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Avoid duplicated signatures when building transactions #4230
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Codecov ReportAttention: Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #4230 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 74.59% 74.60% +0.01%
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Files 342 342
Lines 108724 108792 +68
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+ Hits 81101 81169 +68
Misses 27623 27623 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. |
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While the overall approach taken here to avoid duplicate signatures makes sense, checking whether Authorization
sections are duplicates after they have been produced (by checking structural equality) seems less robust than not producing duplicates in the first place. But perhaps this (situation where a signing process is redundantly being done twice) is unavoidable...
crates/sdk/src/signing.rs
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.iter() | ||
.all(|pubkey| other.public_keys.contains(pubkey)) | ||
.all(|pubkey| other_public_keys.contains(pubkey)) |
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Doesn't this code only prove that public_keys
is a subset of other_public_keys
? Imagine that public_keys = vec![x, x, y, y]
and other_public_keys = vec![w,x,y,z]
, wouldn't this logic conclude that public_keys
and other_public_keys
are equivalent (because both vectors have the same length and all the elements of the former are contained in the latter)?
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You're right! I tried a different approach in fa5bdbf
crates/tx/src/section.rs
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// target(s) and the signatures match ,regardless of how the signer is | ||
// expressed | ||
|
||
// Check equivalence of the targets ignoring the specific ordering |
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Doesn't this code only prove that targets
is a subset of other_targets
? Imagine that targets = vec![x, x, y, y]
and other_targets = vec![w,x,y,z]
, wouldn't this logic conclude that targets
and other_targets
are equivalent (because both vectors have the same length and all the elements of the former are contained in the latter)?
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Same as above, thanks!
signatures: other_signatures, | ||
} = other; | ||
|
||
// Two authorizations are equal when they are computed over the same |
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This definition could work. But it has the implication that if Authorization::signer
contains the variant Signer::PubKeys
and someone tampers with one of the public keys in that list so that Authorization::verify_signature
can no longer pass, this PartialEq
implementation would still say that the tampered instance is still equal to the original. No? If so, is this desirable?
Also, given that this function defines a partial equivalence relation, I guess false
should be returned in those cases where there is insufficient information to check/conclude equality of the signers? No?
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That's correct. The representation of the signer being different in the duplicated authorizations I could see on mainnet was the drive to modify this trait implementation. My reasoning was that once we establish the equality of the signature's targets and of the signatures themselves we can safely consider the two Authorization
s to be the same even if the signers are expressed differently. In case of the signers being straight different (which would cause one of the two instances to fail the signature verification check) I believe we are looking at something else than just equality: I guess one should check the integrity of the sections at the byte level using a digest or similar techniques (see also my answer to your next question since it's related to this one)
@@ -442,6 +441,39 @@ pub struct Authorization { | |||
pub signatures: BTreeMap<u8, common::Signature>, | |||
} | |||
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impl PartialEq for Authorization { | |||
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { |
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Does it matter that partially equivalent Authorization
s might not have the same cryptographic hash? Or is this impossible? Could this sort of definition of partial equality confuse people in the future? (This definition seems to be calculated specifically to deal with our duplicate signatures issue (no?), but could be unintuitive in other cases/situations...)
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I don't believe PartialEq
should guarantee a byte-level match between the two instances but rather a logical equivalence (as I said in the previous question, when safety is critical one should explicitly rely on the digest of the expected instance).
I do see your point on this implementation being potentially confusing in other situations: I could try to reintroduce the check on the signer with a more refined logic. My only concern is the case when a multisig signer is expressed as a set of keys in one instance and as an address in the other one: in this case there's no way I can resolve the equivalence without a query to storage (but there's a chance we always express multisig signers as a set of keys which would solve this issue).
An alternative could be to come up with a different function for this comparison and restore the previous implementation of PartialEq
(net of ignoring the order of the set of keys which I think is a required update regardless).
We already try to filter duplicated instanced of |
Describe your changes
Closes #4203.
This PR modifies adds a new method on the
Tx
type to remove duplicated sections. This function is then called in the signing function before producing the wrapper signature (which is computed on all the sections) and thedump_tx
function (in case the dumped tx needed to be signed offline).To support this logic the
PartialEq
implementation for theAuthorization
type is now manually provided and ignores the way the signer is specified, focusing instead on the targets and the actual signature.As a side note, also the
PartialEq
implementation forSigningTxData
has been updated to account for the shielded hash.Checklist before merging
breaking::
labelsnamada-docs
reponamada-indexer
ornamada-masp-indexer
, a corresponding PR is opened in that repo