of + the territory even if continuation of the present situation risks + eventual destabilization in Morocco.In + telegram 19274 to Algiers, January 19, the Department commented + that during a January 18 meeting with Murphy, Sahnoun “expressed regret that + Algerian-Moroccan progress on the Western Sahara issue had been + thrown off track by the Libyan-Moroccan treaty. The GOA now reluctantly has concluded + that King Hassan may believe that a military solution is + possible (here Sahnoun + cited the recent berm extension).” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850043–0371) For + more on the August 1984 Morocco-Libya Union, see Documents + 37–40. End summary. + + After discussing another matter Jan. 12, Kerroum dismissed the notetaker and + launched into a lengthy discussion of the Western Sahara. He said + the Jan. 8 visit to Algeria of Guedira and Filali was in the nature of + reestablishing contact and that no substantive progress was made. As + agreed, the high-level secret contacts would continue. + + Speaking with great intensity, Kerroum said Algeria was preparing to make a + proposal which King Hassan would find extremely difficult to reject + and one which took full account of his preoccupations. He again + expressed Algerian opposition to the extremes of independence and + annexation. + + In response to probing, Kerroum said the GOA was looking at the “ambiguous” Oct. 1975 advisory + opinion of the ICJ.Reference is to the International Court of + Criminal Justice’s unanimous ruling that “Western Sahara (Rio de + Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain + was not a territory belonging to no one (terra + nullius),” and that “legal ties between this territory” + existed with both Morocco and Mauritania. (“Summary of the + Advisory Opinion,” October 16, 1975) He referred to a + “Solomonic solution” within the context of a Grand Maghreb. + Kerroum hinted that the + proposal would involve an interim status looking toward the eventual + construction of Maghreb unity. + + Algeria would take the initiative in the interest of regional + stability. Kerroum then + expressed deep concern that the King might not want a peaceful + solution of the conflict. Some were of the view that the war was the + “cement” which held the monarchy together. Others contend the King + wants to keep the army busy in the Sahara far from royal residences. + One thing seems certain: continuation of the present conflict risks + an eventual social upheaval in Morocco whose result would be + abolition of the monarchy and destabilization. + + Without directly asking, Kerroum hinted that U.S. support for Algeria’s + initiative would be welcome. In response to a question on the Saudi + position, Kerroum ruefully + observed that Hassan’s influence on Fahd was greater than vice + versa. + + Indicating that his official remarks were concluded, Kerroum said he wanted to ask me, + personally and unofficially, what I thought a possible solution + could be. I replied that not being a citizen of the Maghreb, this + was difficult. Clearly a face-saving solution that would be durable + and meet the minimum requirements of those involved was the general + prescription, but only those involved could have a realistic + appreciation of what a solution might look like. When Kerroum persisted, I said + personally the kinds of ideas we understood were discussed in the + 1983 meeting between President Bendjedid and King Hassan seemed to offer hope.See footnote 2, + Document 19. + + Kerroum said Algeria + considered the King to be a very competent statesman. However, + Algeria was concerned over his apparent miscalculations in his + rapprochement with Qadhafi. + + Comment: This was a rare glimpse behind the scenes. I have never + seen Kerroum so intense and + animated. Based on this conversation, I conclude Algeria is prepared + to make a major effort to reach a compromise with the King on the + Western Sahara. At the same time, Algeria is deeply concerned that + the King may not want (or feel able) to accept a peaceful solution. + As long as pressures exist for the two principal parties to + negotiate, I thought it best to take evasive action when asked for + my personal views on a solution. It is also clear Algeria will + insist that the Polisario be brought into the negotiating process if + sufficient prior general agreement can be reached between Algeria + and Morocco. + + Newlin +
+ +
+ 427. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850118–0738. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Rabat, Tunis, and Nouakchott. + + 965. + + Algiers, February 21, 1985, 1045Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algeria Proposes Compromise on the Western Sahara. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary: Algerian official outlines compromise solution on the + Western Sahara which Algeria has proposed to King Hassan. In it, the + King would exercise sovereignty over a Saharan entity linked to a + wider Maghreb group. According to Algerians, negotiations with + Morocco on the Western Sahara are “on dead center”. End + summary. + + At conclusion of Feb 20 meeting with MFA + SecGen + Kerroum on other matters, + Ambassador and DCM asked where + contacts stood with King Hassan on the Western Sahara. After + reflecting, Kerroum replied, + “on dead center”. + + After many discussions with Morocco, Algeria he said had “assumed + the heavy responsibility” of proposing a compromise solution which + avoided the extremes of independence and annexation “without the + permission of the Saharans.” It incorporated elements of the 1975 + ICJ decision,See footnote 3, Document + 426. which recognized that there had been + historic ties between certain tribes in the north Sahara and the + Moroccan throne. Algeria, he said, was willing, if Morocco accepted + the “national reality” of the Western Sahara (Kerroum used the analogy of Quebec + within Canada) to support extension of this principle throughout the + former Spanish Sahara. + + At the same time, the Polisario had been seated in the OAU and this could not be reversed. + The Western Sahara, he implied, should have a separate identity + within a Maghreb grouping but with the King at its head. Kerroum cited the precedent of + Byelorussia and the Ukraine in the UN, the King, not the Saharan, would represent the + entire country in meetings with Chadli or Bourguiba, for example. + + Kerroum said such a + solution, if accepted by Hassan, would be difficult to sell to the + Polisario and even to some in Algeria who believe closer cooperation + with Morocco hold little economic benefit for Algeria. However, + Algeria was thinking in terms of Maghreb stability. In the short + run, Morocco would gain by a settlement but in the long run, + Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia would be the beneficiaries. Kerroum + said the King’s reaction + to Algerian proposals was leading to a question once again of + whether Hassan has an interest in a peaceful solution. + + Comment: Kerroum’s outline, + if accurate, is hard to square with King Hassan’s statements to us + that Algeria has been completely intransigent. (See Algiers + 962.)In telegram 962 from Algiers, + February 21, the Embassy reported that in spite of Hassan’s + criticisms, “Algeria has backed off its previous position of an + OAU referendum on the + alternatives of independence or incorporation into Morocco. + Instead, Algeria increasingly speaks of avoiding these extremes + and finding a compromise” and “speaks of a solution that will + humiliate no one.” The Algerians, the Embassy continued, “are + willing to envisage some kind of federation or autonomy with the + King having ‘the flag and the postage stamps’ (i.e., certain + attributes of sovereignty).” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850118–0508) + + Newlin +
+
+ 428. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850149–0515. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Priority to USUN. Sent for + information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, Dakar, London, Madrid, + Moscow, New Delhi, Niamey, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, and + Addis Ababa. + + 2078. + + Rabat, March 5, 1985, 1830Z + + +

From Ambassador Jeane J. + Kirkpatrick. Subject: March 4 Audience With King Hassan. + Ref: State 59695.In telegram 59695 to + Rabat, February 27, the Department transmitted the draft text of a + letter from Reagan to King + Hassan, in which Reagan + wrote in part: “I am very pleased to designate Ambassador Jeanne J. + Kirkpatrick as my + personal representative to the celebrations on March 3 honoring your + accession to the throne of Morocco.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850135–0288)

+ + + (S—Entire text.) + + Summary: During a 90-minute one-on-one audience in Marrakech March + 4, King Hassan questioned me closely and at length on politics of + the UN and strategies for handling + the Western Sahara issue. Hassan clearly attaches the highest + priority to moving ahead with a referendum and is determined to make + a major effort at the United Nations this year. Our conversation + dealt almost entirely with UN + matters, and the King was clearly attempting to learn from my + experience in that forum. End summary. + + + Prior to seeing Hassan, I met at length on March 3 with + newly-appointed Foreign Minister Abdellatif FilaliNo + record of the Kirkpatrick-Filali conversation has been + found. who alerted me to the King’s interest in reviewing + in detail with me Morocco’s strategy at the United Nations and plans + to reorganize GOM multilateral + diplomacy. I took the occasion to discuss at length with Filali the importance of regional + blocs at the UN and the need for + active Moroccan diplomacy in the African and non-aligned + context. + + The March 4 audience took place at the Marrakech Palace following + the annual ceremony of allegiance. After I presented the President’s + letter (reftel), with which Hassan was clearly pleased, the King + turned the conversation to the United Nations. He made clear his + real determination to settle the question of the Western Sahara by + holding a referendum next year. He expressed complete confidence + that Morocco would win in a fair referendum and, after expressing + regret that I was leaving government service, sought my reaction to + his strategy for handling the issue. + + Hassan told me that Morocco will take the Western Sahara issue to + the Security Council, seeking an arrangement under which the Council + and Secretariat would organize a referendum in the Sahara. He + reiterated that Morocco could no longer accept a referendum under + auspices of the OAU, which has + already pronounced itself on the issue and is now under factional + control of Ethiopia and other radical states. The OAU, the King told me, is a closed + subject and there is no possibility of Morocco re-joining the + organization. Hassan predicted that other member states will also + withdraw as radical domination of the OAU is further extended. + + Turning to the Security Council, Hassan told me that he was + confident of support in the Security Council for a UN-organized + referendum in the Sahara. Noting a recent conversation with a + high-level Soviet, possibly a special emissary or the local + Ambassador, Hassan said that the Soviets have assured Morocco of + support for self-determination. India too, he told me, has expressed + support for a process of self-determination. Like Morocco a founding + NAM state, India remains + committed to decolonization and self-determination. Finally, Hassan + reported that, during a conversation in the last few days, former + French Culture Minister Maurice Druon had assured him that France + would support Moroccan efforts in the Security Council. + + Hassan outlined for me the new team which he is sending to New + York to reactivate Moroccan diplomacy at the UN. The Permanent Representative, Mehdi Alaoui, was + selected for broad expertise and contacts in the Third World, + political savvy and a + reputation as a “good Moroccan” (Rabat 2022).In telegram 2022 from Rabat, March 2, the + Embassy reported that Alaoui, while “at first glance an unusual + choice” for UN Ambassador, + “appears to be in tune with the palace on key diplomatic + questions facing the country, namely the Western Sahara and + related Maghreb issues. A proponent of Maghreb unity, he is + among the socialists taking the hardest line on the Western + Sahara and relations with Algeria.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850143–0607) Two deputy PermReps, Dr. Mohammed Bennouna, + an expert in international law, and Ambassador Khalil Haddaoui, now + in Monrovia, will round out the GOM + team. Implementing the effort in Rabat will be Foreign Minister + Filali, a colleague + during earlier UN service of + Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, with whom he has good personal + relations. + + In response, I told Hassan that, frankly, I was less optimistic + about the outcome in the Security Council because, Soviet and other + commitments to self-determination notwithstanding, one should not + underestimate levels of cynicism at the UN. I encouraged Hassan, however, to undertake this + important initiative with maximum publicity, insuring that the world + is aware of Moroccan efforts. He should draw on public relations and + other resources, I urged, to make known Morocco’s commitment to a + UN-supervised referendum. Morocco should, nonetheless, face the fact + that efforts in the Security Council could be blocked or otherwise + sidetracked. I also pointed out that, given Algerian influence at + the UN, it would be difficult to get + an SC resolution providing for a referendum on terms acceptable to + Morocco. + + The King also questioned me closely on the General Assembly, + expressing interest in a UNGA + resolution this year on the Sahara. The 1983 outcome and lack of + majority support for Algeria in 1984, he suggested, left grounds for + optimism this year. He was particularly encouraged that, among the + EC–10, only Greece and Spain had + supported the Algerian position. Referring to USUN consultations with Royal + Counselor Reda Guedira last November, Hassan thanked me and the + USUN team of Ambassadors and + Counselors for our counsel and support. + + I also urged that Morocco be represented at all caucuses and + meetings of the non-aligned, even small strategy meetings which + sometimes set subsequent policy. In sum, effective UN diplomacy required an active policy + in both the NAM and OAU, combined with world-wide + lobbying. I described Nicaragua’s success and efforts + world-wide. + + Hassan expressed hope that, at the working level, USUN staff could share thoughts with + his new UN team on key countries and + tactics to enforce disciplined behavior from certain UN states. I said that it was most + important that, in conversation with other heads of state, he + underline the importance Morocco attaches to the Western Sahara in + the UN. While I was there, President + Kountche called about plans for a future meeting and Hassan afterwards praised + the Niger head of state. I told him that it was also important that + the GOM Foreign Minister follow + through in greater detail with his counterparts, mentioning, for + example, GOM disappointment over + the role of countries like Senegal during last year’s UNGA. + + The King referred to the practice by certain countries of buying + UN votes, and I urged that + Morocco make this impossible by prior lobbying and firm commitments + from foreign ministers or heads of state which would limit + maneuvering room for PermReps in New York. Citing Nicaraguan + behavior, I stressed the importance of the new GOM team visiting every delegation in + New York except those which are certain to vote against Morocco. + Even with such efforts, I cautioned, Morocco should be prepared to + lose in the Security Council. A fall-back could be selection of a + few countries to represent the international community as observers + for a referendum. Professional groups, as during voting in El + Salvador, could also help with ballot box technology. + + Hassan had already anticipated such a fall-back and was prepared + to seek observer delegations from the NAM, Arab League, ASEAN and the OAS. He told me that he + had also “secured”, after consulting with President Mitterrand, the services of former + French PermRep Jacques Leprette and international lawyer Maitre + Dupuy, as formal consultants. + + Comment: King Hassan was extremely well informed on UN voting patterns and is obviously + giving top priority to organizing a Saharan referendum next year. He + is briefed on details of past votes and committed to mounting as + professional an operation as possible at the next UNGA. I was impressed by the + seriousness with which he has informed himself and reflected on the + problem. He is optimistic, but has included a realistic fall-back in + his planning. The King clearly made maximum use of me as a resource + during our 90-minute conversation. + + Reed +
+ +
+ 429. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State + Richard Murphy, 1985: + Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Cleared by Jonathan + Benton and Quinn. No drafting + information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the + Family Quarters of the White House. + + + Washington, April 17, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + (1) Reported Moroccan Request for Soviet Arms + (2) Algeria’s View of the Western Sahara + + + PARTICIPANTS + Secretary Shultz + Foreign Minister Ibrahimi + Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun + Ambassador Newlin + +

Foreign Minister Ibrahimi said the + Soviets had informed the Algerians, on the eve of President Bendjedid’s visit to Washington,See Document + 147. that King Hassan had sent a message to Gorbachev requesting T 72 tanks and helicopters. According to the + Foreign Minister the King said he wanted Soviet arms “in order to be + free of American pressure.”

+

On the Western Sahara, Ibrahimi + said President Bendjedid had sent + him to see King Hassan shortly after the OAU decision to seat the Polisaro. He had asked the King + for his views on how to find a solution.

+

The King reportedly asked if Algeria had territorial ambitions in the + Western Sahara. To which, Ibrahimi assured him Algeria had no territorial + ambitions whatsoever and was content with the boundaries it had + inherited at Independence. He said the King had asked him this question + on ten separate occasions.

+

(Ibrahimi then recounted the + February ’83The two leaders actually met in + March 1983. See Document 20. meeting + between Hassan and Bendjedid. At + that time, Bendjedid asked for + the King’s views on how to proceed with a referendum as called for by + the OAU. King Hassan reportedly on this + occasion opposed a referendum on the ground that it would result in a + victor and a vanquished. It could also leave a lasting wound in + Algerian-Moroccan relations. Instead, the King proposed a formula under + which Morocco would have “the flag and the postage stamps” and the + Saharans would have wide autonomy. Secretary Shultz noted the idea of a referendum + had been proposed by the King.)

+ +

When in late ’84 Ibrahimi reminded + the King of the flag/stamp formula, the latter authorized Ibrahimi, Filali and Guerdira to draw up such a plan. When a + document was presented to the King on February 6, he rejected it citing + the example of New Caledonia.Reference is + to the French Overseas Territory of New Caledonia, located in the + South Pacific. Residents enjoyed French citizenship and + representation in the French Parliament and were governed by French + laws and regulations. Once autonomy was achieved, the + Saharans could then demand independence.

+

Ibrahimi replied Algeria was ready + to guarantee autonomy; Morocco would also have to guarantee not to annex + the Western Sahara.

+

While rejecting the flag and postage stamp proposal, and stating that + Morocco would never meet with the Polisaro, the King sent a secret + emissary to meet with the Polisario in Lisbon. About the same time, + critical articles appeared in the European press inspired by Morocco + concerning the “Algerian proposal.”

+

Ibrahimi said Algeria had tried to + fathom why the King had changed his mind and had come up with the + following factors: + + The policy of the French Socialist Party in power was + different from that of the French Socialist party in + opposition. + + Saudi money enabled the King to continue the war. + + The Qadhafi + factor. + + Some Moroccan opposition parties were more royalist than the + King on this issue. +

+

Despite the fact contacts on this issue had been interrupted since + February 6, 1985, Algeria intended to continue its efforts to find a + peaceful solution to the conflict.

+
+
+ 430. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence + and Research (Abramowitz) to the + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, + [text not declassified]. Top Secret. 2 + pages not declassified. + + + Washington, May 15, 1985 + + +

 

+
+ +
+ 431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria + and MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850461–0749. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared + by Gregory Talcott (S/S–O), Richard + Sokolsky (S/P), Bishop, Johnson (P), and James Collins (S–S/O); approved by Nassif. Sent for information to Nouakchott and + Paris. + + 200276. + + Washington, June 29, 1985, 1802Z + + + + SUBJECT + Potential for Increased Tensions in the Western Sahara. + + + Ref: + Algiers 3349.In telegram 3349 from + Algiers, June 25, the Embassy reported that Lakehal-Ayat said he “could + not visit the U.S. as planned this fall” as “Morocco seemed bent + on pursuing the war” in the Western Sahara “as witnessed by the + further extensions of the berm. Some of these now ran along the + Mauritanian border.” He also “predicted a stepping up of + Polisario operations in the autumn.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850447–0765) + + + + (S) Entire text. + + We are concerned by the prospect for increased Polisario activity + raised by Algerian Intelligence Chief Lakehal Ayat with Embassy + Algiers (reftel). Although there is more than sufficient + responsibility and blame to portion out among the various parties, + the fact remains that any significant increase in Polisario + operations would presuppose at least Algerian acquiescence if not + active support. + + For Algiers: you should seek an early opportunity to discuss the + matter further with Ayat and/or other high level GOA officials, making the following + points: + + The USG is concerned by + reports that the Polisario is pressing for transit through + Mauritanian territory. In the past, the Mauritanian + Government has had difficulty in adequately patrolling its + vast and underpopulated northern areas. + + That government has objected to incursions into its + territory by outside forces, including the Polisario. + Friendly neighbors, including the GOA should seek to assist the Mauritanians by + discouraging challenges to Mauritanian sovereignty and + territorial integrity. + + An expansion of the Western Sahara conflict such as that + foreseen by Ayat would be contrary to the interests of all + the governments directly affected, including the GOA. + + The USG urges that the + GOA use its + considerable influence with the Polisario to discourage any + such expansion. + + + The USG has noted with + satisfaction the willingness of the GOA to enter into direct discussions with the + GOM on the Western + Sahara.In telegram 3506 + from Algiers, July 6, Newlin reported that after he made the + démarche, Ibrahimi “immediately and + uncharacteristically heatedly laid much of the blame for + the present situation on the French who, he claimed, + were trying to sell new arms to Morocco at a time when + Morocco is pursuing a military solution. He also blamed + King Hassan for bad faith.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850477–0497) In telegram 3526 from Algiers, July 7, the + Embassy reported that during a follow-up discussion, + Kerroum + responded to Newlin “in quiet and measured tones. He + said that it is a very difficult situation if there is + not equal will on both sides to find a political + solution.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850477–0555) We urge + that this dialogue be resumed and intensified, a point which + we will also make with the GOM. + + + For Rabat: You should seek appointment at the highest appropriate + level to make the following points to the GOM: + + The USG is concerned by + the continuing tension in the Western Sahara and the + possibility this raises for an expansion of the + conflict. + + A wider conflict would be contrary to the interests of all + governments directly concerned, including the GOM. + + The USG has noted with + satisfaction the direct Moroccan-Algerian dialogue on + Western Sahara issues and urges that this be resumed and + intensified at the earliest possible date.In telegram 6239 from Rabat, July 5, + Kirby + reported that Filali said he “considered the U.S. + initiative in raising this matter in Algiers and Rabat + to be ‘very positive.’ Acknowledging that there has been + some continuing military action in the area where + Morocco is now extending the berm, Filali claimed that + Morocco has intelligence that the Polisario and Algeria + may be ‘preparing something’ to coincide more or less + with the OAU Foreign + Ministers’ meeting later this month.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850476–0133) We are making the same + point with the GOA. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 432. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Raphel) to Acting Secretary of State WhiteheadSource: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State + Richard Murphy, 1985: + Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, August 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by + Zweifel on August 15; + cleared by Sokolsky, Bishop, + Ross, and John Willett + (IO). Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the + memorandum. Bova initialed the memorandum and wrote: “17 Aug.” An + unknown hand wrote: “August 17, 1985” at the top of the memorandum. + A stamped notation below the date line reads: “AUG 1985 J.C.W. has + seen.” + + + Washington, August 16, 1985 + + + + SUBJECT + Moroccan Positions on Libya, Western Sahara + +

ISSUE

+

How to respond to King Hassan’s request for a more detailed dialogue on + Libya and the Western Sahara.

+

DISCUSSION

+

At the end of your August 12 meeting with King HassanSee footnote 2, Document + 247. and in your subsequent conversation with + Foreign Minister Filali,A record of the Whitehead-Filali discussion + is in telegram 7565 from Rabat, August 13. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850575–0835) the Moroccans made four specific proposals: + + Hassan stated a willingness to raise specific issues of + concern to the USG in putting + Qadhafi to the test. + The King implied that he would be willing to terminate his + relationship with Qadhafi + if he failed to achieve modified Libyan policies. + + To continue the relevant dialogue, the King appealed for an + early visit by National Security Adviser McFarlane and a detailed + message from DCI + Casey concerning + Qadhafi’s involvement + in terrorist acts. + + Both Hassan and FonMin + Filali suggested that if + the USG could persuade the + Algerians to settle the Western Sahara dispute on terms + acceptable to Morocco, this would remove the necessity for a + continuing Moroccan-Libyan tie. + + Finally, the GOM requested + vigorous USG support on the + Western Sahara issue at this fall’s UNGA. +

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+

3. + Pressure Algeria to Resolve the Western Sahara + Dispute.

+

Filali’s formulation (“if the US and + others could persuade Algeria to agree to what Morocco would consider a + reasonable settlement of the + Western Sahara, the need for a Moroccan-Libyan arrangement probably + would wither”) presents several problems. Clearly the GOA’s written proposal of February + 1985See Document + 427. was unacceptable to the Moroccans. Just as + clearly, the Algerians advanced their diplomatic advantage, now claiming + to have presented the only comprehensive proposal for a settlement.

+

The following points are of relevance: + + After several Department and inter-agency reviews,Not found. we remain convinced that + there is no advantage for the USG to assume a direct role in solving the Western + Sahara dispute. Our interests are served by maintaining our + present policy which has a slight bias towards Morocco. + + Filali’s formulation gives us an opening again to urge the + GOM to be explicit in + detailing its version of an acceptable, negotiated settlement. + We should encourage the GOM to + table this as a counter to the Algerian plan, thereafter being + prepared to consider if and how we or other third parties might + help narrow differences between Moroccan and Algerian + plans. +

+

4. + Work With Morocco at the UN.

+

We should be cautious about automatic support for GOM proposals at the UN. Realistically, in the Fourth Committee + (decolonization) and at the UNGA, the + Algerians will be able to muster a majority in support of their + position. A defeat for Morocco would only add to its diplomatic + isolation and diminish the prospects for some kind of UN role in a negotiated settlement.

+

In an August 10The date is in error; the + conversation took place on August 11. A record of the conversation + between Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Charles + Price’s (D-Illinois) delegation and Ibrahimi is in telegram 4206 from Algiers, August + 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850572–0798) conversation with members of the + House Armed Services Committee, Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi said the GOA would be willing to accept a UN-OAU + jointly organized referendum in the Western Sahara. This sets the stage + for a possible compromise under which the GOM would again accept an OAU role while the GOA + would accept a much more direct UN + responsibility. The modalities likely would have to remain vague at this + stage. GOA demands for a referendum + without the presence of either Polisario or Moroccan forces in the + Western Sahara is impractical and the GOM insisting on narrow definition of eligible voters is + another difficulty.

+ +

Concerned bureaus should work with USUN + to devise a strategy aimed at facilitating a consensus resolution, even + though this will be difficult to achieve.

+

Recommendations:

+ + + That you approve the attachedNot + attached. Platt-McFarlane memorandum recommending an + early visit by McFarlane + to Morocco. McFarlane + should be accompanied by a [less than 1 line + declassified] official who can give Hassan a detailed + briefing. We would use this visit to respond to the King’s request + for specific USG policy objectives + vis a vis Qadhafi.Whitehead did not check the approve or + disapprove option, and wrote: “Hold off on this until I can talk + to the Secretary” in the right-hand margin. + + On the Western Sahara dispute, that you reaffirm existing USG policy (i.e. no direct USG role in this regional dispute + which should be settled through negotiations among parties directly + concerned, the settlement ultimately to reflect the views of the + area’s inhabitants) and that this be communicated to the GOM.Whitehead did not + check the approve or disapprove option, and wrote: “Let’s wait + on this until we get the answer to 3” in the right-hand + margin. + + That we encourage the GOM to + table a proposal on settlement of the Western Sahara explicitly + outlining conditions which it would find acceptable.Whitehead approved the + recommendation. + + That IO, USUN, AF and NEA should devise a strategy to + facilitate a consensus resolution on the Western Sahara at this + fall’s UNGA.Whitehead approved the + recommendation. + +
+ +
+ 433. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D850668–0886. Secret. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel and in draft by William + Imbrie (P), Craig Karp (INR), Willett, David Lyon (AF), Sokolsky, and Mark Gatanas + (PM/NESA); approved by Raphel. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, + and USUN. + + STAT 289810. + + Washington, September 20, 1985, + 0310Z + + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Policy Toward the Western Sahara. + + + Ref: + (A) Rabat 8280In telegram 8280 from + Rabat, September 4, Nassif reported that on September 2, after he + presented his credentials, Filali informed him that “Morocco hoped that the + Western Sahara could be kept off the agenda” of the upcoming + NAM meeting in Luanda. + Filali continued: + “Morocco will determine its strategy with respect to the Western + Sahara in the upcoming UN + General Assembly after it sees the results of Luanda” and he + hoped that USUN “will be able + to provide some support in New York this fall to the Moroccan + position that there should be an early UN-sponsored referendum + on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850629–0198) + (B) Algiers 4558In telegram 4558 from + Algiers, September 3, the Embassy reported that during + pre-General Assembly consultations with the Algerian Government, + “GOA officials said that Polisario will not seek admission to + Non-Aligned Movement at Luanda Summit. Instead, Algeria will + urge affirmation of all UN + resolutions relating to the Western Sahara.” The Embassy + continued that de Cuellar told Abdelaziz “his report on the + Western Sahara situation, and the possibility of a UN referendum, would conform with + previously adopted UN + resolutions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850622–0719) + (C) Rabat 8576.In telegram 8576 from + Rabat, September 11, the Embassy reported: “The September 2–7 + Non-Aligned Ministerial meeting in Luanda was a case of damage + limitation for Morocco. While language adopted on the Western + Sahara contains elements unacceptable to Morocco and Zimbabwe + was not Morocco’s first choice as next NAM Chairman, most GOM officials maintain that the results could have + been much worse. The SDAR + was not seated at Luanda and GOM fears of an Algerian chairmanship did not + materialize.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850447–0556) + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Department appreciates insights into current GOM and GOA approaches to Western Sahara (reftels). We are + particularly encouraged by fact that: + + GOA still talking in + terms of a referendum under UN auspices and has not ruled out consensus + resolution; + + GOM also talking in terms + of ceasefire/referendum and has reopened possibility of some + OAU role in conjunction + with UN (para 4, reftel + C). + + + We are now considering our own approach on this issue at this + year’s UNGA. Timing may require us + to make decisions based on what we presently know, but we want + nonetheless now to encourage the GOM to table a proposal explicitly outlining conditions + which it would accept for + settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. This would not have to + make direct reference to the earlier GOA plan which was clearly unacceptable to the GOM. However, to be a step forward, it + must be more than a statement of willingness to abide by an + ill-defined referendum decree/form of autonomy would the GOM be willing to extend to the + Sahraouis, for example? + + In seeking a more detailed and comprehensive statement of GOM terms,Not found. for a Western Sahara settlement, Ambassador + may use the following talking points: + + The United States is prepared to work closely with the + GOM on the Western + Sahara problem at the UN in + the forthcoming session. + + We note with satisfaction that the GOM has made intensive efforts + to contact other states who may have an influence on the + outcome of UN debates on + this issue. + + We hope that it will be possible to achieve a consensus + resolution on the Western Sahara which both Morocco and + Algeria will be able to support. + + In recent conversations GOA officials have kept open the prospect of + working for a consensus resolution. + + We note that the NAM + Ministerial incorporated Morocco’s call on the OAU Chairman and the UN Secretary General to seek + new ways to secure a ceasefire and referendum. + + In order to avoid a sterile procedural consideration of + this issue this year and perhaps a repetition of last year’s + result, we think that it would be opportune for Morocco to + seize the diplomatic high ground by putting forward a plan + for a detailed comprehensive settlement. + + While there are features of Algeria’s earlier plan for a + comprehensive settlement which are obviously unacceptable to + Morocco, Algeria has made much diplomatic capital out of its + claim to have proposed a comprehensive settlement. + + Morocco itself achieved a breakthrough and much support + when King Hassan originally called for a ceasefire and + referendum. To regain the initiative and to facilitate + resumption of a direct dialogue between Morocco and Algeria + on the Western Sahara, Morocco would be well served to come + forward with a new comprehensive plan designed to gain as + much as possible from the people of the Western + Sahara. + + + Shultz +
+ +
+ 434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: George + H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National + Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners + Files, OA/ID 19801, Folder 19801–068, Meetings with + Foreigners—October 1985: Prime Minister Karim Lamrani of Morocco, October 25, 1985. Secret; + Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Tunis, Algiers, + Nouakchott, Dakar, and USUN. + Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + 334309. + + Washington, October 31, 1985, 0537Z + + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Mtg With Moroccan Prime Minister + Karim-Lamrani. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Summary—The Vice President met with Moroccan Prime Minister + Karim-Lamrani on October 25. The Prime Minister focused his remarks + on the Moroccan initiative on the Western Sahara as well as King + Hassan’s thoughts on how best to counter terrorism. End + summary + + Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani of Morocco met with Vice President + Bush on October 25 at + 1100 hours in the Vice President’s office. Also attending the + meeting were Foreign Minister Filali, Ambassador Jorio as well as A. + Raphel of NEA, + D. Gregg of OVP and H. + Teicher of NSC. + + The Prime Minister opened the conversation by noting that his + address to the U.N., given on behalf of the King, focused on the + Saharan issue.In telegram 2892 from + USUN, October 24, the + Mission reported: “In his October 23 address to the GA, Moroccan PM Karim-Lamrani stressed the + historical ties of Morocco to the territory of the Western + Sahara. Accusing ‘the enemies of Morocco’ (led by Algeria) of + blocking peace and delaying resolution of the conflict, he + confirmed Morocco’s commitment to the self-determination + referendum proposed at the 1981 OAU Summit in Nairobi. He requested that this + referendum take place in January 1986, under UN auspices. He also declared a + Moroccan unilateral cease-fire, stressing, however, that Morocco + would defend itself if necessary.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850759–0752) + After 10 years of war, the GOM + believes the issue should be put behind us. Therefore, King Hassan + had called for a unilateral cease-fire which will be fully observed + unless Moroccan forces are attacked.Following an October 15 meeting with Hassan, Nassif reported on “Moroccan + tactics for the upcoming U.N. sessions,” including + Karim-Lamrani’s planned call for a ceasefire, in telegram 9845 + from Rabat, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850738–0601) Also, + the GOM has called for a + referendum, to take place after January 1, 1986, to decide on + self-determination for the Saharan people. The referendum would be + under the aegis of the UN which + could invite any other organization (e. g. the OAU), to assist. + + + Karim-Lamrani added that the referendum should be supported by all + states interested in peace; the GOM + hoped for full and active U. S. + support. In response to a question from the Vice President, the + Prime Minister said the GOM had + ruled out negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario since it + would prejudge the outcome of the referendum and, in any case, the + organization is not representative of the Saharan people. + + The Prime Minister added that although there had been no official + Algerian reaction, the Algerian media had emphasized the demand that + the GOM talk with the Polisario. + The Algerians are treating the referendum idea as clearly overtaken + by events, even though Algeria originally favored a referendum.During an October 2 meeting with + Bush, Ibrahimi said that from + Algeria’s perspective, “three elements were key to a solution of + the Sahara issue—a referendum, negotiations, and the withdrawal + of all forces before the referendum.” (Telegram 309868 to + Algiers, October 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D850717–0517) See Document 154. Karim-Lamrani said + the issue was really very simple. The Western Sahara, historically, + geographically, and in every other way, is part of Morocco. Algeria + wants to annex it. Everything else is just cosmetic. Karim-Lamrani + went on to say that his only answer is for responsible countries to + give the U.N. a wide mandate to organize a referendum with OAU support. The Prime Minister gave + the Vice President a copy of Morocco’s draft resolution. + + The Vice President responded that the U.S. welcomes any proposal + to end the Saharan conflict, and promised that the USG would review the Moroccan proposal + carefully. We have also always encouraged talks between Morocco and + Algeria on this issue. Once we have discussed the proposal within + the government, we would be back to the GOM with a considered and full response. + + In response to the Vice President’s question about Diouf’s view of the proposal, + Karim-Lamrani said that even though Morocco has withdrawn from the + OAU, Diouf had indicated that if asked + for help by the U.N. Secretary General, he would respond + positively.During an October 24 + meeting with Bush, + Diouf indicated that + “he was prepared to work with the U.N. Secretary General to + bring a resolution to this difficult question. He said that if + an acceptable resolution was introduced in the UN, he would do everything in his + power to see that it was passed. Bush asked about the problem this conflict + created for relations between Morocco and Algeria. Diouf responded that the + problem was not between Morocco and Algeria, but rather between + Algeria (sic) and the Polisario.” (Telegram 345750 to Dakar, + November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850805–0875) + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United NationsSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D840801–0699. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by + Merrick; cleared by Keith Wauchope (AF/W), Zweifel, + Susan Biniaz (L/NEA), Raphel, Gilbert Kulick (IO/UNDP), + Lynda Clarizio (L/AF), and Milton + Kovner (IO); approved by Armacost. Sent for information + Immediate to Rabat and Algiers. Sent for information Priority to + Nouakchott, Dakar, Tunis, and Addis Ababa. + + 343528. + + Washington, November 8, 1985, 0039Z + + + + SUBJECT + Instructions on Western Sahara Debate at UNGA. + + + Ref: + (A) USUN 3023,Reference is in error. Telegram 3032 from + USUN, October 31, contains + the text of UN draft resolution + 39/40, which “reaffirms all relevant resolutions adopted by “the + OAU and UN “on the question of Western + Sahara and calls upon the current Chairman of the OAU and the Secretary-General of + the UN to continue their efforts + in finding a just and durable solution to this matter.” The + Mission also noted the draft “was pushed through the African + group despite the fact that it is not acceptable to Morocco + (which refused to participate in the vote on 39/40).” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850779–0042) + (B) USUN 3121,In telegram 3121 from USUN, November 6, the Mission reported that + Haddaoui informed a mission officer that the Moroccans “have + decided to attempt to invoke rule of General Assembly Procedure + 116 in the Fourth Committee vote November 8 on their Western + Sahara Resolution. Rule 116 permits cloture on debate in a + committee after a representative has moved for an adjournment of + debate.” The Mission continued: “The Moroccans evidently think + that, if successful, this procedure will permit them to have a + better chance of having their resolution emerge unamended by the + Algerians and thus subject to a straight up-or-down vote.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D850794–0987) + (C) 84 USUN 3538.Telegram 3538 from USUN, December 4, 1984, contains the text of a + statement delivered by Feldman that indicated the U.S. delegation would + abstain on a resolution introduced by Algeria in the General + Assembly that called for direct negotiations between Morocco and + the Polisario. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D840776–0148) + + + + C—Entire text. + + Moroccan Resolution. Mission is authorized to vote for Moroccan + resolution as introduced and to support Moroccan parliamentary + efforts to achieve an up or down vote on the Moroccan resolution + (preferably avoiding speeches on parliamentary maneuvers). + + Algerian Resolution. Mission should abstain on this resolution as + presently worded. We assume that Algerian resolution will be voted + on prior to the Moroccan resolution. Mission should give explanation + of vote closely paralleling last year’s statement (ref C) and + drawing on following points: + + U.S. has consistently supported efforts to solve the + Saharan conflict through peaceful negotiations. + + Thus, USG has urged a + consensus resolution which could be supported by both + Algeria and Morocco. + + + Standard which determines U.S. position on resolutions now + under debate is whether a resolution contributes to + solution. + + Abstention on the GOA + resolution reflects USG + assessment that call for direct GOM-Polisario negotiations + does not contribute to a settlement. + + USG continues to support + position that a settlement ultimately must reflect views of + inhabitants. Last year, USG + supported concept that UNSYG arrange for a referendum under + appropriate international auspices. This would be consistent + with USG support for 1981 + OAU resolution. + + International community should have an opportunity to vote + for a resolution which supports the concept of a ceasefire, + international observers and a referendum under UN auspices, in consultation + with the OAU.In telegram 3300 from USUN, November 14, the + Mission reported: “Algeria’s resolution calling for + direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario + passed 91–6–43 (US). After Morocco’s failed attempt to + block Algerian amendments to its own resolution, Morocco + withdrew its resolution. Morocco’s FonMin + Filali said + Morocco would no longer participate in any meeting or + debate in the UNGA, + Fourth Committee or Committee of 24 in which Western + Sahara was discussed.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850814–0055) + However, in telegram 3802 from USUN, December 13, the Mission reported + that Haddaoui advised the United States “to take with ‘a + very large grain of salt’ Foreign Minister Filali’s statement.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D850892–0728) + + + Shultz +
+
+ 436. Letter From Vice President Bush to King Hassan + II of MoroccoSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, Morocco 1986 (01/01/1986–02/11/1986). No classification + marking. + + + Washington, January 24, 1986 + + Your Majesty: + +

The beginning of a new year is both a time to look ahead to new + challenges and to look back on past accomplishments and satisfactions. + One of the great satisfactions of 1985 is the continuation of the United + States’ long friendship with the Kingdom of Morocco.

+ +

Looking ahead, we remain concerned by the situation in the Western + Sahara. Your continuing willingness to seek a political settlement is an + important, positive factor. It was in this spirit that my Government + worked closely with yours at the United Nations. I regret that that + debate was again sterile but I am heartened to learn from close friends + in France of your willingness to address this issue in other fora.

+

Your Majesty, you know that my Government is convinced that a solution to + this problem can best be approached through discussions between Morocco + and Algeria. Your previous high level dialogue with President Bendjedid and his government held out + hope, and is still referred very positively by Algerian officials.

+

Now that the dust has settled after the unfruitful United Nations’ + debate, it would seem a propitious time again to examine whether renewed + high level contacts between you and President Bendjedid might not produce movement. + Based on my personal conversations with him and other ranking Algerian + officials, I believe there is an increasing receptivity on the Algerian + side to such a dialogue.

+

I will subsequently be writing President Bendjedid to suggest to him, as I am to you, that this + could be an important moment to work for peace in the Western + Sahara.In a January 28 letter to + Bendjedid, Bush wrote: “We remain convinced + that the solution to this conflict can best be approached through + discussions between your two governments. I have written King Hassan + to express this view, and wished to express to you directly my hope + that such talks can take place.” (Ibid.)

+

Please accept, Your Majesty, my continuing best wishes for the health and + well-being of yourself and the people of Morocco.

+

Sincerely,

+ George + Bush +
+ +
+ 437. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence + and Research (Abramowitz) and the + Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs (Raphel) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. Secret; Sensitive. 4 pages not + declassified. + + + Washington, January 24, 1986 + + +

 

+
+
+ 438. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Records, Lot 95D23, 1986 Nodis Telegrams, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. + + 1319. + + Rabat, February 7, 1986, 0934Z + + +

SecState pls pass White House for Vice President Bush. Dept also pass to USUN and AmEmbassies Algiers and Dakar. + Subj: February 7 Audience With King Hassan—Initiative on the Western + Sahara. Ref: (A) Rabat 1178In telegram 1178 + from Rabat, February 5, Nassif reported that during a February 4 meeting, + Filali “briefed me on + current prospects for renewing dialogue with Algeria on the Western + Sahara.” Nassif also reported + that Filali said “Morocco is + also following closely current soundings on the issue by the UN Secretary General and OAU Chairman and believes that + progress could also be made through those channels” and “expressed + interest in U.S. thinking on a Saharan settlement.” (Ibid.) + (B) SecState 26510.Telegram 26510 + transmitted the Vice President’s message. See Document 436.

+ + + Secret/Nodis—Entire text. + + Summary: During my February 7 audience with King Hassan on other + subjects, I referred to the Vice President’s message (ref B) + exploring possibilities of direct Moroccan-Algerian talks on the + Western Sahara, emphasizing the U.S. did not want to interfere but + was willing to be helpful. Hassan expressed thanks for the Vice + President’s interest. He said that he was willing to enter into a + direct dialogue with Algiers, and would initiate one. He cautioned, + however, that past experience had shown Algiers is increasingly + opposed to self-determination in the region, and said that talks + without a third party as witness allowed Algiers to intentionally + misconstrue to others the tough positions they took with Rabat. Hassan said the U.S. + could advance the process by encouraging OAU Chairman Diouf to link up with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar’s efforts, and + backing Morocco’s calls for a referendum of self-determination for + the region. End summary. + + Following discussion of other subjects with King Hassan at my + February 7 audience in Marrakech, I raised the issue of the Western + Sahara. (Prior to the audience I had lunched with Foreign Minister + Filali, who noted to me + the “interesting letter” from Vice President Bush to the King (ref B) + regarding contacts with Algeria on the Western Sahara which had been + delivered the day before. He encouraged me to raise the issue with + Hassan, noting that it might be time to again seek to move things + along on the subject.) I emphasized to Hassan that the US had no desire to insert itself into + the process of resolving the issue, but wanted to be helpful if it + could. I explained to him that Algeria had been very active + diplomatically, and had told the U.S. Government of its desire and + readiness to resolve the issue if Morocco was interested in renewing + the bilateral dialogue that has been dormant since early + 1985. + + Hassan expressed appreciation for the Vice President’s interest, + noting that for a variety of reasons, it is only natural that the + United States should take an interest in the Saharan issue. He + emphasized that Morocco was willing to renew the bilateral dialogue. + Morocco is in a strong position, he explained. Like a lawyer who + knows he has a strong case, it is not interested in who pleads + first. Thus, Morocco would not stand on protocol, and was prepared + to seek renewed contacts with Algeria but did not specify a time + frame. + + He cautioned, however, against expecting too much from such + contacts. Algeria is not interested in the solution of + self-determination for the Sahraoui people through a referendum, and + in fact appears to be gradually backing away from that solution. + Moreover, Algeria has to date insisted on face-to-face talks with + Morocco rather than with a third party (other than the Polisario) + because it “wants no witnesses.” He explained that Algeria portrays + one thing as its position to third countries, while in its actual + contacts with Morocco, it says something entirely different. Hassan + recalled that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia had in early 1985 proposed + Moroccan-Algerian talks at his palace in Marbella with the Saudis + acting as facilitators, and that Algeria would have nothing of + it. + + Hassan said the U.S. could help facilitate a solution to the + Western Saharan question, however, by helping to move along the + efforts currently underway with UN + Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in New York (ref A). He asked if + the US could “push” OAU Chairman Abou Diouf to cooperate with Perez + de Cuellar. He emphasized his high esteem for Diouf, and said he had spoken on + several occasions recently “on the phone and through emissaries” + with Diouf. He noted that + Diouf’ s mandate as OAU head runs out in mid-1986, and + expressed fear that Diouf + could be followed “by some leftist” who would complicate more than + help matters. At the same time, he said, the U.S. would be useful if + it helped push for a referendum of self-determination of the Saharan + population. He emphasized that only a referendum would serve as the + basis for a lasting settlement in the area, and that the sooner both + sides moved toward that position, the better. + + Comment: Hassan seemed somewhat less enthused about the efforts + under way in New York than Filali had been just two days earlier (ref A) but + sees usefulness in pursuing that path and would appreciate U.S. help + in encouraging it. He has no illusions, however, about the + difficulties any of the negotiating options will face. + + Nassif +
+
+ 439. Telegram 40098 From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Algeria and MoroccoSource: + Department of State, INR/IL + Historical Files, [text not declassified], + 1986–88, Algeria. Secret; Immediate; [handling + restriction not declassified]. 1 page not + declassified. + + + Washington, February 8, 1986, 0057Z + + +

 

+
+
+ 440. Telegram 7835 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, Morocco, [text not declassified]. + Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. 2 pages not declassified. + + + Rabat, August 6, 1986, 1605Z + + +

 

+
+ +
+ 441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and the Mission to the United + NationsSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D860677–0664. Secret; Priority, Stadis. Drafted by Merrick; cleared + by Bishop, Willett, Mann, + and Laipson; Ussery in + substance, and Biniaz for information; approved by + Suddarth. + + 280047. + + Washington, September 6, 1986, 0710Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara Policy Review. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + Over the next 2–3 weeks NEA and + AF will be reviewing policy + options for the Western Sahara. As this dispute is a fundamental + element of the competition between Algeria and Morocco, the scope of + the review will necessarily include our bilateral relations with + Morocco and Algeria as well as regional questions such as + maintaining support for Tunisia, maintaining Mauritania’s + neutrality, and limiting expenditure of our diplomatic capitol on + this issue in Africa. The value of the review will be enhanced by a + discussion of the widest range of options. The purpose of this + message is to solicit contributions for this review which should be + sent Stadis no later than September 11. + + We propose that the review initially examine long and short term + U.S. interests which relate to the conflict (last review was based + on an assessment of prospects for a negotiated settlement). These + U.S. interests would include the following: + + Regional stability and the U.S. strategic posture for the + long term are best served by the territory of the Western + Sahara remaining under Moroccan control. Our interests would + not be served by an independent non-viable Western Sahara + state subject to Libyan, Soviet or other influences hostile + to or nonsupportive of U.S. strategic interests. + + U.S. interests are best served through maintaining good + relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Moroccan/Algerian + cooperation is the best assurance of long term regional + stability. Competition between these two states, however, is + fundamental in regional politics. Contrary to our interests, + both states have used their relationship with Libya as an + element in this competition. + + + Policy propositions (the intent here is to be stimulative—not + inclusive): + + We should avoid entanglement in efforts to mediate the + Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and Algeria as long + as prospects for a settlement remain unpromising. + + + Continue to encourage Moroccan and Algerian cooperation + and flexibility. + + We wish to avoid policies that might lead to greater + direct U.S. involvement in the Western Sahara war. At the + same time a Moroccan military defeat by Algeria in an + expanded conflict would lead to severe destabilization of a + friendly regime, and is therefore to be avoided. + + We do not want Moroccan/Algerian friction over the Western + Sahara to escalate, given the danger of direct military + conflict between Algeria and Morocco and its + consequences. + + After the King’s meeting with Peres and his abrogation of the unity + agreement with Libya, we wish to increase support for + Morocco (and to be perceived as doing so). However, our + budgetary resources are severely limited. Are our Western + Sahara policies an area in which we can demonstrate support + without undue harm to our relations with Algeria nor changes + to our basic view of the legal status of the + territory? + + We wish to avoid extension of the hostility to Mauritanian + soil. + + + Policy options: We would appreciate each post defining Western + Sahara policy options as they see them with suggested changes as + well as a discussion of the pros and cons of each option. While we + expect the outcome of this examination will lean toward the no + change or modest change end of the spectrum, discussion of longer + term and wider ranging policy alternatives is encouraged. The review + will examine our policy and guidelines for casual incidental contact + with the Polisario. Other issues which might be considered are: + + A Western Sahara referendum under other multilateral + sponsorship, perhaps stimulated by the U.S. (assuming lack + of success of referendum proposals by the OAU and UN). + + How we should react if Morocco takes moves towards a + unilateral referendum? + + Liberalized travel policies for U.S. officials in the + Western Sahara. Who should be allowed to travel and under + what circumstances? + + Should we formally include the territories ceded by + Mauritania in the area we consider under Moroccan + administrative control? + + Can we constructively discuss limiting Libyan support for + the Polisario with Algeria? What will be the effect of + greater Libyan support for the Polisario on our bilateral + relations with Algeria? How will Libyan support for the + Polisario color our wider perceptions of the Western Sahara + conflict? + + If the Polisario adopts indiscriminate terrorist tactics + in Morocco, how will our posture change on the conflict? Can + we persuade Algeria that the adoption of such tactics by the + Polisario would be inimical to their interests? + + + We have generally been supportive of Moroccan positions on + the Western Sahara in international fora, particularly the + U.N. and in OAU countries. + What would be the effect of increased support? Would it be + productive? How would it affect our relations with African + states?In telegram 8819 + from Tunis, September 10, the Embassy replied: “Aside + from encouragement of Tunisian initiatives and + continuing our consultations with the GOT on the problem, there + seems little the U.S. can do from Tunis. Tunisia already + gives its quiet approval to our support of Morocco.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860689–0963) Algeria?In telegram 4583 from Algiers, + September 11, the Embassy replied: “We agree that the + U.S. should continue to avoid direct entanglement in + proposals to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. + Nevertheless, we should continue to maintain a posture + to encourage all sides to seek a political settlement + and not lead any to expect that a military solution + would be acceptable to the U.S. In the end, we continue + to believe that direct Algerian-Moroccan discussions + offer the best prospect for resolving the conflict.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860691–0280) Can we + encourage more effective Arab support of Moroccan positions + on the Western Sahara?In + telegram 3988 from Nouakchott, September 11, the Embassy + replied: “This Embassy welcomes the chance to + participate in the Western Sahara policy review, though + we regret we have no new ideas to offer. In our view, + protracted conflict is inevitable, and the role of + policy must be reduced to damage control. A + Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement would certainly assure + regional stability and best serve U.S. interests, but it + is utopian to expect that it is possible.” The Embassy + continued: “Current U.S. policy on the Western Sahara, + while not particularly satisfying, seems appropriate.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860702–0175) + + +

In this exploratory phase, posts may wish to examine some “straw man” + optionsIn telegram 2600 from USUN, September 13, the Mission + replied: “We think that the U.N. is no place for the USG to deal directly with the + Polisario or to initiate changes in our current policy.” The Mission + continued: “Polisario has not been able to improve its official + status here” and contended, “while we could actively seek to keep + Polisario’s access limited, its lack of progress under current + conditions argues in favor of a more discreet approach—if it ain’t + broke, don’t fix it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D860696–0921) which they oppose + simply to widen the area of discussion.In + telegram 9197 from Rabat, September 15, the Embassy reported: “The + Western Sahara issue appears to be on dead-center with little hope + of early resolution. We consider just about right the present U.S. + policy of stated neutrality with respect to the outcome of a + negotiated settlement or referendum, while encouraging + Algerian-Moroccan contacts and urging a peaceful solution.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860711–0273, S860700–0329)

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 442. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Military Assistant + (Menarchik) to Vice President + BushSource: George H.W. Bush Library, + Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, + Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19816, Folder 19816–022, + Western Sahara—1986. No classification marking. Sent through + Fuller. + + + Washington, November 1, 1986 + + + + SUBJECT + Response to President Bendjedid’s Message on the Western Sahara + +

President Bendjedid of Algeria + sent you a message concerning his complaints that US/United Nations + actions were incompatible with stated USG policy (see Tab 2).

+

The Algerian concern arose as a result of Ambassador Walters’ statements and actions + during UNGA discussion on the Western + Sahara. Ambassador Walters + defined Morocco and Algeria as the parties to the dispute, rather than + Morocco and the Polisario. This point, and the fact that Ambassador + Walters’ rhetoric was + slanted in an anti-Algerian tone, irked the Algerians and precipitated + the complaint to you (see Tab 3).

+

BACKGROUND: During the 1986 UNGA debates, the Algerians appeared to + be predestined to “win” their case again on the Western Sahara issue + (Algeria, perennially gets near automatic support from Third World + supporters). The Moroccans were opposed, but did not actively + participate; rather the Moroccans “leaned” on the US to “carry their freight for them.” This + Ambassadors Walters and + Reed did with enthusiasm. + Evidently USUN wanted the US to vote NO rather than ABSTAIN as State + instructed them to do.In telegram 330954 to + USUN, October 22, the + Department instructed the Mission to abstain on the Algerian + resolution. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860803–0345) No record of the Mission’s + desire to vote “no” on the resolution has been found. A + donnybrook arose between the State Department and USUN. State instructed USUN to abstain and to explain the + abstention by citing the intransigence of the Polisario.No record of the Department’s instructions has been + found. In telegram 3425 from USUN, + October 23, which contains the text of Walters’s statement of explanation, the Mission + reported: “The impact of Ambassador Walters’s explanation of vote given before the vote + was enormous. Literally dozens of delegation representatives + descended on U.S. delegation requesting copies of the statement.” + The Mission also reported: “The level of support for Algeria in the + resolution appeared to have slightly dwindled since 1985,” by four + votes. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D860804–0926) Several “heated” phone calls ensued + between Ambassador Walters and + Asst Secretary Armacost.No record of the telephone calls has been + found.

+ +

Ambassador Walters appeared + before the Fourth Committee of the UNGA (the committee on decolonialization) and delivered his + rather emotional, pro-Moroccan speech.

+

STATE RECOMMENDATIONS: The State Department + believes that a formal response from you is not expected, but provided a + draft letter should you choose to answer President Bendjedid.

+

NSC and OVP/NSA RECOMMENDATIONS: + NSC (Dennis Ross) and OVP/NSA believe you should respond with + a verbal answer (using OVP/NSA as + your surrogate) using the draft letter as an outline.At the bottom of the memorandum, Bush wrote: “1. Yes, keep channel + ‘open.’ 2. Ask Johnstone to + reiterate policy thanking Bendjedid for his message. GB 11–3.”

+ + Tab 2 + Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSecret; Immediate; Nodis. + Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in + the White House Situation Room. + + 5462. + + Algiers, October 28, 1986, + 1556Z + + +

Dept pass VP Office for Don + Gregg. Subject: Bendjedid Message to VP Bush.

+ + + Secret—Entire text. + + After discussing Syria (septel),In telegram 5461 from Algiers, October 28, the Embassy + reported that Ibrahimi “said he had received report on + British Ambassador’s démarche made to Hamdani. The British + had put forward a convincing case that three officials of + the Syrian Embassy in London were deeply implicated in the + attempt to blow up the El Al airliner. Nonetheless, + Ibrahimi said + that he remained personally convinced that the hand of + Israeli intelligence was behind the entire event.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D860819–0263) Documentation on the + attempted bombing of the El Al airliner is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January + 1989. Foreign Minister Ibrahimi pulled Ambassador + aside saying he had been asked to pass personal message from + President Bendjedid to VP + Bush. The message + was simply to raise to the Vice President’s attention Bendjedid’s concern over the + activities of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations over the + past two weeks. + + Ibrahimi said that + Algeria found the U.S. Mission’s role during the debate on the + Western Sahara to be incompatible with stated U.S. policy on the + region. The Mission had lobbied for Moroccan positions, even + trying at one point to convince the Algerian delegation to + accept Moroccan amendments. Although Algeria had, in the + interest of keeping peace at the UN, not proposed any substantive changes to last + year’s + UN resolution, the U.S. Mission + worked very hard to undermine the Algerian position. In addition + to Ambassador Reed’s + efforts to lobby on behalf of Moroccan amendments, General + Walters had + involved himself personally in the fray (for the first time, he + said), having given a strong speech critical of the Algerian + resolution just prior to the vote. Ibrahimi judged that the speech had cost Algeria + several votes. + + Ibrahimi summarized by + noting that the U.S. has reiterated its neutral policy in the + Western Sahara in statements in Washington during the past year. + The policy pursued by the U.S. Mission in New York, he claimed, + seemed to be unrelated to that of Washington. He reiterated the + President’s hope that his concerns would be passed on to VP + Bush. He did not + leave the impression that a reply was expected. + + Ambassador promised to transmit the message but expressed the + view that U.S. Mission in New York was simply fulfilling its + mandate to seek areas of agreement in its discussion of the + resolution in question. He said U.S. abstention was proof + positive of U.S. position and, although he said he had not yet + had the opportunity to see the text of any U.S. Mission + statements, he was quite confident that no one had taken sides + on the Western Sahara conflict. In any case, there was no + question of there having been any change in the well-defined + U.S. policy in the region. + + Johnstone + + + Tab 3 + Telegram From the White House to Air Force TwoSecret. + + WH00504. + + Washington, November 1, 1986, + 2130Z + + +

Please Deliver to LtCol Doug + Menarchik. Memorandum for Mr. Donald P. Gregg, The + White House. Subject: Algerian Message on the Western Sahara + Problem.

+

Growing out of last week’s debate in the U.N.’s Fourth Committee on + the Western Sahara conflict, the Algerians have complained to us + that USUN’s actions were + incompatible with stated USG + policy.

+

In considering the request for Department views and recommendations + concerning President Bendjedid’s message to the Vice President on this + subject (Algiers 5462, Nodis), we noted that Ambassador Johnstone responded to Foreign + Minister Ibrahimi in very + good fashion and that Embassy Algiers does not think a formal + response is expected. This + would be the Department’s preferred course of action as well. + However, a proposed draft is appended should the Vice President + choose to answer President Bendjedid.

+ Nicholas + Platt + + Executive Secretary + + +

His Excellency

+

Chadli Bendjedid

+

President of the Democratic and Popular

+

Republic of Algeria

+

Algiers

+

Dear Mr. President.

+

I am pleased to continue our exchange of messages on issues of + concern. These messages provide an invaluable means through which we + can further the growth of mutual understanding and cooperation + between our governments.

+

You will recall that I wrote to you in January of this year on the + subject of the Western Sahara. At that time, I expressed my concern + about the continuation of the conflict, an issue which I find + particularly disturbing as it involves two friends of the United + States, Algeria and Morocco. My concern is undiminished, Mr. + President, just as the basic policy of the United States Government + toward the dispute remains unchanged. We still are convinced that + this problem cannot be solved militarily, that a resolution will + come only through direct negotiations among the concerned parties, + and that any solution must reflect the desires of those directly + affected.

+

Regarding your observations on the recent United Nations debate, I + wish there could be closer correlation in our views on a range of + topics in international fora. In this case, I want to reassure your + that Ambassador Walters’ + statement to the Fourth Committee was, in itself, an expression of + our deep apprehension about this issue. Our long-held position is + that resolutions which do not have support from all those directly + involved do not enhance prospects for solutions to problems and + might actually impede progress. This is the context of Ambassador + Walters’ explanation of + vote, as well as of my government’s abstention on your + resolution.

+

Mr. President, I reiterate my pleasure at hearing from you again. I + continue to count on your friendship and assure you that you may + count on mine and that of the United States Government.

+

Sincerely,

+ George + Bush + +
+ +
+ 443. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of + StateSource: George H.W. + Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security + Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19874, Folder + 19874–017, Western Sahara [Morocco, Algeria] 1987. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Underneath the date line, Gregg wrote: “Mr Vice President: + Sensible cable. I might suggest that a PRG be held to look at this issue, if a trip to the + Maghreb is at all of interest to you.” No record of a subsequent + PRG on Western Sahara has been + found. + + 354. + + Rabat, January 13, 1987, 1047Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara: Algerian Initiative. + + + Ref: + Algiers 16.In telegram 16 from + Algiers, January 3, Johnstone reported that during a December 31, + 1986, meeting, “Ibrahimi thought the U.S. had a critical role to + play” on the Western Sahara and believed “it would be useful if + the Vice President would renew the appeal he made last year + encouraging a negotiated settlement and possibly visit the + region in the next few months.” (Ibid.) + + + + (Secret/Nodis—Entire text) + + Summary: Embassy does not think there is much prospect of moving + the Western Sahara dossier off dead-center. On the other hand, it + would be useful for the U.S. to remind both Algeria and Morocco of + our continued interest in an early negotiated settlement, provided + we are careful to avoid becoming substantively involved in the test + of wills between Algiers and Rabat. Embassy has previously + recommended strongly that Vice President Bush head a high-level delegation + to Morocco for March 3–4 Feast of the Throne/U.S.-Morocco + bicentennial kick-off celebrations. We recommend that the Vice + President visit Algeria as well and that he take up the Western + Sahara in both capitals. U.S. should approach this exercise with + modest expectations, however, and not unnecessarily use up political + capital. End summary.Gregg drew a vertical line in + the left-hand and right-hand margins bracketing the last three + sentences of this paragraph. + + Embassy read reftel (and reports on previous contacts in Algiers) + with great interest and is intrigued by the Algerians’ efforts to + bring the U.S. into the negotiating process on the Western Sahara + and by the GOA’s insistence that a + 2–3 month window of opportunity for ameliorating the problem is now + open. Since this Embassy does not see much likelihood of an early + settlement, we wonder about the reasons for the full court press by + the Algerians. It may well be that the GOA believes Moroccan plans to build the sixth berm and + extend it to Mauritania, will further solidify the Moroccan position + and thus close the window of opportunity. (According to our DAO, if the Moroccans go all out, they + can complete the main construction in less than two months.) It may + also be that the GOA is trying to + make an impact on what they perhaps consider to be a warming trend + in U.S.-Moroccan relations. In any case, given U.S. interest in enhanced regional + stability, Embassy thinks that with certain cautions, the Algerian + proposal that the U.S. reiterate its interest in a peaceful + settlement could be pursued. + + Implicit in the Algerians’ proposal are several apparent + assumptions that we think may be invalid: (1) The first is that if + the Algerians can deliver the Polisario, the U.S. can deliver the + Moroccans. Apart from the asymmetry of the suggestion—Algeria, after + all, is itself a party to the conflict with its own interests to + serve in a settlement—it is far from clear that either the Polisario + or Morocco is prepared to make major concessions. The Western Sahara + remains, for the King and the Moroccan populace, a national issue of + historic dimensions. U.S.-urged concessions would be politely but + firmly rebuffed; (2) there is an assumption that Morocco is disposed + to negotiate when it is in fact in a position of growing strength, + having forced a stalemate in the war on the ground and now moving to + fill in the final link in its defenses. The Moroccans think they are + playing from a strong hand, and, if we read them correctly, they + have a long-term strategy of gradual absorption of the Sahara which + would not admit major concessions at this time. There appears to be + at least a hope on Algeria’s part that Morocco is tiring of the game + and may be ready for talks, when the prospects have actually + diminished for a political settlement that would do much more than + put the seal on what Morocco already holds. Although Algeria has won + the diplomatic battle for SDAR + recognition by a substantial list of countries, the GOM has, as noted above, outflanked + the Polisario and, following on its efforts to stabilize the Sahara + militarily, is already moving to develop the populated areas + economically. Seen from this perspective, the motivation for + wide-ranging negotiations has diminished since 1984. + + We note that the Algerians have been careful to keep this project + separate from the SYG’s effort and + his presumed visit in late January to Algiers. We doubt that either + side puts much stock in Perez de Cuellar’s ability to resolve the + issues. + + Leaving aside the actual prospects for the Algerian proposal to + us, what should be the U.S. attitude? So long as the U.S. observes + certain principles and cautions, we see some merit in a new U.S. + effort to stimulate direct talks between Algeria and Morocco. + Whether or not the proposed meeting between Bendjedid and King Hassan takes + place, we think it would be useful to have a high level U.S. visitor + in the region at the end of February–early March time frame. This + Embassy has already proposed a Vice Presidential visit to kick off + the bicentennial of U.S.-Moroccan relations on the anniversary of + the “Fete du Trone”, March 3. This might well be an opportune moment + for us to undertake a high-level review of the bidding on the + Western Sahara and perhaps to urge a meeting between Hassan and + Bendjedid. The Vice + President could presumably + then travel to Algiers (and we would urge Tunisia or some other + regional stop also). + + We would strongly urge that the U.S. limit its role to that of + friendly but noninvolved party. We should be careful lest Hassan + sense any Algerian-inspired pressure on him, which might stiffen his + resolve to let events take their course. We should make it clear to + all that we are not substituting for the parties, are not going to + get involved in the substance of the dispute and that we seek merely + to play a facilitating role in bringing the two sides + together. + + We do not think the preliminary visit suggested in para 6–F would + be productive on this issue. + + Department please pass to Algiers. + + Nassif +
+
+ 444. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis + Memoranda: Lot 94D432, Nodis Memoranda March 1987. Secret; Noforn; + Nodis. Drafted by Jefferson. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum reads: “Mar 2, 1987.” + + + Washington, February 27, 1987 + + + + SUBJECT + Military Situation in the Western Sahara + + + + A large Polisario armored force attacked Morocco’s defensive + barrier (berm) in the Western Sahara February 25.In telegram 1974 from Rabat, February 26, the + Embassy reported that “Moroccan forces in the Al-Mahbas + (Northeastern) sector of the Western Sahara defensive berm + sustained a major Polisario armored/mechanized attack in the + morning hours of February 25.” The Polisario “breached the berm + and reportedly penetrated as far as three kilometers before + being driven off.” One-hundred eighty Moroccan soldiers were + killed, wounded, or captured. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870152–0229) + + This was the largest Polisario armor movement ever, and the first + large-scale attack employing armor unit tactics. + + Timely warning and inadequate Polisario air defenses enabled the + Moroccans to fend off the attack; [1½ lines not + declassified]. + + + Nevertheless, the Moroccans are vulnerable to such attacks, due to + thinly spread armor resources; more night-capable anti-tank weapons + would bolster their defenses. + +

Morocco forewarned. Following several minor + attacks on the berm last week, the Polisario attempted a major attack in + the Mahbas area (see map)Attached but not + printed. February 25. Preparations for the attack began + February 18–22 when five tank and six mechanized companies—a substantial + portion of the entire Polisario armor force—left garrison in Algeria. + [3 lines not declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

+

We have no explanation for this uncharacteristic failure to provide + adequate air defense for the assault force. (An SA–6 inside Algeria + downed a Moroccan F–1 during a smaller attack in 1985.) Possibly, the + Polisario realized they had been detected and launched their attack + before the preparations were complete.

+

A real problem. Moroccan forces along the berm are + stretched thin. There are only some 78 tanks along the entire segment of + the berm running south parallel to the Algerian border—the area which + can easily be reached by heavy equipment operating from Polisario base + camps in southern Algeria and northeastern Mauritania. The problem has + been exacerbated by the shift of some units to protect the construction + force now extending the barrier southward from the Bir Enzaran area. + Only some 15 or so fighters are available at southern airbases.

+

There is some question as to how capable the Polisario are of continuing + such attacks. They have only recently begun to conduct armor unit + exercises, and will doubtless have difficulty replacing trained tank + crews. Nevertheless, in this case and in numerous others, fairly large + Polisario units have proved capable of using the terrain and the cover + of darkness to approach the berm undetected and launch surprise attacks. + Moroccan ground and air surveillance is quite deficient, due to + budgetary constraints affecting both the overall equipment inventory and + proper maintenance.

+

TOWs would help. [1½ lines not + declassified] it is clear they face a potentially serious armor + threat. The Moroccan army might find it hard to cope with a large armor + force if that force used surprise to get inside the berm and was + adequately supported by mobile SAMs. A large supply of TOWs and + launchers would help redress the potential imbalance in armor in such a + scenario. Equipped with night vision devices, these anti-tank missiles + would also give the Moroccans a means of preempting an attack at night, + when the Moroccan air force’s planes are out of the equation. For + Moroccan overall defensive strategy to be fully effective, major improvements to Moroccan + ground and air-surveillance capabilities are also needed, as is an + upgrade in electronic protection (ESM) of Moroccan aircraft against + Polisario/Algerian SAMs.In telegram 582037 + to Rabat, February 27, Weinberger requested that the Embassy transmit the + following message to Hassan: “We have received your request for + rapid military support. I give you my firm assurance that the United + States will stand by its esteemed friend—the Kingdom of Morocco—in + its hour of need. I have therefore approved your request and we will + begin shipping requested items within 15 days.” (Washington National + Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–90–0023, 1987 Official Records + (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of + Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy + Secretary of Defense, Box 44, Morocco 1987) On February 26, the + Moroccan Defense Attaché, Mohamed El-Kostali, wrote Armitage + requesting 50 TOW launchers and 500 + TOW missiles. (Letter from + Kostali to Armitage; ibid.)

+
+
+ 445. Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in MoroccoSource: Reagan Library, Near East and + South Asia Affairs Directorate, William + J. Burns Files, Morocco (02/26/1987–04/08/1987). + Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kirby. At the top of the memorandum, Kelly wrote: + “Jim—FYI,” drew an arrow and + wrote: “Pls pass to Bob Oakley,” and to the right of this wrote: + “Frank gave to Gates to check out. BK.” In telegram 2245 from Rabat, + March 6, the Embassy transmitted a similar version of the + memorandum. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870177–0296) + + + Rabat, March 4, 1987 + + + + SUBJECT + Possible Libyan Resumption of Arms Assistance to the + Polisario + +

At Ambassador Nassif’s reception + for Secretary of the Treasury Baker March 4, Moroccan Foreign Minister Filali and Moroccan Air Force Chief + Kabbaj asked to see the Secretary and the Ambassador to pass on a + message from King Hassan.A record of the + Baker-Filali conversation, which took place before the reception, is + in telegram 2246 from Rabat, March 6. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870177–0314) The + King wished to inform Washington of his concern that Libya may have + resumed arms aid to the Polisario and be rushing military equipment to + the Polisario via an “air bridge.”In + telegram 73536 to Rabat, March 13, the Department reported: “Embassy + may inform FM Filali that, + based on information available to us, we are unable to confirm that + there was any resumption of Libyan military support to the + Polisario.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [text not + declassified], Rabat, 1986–88) From February 28 + through March 4, the Moroccans have registered 11 Libyan flights to + Tindouf in Algeria near the Moroccan border. The Moroccans think the aircraft may be + Soviet-built Antopov transports. Each plane has remained on the ground + in Tindouf about one hour.

+

Noting that Libya’s Qadhafi had + rhetorically attacked King Hassan publicly in remarks delivered March + 2,In telegram 2236 from Rabat, March 6, + the Embassy reported: “Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi attacked King + Hassan in March 2 remarks made to the Libyan General People’s + Congress. These public personal attacks, the first that Qadhafi has made on Hassan since + September, indicate that Libyan-Moroccan relations are probably in + for a period of renewed tension.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870177–0036) and + that the head of Algeria’s FLN has also + spoken out strongly against Morocco this week,Not further identified. Foreign Minister + Filali said the GOM wonders whether it is about to face a + major escalation in the Western Sahara.

+

While noting that the primary purpose in asking for the brief meeting + with Secretary Baker was + simply to inform the Washington community about Morocco’s concerns, the + Moroccan officials said that it would be very helpful if the U.S. could, + [less than 1 line not declassified], discover + the nature of Libyan shipments to Tindouf and inform the GOM.

+

Secretary Baker offered to + carry the Moroccan request to Washington expeditiously and said he hoped + the USG could assume a heightened state + of observance in the region.

+
+
+ 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco + and AlgeriaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870178–0920. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by + Ussery, Thomas Benesch + (AF/W), Smith, Mann, Laipson, + Biniaz, Mueller, Bishop, and + Peter Covington (S/S–O); approved + by Armacost. Sent for + information to Tunis, Nouakchott, Paris, and USUN. + + 67502. + + Washington, March 7, 1987, 0936Z + + +

From Under Secretary Armacost, + please hold for COM’s return. Subject: + USG Policy re Western Sahara.

+ + + (C) Entire text. + + After careful review, Department concludes that present USG policies and practices relative to + Western Sahara dispute serve USG + interests very well.See Document + 441. These are reiterated for information and + guidance of addressees. + + Essential points on solution to Western Sahara dispute are as + follows: + + A military solution to this issue is neither possible nor + desirable. The dispute should be settled through + negotiations between and among the parties directly + concerned (USG assiduously + has avoided specification of “parties”, but consistently has + made clear that Algerian involvement would be a sine qua non + to a settlement.) + + USG acknowledges GOM administrative + responsibility in that part of Western Sahara under Moroccan + control. This does not constitute acceptance of Moroccan + sovereignty, a matter to be decided through the political + process foreseen in first tick. + + Solution to conflict ultimately must reflect the views of + those directly affected. (We must avoid formulations which + further would prejudge issue of who would participate in + referendum—e.g. use of either “Saharaouis” or “inhabitants”; + this is another issue to be determined through + negotiations.) + + In confidential exchanges with the GOA and GOM we have expressed + reservations about the viability of an independent Saharan + state. + + + We neither seek nor reject contact with Polisario/SDAR representatives. + + As a matter of practice, meetings between administration + officials and Polisario/SDAR officials will take place in Algeria, be + infrequent, take place at political counselor level or + below, and be subject to prior, case-by-case approval by + Ambassador or Chargé to Algiers. + + At such meetings, USG + interlocutor should reiterate to Polisario/SDAR officials that this + does not constitute USG + recognition of SDAR. + + If Polisario/SDAR + officials directly present formal written communications + addressed to USG, they + should be informed that there will be no USG response. Such + communications, and any received via other means (e.g. via + delivery to our Embassy in Algiers) will be forwarded + routinely to NEA/AFN. + + + Travel by administration officials to Western Sahara: + + Travel by executive branch personnel will be on an + exceptional basis at the working level (specifically + excluding the Ambassador and DCM) and subject to prior case-by-case approval + by the Ambassador or Chargé. + + + Approval will not be granted for visits by U.S. military + personnel, except on a case-by-case basis with Washington + interagency approval necessary. + + When travel is performed, USG personnel should reiterate that this does + not constitute USG + recognition of GOM + sovereignty over disputed territory. + + Codels which visit the territory may be escorted by + Mission officers of the lowest appropriate rank. + + Consuls may go to the Western Sahara as necessary to + handle consular cases. + + + Whitehead +
+
+ 447. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President BendjedidSource: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs + Directorate, William J. + Burns Files, Morocco (02/26/1987–04/08/1987). No + classification marking. + + + Washington, March 9, 1987 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

Ambassador Johnstone has reported + to me his conversations with you, General Belkheir and Foreign Minister Ibrahimi on the difficult Western + Sahara issue.In telegram 1626 from Algiers, + March 17, Johnstone reported + that during a March 14 office call Belkheir provided the following update: “The Pérez + de Cuellar initiative remains on track but major stumbling blocks + remain. The UNSYG reports that + Hassan has agreed to quote UN + organization and supervision unquote of a referendum. Belkheir attaches some significance + to this language in that previous Moroccan formulations, he says, + have agreed to supervision but not a UN role in organization. The question of Moroccan troop + and administrative presence in the Sahara remains a stumbling block. + Certainly no fair referendum can be held as long as Moroccan troops + are co-located with the Saharan population.” Belkheir also said “the question of + what exactly the Saharans might be invited to vote on has not even + been broached.” Johnstone + indicated that Belkheir + believed that “the Western Sahara problem would have to be dealt + with before there could be any easing of Morocco-Algeria tensions.” + Johnstone commented that + Belkheir “appeared + convinced that Hassan’s recent dealings with the UNSYG had turned up a new, albeit + tenuous, element of flexibility.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870561–0463, + D870548–0821, D870206–0787) I continue to take a personal + interest in this issueSee footnote 2, Document 443. and am + hopeful that a way might be found to restore peace to the Western Sahara + in a manner that advances the interests of Algeria and Morocco and which takes into account the + legitimate interests of the people directly concerned.

+

I have asked Ambassador Johnstone + to explore further with you and your government any ideas you may have + on the possibilities of beginning a process which could lead toward + peace in the Sahara. I look forward to hearing your views. For my part, + I am prepared to continue to play a role in helping develop this process + if, in my judgment, there would appear to be a reasonable prospect of + success.

+

With best wishes,Bush also wrote: “& + Respects!” after “With best wishes.”

+

Sincerely,

+ George + Bush +
+
+ 448. Telegram 113526 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, Morocco 1982–1990, [text not + declassified]. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. 1 page not + declassified. + + + Washington, April 15, 1987, 2034Z + + +

 

+
+
+ 449. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + African Affairs (Crocker) to the + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Morocco + 1982–1990. Secret; Sensitive; [handling + restriction not declassified]. 3 + pages not declassified. + + + Washington, April 27, 1987 + + +

 

+ + + Tab A + Telegram 1486 From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + State + + + Nouakchott, April 7, 1987 + + +

[Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not + declassified]. 2 pages not declassified.]

+ + + Tab B + Telegram 107160 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Mauritania + + + Washington, April 9, 1987 + + +

[Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not + declassified]. 1 page not declassified.]

+ +
+
+ 450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Belgium + and FranceSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D870356–0048. Confidential. Sent for information to Brussels and + Paris. Drafted by Fisher; approved by Zweifel. A repeat of telegram 139837 to Rabat and + Algiers, May 8. + + 139837. + + Washington, May 18, 1987, 2328Z + + +

The following State 139837 8 May 87 sent action Rabat Algiers info + Nouakchott Tunis Riyadh being repeated for your info.

+

Quote: 139837. Subject: Washington Readouts on 5/4 Maghreb Summit.

+ + + C—Entire text. + + Summary: NEA/DAS Ussery + invited resident Ambassadors from Algeria and Morocco for separate + conversations aimed at their initial impressions of 5/4 Maghreb + SummitFor more on the Maghreb + Summit between Bendjedid + and Hassan, which took place on May 4, see footnote 4, Document 78. and what that might + portend for + developments in Western Sahara. Sahnoun of Algeria (stating he had talked to + Belkheir) gave + essentially downbeat assessment, although he stressed that this was + not a failure since “psychologically” it had defused tense + situation. Bargach of Morocco + took opportunity to make impassioned appeal for unequivocal USG support for GOM’s position on Western Sahara. End + summary. + + During 5/6 conversation, Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun said that GOA had been disappointed with summit. + Through King Fahd, Algerians had anticipated that Hassan would bring + “something new” to discuss on Western Sahara, drawing on last + bilateral summit (2/83) and subsequent GOA “plan” presented in early 1985. Instead, Hassan had + avoided almost all discussion of Western Sahara, sticking to + previous positions. GOA more + convinced than ever that Moroccans are intent on military solution + to conflict. + + Even though brief summit was “politically sterile”, it was not a + total failure in GOA assessment. + “Psychologically” it helped defuse building tensions. Fact that this + was first time these two leaders had agreed on joint + communiqué—albeit bland—was significant. Sahnoun also pointed out that Hassan and Bendjedid had been stiff at outset, + just shaking hands; at conclusion, two embraced. Although there is + no precise format or timing, Sahnoun anticipates that GOA and GOM FonMins + will have follow-on discussions at an early date. + + Sahnoun expressed view that + Fahd’s principal purpose in meeting with Maghreb leaders was to + press for Arab League summit. Sahnoun believes that lack of progress on Western + Sahara does not necessarily forestall that meeting. In replying to + inquiry about Bendjedid’s + recent visit to Mauritania, Sahnoun replied that this had been to reassure + GIRM of GOA support—especially + economic. + + On 5/7, Moroccan Ambassador Bargach said that he had no direct feedback yet on + summit. He observed that resolution of a major problem is not + possible in one and one half hours’ of meetings in two segments. + Most significant item is that summit took place at all. Hassan has + always wanted dialogue with Algeria on Western Sahara issue, + believing that this is fundamentally an issue to be solved + politically between Algeria and Morocco. Bargach also noted that issuance of joint communiqué + pointing to further contacts is positive. + + Concerning Mauritania, Bargach on several occasions referred to GOM’s strong support for its + territorial integrity and pointed to Moroccan restraint in not + exercising its “right” to hot pursuit of Polisario forces which + attack through, then seek refuge in Mauritania. He said that + Mauritanians were irritated by GOA + offer of support which GIRM felt + it did not need. What Mauritanians want is GOA action to prevent Polisario forces in Algeria from + crossing the Mauritanian frontier. + + + Amb. Bargach then launched + into lengthy, impassioned review of history of Western Sahara + problem, point of which was to press hard for unequivocal USG support for Moroccan positions. + Following were points stressed: + + Settlement can only come from agreement between Morocco + and Algeria. + + American neutrality in the conflict actually supports + Algeria’s position. + + Polisario is creation of GOA, and Algerian claims of not being able to + negotiate for Polisario are a pretext. + + Conversely, SDAR + statement at time of summit (that GOA could not speak for it) is evidence that + Polisario now is a challenge, destabilizing factor in + internal Algerian politics. + + GOM has long supported a + referendum and will respect results thereof. But Moroccans + will “never” agree to independent state in Western Sahara or + relinquish Moroccan claims thereto. + + Algeria which had originally proposed referendum now + opposes it. + + Continuation of the war opens avenues for the Soviets, + Iranians and Libyans to exercise greater influence. + + If Western Sahara were to become independent, Soviets + would have ports/bases there within two months. + + Only “legitimate” governments in Africa are Morocco, Ivory + Coast, Senegal. All others came into being through irregular + processes. + + Lack of U.S. support on the Western Sahara and continued + low levels of military and economic assistance are raising + questions among Moroccans about value of our bilateral + relationship. + + Economic benefits of a negotiated settlement for all + Maghreb countries. + + + Throughout, Bargach + appeared frustrated by lack of success at efforts for a political + settlement and what he saw as U.S. neutrality in a dispute involving + an old and close friend. + +

Whitehead

+

Unquote

+ Shultz +
+ +
+ 451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United Nations and the Embassy in EthiopiaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D870724–0059, D870599–0434. + Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Willett; cleared by + Thomas Benesch (AF/W), Zweifel, Crocker, Joseph Lake (S/S), William Haugh (S/S–O), David Kenney (P), and James Shinn (IO/UNP); approved by Smith. Sent for + information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to + Brazzaville, Cairo, Geneva, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, and + Rabat. + + 231651. + + Washington, July 28, 1987, 1509Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara: AS Crocker’s Meeting With UN Secretary General. + + + Ref: + A) USUN 2040;In telegram 2040 from USUN, July 21, the Mission reported that on July + 17, Diallo provided a + “readout” from De Cuéllar’s July 9–10 meetings in Geneva: + “Polisario is still refusing to cooperate with SYG plan to dispatch a UN technical team to the Western + Sahara. Secretariat officials now convinced that Algeria and + Polisario are tacitly opposing referendum because they do not + expect to win. Talks on dispatching the UN technical team will continue at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D870573–0315) + B) Addis Ababa 2909.In telegram 2909 + from Addis Ababa, July 22, the Embassy noted that the July 21 + session of the OAU Council of + Ministers “was highlighted” by the report of Secretary General + Oumarou, which touched on a number of “key issues.” Regarding + the Western Sahara, Oumarou “reported that the failures of + recent initiatives in Geneva and the ongoing violence in Western + Sahara provided ‘no hope’ for a rapid solution.” In addition, + “Morocco’s construction of a sixth defensive wall had escalated + tensions and threatened the tranquility and neutrality of + Mauritania.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D870582–0282) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + In a July 21 meeting on other subjects with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, + AS Crocker asked about the + status of UN efforts to mediate the + Western Sahara problem. The SYG + confirmed report in ref A that he would take the issue up with + Algerian President Bendjedid + and SDAR “President” Abdelaziz + at the forthcoming OAU Summit in + Addis Ababa.In telegram 3118 from Addis + Ababa, August 6, the Embassy reported that the OAU Summit and Council of + Ministers meeting “concluded July 30 without taking major new + steps on political issues such as Chad, Southern Africa or the + Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D870634–0042) He will also + discuss the Western Sahara with the new OAU Chairman, whoever that turns out to be. Meanwhile, + current OAU Chairman + Sassou-Nguessou is planning to present a report on the Western + Sahara at the Addis summit. + + The main problem, according to the SYG, revolves around the dispatch of a UN technical team to the area to assess + factors involved in implementation of a UN-sponsored ceasefire and + referendum. Though Morocco has agreed to facilitate the team’s work, + Polisario is seeking assurances that GOM is prepared to accept the consequences of such a referendum and to + respect it. In the SYG’s view, it + will not be easy to obtain such assurances. + + The SYG said he is considering + how to handle forthcoming meetings with Bendjedid and Abdelaziz. He hopes to convince them + that acceptance of the technical team does not, in and of itself, + entail acceptance of anything else. He noted the considerable + financial costs that the proposed ceasefire and referendum would + entail for the UN, and the “absolute + need” to assess these costs in advance through the sending of a + team. “We will try to persuade the Polisario not to be suspicious, + but I can’t ask the King to sign a promissory note.” The SYG said he would put + Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim Farah in charge of the team, if + it ever gets off the ground. + + Comment: There was an element of irritation towards Polisario on + the SYG’s part in his presentation + of the problems regarding the dispatch of a UN technical team. Department will be particularly + interested in whatever Embassy Addis can pick up in coming days, in + addition to ref. B, on the Western Sahara issue at the OAU Summit. + + Shultz +
+
+ 452. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ZambiaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N + number]. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House; + cleared by Larry Napper (AF/S), Waugh (S/S–O), Michael Klosson (S/S), and Green; approved by Chas Freeman (AF). The text of the telegram is also + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, + Southern Africa, 1985–1988. + + 327995. + + Washington, October 21, 1987, 1414Z + + + + SUBJECT + Memorandum of Conversation Covering the President’s Meeting With + President Kaunda. + +

1. S Entire text.

+

2. There follows memcon of the President’s meeting with President + Kaunda at the White House on + October 8, 1987.

+

Begin text:

+

Memorandum of Conversation

+ + SUBJECT + Meeting with President Kenneth + Kaunda of Zambia, October 8, 1987 + + + + Participants + The President + Secretary Shultz + Secretary Baker + Chief of Staff Howard + Baker + National Security Advisor Frank C. + Carlucci + Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth + Duberstein + Acting Administrator Jay Morris + Assistant Secretary Crocker + U.S. Amb. to Zambia Paul J. Hare + Herman J. Cohen, NSC + President Kenneth David Kaunda + Amb. Nalumino Mundia + Minister of Finance Gibson Chigaga + Minister of Foreign Affairs Luke J. Mwananshiku + Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs Henry + Meebelo + Special Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs J.C. + Mapoma + Special Assistant to the President for Press, Social, and Cultural + Affairs Naphy M. Nyalugwe + Roving Amb. Paul F.J. Lusaka + +

Date, Time, Place

+

October 8, 1987, 11:00 a.m.–1:40 p.m., Oval Office, Cabinet Room, + Residence (tete-a-tete—Oval Office)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+

Western Sahara Problem

+

Secretary Shultz asked President + Kaunda to give his view as + OAU Chairman of the Western Sahara + problem. The Secretary said that we talk to both Algeria and Morocco + about the issue and that we support the initiatives of the UN Secretary General. The problem, however, + seems to go on and on without any solution.

+

President Kaunda said that as + Chairman of the OAU, he has met with + President Bendjedid of Algeria + and President Azziz of the Saraoui republic (Polisario). He has not yet + met with King Hassan of Morocco who has not been available, mainly + because Morocco is not in the OAU, and + the King does not attend summit meetings. Kaunda said that the UN + Secretary General will be sending a technical team to collect data. + After that, we will have to figure out the next step. Kaunda said he asked the UN Secretary General to continue with his + present line which is to find out what the population was when the + Spanish gave up control of the Spanish Sahara. “Morocco has been + cheating by infiltrating Moroccan citizens to make sure any referendum + will result in Morocco winning control.

+

We must ask the original residents their opinion, not the Moroccans.” + Secretary Baker said that it + must be a very difficult problem to decide what is the right cutoff date for determining + population. Also, it is possible that the Polisario have also + infiltrated people into the territory. President Kaunda said that the UN technical report might be helpful in + this regard. King Hassan dragged his feet on the population count to the + point that it is a very difficult problem right now. He clearly wanted + to manipulate the data, President Kaunda said.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+ Armacost +
+
+ 453. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D871019–0603. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to + Tunis, Rabat, Paris, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Riyadh. + + 7560. + + Algiers, December 12, 1987, 1152Z + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara: Prospects and Policy. + + + + Secret—Entire text. + + We are impressed, but remain unpersuaded, by the general surge of + optimism on the prospects for settlement of the Sahara question + and/or an improvement in Algeria/Morocco relations. + + Our skepticism is rooted in the following fundamentals: + + Algeria is not about to abandon the Polisario. Even the + most moderate AL would + insist on a settlement which would include the return of the + Sahrawi refugees to the Western Sahara with some form of + local autonomy. + + There is no sign that Hassan is prepared to accept any + kind of compromise. His strategy is clearly designed to buy + time for the permanent implantation of the imported Moroccan + population in the Western Sahara. If, as is unlikely, the + Saharans are ever allowed back, it will be as a minority + group in a Moroccan Sahara with no special political status + as an indigenous people. + + A Moroccan-run referendum would be won by Morocco. A + referendum of the Saharan people would be won by the + Polisario. Hence, the two sides will never likely reach an + accord on terms for a referendum. + + + The 180,000 Moroccans now living in the Sahara are not + going to quietly allow Hassan to compromise their privileged + and dominant status for the sake of peace with the + Polisario. They certainly have no intention of giving the + Saharans political control even as an autonomous part of + Morocco. + + The U.N. process will eventually confront these realities + and will stall or be scuttled, probably by Morocco. (The + Algerians have the U.N. clout to shape the process their + way.) + + + The current round of optimism does not alter these fundamentals, + and therefore, we believe it is unlikely to yield lasting results. + The military balance in the Sahara will fluctuate depending on + tactical or weapons improvements by one side or the other. The + Morocco-Algeria relationship will also ebb and flow but will not + improve fundamentally as long as the Saharan war continues. + + As to U.S. policy, it will (and should) continue to be ambivalent + because: + + This is not a critical issue for the U.S. + + We would like to preserve good relations with both Morocco + and Algeria. Taking sides works to our disadvantage by + inviting the Soviets to play a greater role. + + We cannot support Moroccan absorption of the Sahara + without violating our own views on rights of + self-determination. + + We cannot support true self-determination without + destabilizing Morocco and risking the creation of a nuisance + mini-state. + + Playing it the way we have, we get our cake and eat it + too. The only price we pay is occasional Moroccan and + Algerian whining and a perpetual state of nervousness in + Mauritania. As desirable as it would be to see a settlement + of the conflict, this is beyond our reach. Given this, our + current policy is the best we can do. + + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 454. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880172–0245. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Tunis, + Rabat, Paris, Madrid, and Nouakchott. + + 1152. + + Algiers, February 29, 1988, 1253Z + + + + SUBJECT + Tunisian Mediation of Sahara Conflict. + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Tunisian Ambassador Abdelhamid Escheikh says that Tunis has + offered to use its good offices to help find a solution to Western + Sahara problem. According to him, the Algerians have agreed but + Rabat has yet to respond. + + Asked what Tunisia had in mind, Escheikh said that one possibility + was to create Saharan state out of that portion of Sahara which had + come under Mauritanian jurisdiction after Spanish withdrawal. + Escheikh noted that Mauritania had abandoned its claim to this + territory and Morocco had not claimed it. + + Ambassador Escheikh agreed that Polisario would find this an + inadequate solution, but he thought Polisario might accept such a + solution if they could leave open the possibility of further + negotiations with Morocco on northern portion of Sahara. + + Comment: We recall similar proposal being, floated some months ago + by Spanish official.Not further + identified. It looks somewhat farfetched but does have + some appeal in that Morocco ends up controlling only significant + portion of Sahara and Algeria is able to secure recognition of a + Saharan state. We would be interested in views of Embassy Rabat and + Nouakchott.No response from the + Embassy in Rabat has been found. In telegram 865 from + Nouakchott, March 2, the Embassy reported: “We take it as a + given that the GIRM would + welcome any reasonable effort at finding a negotiated solution + to the conflict.” The Embassy continued: “On the other hand, if + the Tunisians are trying to broker a solution around the idea of + creating a rump SDAR state + out of the abandoned GIRM + territorial claim to the southern third of the Western Sahara, + GIRM leaders would be + likely to view this possibility with very mixed feelings.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880692–0250, D880180–0670) During a March 28 + meeting, Mestiri told + Shultz: “Tunisia had tried to make an effort to resolve the + Western Sahara conflict, but all progress was stymied by Algeria + and Morocco. The UN Secretary + General seemed optimistic about his future visit.” (Telegram + 99606 to Tunis, March 31; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880274–0185) + + Johnstone +
+ +
+ 455. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + 1988 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D433, Exdis Documents for + March 1988. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon; Exdis. Drafted on + March 16 by Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA). + + + Washington, March 28, 1988 + + + + SUBJECT + Western Sahara: 1988 a Window of Opportunity + +

In the search for settlement of the Western Sahara dispute, 1988 could be + a window of opportunity.

+ + + The bottom-line objective for Algeria and Morocco is a sustainable + cessation of hostilities, but the process and exact terms of + settlement remain to be determined. + + Moroccan/Algerian negotiations are tied to broader North African + politics, including Algeria’s attempt to build a unified Maghreb, + and Morocco’s improving ties to Libya. + + Progress toward a settlement would benefit both Morocco’s King + Hassan and Algeria’s President Bendjedid, but might also create some frictions + between Hassan and his army. + + Polisario will be forced to follow any Algerian lead, although + some hard-liners may seek alternate aid and use of Mauritanian + territory in a futile effort to fight on. + + UN Secretary General Peres de Cuellar is trying to + develop a mechanism which assures Moroccan control of the Sahara + while allowing Algeria to save face.In + telegram 705 from USUN, March + 11, the Mission reported that de Cuéllar “plans early April trip + with OAU Chairman Kaunda to Morocco, Algeria and + Mauritania to nail down framework for referendum which would + then be presented for approval to OAU summit in May. Algerians are wary but appear + ready to cooperate.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880210–0858) + + While a Sahara settlement and greater Maghreb cooperation could + complicate US efforts to strengthen + its Maghreb presence and influence, it would enhance regional + stability and dilute Soviet influence. + +

If this window of opportunity is not opened, a new one may not appear for + some years. An analysis is attached.

+ + + Attachment + Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSecret; Noforn; + Nocontract; Orcon; Exdis. + + + Washington, undated + + +

WESTERN SAHARA: 1988 A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

+

Defining a Settlement. While a cessation of + hostilities is the end-goal, both the process and terms of a + settlement remain to be determined. Polisario has sought Saharan + independence. Morocco wants international legitimation of its + control of the territory, and an end to the threat from Polisario + forces in Algeria. But Morocco and Algeria are now committed to a + referendum—proceeded or followed by negotiations—which would let + Sahraouis choose independence, Moroccan rule, or a still undefined + alternative.

+

The Setting. The UN Secretary General is set to visit the Maghreb in + early April, four months after a UN + technical team’s visit. Faced with ongoing Saudi pressure to strike + a deal, President Bendjedid + and King Hassan could again meet, as they did in May 1987 in the + presence of King Fahd. Tunisia is also trying to mediate. Morocco + prefers to delink bilateral ties from the Sahara issue and move + toward detente, but Algiers argues detente is impossible until the + Sahara issue is resolved.

+

Algeria. A Sahara settlement (especially one + on Algerian terms) fits neatly into Bendjedid’s plans for reelection. He is fighting + old-guard opposition to his agenda for military professionalization, + political pluralization, greater openness to foreign technology and + capital, distancing from the Soviets, and detente and economic + cooperation with Morocco. His political battle will peak at the + December convention of the ruling FLN party, where he will likely be reelected + President.

+

Bendjedid could purge his + opponents, but would prefer to show the FLN progress on a Sahara settlement, along with an + economic upturn, and reintegration of Libya into an + Algerian-inspired Greater Maghreb. The first would reduce + expenditures on Polisario and on the Sahraoui refugee population, + which Algiers would like to see return to the Sahara. It would also + open the prospect of cooperation with Morocco, which many Algerians + see as economically complementary.

+

Bendjedid’s Sahara strategy entails some risks. He knows Hassan + cannot accept much less than sovereignty, nor grant Polisario much + more than a political sop. Polisario reaction is also unpredictable; + faced with Algerian + concessions to Morocco, its hard-liners could try to defy Algerian + constraints on Polisario military activity, or assert itself in + Mauritania. Also important, though probably manageable, is the + reaction of states which, under Algerian diplomatic pressure and + often at the cost of a rupture with Morocco, have recognized + Polisario.

+

Morocco. Hassan’s interests have changed + little since 1975, but he too is interested in a settlement. A + Sahara deal would open up several prospects: lessen diplomatic + isolation from much of the Third World; satisfy Saudi desire for + Algerian/Moroccan rapprochement, and erase a hindrance to enhanced + ties with the US and the EC, possibly leading to greater + economic and military aid. It might also reduce military costs: the + overall effect of military outlays is arguable, but any + redistribution of funds to increasingly unruly urban areas would + respond to growing domestic ills.

+

Nevertheless, while Hassan stresses commitment to a Saharan + referendum, he recognizes that the status quo has served him well. + The war gives the Moroccan military a raison d’etre and deflects its + interests from politics. And the pluralization which he granted in + return for partisan backing of the war enhances his international + image.

+

Hassan built, and subsequently expanded, a protective berm and + adopted a defensive strategy after 1981 military reverses. The berm + assures control of useful areas of the territory, while a relatively + static defense avoids embarrassing defeats. It also employs large + numbers of young men whose return would exacerbate Morocco’s + employment problems and create a serious new pool of discontent. As + long as he seems to be successfully asserting Morocco’s claim, the + war is a source of internal political strength.

+

Hassan has recently given mixed signals on willingness to make + concessions. Modifying a long-term position, he told the BBC that + Polisario, not Algeria, was Morocco’s opponent in the Sahara. He + later waffled, saying negotiations with the Sahraoui Democratic Arab + Republic (the Polisario’s political arm) would be possible only if + Polisario won a referendum in the territory. He has now dropped + references to negotiations with Polisario, although secret talks + take place sporadically.

+

Polisario. Polisario is well-armed and capable + of adapting to Moroccan defensive advances. It cannot defeat + Morocco, but believes it can fight a successful war of attrition. + Moderates know a referendum will probably be held and have tried to + influence determination of those who will have voting rights.

+

Some Polisario hard-liners advocate terrorism in Morocco, but it is + unlikely anyone in Polisario has responded to third-country offers + of aid, such as those from Iran. Such aid would be quickly blocked + by Algiers. Some Sahraouis think Bendjedid is moving toward compromise under Saudi and other + pressure. But Polisario will not soon risk a break with Algeria—its + primary source of financial, diplomatic, and logistic support—and + has little scope for independent operation in any case.

+

Libya. While Qadhafi may have given Polisario some aid in the + last eighteen months, he now sees support for Polisario as secondary + to the larger strategy of incrementally improved relations with his + Maghreb neighbors. Qadhafi + insists on union with Algeria, has renewed ties to Tunisia, and uses + links to Morocco to counter Algerian influence.

+

After promising Morocco financial aid (and, according to unconfirmed + Libyan assertions military aid as well), Qadhafi is pushing Hassan to reactivate union as + provided for by the 1984 Oujda Accord. Like Tunisia, he has offered + to mediate between Morocco and Polisario. It is unlikely Qadhafi will play any direct role + in the Sahara negotiations, but his rapprochement with Morocco might + sap Algeria’s confidence and enhance Morocco’s bargaining + leverage.

+

Saudi Interest. King Fahd’s 1987 talks with + Hassan and Bendjedid gave + major impetus to current Sahara negotiations. Fahd has not been as + directly engaged recently, but still clearly wishes a reduction in + Maghreb tension. Riyadh believes a mechanism must be found to + integrate the Sahara into Morocco, give Sahraouis special status, + and help Algeria save face.

+

Polisario thinks Saudi financial aid is now a major determinant in + Algeria’s Sahara policy. This is implausible; even in Morocco, where + the Saudi financial contribution is considerably more significant, + Saudi pressure is only one influence on Western Sahara policy.

+

The UN. + Algiers and Rabat agree in principle on a UN framework for a settlement, and know UN-brokered + negotiations and/or referendum could allow Rabat to soften demands + slightly, and allow Algiers to make concessions while saving face. + Determining Sahraoui population and voting rights is a problem, but + Perez de Cuellar, Rabat, and Algiers would accept a Spanish role in + interpreting census figures from the colonial period. Other thorny + questions include disposition of Morocco’s army and administration + during a referendum. Polisario wants both removed. Hassan will draw + troops back to barracks, but wants to retain Moroccan civil + authorities.

+

Perez de Cuellar will reportedly present Hassan written proposals for + significant Moroccan troop reductions (from the present 120,000 down + to 25,000, to be joined by a UN + supervisory force of 10–12,000), and a restricted role for the + Moroccan civil administration. Algeria (and Mauritania) would agree + that Polisario forces be confined to their bases and subject to + verification and control by the UN + force. The Moroccans have rejected similar recent suggestions by + OAU Chairman Kaunda.

+

Prospects. Algeria clearly considers 1988 a + year to make a deal and will try to press Rabat intensively while + preparing for concessions. + Hassan has a narrow margin of maneuver, however, and may fear + backlash from the military, opportunistic politicians, and Moroccan + settlers in the Sahara. He could yet prove unwilling to make the + diplomatic gestures necessary to give Algeria an honorable way to + abandon the Saharan war.

+

The 1988 window of opportunity is created largely by Bendjedid’s internal political + ambitions. Although Bendjedid + could be bolstered by the December FLN Congress, his immediate incentive for a deal with + Morocco will dissipate, and settlement will become more difficult by + early 1989. The next readily apparent window will not open until + after 1992, when EC limits on + Maghreb imports sharpen Maghreb economic problems and intensify the + need for a unified Maghreb economic strategy.

+

US/Soviet Stakes. Resolution of the Sahara + conflict would be a clear plus for US interests, helping both Morocco and, Algeria + economically and removing a contentious issue which the US has felt itself obliged to straddle + diplomatically. It would reduce tensions and help assure North + African stability.

+

To the extent such a settlement, leads to movement toward expanded + regional cooperation and a Maghreb point of view on economics, the + Middle East, or Mediterranean security, US diplomacy in the Maghreb could become more complex. + Algerian and Libyan views may influence the thinking of pro-Western + Morocco and Tunisia, and be influenced in turn. Successful Maghreb + cooperation would further dilute Soviet influence in Algeria and + perhaps in Libya, giving the US an + overall net gain.

+ +
+ +
+ 456. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880440–0511. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Rabat, + Tunis, Casablanca, Cairo, Nouakchott, Riyadh, Kuwait City, Paris, + London, Abu Dhabi, and USUN. + + 2909. + + Algiers, May 22, 1988, 1229Z + + + + SUBJECT + Algeria, Morocco, and the SADR: What You See Is What You Get. + + + Refs: + (A) Rabat 4850;In telegram 4850 from + Rabat, May 17, the Embassy reported: “The decision of King + Hassan and President Bendjedid to restore diplomatic relations is a + major step forward, for which the Saudis and we can take some + credit.” See Document 88. + (B) Algiers 2862;In telegram 2862 + from Algiers, May 17, the Embassy reported: “GOA-controlled + media have hailed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations + between Algeria and Morocco as a positive step toward creation + of greater Arab Maghreb unity and toward a peaceful solution of + the Western Sahara conflict.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880424–0541) + (C) Algiers 2852.In telegram 2852 + from Algiers, May 16, the Embassy reported: “Algeria and Morocco + have apparently agreed to restore diplomatic relations following + Bendjedid’s meeting + with Moroccan envoys.” The Embassy further noted: “The Algerians + until now had insisted that progress toward settlement of the + Western Sahara be a prerequisite for re-establishing relations. + This latest step means either that the two sides have made + progress or that the Algerians have dropped their condition. + Nothing we have seen recently,” the Embassy continued, “would + suggest that either side has compromised its basic positions.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880421–0355) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + The restoration of Algerian-Moroccan relations has left unanswered + the question of Algeria’s intentions toward the Sahrawis. Although + the Algerians have continued to make public statements of support + for the SADR,In telegram 2989 from Algiers, May 26, the + Embassy commented: “The Algerians appear to have put Polisario + on the shelf for the sake of broader Maghreb goals and domestic + political reasons.” The Embassy continued: “Thus they have moved + from costly support of a liberation movement to support of + regional economic integration and Arab solidarity, both of which + promise economic benefits for Algeria that support for the + Polisario could never provide.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880451–0826) + there is nothing to suggest that the Moroccans committed themselves + to anything beyond the “legal and free referendum” mentioned in the + joint communiqué. We note, for example, Basri’s statement (ref A) that agreement contained + no more than the public language and that it would take a year to + resolve the Saharan conflict. In other words, there is no settlement + of the war included in the new bilateral agreement. + + The Algerian press has balanced its enthusiasm for restoration + with gentle reminders that Algeria still supports the SADR and still hopes to see direct talks between it + and Morocco.In telegram 2340 from + Nouakchott, June 6, the Embassy reported: “According to + Mauritanian military and other sources, the Polisario leadership + in Tindouf is reacting gamely to the resumption of diplomatic + ties between Algiers and Rabat, saying that it will not hinder + their struggle. Significant numbers of Polisario rank and file, + however, apparently believe that the restoration of diplomatic + relations signifies that Algeria is abandoning the Polisario + cause.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + Electronic Telegrams, D880480–0473) The public reaction, + however, is even more positive and uncomplicated. Algerians we have + talked with have said, “it’s about time. We should have done it + years ago.” Although no one expects that the restoration will bring + an immediate improvement in availability of consumer goods (the + first priority of all Algerians), those we spoke with hope that + Algeria, free from the need to be hostile to Morocco, can devote + itself to solving its stubborn internal economic and social + problems. Of course, many Algerians are already asking about + traveling to Morocco. + + Why have the Algerians apparently abandoned a long-held position + and accepted the Moroccan urgings that improving bilateral relations + should proceed separately from the issue of the Western Sahara? + There are two reasons, one domestic and one foreign. On the domestic + front, the Algerians had already signaled their desire to settle + regional disputes in order to concentrate on internal economic + reforms. Bendjedid had + inherited the Western Sahara problem from his predecessor. His + willingness to put it aside and settle with Rabat is a sign of + confidence at home, that his reform program is moving ahead, and + that opposition to it is weak and disorganized. + + On the foreign front, Algerian policy has always moved in multiple + spheres: Third World, Nonaligned, African, Islamic, Maghrebian and + Arab. This latest move represents the Arab and Maghrebian spheres + taking priority over Africa and the Third World. With the coming + Arab Summit and with the new situation in the occupied territories, + Algeria must refurbish its Arab credentials. The Western Sahara + never was an Arab cause. On the contrary, it divided Arab states and + created ill will toward Algeria from both Morocco and her (rich) + Arab friends. Algeria has staked considerable prestige on hosting an + Arab summit with high-level attendance, and reconciliation with + Rabat may bring not only King Hassan but other Arab Kings, Amirs and + Presidents to Algiers in June. + + After the March setback to Algeria’s “eastern” Grand Maghreb + efforts, Algeria did not want another diplomatic defeat. Checked by + the Libyans, Algeria can now proceed with its “grand Maghreb + strategy” (in partnership) with Morocco, the only other regional + state that can match Algeria’s weight and influence, inside the tent + rather than out. + + Brayshaw +
+ +
+ 457. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Whitehead to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, President’s + Evening Reading July–September 1988. Secret. + + + Washington, August 31, 1988 + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

+

3. Western Sahara Mediation. The UN has announced that Morocco and the + Polisario Front have agreed in principle to a UN plan to end their 13-year dispute over the Western + Sahara.In telegram 9578 from Geneva, + August 29, the Mission reported the details of the UN plan. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880762–0037) The + UN plans a ceasefire and + demilitarization of the territory as a prelude to a referendum on the + political future of the Saharan people. The UN will seek to move promptly, but contentious issues + remain unresolved, including Moroccan military and civil presence in the + Sahara, establishment of a voter list, and the Polisario’s demand for + direct negotiations with Morocco. We have supported the UN’s efforts over the past year to find a + peaceful resolution to this dispute.

+
+
+ 458. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MoroccoSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880885–0598. Secret; Immediate, Exdis. Drafted and approved by + Crocker; cleared by Casey + and Jim McVerry (S/S–O). Sent for + information Priority to Algiers. + + 325045. + + Washington, October 5, 1988, 0046Z + + +

For Chargé from Crocker. Subject: + My Exchange With King Hassan on the Western Sahara.

+ + + (S—Entire text) + + Herewith is my report of the salient points that emerged on the + Western Sahara during my one-on-one with King Hassan on October 2. + Generally, Hassan took a line consistent with what we had heard from + Foreign Ministry State + Secretary Cherkaoui.In telegram 9690 from Rabat, October 3, + the Embassy reported that in an October 1 conversation with the + Embassy political officer, Cherkaoui indicated: “The outcome in the Fourth + Committee was not only a crucial test of Algerian intentions, + but would prefigure results of the December FLN Congress—i.e., whether + Bendjedid could + assert his authority, take out the hardliners, and end of the + influence of the MFA, which had + always opposed normalization.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880880–0718) + I opened the topic by indicating our support for UNSYG Perez de Cuellar’s diplomatic + initiative and our hopes that the optimistic noises we were hearing + are based on reality. I then asked Hassan how he viewed the UN process and how he assessed Algerian + decision-making on the unresolved issues. + + Hassan responded warmly to our support for the diplomatic process + and expressed confidence in Perez de Cuellar’s efforts. He made it + clear that, from the Moroccan perspective, the ball lies in the + Algerian court and that he doesn’t expect a basic decision that + would nail down an agreement before the Algerian Party Congress in + December. Continuing, Hassan stressed his belief that President + Bendjedid is fully + committed to Maghrebian rapprochement across the board, including + such fields as economic cooperation, opening of borders, the + construction of a regional political framework and a Saharan + solution. Hassan spoke enthusiastically, for example, about the + impact on Algerian public opinion of first-hand experience by + hundreds of thousands of Algerians who had visited Morocco recently + and witnessed its relative prosperity. That said, he strongly + implied that Bendjedid had + further homework to do in his own ranks before the next formulas + would emerge to assuring a pre-cooked outcome of a Saharan + referendum. + + In response to my blunt question as to whether time was on + Morocco’s side in this matter, Hassan said it was, and he indicated + that there were no deadlines that had to be kept. In sum, if takes a + few months for outstanding issues to be clarified and for Bendjedid to sell some face-saving + formula to his colleagues, that is acceptable to Morocco. + + In informal conversations, Cherkaoui expanded on Hassan’s thinking by stressing + that the principal obstacle to necessary Algerian compromises lies + in certain unspecified party hardliners and especially in the + Algerian Foreign Ministry, which has acquired a long-standing vested + interest in the all-or-nothing diplomacy of backing the SDAR’s cause. Cherkaoui repeated well-known + Moroccan positions to the effect that the removal of Morocco’s + military presence and civil administration during the settlement + process was out of the question. As to the prospects for a UN resolution in the Fourth Committee, + Hassan and Cherkaoui both + felt that a polarizing resolution could be avoided. Cherkaoui was reluctant to see an + Algerian hand in supporting extreme Polisario language in New York. Hassan claimed + there was evidence of Cuban support for a confrontation in the + UN. + + Overall, Hassan left me with the clear impression that he is + relaxed and confident about the course of events about the Maghreb + generally and the Sahara question specifically. He added with a + smile that global events favored our common interests in the region + and that, in any case, one had to be an optimist when dealing with + the affairs of state. + + Whitehead +
+
+ 459. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D881001–0504. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, + Bamako, Dakar, Paris, and Rabat. + + 4844. + + Nouakchott, November 10, 1988, 1212Z + + + + SUBJECT + President Taya Opposed + to Western Sahara Settlement. + + + Ref: + (A) Nouakchott 3969;In telegram 3969 + from Nouakchott, September 19, the Embassy reported: “According + to the French DCM in + Nouakchott, President Taya sent a personal message to President + Mitterrand expressing + the GIRM’s concern about the + possible impact on Mauritania of a settlement of the Western + Sahara War. Taya fears + that a hard core of Sahrawi insurgents might continue its + struggle against Morocco from Northern Mauritania. He also fears + that Polisario followers of Mauritanian origin might return to + Mauritania and destabilize the GIRM.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, + D880832–0377) + (B) Nouakchott 2952.In telegram 2952 + from Nouakchott, July 17, the Embassy reported: “According to + the French DCM in Nouakchott, + the GIRM has made clear to the + French that it fears part of the Polisario might move to + Mauritania in the event of a Western Sahara settlement.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic + Telegrams, D880613–0099) + + + + Confidential—Entire text. + + Summary: [less than 1 line not + declassified] Mauritanian Chief of Staff Minnih confided that President + Taya is worried that a + rapprochement may be underway between Morocco and the + Polisario.In telegram 10922 from + Rabat, November 8, the Embassy reported: “In his Green March Anniversary address + to the nation, November 6, King Hassan at once reaffirmed the + validity and inalienability of Morocco’s claim to the Western + Sahara and issued a call to the Polisario for reconciliation + with Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, Electronic Telegrams, D880993–0926) The Green March was a 1975 + demonstration organized by the Government of Morocco designed to + force Spain to withdraw from the Western Sahara. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents + on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 99–104, 107, 108, 110, 111, and 114. + Minnih + stated that the President + had asked him whether Mauritania should attempt to derail this + incipient rapprochement, which Taya believes would be inimical to Mauritanian + interests. Minnih reportedly + replied that Morocco and the Polisario are unlikely to reach a + lasting agreement and recommended that the GIRM let the current U.N. peace initiative fail on its + own. End summary. + + In a lengthy, private conversation during the week of October 30th + [less than 1 line declassified] + Mauritanian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ahmed Ould Minnih reportedly said the President + periodically consulted him about the Western Sahara conflict. The + President believes Minnih + possesses a good understanding of the protagonists as a result of + his tenure as Foreign Minister (1980–1986) and his earlier service + as military attaché in Algeria. Minnih stated that the President is worried that a + rapprochement might be underway between Morocco and the Polisario, a + development he believes would be inimical to Mauritanian interests. + The President recently asked Minnih whether he thought the GIRM should try to derail this + incipient rapprochement. Minnih said he replied that Morocco and the + Polisario are unlikely to reach a lasting agreement. He predicted + that the current U.N. peace initiative will fail on its own and + therefore recommended that the GIRM, simply let events follow their natural course. + Minnih reportedly told + our contact that Taya does + not want the conflict to end, since the war is the justification the + Mauritanian military uses to remain in power. + + Comment: We have received several indications in the past few + months that Taya is + worried about the impact on Mauritania of an eventual peaceful + resolution of the Sahara war. In September 1988 he sent a personal + emissary to French President Mitterrand to express this concern. The emissary + conveyed, in particular, Taya’s fear that a peaceful settlement might trigger + an influx of radical Sahrawis into Mauritania, who could threaten + GIRM, stability (refs A and + B). Minnih’s comments + confirm that Taya’s + concern indeed runs deep—although the Chief of Staff apparently + believes this concern has more to do with a selfish desire to keep + the military in power than with larger considerations of + Mauritania’s national interest. We cannot tell whether this + interpretation is accurate. [less than 1 line + declassified] the Chief of Staff is convinced that + Mauritania’s successive military governments have failed and for + that reason he favors a return to civilian rule. This jaundiced view + of military rule might account for Minnih’s cynical interpretation of Taya’s motivations. But + regardless of whether Minnih + is right or wrong about the President’s motives, this swipe at + Taya is nonetheless + significant. It is the first indication we have that Minnih’s support for the President + may be less than wholehearted. End comment. + + Twaddell +
+
+
+ + + +