A Python implementation to compute allocations and payoffs for Auctions using VCG mechanism. Part 2 analyses Seller revenues for second price auctions when the bidder valuations are IID drawn from [0,1]
This file needs Python 3.x and the following Python libraries: numpy, ipython, itertools, Math, Pandas, Decimal, ipywidget
Execute the first cell and complete the html form generated. Scale the valuations if needed and pass the values to the rest of the module by clicking on 'Set Values' Now simply execute each cell sequentially, one after the other. The cells are simply used to structure the code in a modular format.
In this part we simply look at theoretical and experimental results showing the seller's revenue where the bidder's valuations are Independently and Identically drawn random variables from [0,1] Running the cells sequentially would show the outcomes for bidding involving different number of players and reserve price Note that the main cell takes some time to run the progress of which is displayed using a progress bar.